

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTUALITY



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Together in Excellence

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ERRATA

Page 10, line 13 For " proposition " read " propositions "

Page 94 footnote For " Gcgenwart " read " Gegenwart "

Page 94 last quotation line 44 listed as " 1 " should read " 4 "

Page 94 insert footnote 4 " ibid. p. 572 "

Page 95, line 2 For " 2 " read " 1 "

Page 95, line 15 For " 3 " read " 2 "

Page 95 footnote 2 to be omitted

footnote " 3 " should read " 2 "

Page 120, line 1 For " out " read " our "

Page 133, line 43 For " vertues " read " vertus "

Page 145, footnote 2 For " col " read " colony "

Page 157, footnote For " Doyeweerd's " read " Dooyeweerd's "

Page 162, line 28 For " unti " read " until "

Page 179, footnote For " idoology " read " ideology "

Page 187, line 44 For " uture " read " future "

Page 189, line 40 For " builtt " read " built "

The Philosophy of Actuality

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
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FOREWORD

The philosophy expounded by Dr. Rauche in this book may well be said to take its key from a statement by F. H. Heinemann in his *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, which runs: '... in times of crisis philosophies become expressions of the predicament of the age.' In fact there is always some crisis in the life of the individual; at times the crisis is so great that it can truly be said to face an entire age.

Dr. Rauche is free with the word 'crisis' and understandably so, because he has experienced it in its most intense forms in war, in life behind the Iron Curtain, and in South Africa, in which country he has had particular experience in the higher education of Africans. Then, pervading all, is the general crisis associated with the development of nuclear weapons. Dr. Rauche is therefore an individual philosopher drawn to face and consider the actual as he has met it.

The influence of Eberhard Grisebach upon him is important, though naturally he does not go all the way with Grisebach. In terms of academic philosophies he finds that he must return to Kant's intermediary stage and then refuse to follow Kant and the post-Kantians in their seductive attempts at constructive reconciliations. That follows from the view that absolutes and unifications, the resolution of dualism, are more the concern of theology than of philosophy. When philosophies attempt seriously to explain what are in fact irreconcilables, they are in grave danger of finding that instead of explaining them they have explained them away, and that process certainly solves no problems.

Actuality, the true field of philosophy, stops at the recognition of contradictions; if it attempts to go beyond them and to reconcile the contradictions it ceases to be philosophy, or at least the philosophy of actuality. That is why no epistemologist can really quarrel with such dicta as: 'The transcendent is inaccessible to my reason or will, it is not at my disposal,' and 'The taking as absolute of a self-constructed world is the fundamental error.' The culmination is in the recapitulation to the effect that: 'The real in its absolute form, therefore, is completely inaccessible to man.' Such an epistemology, by necessity, becomes ethics, according to which the 'ought' is no longer constituted by some absolute, but by the actual relation or contradictoriness existing between man and fellowman.

Naturally this conclusion has its bearing upon the form of the book, which is not unified or systematic but an examination of particular problems of actuality, using the critical apparatus provided by this epistemology. One emphasis is upon aspects of the South African situation, but it is obvious that the method can be extended to other

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situations in which the philosopher feels he should apply his critical faculty. When used, it promises to give a new and sharper view to much that has become obscured because it has had the light of the metaphysical rather than of the critical playing upon it.

ELDRED GREEN.

1963.



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PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE NATURE OF ACTUALITY

When we speak of actuality, we must clearly distinguish it from reality. The latter is in the last instance a metaphysical concept ; for what we mean by it is the world as it exists independently of our perception. This, however, is precisely what we do not know, and it is in this sense that the world or reality is transcendent. What we do know is the world as we see it or rather how we build it. For to know the world means to arrange our chaotic surroundings in such a way that they become meaningful and familiar to us. To know the world is therefore to build it, so that we can live in it. It then becomes *our* world, i.e., we are part of it and it is part of us. We never know the world as it exists away from us, so that our actions do not really affect it, but we know it by building it. Hence knowing is identical with becoming or acting. It follows that knowledge does not in the first instance depend on a certain method, inductive or deductive, empirical or rational, scientific or historic. Its primary source is not man's reason, but the experience of a chaotic and ever changing world, which reason in vain attempts to tame for good, so that man's perpetual dream be fulfilled, namely, to overcome the nothing and to be something. Man's permanent insecurity about himself, the distrust in his sense-perception as well as reason, the fear to be nothing after all spurred him to ever fresh attempts to rearrange his world, to reconstruct it from the debris of the worlds of his predecessors and so to establish *his personal* identity. This interminable activity of man, now, to build his world in the face of the world of his fellowman and to defend it against the permanent threat on the part of the fellowman to destroy it, we call *actuality*. It is obvious that, throughout the years of history, man has been restricted to this actuality. It is true that he tried to transcend it by erecting magnificent edifices which were to reach the sky, the eternal truth, but it is also obvious that he has failed to do so. We can thus conclude that, for us, there is no absolute knowledge, that *the truth* is inaccessible to us. All our knowledge is relative, is becoming or acting from a given situation which results from men's contradictory positions to one another. There are, therefore, only relative truths, namely, the contradictory worlds individuals build for themselves from their given circumstances, i.e., their particular natural constitution, sense-impressions, feelings and ideas formed by their upbringing. We call these self-constructed worlds truths, because they are necessary for man to live in. He cannot help constructing them. They are a manifestation of his existence. We may say that the pattern of life or the carpet of actuality is woven by these contradictory truths of man. It is in the above sense that man may be called the maker of actuality and that the world is his workshop.

From this it follows that reason plays a secondary part. It is merely man's rational disposition to construct his own world, thus giving meaning to his existence in a world of contingency and uncertainty. We have already mentioned, however, that man again and again tried to overreach himself and to transcend actuality. We have only to remember such towering philosophical systems as that of Plato or Hegel. But not only philosophy is guilty of these offences; not so long ago science laid claim to being the only discipline through which knowledge could be obtained. It had forgotten that it formed only one method among others of man's attempt to penetrate to "real" knowledge of the outside world, and, as F. Heinemann shows so aptly in his work "Existentialism and the Modern Predicament," thereby a method towards an end (which science really is) had become an end in itself.

How was it possible that again and again man tried to transcend himself? This fact can only be explained by man's misjudging and misunderstanding his own nature. As from the dawn of Western thought, i.e., the beginning of Greek philosophy, man's true essence, by which he decisively distinguished himself from animals, was seen to lie in his rationality. The changing world of things, which had always perplexed and even frightened man, always caused him to seek for a firm anchor, a principle by which he could understand the world and by which he could understand himself and therefore act. And this principle by which everything could be explained was more often than not an intelligent principle. It was called "apeiron" by Anaximander, "logos" or "nomos" by Heraclitus, the "truth" or "one" by Parmenides, the "nous" by Anaxagoras and the "atom" by Democritus and Leucippus. But even Thales' "water," Anaximenes' "air" and Empedocles' "sympathy" and "antipathy" principles could be called intelligent. All in all, the world of reason was always the real world in contrast to the deceptive doxa world. It is thus not surprising that Aristotle defined man as a rational animal. This was in effect also the conception of the epoch of Enlightenment and became the ideal of humanism as such. Thus even where we find other definitions (e.g., man distinguishes himself from animals by being conscious of himself or by being a cultural being), it is man's rational nature that makes such definitions possible. And even the definition of man as the image of God by the Christian Middle Ages was based on man's rational character, as is shown for example by Thomas Aquinas' concept of "analogia entis."

The overestimation of man's rationality, however, proved a fatal mistake. Man was regarded as an individual who was capable by his reason of rising above actuality and blending with the world of being or the world of pure truth. By acting reasonably, he would harmoniously fuse with society. The state was thus an educational institution or later an ethical idea. Only by the Existentialist philosophers is the monopoly of the mind broken through, and man's existence as a whole

individual becomes an object of reflection. But as Heinemann in the above mentioned work points out, the Existentialists attempt to systematize the principle of life as such, which defies systematization. They try to find being in themselves, thereby arriving at the nothing. Sartre's philosophy is thus the logical result of Existentialist thought.

From the above we are driven to the conclusion that rationality is not the basic structure of man nor must he be studied as standing alone as an individual. The structure of man lies much deeper, and only if we start from this natural structure, will man be prevented from being absorbed by some ontological or rational principle such as Plato's "Good" or Hegel's "Absolute Spirit," or will he be levelled by some rationalistic principle of state such as Plato's "Republic," Locke's "Commonwealth," Rousseau's "Volonté Générale," etc. Only if we study man in his relation to his fellowman and not as a secluded individual, will his individuality be preserved. And if we do so, we shall find that this relation is not harmonious at all, but one of *conflict* and *contradiction*. Husband and wife, parents and children, neighbour and neighbour are each in *possession* of their own world, however small, which the other can never fully penetrate, which makes life meaningful to them and affords them some sense of security. It is through this world, which they feel constantly threatened by their fellowman, that they posit their truth. *Thus the essential nature of man is not rationality* University of Fort Hare by his very action, i.e., building his own small world or *expelling* his truth, in other words, by his very existence contradicts his fellowman. Whether he wants to or not, he limits his fellowman, puts a brake to his egoistic instincts and appetites, but he also confirms him in his ego, his individuality by this very act of restriction. He feels a self by the resistance of his fellowman, by whom he measures himself and with whom he competes, by whom he suffers and rejoices, weeps and laughs. In fact, we are wondering whether, without the challenge of the fellowman in environment, man would have developed a language, or if he would not have remained mute. We must, therefore, not suppose that this newly found structure of man, which is much broader than mere rationality, constitutes a war of all against all. Contradictoriness does not only form a gulf but at the same time builds a bridge from individual to individual. It both negates and confirms him, limits and expands him. It is the only guarantee of his individuality and freedom as we shall yet see. It is by contradictoriness that man becomes the architect of actuality, which he *experiences* and therefore *knows*. It is in this sense that it is real to him. He starts building it within the family in contradiction to his wife and his children, and yet he loves them, not despite but because of the contradiction, because of the daily confrontation of self to self. Does not true love mean sacrifice, i.e., to accept the other as he is and to limit oneself for his sake, and not to try to possess or dominate him and make him conform? For however hard I try to do so, I shall be unable to break down his world completely.

It is simply impossible for a husband to build up a world exactly like that of his wife and vice versa. They will therefore never have a perfectly identical outlook on life. This is even more obvious in the case of the children who belong to a new generation attaching different values to life than the older generation. And yet there does develop within the family some kind of family truth or common outlook on life; for the family is joined together under a common fate. Thus, just as there exists a contradictoriness between husband and wife, the older and the younger generation, there is the same contradictoriness between families, communities, nations, in short, all human beings. If the contradictoriness between husband and wife makes true love (i.e., the curbing of my ego in favour of the other) not only possible but seems to command it, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the remaining scale of contradictory relations between families, communities, nations, people in general, likewise points to an *ought*. Instead of trying to dominate each other, they should respect and assist each other in promoting each other's interests. In the *ought*, which is implicit in the relation of contradictoriness, lies *man's freedom*. Only if we comply with it, can we hope to become more human; for only then do we comply with our true nature. The overemphasis of man's rationality, which caused man to estrange himself from himself, as well as its leveling effect, which can to-day be observed in all walks of life, has prevented man from reaching his true aim which he pursued throughout the centuries of history, namely, to become nobler and ever more human. It is in this aim that the true meaning of progress consists. But that which was to have been the means to this end became an end in itself. Thereby the question arises whether, instead of having become nobler in character and more human, man has not travelled in the opposite direction.

It is worth the while to investigate the history of Western man in its entirety in order to show how, in the sphere of Western civilisation, man by the overestimation of reason has landed himself in an impasse from which it is hard to wriggle out again. All the hope man cherished that the solution of his problems would lie in the direction of his becoming more and more rational, so that he would act more and more reasonably and live in harmony with others, has come to nothing. That the beast is still as strong in him as it was in the past has been proved by late events. He still has not found a basis on which he could live harmoniously together with his fellowman; he has failed to elicit from nature the last secrets of life; he still argues about good and evil; and his diligent search for the truth has not been successful either. All these problems man hoped to solve by reason, in whatever guise it paraded. Was it surprising then that man lost all sense of proportion and assigned to his rational faculty a task which it could never carry out? Putting all the trust and confidence in reason had to lead him to the belief that he was essentially rational. But after what happened to mankind during the first half of this century and in some other form

continues to happen, we cannot possibly be blamed for casting a vote of non-confidence in man's rational powers. This does not mean, that we deny that man possesses such powers and that we maintain that he can do without them ; for that this is not the case should have become sufficiently clear from our discussion of actuality ; but it means that man's essence has to be sought in a much broader structure than a rational one, namely, in that of *contradictoriness*.

The German philosopher Eberhard Grisebach, afterwards Professor of Philosophy in Zürich, saw man as a being which experienced the contradiction of his fellowman. And we want to state here that he was our teacher in this respect. Unfortunately, we have to differ with him for various reasons (which we cannot discuss here at great length, but which we hope will become clear from the following papers) as to the nature and ultimate significance of his idea of contradiction. It is a great pity, indeed, that this highly original thinker is relatively little known ; for many a man reading his principal work "Gegenwart" would have been roused rudely from his dream world of reason. Just after the outbreak of the second world war, Grisebach, on the 22nd October, 1939, before the Swiss Philosophical Association in Berne, demonstrated the "Crisis of Truth" into which our reason had led us. He showed the collapse of the humanistic bourgeois world view, which was about to dominate other continents and which was therefore a world crisis. In a statement such as "Der Mensch hat Furcht, allein zu sein. Was der Geist als wahr setzt und was seine Ideen fordern, das soll für ihn wirklich verbindlich wahr sein und in Gemeinschaft verwirklicht werden können. Das Wahre gilt als das Vernünftige und das Seiende. Die Vernünftigkeit wird als Modus der Wirklichkeit vorausgesetzt. Ein Geist, eine Vernunft sollen die Wirklichkeit aufbauen. Dieser Glaube an die Wahrheit befriedigt die Seele und beseitigt ihre Angst. Der Mensch träumt davon, eine Welt in Gedanken aufzurichten, damit er über das Seiende vernünftig herrschë. Die Herrschsucht vor allem hat ihn zur Verkennung der Zwiespältigkeit der Wahrheit geführt," we see how Grisebach has recognized man's fundamental error. It was precisely man's attempt to transcend himself by reason, into which he was driven by anxiety and uncertainty, that brought about the crisis of truth which, according to Grisebach, the politicians tried to solve by other means. As a first effect of this attempt, Grisebach noted the end of any kind of speculative philosophy, of every attempt to prescribe to God by reason or intuition how he was to govern the world. As a further effect Grisebach noted the end of all individualism. For Grisebach the truth was inaccessible to our reason : "Wahr sind in Wirklichkeit nur unsere Irrtümer und die daraus folgenden Verbote." But if we look at man to-day, it becomes questionable whether he realizes that which Grisebach had already recognized after the first world war, namely, the bankruptcy of our rational structures and the doubtfulness of our truth. It is true that after the first and second world wars had shaken man's

truth to its very foundation so that he was left with nothing, there were hopeful signs that he would start in a quite different direction. But it seems now that he picked up the ends of his thread where he had lost them. He has slipped back into his groove of reason, little realizing that this may lead him to his very end. And yet man's slipping back into his wonted gait proves that Grisebach, too, makes a mistake. In his anxiousness to refer man to the present crisis, i.e., the crisis of his own time, and to prevent him from making the same mistake of constructing new worlds and new truths with the hope of finally succeeding in establishing a perfectly reasonable world in which there would be no more strife and conflict but harmony, he bracketed man's constructive nature and his habit of historic thinking. In other words, he arbitrarily separated the internal from the external, the former being formal and as man's own construction representing the humanistic world of truth, the latter being problematic and contradictory and as the contradiction to man's rationality representing the real, the contingent world of experience. Grisebach thus hoped to draw man's attention to the practical experience of actuality, i.e., his actual relationship of conflict and contradiction with his fellowman. In the hope that man would eventually be enabled to suffer this conflict thereby having his self terminated by his fellowman, Grisebach envisaged an ethical existence for man in utter contingency. Man cannot, however, live in utter contingency in the mere expectation of being enabled to suffer the termination of his self by his fellowman, thereby experiencing peace. As long as he is in this world, he is not only a communal being in Grisebach's sense of the word but also an individual, as we have already seen. It is against man's nature to live in an eschatological mood all the time as he would have to do, were he to follow Grisebach. That is why man will have to build again, though not in Grisebach's sense, where the dismantling of man's truths and the bearing of the contradiction are at the same time the beginning of a spiritual reconstruction, but he will have to continue building his intellectual, spiritual and emotional home and thus to realize himself in the face of his fellowman. But he must do so by heeding the *ought* which this contradictory building implies, and as we have described it before. In other words, his building must occur in a great sense of responsibility, in the realization that, together with his fellowman, man weaves the pattern of life, of actuality.

As now actuality is unsystematic because of the contradictoriness and the responsive nature of the human truths, worlds and systems, which all spring from man's existential situation and are related to it, we cannot possibly here offer a system. There can be no doubt that in the future fresh systems will be built, fresh world views will be established, but we cannot say beforehand what they will be like; that will depend on the existing situation. But as it is certain that man will continue to rearrange the world so that he can "know" himself again and restore his self in the midst of a new scientific, economic, social,

aesthetic and philosophical crisis, and that he can again regard the world as his intellectual, spiritual and emotional home, we merely try to show how man's world views spring into existence. The revelation thereby of their contradictoriness and their relatedness to a contingent situation should draw the attention of the systematician, who is busy positing another truth, whether scientific, aesthetic, ethic or philosophic, to the *ought* which such contradictoriness and contingency implies. This *ought* will prevent him from laying claim to the absoluteness of the new truth he is positing, or to the permanency and perfection of the new home he is building. He will keep himself open and listen to the truth of the others, he will respect their homes, for he knows that only by so doing he ensures their *freedom* as well as his own, because only then is he true to his own contradictory nature. Is it not self-evident that man can only contradict, if he allows others to posit their truth? If, however, he puts himself absolute and tries to suppress other truths, he destroys himself; for there will be nobody left whom he can contradict, against whom he can posit his truth. All polarity, exchange of ideas will perish; in brief, there can be no more human life. Consequently the conflict must remain, and man must never try to remove it by overstepping actuality (transcending himself: Hegel) or by understepping it (living in expectation of the end: Grisebach). Any attempt to remove the conflict lands man in an impasse. But this conflict is not merely a *law*, "Heracitus' *Paleos*," which I gain by rational insight and which is a mere rhythmical up and down movement; it is an occurrence in the literal sense of the word, which I experience directly and in a versatile and contingent manner. As we have said, we can never know beforehand by whom and in what manner we shall be contradicted. This depends on the contingent situation from which we have built our world and on the specific situation in which the other finds himself and which will determine the form of his contradiction. But one thing is certain: As long as there are other men, we shall be contradicted.

In consideration of the unsystematic nature of actuality, as described above, we have therefore in the following papers merely sought to treat in the form of essays certain questions which seemed important to us. It will be noticed that all these questions concern problems the solution of which has always been attempted, which have, however, never been solved nor ever will be solved. We have therefore endeavoured to show in all of them the reason why such an attempt at solution is made, the one-sided premiss of a metaphysical nature from which man thereby starts, thereby greatly overestimating himself and estranging himself from his real nature as well as from actual life, and last but not least, the dangers such an attempt at solution implies. We are thereby taught the lesson that there is no solution of these questions and problems in the sense of giving an answer by which all contradiction is removed. The fact that such contradiction cannot be removed led us to the conclusion that we should abandon all attempts to do so,

because any such attempt really constitutes an act against man in as much as he is contradictory by nature, and it could mean at the present stage inviting catastrophe.

We do not claim that the following series of papers covers all important problems of man, and we are aware of the fact that there are a great number of other problems of a similar nature and of the same importance. The collection of papers contained here is only meant to make a start. It, so to speak, serves as an *introduction to the philosophy of actuality*. It is meant to serve the reader as a guide. Once he has seen how the following questions and problems are all dealt with in the light of actuality, he will not find it difficult to apply to it other important and "insoluble" problems as well as his own personal problems. Thus it should be obvious that it lies in the nature of the philosophy of actuality that it cannot possibly offer a system of thought, but that each system can only be assessed in connection with its specific situation. The treatment, therefore, of all the following questions and problems in the light of actuality gives this seemingly incoherent series a uniting bond. And we hope that, by leading man away from mere theory and the rationalisation of actual life into the practical contingency of human life, we have, in pointing out a possibility of a peaceful co-existence between individuals, nations and races, not in spite of the contradiction but because of it, made a modest contribution in the interest of the continued existence of a responsible and free mankind.

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY ?

If you study the History of Philosophy, you will find that almost every philosopher answers this question in his own way. In fact, each philosophical system may be looked upon as constituting an answer to this question, apart from the various direct attempts at definition on the part of various philosophers. In B. D. Alexander's "A Short History of Philosophy," philosophy is understood to mean "the love of wisdom, and may be said to be in general the mind's search for truth."¹ To Pythagoras, who is supposed to have made use of the word first, philosophy meant the pursuit of knowledge. To Socrates it meant the seeking of the truth which had been lost in the Sophists' jungle of opinionism. To Plato and to Aristotle, "the sense of wonder . . . is the mark of the philosopher."² According to Alexander, Ferrier has defined philosophy as "the pursuit of absolute truth, that is, of truth as it exists for all intelligences,"³ and according to the same source Windelband says : "By philosophy, present usage understands the scientific treatment of the general questions relating to the Universe and human life."⁴

From the above we gather that, to speak with Hegel, philosophy "defines all else, but cannot itself be defined." We admit that it is extremely difficult to define philosophy and that we actually philosophize when trying to do so. Yet, when studying the above pronouncements on the origin, meaning and purpose (for all three are implied) of philosophy, we find that, apart from their changing meaning as a result of changing circumstances, they all contain the factor of *generality*. Thus we can make one important distinction here between the sciences and philosophy. While the former study particular objects and events, the latter studies the general. Philosophy seeks to establish order among the various phenomena of the surrounding world and traces their unity by reducing them to their simplest elements, which unity the layman just takes for granted. It is in this sense that the origin of philosophy lies in wonder, in looking about, which leads to "teoria" or in a more modern sense, to a "Weltanschauung." Thus, when the layman says that he sees a house, knows "that" his neighbour died and "how" he died, that Mr. X exists, that he performed a good deed or an evil deed, or that his services to the community are valuable, the philosopher asks: What are perception, knowledge, existence, good and evil, value? And when the scientist talks about the causal connection between phenomena, or about the processes and the laws of life, the philosopher asks what is causality or life—what is their origin?

¹ Introduction, p. 1.

² G. Misch, *The Dawn of Philosophy*, pp. 47 ff.

³ *A Short History of Philosophy*, Introduction, p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid*

By these questions he discovers that there is a world of things, facts and events, an intelligible or logical world, an ethical world and a metaphysical world. Of each of these worlds he tries to discover the "structure", which he does largely through introspection by which he tries to define the different categories that must be applied to these layers or strata. Thus, by investigating and trying to describe his contents of perception and acts of perceiving and modes and possibilities of knowing, the science of epistemology was developed. Man's faculty of logical judgment caused the intelligible world to come into existence. This world is largely an a priori world, in contrast to the epistemological stratum which is a posteriori, i.e., the intelligible world, unlike the epistemological one, is independent of man's observation, but is valid, whether it is thought of by man or not. Thus the proposition of identity, contradiction and the excluded middle are true, irrespective of our thinking them or not. In modern times even a logic of logic, or pure logic, has developed, which seeks to arrive at a general structure of logic, either by an analysis of the intentional acts of consciousness pointing toward an ideal entity or a pure consciousness (Husserl) or by finding the logical calculus for various logical propositions (Russell, Whitehead). The structure of the ethical world is found through the act of valuation, which is done either rationally, i.e., in compliance with a formal ethical law (Kant's categorical imperative) or by means of a *logique du coeur*, i.e., a scale of values based on feeling (Pascal, Scheler). In the sphere of metaphysics, i.e., the origin of the universe, the idea of freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God or a first cause, the method of indirect proof or analogy is applied. That is, from an imperfect creature we conclude the existence of a perfect creator. From our feeling of dependence and our inner religious need, we speculate that there must be a being on whom we depend and whom we worship. The limited freedom of our will suggests to us the absolute freedom of will of an all-powerful being. The spirituality of our soul makes us believe in its immortality. Our spirituality and rationality cause us to believe that we are the image of God. The rationality, orderliness and beauty in the world point to a kind and intelligent architect or first cause. Motion suggests a first unmoved mover, etc.

From the above it follows that individual phenomena of objects, logical propositions, moral values, metaphysical concepts have all one factor in common, namely, they all *are* because they are all objects of our inward acts, e.g., of perceiving, knowing, judging, valuing, inferring, etc. For in all cases a "something" that is perceived, known, judged, valued and inferred is implied. Thus philosophy is actually the science of being in the widest sense of the word, its contents being the structures of this being. In this sense, philosophy is an ontology, i.e., the science of all that which exists. And as these existents comprise physical, intelligible, ethical and metaphysical entities, we may define philosophy as the *science of totality*.

So far we have noticed that, although we gained the layers of being through introspection, we studied them in an objective way, i.e., ruling out as much as possible the subjective constitutive factor, much the same as science studies its particular fields in the world of things and events. But we would not be philosophers unless we included in our philosophical reflection this constitutive factor of the various layers of being, which science proper is inclined to bracket, namely, man's consciousness or what Husserl called the "pure ego" or "pure consciousness," and which he called the "wonder of all wonders." Spiegelberg says: "The central mystery was to Husserl not Being as such, but the fact that there is such a thing in this world as a being that is aware of its own being and of other beings."¹

If we now subject this constitutive factor, our consciousness, to our rational insight and consider it in connection with its material contents, we arrive at the transcendental view in Kant's sense or the phenomenological view, the essences (Wesensschau), in Husserl's meaning. However, our consciousness also causes us to become aware of the temporality and change of our experience and of the receptivity by or occurring to our consciousness of something external to it, a wave or stream of life, which it then constitutes. In this connection we are reminded of Scheler's and Hartmann's ontology and of Bergson's "Lebensphilosophie". If we take all those factors into consideration, then we realize that a pure "objective" approach to the philosophy of totality after the manner of the natural sciences is inadequate. This approach amounts to an artificial freezing of the strata of being as we described them above. The systematic approach of philosophy, while being of value in the special construction or study of a philosophical system, must be followed up by the historical view. For in the first place, each philosophical system springs from a given life situation and constitutes an answer to some other philosophical view; secondly, each philosophical system purports to lay meaning into a situation of actuality and to arrange it so as to control and master it. Seen in this light, we arrive at new definitions of philosophy without the element of totality or generality getting lost, but by moving on from a mechanistic concept of totality to an organic one.

We now propose to discuss two definitions of the organic view of totality. The first is: *Philosophy is the discipline of Life* based on Dilthey's concepts of an experience of life and "Weltanschauung," and the second is: *Philosophy is the discipline of Actuality*.

As regards the first definition, G. Misch says:

"Dilthey regarded 'life' as the starting-point of philosophy: life as actually lived and embodied or 'objectified' in the spiritual world we live in. Life, according to Dilthey, is a subject for scientific investigation in so far as history and 'moral philosophy' or the 'human sciences' (Geisteswissenschaften) deal with it; but our

¹ The Phenomenological Movement, Vol. I, p. 87.

knowledge of life is, above all, contained in certain cultural or personal views of the world—Weltanschauungen—which play a prominent part in philosophy as well as in religion and poetry.”¹

It is now these Weltanschauungen, their origin and development, which Dilthey made the object of his enquiry.

Which now is the structure of life that unravels before our eyes by reflection? It causes us to become aware of the “experience of life” which consists in “each thought, each inward or outward act” coming upon me like “a concentrated thrust, pressing forwards.” “At the same time I experience an inner condition of rest—reverie, play, wool-gathering, contemplation, calm receptivity, . . . like a substratum of life.” Thus Dilthey starts from the commonest inner experiences that cause me to enter into communication of my surroundings. I intuitively grasp the causal relationship of external realities to me and among each other; and I take up an attitude towards those realities, e.g., the sense of “enjoyment” and the feeling of “expansion to my being and increase to my powers” is aroused on the one hand, and the feeling of “oppression and confinement” on the other. Everything falls into place for me, becomes my world which I weave myself, to which I am used, by which “Weltanschauung” I try to overcome its transitoriness. And although this experience of life takes on different forms, there is a common structure in it of which all are conscious, namely, “awareness of the power of chance, the corruptibility of everything we possess, love, hate, or fear; and of the continual presence of death, whose sovereign reality determines for every man his life’s meaning and value.” The succession of individuals, through human contacts, records regular repetitions of particular experiences in traditional terms in an ever-increasing measure, so that we gradually gain greater accuracy and certainty concerning the experience of life as a whole. Thus our knowledge concerning life grows organically; we cannot check its procedures as scientific knowledge can check its methods by logical propositions and rigid formulae. Hence there is a decisive difference between the methods of the natural sciences and the human sciences, each being subject to its unique laws. Thus “man in his environment, determinism, action and reaction, habit” forms the structure of life, the components of which are “self, persons, and things.” In other words, their interrelationship makes up “empirical consciousness.” By making the individual an “ideal fact” which “has roots that reach down below the lowest substratum of human history into the realm of organic nature,” Dilthey has merged the particular with the universal. We may also say that, in his view, the particular is the universal, as the individuals are the essential categories of life.

What is important in this definition, *philosophy is life*, is that the purely objective picture of philosophy has been supplemented by the subjective factor as was already the case in Kant’s transcendentalism

¹ The Dawn of Philosophy, p. 4.

and Husserl's phenomenology; but in addition the rigidity of the mechanistic systematization of the layers of being in our first "objective" concept of philosophy as totality and the purely mechanistic and logical constitution of the physical world in Kant's and Husserl's system have been superseded by the weaving of an organic world view that takes its origin in the individual, who thus becomes an essential category of life and thereby the "pure individual" or, to put it differently, individuality becomes the fundamental structure of life. In the ideal individual, subjectivity and objectivity are one.

Although, on the whole, Dilthey's definition of philosophy qua life is regarded by us as an improvement on the mere mechanistic picture which we presented in connection with the definition, *philosophy is the science of totality*, it is still too one-sidedly rationalistic to suit our taste entirely, in that it is still bent on working out structure, i.e., the structure of life by the analytic method. And if in the end the individual is transcended by becoming the ideal individual, we wholeheartedly disagree, because this universality of the individual is strongly suspect of being a primaeval ground of life from which all its forms spring forth. While we agree with Dilthey that "nowhere in our 'empirical consciousness' there is any loose, free-floating 'reality', everything everywhere is related to our attitude, to the totality of our existence in so far as we act, pursue aims, strive for goods and possessions,"¹ we object to the arbitrary assumption of any real ground, be it called life, organic nature or the ideal individual. We do not "know" reality as such, for this is beyond our experience, but we know only actuality because it is inherent in us, or, to put it differently, we, together with our fellow-man, are its own makers. We would therefore define philosophy as the *discipline of actuality*. This shows that we are not out to analyse the structure of some objective being such as life, but to describe man's action and reaction as they manifest themselves throughout the ages of his existence and as they are still experienced by us to-day.

When we study the history of philosophy, we find a myriad of philosophical systems contradictory to each other. At closer inspection we find that this contradiction is not merely accidental in as much as one system or group of systems is answered by another, the latter mostly trying to refute the previous and even combating it. We are, therefore, entitled to say that the history of philosophy represents the battle field of life. The reason of all this is man, who by nature, i.e., inherently or essentially, is contradictory. What does that mean? It means that what we call life, i.e., the interrelationship between objects and persons and between persons and persons themselves, is a chaotic affair. It is only when man applies his consciousness to it, be it in a naive, scientific logical, ethical, aesthetical or metaphysical way, that order is established in this jumble of facts, data and events. But the order man establishes is *his own order*, not *the order*, but an order relative to him. This leads to the establishment by him of the various truths of a spontaneous,

¹ G. Misch, *The Dawn of Philosophy*, pp. 4-7.

scientific, logical, ethical, aesthetical and metaphysical nature, not one of them (logical and mathematical truth included, as any one can see who studies the history of logic and mathematics) being of absolute or universal validity. Why does man posit these truths? Because, as a being endowed with a consciousness, he realizes the constant change of his environment and himself, so that his relation to his environment is constantly altered too. He is thus forever uncertain of himself, his identity and his purpose. By establishing order and positing his truth, man hopes to conquer this chaotic change and to build himself a home in which everything becomes meaningful for him and which offers him some temporary security.¹ In other words, man's positing of his truth is a necessary act of self-realization in a contingent situation by which man hopes to establish his identity. Often he considers his truth as absolute and infallible, and if this is the case, it provokes even more the contradiction of his fellowman than if he realized the fallibility of his truth. The contradictory interplay of man and fellowman is essential to man's existence. As Grisebach puts it: Man lives not in oneness but in twoness.² In other words, man can only posit his truth in the face of the truth of his fellowman, and in such a way the pattern of actuality is woven. It follows that the fellowman is both the negation and the affirmation, termination and expansion of his fellowman. It is in the above sense that we can regard actuality as the workshop of man; for he is the architect of actuality of which he is an inextricable part. Actuality may thus be said to consist of man's contradictory truths. Its fundamental structure is contradictoriness. This does not mean, however, that it is an abstraction which is found by us through the analytic method, so that it becomes the object of our reason. Actuality is experienced by us directly, inwardly as well as outwardly, i.e., in the form of our constructive activity as well as in the form of contradiction on the part of our fellowman. It is thus both subjective as well as objective, immanent as well as emanent. It constitutes our limit which we must not transgress, and this limit is marked by our fellowman who, by his contradiction, bids us halt. Actuality is therefore dynamic. It is always in a flux. It represents both existence and non-existence, the being and the nothing. It is between those two poles that man constantly fluctuates. The *no* of the fellowman at the same time represents a *yes* for him, which in turn represents a *no* to the fellowman, etc. It is in this sense that we remarked that man is contradictory by nature, so that he is an inextricable and inherent part of actuality. He both contributes to determine it and at the same time is determined by it. It is our opinion that it is the very interwovenness of ourselves with actuality that prevents us from

¹ In connection with this point the reader is referred to F. Bollnow, *Die neue Geborgenheit*, Saint-Exupéry, *Citadelle*, and M. Heidegger, *Wohnen Bauen Denken*, though we definitely disagree with the metaphysical nature of their abode.

² Cf. *Die Grenzen des Erziehers*, esp. pp. 83-90.

realizing its true nature as well as ours. We take actuality for granted, never thinking about it, so that its meaning and implications for us escape our notice.

And yet the definition of philosophy as the discipline of actuality in the above sense has far-reaching ethical implications. If men realized that they are the makers of actuality, and that they are essentially contradictory, so that they would be unable to exist if all contradiction were removed and if perfect harmony reigned, they would cease to claim the absoluteness of their truth. And they would, when positing their truth, keep themselves open for the contradiction of their fellowmen; instead of trying to master and control them, they would listen to them. In this self-control and responsible attitude in the sense of responding to the truth of the other by listening to it, instead of ignoring it and the fellowman's right to posit it by overpowering him and trying to possess him, lies the freedom of man. For only in the acknowledgement of the right of the fellowman to posit his own truth does a man guarantee the freedom of his fellowman, as well as his own. Such an *attitude of the open mind* prevents him from becoming the slave of his own truth, thereby trying to run away from actuality, which in most such cases takes bitter revenge by destroying the outsider, i.e., the one that wants to move outside the contradictoriness of actuality. For without such contradictoriness actuality or life would cease. There is no "solution" for such contradictoriness, but we have to accept it, because in accepting it, we are at the same time accepting ourselves in that we are contradictory by nature. Any attempt at solution leads into the wilderness and creates problems which are in reality nothing but an obstacle to ourselves. We often complain about the problems we have to face. But do we realize the nature of the problem? It does not consist in the natural contradictoriness which exists among men, as we are all too often inclined to think. The contradictoriness of actuality or life is not a problem but a fact. It becomes a problem only if we refuse to accept that fact and to reconcile ourselves with it by adopting an *attitude of the open mind*, i.e., of allowing the other to realize himself. In other words, it becomes a problem if we refuse to cooperate with our fellowman in the above sense despite certain differences, or rather because of them. Only if we insist on our truth exclusively, if we are unyielding and want to prescribe it to the other, does the natural tension, which is the fundamental structure of life, turn into a problem, because we are thereby not only blocking the way to our fellowman but also to ourselves—in short, to actuality of which we are an inextricable part.

