The role of the office of the auditor general of South Africa in enhancing sound public financial management, with special reference to the Eastern Cape Province.

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Date

2016

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University of Fort Hare

Abstract

The 1996 Constitution of South Africa and the Public Audit Act of 2004 provide the legislative framework for the Office of the Auditor General of South Africa (OAGSA). The Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors further enriched the interpretation of the framework – for government auditing. Over the years of democratic rule in South Africa, audit performance by State organs was generally poor. Despite the efforts by the OAGSA to improve the performance, very little improvement was notable. Most disturbing was the observation that there was widespread, a prevalence of recurring findings, which indicated that the OAGSA’s recommendations and guidelines were not acted upon, or largely ignored. Firstly, the research study established that the system of capitalist democracy, which comes in different varieties throughout world democracies, indeed brought about a situation where the electorate was effectively removed from its rightful place of being the principal, and had its place taken up by political parties (which are in fact, agents) - which (parties) governed on its (the electorate’s) behalf. This system, taken together with the Principal Agency and the Rational Choice Theories – fully explained the prevalence of maladministration and malfeasance in government in South Africa. Secondly, the study established that the OAGSA has done everything imaginable in its attempts to improve audit performance in government institutions – using the carrot rather than the stick approach. The legislative framework cited above, revealed that the OAGSA has the power to audit and report, while Parliament has the power to enforce corrective action. The lesson of this revelation is: that there is not much that the OAGSA can achieve without a high level of cooperation between itself and Parliament – if audit performance is to be effectively, and appreciably improved in South Africa. A disappointing discovery however was indirectly delivered to the world, through the results of a research study conducted by one Wehner in 2002, on Public Accounts Committees (PACs) (alias Standing Committees on Public Accounts (SCOPAs)) in world democracies. The Wehner study clearly demonstrated that there was nothing contained in these committees’ founding documents or enabling legislation – which in no uncertain terms, directed the committees on what procedures and processes to follow to ensure that their resolutions were acted upon. In other words there was no enforcement mechanism discernible for their resolutions. Thirdly, there were developments in case law in South Africa, which augured well for Constitutional Institutions in general. They are contained in court judgements relating to the mandate of the Office of the Public Protector (OPP). The question at the core of these developments was: whether the decisions or remedial action emanating from the OPP, were binding and enforceable. Two judgements cited as cases in point, one a High Court judgment and another a Supreme Court of Appeal’s (SCA’s), feature in the research report. The SCA, in summary found that decisions of administrative bodies of State – stand in fact and in law, until such time that a court of law invalidates them. The SCA ruled through citing a High Court judgement passed way back in 2004 - that Constitutional Institutions, although not organs of State per se – were certainly included in this 2004 finding, if one considers the rationale of this initial finding, taken together with the purpose for which Constitutional Institutions were established in South Africa in the first place. In conclusion, although visible root causes of poor audit findings appear overall to be poor consequence management and questionable leadership quality in government, the system of capitalist democracy is ultimately to blame. The system certainly had unintended consequences.

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