If we define philosophy as the *discipline of actuality*, self-control becomes the most important act of the philosopher. He must not overstep his bounds by claiming his truth or his philosophy to be infallible (we have already stated that all human truth is contradictory), but he must take great pains to restrict himself to actuality. To establish order among our chaotic surroundings, the philosopher must build an

abode in which man can live, which is meaningful to him, offers him a temporary sense of security (for there is in this life no such thing as permanent security), in brief, within which man is able to realize himself and to establish his identity. But such an abode must be erected from the given situation and must correspond to it. In building such a home for man, therefore, philosophy must at first analyse and interpret the situation, i.e., (i) discuss critically the current problems of science as they have emerged in connection with the latest results of scientific research; (ii) elucidate the present day economic, social and political situation and point out in these three aspects of life any existing discrepancies and incompatibilities; (iii) investigate the meaning and significance of the new creations of art, which serve as a mirror of society. The specific kind of conflict and contradiction existing in the abovementioned fields at this particular stage will enable philosophy to recognise a kind of epochal spirit (*Geist der Zeit*) to which individuals, nations, races, etc. can adjust themselves. Here are a few examples:

In the present age we clearly realize the relativity of everything. There is nothing that can be set up as an absolute, i.e., as a principle or a truth determining and governing anything else. In science, especially in physics, the interrelation and uncertainty of atomic events have been described by scientists such as Planck, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, etc. When, for instance, in a discussion following a lecture given by Heisenberg on 4th September, 1958, on "Planck's discovery and the philosophical problems of atomic physics" René Schaerer could not understand why Heisenberg found himself nearer to Aristotle than to Democritus because in his opinion, "An atom. . . always remains an atom,"¹ Heisenberg replied:

"When a simple hydrogen atom is considered and its collision with an electron is studied, a disturbance in the hydrogen is observed. The classical physicists believed this collision occurred in a completely analogous manner to that which would have been produced between a planet and a comet. In more modern physics the result of this collision is nevertheless not completely predictable, even though it depends on the initial conditions. There exists one probability of finding an electron in the excited hydrogen atom, another of finding the nucleus deprived of its electron. And these probabilities are fixed and cannot be modified. The hydrogen atom that is found after the collision is, however, no longer exactly what it was before. It is in fact known that, when an interaction contains energy, there exists the probability that the hydrogen is not found again, but instead something completely different is found. Several different cases are possible, and these cases are connected among themselves by relations of probability. In fact, what is thus found as a result of an interaction, of any action, is not always objects, but forms—forms of

¹ On Modern Physics, p. 30

that energy which is the fundamental basic material of modern physics, capable of taking different forms in which we recognize objects."¹

We quoted Heisenberg's reply rather in full, because the pattern of the world of nuclear physics appears to be analogous to that of our actuality. For we discover there the same fundamental dynamic character which seems to be the cause of all opposite and contradictory forms, as well as of their existence and non-existence. Owing to this dynamic nature, everything seems to be in a constant flux, so that these forms are blurred and blended into each other even as the contradictory truths and worlds of man are blended into each other, thus creating ever new situations, thereby terminating an old truth and replacing it by a new one. Or, to put it differently, it is never possible to observe a human truth twice ; for, by every contradiction, it is negated and must be posited afresh, but in whatever form this re-positing will occur is unpredictable. In physics we have the same phenomenon as represented by the particle-wave problem. As each energy quantum can be regarded as a wave within other waves but each wave also as a particle, the question as to the individuality of a particle or wave is raised. Schrödinger does not believe in considering single particles as a well-defined permanent reality because from the

"fleeting picture of the 'wave packet,' it is easily possible to infer the famous Heisenberg uncertainty principle . . . Even if this uncertainty were small—~~and it certainly is not~~—it follows from it that it is never possible to observe the same principle twice with apodictic certainty."²

And another reason for his belief is adduced by him :

"When we are dealing theoretically with two or more particles of the same type, for example, with the two electrons of a helium atom, we *must efface their identity*, otherwise the results will simply be untrue and not agree with experience. We must count two situations which differ only by an exchange of roles by the electrons not only as equal—that would be obvious—but we must count them as one and the same. If we count them as two equals, it becomes nonsensical."³

But Schrödinger has conditioned his argument by saying :

"When *we* are dealing *theoretically* with two or more particles of the same type . . ."

This is nothing but the constitution of an immanent truth by analytic means. It is only in connection with this rational approach that "*We must efface their identity*," so that *our mathematical results agree with our experience*, which *in the light of the same mathematical results* is regarded as *the same experience*. It is only by mathematical

¹ On Modern Physics, pp. 30-31.

² Lecture on : Our Image of Matter, presented in September, 1952, published in : On Modern Physics, p. 51.

³ Ibid., pp. 51-52.

construction, therefore, that two situations become one. But is it so in reality? Schrödinger himself spoke of *two* electrons. And he himself admits that the single particle still plays a part in the "representation, deliberations, discussions and writing" of most theoreticians,¹ and that we cannot do without individuality from the linguistic point of view.² In reference to Heisenberg we submit that there is in the flux of atomic events a certain individuality, i.e., that we find as a result of atomic interaction forms which Heisenberg called "forms of that energy which is the fundamental base material of modern physics, capable of taking different forms in which we recognize objects." This seems to be borne out also by the fact that Schrödinger regards atoms as :

"more or less temporary creations within the wave field, whose structure and structural variety, in the widest sense of the word, are so clearly and sharply determined by means of wave laws as they recur always in the same manner, that much takes place *as if* they were a permanent material reality. The very exactly specifiable mass and charge of the particles we must thus consider as *Gestalt* elements determined by the wave laws. The conservation of charge and mass on a large scale must be considered as a statistical effect, based on the 'law of the large number.'"³

The conclusion, now, that we draw from this discussion of the physicists and their contradictory views is that those representations of atomic events are again a relative constitution of actuality. These various views, therefore, are also immanent truths, the contradictory character of which sheds more light on man's contradictory nature. Again we hear the distinct halt of actuality, which we know only as far as we experience it in the form of our own construction and in the contradiction this structure of ours provokes on the part of our fellowman. Actuality alone is real for us. But whether it in any way reflects *the* real or the absolute remains a matter of conjecture and cannot be known. Thus Schrödinger at the conclusion of his lecture says :

"If you ask me : Now, really what *are* these particles, these atoms and molecules ? I should have to admit that I know as little about it as where Sancho Panza's second donkey came from."⁴

And if we consult Einstein, we find that he has described the same relativity in the universe. As there is no logical way from our experience (sense-perceptions) to the elementary mathematical laws from which we must deduce our world view,⁵ it follows that, as those laws are rooted in sense-experience⁶, the existence of the outside world must

¹ Lecture on : Our Image of Matter, in : On Modern Physics, p. 52.

² Ibid., pp. 55-56.

³ Ibid., p. 56.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 56.

⁵ *Mein Weltbild*, p. 109.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 119.

be accepted on trust¹ and that it is intuition which forms the "link" between the sense-data and theoretical construction.² It is again by an immanent truth, therefore, that Einstein *hopes* to grasp the real in its depth.³ It can thus be seen that belief, intuition, probability and speculation are indispensable factors in modern science.

In the economic, social and political field we find to-day the same relativism. The European monopoly has disappeared. Overseas countries have developed a strong economy of their own or are about to do so. They are to-day factors to be reckoned with. They are about to determine their own form of society in compliance with their peculiar situation, and they emerge as political factors, thereby reducing the political scope of the former leading European powers. No major occurrence in any part of the world is in the present state of affairs without effect on other parts. With the disappearance of European colonialism everything has been relativised. This does of course not mean that there are to-day no longer any political units which lay no claim to absolutism, and which seek to establish a universal order again. And no matter how much these political units insist on the absoluteness of their economic and social theory and their political ideology, they are based just as much on belief, probability, speculation and intuition as the theories of the scientific world. But there is, largely on account of the existence of such absolute political units, not only uncertainty but anxiety and fear as well.

In the field of the arts we find the same atomism and relativism as in science and in the economico-socio-political sphere. The inner breakdown, the despair and agony, the splitting up of man into many personalities become manifest in the style of expressionism. Cubism and futurism again aim at the destruction of all conventional form. The dissolution of man's self in arts can be observed in what Sedlmayr calls the loss of the centre (*Verlust der Mitte*). Man and the world face each other as strangers. He himself becomes a mere relation. Hence his question: Who am I? What is my existence? The loss of the centre is the reason why in many cases contemporary art states the grotesque, e.g., Kafka, who in his stories does so in the form of symbolic language. The relativism is further clearly seen in literary works such as James Joyce's "Ulysses" and "Finnegans Wake," where style and hero are protean, and where there is no more order of time and all causality is broken through.

Now philosophy must not blindly follow the atomistic pattern represented by modern science and art as in some respects it has done. It must not itself break up into an atomistic phenomenologicistic linguistic or an aprioristic logistic as we find it to be the case, especially in modern British philosophy. It must not lose itself either in the

¹ *Mein Weltbild*, p. 159.

² *ibid.*, p. 109.

³ *ibid.*, pp. 116, 117, 118

desperate loneliness of the human soul, by making the individual the ground of his own being without a supporting relation to an existent external to man, as is done by the philosophy of existence. After having established the nature of the new epochal spirit, i.e., after having found that in our present age it consists of an all out relativism, it should proceed to reconcile man with this state of affairs. It should point out that the existing contradictions and uncertainties cannot be removed, because they are the result of man's action and counteraction, and that they, therefore, constitute actuality. It should therefore warn of, and protest against any attempt on any one's part, whether scientist, economist, sociologist, politician, artist or philosopher, to proclaim his truth absolute. The philosopher should emphasise that this contradictory relativism, by which all physical events and human affairs are connected, has caused the world to shrink, i.e., has drawn people together more closely. He should emphatically point to the *ought* that imposes itself on man and refers him to his fellowman. This ought commands man to practise self-control, to be modest and not to overestimate himself. It obliges him to respect the truth, perspective and world view of the fellowman as well as the social, economic, cultural systems of other nations and races, however greatly they might differ from his own. In brief, the constructive part of philosophy lies in its positive approach, i.e., its bid to all men to accept the actual situation, instead of striving against it by claiming to be in possession of the only truth, or of the only possible solution of the "world crisis." This crisis has always existed, even though in a different way, and will continue to exist, because man is by nature contradictory. In other words, it is the duty of philosophy to illustrate the meaning of relativity as resulting from man's contradictory nature by which he with his fellowman weaves the pattern of life, thereby constituting part of actuality, which, therefore, he must accept, instead of trying to overcome. For by accepting actuality, i.e., contradiction, man really accepts himself, his true nature which consists of contradictoriness.

By contradictoriness, therefore, man's self is restored ; for as we have already mentioned, man can posit his truth, build his world or realize himself only in contradiction to the existential truth of his fellowman. In other words, it is through the fellowman that he becomes conscious of himself, his identity and his own position in life. In short, without the challenge of his fellowman, he would never know himself, because there would be nobody to whom to respond. But it is by this very response, this reference to an external existent, that he establishes his identity as a self and an individual ; and yet it is the very same contradictory relation that changes man into a communal being and that makes him realize that he exists not in oneness but in twoness. It is therefore obvious that, although the acknowledgement of contradiction restores man's self, it does not do so in a theoretical and intellectual sense, in the sense that the individual again becomes the centre of the world, the pivot around which the universe revolves, but in a practical

sense, in that it draws our attention to the experience of the contradiction on the part of our fellowman as well as our own contradictory nature. When Sedlmayr speaks about the "loss of the centre," he has of course in mind the dissolution of the self as the centre of the world. But this middle is an object constructed by our reason. It is dangerous in as much as it tempts us to fuse ourselves with the absolute. Our experience, however, advises us that there is no such middle, but only contradiction. And it is this experience which leads us to restrict ourselves to actuality, i.e., to the contradictory relation that exists between ourselves and our fellowman.

From the above it follows that it is the function of philosophy to refer man to his home, namely, actuality, which is his abode, and with which he is most familiar in as much as he experiences it directly and is an inherent part of it. He himself determines it and is determined by it. By referring man to his true home, philosophy prevents him from trying to find it outside his reach, in a self-constructed "real ground" of whatever nature, which is nothing but the absolutisation of himself or his own reason. In other words, by transcending himself, he hopes to overcome the contradictoriness of actuality, i.e., himself, in order to reach harmony and absolute truth and thereby security. By referring man to actuality as his true home, philosophy will cause him to exercise self-control and to be unassuming and modest. Man will come to realize that any attempt to overreach himself represents a violation and transgression of the boundaries of actuality. It therefore constitutes an attempt to escape from himself and his fellowman.

It is thus obvious that the philosopher has a great duty to fulfil towards the community. He is obliged to contradict and refute all claim to absoluteness by whatever field—scientific, philosophical or political—such a claim may be made. The claim to absoluteness, as we have seen, undermines freedom. By rejecting and refuting it, the philosopher becomes the *guardian of freedom*. A free community, therefore, is one which accepts and acknowledges contradiction as the essential experience of actuality, and which realizes that its individual members are the architects of this actuality. In a free and genuine community, therefore, the necessity and right of the individual to contradict will be fully appreciated, and self-control and the willingness of the individual to listen to his fellowman, which leads to *co-operation in contradiction*, will be considered the highest moral values. It is in this sense that we consider a free community as an organic or, rather, *spontaneous* one, and though its structure is always that of contradiction, the methods and forms of this contradiction or of actuality, as they become manifest in the various human truths, change along with changing actuality. Any attempt to remove this contradiction by insisting on the absoluteness of a human truth, any rationalistic or ideological collectivization, levelling or abstraction of a community leads automatically to its death. Its real props and pillars are individuals, but not in Dilthey's ideal sense, but as architects building actuality, which they

weave by contradicting each other. It is by the above reflections that we arrive at the definition : *Philosophy is the discipline of actuality.*

But now the theologian will come and will raise certain objections. He will say that if God has created the world, then the absolute must somehow be reflected in actuality. In any case, if this is so, there must certainly be some relation between the world and God. Moreover, the question may be asked : You have spoken of the various contradictory truths of men as they manifest themselves in science, ethics, art and philosophy. What about the theological truth ? Are you going to ignore that ? But just as there exist a science, an ethics, an art and a philosophy, there is a theology, and does this latter not deal with the absolute ? And at last the question may be asked : Is there no community where all contradiction has been removed, where all conflict has come to an end and where perfect peace and harmony reign ? All these objections and questions are pertinent and must be met and answered by the philosopher. As to the first objection, the philosopher's reply is that it may very well be as the theologian says, namely, that somehow the absolute is reflected in the actual world. But whether this is so cannot be ascertained by knowledge or by experience, but solely and exclusively by belief¹. The philosopher cannot speak about the absolute or about its relation to the world. For even if he said as much as : " It is transcendent ", he would presume to some knowledge of its existence, and yet he could not possibly know it because of its transcendence and would therefore only believe in its existence. He would thereby tint belief with an admixture of knowledge which thereby would no longer be really belief, because once we know we need no longer believe. But he would also taint knowledge by mixing it with belief, because that which is believed is no longer known. Any absolute, philosophically speaking, is an assumption or an immanent truth constructed from a given existential situation, and is therefore relative and contradictory. But it is quite a different matter when the theologian tells us that we must *believe* that the absolute is reflected in the actual world, or that there is a relation between the world and the absolute ; for he bases his belief on revelation.

It is now clear that philosophy strictly confines itself to the sphere of actuality. It no longer transgresses the boundary of knowledge and experience, thereby overreaching itself and intruding into the sphere of theology. It is thus a practical discipline in that it is chiefly concerned with the contradictory relation among men. But theology is no less practical. Its task consists in guiding man from actuality to the absolute on the basis of belief, in the hope that some day his belief will culminate in the experience of an absolute faith in Christ. Philosophy and theology, knowledge and faith must thus completely be separated.

¹ We use here belief in distinction to faith. By belief we mean the acceptance as true of the Christian theology. By faith we mean the absolute delivery of ourselves into the hands of Christ.

As to the second question, the philosopher's reply is that, philosophically speaking, theological truth belongs to the sphere of actuality. This is proved by the fact that theological truth is as contradictory as any other truth. It is as immanent and as relative. It constitutes just as much part of man's abode as do the other human truths. It also has to be reformulated and posited in a new way over and over again, in accordance with the changing conditions of life. It represents man's religious existence throughout history. As all religious truths deal with the absolute, their dogmatic character becomes understandable. The various dogmatic starting-points are the reason for the existence of the many confessions and denominations.

Because the theological truths and religious confessions and denominations belong to the sphere of actuality, they are subject to the same ethical imperative, to the *ought* of the contradictory world, in spite of the fact that they deal with the absolute. This means that they are referred to each other in contradiction; for it is through contradiction that they have arisen, and, because of this contradictory relation in which they stand with each other, it is their bounden duty to listen to each other, to respect one another and to assist one another, instead of trying to harm and destroy each other.

It is, however, a fact that these religious truths deal with the absolute, and that they do so or at least should do so on the ground of belief in the revealed truth of the Bible. Even though, on account of human inadequacy, this revealed truth becomes contradictory and relative in the actual world, as it is bound to be, we must assume that on the basis of belief, and on the ground of belief alone, these truths do reflect the absolute in their own specific way.

This brings us to the last question, namely, is there no ideal community where instead of contradiction and conflict we find peace and harmony? We believe that there is. But such a community falls outside actuality, and exists only in the sphere of divine grace. Theology and the church can only do preparatory work for it. We have already seen that its task is restricted to the sphere of actuality, where there is strife, contention and contradiction. It can only administer the evangelical message and admonish people to deliver themselves entirely and unconditionally into the hands of Christ. But whether they are able to do so, does not depend on any human being, but is the work of God's grace alone. The community of peace and harmony, therefore, consists of those who, by the grace of God, have risen above any controversies, including those of the churches and of theology; by their unconditional faith in Christ the worldly community is transcended and is transformed into a community of the faithful. This community, on the strength of the vicarious sacrifice of Christ from love, is bound together no longer by contradiction but by love. For love means sacrifice and suffering for the sake of my fellowman. In the state of unconditional love I contradict no more, and I posit myself no longer, but I allow it to be terminated, and I deliver myself up

completely to God's promise of being saved from myself. Christ, on the Cross, lived the example of absolute faith by living through to the bitter end His suffering in unconditional obedience and in perfect trust in God's promise. It was by this absolute faith that Christ had overcome the world. It was on the Cross that He was resurrected, and thereby had saved all those that entrusted their whole existence to Him in loving faith. In the dying form of Jesus, God had revealed itself. The Cross thus constitutes the absolute contradiction to relative actuality. It terminates it.



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

THE PROBLEM OF GEGENWART (ACTUALITY) IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EBERHARD GRISEBACH

(Presidential Address delivered to the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy in South Africa at Fort Hare on 28th January, 1963).

1. Biographical Data

Eberhard Grisebach was born in 1880 in Hanover. He was the son of a Prussian official who finally occupied the post of Vize-Regierungsrat in the province of Schleswig, and who, from 1890, was Kammerpräsident of the Prince of Stolberg-Wernigerode. Grisebach's mother, Marline born von Harnier, died in Frankfurt (Oder), when he was still a child.

Grisebach first attended school in Frankfurt (Oder), then in Schleswig and in Stargard (Pomerania). He later attended the Gymnasium at Wernigerode. In 1900 he commenced his studies in architecture at the Technical University in Darmstadt (Hesse). From 1900 to 1901 Grisebach underwent his period of compulsory training as a soldier in Darmstadt. From 1902 to 1904 he continued his studies of architecture in Berlin. During this period he also performed practical work on the Kobelnick palace in Posen.

In accordance with the custom of the time, Grisebach set out to hike through Southern Germany and studied in Stuttgart (Württemberg). From 1904 to 1908 he stayed at Davos for the purpose of convalescence.

In 1907 Grisebach resumed his studies, this time in philosophy, and for one semester, till 1908, attended the University of Zürich. In 1908 he resided at Corpus Christi College, Oxford. In 1909 he returned to Germany and continued his studies in philosophy at the University of Jena. In this year fell his marriage with Lotte Spengler. In 1910 Grisebach received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Jena on a dissertation entitled: "Kultur als Formbildung," and in 1913 he became a Privat-Dozent under the guidance of Rudolf Eucken on submission of a thesis called: "Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart." During the first world war Grisebach served as an officer in the garrison of Ulm. In 1922 he was appointed Professor Extraordinary in Jena, and in 1931 was offered a chair by the University of Basel and of Zürich. He accepted the chair of philosophy, education and psychology at the University of Zürich.

Grisebach repeatedly returned to Davos for the sake of recreation. Between 1932 and 1939 he undertook brief journeys to Scandinavia, France and England. He died on 16th July, 1945, in Zürich.

2. The Development of Grisebach's Thought

It is to be regretted that Grisebach is so little known. He deserves to be studied, especially in our time. We all feel that we have lost ourselves in a labyrinth of contradictions from which we in vain look for a way out. It does not matter whether we agree or disagree with Eberhard Grisebach, the fact remains that, in our situation of crisis, which we so acutely feel, he has a message for us. It cannot be denied that his critical philosophy shakes us in our very foundations. We begin to question ourselves, our accepted standards of value, our pride in our culture, civilisation, creative nature, etc. What impresses us is Grisebach's uncompromising honesty, his courage and outspokenness with which he faces reality and by which he mercilessly exposes the fallacy, vanity and selfishness of our accepted beliefs and virtues, which in the light of the problematic nature of "Gegenwart" he unmasks as untruths and vices. Despite the importance of his message to us or perhaps because it is uncomfortable and inconvenient to us, Grisebach has largely been ignored. Arthur Hübscher says :

"Und doch ist er in Zürich immer einsamer geworden. Die Lehrer verstanden ihn nicht, den Theologen gefiel es nicht, dass er die grossen Leuchten am Himmel ihrer Wissenschaft in aller Demut verachten konnte. Kurz nach dem Ende des Krieges ist er gestorben. In der Erinnerung seiner Hörer steht er da, wie er gross, mit entlarvenden Augen und erhobenem Haupt über sie hinwegblickte."¹

Grisebach himself in "Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes" has given a concise description of the devious paths he travelled in his search for truth. The youth, who, at first, is inspired by the noble ideal of Plato's good, the courageous self-sacrifice of Socrates and Bruno in the name of truth, is eventually led to the sceptical meditations of Descartes and the critical thought of Kant.

The acquaintance with Heinrich Rickert, who, like Fichte, was prepared to go beyond Kant and who, following his teacher Wilhelm Windelband, made a critical analysis of the natural sciences and the humanities in reference to their grounds of cognition, could not fail to make an impression on the mind of the young man. The doctrine of the eternal logos, which reveals itself in history, led the young disciple of philosophy to his first independent decision, even though it did not lie in the direction of the offered method. We must remember Grisebach's interest in the fine arts, which can be traced throughout all his works,² and which at first caused him to study architecture. It was no doubt through this interest that his constructive talent was formed.

¹ Die Denker unserer Zeit, p. 203.

² Grisebach's last big work is a critical study of the Swiss historian of culture and fine arts, Jacob Burckhardt, entitled: Jacob Burckhardt als Denker, published by Paul Haupt, Berne, 1943.

This constructive disposition is so strong that even later in his critical period, when he rejects the philosophical system and assigns to philosophy the modest part of a warner, he does so with an eye on spiritual reconstruction¹. But before Grisebach developed his critical philosophy, his constructive and creative inclination caused him to combine scientific and artistic interests, which at first led him to a *classical formal* thinking.

Grisebach declined Rickert's invitation to attend his seminar at Freiburg for fear of getting stuck within a definite school of thought the circle of which had been determined by a formal method. In order not to lose contact with his own living questions about freedom, God and infinity and only to get problems of science as a substitute, he decided to continue his quest for truth. He thus journeyed to England. Here, his young inquisitive mind was at first attracted by the psychologico-genetic method of the pragmatist school. The realisation of all values through social life and the doctrine that the value of truth had to stand the test of experience at first greatly impressed the young Kantian. The aversion to all verbalism, the humour and elasticism, the analytic method, which notwithstanding never lost sight of an existential interest, all this greatly appealed to him. Soon, however, the easy solution of the conflict between critical and positive claims roused fresh doubt in him, which was directed towards the reflective character of the offered criterion of truth, the aesthetic nature of the act of thinking, and the psychological interpretation of processes in the historico-social sphere. Was it correct to say that all values depended on their contingent confirmation by society, i.e., on its taste and judgment?

Tormented by such doubts, Grisebach returned to the continent. In Rudolf Eucken's philosophy of the spirit he believed to have found the mediating link between the contradiction of the pragmatism of William James and the idealism of the neo-Kantians. In cosmic all-life, concept and intuition, spirit and nature, infinity and finiteness were supposed to merge with each other, so that it was not necessary to take a unilateral methodological decision. In this universal space, culture could be conceived as bestowing form on the flux of all events, natural as well as historical, which was the theme of Grisebach's doctoral dissertation entitled: "Kultur als Formbildung." In the philosophy of the spirit the task of man, in whose consciousness the natural and historic process realises itself, is clearly set, namely, to participate in the construction of the respective cultural system of his time, by which cultural act he blends himself into the ever changing and becoming spirit. This school could not fail to appeal to Grisebach, as in it artistic and scientific needs were equally satisfied. Here, the creative cultural act seemed to take him from the anaemic field of theory right into the

¹ Cf. Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, Book III, Aufbaugedanken.

reality of full-blooded life. To break through the merely theoretical and academic and to take an active part in real events had always been Grisebach's greatest aspiration. In Eucken's philosophy of the spirit not only the problem of freedom and infinity appeared to have been solved, but the problem of religion as well; for the fundamental truth of all religion seemed to have been discovered in the irrational-rational world spirit. An important supplementation to Eucken's "Tatphilosophie" was made by Grisebach when he studied Dilthey's more concrete historicism based on psychological experience.

A comparison of Eucken's, Bergson's and Simmel's "Lebensphilosophie", whose vague psychologico-genetic method led to a historicism and relativism, with the strict scientific and logistic method of the neo-Kantians seemed to reveal the advantage of the latter over the former. As a whole, however, Grisebach's course of studies disclosed to him the contradictions of the various schools of thought, their methods and their truths. Grisebach's enquiry into truth and reality had not procured for him an indisputable answer and therefore certainty. Accordingly, it ended in "embarrassment" (Verlegenheit). But as all these schools had grown from the great classical philosophers, Grisebach thought it would perhaps be wise not to commit himself at this stage, but to consult the masters, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, themselves.

Perhaps the gulf between Kantians, the disciples of Eucken and of Dilthey could be bridged by the new phenomenological method developing from the investigations of Bolzano and Brentano, which again moved into the foreground the problems of ontology? Did not the co-operation of the followers of Kant, Eucken and Dilthey improve the prospect of proceeding from the understanding of the historic world to a creative act of the mind? But all these attempts got stuck in the historic sphere, they did not really tackle the problems of actual life (Gegenwart), but kept moving within the immanent sphere of the mind, within the circle of the self, in short, within the theoretical field:

"Jeder Denker suchte den Anschluss an die historische Tradition zu bewahren und blieb deshalb im historischen Raum. Jeder Vorsatz eines 'handelnden Denkens' musste am Problem des Historismus scheitern, da die Kritik des historischen Bewusstseins versäumt wurde."¹

Thus the great amount of criticism, the great number of constructive methods that were offered, the many warring schools of thought that criticised and despised each other, but failed to criticise themselves, all this led Grisebach to the problem of "Gegenwart" (actuality). He begins to realise that all these systems and methods move only in an academic, theoretical circle of the self. They are therefore individualistic and egoistic and so invariably fail to lead man to the problems

¹ Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 184.

and conflicts of reality. On the contrary, they lead him away from them into a dream world, which he mistakenly takes to be real. Here, the everyday conflicts are conceived as representing a dialectical process which moves from or towards a metaphysical ground, and as this dialectical process is understood and therefore constituted by man's consciousness, it follows that man's ethical existence is thereby guaranteed. But what has really happened is that man, by constituting the conflicts and contradictions of everyday life as a dialectical principle in his mind, has moved the contingent actual events into a theoretical sphere. As a principle or as being remembered in man's mind, these events no longer belong to the present but to the past. It is therefore impossible that a dialectical principle or a constituted metaphysical or ontological ground, which man professes to know and which in reality is immanent even if it is postulated emanent, can guarantee man's ethical existence. Grisebach himself has found the way to his *critical philosophy* only gradually. Influenced by modern dialectical theology, especially that of Friedrich Gogarten, with whom he made a common effort to draw a clear line between theology and philosophy, he at first fell victim himself to the dialectical method. In "Erkenntnis und Glaube" and "Grenzen des Erziehers," the conflict between man and fellowman, their relation of mutual contradiction is still conceived as a principle, the "law of relatedness" (*Beziehungsgestzlichkeit*). In "Grenzen des Erziehers" the real ground is still understood as being reflected in the rift of the community (*Riss der Gemeinschaft*). It follows that it still could be known by its being reflected in actual life as the law of contradiction. Grisebach realises, however, that as long as he conceptualises the contingent events of actual life, as long as he conceives them in the form of a principle, they cease to be actual and are moved into memory and the past. They then, as a constitution of the mind, belong to the theoretical sphere. The moment they are conceived as a law which is generally understood and to which we are all subject, they are governed by the logos in which all contradiction is overcome. To arrive at the ethical sphere of *Gegenwart* (actuality), therefore, Grisebach must effect a clean break with all conventional philosophy, its systems and methods. This break is brought about in his chief work "*Gegenwart*," the appearance of which also ended his friendship with Friedrich Gogarten and his flirtation with dialectical theology. In this work he outlines the task of philosophy. Philosophy, instead of constructing new systems or constituting new principles, be it of a materialist or idealist nature, must turn critical and must expose the truths of the systems as untruths and lies. In the midst of the crisis of truth, as it exists to-day, it must raise its warning finger and refer man to the conflicts of everyday life. He will then experience the problematic nature of the real and the transcendent in the form of his fellowman. The latter, in contrast to mute nature and history, defies any control through construction. On the contrary, he contradicts, negates me and my truth, prevents my self from expanding itself into an absolute

and limits it, perhaps even terminates it. It is only through this contingent encounter between me and my fellowman that I experience the real as conflict, and only in the midst of this crisis ethical existence in the form of my being enabled to suffer and bear the contradiction on the part of my fellowman might occur to me. In other words, the transcendent is inaccessible to my reason or my will, it is not at my disposal. Any attempt to reach it through my reason or my will leads away from reality into a theoretical dream world. I cannot control the transcendent as the systems attempt to do; on the contrary, it controls me. By it I am justified.

It is obvious that Grisebach's critical philosophy is orientated towards the crisis of the time, thereby taking part directly in the great debate of actual occurrence and in the discussion of the present situation. Arthur Hübscher says about the result of Grisebach's critical philosophy :

“ Ein merkwürdiges Ergebnis : Was als Beitrag zur Selbstausslegung, Selbstbegrenzung und Kontrolle existentieller Begriffsbildung begann, führt in folgerichtiger Entwicklung unmittelbar an die konkreten Aufgaben der Gegenwart heran. Das Denken Grisebachs mündet in das grosse europäische Gespräch.”¹

3. Preliminary Remarks To The Problem Of “Gegenwart”

The problem of “Gegenwart” is one of Grisebach's chief problems. The reason why I decided to present this problem to this year's Congress is that it never loses its actuality, and that it forces us, as philosophers, to face the world in its naked reality, i.e., with all its conflicts, contradictions, pain and suffering. If we do not close our eyes, we find that we live in a world where the existing conflicts seem to sharpen in proportion to an increasing mechanisation and rationalisation of the world. But were we not told that science, technology and reason would lead us into the promised land, where our conflicts would be solved, where the civilisation of man would be advanced to a degree that we all lived in peace, happiness and harmony? Was this not the real meaning of progress? But in view of what is happening today, nobody can blame us for asking the question, whether the three above-mentioned forces have not achieved the opposite to what they meant to achieve. And the conflicts we experience in Africa today can really be understood only if they are seen as part of the world pattern.

In view of the existing situation of crisis throughout the world the question imposes itself on us as philosophers: What should be the rôle and attitude of philosophy? Can we afford any longer to ignore the actual problems and conflicts of the present and to overlook the crisis, which threatens to devour us, by going on to build our ivory towers in the form of imposing and awe-inspiring systems or to con-

¹ Denker unserer Zeit, p. 203.

stitute our general laws and universally valid principles as though nothing had happened? How can we justify our existence, if in view of unsurmountable conflicts and unbridgeable contradictions, which threaten to destroy mankind as a whole, we carry on as usual, namely, by quarrelling over philosophical methods and by quibbling about logistic niceties. If philosophy has nothing to do with life, what is its *raison d'être*? If we consider the history of philosophy from its Greek beginning up to date, the question arises: Do not all these various systems, different methods and starting-points, whether they parade under the name of realism, idealism, phenomenology, ontology, existentialism, logistic positivism, etc., represent the same, namely, man's over and over repeated attempt at self-realisation?

It is in this connection that Grisebach asks the justifiable question: How is it possible that the more man seeks to immunise conflict and contradiction by means of his reason, the more he endeavours to construct the real or true world by the constitution of the ontological principle, the scientific formula or the logical calculus, the more he estranges himself from actual life and lands himself in a mass of indissoluble contradictions? Is this not because all these systems, principles and formulae are founded in man's self and are nothing but the expansion of man's ego, so that, by constituting them, man never touches reality, but keeps moving within the circle of his self? In other words, are these systems, principles and formulae not all immanent and tautological? But if these systems, principles and formulae fail to overcome the conflicts of reality and on account of their egoistical nature even sharpen them, must we not seriously question their claim to lead us into ethical existence? Must we not turn critical and doubt the constitutive role of philosophy? Surely, if philosophy fails to constitute reality, and if its results are always questioned by another method, principle or formula, then the sphere of real existence or ethical existence must be elsewhere, and it then becomes the task of philosophy to refer us to this real world.

Grisebach now finds this real world not in the humanistic world of the sciences, technology, epistemology, logic, ethics, metaphysics or the fine arts, but in the conflicts and contradictions of everyday life. As far as we know, he is the first thinker who accepted the crisis of his time in its sheer nakedness and contingency, i.e., by endeavouring not to conceptualise the conflict and contradiction, thereby constituting another dialectical or ontological principle as is the case in dialectical theology and the philosophy of existence. He accused theology, the humanities, the sciences, technology and the fine arts of an insatiable hunger for power and blamed them for plunging us into catastrophe. He mercilessly exposed as Satanism man's self-assertive or what is commonly called constructive or creative nature. According to him, it was man's selfish individualism that led us into bankruptcy and that brought about the crisis of truth.

This brings us to the *problem of Gegenwart* or actuality as seen by Eberhard Grisebach. But we must warn that in such a brief paper we cannot hope to treat it exhaustively. We can only hope to sketch it in such a way that its significance for us today becomes apparent. It does not matter whether we like Grisebach's critical philosophy or whether we dislike it because it threatens our fundamental philosophical position. If Grisebach's problem of actuality has led us to reconsider our established philosophical methods in the light of the existing crisis situation (which is the very result of these methods), this paper will have achieved its purpose.

4. The Meaning Of Grisebach's Gegenwart (Actuality)

It is no mere coincidence that we translated Grisebach's "Gegenwart" by "actuality." This at once moves it into a sphere of its own, namely, into the sphere of actual occurrence, where man happens to encounter his fellowman and through him experiences contradiction and his limitation, which cause man to suffer. In other words, by "Gegenwart" Grisebach means the contingent world of everyday conflict, where no law, principle or real ground exists but where, on the contrary, all laws, principles and metaphysical grounds, in short, all knowledge of man, i.e., his self, are put in question and are negated by the fellowman's contradiction.

It follows that this sphere must be clearly separated from the technical, scientific and historic world, which are but illusory dream worlds and can never lead us to the real world; thus Grisebach distinguishes between the *real world*, which as the actual (problematic) world of *experience* is the only legitimate field of ethics, and the *world of truth or knowledge*, which is constituted in man's mind from some real ground or other or some universal principle. It thereby bypasses Gegenwart (actuality), avoids its conflicts and represents nothing but man's self-realisation (Wesenszirkel). We shall now treat these two spheres at greater detail, starting with the world of truth first and then discussing the sphere of Gegenwart (actuality).

5. The World Of Truth

In the beginning of his work "Gegenwart" Grisebach argues that our conception of *Gegenwart* or *Wirklichkeit* (the two may be said to be identical as is evident from the word actuality) rests on a confusion of the two spheres mentioned above. In other words, the taking as real of a self-constructed world is the fundamental error, not only of philosophy, but of the humanities, the sciences and technology in general. This error occurs by our basic assumption of a self-constituted real ground or general principle, which may be of a mystical, ontological, logical or empirical nature. By the knowledge of the real ground, of whatever nature, realistic or idealistic, the logical principle or mathe-

mathematical formula, we profess to know the real, notwithstanding that it is ourselves that have constituted it from ourselves, in accordance with our nature. In other words, the known real ground, principle or formula is always immanent, and its character of reality is thus a myth. It is, however, this real ground, principle or formula of whatever nature that represents the identification of reality and truth, and it is this very identification which is responsible for the confusion of the sphere of reality (experience) and the sphere of truth (knowledge). It is on the strength of this identification that the contradictory world of changing phenomena receives its status of reality, but at the same time all contradiction, conflict, and change are merged in a real ground, frozen in a dialectical principle, or grasped by the logical proposition, or constituted by the mathematical formula. And as all this occurs in the mind of the respective systematic thinker, it follows that the real ground, the principle, law or formula, is immanent and not emanent, even if the latter is supposed to be the case.

It is now the task of *critical philosophy* to analyse the true nature of the system, to expose through it the individual's desire to rule and to inflate his self into an absolute. Above all the dogmatic nature of the system should be revealed. Grisebach shows that the method of building the system or the angle from which the question is asked determines the structure of knowledge or the answer given to the question. In other words, in the principal question the answer is already contained or predetermined, for the simple reason that on account of the *autonomy of the self* (which causes the self to realise itself through its movement from itself to the real ground, principle or law, back to itself: *Wesenszirkel*) no *real* question has been asked. In this theoretical, academic sphere nothing was really at stake, the real conflict or contradiction from outside, through which everything became uncertain and questionable, had been bypassed or side-stepped by the self completing its own circle. It is for this reason that Grisebach allocates to philosophy the task of dismantling all systems and constructions and of preparing us to face the problematic nature of reality.

In "Schicksalsstunde des Abendlandes" and in the essay "Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit?" Grisebach seeks to show where this autonomy and absolutisation of the self have led us. Certain political ideologies and certain states were believed to be in possession of the absolute truth, and they all based it on some philosophy or other, which had applied all its ingenuity to found its system on some metaphysical ground or general principle. Thus, Grisebach is in a position to show that the constitutive and systematic nature of philosophy was greatly responsible for the destruction of the bourgeois world and values as well as the crisis of truth which ensued. The constituted truths of philosophy had led to totalitarianism, dogmatism and intolerance. They had revealed themselves as untruths and lies:

"Die Wahrheitskrise bedeutet den Zusammenbruch einer seit Jahrhunderten durch eine humanistische Weltanschauung aufgebau-

ten bürgerlichen Welt, welche die anderen Erdteile zu beherrschen im Begriffe war. Die Wahrheitskrise ist deshalb zugleich eine Weltkrise. . . . Unter den Trümmern der Lügegebäude zeigt sich nach Bereinigung der neue Boden, die harte Wirklichkeit, in welcher das Denken neue positive Aufgaben erhält. . . . Es wird sichtbar, was Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit ist."¹

As philosophy is guilty, not only by its constructive and constitutive nature but also, and perhaps even more, by the fact that it has for so long sought to hide the true state of affairs and has attempted to patch over the crisis and to cover the abyss before us, it is its duty to become critical and to reveal the real situation. It is not enough to merely acknowledge the crisis and conflict intellectually. This would at once move it into the world of memory and the past, so that it would no longer be actual. It would be treated as an intellectual principle, as is done by dialectical philosophy and theology.

But here the question arises: Does Grisebach reject the world of truth altogether? Does he not talk about the "Wesenszirkel", thereby admitting that it is man's very nature to be constitutive?

"Der Mensch befand sich hier (in the humanistic world of truth) . . . bei sich selbst (Eucken). Ein Himmel schien sich über der menschlichen Seele zu wölben. Alles unterstand dem Gesetz des Wesens. Das machte den Menschen in dieser Innenwelt so wertvoll. Ein System der Werte und Güter aus dem Wesen des Menschen geschöpft war hier massgebend. Das gab Heimatgefühl. In dieser Heimat wusste sich der Mensch autonom, das verlieh ihm das stolze Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstgefühl."²

We have not time here for criticism. We will only ask: Is this "Heimatgefühl" not essential to man? We are reminded here of thinkers who have made this the centre of their thought, e.g., O. F. Bollnow in "Neue Geborgenheit," A. de Saint-Exupéry in "Citadelle" and also M. Heidegger, who in an essay, "Bauen Wohnen Denken," argues that man's true nature is dwelling, and it is for this reason that he builds. But Grisebach would certainly ask back: Have you really found your home through building, or is what you build in reality the building up of your ego? Have you therefore found your true home, i.e., peace of mind, happiness or even blissful harmony? Or have you landed yourselves in a crisis which threatens to extinguish you altogether? Can the individualistic path, which leads to the glorification of the self, to self-righteousness, intolerance, etc., be the right way, or is it necessary for the self to be curbed and limited by something outside yourself to make possible a real community with your fellowman?

Hence Grisebach demands a clear decision for *either* the "internal" or the "external." The answer to our question, whether Grisebach

¹ Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit?, pp. 30 and 41.

² Gegenwart, pp. 10-11.

rejects the humanistic world altogether, is found when, in the second paragraph of the second chapter of his chief work "Gegenwart," he discusses the "pure method." He argues that if the humanistic world is to constitute a world of truth, it must be purged from all elements of reality. It must not claim to have anything to do with Gegenwart (actuality) or to include it. And it must not profess to include ethical reality either, which only exists through the external. It must keep in mind that it is a purely academic and absolutely technical world, the world of the intellect or sentiment, which exists only through man's memory and therefore in the past. It must not try to transgress these boundaries, but it must keep itself pure and confined to its own field. It is within these bounds that Grisebach recognises the humanistic world of truth as a field in which man gratifies his intellectual, technical and aesthetic aspirations. In other words, it is the world of man's enjoyment but no more.

As, however, each circle of the self of whatever nature is taken to represent reality (the practical or ethical sphere), the result is an uninhibited unfolding of the self, an unrestricted individualism and egoism, leading to the absolute negation of the other circle, which will consistently result in a war of all against all: "Ein Willenskreis würde durch seine zentrale Kraft den anderen zurückzudrängen suchen, wie das tatsächlich im Leben vor unseren Augen geschieht."¹ Seen in the light of the actual crisis (Gegenwart), therefore, the old accepted virtues: σοφία (wisdom), ἀνδρεία (courage, strength of mind, endurance), ἐπιθυμία (desire, striving), σωφροσύνη (temperance), δικαιοσύνη (justice), which in a modified form are still valid to-day, lead man into isolation, as they rest on man's self. They are no longer virtues but vices,² because, as the expansion of man's ego, they prevent him from finding the way to his fellowman and make impossible the formation of a community. As the above virtues may be interpreted in many various ways and from a variety of underlying principles, a clash of wills or a crisis of truth is inevitable.

And is this crisis not occurring just now before our very eyes throughout the world including this African continent of ours? Should not this cause us philosophers to pause and think, so that we become critical of our accepted values, our creative urge, our disposition to constitute and to systematise, our high aims and noble aspirations? Should we not seriously take stock of the nature of our philosophical work in the light of the demands of Gegenwart? In how far is Grisebach's postulate justified that philosophy give up its constitutive and constructive work and instead assume the critical task of a warner, thus questioning any claim on any one's part to absoluteness, universality, reality, etc., and referring man to the actual situation in which he finds himself? It cannot be denied that the realisation of the questionability, fallibility and contradictoriness of all our self-

¹ Gegenwart, p. 468.

² Cf. the chapter on : Satanism, in : Gegenwart, pp. 467-472.

constructed human truths will lead us to a *critical attitude of reserved judgment* which will prevent us from being dogmatic or one-track-minded hotspurs. It will prevent us from becoming the slave of our own truth, and will lead us to be genuinely free and tolerant (not to toleration as a rule by which I *must* be tolerant *on principle*). It will cause us to have an open mind for the truth, i.e., the interests and needs, in short, the situation of our fellowman, and thus to be modest, unassuming and tactful. It saves us from the presumption of asserting that only our respective philosophical view, or only the school of thought to which we subscribe represents *the truth*, and therefore philosophy. This attitude, in spite of its detrimental effects, which we are experiencing to-day, seems however still to exist even among philosophers. The acuteness of the crisis, which resulted from such claims of having found *the truth*, led Grisebach to the conviction that such dogmatic conduct is immoral and even vicious—and let us mark well: *the kind or nature of the absolute ground or principle does not matter*. It is therefore impossible to condemn one absolute or universal idea, principle, formula, etc., and to *accept another*.

We now realise that this Congress is constituted of representatives of the most divergent schools of thought. And yet, or just because of this, our discussions and debates could be very fruitful, if they were conducted in the spirit of *critical, reserved judgment*, i.e., if we realised that the various views, perspectives, stand-points presented by the various lecturers are all true in the sense that, in the end, they were all constituted from a particular situation of life. None of the views presented here, therefore, will reveal *the truth* to us. But behind each view presented, there is man with his various needs, interests which spring from his particular existential situation. In other words, this Congress, too, represents a clash of wills on a small scale. But, now, our critical attitude of reserved judgment will lead us to an understanding and appreciative attitude of the other's point of view. We are prepared and willing to listen to him and perhaps even to adjust and modify our views, instead of making an all out effort to assert ourselves by repressing him, thus seeking to control and to master him. If our Congress is conducted in this critical spirit, it is impossible that the various speakers in presenting their views erect unsurmountable walls which inevitably divide them from one another. On the contrary, just because of the contradictions, they are led to a discussion of the existing conflicts in the spirit of mutual understanding and respect in which a genuine human relationship can be formed. If this should be the fruit of this Congress, then it has achieved more than any artificial patching over of the existing conflicts could have done, which is only a false front. *It lies in our hands whether we are gathered together here in truth or in reality*. It is the conflicts that are real, in which we are directly involved and which link us to our fellowman. We must therefore accept them with an open mind and an understanding attitude. What we need is not to overcome these conflicts, for this is impossible

because it would be tantamount to overcoming life as such, but *co-operation in contradiction*. It is under this motto that I should like to place the 7th Congress of the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy in South Africa.

Even if we do not agree with the splitting of the world by Grisebach into a humanistic world of truth and an ethical world of contingent experience (conflict) and argue that the two worlds are really one (as I would argue), we must admit that there lurk great dangers in our constructive and systematic disposition. The situation in Grisebach's time (the period between the two World Wars till after the Second World War) had clearly revealed the catastrophe into which idealist philosophy on the one hand and the myth of scientism (which was as absolute in character as the former) had plunged us. It is in the light of this experience that we must understand Grisebach's negative attitude concerning man's constituted truths, whether theological; philosophical, educational, artistic, scientific, technological, and that, from the ethical point of view, he saw in them only the manifestation of evil resulting from man's evil nature, his egoism and his megalomania. Man's self-centredness causes him to evolve the universe from himself, no matter whether this evolution is realistically or idealistically founded. In this self-transcendence on the part of man, Grisebach sees the origin of all evil :

“Denn es gehört nur Selbstbesinnung dazu, um das menschliche Selbst als den Ursprung alles Bösen, als den wahren Satan zu erkennen. . . . Das Böse ist somit nicht auf rätselhafte Weise in die Welt gekommen : wir sind der Ursprung alles Übels selbst, soweit die Entfaltung unserer Egoität Gegenwart und Gemeinschaft gefährdet.”¹

In this way man's constructions, principles, laws, values assume the character of the Satanic. The outer splendour of man's cultural and civilisatory edifices is deceptive, treacherous and tempting. They conceal the emptiness, the nothing, the abyss under their glittering surface :

“Die Natur des Menschen ist nicht gut, sie ist böse. Das ist kein ethisches Urteil, sondern ein logisches : es gehört zum Wesen des Ich, sich unbegrenzt zu entfalten. In der Welt, in der die menschliche Natur herrscht, geht es böse zu. Die unbeherrschte Bosheit ist vorherrschend. Jeder andere, der sich der Ausweitung eines Ichkreises widersetzt, wird verneint und vernichtet. Diese Vernichtung geschieht mit Fleiss, Besonnenheit, d.h. mit aller Tugend. Das Ich betätigt sich in einem absolut negativen Urteil, wenn es sich entfaltet.”²

It is obvious that, as regards his doctrine of Satanism, Grisebach links up with Kierkegaard's ethics of evil.

¹ *Gegenwart* pp. 468-471

² *ibid.*, pp. 469-470,

6. The World Of Gegenwart (Actuality)

A. Epistemological Aspect

From the above it becomes clear that Grisebach aims at a clear separation between knowledge and experience. Knowledge is possible only in the world of memory, the past, yesterday, in brief, in the immanent humanistic world. Experience is afforded to us from the outside in Gegenwart, i.e., in the struggle and conflict of actual life, the accidental encounter taking place between myself and the fellowman. Through his contradiction my ego is limited and negated. My truth and my values are put in question, and I become uncertain of myself. The real, therefore, is the transcendent or the emanent, which in the form of my fellowman contradicts me and causes me to suffer. It is of a problematic nature, and as it terminates all my truth and my knowledge, I cannot possibly form a concept of it. But in this connection the question will be asked: Where does my mind, my thinking come in? Surely I am capable of understanding that there is such a conflict between me and my fellowman? But at the same time Grisebach argues that by thinking, talking and writing about this very conflict, in short, by understanding it, it is no longer actual. It has been committed to the theoretical world of truth, memory and the past, and now is understood logically, as a dialectical principle. Thereby the identity between subject and object has again been restored. But do we not all observe a logos in which others participate, if we wish to communicate something to our fellowmen, so that the object under discussion is understood by all, and does Grisebach not do the same? Grisebach admits that this is so. No philosophy (Grisebach's critical philosophy included) can escape the theoretical:

“Indem die kritische Philosophie in Erinnerung behält, dass sie dem theoretischen Bestande niemals entfliehen kann, hat sie für das Gegenwartsproblem selbst nur noch Warnungen anzubieten.”¹

In other words, once critical philosophy has exposed the untruth, emptiness, dogmatic nature and contradictoriness of the human truths and systems, which, however much they differ, constitute nothing but a circle of the self and so contain in themselves their own respective logos, it arrives at a dialectical multiple logos. The development of this logos is no systematic unfolding of an eternally valid logos, but the real struggle of man against man, word against word, speech against speech, reason against rationality. It is the positive task of critical philosophy to make these various modes of speech intelligible to each other. In other words, the new logos reveals the crisis and above all *the common distress whereby we are all linked*. It is of the greatest practical significance for us to-day, wherever we are, in Europe, Asia or in Africa, when Grisebach says:

¹ Gegenwart, p. 478.

“Der Grund und Boden, auf dem wir Europäer miteinander reden ist . . . die gemeinsame Heimat, die gemeinsame Not. Sie ist die menschliche Wirklichkeit auf unserem Kontinent, die wir uns nicht ausdenken, sondern die sich in der konkreten Gesprächslage geistig als Wortwelt entwickelt. Es ist unser Beruf, der sozialen Not zu dienen und vor allem die Missverständnisse und Verwechslungen der Sachräume nach Möglichkeit zu beseitigen. Wir fragen daher nach dem Grund des Missverstehens. Diesen Grund feststellen heisst schon den geistigen Aufbau positiv befördern, die Arbeiter am Bau einander näherbringen. Das setzt eine Sprachkenntnis, das Werkzeug einer Logoslehre voraus.”¹

In preparing us for Gegenwart, critical philosophy, so to speak, dismantles the systems. It warns us against an overestimation of ourselves, self-deception and rash solutions or answers based on the circle of the self. It rejects the competency of all theoretical efforts for ethical reality and even the constitutive meaning of this rejection itself. After critical philosophy has afforded us a glimpse into the problematic nature of reality, it practises self-restraint and keeps passive. It virtually rejects itself and then keeps silent. Philosophy, now, plays the part of “Aschenbrödel” (Cinderella). From a quiet corner it can only warn, not to overstep the boundary. This alertness and attentiveness of philosophy, which has risen from a self-warning, is the minimum measure of virtue that may be accorded to man without overestimating himself. But this virtue must not be generalised as an “ought” or a real virtue. It cannot be recommended to the other as a condition of existence. It is only a critical technical virtue which falls within the theoretical sphere. It has not yet anything to do with “Gegenwart” (actuality); for:

“Der Zirkel des Selbst ist mit der kritischen Erkenntnis noch nicht überschritten.”²

Grisebach makes it clear that one cannot really talk of an external within the sphere of knowledge. Knowledge can only experience an external through being questioned and contradicted by the fellowman. The world of experience and contingency, however, is quite a different sphere in which no attitude, calculation, expectation or sentiment has any more meaning.

It follows that the cognition by philosophy of the problematic nature of reality at the same time draws a clear-cut line between the theoretical and the practical, the internal and the external, the identical and the divergent, the necessary and the contingent, in short, the homogeneous world of truth and the problematic nature of the real world. All that critical philosophy can do, therefore, is to refer us to the practical world, but it can never really lead us into it by constituting it. Any attempt of this nature would at once throw us back into the circle of the self.

¹ Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 294.

² Gegenwart, p. 479.

It would therefore lead us away from *Gegenwart* (actuality) into the theoretical world of memory and of yesterday. Critical philosophy must be content with the problematic situation of knowledge itself or, to put it differently, with the questionability, doubtfulness and uncertainty of all knowledge.

In the crisis of all knowledge, therefore, we acquire a *Reife* (maturity of thought). Critical insight leads us to the expectation of an *Ansprechende* (one that applies himself to us). This in turn leads us to *Bescheidenheit* (self-restraint), which is a virtue and belongs to the inner theoretical sphere. Even this *technical* virtue can easily become evil by laying claim to ethical reality to which it does not belong. To it may occur (in the literal sense of the word: *occurro*-encounter, in German: *widerfahren*) *Bescheidung* (limitation). It then receives a *Bescheid* (communication). But it must be clearly understood that *Bescheidung* (limitation) belongs to the external, contingent, practical sphere, which we cannot know but only experience. The same difference exists between *Hörigkeit* (keeping oneself open to the contradiction of the fellowman in self-restraint), which we can learn and practise, or which we can adopt as an attitude and which, therefore, as a virtue, belongs to the technical world and *Gehorsam* (obedience), which belongs to the practical contingent world. But by obedience is not meant a listening to oneself or being true to one's nature, which leads only to an unfolding of the ego and therefore is evil, but real *Gehorsam* through which a *Bescheid* (communication) from the outside is endured and borne as something that causes suffering.

Thus the technical virtues constitute the border of the technical world and of our knowledge, which at the same time has turned critical and has become a problem to itself. This problematic nature, now, of knowledge always refers us to something which contradicts all knowledge and renders it questionable. It refers us to and prepares us for a world in which all our abilities, dispositions, principles, attitudes, in brief, all our essential characteristics fail, are contradicted and questioned:

“Durch die Unterscheidung der Tugenden als Anzeichen der Reife und einer zukünftigen Erfahrung ist uns die Grenze zwischen wissenschaftlich-humanistischem Denken und dem gegenwärtigen verantwortungsvollen Leben haarscharf gezogen worden. Jede Welt hat nun ihren eigenen Bereich. Eine sachliche Auseinandersetzung über beide Welten ist auf Grundlage dieser Unterscheidung möglich. Das wissenschaftliche Denken kann in der problematischen Gegenwart selbst die Erfahrung seiner Begrenzung machen, doch davon urteilend zu reden steht ihm nicht mehr zu.”¹

B. Practical Significance.

From the above it becomes obvious that critical thought fulfilled a twofold purpose: It led us to a new *logos* through which the crisis of

¹ *Gegenwart*, p. 509.

truth was brought home to us, and it referred us to another world, which critical knowledge experienced in the form of a limit, i.e., by being contradicted itself. The self-restraint of critical philosophy, therefore, which was the result of the consciousness of crisis on the part of critical thought, was only a technical virtue, which still belonged to the theoretical sphere, and did not yet possess any true ethical significance. But this must not blind us to the fact that the theoretical in the form of critical thought was necessary to let us seek reality elsewhere than in the human truths. In other words, the realisation of the crisis of truth is the presupposition to turning from the world of memory or yesterday to that of actuality or to-day in the expectation of a *Zukommende* (a future coming), namely, ethical existence. It follows from this that Grisebach's critical philosophy has not only theoretical but, in a much greater measure, practical significance, especially for us to-day, who seem to be moving within rigid ideologies and thus along the edge of an abyss into which we might tumble at any moment.

The practical significance of Grisebach's critical philosophy is understood by the fact that it blames man's nature, his self-assertiveness, his desire to rule, his cultural and educational fanaticism for the crisis in which he finds himself. In a yet unpublished series of lectures entitled: "Introduction to Education," delivered during the summer semester of 1945 at the University of Zürich, Grisebach says :

"Hier in Gegenwart wird ihm seine eigene falsche Erziehung und sein bisher begangenes Unrecht, seine Verfehlung durch Einsicht in die Folgen seiner Erziehungssucht, seiner Schulmeisterei, seines Bildungsfanatismus täglich klar werden, wenn er noch Gehör für die wirkliche Lage hat."

Theology, philosophy, education and science are all guilty of having lent themselves as tools for man's vanity and will to power. It is thus not surprising that they achieved the opposite to what they meant to accomplish. Instead of leading man towards the promised land, where there would be a minimum of conflict and suffering and a maximum of harmony and peace, where reason and culture triumphed, in brief, to a land where humanism proved victorious, the aforementioned fields of human activities had led him into yet deeper conflicts, to the brink of disaster. Not only were they helplessly divided in themselves, but they had failed to build up a real world as they professed to do. They had led man away from actual life into an imaginary world of isolation, which was really based on man's self and therefore could never find the way to the fellowman and establish a true community. And it made no difference whether these human worlds were constructed from nature or the mind. Whether man unfolded and realised himself by making passive and mute nature the basis of his structure as in realism, or whether he evolved nature from his mind as in idealism, was in the end the same thing. In reality both poles merely served man to complete the circle of his own self.

The historic world was no exception. By remembering the past feats, exploits and cultural acts of man, the historian¹ already believes in presenting reality. But he seeks in history that which he already assumes, namely, the gradual unfolding and emancipation of the spirit in some way or other, which manifests itself by progressively creating ever new cultural systems and political organisations. By remembering the ever present spirit as the *continuum* in all change and decay, the historian believes that he thereby takes part in the process of ever fresh creation by the spirit. This explains the ever young classical spirit of the philologists and the historians :

“ Während der Tag mit seinem klassischen Werke zur Neige ging, setzten die Philologen und Historiker ein, um sich in der Erinnerung des eben vollendeten Werkes zu bemächtigen, um die Blumen der Poesie ganz frisch zu pflücken, die Werte der Kultur aufzureihen, wie die Perlen auf eine Schnur. Eine Bildungswelt entwickelte sich in der Erinnerung, in welcher die Spuren der schöpferischen Geister, nicht nur der letzten Zeit, festgehalten wurden. . . . Mit den Erinnerungsweisen und dem Aufbau einer Bildungswelt gewannen die Geisteswissenschaften an Bedeutung.”²

The Christian religion, too, was rationalised and historicised by theologians, so that it, too, became part of the world of memory and lost its original practical and anti-historical character. Through the buttressing of the Christian faith by Greek philosophy, the classical canon was continued and the Christian faith became a Christian humanism. This process of conversion, which may be said to have been initiated by Augustine, found its consistent outcome in Hegel's thought. In reference to Hegel's philosophy I have said elsewhere : “ The Christian epoch is the epoch of fulfilment. In this fulfilment the spirit is free and has returned to itself. Here, history, philosophy and theology are merged, and as this process takes place in man's consciousness, it follows that the self-emancipation of the spirit is at the same time the self-creation of man in freedom.”³

Small wonder then that the theologian A. von Harnack calls the dogma : “ Ein Werk des griechischen Geistes auf dem Boden des Evangeliums”, and religion “ Hauptstück der Kultur.” It is against this Christian humanism and culture⁴ that Kierkegaard lodges his protest in

¹ By “ historian ” Grisebach here means the historian of culture or the philosopher of history rather than the historian proper who seeks to arrange and to interpret the mass of historic data.

² Jacob Burckhardt als Denker, p. 16.

³ Cf. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, pp. 46, 47, 90, 91.

⁴ On Christian humanism cf. Grisebach : Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, ch. V, and in connection with contemporary theology : Zwei Vorkämpfer kirchlicher Theologie zu Erich Przywara's S. J. Analogia entis, in : Freiheit u. Zucht, XIX., pp. 321-339.

the name of the soul, but according to Grisebach, he, too, remains within the circle of his self.

This analytical historic attitude, now, which results from the myth of the revelation of the spirit in history, is of the most dire consequences. It misleads the young generation completely, who imagine themselves torch-bearers of culture and the agents and messengers of the historic spirit. It causes them to despise the older generation as backward, and they are tempted to become overweening and overbearing, intolerant and dogmatic. The feeling of being in possession of the historic spirit induces them to be rash in their judgment and to evade true responsibility to their fellowman. They turn their face to the future, by carrying on the historic spirit in the direction of the promised land, which they possess already in their imagination. That is why each generation believes that the task is entrusted to them to bring about a better world, in which we find more perfect people.¹

Thus, look where we will, the attempt to reach the absolute by self-realisation and self-transcendence invariably leads to a clash of wills, to utter confusion, to despair and frustration. For if we look at the present world situation, there are few signs which point to a better world and a more civilised and cultured mankind, except perhaps in the merely technical sense of the word civilisation. And as far as the reasonableness of man's present conduct is concerned, we venture to put a large question mark. In fact the question could be asked: Has the crisis not reached its very climax? It is therefore in a genuine concern for the future of mankind that Grisebach's critical philosophy has its origin. He himself experienced acutely the clash of ideologies, which all claimed to represent *the* truth, and this struggle is still on to-day. It is from this immediate experience of the threat to man's very existence that in the above-mentioned unpublished series of lectures, "Introduction to Education," he admonishes his young student teachers to remain critical and to take part in the present discussions that arise from the common experience of the crisis, thereby taking part in actual events. He warns against an overbearing pedagogism, a blind fanaticism to educate, instead of leading the pupil to *Gegenwart*, i.e., the actual problems of the present. He once more categorically rejects any absolute and dogmatic stand-point, and warns the young teacher to allow himself to become its mouth-piece, thereby again misleading the young generation.

Whether, now, we agree or disagree with the way in which Grisebach proposes to deal with the crisis, we nevertheless can understand the distrust and pessimism he evinces as regards reason and human nature. It becomes clear to us why he looks for a world which is not based on man's nature and man's imagination. And he finds this

¹ As regards the historic outlook of the young generation, cf. Grisebach: *Das Moderne an der Kunst and das Generationsproblem*, in: *Freiheit u. Zucht*, ch. IV, pp. 44-68.

world in precisely the sphere from which man's self-constructed truths are contradicted and negated. This world is transcendent in the sense that it is external to us and that we have no control over it. On the contrary, it controls us by limiting us, putting a stop to the expansion of our ego, our worlds constructed from nature and from spirit in time and in memory as well as to our historic continuum constituted by us in the same way. That is why M. Heidegger's attempt to base man's ethical existence on the temporality of being (*Dasein zum Nichts*) is ranged by Grisebach among the humanistic truths which fail to realise man's ethical existence:

“Das Buch von Martin Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit,’ Halle 1927, ist eine in ihrer Methodik völlig geschlossene tiefeschürfende Arbeit über das Problem der Zeit. Sie bildet vielleicht auf lange den Höhepunkt des humanistisch-technischen Denkens. Wir danken ihr die Möglichkeit, unser Problem der Gegenwart auch gegen eine phänomenologische Untersuchung deutlich abheben zu können. Der Sinn des Seins wird als Zeitlichkeit des Seins entdeckt und aufgewiesen. Das ist nur möglich auf Grund des vorausgehenden ausdrücklichen Entscheides für die Immanenz des Systems, für das sich selbst denkende Selbst, für die humanistischen Menschen.”¹

In other words, the temporal and historic world is the world of yesterday. It is the contingent, anti-temporal and anti-historic world which makes possible an ethical existence in faith to-morrow, the peace of which surpasses all understanding.

The emanent or transcendent, now, confronts me in the form of my fellowman. In the accidental encounter that takes place in everyday life between me and my fellowman, I experience my limitation and negation. His contradiction causes me to suffer. If now any critical insight has already prepared me in such a way that it has led me to the technical virtues as described above, i.e., self-restraint and willingness to keep myself open to the other and listen to him, it *may* occur to me that I find myself able to endure the complete negation of my self including the aforementioned technical virtues and my attitude of expectation, which belong to the humanistic sphere. To put it differently, I may find myself enabled to bear the contradiction of my fellowman in passion (suffering):

“Auf dieser Grenzscheide der Entscheidung wird das Unerwartete vielleicht Ereignis, was wir Zukunft nennen.”²

In other words, in the event of my bearing my fellowman's contradiction in passion, the experience of a peace might occur to me which, as we saw, surpasses all understanding. It is then that I would lead an *ethical existence*. In the event, now, of my being able to bear the con-

¹ *Gegenwart*, pp. 511-512

² *ibid.*, p. 483

³ *ibid.*, p. 579

tradition of my fellowman in passion, I find myself in *Gegenwart* or in *real time*, which in contrast to time as a principle of homogeneity, of order and of judgment cannot be derived from our own nature. It is the very moment of the endured conflict itself, and it is therefore itself problematic. It is therefore the very discontinuity of time or we may perhaps say, it represents the contingent experience of endured contradiction. :

“Es ist eine ganz neue Situation geschaffen, in welcher das Ich nicht mehr im Mittelpunkt steht. Der Wesenszirkel nützt uns nichts mehr, das Wesen kann sich aber deshalb nicht dieser kritischen Situation entziehen, indem es wieder über dieses Heute reflektiert. Im Heute ist alle Reflexion selbst in Anspruch genommen und allem Wissen von Zeit und Zeiten widersprochen.”¹

The significance and importance of this practical sphere of ethical existence lie in the fact that here the fellowman confronts us as the emanent or the external of which we cannot take possession as we can in the case of a natural object by which we can unfold ourselves just as we can by our mind. The fellowman does not lend itself to such constitutiveness and constructiveness. On the contrary, he contradicts, he says no, he puts everything in question, he limits me and prevents me from unfolding my ego. In other words, he is the constant stumbling block, and it is through him that I experience the problematic nature of the real, which I can never know and which I can never possess, but which I can only suffer. But it is exactly on the ground of this suffering that, according to Grisebach, the only true community is possible, that we become aware of the fact that man never exists in oneness but always in twoness. We only have to think of the conflicts of the family, between father and son, mother and daughter, brother and brother, sister and sister, master and servant. But the family represents a true community just because, as a community, which destiny has joined together, they must put up with each other, and it often happens that, in the family, conflict and contradiction are borne in reality. And do not all nations and all men after all form one family? Should it not be possible that they took up a critical attitude in Grisebach's sense, which would lead them to the virtue of self-control or self-restraint, and to the willingness to listen to each other and their respective points of view, instead of each trying to make the other conform to some truth, ideology or principle to which a particular nation or man happens to subscribe? Unfortunately, it all too often happens that a particular nation, group of nations or a particular man or group of men proclaim their point of view as *the* truth and pass moral judgment on other nations or men, without realising that the ethical sphere lies outside their truth, principle or ideology to which they happen to subscribe. In other words, it is not for nations or men to judge each other in the light of their self-styled and self-constituted

¹ *Gegenwart* p. 572

truths, principles and ideologies (for they represent nothing but man's self-realisation from a particular self-constituted rational ground and are therefore all relative), but it is nations and men that are judged and justified by the transcendent in reality. What we need, therefore, in our present crisis are no more new truths and principles to solve it, but an *understanding attitude* for our fellow-nations and our fellowmen. Any principle, which is forwarded as a solution of the crisis, only sharpens it, and the more it is stressed, the more it provokes contradiction. Once we realise that the conflict cannot be removed by principles and ideologies of whatever nature, but represents the real, we shall also understand that it is the very crisis through which we are referred to each other. The common experience of the crisis, which we share with our fellowman and fellow-nations, sets us a common task which links us together in a genuine community. In other words, a real community would be brought about by the discussion of our mutual needs and interests as they arise out of the actual situation or *Gegenwart*. In the recognition, therefore, of the *permanent crisis* we are together with our fellowman no longer in truth but *in reality* :

“Nicht durch neue Theorien und Systeme können die Krisen überwunden werden, sondern durch das Anerkenntnis der in Wirklichkeit vorhandenen permanenten Krise.”¹

C. Metaphysical Aspect

We have seen that Grisebach's critical philosophy exposed the metaphysical grounds of the philosophical systems, be they of a realistic or idealistic nature, as the self-transcendence or self-absolutisation of man. They were immanent and accessible to man because they were based on man's own nature. They were therefore imaginary and constituted a myth. Critical philosophy led us to the realisation of the problematic nature of reality, the contingent character of which did not allow us to form a concept of it. Any conceptualisation of the problematic nature of reality would at once have moved it back into the world of memory and the past. In fact, this was done by dialectical philosophy and theology, which by their method of the paradox elevated the contingent, contradictory nature of reality to a principle.² It follows that neither philosophy nor theology is able to *constitute* reality. They can only construct into an absolute their self-assumed principle, proposition or theologoumenon. The real in its absolute form, therefore, is completely inaccessible to man. It is not at his disposal at all but absolutely transcendent. The problematic nature of this transcendent can be experienced only in *Gegenwart*, i.e., as the problematic nature of the real in the form of contradiction on the part of our fellowman. In other words, it is the *foreign* other man, who, as

¹ Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, p. 317.

² Cf. Grisebach, Zwei Vorkämpfer kirchlicher Theologie zu Erich Przywara's S. J. *Analogia entis*, in : *Freiheit und Zucht*.

the stumbling block, is my negation. Through his contradiction he makes really impossible all theoretical metaphysics :

“Damit ist das Problem des Transzendenten aus dem Bereich der Erkenntnis herausgerückt, aber zugleich der Erkenntnis erst absolut nahe gekommen.”¹

In the description of the actual experience, i.e., the limitation of the self as passion, which description occurs by taking into account the transcendent, critical philosophy has exhausted itself. From now on the philosopher leaves the field to the theologian, who of course must not make the experience of the problematic nature of the real the presupposition to knowledge, thereby becoming systematic, constitutive, dogmatic, and thereby missing *Gegenwart* (actuality) on his part. He can only report what has happened in the sphere of experience through the transcendent in reference to the philosopher. His field lies there where suffering (experience) is borne in contact with a transcendent (contradiction of the fellowman) in faith, in the real *Entscheidung* (decision) which, however, is not man's, but can only be experienced in the crisis, that is, the *Scheidung* (separation) of unequal men. The conflict resulting from this separation can never be solved by man or be removed by systematic knowledge :

“Denn der Frieden der ethischen Existenz ist höher als alle Vernunft.”²

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Grisebach designates peace as the basic theme of the theologian, but he, too, like the philosopher, can really only warn. The crisis or conflict as a result of man's inequality and therefore of *Scheidung* (separation) is the true ground where suffering can be endured in faith. As it really puts a stop to all knowledge, it constitutes the complete separation between knowledge and faith or the world of memory (the theoretical, technical world) and the world of experience (the contingent, practical and ethical world).³

We notice that critical theology practises as much self-restraint as critical philosophy. Both must beware of constituting the experience of conflict as a dialectical principle. Both wage a defensive struggle against possible metaphysical assumptions of whatever nature. It must be clearly understood, however, that even this defensive work (which requires the greatest self-restraint) still moves in the technical or theoretical sphere. The technical virtue of theology Grisebach calls *Mannhaftigkeit* (manliness). Thus neither theology nor philosophy is justified in pronouncing an ethical judgment on man's existence :

“Das Urteil über die Existenz kann in der Dimension der Erfahrung nur die wirkliche Rechtfertigung sein, die der wirkliche Theologe als sein eigentlichstes Thema und als Glauben für die

¹ *Gegenwart*, p. 482.

² *ibid.*, p. 483.

³ *ibid.*, p. 485.

Kirche vorbehält. Mit der Dimension der Erkenntnis, in welcher Sein beurteilt wird, hat solche Rechtfertigung nichts zu tun."¹

The influence of Luther's doctrine of *justification by faith* is obvious here. There, too, the crisis is the presupposition to the experience of faith, which experience is contingent and an "opus externum."²

If we now subsume Grisebach's critical thought under the event of the Cross, it may be said to assume an eschatological character. It appears as though, in the experience of bearing the contradiction of my fellowman in passion, my ego is shrunk to the point where I have lost my original nature (which consists in positing myself as a self as is manifest in the theoretical humanistic world) and am thereby moved nearer to the nature of that which makes my ego shrink. This is the more probable, the more it appears incomprehensible how there can still be conflict when conflict is being borne. Does this not remove all conflict? But we must remember that Grisebach himself talks about peace which surpasses all understanding. But could we not say that in contrast to the immanent systems, where man transcends himself, in Grisebach's actual bearing the conflict in passion man is being transcended? If this is so, does this not mean that he is moved nearer to the transcendent, and in the experience of bearing the conflict has been made to enter into communication with it, thereby being led to an ethical existence, i.e., faith? That it must be so, becomes clear, if we take into account the totally practical and realistic significance Grisebach ascribes to the Cross:

"Das Kreuz ist als Zeichen aller enttäuschten irdischen Hoffnungen, als ein Anlass zur Beunruhigung der menschlichen Natur, als Widerspruch zu aller ihrer Selbstsucht und Herrschaft auf einem Hügel errichtet worden, den kein Heldendenkmal, kein Bildungstempel, kein Katheder und kein Herrscherthron passend schmücken kann."³

In other words, the Cross is the absolute contradiction to man's nature. It is anti-historical and anti-theoretical. It is the total negation of the humanistic world, the absolute No. Jesus, on the Cross, gave a living example of absolute obedience, patience, humility, love and hope. By enduring His passion to the bitter end, He lived absolute faith. In the hour of utter darkness He delivered Himself up into the hands of the Father. According to Grisebach, there is nothing mystical about the sacrificial death of Jesus. It was a realistic and sober affair. Jesus overcomes death by dying in absolute faith. He dies with a word of *peace* on His lips when He prays: "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do." Thus, the resurrection of Jesus takes place on the Cross. It is by the Cross, therefore, that God reveals Himself, and in the unbounded faith of Jesus His promise is fulfilled:

¹ Gegenwart, p. 485.

² Cf. H. M. Müller, Erfahrung u. Glaube bei Luther.

³ Schicksalsstunde des Abendlandes, p. 110

“Die Zukunft des Gottesreiches war für ihn nicht mehr der Gegenstand einer neuen Prophezeiung; sie wird ihm im Glauben und im Leide wirklich auf dieser Erde erfüllt.”¹

From the above it follows that, if we regard the problem of *Gegenwart* (actuality) in the light of the Cross, Grisebach's whole critical philosophy assumes a religious character. Man's constructivist and constitutive nature, his disposition to realise himself by transcending himself, in brief, the various humanistic logoi now appear as sin for which he must atone through suffering. In the crisis, therefore, through passion, man is justified in the event of being enabled to bear his fellowman's contradiction. It is then that he has been led into an ethical existence, i.e., into the experience of faith in Christ as an *opus externum*. Through the peace which he might experience through faith, he participates in God's kingdom.

If the above interpretation is correct, then we are justified in saying that, philosophically speaking, the Cross represents Grisebach's *meta-physical ground or real ground*, which man does not reach by self-transcendence, but into which he is merged by being transcended through his ego being shrunk to virtually nothing.

The question now arises: Can Grisebach still justly claim to move within the precincts of “*Gegenwart*” or is he through faith again merged with the real ground, and, therefore, has relapsed into truth? Grisebach would of course point out that the Cross as the absolute contradiction of man's imaginary world is the very realisation of the practical world of contingency and conflict. But is this contradiction not absolute, and is not through it all conflict overcome? Has the crisis not been ended, so that peace reigns and the Kingdom of God has been realised? Thus, we cannot help feeling that Grisebach's critical philosophy is really but a protestant theology in philosophical disguise.

7. Conclusion

But this result must not blind us to the fact of the great significance and importance of Grisebach's philosophy for us to-day. In our opinion it lies in his attempt to expose as unreal and illusory our human truths, our culture, civilisation and our self-determined values and virtues. They are the result of the expansion of our self and the fruit of egoism. They cannot, therefore, but constitute evil from the ethical point of view, and, instead of solving our problems and bringing about a better world and causing mankind to become happier, they plunge us into disaster. It is now Grisebach's great merit to have traced reality to the contingent world of everyday conflict in which, by the accidental encounter of man and fellowman, there occurs a clash of wills. In other words, it is through the fellowman that we experience the problematic nature of the real, which inflicts on us so much pain

¹ *Schicksalsstunde des Abendlandes*, p. 111.

and suffering. Grisebach has opened our eyes to the fact that, in this world, we do not adjust ourselves to the transcendent by striving towards it, i.e., by evolving it from our own being, so that it is really immanent, but we are being adjusted by the transcendent, i.e., we experience it as the unequal, as contradiction, in short, as the emanent. This contradiction at first leads us to the technical virtues of self-restraint and the willingness to keep ourselves open to the voice of our fellowman. By these technical virtues we find ourselves in expectation of something that might occur to us, namely, the ability to bear the conflict between me and my fellowman in passion. It is this contingent experience which constitutes "Gegenwart" or real time, in contrast to time as the principle of order and judgment in the world of memory and of yesterday. Through this contingent experience, now, I might be led into an ethical existence in the future, the peace of which surpasses all understanding.

It is true that such a philosophy lays itself open to criticism. For instance these questions arise: Are the humanistic world or the truths constructed by man merely illusory and evil, or do they form part of the real world and are therefore inevitable abodes of man's existence? Does not Grisebach by arbitrarily separating the world of truth from that of reality also rend asunder man, thereby destroying his worldly existence? Is the fellowman only man's negation or also his affirmation, etc.? In spite of these critical questions to which we are by no means blind and which show that in many important issues we do not subscribe to Grisebach's philosophy at all, it cannot be denied that, by opening our eyes to the fact that the fellowman represents a constant stumbling block to all our aspirations, wishes and ideals, Grisebach prevents us from conceiving reality merely theoretically, in the form of a principle or dialectical law. He keeps us earthbound and makes us realise that a true community cannot be established by making every one conform to one principle of reason, but that it consists in the very experience of contradiction on the part of my fellowman, which I am compelled to take into consideration.

WHITHER MAN ?

(A DISCOURSE ON METAPHYSICS)

1. Introductory Remarks

To answer the question : " Whither Man ? " I propose to resort to philosophy as a reflection of man's mind. As it will, however, be impossible to consult philosophy as a whole, i.e., from its very beginning, in such a brief essay, I shall, in the main, restrict myself to man's thought in the modern period. And even there my aim is not to give a full picture of the existing philosophical systems, but merely to work out in a historic way the salient trends of thought, which reveal to us man's basic desire and aspiration, and which may explain the cause of our present plight and predicament. It will thereby become clear that the present crisis is not unique, but is nothing but a " normal " phenomenon of " actuality." I shall endeavour to give an answer to the above question, which in our situation might serve not as a " solution," for there is no solution, at least not on the part of man, but as a beacon or road-sign. In other words, our answer will merely open our eyes and our mind to *actuality*, i.e., life in its aspects of contradictoriness and conflict. We shall see that man is inextricably interwoven with this actuality, and that he is even an indispensable architect of it. Never will he be able to overcome or conquer it. The contradictory " truths " he keeps constructing in science, philosophy, arts and religion are smashed up by actuality over and over again. The absolute he is forever trying to reach slips away from under his very hands. What then must he do ? Must he resign himself to actuality in bitterness, frustration and despair ? Must he suffer in silence in the hope for redemption by an external absolute, an opus externum ? Or is there room for action and confidence within this actuality, of which man is an integral part ?

2. Shifting Of The Real Ground In Philosophical Thought

It is very hard to define philosophy. When we think of philosophy, we really think of the numerous philosophical systems as they are scattered over the centuries, which have been constructed on some real ground, and which are said to constitute some truth. There are two ways of studying the methods and problems of these various philosophical systems. Firstly, we can study them in connexion with their historic background, thus becoming aware of their change and their ever assuming new meaning and significance in the light of the changing conditions throughout the centuries of life. This is the approach of the history of philosophy. Secondly, these methods and problems

can be compiled and arranged systematically, this being the approach of systematic philosophy. In studying systematic philosophy, however, we cut loose the methods and the problems of these various philosophical systems from their respective historic backgrounds and arrange them systematically.

For the purpose of systematization the problem of causality, for instance, would be traced to its real ground, which in this case must be identical with the empirical ground, namely, the causal connexion that is supposed to exist between phenomena, otherwise systematization of this problem would be impossible, at least if we want to base the systematization of the causal problem on a scientific premiss, instead of founding it on some arbitrary vague metaphysical ground which is but an unverifiable basic assumption. We could not, therefore, in systematic philosophy apply the deductive method in connexion with the systematic discussion of the problem of causality lest we become unscientific. For if the problem of causality were not based on an empirical foundation and were developed inductively from epistemological into logical and metaphysical reflections, systematic philosophy could hardly be called scientific. John Stuart Mill has shown that causation is built on human experience and that induction is the presupposition for deduction, e.g., the major premiss of the syllogism contains an inductive inference. The causal connexion between the particular phenomena constitutes the common link between science and philosophy. But philosophy does not stop there. Unlike science, it does not take for granted the causal connexion which apparently exists between particular phenomena, but it proceeds to investigate the phenomenon of causality as such. The question is raised whether the causal connexion between phenomena is based on the constancy by which we observe certain phenomena together, so that it is habit and belief by which we form this idea, or whether this connexion is a necessary one.

In other words, is cause and effect a question of "post hoc" or of "propter hoc?" There is also the problem, whether causality is an objective connexion which exists between phenomena, i.e., whether it is a posteriori, or whether it depends on the function of our mind, i.e., whether it is a priori. All these problems are of an epistemological and logical nature. The moment, however, that I realize that all causes within my reach are "conditioned" causes, my reasoning compels me to postulate an unconditioned cause, a first mover or a first principle, a one that is the cause of the multiple, and thereby I have entered the realm of conventional metaphysics.

The transcendental concept of causality, however, which my mind has formed from the particular causal connexions between phenomena and which is thus traceable to observation, is in itself of a metaphysical nature in that it points towards a "something" or "being" without which there would be no causality. In other words, where there is causality there must be being. It is inconceivable that there is causality

between nothing. Thus the concept of causality takes us right into metaphysics. If it is right to say, that philosophy really starts from concepts, in this case the concept of causality, then H. J. de Vleeschauwer seems to be justified when he says that philosophy and metaphysics are really identical, and when he rejects metaphysics as a separate philosophical discipline.¹

Now, when we study philosophy in its historic perspective, i.e., when we study its manifold contradictory systems against their historic background, we find that, not at all times and not in all cases, the real ground of causality rests on the observation that there exists between phenomena a causal connexion, as it is the case when we systematize philosophy and from epistemological reflections of causality proceed to logical and finally metaphysical considerations. The systematization of the problem of causality is nothing but an artificial construction on our part. It is of purely academic value. But it is worthless to me as an individual in my daily wants and needs. It does not help me to solve the problems of my situation of life, nor is it of any assistance to me in my constant struggle for survival. In other words, systematic philosophy is far removed from actuality. And because of this fact, it is also irreconcilable with the history of philosophy. Systematic philosophy removes all philosophical methods and problems from space and time. They become impersonal objects of our reason, transfixed and neatly arranged. The history of philosophy, on the other hand, reveals to me the battle-field of life. There, man's frantic search for reality, being or "the truth," as well as his constant failure to reach it, his despair, his agony, his frustration become apparent. The ruins of man's contradictory philosophical systems bear witness to that effect. They reveal man's broken nature which Grisebach aptly described by pointing to man's constant fluctuation between wanting-to-know and not-knowing, wanting-to-have and not-having. If we consider our concept of causality from the historic point of view, studying it in connexion with the different historic periods in their widest scope, we notice the shifting of its real ground over the centuries. The Greeks observe in the world an orderliness which led them to believe that the cosmos as a whole constitutes a unity. They did not, therefore, find the real ground in the causal connexion that exists between phenomena (as a matter of fact the principle of causality in its clear formulation does not occur in Greek thought before Democritus),² but in a first principle or first cause. H. J. de Vleeschauwer says :

"The Greeks never asked the question how the universe had come into being. They accepted the supposition that the originally given had been there from all eternity. The question which they asked was always firstly, whether the universe represents an order that could always be accepted without question on the basis of the

¹ Study notes of University of South Africa, Systematic Philosophy, Course III.

² H. Schmidt, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, p. 306.

visible order and regularity of things, and secondly, where such order had come from. In other words, they did not look for a creator, but rather for an architect or planning agent in the universe. Greek philosophy always strove towards the concept of the unity of the cosmos, and in order to maintain that unity it postulated a single principle lying at the basis of the universe."¹

Thus the real ground in Greek philosophy is constituted by principles such as Anaximander's "apeiron", Heraclitus' "logos," Parmenides' "one," Anaxagoras' "nous," Plato's "idea," Aristotle's "unmoved mover." It is significant that all those principles are regarded as existing outside the mind.² They are active determining principles that, directly or indirectly, order and build the cosmos from chaos. Man is part of this cosmos and thus is subjected to the first principle; hence the strong emphasis in Greek thought on necessity, *dike*, *moira* or *anagkè*. Even Aristotle's "eudaimonia," the purpose of all human striving ("telos"), is partly dependent on outer destiny. In other words, in Greek thought the real ground is considered emanent. It is separate from the ground of cognition which is constituted by perception and reason.

In mediaeval philosophy the real ground has shifted and is found in the "lumen supernaturale", i.e., the revealed truths of Holy Scripture, e.g., the incarnation, resurrection, ascension, transubstantiation, trinity, etc. It is the task of reason to provide the form for these unassailable truths, to systematize them and to explain them logically as far as this is possible.

Thus the decisive difference between Greek thought and mediaeval philosophy, as regards causality, is this: While the Greeks worked out the causal principle by observation and arrived at a first cause by reflection, mediaeval thinkers "knew" the cause of the universe, God the Creator, by revelation. This explains the subordination of philosophy to theology in the Middle Ages. Thereby philosophy becomes the ancilla theologiae, the task of which is to afford rational insight into the revealed truth, which is not questioned but is accepted on faith. It is by this analytic task of philosophy, that the conceptualism of the scholastic method was developed.

This holds true not only during the first half of the Middle Ages, i.e., up to 1200, which was dominated by the thought of St. Augustine, but even later, when the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas did accord to

¹ Study notes of University of South Africa, Systematic Phil., Course III.

² Although Parmenides' "one" is immutable "being," which has no become nor decays but simply is and therefore is an abstract concept, Parmenides materializes it, by declaring that it possesses the shape of a sphere. Moreover, in the second part of his didactic poem he develops a cosmogony which explains the coming into existence of the decaying and changing things by the co-operation of "fire" and "night," i.e., being and non-being.

reason a sphere of its own, the real ground rested in God. Despite his Aristotelianism, Thomas did not get rid of Augustine's influence in that the universals exist *ante res* (as original idea in God's mind) before they exist *in rebus* (i.e., as their essence in distinction from the accidental world) and *post res* (as concepts in our mind), which two latter forms of existence are based on Aristotle. By this doctrine the idea of divine illumination, which is the central idea of Augustine, is upheld. Thomas, even as Aristotle, regards God as the "prime efficient cause," the "pure act", who, by divine illumination, endows reason with the light to conclude from the hierarchy of the forms of the world the existence of God. In other words, the "analogia entis" causes the *lumen naturale* to recognize the same truths as had been revealed to us by the *lumen supernaturale*. Etienne Gilson writes about the thought of Thomas :

"If this be true, the unity of theology is that of an organic whole whose parts are united under one single formal reason. Naturally, it first includes what God has actually revealed (whether it be naturally knowable or not). It also includes what the theologian deduces, as a necessary consequence, from the actually revealed truth (theologians often call this the 'virtually' revealed). Moreover, it includes all the material provided by logic, the sciences of nature and metaphysics, to the extent that it is taken up by the theologian and incorporated by him into his work. He alone is judge of this extent. Just as it is the soul that builds itself a body, so also theology builds itself the philosophical body which it needs in order to promote the saving work of the sacred teaching."¹

In mediaeval thought, even as in Greek thought, the real ground is regarded as emanent. But the Greek truths or first principles are replaced by one revealed truth. Although reason can recognize the existence of God as prime efficient cause or pure act, it is through faith that we identify this prime efficient cause or pure act with the revealed truth, i.e., God the Creator. Already Augustine, who was influenced by Plato rather than Aristotle, identified Plotinus' "One," the first of Plotinus' universal cause, with God. Gilson says :

"According to Plotinus, the absolutely first principle was the One, which he posited above being. Now, in the mind of a Christian, there is nothing above God, and since we know from Scripture that God is He Who Is, we also know that the absolute first principle is being. Naturally, Augustine admits that God is One, but he does not subordinate being to the One; rather, he identifies the One with Being."²

Augustine conceived the highest Platonic ideas, the Good, the Beautiful and the Just, as existing in God's mind.

¹ History of Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages, p. 367.

² *ibid.*, p. 70.

“In him they are all contained in highest union; he is absolute unity, the all embracing truth; he is the highest Being, the highest Good, perfect Beauty (*unum, verum, bonum*). All rational knowledge is ultimately knowledge of God. Complete knowledge of God, indeed, even according to Augustine’s admission, is denied to human insight in earthly life. Perhaps only the negative element in our idea of him is completely certain¹. . . . he (Augustine) teaches also that the appropriation of divine truth is effected not so much by insight, as through *faith* or belief. Faith or belief, however, as ideation plus assent, though without the act of conception, presupposes indeed the idea of its object, but contains in the factor of assent, which is determined by no intellectual compulsion, an original volitional act of the affirming judgment.”²

Thus we are justified in saying that not reason so much but faith is the true ground of the cognition of the real ground. This also holds true for Thomas. He has taken over more from Augustine than is sometimes realized. All “proofs” of God forwarded by Thomas do not exhaust Him. The “prime efficient cause” at which we arrive by reason still requires our assent. We still have to affirm in faith that this is one aspect of the Christian God of revelation. Gilson says: “This God whose existence we affirm, does not allow us to fathom what he is; he is infinite, and our minds are finite; we must therefore take as many exterior views of him as we can, without ever claiming to exhaust the subject.”³

For Thomas, even as for Augustine:

“Faith is a matter of will; the will commands acceptance; this compulsion Thomas explains as an inner instinct (God invites us to believe), or as coming to us from without, as the result of miracles.”⁴

By the shifting of the real ground in mediaeval thought, man’s position has considerably changed. He no longer is a mere link in the teleological process of the cosmos where the efficient cause becomes its own purpose, as is the case in Greek thought. Man is now a personality who faces a personal Creator. He is no longer, as man in the Greek period, subjected to an impersonal principle which is limited and by necessity must act according to its own law. On the contrary, even as this Creator created man and the universe from His own free will, man is endowed with free will also, his action thereby becoming of the utmost consequence to him.

In modern thought, now, the real ground shifted from revelation to reason on the one hand, and to the external object or phenomenon (physical sensation) on the other. In both cases the real ground may also be said to constitute the ground of cognition. These two real

¹ W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1., p. 279.

² *ibid.*, p. 282.

³ *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 372.

⁴ F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 228.

grounds of modern philosophy are different from both, the Greek first principle, which was objective in that it remained outside the mind but of which the world of multiplicity (phenomena) was only an effect or a doxa, and the Christian revealed cause, God the Creator, who by divine illumination caused man's will and reason to reach up to him in faith. In modern thought reason on the one hand and the object or phenomenon on the other are the only sources of the truth and knowledge.

Thus, on the one hand, reason or the self becomes not only the cause of the world, but its own purpose. The universe is nothing but the self-determination and the unfolding of reason. All that which was either conceived as external in Greek thought or that which was understood to be revealed in mediaeval thought is now seen as immanent. Reason thus becomes the real absolute, either in its more static and analytic form, e.g., Descartes' "innate ideas," Spinoza's "geometrical spirit," Locke's "ideas" and "modes," or its more dynamic and synthetical form, which may be said to start with Leibniz' "monadology" and is embodied also by Kant's "moral law" as the object of the will, which is lodged in man and makes him "autonomous." This self of Kant's practical reason is developed by Fichte's ego-non-ego concept, Schelling's indifferenced absolute (world soul) as the intuition of man's consciousness, and which finds its consummation in Hegel's absolute spirit, i.e., reason which externalizes itself in nature, history, etc., and returns to itself in universal history, arts, religion and philosophy.¹ To substantiate our proposition that in modern philosophy reason becomes both the real ground and the ground of cognition and that man realizes himself by the absolutization of his own reason, let us see what Windelband has to say about Descartes, whom we listed above as a representative of the absolutization and objectivization of reason in its more static or analytic form :

"Das Selbstbewusstsein ist der 'ruhende Pol in der Erscheinung Flucht.' Aus dem Skeptizismus rettet sich Descartes auf den reinen Rationalismus : eine zweifellose Erkenntnis wurzelt ihm nur in der selbstbewussten Besinnung des Denkens. Der erste und alles übrige Wissen bedingende Punkt für die erkennende Vernunft ist sie selbst. Statt der unendlichen Mannigfaltigkeit des äusseren Daseins, von welcher die empiristische Philosophie ihren Weg beginnt, ergreift Descartes die innerste Tiefe der Erkenntnis selbst, und seine Lehre bildet in dieser Hinsicht die Abklärung aller der phantastischen Versuche, welche den Menschen als Mikrokosmos zum Ausgangspunkte der Erkenntnistheorie nehmen wollten. Nur der erkennende Mensch ist der Inhalt der Selbsterkenntnis, von der aus Descartes die ganze Philosophie zu gestalten unternimmt."²

¹ Cf. E. v. Aster, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, pp. 292 ff.

² *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, Vol. 1, p. 177.

The absolutization of reason in its dynamic form by Hegel is described by Heinemann as follows :

“Das System als Ganzes vermeinte, alles in der Welt Begegnende zwingend und lückenlos endgültig logisch deduziert zu haben. Der zu sich selbst gekommene Geist macht allem Geheimnis ein Ende. ‘Gott ist nur Gott, insofern er sich selber weiss ; sein Sichwissen ist ein Selbstbewusstsein im Menschen und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott, das fort geht zum Sichwissen des Menschen in Gott.’”¹

On the other hand, Comte tells us that it is useless to enquire into the real cause of the phenomena. Their relation to one another as to their similitude furnishes us with “concepts.” Their constant succession constitutes their “laws.” There is no self-observation or analysis of consciousness. We can only perceive the content of our consciousness, the phenomena, their conditions and laws are the object of study of the natural sciences. Avenarius polemicises against any kind of duplication of the world, which is caused by placing the perceived phenomenon into the brain and by projecting it into space, so that in this manner a world of consciousness, a soul, a thing-in-itself, etc. are created. In other words, this method leads to the creation of metaphysical mock problems. The “experience” consists in the representation of the world, the environment as we observe it. This Avenarius calls the principle of economy. Kirchhoff demands that explanation of the objects, which causes the concept, be superseded by the “description of natural motion” (experience). This process constitutes “pure empiricism.” Mach advocates the “simplifying description as an economical conception.” To him the self is constituted by the sum total of physical sensations which accompany our experience. Heinemann says about Comte’s philosophy :

“Er war sowohl der Antipode Birans wie der des deutschen Idealismus und siegte nicht nur in Frankreich, sondern auch in England und Deutschland. Er lehnte alle Metaphysik ab und wollte nur das Erfahrbare und wissenschaftlich Feststellbare gelten lassen.”² This shows the other side of the medal, the shifting of the real ground onto the object or phenomenon.

In contemporary science, now, the certainty that causality is constant has received a severe blow by the postulation of Heisenberg’s “relation of uncertainty” in atomic events. Einstein’s two pillars of knowledge are in the end “intuition” and “belief” :

“Höchste Aufgabe der Physiker ist also das Aufsuchen jener allgemeinsten elementaren Gesetze, aus denen durch reine Deduktion das Weltbild zu gewinnen ist. Zu diesen elementaren Gesetzen führt kein logischer Weg, sondern nur die auf Einfühlung in die Erfahrung sich stützende Intuition.”³

or :

- ¹ Die Philosophie im XX. Jahrhundert., p. 238
- ² *ibid.*, p. 246.
- ³ Mein Weltbild, p. 109

“ Nach unserer bisherigen Erfahrung sind wir nämlich zum Vertrauen berechtigt, dass die Natur die Realisierung des mathematisch denkbar Einfachsten ist. . . . In der Beschränktheit der mathematisch existierenden einfachen Feldarten und einfachen Gleichungen, die zwischen ihnen möglich sind, liegt die Hoffnung des Theoretikers begründet, das Wirkliche in seiner Tiefe zu erfassen.”¹

Small wonder then that Einstein's two irrational elements, belief and intuition, on which his world view rests, lead him to a deep religious feeling :

“ Das Schönste, was wir erleben können, ist das Geheimnisvolle Das Wissen um die Existenz des für uns Undurchdringlichen dies Wissen und Fühlen macht wahre Religiosität aus.”²

Does this great modern scientist and thinker not show that all truth is relative to us (even though he believes that the natural laws, which he establishes mathematically, exist independently of his establishing them) ? Does he not realize the impenetrability of the absolute and thereby admit its unknowability ? And as Eddington points out, the fact that it cannot be explained how a certain class of atoms constituting the human brain are endowed with a consciousness and the power to think” furnishes the key to all metaphysics.³ Thus, in connexion with the discoveries made by modern science, a remarkable return to metaphysics is noticeable, which involves a renewed shifting of the real ground. University of Fort Hare

What now has this historic survey in connexion with causality (which we chose as an example of the shifting of the real ground) revealed to us ? It becomes apparent that there is no such thing as causality as such. This concept is an abstraction of the mind, which we gain by observing an interactivity of the phenomena and by experiencing the relatedness of ourselves to objects. To call this interactivity of “substances,” which we observe and experience, causality, we require a first causal principle, otherwise it is nothing but mutual relatedness in contradiction and limitation. Only if we have a first cause, can we distinguish between cause and effect, i.e., can we make out the hierarchy of causes, the lower cause being the effect of the higher. Thus the problem of causality is inextricably interwoven with the problem of truth, being, reality, knowledge, in brief, with the problem of the absolute. Throughout our historic survey, the shifting of the real ground, which we demonstrated in connexion with the causal principle, becomes quite clear and presents itself as follows : In Greek philosophy it was the *apparent orderliness* of the world which led man to an *ordering principle* from which all the multiplicity, change and contradictoriness of the empirical world could be explained. In the Middle Ages the real ground shifted over to *revelation*, and the causal principle

¹ Mein Weltbild, pp. 116-118.

² *ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

³ R Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, p. 734.

presented itself as a *creative principle*, which at the same time enabled the creature (man) to move in the direction of God and to become one with Him in faith. In modern times the real ground moved to reason on the one hand and the *object or phenomenon* (science) on the other. These two factors, reason and the object, now assumed the function of the objective and material first principle of Greek philosophy and the creative and saving principle of the Middle Ages, namely, to bring to man peace, happiness, security and knowledge in the midst of conflict, suffering, uncertainty and ignorance. But the discoveries of contemporary science and philosophical thought, especially what is termed *New Realism*, have revealed the doubtfulness of both our sense-perception and our reason. A. D. Woozley remarks on the sense datum philosophy as represented by Moore, Russell and others :

“Wether one chooses to describe perceptual experience in terms of sense data is a matter of linguistic convenience, the sense datum language solves no problems and creates no new ones.”¹

As to logistics R. Metz gives the following assessment :

“Reason (ratio) celebrates here as in mathematics its most exalted triumphs, and the spirit of rigorous scientific precision attains its finest possible development. But this spirit has become wholly disembodied and has broken behind it every bridge uniting it to life and concrete experience. And so we are often reminded of Bradley’s comment on the ‘University ballet of Port Hoodless categories,’ or Windelband’s sharp condemnation when, glancing at the logical calculus, he speaks of it as ‘a spacious exercise ground for gymnastics of a sterile ingenuity’ A series of problems which logic had hitherto worked at in vain or which had never come within its purview have been successfully tackled and in part solved by mathematical logic. It has only proved inadequate where it was occupied with specifically philosophical problems ; for we cannot admit that it can itself usurp the place of philosophy. Logistics has retired to a lonely and remote island and assumed sovereignty over it, but no road leads back from thence to the familiar ways of everyday life and thought. It is ‘gray theory’ and the ‘golden tree of life’ cannot grow ‘green’ in its territory. It is also noteworthy that some of the most original thinkers of the school, like Russell and Whitehead, have latterly turned away from mathematical logic and reverted to more customary methods of philosophizing, whence we may perhaps conclude that the former is easily exhausted and can give no genuine lasting satisfaction.”²

We have quoted Metz in full because of the overestimation of logistics especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, where, together with the empirical sciences, it is regarded by a great many as *the truth or reality as such*. We, therefore, also want to refer to F. Heinemann, who also

¹ Theory of Knowledge, p. 22

² A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, pp. 709-710.

studied mathematics and science, but warns us, as we shall see, to regard them as an absolute. It seems to us that most of the great thinkers (scientists included) of our time have realized that the real ground lies neither in the phenomenon nor in reason and that they are in search for it elsewhere. One thing should however become quite clear from the above, namely, that even there where the real ground is considered eminent as in Greek or mediaeval philosophy or appears eminent as in science, it is really constituted by the mind and is *known* only because it is really immanent. This being so, it follows that the constitution of the real ground by and within man's mind represents nothing but man's constantly repeated act of self-realization. It makes no difference whether thereby man starts from nature or from the mind. In both cases man constructs the world from and according to his own nature, i.e., by *his* sense-impressions and *his* reason. As Grisebach puts it, in both cases man keeps moving within the circle of his self, so that Grisebach comes to the conclusion that the sciences and the humanities have nothing to do with the real world, i.e., the ethical existence of man, but constitute a purely technical world, which Grisebach calls a world of phantasy and imagination. While we do not go so far, we agree that the constitution of the real ground through man's mind represents an act of self-realization. We ask the question: What is it that causes man to realize himself over and over again? Or what is the same: What is it that induces him to look for ever fresh metaphysical grounds and to build ever new philosophical systems which are supposed to guarantee to him his identity and ethical existence?

3. The Real Ground Is An Existential Ground

Our brief survey of causality, which we used as an example to demonstrate the shifting of the real ground, leads us to the conclusion that the real ground of each philosophical system is bound up with man's existential situation. In other words, each philosophical system and trend of thought grows from a feeling of uncertainty in man. It is the product of the experience of crisis, conflict and catastrophe. This holds true for all the causal principles we discussed. Thus the various first principles in Greek philosophy may be said to be the result of the struggles and conflicts within city-state society. H. J. de Vleeschauwer, for instance, names the emigration character of the city-state as an indirect and the opposition of the aristocrats to the bourgeois city-state as the direct cause of the birth and development of Greek philosophy. On pages 16, 17 of "The Cultural and Historical Background to the History of Greek Philosophy", which serves as an introduction to the History of Philosophy, Chapters 1-9, H. J. de Vleeschauwer says:

"At the beginning of this note we put the question: Why did the Greek people become the philosophic people par excellence? Ignoring the favourable factors of position and time, our answer may be briefly summarized as follows: Owing to its political status and

development. The emigration character of the Greek city-state created the conditions of life which inevitably caused a repercussion; the sovereign creative spirit became bourgeois. But the direct cause was undoubtedly the elimination of the aristocratic and cultured element of the city-state from political life When banishment from this aristocratic leadership of the city-state condemned this cultured class of Greece to unemployment, it fell back on the intellect and turned philosophic reflection into a permanent opposition against political development. Greece owes the incomparable advance of her philosophy to this politically sterile but intellectually unique opposition."

The Christian revealed truth of the Middle Ages sprang from the breakdown of Greek and Roman culture and society under the onslaught of the barbaric tribes of the north:

"The conquests of the Greek spirit would have been given over to destruction beyond hope of rescue, if in the midst of the breaking down of the old world a new spiritual power had not grown strong, to which the sons of the North bowed, and which, with firm hand, knew how to rescue for the future the goods of civilisation and preserve them during the centuries of subversion, this power was the Christian Church Augustine was the true teacher of the Middle Ages His doctrine is the philosophy of the Christian Church."¹

It is well known how Augustine in the face of the sacking of Rome by Alaric, King of the Visigoths, wrote his "De Civitate Dei." Here Augustine stresses the incompatibility and the contradictoriness of the earthly and heavenly kingdoms, which combat one another.

"The uniformity and self-contained nature of mediaeval philosophy"² as well as society broke down in the tempestuous times of the Renaissance. More and more man took the place of God. Through reason and experience man tried to realize himself. Heinemann writes about the 17th century:

"Ohne den methodischen Zusammenhang mit der neuen Naturwissenschaft und der in ihr sich anbahnenden Bewältigung der Natur durch den Menschen wäre diese Philosophie kaum Ereignis geworden. Sie hat insofern ihren Rang, als sie weit über die Grenzen der äusseren Welt hinausgreift und dem Zug des modernen Denkens zur Selbstverwirklichung einen grossartigen Ausdruck gibt. Denn wenn man auch mit Grund von dem natürlichen System zu sprechen pflegt, in das auch die moralischen, rechtlichen und religiösen Dimensionen des Daseins sich einbezogen finden, so ist es doch der Mensch, der auf diesen methodischen Wegen sich zu realisieren trachtet. *Die naturwissenschaftliche Methode darf nicht zu einer naturalistischen*

¹ W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, pp. 263-264.

² E. v. Aster, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 192.

Beurteilung der durch sie bestimmten Systeme verleiten ; sie ist vielmehr das Zeichen einer verwandelten Mentalität."¹

In this brief essay we must content ourselves with the above to show that philosophical systems, methods or trends of thought originate in man's nature as an individual (i.e., his constant wavering between wanting-to-know and not-knowing, wanting-to-have and not-having) and as a communal being (i.e., his relation to his fellowman, which is one of conflict and contradiction). In other words, the philosophical system is nothing but man's attempt at self-realization and at communication with something believed to exist outside himself to find not only security, certainty and truth, but also himself, to make sure of his own existence of which he is forever doubtful. This could be demonstrated for the truths of Greek philosophy as well as for the revealed truth of the Middle Ages. It follows that no philosophical system ever reveals the truth as such. It contains only relative truth as referred to the respective existential situation from which it flows. If we want to understand philosophy, we must, therefore, not study it in a systematic way; for to systematize it, means to cut it off from life and actuality. If philosophy is the science of totality as some thinkers describe it, this totality can be studied only historically, i.e., by all the historic systems as they grow out of the actuality of life, one after the other, opposing one another. We shall then realize that philosophy is anything but systematic. It is the child of actuality, of man's natural desire to realize himself and to transcend himself and thus to confirm his existence as an individual. Before we give our answer to the question as we formulated it in the title of our essay, we shall try to demonstrate the truth of the above remarks by restricting ourselves to modern philosophy.

When the universal culture and thought of the Middle Ages had broken down, and the revealed truth was no longer regarded as unassailable, the result was religious and political strife. If the world had appeared an organic whole and certainty during the Middle Ages, the opposite was true in the 16th and 17th centuries. Luther was expecting the end of the world at any moment. His entire thought is directed towards this end. That is why, according to him, faith is a matter of contingency, i.e., only proves itself in the midst of a crisis.²

Baroque thought, e.g., Gryphius, Grimmelshausen and Bidermann, regards this world merely as "vanitas," we would say to-day the nothing which would lead us into the nothing, if we allowed ourselves to get entangled in it. It is, therefore, the call of the hour to turn away from this world to God. Baroque man experiences a split soul and a dualism of the heart. He finds himself placed in the irreconcilable contradiction of this world and the world beyond, with its inverted signs: What was temporary suffering in this world, becomes eternal

¹ Die Philosophie im XX. Jahrhundert, p. 202. (italics are mine).

² Cf. H. M. Müller, Erfahrung und Glaube bei Luther, esp. chapter IV, p. 43.

triumph in the beyond, what was finite triumph here, will be infinite despair there.

It is into an epoch like this that Descartes was born (1596-1650). Small wonder, then, that in such a world of conflict and uncertainty the ardent desire was roused in him to strive for certainty. It is thus not surprising that "he prayed for divine illumination, vowing a pilgrimage to the shrine of Loretto in the case his prayer should be answered."¹ He thus set out in search for truth "as he might discover in himself or in the great book of the world."² Here he links up with characters such as Wolfram von Eschenbach's "Parcival" and Goethe's "Faust." Frischeisen-Köhler, for instance, in describing Descartes' character, speaks of a "Faustische Drang nach Erkenntnis der absoluten Wahrheit,"³ which was aroused in him from a deep religious-metaphysical need, and which was never suppressed even in times of greatest scepticism. We thus understand the meaning of the "Cogito, ergo sum" as a formula to make sure of man's existence, as an answer of who and what he is in a time where everything had become uncertain. In other words, the "Cogito" is not only an epistemological but also an existential proposition. It constitutes a haven of refuge in the seething waters of the time. It is a starting-point to enable man to communicate with something outside him; for when I think, I think of something, and I find in my mind not only the confused notions of the outside world, which I gain through my sense-organs, but I find clearer ideas, e.g., logical and mathematical concepts and moral ideas, above all the clearest of all, namely, the idea of God. It was in this sense that we remarked previously that the real ground shifted from the revealed truth of the Middle Ages to reason. The self became the centre of the universe. Frischeisen-Köhler says:

"Das denkende Subjekt baut von sich aus in Freiheit und aus eigenem Reichtum das neue Kultursystem auf. Hat die coppernicanische Kosmologie den Menschen aus seiner zentralen Weltstellung gerückt, so findet dieser nur in sich den unerschütterlichen Mittelpunkt aller Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit: vom Ich aus erobern wir uns die Welt."⁴

In other words, Descartes' "Cogito" supplied man with a fixed point from which he could realize himself. This self-realization took place principally in two directions, in the direction of the outside world and in the direction of God. In both directions, via the "res extensa" and the "res cogitans," man objectivized or transcended himself in the course of his further history. Objectivization via the "res extensa" led him to a material "id" or absolute, while objectivization via the "res cogitans" guided him to an ideal "id" or absolute. Thilly, for

¹ F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 301.

² Quoted according to Thilly, *ibid.*, p. 301.

³ *Grosse Denker*, p. 380.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 379.

instance, describes the consequences that result from Descartes' dualism as follows :

"Descartes' philosophy is an attempt to harmonize the mechanical theory of modern science, which it was impossible to ignore, with spiritualistic theology and metaphysics which had appeared with Christianity. Nearly all of Descartes' difficulties are caused by this task of reconciliation ; the function of his successors consisted either in pointing them out or in discovering ways of escaping them. It was possible to avoid the dualism of the system : (1) by eliminating nature as an independent reality and teaching absolute idealism (Malebranche) ; (2) by eliminating mind as an independent reality and accepting materialism (Hobbes, La Mettrie, and the French materialists) ; (3) by making both mind and matter manifestations of an absolute substance, God or nature (Spinoza). Or it was possible to retain the dualism and frankly deny the possibility of interaction (parallelism). In addition to the metaphysical problems questions concerning the origin, nature and method of knowledge demanded further attention ; and in this work English empiricism and French sensationalism were leading participants."¹

Man's self-realization via Descartes' two substances, however, led to his self-estrangement. In whatever direction he transcended himself, idealist or materialist, metaphysical or scientific, in each case he alienated himself from his true nature as an individual bound up with an existential situation. He was no longer an autonomous personality as Kant still saw him, in whom the highest law, namely, the moral law was lodged and who, therefore, represented the highest value. He was no longer a cause initiating a series of effects by his action. He became merely a link in a causal chain. In the material direction he constituted nothing but a causal relation such as existed between other phenomena, and the self was nothing but the sum total of physical sensations which accompany our experience (Mach). In the same direction Positivism demands the subjugation of the individual to society, the social "id." Thus Comte's "humanity" as the "great being" is even made an object of worship. Bentham's and Mill's "greatest happiness of the greatest possible number" is the "summum bonum" and the touch-stone of morality.

If in the material direction the scientific method became an end in itself, an absolute, so that even the self was dissolved in it and all individuality was levelled down to mere relation and mere number, the self inflated itself into an absolute in the ideal direction, thus creating the ideal "id." Fichte's "pure ego", Schelling's "world soul" and Hegel's "absolute spirit" are all the result of man's self-estrangement and transcending himself in the ideal direction. Subject and object are merged in man's consciousness. Without consciousness the dialectical self-movement of the spirit would not take place at all. The

¹ A History of Philosophy, p. 315.

triple dialectical movement of the spirit in its "An-sich-sein" (logic, ontology, metaphysics), spirit in its "Anders-sein" (philosophy of nature) and spirit in its "An-und-für-sich-sein," i.e., the return of the spirit to itself (spiritual philosophy) represents nothing but the activity of the human soul or human consciousness. The "Selbstentwicklung" (self-evolution) of absolute reason is "eine dreifache, nach dem Schema: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis. Die dialektische Methode, die dieses Denkschema durchläuft, stellt die Selbstbewegung der Idee im Bewusstsein des denkenden Subjekts dar, wie Hegel in der 'Wissenschaft d. Logik' (1817) kürzer darlegt."¹ And even though Hegel regards the objective spirit as a "source from which individuals proceed as regards their spiritual life,"² it cannot be denied that, without individual consciousness, the idea of Right (objective spirit in itself) as the abstract form of the body of individuals could not be formed. "The arbitrariness of (Hegel's) constructive thought, which presents the actual reality not as it offers itself empirically but as it ought to be in the dialectical movement,"³ only outlines more clearly the fact that it is consciousness through which man transcends himself and through which, via common consciousness (to which the individual is subjected and which act of subjection Hegel calls "morality"), i.e., the state, which as the realization of common consciousness Hegel names "Sittlichkeit" (social morality or the moral order) and which constitutes the realization of the ethical idea, man blends himself into universal history.⁴

"The state is the realisation of the ethical Idea ; it is the spirit of the people become visible ; it is an Idea, the living work of art, in which the inwardness of the human reason comes forth into outer manifestation. But this Idea, from which the system of the forms and functions of political life derives, appears in the actual world only in the individual structures of the states which arise and pass away. Its only true and full realisation is universal history, in which the peoples enter successively, to live out their spirit in the work of state formation, and then retire from the stage. So every epoch is characterized by the spiritual predominance of a definite people, which imprints the sign of its peculiar character upon all the activities of civilisation⁴." Here the idea of a historic fate emerges, which we also encounter in Kierkegaard's thought and in Nietzsche's "Amor Fati." "Schicksal ich folge dir freiwillig, denn täte ich es nicht, müsste ich es ja doch unter Tränen." Heidegger, too, demands that man must integrate in his will historic fate, the challenge of the time, to which he is subjected. He must not passively comply with it or try to avoid it and escape from it.⁵

¹ H. Schmidt, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, p. 230.

² W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 313.

³ *ibid.*, p. 612.

⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 613-614.

⁵ Cf. E. v. Aster, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, p. 397.

In Hegel's system the absolutization of the self in the form of the absolute spirit (toward which everything strives) and man's self-estrangement as a result of it become obvious. The two antithetical absolutes, science on the one hand and idealist metaphysics on the other, determined the cultural look of the 19th century and that of the 20th century till the outbreak of the first world war. They developed in man a new mentality, a feeling that there was nothing that was impossible or inaccessible to him. Man fancied himself an irresistible conqueror, who was greatly pleased with himself and felt extremely self-important. By transcending himself and inflating himself into an absolute, he had cut the Gordian knot of the existential problems. The tempestuous years had passed, and the stormy waves of life had been smoothed down to mere ripples, at least on the surface. The imperialist epoch of the European great powers was about to begin. Britain, France, Russia and a newly united Germany were to vie with one another in exporting their wares. By that we mean not only industrial goods, but their culture and their faith as well; for the church, too, more and more had developed into a smug institution of Christian culture. The theologian Adolf von Harnack was soon to call religion the "Hauptstück der Kultur" (heart of culture). In other words, when during the second half of the 19th century European culture had reached its climax, its richness caused it to overflow and reach across the continents. But this epoch of grandeur and splendour, when man represented his own measure and which our parents like to remember as the good old times, was not going to last. It could not endure. It stood in sharp contrast with actuality and man's nature as an individual bound up with a contingent existential situation. This culture was accessible to the idle and the rich only. Under the surface of splendour, might and self-content, therefore, the forces of actuality kept gnawing at this magnificent and imposing structure. Science and technology had given birth to a new social class which clamoured for a bigger share in the profits of the capitalists and for political rights at the expense of the privileged classes. The working class posited its "truth" against the resplendent culture of the possessing class. Marx inverted Hegel's imposing system by converting the latter's idealist dialectics into a materialist one. Jacob Hommes says :

"Durchaus folgerichtig ergibt sich die kommunistische Ideologie aus der Hegelschen Dialektik. Dieses dialektische Unternehmen besteht ja darin, dass hier der Mensch zunächst sich selbst gehören will, dass er daher aus der Naturwirklichkeit als solcher herausgeholt und auf sich selbst, d.h. auf seine eigene Handhabung der Naturwirklichkeit gestellt werden soll... Marx nennt Hegel noch am Ende seines Lebens den 'grossen Meister'... aber du bleibst bei diesem dialektischen Unternehmen stecken, d.h. du lässt den Menschen gar nicht sich selbst erzeugen, sondern nur ein Unwesen seiner selbst, den 'Unmenschen,' den er über sich in die Wolken fixiert.... Die Hegelsche Idee, so argumentiert Marx, ist nur ein

theologisches Missverständnis der Arbeit, an die Stelle der Theologie muss die Ökonomie treten. Deren Analysen zeigen uns den in seiner Arbeit sich selbst entfremdeten Menschen. In der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft erzeugt der arbeitende Mensch nicht mehr sich selbst, sondern nur noch den Unmenschen, d.h. er bringt den gesellschaftlichen Grossmenschen hervor nur noch in der unmenschlichen Gestalt des Kapitals, das sich in der Hand der Kapitalisten immer mehr zusammenballt und so sich für den Arbeiter zu einer ihm fremd und feindlich gegenüberstehenden Macht entwickelt, während der Arbeiter selbst 'immer weniger' wird."¹

Here the unbridgeable gulf that exists between the working class and the possessing class becomes obvious. But Jacob Hommes shows that Hegel's doctrine of the self-creation of man from the given reality of nature corresponds to Marx's teaching that, through work, all men merge into a "Grossmensch" (greater man)². In other words, despite the inverted signs, Hegel's as well as Marx's truth (which latter springs from the worker's existential situation) is a religious truth. In both cases man inflates himself into a god: in the first case through the individual, in the second through the collective:

"Gegenüber dem bürgerlichen 'Gott' steigt nun der proletarische auf: die Gesellschaft in ihrer unbedingt gesellschaftlichen oder kommunistischen *Verfassung*."³

On account of the industrialization and the improving standard of living, which gradually bettered the lot of the working class (which at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution had sunk to the very depth of misery), the population was growing fast. These facts and other factors, e.g., increasing production (which made industry clamour for new resources of raw material) drove the imperialist powers into ever greater competition, and the race for overseas markets was on. This rivalry resulted in an increasing nationalism and hostility among the imperialist powers. Already in the middle of the 19th century, before the heyday of imperialism had begun, the first voices were heard in protest against the existing culture. The Danish Christian thinker Sören Kierkegaard realized the self-estrangement of man and the destruction of the individual.⁴ As a pupil of Hegel he recognized the absorption of man by the ideal "id," the absolute spirit. Hegel's pantheistic doctrine did not only tend towards the de-personalization of man, but man's participation in the absolute also induced him to forget how frail and weak he really was. He became so certain of himself that he felt capable of lifting the veil from the last secrets of life. He believed that he could bend the world to his will. Thereby he had not only been led away from himself, i.e., from his true nature

¹ Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie, pp. 23-24.

² *ibid.*, p. 24.

³ *ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴ The Present Age, translated by A. Dru, Oxford, 1940, p. 30.

as an individual bound up with a contingent situation of life, but he virtually behaved like God. And he had every reason to do so; for did not the absolute flow from himself? Hommes, in this connexion, describes Hegel's teaching as follows :

“Nach dieser Lehre ist der Mensch ein Wesen, das von Haus aus in der Natur an sich selbst denkt, das mithin aus der Natur heraus auf die Weise sich selbst erzeugt, dass es von der Natur, da sie als solche sein Wesen veruneigentlicht, sich befreit und damit aus seiner Selbstentfremdung zu sich selbst, in seine eigentliche innere Gestalt zurückkehrt. Dieser sich selbst entfremdete Mensch nun wird von Hegel noch als ‘mystisches Subjekt-Objekt’ gedacht, d.h. als göttlich-menschliches Wesen, der Mensch wird Mensch durch Einwohnung Gottes in ihm, er ist die Stätte, wo Gott geschieht.”¹

Kierkegaard, the cripple and the pupil of Hegel, realized the danger which threatened the individual from Hegel's system. Perhaps his physical deformity, which caused him to suffer so much and which made him so desperate that he toyed with the idea of the master criminal and imagined “that he might potentially be a criminal or commit a crime,”² was the reason that his existential feeling was forever kept alive. Haecker points out that Magnussen in his work on Kierkegaard “The Special Cross” comes to the conclusion “that ‘the individual cross’ of which Kierkegaard speaks so much and so often and so forcibly is none other than his own hump and that his psychological structure was stamped by his deformity.”³ Thus Kierkegaard's physical handicap, which made him a marked man among society, made him realize his loneliness. He felt an outcast in every respect. The world seemed hostile, and alone he faced the wrath of God, in Whom he, like Luther, saw the almighty avenger, before Whom he trembled in fear. In anxiety and despair the self-estrangement of man becomes manifest. By anxiety Kierkegaard understood “sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy.” He regarded it as “a desire for what one dreads...an alien power, which captivates...with sweet comprehension,” a dizziness “in which freedom succumbs.”⁴ Thus if one wants to find God, one must start with despair. Through despair occurs the “reintegratio in statum pristinum,” i.e., the finding of the self in the original state, before God. Kierkegaard calls this “repetition.” In repetition the split in man's personality is healed. It is therefore a religious category.⁵

¹ Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie, p. 18.

² Theodor Haecker, Kierkegaard the Cripple, Engl. translation by C. van Bruyn, p. 2.

³ *ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ Quoted according to F. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, p. 36.

⁵ Cf. F. Heinemann, *ibid.*, pp. 36, 37, 38.

At last, therefore, Kierkegaard comprehended that God had castigated him and had smitten him with his affliction because he loved him and meant to save him. Haecker writes :

“ It is possible that God, in His infinite foresight, with love and predilection, thrust this sword into the side of Kierkegaard for his salvation, knowing that an upright and physically sound Kierkegaard would never have found the strength to ‘ pluck out his eye which offended him ’ for the sake of the Kingdom of God, because in attaining the Kingdom of God it is a matter of indifference whether one arrives with but one eye—or with a hump.”¹

Kierkegaard thus puts the spiritual inwardness and the soul of the individual against the impersonal absolute and the abstract consciousness of Hegel, and in 1842 he launched his polemic against Cartesianism in “ Johannes Climacus; or, De omnibus est disputandum.” He also recognized in Cartesianism the starting-point of man’s self-realization, which ended in the dissolution of the self. Heinemann describes Kierkegaard’s position in relation to the two cornerstones of the ideal “ id,” Descartes and Hegel, and the bastion of the material “ id,” Marx, as follows :

“ In 1842 he started a polemic against the followers of Descartes under the title *Johannes Climacus ; or, De omnibus est disputandum*. On this point he is in agreement with Karl Marx. Both reject Descartes’ *Cogito ergo sum*, both replace it by the *Sum ergo cogito*. But the two give a diametrically opposed interpretation to the *Sum* (I am). Marx interprets it in a materialistic sense, as material being, as an action which produces not only the economic and social conditions of our life, but our existence itself ; he rejects consciousness and mind as mere superstructure and ideological reflection. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, does not reject them, though objecting to Descartes’, and especially to Hegel’s interpretation of consciousness and mind. He does not protest in the name of material existence and of the proletariat, but in the name of the individual and his soul. His attitude to the philosophy of consciousness is paradoxical. He rejects abstract consciousness and abstract thought for the sake of the concrete spiritual individual, with his ‘ inwardness ’ and ‘ subjectivity. ’ ”²

In “ The Present Age ” Kierkegaard protests against other “ ids ” or external alienation, e.g., public opinion, the ascendancy of the mass and mass-man, socialism, the demon of collectivism and the collective as an artefact.³ Here Kierkegaard showed a rare farsightedness ; for everyone will readily agree that these forces have gained real momentum only to-day. In *The Journals* (ed. A. Dru), 1317, he writes :

¹ Th. Haecker, *Kierkegaard the Cripple*, Engl translation by C van Bruyn p. 8.

² *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, pp. 32-33

³ Cf. F. Heinemann, *ibid.*, p. 34.

"To battle against princes and popes is easy compared with struggling against the masses, the tyranny of equality, against the grin of shallowness, nonsense, baseness and bestiality."¹

It is thus not surprising that Kierkegaard turned against the church and even left it; for we have already mentioned that the church had sunk to the level of an institution of Christian culture where people listened to edifying sermons in security and self-satisfaction. But if Kierkegaard's protest against the estrangement of man in the direction of an objectivized idealism was a healthy reaction, we must not overlook the fact that his one-sided emphasis of subjective truth was liable to lead man into isolation and to prevent him from communicating with the outside world. If man failed to find God in himself, if he were incapable of passionate belief, which according to Kierkegaard is subjectively true, man would be confronted with nothing. And if I should be capable of such passionate belief, i.e., if I should succeed in reaching the highest truth attainable for the existing individual, which is far from certain, namely, "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness,"² it is nothing but my subjective faith and inward experience that determines that as the truth. If previously, in the case of Descartes, Hegel, Marx, etc., we witnessed the self-realization and transcending of man in the direction of objectivity, we now, in the case of Kierkegaard, come across the same process in the opposite, the subjective direction. For in Kierkegaard's paradoxical concept of subjective truth man, too, transcends himself and merges with the absolute. Thus we find ourselves in agreement with Heinemann, who, for completely different reasons (as we shall yet see), likewise rejects Kierkegaard's overemphasis of subjective truth.³

Kierkegaard was not the only one who protested against the existing culture and civilization of the 19th century. It is well known how Schopenhauer in his treatise "Über die Universitäts-Philosophie" condemned the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling and especially Hegel. Schopenhauer, unlike Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, did not see in the will a teleological factor, which, combined with reason, caused us to strive towards the absolute, but he saw in it a senseless, meaningless and blind force, "The will to live," which compelled us to gratify our appetites and desires. The sobriety, emptiness and frustration that followed upon the gratification of our appetites, desires and striving caused the same cyclic process to occur over and over again. To escape from the agony and suffering caused by this ever turning wheel of life, Schopenhauer, even as the Buddhists, preached abstention from life. He tried to overcome the principium individuationis by plunging into himself and thus attempted to merge with the nothing (Nirwana).

¹ Quoted from F. Heinemann, *ibid.*, p. 35.

² F. Heinemann, *ibid.*, p. 42.

³ Cf. *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, pp. 44 ff.

Though Nietzsche preaches the opposite, namely, the "will to power," his philosophy springs from the same existential ground, namely, his disappointment and dissatisfaction at the prevailing Christian culture and ethics, which he shared with Schopenhauer. Messer says :

"Bestärkt wurde er in dieser Abwendung vom Christentum dadurch, dass er in Leipzig in den Bann der atheistisch-pessimistischen Philosophie Schopenhauers geriet."¹

Nietzsche's criticism was chiefly directed against Protestant Christianity and ethics, which prevailed in Prussia, the leading German state. Perhaps this sharp reaction on the part of Nietzsche to Protestant faith was the result of his early pronounced religious education, which he received at the hands of his mother, his father, a minister of religion, having died when he was not yet five years old :

"Der Knabe wuchs also in völlig weiblicher Umgebung und in der geistigen Luft evangelischer Gläubigkeit und Kirchlichkeit heran."²

His class mates at Schulpforta called him "the little pastor."³ But the effeminate atmosphere in which he grew up and his frail condition of health caused Nietzsche to strive for that which he was not, the strong, robust and unscrupulous leader, the superman. Will Durant says :

"Während seines ganzen Lebens suchte er ständig nach physischen und geistigen Mitteln, um sich zu einer idealisierten Männlichkeit abzuhärten. 'Was ich nicht bin, das ist mir Gott und Tugend.'⁴

Small wonder that Nietzsche regarded Christian ethics as the "morality of the slave." While in the hierarchy of the Roman church he still saw an aristocratic élite, he regarded the Reformation and Protestant faith as the "Bauernaufstand des Geistes" (the peasant rebellion of the spirit). He writes about the conditions of his time :

"Wir Europäer befinden uns im Anblick einer ungeheueren Trümmerwelt, wo einiges noch hoch ragt, wo vieles morsch und unheimlich dasteht, das meiste schon am Boden liegt, malerisch genug—wo gab es je schönere Ruinen?—und überwachsen mit grossem und kleinem Unkraute. Die Kirche ist diese Stadt des Unterganges : wir sehen die religiöse Gesellschaft des Christentums bis in die untersten Fundamente erschüttert. . . . Die Lutherische Reformation war in ihrer ganzen Breite die Entrüstung der Einfalt gegen etwas 'Vielfätiges,' um vorsichtig zu reden, ein grobes, biederer Missverständnis, an dem viel zu verzeihen ist,—man begriff den Ausdruck einer siegreichen Kirche nicht und sah nur Korruption, man missverstand die vornehme Skepsis, jenen Luxus von Skepsis

¹ Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche Works, Vol. 1., p. XII.

² *ibid.*, p. X.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Die Grossen Denker, p. 377.

und Toleranz, welchen sich jede siegreiche, selbstgewisse Macht gestattet. . . . Man übersieht heute gut genug, wie Luther in allen kardinalen Fragen der Macht verhängnisvoll, kurz, oberflächlich, unvorsichtig angelegt war, vor allem als Mann aus dem Volke, dem alle Erbschaft einer herrschenden Kaste, aller Instinkt für Macht abging : so dass sein Werk, sein Wille zur Wiederherstellung jenes Römerwerkes, ohne dass er es wollte und wusste, nur der Anfang eines Zerstörungswerkes wurde."¹

And in the following words Nietzsche's attitude towards the science and metaphysics of his time is clearly outlined and his realistic and existentialist view of man becomes obvious :

"Ehemals suchte man zum Gefühl der Herrlichkeit des Menschen zu kommen, indem man auf seine göttliche Abkunft hinzeigte : dies ist jetzt ein verbotener Weg geworden, denn an seiner Tür steht der Affe, nebst anderem greulichem Getier, und fletscht verständnisvoll die Zähne, wie um zu sagen : nicht weiter in dieser Richtung ! So versucht man jetzt in der entgegengesetzten Richtung : der Weg, wohin die Menschheit geht, soll zum Beweis ihrer Herrlichkeit und Gottverwandtschaft dienen. Ach, auch damit ist es nichts ! Am Ende dieses Weges steht die Graburne des letzten Menschen und Totengräbers mit der Aufschrift, 'nihil humani a me alienum puto.' Wie hoch die Menschheit sich entwickelt haben möge—und vielleicht wird sie am Ende gar tiefer als am Anfang stehen !—es gibt für sie keinen Übergang in eine höhere Ordnung, sowenig die Ameise und der Ohrwurm am Ende ihrer 'Erdenbahn' zur Gottverwandtschaft und Ewigkeit emporsteigen. Das Werden schleppt das Gewesensein hinter sich her : warum sollte es von diesem ewigen Schauspiele eine Ausnahme für irgendein Sternchen und wiederum für ein Göttingchen auf ihm geben. Fort mit solchen Sentimentalitäten !"²

It is Knittermeyer, who in "Die Philosophie des XX. Jahrhunderts," edited by Heinemann, p. 256 ff., points out the common blow Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (despite fundamental differences) strike at the objective and secure metaphysics of their time. If Heidegger called Nietzsche the last metaphysician, because he gave one answer to all questions : the will to power, Knittermeyer rightly reminds us that Nietzsche called this a last fact. In other words, it was not merely a neutral statement, but a last experience, a challenge which deeply touches our existence and lies beyond all metaphysical or ethical formulae of value. This challenge is the affirmation in the labyrinth of all resistances and comprehends them as that which legitimises this "will to power," as that which resolves all tension and despair. "Do

¹ Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, par. 93, in: Friedrich Nietzsche, Works, ed. by A. Messer, pp. 278-279.

² Morgenröte, 1. Book, par. 9, in: Friedrich Nietzsche, Works, ed. by A. Messer, p. 205

you want a name for this world ? A solution for all its riddles ? 'This world is the will to power and nothing else !' The will to power constitutes the harmony of action and suffering, war and peace, bad luck and good luck. This will to power works itself eternally in the creative power of becoming, which is experienced as being. Only becoming is, and only one being-there is valid, namely, that which releases itself into power of its lust of becoming, and which permits itself to be spurred on "beyond good and evil," i.e., beyond all ethical and metaphysical dictates of the past philosophy, by the "instinct of freedom." H. Knittermeyer concludes his chapter on Nietzsche by pointing out that to-day we can no longer re-live this metaphysics of Nietzsche. This last dream of mankind has also faded away, this last dream which carried a thinking beyond itself, which formulated the question to its very extreme, and which foresaw the catastrophe very clearly, which had to happen to a time which to the last wanted to study metaphysics with scientific sobriety.

The word "catastrophe" is our cue. Nietzsche is the thinker who clearly saw the catastrophe looming large before mankind. He realized the dangers of the absolute "ids" in their scientific, social and metaphysical form, and his philosophy was a last attempt to avert the catastrophe and to save Europe from destruction. But this would have required the revaluation of all values. Man had to be thrown upon himself, i.e., into the midst of actuality as a struggling, fighting and conquering individual. Neither reason, faith nor science would enable man to overcome himself: they all have as an aim mankind. Mankind, however, does not exist, it is an abstraction. It is, therefore, preposterous to improve it. Life, for Nietzsche, resembles a huge laboratory in which the aim of experiments is not the happiness of the mass, but the evolution of the type. Society is a means for the increase of the power of the personality. Not mankind but superman is the aim. This working up of the individual from the slough of the average is a slow and painful process. It requires the unyielding and unscrupulous application of the whole personality in the face of seemingly unsurmountable obstacles. Combat, therefore, is the main occupation in life. Manliness, courage, spirit of enterprise, valour and heroism are the highest virtues. But has Nietzsche solved the dilemma of man by declaring superman the aim ? Can man create himself at the expense of his fellowman ? Can he struggle his way up to an earth-bound "divinity" in this manner after the method of classical metaphysics had estranged man from himself by fusing him with an impersonal idea! "id ?" Nietzsche drives the individual into isolation, which no man can bear. With Kierkegaard the individual could at least embrace God in passionate faith. But with Nietzsche man can only embrace himself. This to us seems to be a great violation of actuality, which represents man not only as a self but also as a social and communal being. Nietzsche's man, at least the type of man Nietzsche considers worthy of this name, has to go it alone. Nietzsche

overlooks the fact, however, that man does not exist in oneness but in twoness, or in relation to the other as Eberhard Grisebach points out. It is very strange that those two thinkers both start out from man's uncertain lot and both conceive man's being-there as an existence in conflict with the fellowman. But the conclusion both thinkers draw from this state of affairs is entirely different. Nietzsche advocates the self-assertion of the individual over his fellowmen, while Grisebach urges us to accept and to bear in silent suffering this state of mutual contradiction that exists between me and my fellowman. Both thinkers thereby transcend actuality, Nietzsche by overstepping it and Grisebach by understepping it, as we shall yet see. Nietzsche is the pagan thinker who hopes to avert the catastrophe by the absoluteness of the capable leader. Grisebach is the Protestant thinker who has experienced the catastrophe and who realizes the danger of any claim to absoluteness on the part of any system or individual. He thus distrusts any human leader and opens our eyes to man's actual situation, which consists in mutual contradiction between me and my fellowman. Like Nietzsche, he knows no abstraction such as mankind. He, too, knows only man, not, as Nietzsche, as a self-contained individual who lays claim to absoluteness, but as a communal being who realizes that he is linked up with his fellowman in mutual contradiction.

Though we may not agree with Nietzsche's proposed solution of averting the catastrophe, we must admire his foresightedness, which sometimes was really prophetic. Like Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer he distrusted the culture, philosophy and the various prevalent ideologies of the 19th century. He also realized the sterility of the impersonal "ids," which led to man's alienation from himself as an individual. In other words, he, too, referred us again to the actual world of the individual. The pessimistic feeling of these three thinkers was fully justified, when the fallacy of man's view of life in the 19th century, the doubtfulness and questionability of his grand culture and civilisation, was fully revealed by the catastrophies of the First and Second World Wars. Actuality flung man back into the midst of an existential situation in which his metaphysical world had become meaningless and senseless, and in which science, too, unmasked itself as a force hostile to man, as a means of his destruction. To understand man's disillusionment in connexion with science, we must keep in mind man's trust in progress. And what was the real meaning of progress? The progressing humanization of man! In other words, science and technique were supposed to have been instrumental to man's becoming more human. But the two World Wars made it clear that science had had the opposite effect. Even in killing, the personal factor had been removed; killings, like anything else, had assumed an anonymous character. If science had aroused in man the vision of the promised land, it had now revealed itself as a factor of uncertainty and as a menace to man's existence. Thus man was thrown entirely upon himself. If he believed that he had penetrated the sphere of reality by science on the one hand and

metaphysics on the other, he now found himself surrounded by emptiness, by the nothing. Anxiety and despair made him realize his being thrown into nothingness, and caused him to search for being in himself, in self-seclusion. In other words, from the *Cogito, ergo sum*, man moved to the *Existo, ergo sum*. It is thus not surprising that man by withdrawing into himself and searching for being in himself found "nothing," as is especially revealed by the existentialist philosophy of Sartre. For without outside communication man cannot determine himself and, therefore, is nothing.

Heinemann in his "Existentialism and the Modern Predicament" has clearly shown that Existentialism is a protest against man's estrangement in the direction of objectivization in its idealist form, and against the alienation of man caused by the forces of technology, the mass and bureaucracy. But he also points out that the existentialist subjectivization does not overcome estrangement but retains it. One could go even further by saying that it represents an estrangement not via the mind, as is the case in idealist metaphysics, but via man. Heinemann says:

"Existence cannot be systematized; it is a principle of life which escapes all Procrustean systematization. This does not mean that the existentialists are unable to construct philosophies of their own; but if they do, they are bound to transcend the principle of existence. Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre and Berdyaev illustrate this point."¹

In chapter II of "Existentialism and the Modern Predicament" entitled: "Beyond Technology?" Heinemann argues that the technological alienation manifests itself in man in the form of frustration. Man is in danger of not being able to control the technical forces any longer and runs the risk of becoming their slave. He, therefore, finds himself a stranger in this world of automatization. Technology has penetrated into the arts and philosophy, and its danger consists in becoming an end in itself, instead of remaining a mere means towards an end. In philosophy this danger manifests itself in Logical Positivism, which has created a self-contained world of logical relations outside space and time, which claims to hold the essential and universal truth and which, according to Russell, is applicable to all possible worlds. Heinemann rightly points out that in this school of thought the discussion of real problems has been replaced by the debating of mere pseudo-problems. The problem of man's existence emerges in the face of his estrangement caused by the forces of technology, the mass, bureaucratization. Existentialism must be understood as a reaction to this state of affairs. Thus, when positing the problem in chapter I, Heinemann asks the question: What is the function of existentialism in the present circumstances? It may be fulfilling a function vital for man's survival. He next seeks to separate the wheat from the chaff by pointing out what is alive and what is dead in the

¹ Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, p. 174.

existentialist systems of seven existentialist thinkers. He comes to the following conclusions :

1. Existentialism demonstrates the alienation of man from the world as well as man's self-estrangement. In this respect it is very much alive.

2. Existence cannot be systematized without transcending the principle of existence. In other words, the construction of a metaphysics on the existential proposition *Existo, ergo sum* again leads to man's alienation and self-estrangement, because existence is a principle of life which defies all systematization. In this attempt at systematization, therefore, Heinemann sees that which is "dead" in existentialism.

3. Dead branches in existentialism are, according to Heinemann, Kierkegaard's distinction between objective or inessential and subjective or essential truth and the overstressing of the latter at the expense of the former.

Husserl's transcendental ego.

Jaspers' philosophy of elusiveness (floating). He shows numerous possibilities for the individual to realize his "self" in a "Grenz-situation" but never commits himself.

Heidegger's metaphysics based on the natural disposition of man (Dasein) proves a failure in that the uncritical assumptions of being, truth, etc. lack any logical foundation.

Sartre's thought is dead in so far as the author commits himself to certain general propositions which again lead to alienation and self-estrangement, e.g., the nothing as an absolute (man's consciousness is the nothing); liberty is negation and therefore nothing; man is the source of all negating and, therefore, is responsible for everything. He is condemned to be free.

Marcel's systematization consists in the "ontological mystery," i.e., the transition from the problem to the mystery. The mystery is something in me, in which I am myself engaged; the problem, on the other hand, constitutes an obstruction to my self. "Faith" thus becomes a mode of being. Descartes' "Je pense donc je suis" is changed into "Je crois donc je suis."

Nicolas Berdyaev dreams of man's self-realization in the form of the transfiguration of this earth, brought about by the creative act of man.

4. Up to a certain degree man will always be a foreigner in this world. But he must never allow alienation to proceed as far as to crush his existence, he must try again and again to conquer it, e.g. he must not permit technology to control him, but must himself keep in control of it.

5. Despite its dead branches existentialism is alive, a challenge in a world, where man's existence is menaced.

In trying to answer "Whither?", which constitutes chapter XI in "Existentialism and the Modern Predicament," Heinemann at first

shows that, despite their arousing effect, the existentialist philosophers are not the true leaders of our time. The postulate of existentialism "man for himself" turns into "man against himself." The split between the extreme subjectivism of the "unobjectified subject" (Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Berdyaev) and the extreme objectivism of the "unsubjectified object" (Heidegger's last philosophy) arises because existentialism has failed to bridge the gap between nature and mind. It makes the mistake of assuming that the *natura naturans* of the mind can exist without the *natura naturata*, thereby reducing mind to nothingness. Heinemann, therefore, postulates a "redistribution of being." He demands a different approach to the metaphysical problem as a problem "*sui generis*." The linguistic approach to philosophy is inadequate. We no longer believe in the infallibility of science and the human understanding. On the other hand, the result achieved by existentialism "man against himself" must be overcome. Being-in-the-world should be replaced by being-with-the-world (participation), i.e., man-with-himself, man-with-man, man-with-the-world, man-with-God. Thus Heinemann finds another existentialist ground in that the *Existo, ergo sum* of existentialist philosophy is replaced by *Respondeo, ergo sum*, i.e., the response towards a stimulus on the level of instinctive, intellectual, aesthetic, ethical and religious reaction in a positive or negative way.

Heinemann deals with the *Respondeo in* chapter XII of "Existentialism and the Modern Predicament." He proposes to build a new metaphysics on the psychological experience of stimulus and response. In so doing, he, like any other philosopher, searches for the real ground of the stimulus-response experience, which he finds in the "sign" or the meaning of this psychological function. This constitutes the "meta-analytic method," i.e., the function of responding means that one responds to something which exists. If one responds positively, one participates in being, if negatively, or not at all, one estranges oneself. Thus meta-analytics reveals the fundamental function of participation in something as well as the structure of the latter. This is Heinemann's new ontology and his answer to the thrust into the nothing by existentialism. Heinemann's meta-analytics reminds us of the phenomenological school (Brentano, Husserl), but we may also conceive it to constitute an attempt at synthesis between traditional British Philosophy (Hume) and continental existentialism. That the latter view is possible becomes obvious from the fact that Heinemann admits that the something in which we participate cannot be verified rationally. We depend on *our* ways of response, on an ordinary-spontaneous, scientific, artistic, ethical and religious level. That in so doing we respond to something is a matter of trust. It is true that Heinemann's system points out a possible way towards freeing man from the danger of being crushed by technology and towards the restoration of his dignity and autonomy as a person. But it seems that man can free himself only as a creature of faith. It is interesting to note that man is

again turned from an animal of reason into an animal of faith. Reason and faith may even be said to be identical. Faith again becomes the true ground of cognition. That this is the case becomes particularly clear from Heinemann's philosophy of religion. It is we who have to respond to God in the height of suffering and despair, when everything seems to break down around us. It is then that we have to "affirm" God. In other words, the choice in an existential situation, where God seems to be silent, is ours. The act of affirmation is an act of the will, of reason and of faith.

If we have interpreted Heinemann's philosophy correctly, we must say that it reminds us very much of the system of Augustine. Through our striving, by our free will, we have alienated ourselves from God (this happened by the absolutization of science on the one hand and speculative metaphysics on the other). Existentialism, too, was not able to overcome this alienation, but we may say that by its thrust into the nothing, it landed us in despair and doubt. This alienation from God Augustine would call sin. But this very doubt and despair arouse in us afresh the desire for truth. Where is this to be found? The answer, which Heinemann together with Augustine gives, is: In ourselves, our inner experience. We are constantly challenged by our sense-organs, our intellect, our aesthetic, ethical and religious sense to respond to something which constitutes reality, being or "truth." And the call of the hour bids us respond now, unless we want to run the risk of getting crushed by the forces of technology. Even as Augustine demanded that the revealed truth be grasped by a last act of assent, in other words, that it be embraced by faith, which seemed a reasonable thing to do because reason alone led only to a truth which was not free from contradictions, Heinemann tries to convince us that, in our present dilemma, it would also be reasonable to affirm God, even though or just because He seems to be silent. Thus faith becomes an act of reason (ideation) and of the will (assent). It is for this reason that we said previously that in Heinemann's meta-analytics reason and faith are really identical and that faith is the true ground of cognition. Though Heinemann's inner experience in the form of the Respondeo leads us to various fields of reality, the empirical, scientific, intellectual, aesthetic and divine, the uncertainty that remains in ever getting an answer on the part of God keeps alive our existential feeling. In the face of uncertainty, therefore, a decision is called for; therein consists our responsibility and our freedom. The philosophy of response is summed up as follows:

1. As a general imperative it says: "Your responses shall be existential."
2. Morally it implies: "You shall react in such manner that you are able to accept responsibility for every one of your answers."
3. As a religious principle it demands: "Reply with absolute responsibility in the face of God."

4. In metaphysical language it exhorts us : " Answer so that you mirror the Universe in your specific way from your point of view."

We hope that in our discussion of the real ground it has become clear that, whether this ground is of an idealist or materialist, subjective or objective nature, it is in the last instance always an *existential* ground and thereby really immanent. We recognized Descartes' *Cogito, ergo sum* as such an existential ground from which man made the attempt to realize himself. We witnessed how man, in the course of his further history, transcended himself via the " *res extensa* " and the " *res cogitans*." In Positivism we recognized the absolutization of the scientific method. It represented the material and the social " *id* " by which man was absorbed as an individual. Idealist metaphysics, on the other hand, constituted the ideal " *id* " by which man absolutized himself. Though Marx' system was nothing but the inversion of Hegel's, there is at the same time a great affinity with Positivism. Even as Comte's " *humanity* " or " *great being* " is nothing but an abstract through which man transcends himself, Marx sees in labour the factor which welds man into the collective and through which he becomes the " *Grossmensch*." But the decisive difference between Marx and Hegel is that the former turns against Hegel's interpretation of mind and consciousness thereby linking up with Kierkegaard. Both thinkers likewise reject Descartes' *Cogito, ergo sum* and change it into *Sum, ergo cogito*. While Marx interprets the *Sum* in a materialistic sense, as an action which produces not only the economic and social conditions of life but our existence itself, Kierkegaard protests in the name of the individual and the soul. The *Existo, ergo sum* is then further developed by Schopenhauer and especially Nietzsche, who, together with Kierkegaard, delivered a blow to idealist metaphysics. While Kierkegaard, however, exists before God, whom he embraces in faith (which is an " *objective uncertainly held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionable inwardness* "), Nietzsche sees in the " *will to power* " the resolution of all tensions and despair. In the midst of the catastrophe of the two World Wars and the menace to man's existence by the technological forces, the *Existo* may be said to have become ground and purpose in one. Man, so to speak, communicated only with himself, thereby turning against himself, as Heinemann pointed out so aptly. The systematization of the principle of existence proved a failure, as such a principle of life cannot be systematized. And as the existentialists erroneously assumed that the *natura naturans* of the mind could exist without the *natura naturata*, thereby reducing mind to nothingness, Heinemann postulated the " *redistribution of being*." To heal the gaping split in man, Heinemann arrived at another real ground or existential formula and replaced the *Existo* by the *Respondeo, ergo sum*. Now man was again able to communicate with something outside himself, even though this something was a matter of trust and faith.

4. Whither Man ?

Heinemann has answered this question by providing a new existential ground which reminds us of Brentano's and Husserl's intentionalism. He saw man's salvation as an individual in the new formula: *Respondeo, ergo sum*. We do not deny that Heinemann's constructive "truth" heals the rift which the existentialist philosophy had torn open in man and again enables him to communicate with something outside him, nor do we deny that man finds himself again as an individual in the face of the technological forces which threaten to destroy man's self. We must, however, ask the question: Is Heinemann's meta-analytics a permanent "solution" of man's problem of existence? Does it answer the question: Whither? or does it contain all the inadequacies of other metaphysical systems, i.e., in the main, does it merely represent another attempt on man's part to transcend himself.

Our historic study of the "real ground" revealed to us the fact that all man-made truths are of an existential nature and lead to man's alienation from the world and man's self-estrangement. We also noticed that those man-made relative truths contradicted each other and were, so to speak, destroyed again by actuality (i.e., in German *das Geschehen, die Wirklichkeit*). It follows that Heinemann's new "truth" is no exception. The "Respondeo" is another man-made relative truth which has been developed from a specific historic and existential situation. It, too, is really an ontology, based on the inner experience of responding to something which, I believe, exists, e.g., the outside world, the true, the good, the beautiful, God. Here we are reminded of Rickert's "universal values," the validity of which is outside time, and is neither physical, psychical nor ideal being, but of a mere logical character. The "acts," however, by which we experience those timeless values and by which we turn towards them, according to Rickert, exist in the soul. Heinemann, too, as so many others had done before him, cannot help constructing the universe from himself. Again the individual is the centre of the universe, as he had always been in reality, even there, where the real ground was conceived to be emanent as in Greek and mediaeval philosophy. The only factor that prevents him from getting entirely fused with it, is the element of insecurity which consists in the uncertainty of receiving an answer on the part of God. This element of insecurity is the only factor that keeps man bound up with the existential situation. But there is always the danger that man becomes certain of God's answer. If this should happen, he at once would soar up to the deity, and would become part of it again. In other words, the danger that man again inflates himself into an absolute, the possibility of another estrangement, the creation by man of another "id" have not been excluded. But even if this should not happen, Heinemann's Respondeo in faith is a truth constructed by Heinemann. In other words, faith becomes man's pathway to the sphere of metaphysics and the divine, the alley of escape from actuality.

The question now obtrudes itself: What is the cause of all this? Why does man always land in the same impasse of alienation and self-estrangement? The answer is: Because of man's natural inclination to overcome actuality (*die Wirklichkeit, das Geschehen*) and to reach reality or absolute truth; in other words, because of man's constant aspiration to transcend himself. In this attempt he communicates with all possible fields of being or fields of reality, e.g., the outside world, the intellectual world, the ethical world, the aesthetic world, God. And in all these modes of communication, man becomes constructive and creates the various "ids" of science, morality, metaphysics, the Godhead, etc. And if all this breaks down, or is shattered by actuality, he even communicates with himself, thereby turning against himself as is revealed by existentialist philosophy. By so doing, he becomes the architect of the nothing. Whither man? No matter how you turn and squirm, you cannot get away from yourself, you cannot transcend yourself, you cannot escape actuality. The merit to have clearly recognized this fact is due to Eberhard Grisebach. Although he may be said to precede Heinemann, chronologically speaking (he died on July 16th, 1945), he may be said to go beyond Heinemann in his philosophy, and this is the reason why we deal with him after having discussed Heinemann. Grisebach, in connexion with our question: Whither man? opens another possibility for man, which is not only worth discussing, but which leads us to the answer we intend to give. He, too, like Heinemann, recognizes the need of man to communicate with something outside himself and he, too, thereby reaches beyond existentialism. But his starting point is entirely different. Unlike idealist metaphysics, existentialism and Heinemann's meta-analytics, he does not start from the self as a unity but from the broken nature of the self, which, as we shall see, confines man to the precincts of actuality. Together with Kant he holds that the real ground or the absolute is unknowable, but, unlike Kant, he does not see in the absolute something for which we strive, a goal or a purpose, but, in conjunction with the broken nature of the self, something that "contradicts." In other words, the real ground confines man to actuality, which we experience by contradiction. Unfortunately, Grisebach, in the end, pins down actuality to such a contingent experience that, in our opinion, he no longer remains within its precincts either, but, in accordance with the nature of his philosophy, does not overstep it (as is the case in the other systems) but understeps it.

Grisebach differs from other philosophers in that he clearly realizes that man will never reach the absolute through his own effort. Neither reason nor rational faith will bring it within our grasp. The absolute is not immanent in man but emanent. Man will never be able to fuse with it, but it will always contradict him. All attempts on the part of man to do so, only end in a material or ideal "id." Though Grisebach recognizes the necessity of man's communication with something outside himself, he holds that this communication cannot be based on

the law of identity, i.e., the identification of subject and object with the self, but that man's communication with the object is one of contradiction. In other words, Grisebach starts from the law of contradiction.

Already in "Die Schule des Geistes" (1912), Grisebach points out that none of our concepts and propositions ever reveal the pure truth and that they all imply their opposite or their negation, although here the influence of Hegel and especially of Rudolf Eucken is still very strong. In this work Grisebach develops the concept from experience. In its passive receptivity experience is uncritical experience, and as such refers to non-existence, i.e., matter as the accidental manifoldness of experiencing. In the concept of experience, now, the element of activity or being is added to that of passivity and non-being.¹ In other words, in critical experience we unfold actuality by the concept, which is dialectical, so that becoming and not being constitutes the "real ground" of philosophy. Thereby the relativity of actuality or of our truth becomes obvious. The absolute is completely transcendent. It is unavailable and not at our disposal. It is an *opus externum*. It can only be believed but not grasped by reason. By that we mean that, according to Grisebach, it can never become part of the self, neither in form of Kierkegaard's objective uncertainty, which was grasped by an "appropriation-process" (i.e., passionate belief) and thus became immanent, nor by Heinemann's responding to God in truth, which act of response likewise restores the communion between myself and God. Thus Heinemann, too, finds the absolute in himself. For Grisebach, on the other hand, such a fusion of the self and the absolute is impossible. It is the very rupture between the self and the absolute and between knowledge and faith that constitutes actuality, the absolute being merely reflected in its dialectics. Faith, therefore, consists in the acceptance of the rupture that exists between actuality and the absolute. It is referred to the sphere of actuality, in other words, the absolute remains completely emanent. Perhaps this is not yet so clearly formulated in the "Schule des Geistes," but already in "Erkenntnis und Glaube" it becomes perfectly clear that, to Grisebach, faith means the acceptance of the rupture that exists between actuality and the absolute and that faith and knowledge meet each other in the dialectics of the real world:

"Ich hüte mich nun wohl, über den Glauben als Erkennender etwas Direktes zu sagen. Die Philosophie hat ja nur die Aufgabe, der Erkenntnis die Grenzen zu weisen, kritischer noch als der Kritizismus den Glauben, d.h. die Verleihung des Ursprungscharakters und seines absoluten Akzents, für sich abzulehnen. Wir können keinen Vernunftglauben für uns mehr in Anspruch nehmen, wir können kein Apriori der Religion anbieten oder in unserer Dialektik den absoluten Geist zu besitzen meinen. Wir können auch keinen Pantheismus lehren, kein kosmisches Ich und Personal-

Cf. chapter I.

leben mehr beibehalten, das den Ursprung in sich tragen soll. Wir können keinen Theismus philosophisch behaupten. Die Philosophie als Erkenntnis aller das Sein konstituierenden Prinzipien endet mit absoluter Ohnmächtigkeit. Die dialektische Beziehungsgesetzlichkeit ist ohne die absolute Macht des Ursprungs, ohne Einheit und Identität. Sie ist ein mit Bezug auf jedes Moment zwiespältiges System von Beziehungen, das für den Widerspruch offen bleibt und somit weder Glauben beanspruchen darf, noch irgendeine Beziehung zu einem absoluten Ursprung; aber sie lehnt den Glauben auch nicht ab. Nur ist das, was jetzt Glaube bedeutet, etwas anderes als Erkenntnis. Die Erkenntnis lässt den Glauben im Widerspruch gelten. Die Erkenntnis kann nur diesen Glauben widerspiegeln, nur die Treue und Permanenz des Fragens bewahren; sie muss auf jede absolute Antwort verzichten und im Widerspruch die Krisis auszuhalten suchen."¹

And here the answer to metaphysics:

“Nun laufen wir nicht mehr Gefahr, in ontologische Metaphysik zurückzufallen, den Glauben zur Unterbauung der Erkenntnistheorie zu benutzen. Erkenntnis und Glaube sind zu unterscheiden. Beide haben ihr eigenes Feld, beide treffen sich in der realen Dialektik der wirklichen Welt, um gemeinsam die Frage zu stellen und den Gegenstand, unsere uns zugängliche Wirklichkeit, unter dem Aspekt des Ewigen zu betrachten.”

In “Die Schule des Geistes” Grisebach is not yet so outspoken. He points out here that faith puts the question about the absolute and that philosophy gives the answer. This answer always reveals the inadequacy of philosophy to reach the absolute. Philosophy, therefore, is the science of the ground of the becoming of the world. It is itself becoming or actuality.² Science and philosophy, therefore, must submit to faith. Religion and philosophy are clearly separated, their link consisting in their contradictoriness. The latter does not know the irrational. It keeps silent in modesty, in the realization of its limits. (This reminds us of Kant.) Metaphysics is the realm of faith and religion. It cannot be overcome dialectically. It is the ground of becoming.⁴ “Der Idealismus ist zu einem metaphysischen, relativen Realismus geworden.” Thereby man is clearly referred to the sphere of actuality. This is the fundamental difference not only between Grisebach and the metaphysicians but also between Grisebach and thinkers like Kierkegaard and Heinemann. The latter’s meta-analytic is nothing but a metaphysics of response in faith. Grisebach’s faith, however, is not an affirmation of God, but it is experienced in the contradictoriness of actuality. If Grisebach had stopped here, we

¹ Erkenntnis und Glaube, pp. 38, 39.

² *ibid.*, p. 46.

³ Cf. chapter 14.

⁴ Cf. chapters 15-18.

should perhaps have been able to agree with him more than we are able to, when we follow the further evolution of his philosophy. According to "Die Schule des Geistes," the question about the absolute, which theology keeps asking again and again, constitutes a continual challenge to man. And even if man's answer is nothing but patch work and bungling, and is contradicted by the absolute, or to put it differently, if man's truths, values and systems of thought are destroyed by the absolute over and over again, the continual question and answer is not meaningless. It keeps alive the activity and creativity of man. He will realize the constant question mark which looms behind all actuality; it will become clear to him that there is nothing final, perfect or absolute in the actual world. One form of culture is superseded by the other, all values have to be revalued over and over again. Man's failure and defeat in the face of the absolute not only keep him humble and modest, but prevent him from getting absorbed by an impersonal "id," ideal or material, scientific or technological. They refer him to his existential situation and thereby keep his mind and heart open for faith. As he, however, states himself in the foreword to "Erkenntnis und Glaube" (1922), Grisebach's discussion with his friend, the dialectical theologian Friedrich Gogarten, caused him to arrive at different results in connexion with his philosophy at a later stage. It may be said that this discussion spurred him to an attempt to clear away all the vestiges and all semblances of a philosophical system, which might still have existed in "Die Schule des Geistes," and to restrict rigorously man's external relations and communications to actuality. Here the de-mythologization of philosophy, i.e., the dismantling of all conventional metaphysical apparatus and of all philosophical truths that claimed to be absolute and real is already in full swing and is continued in his other works: "Die Grenzen des Erziehers" (1924); "Gegenwart" (1928); "Freiheit und Zucht" (1936); "Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes" (1942). Grisebach does not succeed, however, either in avoiding the construction of a new philosophical system or a metaphysics. On the contrary, he may even be said to re-mythologize philosophy. Grisebach's main objection to conventional philosophy, i.e., metaphysics, is its starting-point, which he finds in the law of identity,¹ by which he means that for example in Hegel's philosophy the self-evolving and self-propelling activity of reason becomes conscious of itself in human consciousness, so that man becomes the mystical "subject-object."² In other words, Grisebach starts from the law of contradiction, which is the real ground:

"Unsere Welt liegt im Schatten jenes Widerspruches vor uns. Es ist das Wesen dieser uns zugänglichen Wirklichkeiten und realen Güter, immer widerspruchsvoll zu sein."³

¹ Erkenntnis und Glaube, p. 15.

² Cf., J. Hommes, *Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie*, p. 18.

³ Erkenntnis und Glaube, pp. 23, 24, also cf. especially pp. 15 ff.

In Grisebach's thought, therefore, the object is not immanent but emanent; it always limits us and restricts us to actuality. This emanence of or contradiction by the object is constituted by the outside world, my fellowman and the absolute. The absolute, however, as the "Realgrund im Unterscheiden" (real ground of distinction), cannot be included in the "Beziehungsgesetzlichkeit" (law of interrelatedness) between the individual or subject and the other emanents or externals. It strictly confines me to actuality, i.e., the real goods. It refers the values to a material content which manifests itself by "becoming." The individual thus moves between the real ground, the law of contradiction and the hidden absolute. This fluctuating movement is reflected in the subject by the broken nature of the self. The will as a component of self-conscious existence is determined by the subjective, the objective and the purposive factor. It cannot be traced to an origin. It operates between "not-knowing" and "wanting-to-know." It is this condition of tension, the "Spannung der Momente" which indirectly refers us to a "hidden ground." Thus my volition has its origin in a polarity which sets me my task. It is not "aufgegeben" or set to me as a task by the absolute, but by this brokenness of the "neither-nor."¹

In this manner everything is constantly in question; nothing is certain. History moves between question and relative actuality. The difference from Positivism is the emanence of the "real ground," the absolute, the relatedness of which we do not know. It is reflected in our mind as a "docta ignorantia":

"Bedeutungsvoll aber ist, dass dieses System als Frage selbst beständiger Verneinung untersteht, immer neu fragen muss und so offen bleibt gegenüber einem verborgenen, nur im Widerspruch reflektierenden Realgrunde... Nicht im Sinne kontinuierlichen Fortschreitens lässt diese Dialektik das Werden in der Geschichte erscheinen, sondern der Widerspruch unterbricht immer wieder die Kontinuität... Was uns von dem gewöhnlichen Realismus und Positivismus scheidet, ist die Emanenz des Realgrundes... Die Beziehung zum Realgrunde alles Werdens kann von der Erkenntnis allein aus nicht gewonnen werden. Die Erkenntnis gibt ihn nur in dem Widerschein ihrer Spekulation. Liesse die fragende Erkenntnis den Widerspruch des Realgrundes nicht gelten, so wäre sie nur Schein, ohne Widerschein zu sein."²

The most intensified form of actuality or of the law of relatedness (Beziehungsgesetzlichkeit) becomes manifest in the relation from man to man. The fellowman represents the individual's emanent contradiction and vice versa. In other words, the relation of the subject to the object, i.e., the fellowman, constitutes a crisis. In the ability to suffer and bear this crisis, the individual touches on faith. This seems

¹ Erkenntnis und Glaube, pp. 16 ff.

² *ibid.*, pp. 37, 38, 40.

to be the only relation to the absolute.¹ In "Grenzen des Erziehers," pp. 63, 64, Grisebach says :

"Historische Entwicklung, menschliche Erziehung als Wechselwirkung ist ein Schicksal, ein Gebundensein, das in der Aufnahme der Ansprüche vom Menschen gehorsam erfüllt werden muss. Wir können sie nicht wissend meistern und ihrer nicht besitzend gewiss sein, wir können nur auf sie horchen, an sie glauben, damit sie durch den Nächsten uns zuteil werde. Wir müssen die Eitelkeit aller unserer Bemühungen und aller ererbten Güter einsehen. Wir müssen der ewigen Vernichtung Rechnung tragen, den Widerspruch aushalten, in der Schweben bleiben, nie Einstimmigkeit und Harmonie erträumen, Hass, Neid und Kampf ertragen und nüchtern auf unsere Grenze im Nächsten achten."

And further, p. 95 :

"Der Bezug bleibt in diesem Widerspruch der Personen reflektiert, aber kein Einzelner hat Ursprungsbezug."

If we now ask here the question : Has Grisebach managed to break through the system ? Has he succeeded in de-mythologizing philosophy, i.e., in dismantling its man-made "truths" or does he introduce another "truth ?" To answer this question, we must first ask a counter-question ? Does Grisebach in stating his philosophy make use of concepts ? Does he resort to basic assumptions ? For if he does, he, like any other philosopher, will have to form these concepts in his mind and will have to unfold his philosophy logically in conjunction with his basic pre-suppositions. I am afraid that this is the case and that, therefore, he also moves within a system. The only thing is that his starting-point, namely, the law of contradiction, leads him to conclusions which may be acceptable to a theologian, but which are untenable from the philosophical point of view. If we study the history of philosophy, we find that Grisebach's philosophy of contradiction or of actuality is not so very original after all. Some of his ideas we encounter in the thought of Cusanus, Jacob Böhme, Luther and later on in the Philosophy of Existence. It reminds us greatly of the system of Heraclitus, who found the real ground in the logos which, like Grisebach's absolute, "loved to hide," and which as "nomos," i.e., polemos, change and becoming, governed the world. The difference is that Grisebach seems to have overlooked one important fact which did not escape the keen mind of Heraclitus, namely, the positive and creative nature of conflict and antagonism. Heraclitus points out that harmony develops through antithesis by referring us to music and the union of male and female. Conflicting things unite and antithetical tones give rise to the most beautiful harmonies and all things come into being through strife. The real ground is experienced by Grisebach (and Heraclitus) as hidden, i.e., not-knowing and not-possessing. It is therefore transcendent, and refers him to actuality.

¹ Erkenntnis und Glaube, pp. 34, 35, 36, 40.

But how does he know that what he experiences as not-knowing and not-possessing is the real ground and not simply nothing? ¹ And if his answer is: by contradiction in actuality, our question is: What, if there exists nothing but this contradictory actuality? The emanence of the real ground and the brokenness of our self consistently lead us to a *Docta Ignorantia*. This concept, for that is what it really is, may be regarded as an absolute in a negative form, which as absolute not-knowing points to the limitation of our own knowledge, to the conflicting processes of actuality and refers us to an "ought" which arises from this actuality in the ethical dimension, namely, our obligation in the light of the contradiction constituted by the emanence of the fellowman and the absolute. The brokenness of our own nature or self, too, is nothing but a mental concept. For, as an experience, we become conscious of it only immanently. Thus as long as Grisebach explains, describes and argues, he has to start from presuppositions such as the law of contradiction, and he is forced to carry on by means of concepts. This means that he has to include time, memory, and thereby the past; for without those factors no intelligible argument would be possible. To be fair to Grisebach, we must state here that in "Gegenwart" as well as in "Freiheit und Zucht" and "Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes" he himself has become aware of the systematic character of his law of relatedness (*Beziehungsgesetzlichkeit*), i.e., the law of contradiction, in which the absolute is reflected. He himself feels that thereby the *opus externum*, however indirectly, again comes to fall within the grasp of man. In other words, it really becomes immanent or an experience of faith as a psychological and ontological experience. In "Gegenwart," therefore, Grisebach seeks to remove all semblance of the constructive and the theoretical and to push through to the purely practical, i.e., the entirely unsystematic, completely practical and problematic character of actual life, which man experiences directly as a crisis. His self and his self-constructed truths are questioned by the contradiction of his fellowman, which, however, is no law or structure but a contingent experience. In "Gegenwart," therefore, Grisebach seeks to exclude even the faintest semblance and trace of an absolute in actual life to avoid any theoretical systematisation or conceptualisation. It is thus not surprising that "Gegenwart" constituted the breach between Grisebach and the dialectical theologians, especially Gogarten, Barth and Brunner, who had still influenced his thought in "Erkenntnis und Glaube" and "Grenzen des Erziehers."

The difficulty for Grisebach, now, from the philosophical stand-point, is that his view of actuality, or rather the problematic nature of actuality (for, according to Grisebach, it is impossible to form a concept of it), which is really the relation of a conflict between me and my fellowman experienced by me now and then, i.e., in utmost contingency, renders any intelligible communication impossible. For any explanation or

¹ If it were conceived in this way, Grisebach's thought would move in the direction of Heidegger.

description of such a contingent experience constitutes its conceptualisation, and as such this experience is automatically moved into the past, in that, as remembrance, it is moved into the sphere of the theoretical. Grisebach's critical philosophy, therefore, only reflects indirectly the problematic nature of reality. By this knowledge, namely, the not-knowing of the real (*docta ignorantia*), it annuls or rejects itself. What then is left? Grisebach would answer, "The actual experience of the conflict in passion" (suffering). But is there any experience without consciousness? Thus the question arises: Does Grisebach stay within the precincts of actuality as he understands it, namely, as conflict and contradiction? For the moment I experience the conflict as suffering and bear it, I no longer really move within problematic actuality but understep it. Or, to put it differently, the moment I am really enabled to bear the contradiction of my fellowman and he is enabled to do the same by me, we have really ceased to contradict each other. Thereby the problematic character of actuality has been terminated and we are in peace. Grisebach himself has designated the experience of bearing the contradiction of my fellowman in silent suffering as "ethical existence." When, however, we find that the contingent experience of actuality has been conceptualised by Grisebach in that it is identical with "real time," as we shall yet see, we are compelled to draw the conclusion that faith, too, has been moved again into the theoretical sphere and has therefore been rationalised.

But even if we forget this for the time being and take quite seriously the untheoretical and practical character of Grisebach's contingent experience of actuality, the absolute has not really been excluded and is therefore not completely transcendent. For if we realize that, according to Grisebach, the Cross² is supposed to be of the same practical significance as the contingent experience of actuality, we become conscious of the connexion between ethical existence and the absolute. The Cross points to the conflict and contradiction which all men suffer every day in regard to their fellowmen. Jesus set an example of absolute faith by complete self-denial and by obediently living through on the Cross His suffering and agony to the bitter end, thereby ending all conflict and contradiction, in short, actuality. It is in this sense that the event of the Cross may be said to contradict all actuality and, according to Grisebach, stands outside history. However practical and contingent, therefore, the experience of contradiction on the part of my fellowman may be, the moment I regard it in the light of the Cross, my suffering this contradiction, in the event of which the experience of peace, which transcends all reason, might come to me, becomes a religious category. For if, according to Grisebach, God has revealed

¹ Gegenwart, p. 483.

² In regard to Grisebach's conception of the Cross cf. *Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes*, pp. 102-116.

Himself on the Cross, i.e., in the dying Jesus, Who by His absolute faith had already overcome death and had already been resurrected, so that God's promise of salvation was fulfilled, the preparedness of man to live in the expectation of his end, i.e., the termination of his self by his fellowman in the future, points in the same direction.

Communication with the absolute, however, in whatever form, be it by identity or contradiction, implies that I am no longer in contradictory actuality, but that all contradictoriness has been resolved, so that I have relapsed into truth. Or do actuality and truth fall together in the contingent experience of bearing the antagonistic tension that connects me with my fellowman? However this may be, in both cases man may be said to have merged with the transcendent, in the former case through his own striving, in the latter case through a contingent experience that occurs to him, namely, the actual bearing of the contradiction of his fellowman in passion, which might lead him to an ethical existence the peace of which surpasses all understanding. For if truth falls together with actuality, then man, who constitutes part of actuality, likewise participates in truth. If the above is correct, then Grisebach's thought, like that of any other metaphysician, is crowned by man's communication with the absolute. Grisebach may be said to chase away the absolute from the front door, without noticing that it slips in again clandestinely by the back door. It is by the pinning down of contradictory actuality to the most extreme contingency that Grisebach's system becomes untenable *from the philosophical point of view*.

The view, therefore, that history is alive only in as much as we to-day have determined its law by the brokenness of our nature, i.e., the antagonistic relation between the "I" and the "thou," which he propounds in "Grenzen des Erziehers," is also questionable. We do of course agree with Grisebach when he sees in history nothing but the contradictoriness of the truths of man, and when he points out that the law of history is at the same time the law of the community. But we object to Grisebach's argument that the past is only meaningful to us when contradicted and questioned by us to-day. In the first place each human truth in the past, i.e., each philosophical, cultural and political system is meaningful in its own right as the result of man's self-realization from a given existential situation. Secondly, such a conception of history deprives man of understanding his position of to-day as being rooted in the past even existentially. For the past determines the present. Without the systems that we built in the past, the crisis of truth would never have arisen. Grisebach would never have experienced it, and would, therefore, never have arrived at his critical philosophy. It is the past, therefore, which determined Grisebach's position as being confronted with a crisis of truth. The historic truths of man must have created an actual situation first, from

which Grisebach can consult history as to its meaning for him, in his present. When Grisebach says :

“Das Gewissen gründet sich auf mancherlei Erfahrung. Es kennt die Folgen seines Tuns in der Vergangenheit. Es kennt die Folgen seines Denkens in der Gegenwart, denn es hat daran zu leiden. Ein Kriterium lässt sich gewinnen aus der historischen Erinnerung, die nicht nur des Rühmlichen in der Geschichte gedenkt, sondern uns vor allem über die klassischen Irrtümer belehren kann, an deren Folgen wir heute erfahrungsgemäss schwer zu tragen haben. Die Historie behält für das Gewissen einen Bildungswert. Aus der Geschichte lässt sich ein Gesetzbuch gewinnen, das lauter Verbote und Strafen für unsere Verfehlungen enthält. Die Erfahrung gibt die Illustrationen dazu,”¹

he can only speak from an existential situation which has been determined by the past. Thereby the *real nature* of history has been revealed. The moving, therefore, of the historic truths into the world of delusion by Grisebach can only be explained from Grisebach's eschatological presupposition, namely, his expectation of being able to bear the contradiction that exists between him and his fellowman, which experience is anti-historical. In other words, Grisebach's bracketing of the historic world from actuality is itself historic in that it is rooted in an existential situation which has been determined by the human truths of the past, namely, the situation of the experience of the truth as a crisis. This led Grisebach to a delusive eschatological feeling and to the idea that, in his age, the final breakdown of the historic truth would induce man to stop realizing himself and to practise self-restraint, so that, eventually, he would be led to bear the contradiction of his fellowman, which would pave the way for his salvation.

Already Grisebach's "law of history" in "Grenzen des Erziehers" aims at a separation between the remembered past and the actual present. It points to the future "ethical existence" of man, i.e., to faith as we find it stated later in "Gegenwart." In the law of the community, i.e., the contradictoriness between myself and my neighbour, I, so to speak, experience history, and "Der Riss in der Gemeinschaft ist der Reflex des Realgrundes."² In other words, the "law of history," too, indirectly refers to the absolute. And when in "Gegenwart" Grisebach, as we have already seen, excludes even the "Riss in der Gemeinschaft" (the chasm in the community) as "Reflex des Realgrundes" (reflection of the real ground) and aims at complete contingency thereby becoming entirely anti-historical, he even more clearly *understeps* actuality. For it is man's nature to move within the historic sphere, and the arbitrary suspension by Grisebach of this characteristic of man leads him away from himself and from the actual world in which man moves.

¹ Was ist Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit, p. 28.

² Grenzen des Erziehers, p. 28.

To remain in actuality, the remembered past is necessary. Even if we cannot re-live it, we are nevertheless existentially rooted in it. It has meaning for us, not only through being questioned by us to-day, but also through being remembered by us as that which it is, namely, the constant attempt of man to conquer a specific existential situation and to transcend himself. Hence the construction by man of contradictory historic truths by which, as we have already seen from our historic survey of man's thought, man's respective historic position is determined. Not only would it be impossible for us to-day to understand the existential nature of actuality without the past, but the past also determines the present and the future. In other words, without an existing related truth constructed in the past, no new truth to contradict it could be built nor would it have been built, so that actuality would have ceased. Moreover, Grisebach's contingent actuality, too, is something that is understood, otherwise Grisebach could not philosophise about it. Mutual contradiction can only be conceived through the category of time. To pin-point it to a contingent experience, therefore, in the expectation of which I live, means to annul actuality; for, without the category of time actuality is inconceivable. When, to escape this contradiction in adjective, Grisebach converts time into real time, which is nothing but the pin-pointed moment at which I am actually bearing the antagonistic relation existing between me and my fellowman, a time which is really without a dimension and which may be said to constitute contingency as such, we can only say that this is mere speculation. This real time Grisebach conceives as problematic. It is a split time, so to speak, the one half of which belongs to our humanistic world in the form of our expectations, our attitude of preparedness, which, as an effort of our will, still springs from our own nature and our ego. The other half lies in the world of that which is expected, i.e., the experience of contradiction on the part of my fellowman, which, as a contingent experience, terminates all unfolding of my ego, even in the form of self-restraint and expectation. By limiting the self and making all knowledge problematic, real time represents the discontinuation of time, because knowledge, according to Grisebach, is only possible within the circle of the self, i.e., in the continuum of time. The self, therefore, always leads us away from actuality into a humanistic world of imagination which is entirely technical and can never guarantee us an ethical existence. The experience of real time and actuality, therefore, is no longer at our disposal, i.e., it is outside the grasp of myself and my knowledge and renders everything questionable and problematic. We could not possibly describe it and communicate it to anybody. This being the case, I would never be conscious of it if it could occur to me; for, in consciousness, it would no longer be actual but only a reflection of the actual. On the other hand, if it could be experienced by me, then I should also be able to remember it and to describe it, which would move it again into the sphere of historic time, which real time is supposed to terminate. There is

therefore, according to Grisebach, a pronounced rift between the actual experience of the transcendent and the being conscious of its problematic nature, which moves the former into the sphere of blind trust and faith, where not a single trace of the ego, the will or knowledge is left. And even if the experience of peace were to come to me, then the question arises : Is this the end of everything or is it the beginning of something new ? Thus Grisebach may have a point from the *religious point of view* but not from the philosophical stand-point ; for philosophy without understanding, memory, space and time is impossible, because, without those factors, I could not understand actuality, and Grisebach would not have been conscious even of his abstract contingent actuality. Thus we do not criticise Grisebach for holding the view of actuality which he does ; for he may even be right, who knows ? But we object because he presents this view to us as a philosopher, by means of a philosophical system and in philosophical terms. But the objection may be raised that it was Grisebach's very aim to end all systems and to push through to an ethical existence in the future in which he no longer posits his truth or his self, but in which his self is terminated by his fellowman, and in which he is enabled to suffer the contradiction of his fellowman. Our answer is that Grisebach undertakes this work in a most systematic and academic way, so that his system may be called the system to end all systems. Moreover, the presupposition of his philosophy, the contradictory nature of the Cross, which seems to be the purpose of his philosophy, makes the systematic character of his thought more obvious still.

The difficulty is *from the philosophical point of view* that, by pin-pointing actuality to contingent experience, Grisebach moves in the sphere of the transcendent, which is the field of religion. It may even be as Grisebach says, but no one will ever know ; for to know means to remember, to form an idea which I can communicate to others. In memory, however, such an experience, according to Grisebach, could no longer be actual, but becomes an incident of the past and therefore dead and meaningless. Such a contingent experience, therefore, is never within the reach of our understanding and therefore lies beyond the precincts of philosophy.

Though Grisebach realizes himself that, as long as he speaks about actuality, he also judges it through the category of time and thereby keeps moving within the circle of the self,¹ he merely regards this fact as a preparatory step towards bearing the relation of contradiction to the fellowman in contingent actuality. It does not occur to him that this really constitutes the border of actuality and that without time, meaning and the past there would be no actuality. In other words, he does not realize that one cannot go any further, at least not as a philosopher, without intruding into the sphere of theology, which intrusion by philosophy he had previously categorically rejected. He wants to get

¹ Cf. *Gegenwart*, pp. 583 ff.

rid of any ballast of the mind, which keeps him tied down to the system, and endeavours to break through completely. He pushes thus on to where actuality can no longer be described but only experienced in contingency. Real time, i.e., the very moment of my experiencing actuality, represents the limitation and even the termination (Endsetzung) of my ego by the transcendent in the form of my fellowman, which is also the suffering of passion, not as eros but as challenge, contradiction, as being in the wrong. In other words, only in the punctuation of the crisis does man truly exist. Anything else, e.g., self-assertion, sentimentality, feeling sorry for oneself, leads us away again from actuality. No firm stand and no good intentions are of any use in this critical, problematic situation. Such stand is of a mere indirect significance. It can only reject tempting ideologies. In the uncertainty of the critical situation nothing can be rejected or warded off, only suffering is accepted and borne. The task is clearly set, namely, to endure suffering in self-restraint. There is no hope for immortality as a further evolution of our essence, but only for a future ethical existence.¹ Only in this contingency of the experience of actuality Grisebach may be said to have broken through the system and ended it, but thereby systematically terminating anything else. To understand Grisebach completely, it is necessary to quote him in full :

“Wollen wir diese Erfahrung als wirkliches Problem zurückführen auf ihr Grundproblem der wirklichen Zeit, so erhalten wir nicht wie bei der Erinnerung eine aus dem Wesen ableitbare zweideutige Zeit, sondern ein einziges Problem der realen Zeit. Dieses ungelöste und vielleicht unlösbare Problem der realen Zeit ist nicht mehr Einheits-, Ordnungs- und Urteilsprinzip für eine Wirklichkeit. Die wirkliche Zeit hat als wirkliches Problem der Erkenntnis alle Erkenntnisprinzipien in die Krisis hineingezogen und stellt sich als das Haltgebot für alles vereinheitlichende Ordnen und Beurteilen dar. Die reale Zeit des Heute kann deshalb keine ‘problematische Temporalität’ des Seins sein, die als solche nur die Dialektik der Zeit als Grundform einer Erinnerung bezeichnet. Die reale Zeit ist dagegen eine kritische Problemlage der Erkenntnis. Die Erfahrung als Problem ist die Infragestellung der Erkenntnis im gegenwärtigen Augenblick des Heute. Dieses Heute ist deshalb kein Moment in der Kontinuität der Zeit mehr, sondern die Störung jedes kontinuierlichen Masses, der Halt jeder Wesensentfaltung in der Langweile der unendlichen Zeit. . . .”² Das Heute ist auf Grund des Problems der realen Zeit ein endliches Begrenztes, für alles Erinnernte eine Gefahr, weil es alle Berechnung, Besorgung, Befürchtung zerstört. . . .”³ Es ist eine ganz neue Situation geschaffen, in welcher das Ich nicht mehr im Mittelpunkt steht. Der Wesenszirkel nützt uns nicht mehr. . . .”¹ Im Heute ist alle Reflexion selbst

¹ Cf. Gegenwart pp. 567 ff.

² Gegenwart, p. 571.

³ *ibid.* p. 572.

in Anspruch genommen und allem Wissen von Zeit und Zeiten widersprochen."²

And the ethical conclusion from this, which is his chief aim, Grisebach formulates as follows :

“ Die Aufgabe im Aufenthalt bleibt mit Geduld und Bescheidung auszuhalten. Die Leidenschaft (passion in the sense of suffering) begleitet alles Werden wirklicher Bildung, wie das Werden des Gemeinschaftsgutes. Sie beklagt nicht den Abbruch der selbstischen Zeit. Sie führt über Tod und Grab hinweg und lässt keine Hoffnung auf die Unsterblichkeit als Fortentwicklung des Wesens, sondern nur auf zukünftige ethische Existenz. Die Aufgaben aus der Nähe lassen nicht Zeit, in unendlichen Fernen zu schweifen. Den einzigen Trost angesichts der Unzulänglichkeit und Verfehlung gewährt die Inanspruchnahme durch die Zukunft des Morgen in Leidenschaft.”³

If we are correct in interpreting Grisebach's fundamental philosophical position as : Philosophy must de-mythologize the truths and unmask them as untruths so that its task consists in preparing us for and referring us to actuality—we must point out that philosophy can only do so by means of concepts. For concepts or propositions form the very nature of philosophy. And Grisebach's method is no exception. Concepts such as “the present,” “real time,” “ethical existence,” “passion,” to mention only a few, enable him to decompose systematically the positive systems. The chief concept he gains thereby is *the real* as opposed to *the true*, which latter, as we have seen, is relegated to man's world of imagination after having been purged from any traces of the real. The real in its problematic form (actuality) at first (in “Erkenntnis und Glaube” and “Grenzen des Erziehers”) is contrasted with the real ground (the absolute), which, we saw, was supposed to be transcendent and was not included in the “Beziehungsgesetzlichkeit” (law of relatedness) of actuality. In “Gegenwart” we could not help drawing the conclusion that in “real time” the real in its problematic form, the actual, fell together with the real in its absolute form in that, by man's being enabled to suffer his fellowman's contradiction, the actual had been understepped by the termination of man's self. The difference between the positive systems and the negative system of Grisebach is this : While in the former man blends with the absolute by systematically transcending himself, i.e., by inflating his self into an absolute, in the latter man is blended into the absolute by the opposite process, namely, by systematically being relieved of his self, i.e., through the gradual complete termination of his ego by the contradiction of his fellowman. Thereby man has been led to an ethical existence, i.e., to the stage of unconditional faith, which, in the face of the Cross, promises man salvation from himself.

¹ Gegenwart, p. 572.

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.*, p. 585.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, we want to point out here clearly that the *Entscheidung* (the decision) whether man will be able to bear the contradiction of his fellowman in passion and whether thereby the experience of peace (ethical existence) will come to him does not rest with man. The *Entscheidung* (decision) occurs through the *Scheidung*, that is, through the separation and inequality of men, or through the contradiction on the part of the fellowman. In this crisis the above named experience *might* occur to me, by which I am moved from the theoretical and imaginary world of the self, which is also the world of evil, to the practical and real world of contingent experience. In other words, I cannot justify myself by building up a dream world of real ethical existence, but I am justified by the emanent transcendent, i.e., through my fellowman. The self-restraint, modesty and willingness to listen to my fellowman, therefore, to which this insight by critical philosophy will lead me, are only technical virtues, which Grisebach still counts among the humanistic, theoretical world, and which might easily become evil by laying claim to ethical reality, to which they do not belong. In the crisis of all knowledge, therefore, we acquire a *Reife* (maturity) of thought which leads us to the expectation of a future *Ansprechende* (he who applies himself to us). In other words, to the virtue of *Bescheidenheit* (self-restraint) may occur the experience of *Bescheidung* (limitation). This *Bescheidung*, therefore, belongs to the contingent practical sphere which it is impossible for us to know. It is through this *Bescheidung*, then, that all our expectations are ended and that our *Bescheidenheit* (self-restraint) receives a *Bescheid* (communication). According to Grisebach, it is now the ability to bear this communication from outside, which inflicts suffering and pain, that represents real *Gehorsam* (obedience). And if we now see this obedience in the light of the absolute obedience as revealed through Christ's suffering on the Cross, the linking up of man with Christ through the termination of man's ego, i.e., through suffering, love and faith, becomes obvious. Through the overcoming of death by Christ on the Cross, through absolute suffering, love and faith, man's suffering, love and faith are moved into an absolute dimension. Through Christ, therefore, God's promise of salvation has been fulfilled.

This brief account of the process of man's salvation shows that, *from the philosophical point of view*, it is an entirely systematic procedure, the logical consistency of which allows it to be laid down conceptually. Thereby the following steps may be observed: The critical insight into the nature of humanistic truths, which reveals them as untruths and mere expansions of the ego, leads man to the technical virtues of self-restraint and willingness to listen to the other. In this modest attitude of expectation, now, man may come to be justified. In other words, in this marginal region his modesty or self-restraint may be changed through the fellowman into real limitation, by which our expectations will be ended and our self-restraint receives a real

communication. Only if man is enabled to bear this communication in passion, he experiences real obedience. Thereby his self has been terminated, and he has been moved from the humanistic world of imagination and evil to the real world of experience, faith and peace. In the sphere of the real world, therefore, man may be said to have been placed under the shadow of the Cross.

An analysis of Grisebach's conception of actuality, as it appears in "Erkenntnis und Glaube" or "Grenzen des Erziehers," reveals the broken nature of man in all laws of relatedness, i.e., in relation to things as well as to his fellowman. In this broken nature or else in the "realen Grunde der Unterscheidung" (real ground of distinction) we conceive the eternal.¹ Although this real ground is regarded as emanent, it is yet a concept, and is reflected in the brokenness of man, who fluctuates between wanting-to-know and not-knowing, wanting-to-have and not-having. We arrive at this ground by our own nature. If this were not the case, it would be a mere assumption; this would contradict Grisebach's argument, and the systematic nature of Grisebach's thought would be more obvious still. Accordingly, it is the inner brokenness of our nature of the self which in the two above mentioned works is Grisebach's presupposition and from which he constructs his system. This system is constituted by a dialectics of the self, the result of which is nothing but an inversion of the positive systems. In the latter all contradiction is merged by the identification of subject and object. The dialectical nature of Grisebach's ego, on the other hand, effects a dialectics of contradiction which Grisebach calls actuality, and which is continued in all eternity. As all this is postulated by means of concepts (how should it be postulated otherwise?) and as these concepts, e.g., real ground, ground of distinction, primeval process of dialectics are of a metaphysical nature or represent the opus externum of actuality, we may speak of a re-mythologization of philosophy, in which truth is replaced by actuality in a metaphysical sense.

And when in "Gegenwart" Grisebach eliminates even the reflection of a real ground, thus relegating it to absolute transcendence, he does so with the intention of removing what might have been the last vestiges of a conceptual and self-constructed world:

"Denn wüssten wir, was die ethische Wirklichkeit ist—etwa der Gegensatz zur Wahrheit—, so hätten wir ja auch nur eine Wahrheit von der Wirklichkeit. Es lässt sich immer nur indirekt auf das Problem der Wirklichkeit schliessen, nicht auf einen richtigen Begriff derselben."²

With the relegation of the real ground to absolute transcendence, therefore, Grisebach has eliminated the conceptualisation of reality. It, therefore, no longer lends itself to becoming an immanent metaphysical concept for the purpose of man's self-realization in a historic

¹ Erkenntnis und Glaube, pp. 45-46; *ibid.*, pp. 26, 30; *ibid.*, pp. 27 ff.

² Gegenwart, p. 65.

and remembered world. We can never understand or comprehend reality, but we are merely referred to its problematic nature. In other words, it is only experienced by us in the form of actuality, i.e., in the form of contradiction on the part of our fellowman. It becomes so clear that man's constructive nature and historic tendency have been suspended. They, according to Grisebach, constitute a world of truth which rests on man's imagination and which has nothing to do with the ethical world of practical contingency in which we now are. But even this ethical existence of man must be understood by man, if only to avoid relapsing into the historic and aesthetic world in which he merges with the real grounds by various methods. Grisebach himself urges philosophy to unmask the true nature of the contradictory human truths and to strip them of all semblance of reality. Reality must thus be conceptually distinguished from truth, even though this distinction is a negative one, namely, that while truth is known and accessible to man in the academic or remembered world, reality is inaccessible to man's reason and entirely transcendent. It can only be experienced, as we have already mentioned, in the form of contingent actuality. But when this actuality is pin-pointed by Grisebach to the very moment in which the contradiction of the fellowman is actually being suffered, so that my self is thereby terminated (which moment Grisebach calls "real time"), another conceptualisation has taken place, because, philosophically speaking, this so-called real problematic time is nothing but an abstraction of contingency or constitutes contingency as such. It does not really exist, because, in the event of absolute suffering, there would be no suffering, as all conflict would have been terminated on which suffering depends. Real time or contingency as such, therefore, resembles the nothing or the "Leere" which Grisebach had found in the various real grounds of man's constructed systems. It is obvious that by his real time Grisebach has understepped actuality. He may be said to have himself relapsed into truth. Moreover, one gains the impression that the arbitrary bracketing of man's nature to realize himself and of the historic world is done with a view towards placing man's whole existence in the middle of the event of the Cross, as this event was conceived by Grisebach :

"Das Kreuz ist als Zeichen aller enttäuschten irdischen Hoffnungen als ein Anlass zur Beunruhigung der menschlichen Natur, als Widerspruch zu aller ihrer Selbstsucht und Herrschsucht auf einem Hügel errichtet worden, den kein Heldendenkmal, kein Bildungstempel, kein Katheder und kein Herrscherthron passend schmücken kann. Hier wird eine wirkliche ewige Lage des Menschen offenbar. Der Opfertod war die letztmögliche Steigerung des durch das ganze Leben hindurch geübten Gehorsams gegen Gott, das höchste Mass der erprobten Geduld gegenüber den Menschen, die letzte Bewährung einer unerschütterlichen Hoffnung und einer praktischen Liebe im bitteren Leid. Hier geschieht eine Offenbarung: Gott

entscheidet am Kreuz, er erfüllt dem Gekreuzigten die Bitte um Vergebung."¹

The Cross may be said to become the real ground of man's existence, and the eschatological meaning which Grisebach attaches to the event of the Cross cannot but steep man's whole existence in an eschatological atmosphere also. The peculiar meaning, therefore, Grisebach ascribes to the event of the Cross reveals itself as the presupposition to his whole philosophy, and this presupposition is existential in as much as it has its roots in an epoch, when the bankruptcy of our culture and civilisation could no longer be ignored, and when technology, too, had come to constitute a threat to man's existence. Thus Grisebach, as a philosopher, adds another real ground to the many existing ones, namely, the Cross, and this real ground is as existentially rooted as all the others which we observed in our historic survey. It is in this way that Grisebach has re-mythologized philosophy, i.e., that he, by philosophical reflection, has constituted another philosophical truth.

In the sphere of ethics we find the same. Here actuality is "verdichtet" (intensified) by the fellowman. Though in the experience of this connexion with the fellowman in contradiction the fellowman remains emanent, the experience of the contradiction cannot but be immanent, because I am aware of such an experience only in my consciousness. In other words, this relation to my fellowman is in the last instance another concept, and as soon as I say that eternity is reflected in it, as Grisebach does say,² then this is certainly the case. For how does Grisebach know that in his experience of his fellowman's contradiction the eternal is reflected, if not through thinking? Even if what I experience should be external, I would *know* this only by the concept. If this is denied, then no philosophy is possible any longer, not even a philosophy of actuality. What is left for philosophy to do in this case is to destroy all its systems or, rather, to allow them to be destroyed by contingent actuality, and then to keep silent. In other words, everything is dissolved in the contingent experience in which this contradiction is being borne and suffered in silence, in which state man has been moved into the sphere of an ethical existence. This now is exactly the position as we find it in "Gegenwart," "Freiheit und Zucht," and "Schicksalsstunde des Abendlandes." There, Grisebach, as we have already described, pushes through to the very end, but this also leads to the end of all actuality. In "Gegenwart," pp. 591, 592, he declares critical philosophy to be the only philosophy possible: "Sie ist deshalb kritisch genannt, weil sie sich die Überlegenheit als System bestreiten lassen muss." But this does not prevent him from philosophising about that about which, according to his own philosophy, he is unable to say a word.

¹ Die Schicksalsfrage des Abendlandes, pp. 110 and 114.

² Grenzen des Erziehers, pp. 27 f.; pp. 214 ff.

There is in connexion with this relation of contradiction to our fellowman another question we must ask. Is the fellowman only my negation or limitation, or does his contradiction at the same time constitute my affirmation, the confirmation of myself, the means through which I become an individual and a personality, which causes me to arrive at certain standards and values which are of an objective and general character, even though they are not absolute? Socrates and his dialectical method would be a good example here. The "know thyself" would not be possible without the fellowman. The only thing that must be guarded against is, to regard this as an absolute truth.

What we pointed out in connexion with the fellowman holds true also in regard to the other relations of man, i.e., the other fields of actuality, e.g., the world of things. In our relation to things Grisebach, too, merely mentions the contradictoriness of our views of the outside world as they are for instance exposed by the opposing methods and perspectives of the sciences. For Grisebach the natural world, which, unlike the fellowman, is no stumbling block that curbs the expansion of my ego and through which all my knowledge, truths and principles become questionable but which is mute and passive, is only a starting-point from which to realize himself. In other words, the world of nature as constructed by the sciences is another way of the ego to describe the completion of its own circle in various ways, as it becomes obvious by the various contradictory methods of the sciences. The fact that every individual *has to* arrange and order his chaotic sense-impressions, the fact that, driven by a feeling of uncertainty and anxiety, every man *must* build for himself a world which is meaningful and familiar to him and which offers him some sense of security, is not sufficiently appreciated by Grisebach. In fact, the constructive urge is relegated to a sphere of its own, the aesthetic and historic world of truth, which for Grisebach is nothing but a world of imagination, a world which is based on man's nature and therefore represents nothing but a circle of man's self. In other words, it is a purely immanent world. The real world, on the other hand, is constituted only by the experience of the contradiction on the part of our fellowman, which, in the event of our being enabled to bear it, transforms our existence into an ethical existence. But if the small world that man constructs from his own peculiar situation constitutes man's self, it follows that it is a relative truth which man posits in contradiction to the truths of his fellowman. It is through them that he is separated from and yet linked to his fellowman. And it is in our opinion these opposite truths that make up actuality. It follows that man's constituted truths are also of an existential nature and possess ethical significance. Grisebach, however, believes that we can suspend our constructive nature completely, which for him is only of theoretical and not of practical value, but not so for us. He does not realize the importance of man's constructive activity for his own existence and that of his fellowman. It

is thus not surprising that Grisebach rejects the constructive nature of philosophy. But Grisebach himself cannot escape constructivism; for his conception of real time is nothing but a construction to end all other constructions.

He certainly has an object from the philosophical point of view, to which he directs his thoughts and which he somehow constitutes in his mind, namely, *contradiction*, which is experienced by all, otherwise he would not be able to speak about it in such a way as to be generally understood. One can only speak about an object. When talked or thought about by philosophy, that is, when formed into a concept, a subject is turned into an object. In this sense we speak about the re-mythologization in Grisebach's philosophy, meaning thereby the restitution of an immanent general concept. The moment, however, that I am enabled to bear the contradiction that exists between me and my fellowman, my ego has been shrunk to the point where I am delivered up to actuality in faith. This being shrunk of my ego below actuality, whereby it is really understepped, according to Grisebach, is a contingent experience. Here man may be said to have been made to enter into communication with the absolute, i.e., here man has not transcended himself as in the positive system, but has been transcended. At least this would be the consistent outcome of Grisebach's philosophy. In other words, this contingent experience cannot be striven for, but simply occurs to the individual in the contingent encounter between man and fellowman. This being so, it follows that it could never be talked about or communicated to our fellowman, lest it be conceptualised and referred back to the world of the mind, memory and the past. This experience of peace surpasses all understanding; it is not general but contingent. In this connexion the difficulty presents itself: How can Grisebach *know* that such a contingent experience is possible. Even if it were experienced, its punctuation in pure time or real time renders it unknowable from the philosophical point of view. This contingent experience refuses to lend itself to philosophical treatment and thus remains unknown. It is difficult to see, therefore, how Grisebach can not only include it in his critical philosophy, but make it the apex of it. This apex, in conformance with Grisebach's broken nature of the self, is the inversion of the apexes of the positive systems which start from the inclusion of object in the subject. It does not point upward, as the apexes of the positive systems, but downward. While in the positive systems, therefore, the communication of man with the absolute is reached by man's own effort, it is arrived at in Grisebach's system by the opposite, namely, man's being enabled to suffer the antagonistic relation that links him to his fellowman, and whereby his ego is shrunk to the point where he is delivered up to actuality in faith. That is why we said before that Grisebach's philosophy consistently results not in the triumph of philosophy (as is the case in the positive systems), but in the termina-

tion of philosophy and therefore also of any human intellectual activity, i.e., the sciences, history and theology.

Our criticism of Grisebach must, however, not be understood to mean that his thinking is of no value whatsoever. On the contrary, he may have said something which is the truth, and his newly won position of the problematic nature of reality, which we call actuality, deserves the most serious consideration. In any case, anyone who has read Grisebach must ask himself whether in everyday life, i.e., in his daily relationship with his wife, his children and his friends, he has not encountered situations which confirm the truth of Grisebach's view. Have not most of us been manoeuvred into conflicting situations as regards the relationship to our nearest kith and kin? And have we not been able to bear this tension, conflict and contradiction, instead of running away or knuckling under those that are dear to us? In this connexion it is worthwhile to hear Grisebach in full:

“Die Familie . . . braucht nicht eine metaphysische Begründung ihres Systems zu versuchen, und ihre Existenz erst zu beweisen, sie ist vielmehr der Ort, wo die Gegenwart als Problem vernommen wird. Wenn irgendwo, so ist hier der Selbstsucht der Natur und des Geistes durch Gegenwart der Glieder eine Schranke gesetzt. Das Gegenüber von Mann und Frau, Eltern und Kind, Vater und Sohn, Mutter und Tochter, Bruder und Schwester, Herr und Knecht, Frau und Magd lässt sich durch Voraussetzung einer Identität schwer in eine Abstraktion verwandeln. Die Gegenwart taucht hier in dem Widerstand und Anspruch der Anwesenden als Problem der ethischen Wirklichkeit auf. Innerhalb der kritischen Situation einer Familie ist auch der Lehrer und Schüler, wie wir sahen, vorgebildet worden. Die geordnete und durch Regeln beherrschte Gemeinschaft der Schule mag gegen diese widerspruchsvolle Familie allerdings wie eine ideale Gemeinschaft erscheinen. Die Problematik der Familie wurde nicht durch eine Identität aufgelöst, sie blieb in ihrer Gegensätzlichkeit auszuhalten.”¹

All this sounds very plausible and could be readily subscribed to. The important thing is, however, the meaning and the purpose which Grisebach ascribes to this problematic contradictoriness, which it is important for man to bear. We gain the impression that this whole philosophical effort on the part of Grisebach, to break through from the theoretical to the practical, i.e., an ethical existence, is made in the light of the Cross. We must therefore keep in mind that he thereby is not only forced to cut the connexion between the theoretical and the practical, but that the two fields assume a peculiar meaning. The theoretical becomes identical with man's active constructive or constitutive nature, and the practical with his capability of passive suffering (passion). Not only has the practical in Grisebach's sense been arbitrarily separated from the theoretical in Grisebach's sense, but man has been cut in

¹ Gegenwart, pp. 256, 257.

twain too. By eliminating his constructive nature (Grisebach himself admits that it is man's nature to be constructive), he has really deprived him of his true nature. As the Germans would say, he has transformed him from a "Wesen" into an "Unwesen" or from a "Mensch" into an "Unmensch." In short, by stripping man of his constructive urge, he has de-humanised him. We do not say, that man is only constructive, but we hold that he is also contradictory, or, rather, man is constructive because he is contradictory. In any case, the two cannot be separated. It is against man's nature to live in utter contingency, as Grisebach demands. The question does arise: Does Grisebach insist on man's self-denial or the termination of his self, his nature to fit in better with the completely different nature of the absolute? But keeping in mind that apparently the absolute *occurs* to man in the form of faith, we should perhaps say that its contradiction ends man's self or nature to adapt him to its own nature. It must be this that Grisebach means when he says that man cannot justify himself, but is justified, which reminds us of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith. However this may be, we cannot escape the logical conclusion that, by the termination of his self or his nature, man is smoothly dovetailed into the absolute. As the absolute is represented by the Cross in that, according to Grisebach, God reveals himself in the dying Jesus, we cannot avoid the conclusion that Grisebach looks at problematic actuality through the spectacles of a theologian, which gives it its colouring and perspective. It is in the light of an eschatological feeling that he interprets the conflicting situation of life and through which he gains his concepts. It is these that deserve our criticism, even though these concepts are negative and, as Grisebach says himself, point towards a problematic situation, or just because of it; for to form a concept of the unknown and call it real ground (or prime process of dialectics, the eternal or, later in "Gegenwart," real time and the transcendent) constitutes a problem in itself. What cannot be denied is the contradictoriness of actuality and our inability to reach the absolute. But whether Grisebach's interpretation of these facts or the meaning he attaches to them is correct, is quite a different matter. He may be or he may not be right. However this may be, the fact remains that Grisebach's interpretation cannot be verified by philosophical means.

Despite Grisebach's shortcomings from the philosophical point of view, we are in a position to subscribe to two fundamental theses in Grisebach's thought:

- A. That all human truths are contradictory and that absolute truth or the real ground is inaccessible to man.
- B. That the most important relation of man is that to his fellow-man, so that to the question: "Whither Man?" Grisebach would answer: "To our fellowman!"

Yet the difference between our view and that of Grisebach, as far as A is concerned, is as follows: While Grisebach, by his concepts of "real ground" or the "Urgeschehen der realen Dialektik" (prime-

process of real dialectics) in his earlier works and "real time" and the "transcendent" in his later work "Gegenwart," not only creates a system (even if negative) but transgresses the boundaries of actuality by understepping it, thereby communicating with the absolute in faith, we hold that, as philosophers, we must attempt to restrict ourselves to the sphere of philosophy. We must resist all temptations to evade the hard facts of life by either building an absolute from within ourselves by means of absolute self-realization, thereby forgetting that we are contradictory, or by allowing ourselves to be shrunk to a dimensionless something (which closely resembles the nothing) in the hope of being freed from ourselves, thereby forgetting that we are unable to do so because we are by nature also constructive. In other words, we should, as philosophers, clearly know one thing, namely, that we have no knowledge whatsoever of the absolute. It is always a basic assumption *from the philosophical point of view*, no matter whether we postulate it to be immanent or emanent, or whether we claim to reach up to it through reason and rational faith, declare it to be reflected in actuality, or whether we declare it to be absolutely transcendent in the sense of being the absolute contradiction to actuality. In any such case we imply that we have some knowledge of the absolute. But the many possibilities of constituting the absolute already should arouse our suspicion as philosophers. And is it not, from the philosophical point of view, as possible that there exists no absolute at all, but only actuality? However this may be, one thing is certain: the absolute cannot be known but must be believed. It therefore belongs not to the sphere of philosophy, but to that of theology.

What does this difference from Grisebach entail? It means that we have a different conception of actuality. Our historic survey has shown that the real ground from which man constructs his truths, his systems of thought, in brief, his worlds, changes along with the changing circumstances and conditions of life. We also noticed that this real ground is always, in the last instance, an existential ground from which man realizes himself and attempts to gain certainty and security by transcending himself. But every time he finds that this "absolute truth" is contradicted by another one, posited by some fellowman from a different existential situation. Even though the word actuality points to processes which are occurring in the present, we could not construct our philosophical systems without the category of time, without memory and, therefore, without reference to the past, we could in fact not make a meaningful statement. Without an existing truth, which had to be constructed in the past to exist in the present, the building of a new truth, to contradict the existing one, would never occur. To quote one example: Without the great confidence of 19th century man in the scientific method as the only method by which knowledge was obtained, which led to the absolutisation of this method, history would have taken a different course, and actuality would present itself to-day under different conditions. As it is, science and techno-

logy have developed into such powerful factors that they constitute a menace to man, thus plunging him into a crisis, especially as they are linked up with the mass problem, bureaucracy and dictatorship. We described the threat they constitute for the individual and even for human existence as such, and the outcries they have provoked on the part of a fear-ridden mankind in the form of the philosophy of existence. It is thus not surprising that, to a large extent, modern philosophy represents an antidote to the danger of technology. We only have to think of thinkers such as Santayana, Ortega y Gasset; and we saw that Heinemann's idea of "meta-analysis" sprang from his concern about the individual, whose identity he felt to be jeopardized by the technological forces. It follows that we can only do something about this situation of crisis and counter this threat, if we understand our present position in the light of the past. In other words, we must at first realize where this blind trust in science and technology has really led us, and that it is necessary to question certain claims of science and technology, i.e., their alleged objectivity, their exclusive claim to real knowledge and to representing the panacea for mankind in the midst of a crisis. Indeed, we must advance the fact that, besides science, there are other fields of human activity which are as important as the scientific field, such as the artistic or religious field for example. In short, we must emphasize the fact that science is just as man-made and immanent as any of the other provinces of human activity, that the scientist is more than science and that, therefore, science must remain under human control. In other words, the threat of technology, which was established by man in the past, cannot be dispelled by Grisebach's passion or suffering of the conflict. It is an anonymous and impersonal force which threatens to overpower man, turn him into its slave and transform him into an automaton or robot. In such an existential crisis only determined action can save the hour. Grisebach overlooks the fact that an impersonal and anonymous enemy such as technology (and this is not the only one man has) will not play the game. There, no mutual contradiction can be borne, but man would simply be crushed, and all actuality would cease, unless man took the counter-offensive. Grisebach's contingent experience of actuality does not take into account a situation as described above. His most important aspect of actuality is man's existence in twoness, i.e., man's relation with a fellowman with whom he forms a community of destiny, e.g., wife, child, brother, sister, parents, friends, etc. But is actuality to-day not constituted of all kinds of "ids," technological, social, ideological, etc. ?

It is true that Grisebach also realizes the danger which lies in the claim to absoluteness on the part of the sciences, but he hopes to devalue this claim by pointing out the contradictory nature of their views and their "knowledge" of the outside world. After all the sciences are also relegated by him to the world of memory, i.e., the academic world. But the sciences are not only of a theoretical or epistemologi-

cal nature, but also of a practical and pragmatic character. And it is in this respect that they constitute a *real* threat to man's existence. For it appears as though the scientific goods have the tendency to make themselves independent of their producer and impose on him their own mechanic character, or perhaps even destroy him altogether unless he take immediate counter-measures? There can be no doubt that the technological, social and ideological "ids" are the most powerful enemies of man, so that his very existence is at stake. Can Grisebach, in the light of this state of affairs, be right when he determines the rôle of philosophy as follows:

"Die philosophische Arbeit . . . muss sich unausweichlich mit einer bescheidenen Rolle im Aschenbrödelwinkel begnügen. Sie kann aus dem Winkel heraus nur mahnen, das eigene Wesen nicht zu überschätzen und dadurch wenigstens versuchen, dem Geschehen in Gegenwart nicht mehr zu schaden."¹

This negative and secondary rôle, which Grisebach allocates to philosophy, can only be understood in the light of his religious purpose, namely, the suffering of the antagonism that exists between me and the fellowman, which might lead me to an ethical existence, i.e., the experience of faith. But if we cut out this theological aspect and accept actuality as it is, i.e., without any preconception or presupposition, philosophy, instead of becoming the step-child of faith, becomes the only field of human activity in which something effective could be done to combat the various "ids" which threaten to crush our individuality and jeopardize our very existence. We find ourselves unable, therefore, to agree with Grisebach, when he brackets our constructive nature with the aim of pin-pointing actuality to the inconceivable moment of real time, when my self has been terminated by my fellowman, and when I am enabled to suffer his contradiction absolutely, in perfect peace. We regard the human truth in a different light.

If we leave out all speculation about the absolute and ignore it altogether, even as a reflection in actuality or as an absolute transcendent, then we must consider the related truths, i.e., man's philosophical systems, scientific and historic views as well as all his ideologies as ends in themselves and not as mere instruments of faith, i.e., that the individual by being enabled to suffer the destruction of his own truth experiences faith in being delivered up to actuality. We have already pointed out that actuality is thereby understepped, or, to put it differently, man has been merged into the transcendent.

Having won this position, we are now able to state that our constructive nature and the disposition to assert ourselves in the face of the contradiction of our fellowman are no longer merely evil properties which, by critical insight, we must reduce to the technical virtue of self-restraint i.e., to living in expectation of a contingent experience which might lead us to an ethical existence in the future. In other words, they are

¹ Gegenwart, p. 592.

no longer only preparatory stages for the possibility of bearing the contradiction of our fellowman, thereby linking up man with the absolute through faith. They are, indeed, indispensable parts of actuality and are necessary for the continuation of human existence. For if I have accepted the position that all that which is within my grasp is actuality without any absolute, eternal or real ground in mind or without any eschatological expectations, i.e., without the idea that the crisis of my time is particularly acute and therefore the last one, the changing and contradictory philosophical, scientific and ideological systems (by which actuality is constituted) are understood to be an essential business of man. They are his walking crutches, so to speak, without which he would collapse. By means of them he organises and arranges his affairs and rearranges and reorganises them according to the changing circumstances of life. They cause life to become meaningful to him. They are an abode which he erects for himself in the midst of chaotic surroundings and the uncertainty of his situation. By these truths man becomes conscious of himself and, through them, establishes his identity. St. Exupéry would call these self-constructed truths a "citadelle," which must be defended continually against the advancing desert :

"Car j' ai découvert cette autre vérité. Et c'est que vaine est l'illusion des sédentaires qui croient pouvoir habiter en paix leur demeure car toute demeure est menacée."

In brief, Grisebach's dualism, i.e., his arbitrary division of the human world into two spheres, the constructive, theoretical world of truth on the one hand, which is dismissed as a dream world and which must be purged from all semblance of reality, and the practical world of suffering and conflict on the other, which is called the ethical world, is absolutely unwarranted. We submit that both spheres are really one. Grisebach himself realizes that man is essentially constructive ; but for him the constructive nature of man constitutes an obstacle in the way to practical life rather than a foundation of man's existence. In "Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit" Grisebach explains the world crisis as a crisis of truth, in which crisis the contradictory human truths reveal themselves as untruths and lies. These lies Grisebach calls the truth about the truths. He forgets that man's very existence depends on the positing of his truth, i.e., on building his own world and on asserting himself in the face of the contradictory truth of his fellowman. But it is man's very existence in this form which he expects to be terminated and which he hopes to exchange for an ethical existence which we might call pure actuality and which we strongly suspect of being no existence at all, but merely an empty abstraction. In other words, we submit that it is the contradictory human truths that represent actuality, of which man is an inherent part in as much as he has created the actual situation together with his fellowman. It follows that he

¹ Citadelle, section vii, p. 40.

should accept it, instead of trying to overcome it by either overstepping it (transcending himself) or by understepping it (being made to shrink away into real time by the transcendent). For, in both cases, man has transgressed his own limits, either in the upward or downward direction. He has also, in either case, crossed the boundaries of actuality, thereby acting against his very own nature, which is contradictory.

It is of course a fact that these human truths have been absolutised, as Grisebach also points out.¹ But it is man's inclination to transcend himself, because this act makes him believe that he has entered into communication with the absolute. But does not Grisebach's philosophy at closer analysis reveal itself as the same? The fact that man often overreached himself in constructing his truths does not dispose of another fact, namely, that these related truths (for that is what they really are, despite their absolute trappings) are indispensable. It is man's very nature to live by these truths, and why should we regard them as an obstacle in the way rather than a support in the conflict of life? If there is an absolute, we do not know its purpose. Who can say that it only contradicts actuality? Have not already the Greek philosophers, especially the Pythagoreans, pointed out to us that harmony depends on contradiction? Does not Grisebach have in mind the same harmony when he talks about an ethical existence the peace of which surpasses all understanding? And does not Grisebach simply create another truth or system which is just as much related to the actual circumstances of his time as any other system or truth to its time? It is a fact that Grisebach wrote his chief works between 1919 and 1945. It was during these years that the question of absolute truth was particularly acute; for the ideological struggle that was raging in Germany and in other European countries during these years developed into a war of ideologies on a world scale.

We have endeavoured to justify the human or related truths on the ground that they cannot be regarded only as an attempt of man to escape from actuality or to overcome it, but must rather be seen as an indispensable part of human nature, as a propelling factor. We based our contention on the observation that Grisebach's real time or contingency is nothing but an abstraction and that actuality must not be interpreted even in the shadow of an absolute which contradicts actuality, but on its own merits. We hasten to add, however, that we did so with one reservation. If we concede that the construction of philosophical systems is a necessary and fruitful process of actuality, i.e., the contradictory constructive activity of man, it follows that any human truth, whether philosophical, scientific, historical or ideological, can never be an absolute truth, but always constitutes the self-realization of a particular man from a given existential situation. It is for this particular man that it is really true, because it constitutes *his* world, *his* reality; and it is because of the subjective nature of such a truth that

¹ Cf., *Grenzen des Erziehers*; pp. 55 ff., and also, *Gegenwart*, esp. pp. 92 ff.

it must needs be in conflict with the truth, the world or reality of the fellowman. It is now this situation of conflict that really constitutes actuality. This situation is experienced by all men, and, through it, they are linked up with one another. It is true that a truth is sometimes "appropriated" by others, but, then, it never remains the same, but becomes *their* truth. This must be so, because their existential situation is different, which causes an "appropriated" truth to be determined by the new situation, whereby it virtually becomes a new truth. Examples of this nature are the Hegelians, Kantians, Thomists, etc.

It is for instance common knowledge that the neo-Kantians reformulated Kant's truth from their specific situation, and that they adopted his critical attitude and his transcendental method in order to overcome the materialistic and positivistic philosophy on the one side and to avoid metaphysics on the other. The materialistic and positivistic thought was the reaction to the idealistic metaphysics of thinkers such as Schelling and Hegel and the arbitrary assumptions and presuppositions on which they based their systems. The consequence was a distrust of any kind of thinking which bore only a semblance of idealism. Any autonomy of the mind and the spirit was denied. Any thought was conceived to be the result of physiological processes, and the causal relations existing between phenomena were considered to determine our thinking. The rule of a strict scientism deprived philosophy of a sphere of its own, so that its very existence was at stake. It was in this situation that Otto Liebmann raised the cry: "Back to Kant," and that thinkers such as Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer, Liebert, Vorländer, Stammler (who formed the logistic Marburg School) and Rickert, Windelband, Lask (who formed the axiological Baden School) "appropriated" Kant's truth. But the special situation in which they were caused them to change Kant's truth considerably, so that it became *their* truth. For example, they rejected Kant's idea of a given raw material which is constituted by the mind, as well as Kant's concept of the "Ding-an-sich." But even as a school, they were split as we have already shown, the above mentioned schools not being the only orientations of neo-Kantianism either. But if we have a closer look, we shall find that, even within these schools, each individual thinker formulated his own truth. This even goes for such closely linked philosophers as Windelband and Rickert, who both belonged to the Baden School. The former presupposed a logistic concept of reason which determines the totality of life, which thereby becomes a logical structure of meaning. Rickert erected a methodological structure from scientific work as a special logical sphere between absolute truth and the real world, in which science and history merge, and which reaches up to absolute meaning, the absolute truth, which logically is the presupposition for man's cultural activity and the historic cultural goods which are judged in its light.

Ruge, Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, Stirner, Baur, Strauss, to mention a few names, are all Hegelians, and yet they all argue from different

existential positions, so that they combat one another fiercely. While Hegel, for instance, argues from the position of the more reactionary, conservative bourgeoisie, Marx polemicises from the stand-point of a proletariat struggling for an improvement of their economic situation as well as for social and political recognition.

From all this we must conclude that it is really impossible to appropriate a truth, because it is the self-constructed world of an individual, which construction is in itself a changing and fluctuating process, because no situation remains, but everything is in a constant flux. This explains the frequent change of opinion which every man experiences, and this explains the "stages of development" which the professor of Literature or of Philosophy reads into a great author or a great philosopher. How often does it not occur that a philosopher contradicts himself during the time of his creative period and turns about completely? We only have to think of Hegel, Heidegger and Grisebach himself, who, in his youth, was an eager constructivist, enthusiastically tracing the continuity of the same creative spirit in the different historic cultural systems, and who exchanged his former more or less idealistic position for an extremely critical one. All in all we might say that each contradiction to a certain truth does in a way terminate it, because thereby a fresh situation is created in which the builder of this truth must react by re-formulating his truth, which very often leads to a modification of his truth or sometimes even to complete abandonment and the formulation of a new truth. And even where a thinker is very autocratic, he will, in defending his truth, be forced to make certain concessions to his opponent and his "stand-point" in the literal sense of the word; for if the defence of his truth is to be successful, he must to a certain extent be flexible. In short, in the event of being contradicted, the integrity of man's self is threatened. He must, therefore, re-posit his self by re-stating his truth from a new situation. Thus, even if it is not fundamentally changed, it is new in the sense of having to be re-stated in a new situation, which in turn creates a fresh situation in reference to his fellowman.

Once we have realized the relativity of all our truths as well as their contradictory nature, our reason tells us that the formulation of such truths involves great responsibility, but not in Grisebach's sense. And it is really in this spirit of responsibility that we previously criticised Heinemann. His system and his truth may represent a workable and practical formula in the light of our current problems, in this case the extreme individualism in which man has got stuck and which becomes manifest in the philosophy of existence on the one hand and the menace to man's existence of the technological forces on the other. But as soon as Heinemann claims that his truth is an absolute truth (we do

¹ As regards Grisebach's constructive thought, cf. his dissertation "Kultur als Formbildung" and his treatise of habilitation "Kulturphilosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart."

of course not know whether he does, but there is always the possibility ; Schopenhauer did), it is our duty as philosophers to object to it most strongly. Thus, whenever a philosophical, ideological or scientific system threatens to swallow up man as an individual by alienating him from the world and estranging him from himself, philosophers are under an obligation to expose the fallacies and dangers of such a system. Kierkegaard, Marx, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche all complied with this requirement when they turned against Hegel, and they were in turn contradicted when they committed the same offence. We became aware that Kierkegaard in the name of the individual protested against other levelling "ids" besides Hegel's ideal "id" of the absolute spirit, e.g., socialism, public opinion, the mass and the scientific and technological "id." In connexion with the latter, the menace of which has become more acute still in the present epoch, Heinemann, together with the existentialists, protests most vehemently, but he also finds it necessary to point out the impasse in which the existentialists had landed themselves. There may, however, be a time when Heinemann's philosophy will have lost its power of appeal and when especially his meta-analytic will no longer constitute a truth, which it is only by virtue of trying to find a way to rescue man from himself and from the technological menace. In other words, any philosophical system derives its character of truth only in as much as it is erected from a specific existential situation. It follows that the highest philosophical discipline is really deontology. It is the duty and the most important task of the philosopher to combat any claim to absoluteness, be it of a philosophic, scientific or ideological nature. For even though it is a fact that no philosophical, scientific or ideological system is free from contradictions and that the attempt to overcome actuality and to reach the absolute has been frustrated time and again by actuality, many a thinker, scientist, or statesman has declared his system to be infallible. In combating any claim to actuality, therefore, the philosopher serves the community no less than when building his system to conduct man over the stormy waters of actuality.

By fighting any presumption to absoluteness, the philosopher, so to speak, stands guard over society. Thereby the natural, living community is preserved, which exists in freedom, i.e., in mutual contradiction or free exchange of opinion, and yet it is guided by the responsible leadership of some thinker or thinkers who know themselves to be under obligation towards the community and who realize the relatedness and defectiveness of their truth. Such leaders will therefore willingly accept criticism and will allow contradiction. It is by the adoption of this attitude that they prevaricate the danger of becoming the prisoner of their own truth in that they posit it as an absolute truth. It is by the adoption of this attitude, therefore, that they are free.

Grisebach's doctrine that there cannot be such a leader¹ is only possible from his philosophy which merely regards the related truths as evil, as alleys of escape from and unpleasant obstacles to actuality, in other words, as an attempt on the part of man to transcend himself. But just because it is true that man in his philosophical system often tries to overcome actuality and to transcend himself, philosophy must be on its guard. Any absolutization on man's part results in an artificial, dead and unfree community; for here the stamp is more than the gold. In such a community, even if it parades under the cloak of democracy, the leaders fancy themselves infallible and will, therefore, not tolerate any kind of criticism or contradiction. A good example of this type of "democracy" is French society under Robespierre's regime of terror, which was the fruit of Rousseau's "volonté générale," a cold abstraction which levelled the individual and spelled death to any natural and genuine community, which exists only in the free exchange of opinion.

This brings us to the second thesis that was acceptable to us in Grisebach's system, namely, that the most important relation of man is the one to his fellowman, so that the question: "Whither man?" would be answered by Grisebach by: "To our fellowman." While we could give the same answer, we could not do so in Grisebach's sense. Grisebach, in the contradiction of the fellowman, sees only a possibility for the individual to bear this contradiction, thereby being delivered up to actuality in faith. In other words, this relation, in the last instance, constitutes a religious category. He does not regard this contradiction as a constructive factor at all, i.e., to reverse Grisebach's position (for whom man lives only in twoness and not in oneness at all, i.e., he wants to end all individuality), that I become conscious of my identity, individuality and value, in short, that I become a personality only through this contradiction. Nor does Grisebach consider contradiction to my fellowman on my part anything more than a preparatory stage towards the possibility of bearing my fellowman's contradiction. Grisebach only lives in the expectation of the hour when he will be enabled to bear the suffering inflicted on him by the contradiction of his fellowman, which, as we have already mentioned, points to faith and the communication of the individual with the absolute in faith. In other words, the shadow of the absolute, which constantly spreads over actuality and which determines the relationship with my fellowman, steepes the world and man in an eschatological atmosphere. And, unfortunately, Grisebach mixes up philosophy and theology to a large extent. What he really does is to give the content of Protestant theology a philosophical cloak. The danger is thereby that both his theology and his philosophy are diluted, as indeed they are. Thus, to give a few examples, sin parades as logoi, i.e., the truths of man by which he transcends himself; grace becomes the ability to bear the relation of contradiction in which I stand to my fellowman; faith is called

¹ Grenzen des Erziehers, pp. 39 ff.

an ethical existence which transcends all reason. We find ourselves unable to subscribe to such a philosophy. We must insist on a clear-cut separation of the two disciplines, which Grisebach professes to make, but does not. We prefer to treat actuality without prejudice, i.e., to regard it not as a Protestant, Catholic or any other qualified thinker would, but just as a thinker, or rather as one who lives actuality thinkingly. We prefer to stick to actuality without any ulterior motive i.e., we do not, like Grisebach, live in expectation of what is in the last instance a religious experience and thereby allow such an expectation to colour our whole thought. We prefer to act, instead of being in expectation of something which might never happen, because our conception of this something might be false. And if it does happen, it will come to me, whether I am in expectation of it or not. It is however my very nature to act, i.e., to posit my truth, whereby I contradict.¹ This shows the dialectical nature of man, who, as a self, is at the same time a communal being. For by positing his self, he at the same time contradicts, thus negating the truth of his fellowman and yet affirming him in his separate individual existence, or rather creating for him, through the negation of his truth, the possibility of a new existence in fresh truth. (We have already seen that by contradiction a new situation is created and that thereby man is compelled to re-assert or re-formulate his truth or change it altogether). In being contradicted, man, by responding, at the same time experiences his negation as well as his affirmation in that his old truth (which sprang from his old situation) must either be posited afresh in the new situation or a completely new truth must be put forward by him in answer to his fellowman's challenge. Man's affirmative constructive nature can thus not be separated from his negative destructive nature. He constantly fluctuates between existence and non-existence, between the external and the internal. The fellowman is emanent to man and as such constitutes man's limit, i.e., restricts him to becoming, i.e., contradictory actuality. This actuality man experiences by the emanent, i.e., the resistance of his fellowman as well as by the immanent, i.e., the act of positing his truth or building his own world in response to the fellowman's challenge.

From the above it follows that, when I assert myself in the face of my fellowman, when I contradict him, I am of the same service to him as he is to me. Through me he becomes aware of his identity, individuality and his value, in short, he becomes aware of his personality, even as I become aware of mine through him. And here again my action must be responsible action, i.e., it must occur in consideration of the just claims of my fellowman. Though it may be my natural desire to possess him, to master him or to knuckle him under, I must exercise self-control, not with an eye on the termination of my ego and the possibility of suffering the contradiction of my fellowman,

¹ That Grisebach regards the positing of my truth and my self as evil (sin) becomes clear in the chapter on "Satanie" in: *Gegenwart*, pp. 467-472.

which experience, if it came to me, would afford me peace which is higher than all reason (for this I do not know from the philosophical point of view), but because I realize that I depend on my neighbour just as he depends on me. Without him there would neither be actuality nor would I be able to exist.

The above shows that we consider actuality as the workshop of man, where he builds his system, his home or abode, i.e., in the realization that all his principles are related truths and that they are developed by man from a specific existential situation, which seems to be the determining factor in the construction of man's truths and which impels man to build them. Although they lose their character of truth or, rather, power of appeal as soon as the conditions of life change, this does not mean that they are insignificant to the systems succeeding them. On the contrary, the latter would never have been built without the former, or we may say that they were constructed in contradiction to them. It also happens that such truths are forcefully maintained, e.g., by the power of the state, if they form the ideology of such a state. But in this case, too, an ideology usually undergoes considerable changes and suffers important modifications depending on its subjective interpretation by the respective authority in power from the given existential situation. And it is not uncommon that these changes and modifications are of such an incisive nature that they deviate from the original conception of the ideology to such an extent as to represent virtually a new truth.

It is now the duty of the philosopher to demonstrate to man the nature of these truths, to point out their necessity, but also their dangers. Philosophy has to stand guard over the community by acting as a regulative discipline. It is its function to question not only the truths and methods of philosophy but also those of science, history and politics. It is through this critical function that philosophy must strive to prevent any of these truths from laying claim to absoluteness. For it should have become abundantly clear from our above discussions that all truth is related truth and can therefore never be absolute, but is really immanent and contradictory. This being the case, actuality constitutes a constant challenge to man. It prods him into action. It must be conquered by man over and over again, only to slip out of his hands again and take the counter-offensive.

It is this struggle that seems to be man's fate and chief business in life, until actuality puts a final stop to his individual existence. Thus man in every respect fluctuates between existence and non-existence. We cannot, therefore, agree with Heidegger when he says that man's being (Sein) is a being-to-death (Sein zum Tode). It is true that we experience dying in the form of decadence but not death, which, in contrast to dying, is emanent to us. Death is another term by which man seeks to conceal his embarrassment and his ignorance at what happens to him beyond actuality. The uncertainty of the unknown has caused him to symbolise, to rationalise and to conceptualise the nothing, i.e.,

that which he did not and could not possibly experience, in order to allay his fear of it. But the attempt to constitute philosophically that which we cannot experience, i.e., that which lies beyond the boundaries of actuality, in other words, the nothing, cannot but end in nothing. As Heinemann puts it :

“Wer nach dem Wesen des Nihilismus fragt, befindet sich auf einem Holzweg. Er ist der *monomorphic fallacy* verfallen, das heisst dem Aberglauben, es müsse einem jeden Worte eine Wesenheit entsprechen, welche ihren Sinn enthülle. Das jedoch ist nicht der Fall. Der Nihilismus offenbart sich in einer Mannigfaltigkeit von Gestalten ; sollte sich hinter ihnen ein Gemeinsames verbergen, so könnte dieses nur ein X sein, dessen Wesen sich nicht erfassen oder definieren lässt. Wir müssen die Frage nach dem Wesen des Nihilismus als unfruchtbar aufgeben.”¹

In our opinion philosophy should only constitute that which man can really experience. Thus, to call man's existence (Dasein) a being-to-death (sein zum Tode), as Heidegger does, is to say something which lies beyond the bounds of our experience. For as we know nothing about death, we cannot possibly know that man's existence is a being-to-death. Moreover, we experience not only dying but also living. In other words, we experience a dying in living just as much as we experience a living in dying ; for we posit our self during our whole life-span and we struggle against death, i.e., the unknown and the unfathomable, till the last moment as is revealed by the so-called death-agony. We must therefore retort to Heidegger that man's existence is just as much a being-to-life in the sense of existence as a being-to-death in the sense of non-existence.

The question now arises : If man is engaged in a constant battle with actuality, if his system and truth, won by him in the sweat of his brow, are always broken to pieces again by actuality, so that he is forced to posit his truth afresh, thereby redeeming himself as a self, can the fighting of this battle not be compared with the work of Sisyphus ? Must not the realization of the perpetuity of such a task (for it is taken up by all generations anew) lead him into frustration and despair ? We believe that this is not the case. It is of course true that there are men who, through this state of affairs, have turned into pessimists. But the fact remains that, despite defeats and setbacks, man continues to battle against the odds of actuality. Does this not prove the confidence and faith man has in actuality ; or, as it is so often stated by ordinary men, that their attitude to life is positive ? And even where a man takes up a “negative” attitude towards life, he nevertheless continues to battle. Must we not come to the conclusion that man hopes that there is meaning in his life struggle, even if he fails to see sense in it ? The German post-war poet Wolfgang Borchert in one of his stories written in the midst of the utmost despair and despondency of a war-marked Germany causes the stocky blond fellow to advise the tall thin fellow to hang

¹ Jenseits des Existentialismus, p. 24

himself if everything is senseless and meaningless anyway. But to his question why, under these circumstances, he is still alive, the thin fellow replies :

“ Aus Trotz ! Ja : Leben ! Aber zum Trotz ! Aufgeben, aufhängen : ich ? Und morgen passiert es vielleicht, morgen kann es geschehen, jeden Moment kann es eintreffen . . . Denn einmal muss es doch kommen, das Unerwartete, Geahnte, Grosse, Neue. Das Abenteuer, das Geheimnis, die Lösung.”¹

But just because of the unknown, the unfathomable, the secret by which we are surrounded, just because it is becoming, thus representing both existence and non-existence, between which two poles man seems to fluctuate, actuality is of existential and moral significance to man. It opens ever new possibilities of existence, but it also terminates existence. And it is precisely this very element of uncertainty in his life of which he is always conscious that keeps alive man's existential feeling and consciousness. It is the very question mark behind his existence that prevents him from soaring up to any metaphysical, ideological, scientific or technological “id” permanently, thereby losing himself in it and his identity. For as soon as any of these truths do parade as an absolute, they become a menace to man in that they alienate him from the world and estrange him from himself. Thereby man's existential feeling is aroused and he will start questioning the pseudo absolute. Thus the realization of the process of actuality causes man to be modest and unassuming. It drives him to his fellowman, with whom, indeed, the individual is linked up by mutual contradiction. In this respect we agree with Grisebach, but we cannot, as philosophers, read into this relation of contradiction the reflection of an absolute with which, however indirectly, man might expect to be united again or consider it under an eschatological aspect. In short, we cannot understand this relation as a religious category. For, if we did so as philosophers, we should immediately transgress the boundaries of philosophy. The contradiction which we experience in actual life constitutes a definite limit. It is a warning, a sign of prohibition to trespass on forbidden ground. It calls a halt to man and restricts him to actuality, which is the limit of man's experience and knowledge.

But here the question could be asked : Does this limit not point to something which limits actuality, a something which man experiences as a halt, a limit, or as contradiction ? In other words, does actuality not point to a transcendent absolute which, by its absolute contradiction, causes the absolute relativity of actuality ? In short, is not the absolute reflected in the relative ? Our answer is that this may very well be so but that, as philosophers, we can neither deny nor affirm this because, in either case, we should profess to possess knowledge and experience of a transcendent sphere which from the epistemological and empirical point of view is inaccessible to man.

This at once moves the absolute into the sphere of faith. The absolute can never be known but must be revealed. It falls within the province of theology and not into that of philosophy. Our conception of actuality, therefore, does not mean that man is deprived of the possibility of believing in God or of being a Christian, but only that such a faith can never be justified philosophically. We can never be led to God by either overstepping or understepping actuality. We, then, become somehow merged with Him, either actively or passively. This would bring God somehow into our reach. He is then somehow at our disposal, which must be detractive from His holiness. Faith, therefore, can only be an unconditional trust in the revealed truth of the Bible, which truth really terminates actuality. Christian faith, therefore, always points beyond actuality to the absolute.

But in this connexion a number of questions may be asked: If all immanent truths of man are relative and contradictory thus belonging to the sphere of actuality, while absolute truth cannot be known at all but must be revealed thus belonging to the sphere of faith, what about the religious truth of man? To what sphere does this kind of truth belong, to that of actuality (knowledge) or that of the transcendent (faith)? Is this truth not immanent and yet it deals with the absolute (emanent)? Is this truth not as real a truth as scientific, historic, aesthetic and ethical truth? For even as there are a science, a history, an art and an ethics, there exists theology. And as theology deals with the absolute truth and yet belongs to the sphere of actuality, is not the absolute reflected in actual life? These questions, which theology puts to us, have their full justification, and, as philosophers, we are obliged to answer them.

It may have appeared from our discussion of the real ground or the absolute that we advocate an absolute agnosticism from the religious point of view, but this is far from our intention. On the contrary, we had to stress the absolutely relative and contradictory nature of philosophy in order to point out its limits and thereby the limits of our knowledge and to show that any interpretation of actuality, even in the shadow of an absolute, by philosophy draws religious faith into the sphere of knowledge and knowledge into the sphere of faith. But faith mixed with knowledge is no longer faith; for if I know, I need no longer believe, nor is knowledge mixed with faith any longer knowledge; for if I believe, then I cannot possibly know. It follows that knowledge and faith must be strictly separate. The former belongs exclusively to the sphere of actuality, the latter to that of the absolute. It is thus obvious that the philosopher is simply not qualified to speak about the absolute, not even in a negative form. He is wholly unjustified in speaking about the absolute in whatever form. To say that it is in any form reflected in actuality or contradicts it and man, implies a certain knowledge on the part of the philosopher about the absolute, which seems a gross overestimation of himself. Even the statement on the part of the philosopher that the absolute is absolutely transcendent would imply that he possesses knowledge of its existence.

From the philosophical point of view nothing can be stated about the absolute, because, for philosophy, it does not even exist.

But it is quite a different matter, if the theologian tells us that it must be *believed* that the absolute is reflected in actuality. It is true that the philosopher, besides the contradictory truths of science, arts and ethics, also finds the contradictory truths of theology, and that, therefore, from the philosophical point of view, these truths are also immanent and belong to the sphere of actuality. They belong to the sphere of knowledge in as much as they form part of man's abode in which he exists. They constitute his religious existence as it is known to us in the form of the various historic church dogmas, traditions and confessions. It follows that these contradictory theological truths, even as any other truths of man, are subject to the "ought" which we described previously as the categorical imperative of actuality. By that is meant that the theologian, even as the philosopher, scientist and artist, experiences his halt by the contradiction of other theologians to which he is obliged to listen and whose views he should respect. For as these religious truths are immanent, they are only true in as much as they have been constructed from a given existential situation, and they are subject to the same changes and modifications as any other human truths as soon as, through contradiction, the situation changes. The various churches and confessions are therefore obliged to listen to each other, to respect each other and to keep the peace among each other. This is what the philosopher would have to say to the theologian from the point of view of knowledge and actuality. For whether the absolute is reflected in the various theological truths, or whether it has been revealed at all, can never be known philosophically but is purely a matter of faith. If, however, the theologian tells us that we should *believe* that the absolute is reflected in actuality, this is an entirely different matter, for if we do so, it follows that, on the basis of faith, *and on the basis of faith alone*, one theological point of view is as true as the other, so that, *on the ground of faith*, all confessions and denominations reflect the absolute in their own specific way.

Thereby we have drawn a clear line between philosophy and theology. While both disciplines are of a practical nature, i.e., are concerned with actuality, philosophy is practical on the *basis of knowledge* in the sense of restricting man to the sphere of actuality and drawing his attention to his contradictory nature which refers him to his fellowman. Theology, on the other hand, is practical on *the basis of faith*, i.e., it leads man to believe, on the ground of revelation, that his resigning himself to actuality, i.e., to the contradiction on the part of his fellowman (the religious version would read: Love thy neighbour as thyself) represents an act of implicit trust in God's promise of salvation, which is really salvation from myself. In other words, it is in the expectation of the fulfilment of this promise that faith consists.

It is in this sense that we remarked in the paper on "What is Philosophy?" that the absolute truth is accessible through faith in the Cross

alone. For Jesus has lived the example of absolute love and absolute faith, which concerns us all and which is actual in whatever situation we may be, in whatever place and at whatever time. If, through God's grace, we were able to live in pure faith and to entrust our whole existence to the Cross, then, and only then, actuality would have been overcome, not by us but by Jesus. For the Cross is the absolute contradiction of actuality through which all actual contradictory situations are terminated. It follows that faith no longer can fall together with reason—as for instance in the case of Heinemann—or is founded on a negative philosophical concept such as Grisebach's "real time," which is supposed to end all philosophy and all truth, thereby terminating man's truth, which would really mean man's existence. Man's existence, which we saw is identical with the positing of his truth or the building by him of his own world in response to the contradictory truths and worlds of his fellowman, is, however, the presupposition for his salvation. Only in the implicit faith, therefore, in the saving power of the Cross actuality may be said to have been overcome, and contradiction may be said to have been turned into harmony, suffering into peace, hatred into love. And it is only through faith that actuality with all its suffering and conflict may be regarded as a preparatory stage for the absolute. It is in this respect that theological actuality differs from philosophical actuality.

From the above we are now, as philosophers, in a position to answer our question: "Whitherman? Our answer is: **"TO ACTUALITY."** Actuality is the road sign, the sign of prohibition, the halt to man. It indicates the direction in which we must travel. It does not permit itself to be overstepped or understepped. It means responsible building from a given situation and openness for a new situation in the face of which the old building is exchanged for a new one. It means the relation of mutual contradictoriness which exists between me and the fellowman. It teaches us the unknowability and inaccessibility of any absolute, whether directly or indirectly. The conception of any absolute on any philosophical basis, whether positively or negatively, is really only a related truth which man develops from a specific situation. It makes thereby no difference, whether we start from the law of identity or the law of contradiction and whether we conceive the real ground to be immanent or emanent, or whether we interpret actuality in an eschatological light. In each case we, as philosophers, assume an absolute, thereby allowing our thinking to be governed and to be coloured by it. By so doing, we really mix up knowledge and faith. In each case we become somehow one with it. It matters little, whether we identify ourselves with it or whether it contradicts us, so that, in each case, we have really transgressed the bounds of actuality to which philosophers should restrict themselves. Seen in this light, Grisebach's emanent real ground is nothing but the contradiction to the immanent real grounds of other philosophers before him, and his eschatological actuality (ethical existence) transcends the human world just the same as do the absolute concepts of the positive metaphysical

thinkers, only in a different direction. Moreover, in the light of our previous discussions and our view of actuality, we cannot help regarding Grisebach's "real time" and "ethical existence" as nothing but immanent concepts either. In other words, Grisebach does nothing else but add philosophically another real ground to the many existing ones, as they emerged in the march of actuality throughout history. And his real ground, too, is, in the last instance, an existential ground, in that, by its emanance, man would be led to abandon his claim to absoluteness (sin), and would be taught that only if his self were shrunk to virtually nothing and if he were able to suffer his fellowman's contradiction in silence, could he hope to experience an ethical existence (faith), the peace of which transcended all reason. Through existence in faith, therefore, man has returned to himself, and at the same time is referred to the absolute, namely, the Cross. We have already pointed out that Grisebach conceived this philosophy at a time when man's ideological absolutes threatened to wipe him out, and when the philosophy of existence confronted him with the nothing. Hence the eschatological character of his truth.

The chief result of our brief historical investigation of man's thought, which we undertook in the light of the question: "Whither man?" is that, in the last instance, the real ground of each philosophical system or thought is an *existential ground* from which man attempts to realize and assert himself by *positing his truth or building his world*.

Through this constructive act, he tries to reach some firm ground, some haven of refuge, no matter whether he arrives at it through reason, in a faith tinted with reason, in fulfilment or in expectation. It follows that all the truths of men are related truths and contradict one another, and that absolute truth is completely unavailable to us in the fullest sense of the word, i.e., we have to it neither direct nor indirect access, and, as philosophers, do not even know whether it exists. In other words, there is, from the philosophical point of view, only actuality.

The philosopher finds himself unable to read into it an absolute or even a reflection of it, nor can he regard it under an eschatological aspect. The philosopher who does so violates the boundary of philosophy. Philosophy treats that which is within the grasp of man's experience and reason. Theology occupies itself with the province of faith. This does not mean that there are two truths in the sense of Siger of Brabant. This should have become abundantly clear from the above discussion concerning the relation between philosophy and theology. It means that philosophy deals with actuality only while theology, *through faith and on the basis of faith*, leads man to the absolute truth. It is in this sense that philosophy must answer the question: Whither man? by: To actuality. But it does so in the mind of responsibility, i.e., by obliging man to remember always that whatever truth he establishes, in order to survive, this truth is never infallible. It is a mere walking crutch. No man or any group of men can therefore ever lay claim to absoluteness. They are thus morally

bound to consider other existential human truths and to lay themselves open for criticism and contradiction. It is in the adoption of this open attitude that man has arrived at an *ethical existence* in our sense of the word. It is in this attitude that man is free, in that it prevents him from becoming the slave of his own truth, and it is through this *freedom of his own* that he guarantees the *freedom of his fellowman*.



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

MAN AND CITIZEN : A PROBLEM OF ACTUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LIFE

(A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH)

1 Positio Quaestionis

In our opinion philosophy is the science of actuality, i.e., we regard the task of philosophy as twofold : To analyse the conditions of actual life in their totality and to act as guardian of the freedom of the community. Philosophy realizes the inaccessibility to man of *the truth* by reason, but at the same time recognizes that it is man's nature to posit his truth, which may be of an apodictic, scientific, philosophical or religious character. It follows from this, that none of these truths can possibly be absolute. They merely are tools or methods in the hands of man to construct a meaningful abode in the midst of everlasting change and flux in the ocean of life. In building these fortresses or, to speak with Saint-Exupéry, these citadels in the desert, man finds his essence, and therefore "is." "Die Art wie du bist und ich bin, die Weise, nach der wir Menschen auf der Erde sind, ist das Buan, das Wohnen. Mensch sein heisst : als Sterblicher auf der Erde sein, heisst : wohnen."¹ The abodes of man may therefore be said to be integral parts of actuality, which so to speak cause actuality to come into existence ; for previous to its being constructed by man, it is chaotic and therefore may be said not to exist at all. But this does not mean that the islands of man in the stream of the chaotic are immune from destruction. On the contrary, these oases are in constant danger of being devoured again by the greediness of the desert, so that man constantly fluctuates between having a home and being homeless, possessing and losing :

"Diese seine Heimat gibt dem Menschen nicht eine endgültige Geborgenheit, sondern sie bleibt immer etwas Angreifbares, das immer bedroht bleibt, dessen Bedrohung der Mensch aushalten und dessen Vernichtung er gegebenenfalls auch überstehen muss. In diese Doppelseitigkeit von Heimat und Heimatlosigkeit, von Haben und Verlieren ist der Mensch hineingestellt, und er gibt sein Wesen ebensosehr preis, wenn er sich an das endliche Dasein verliert, als auch, wenn er sich heimatlos von der Unendlichkeit verzehren lässt."²

In other words, man must keep moving within the sphere of actuality ; he must not allow himself to be swallowed by an anonymous metaphysical ground or by a material, scientific, methodological or technological "id." The dimension, however, in which we experience

¹ M. Heidegger, Bauen Wohnen Denken, in : Vorträge u. Aufsätze, p. 147.

² O. F. Bollnow, Neue Geborgenheit, p. 186.

actuality in its densest form, is constituted by our relation to our fellowmen.¹ This relation does not merely consist "in der konkreten Begegnung des echten liebenden Bezugs"² as Buber, Marcel, Scheler and Binswanger see it together with Bollnow, but it is also that of contradiction, as Grisebach points out. From this it follows that man, in positing his truth, will necessarily be contradicted by his fellowman, and perhaps the "liebende Bezug," the loving relation of Bollnow, consists in keeping oneself open to this contradiction. Man is therefore obliged to construct his truth, his world, or his home in responsibility, i.e., in the realization that his truth is but a relative one, arising from an existential situation. The consciousness of this state of affairs will prevent us from positing our truth as absolute. It will enable us to suffer the contradiction of the fellowman, and will therefore safeguard the freedom of others as well as our own in as much as it will prevent us from becoming the slave of our own truth. Actuality thus may be said to move within the truth and counter-truth of man. Each human relative truth is therefore of the utmost importance, because it is an integral part of actuality, and actuality, i.e., human life, would cease without these human truths or logos. It is, therefore, of no avail to ignore any human truth, no matter how "insignificant" or "primitive" it may appear. It, nevertheless, constitutes a part of actuality, and the positing of my own truth is possible only in the light of the other existing truth or truths. In other words, without other truths posited by other human beings or groups of human beings, I could not posit my own truth. I posit it only in response to other existing human truths. From this the dependence of myself on my fellowman becomes clear. As my opponent he is just as much my negation (who says "No" to me) as my affirmation (who confirms my existence and causes me to become conscious of my identity).

From the above, the duty of philosophy clearly outlines itself. It is its task to point out man's moral obligation towards his fellowman, namely, to listen to his truth and to keep himself open to it. This moral attitude seems to be the meaning and significance of all processes of actuality; for it takes but little reflection to see what a tremendous change in the world would occur if in all men such an attitude could be cultivated. All the problems would melt like butter in the sun, because really problems are only man-made, i.e., would not exist in their insoluble form if man did not *insist* on his truth, be it as an individual or a member of a certain group. If problems are, however, man-made, it follows that they cannot be removed by intellectual schemes of whatever kind, simply because any such scheme actually represents the rationalised insistence on one's own truth or point of view, i.e., of how the problem or rather the contradiction is seen by a certain individual or group of individuals, and how it can be "solved" by them, that is in reality, how it can be overcome. In other words, there is the danger

¹ Cf. Grisebach, Erkenntnis und Glaube, pp. 34 ff.

²O. F. Bollnow, Neue Geborgenheit, p. 145.

that the existing situation is intellectualised with the aim to overcome it and arrive at harmony. But it is this very attempt that sharpens the conflict or creates only fresh problems or conflicts, instead of removing the contradictory situation. It follows that this *natural* contradictory situation cannot be overcome, but must simply be accepted. It invites man to focus his attention not only on his own views, interests and way of life, but also on those of his fellowman and to adopt towards him an understanding and sympathetic attitude. Is it not strange that, in order to "solve" their problems, men seek to travel a round-about path, and therefore only complicate matters, instead of simplifying them. The reason seems to be that they do not realize the origin and the nature of the problem. They forget that it originates in the positing of their contradictory truths, which we grant they must posit. But by regarding these truths as absolute and infallible, they estrange themselves from themselves, i.e., from their own nature, their essence as an integral component of actuality which refers them to their fellowman on whose contradiction they are dependent, and to which they should therefore keep themselves open, *instead* of hardening themselves against it and closing up like an oyster in its shell. They attempt to solve their problems intellectually by a certain plan, project or scheme, without realizing that such scheme is nothing but the positing of *their* truth in some other form, an attempt to bring about a solution according to *their* truth, thereby disregarding any other truth, which creates problems out of the problem. For if a situation is never created by one party alone but always by at least two, in other words, if a situation is the result of mutual contradiction by two or more parties, it follows that this situation cannot be overcome by one party alone, and without disregarding and suppressing the vital needs and interests, or what we here call the truth, of the other parties concerned. In addition to that, we must keep in mind that actuality is not static but dynamic, i.e., the circumstances of life are in a constant flux, causing the existential situation of individuals or groups of individuals to change continually. Any intellectualisation of the existing contradictory situation by any plan or scheme that aims at overcoming it and hopes to establish harmony must needs be static and can never do justice to the dynamic nature of actuality. It so to speak "freezes" it, or we may also say obstructs it, and it is because of this very fact that it is bound to fail. Hence the existing problems (contradictions) cannot be "solved" at all, they can merely be positively accepted in that we become conscious of their representing an inalienable factor of actual life, because actuality consists of the contradictory truths of man. But once we have accepted actuality, as it manifests itself in the above sense, these problems may be said to exist no more. For they are problems only if I dissociate myself from the actual situation and look at it as an object with my intellect. That is the mistake we all make. That is what we previously called the round-about path, which leads to our self-estrangement. But it is high time that we realized that those "problems" are an inte-

gral part of our existence in that we cannot help creating them. We are essentially problematic in the sense of being controversial, in that it is our nature to posit our truth in the face of the truths of our fellowmen. It is in this sense that we stated previously that problems are man-made. But as soon as we realize our essentially problematic nature in the above sense and accept it, the problem ceases to be a problem. In so doing, we are loyal to our own nature, or we have chosen ourselves, instead of estranging ourselves from ourselves. It is in this choice that our freedom consists, and it is through it that we are led to adopt an understanding and sympathetic attitude towards the truth of our fellowman by which problems cease to be problems.

Thus, instead of vainly trying to transcend ourselves and using our reason to transgress the boundaries of nature by seeking to overcome all contradiction and reaching out for harmony, justice and truth because we erroneously believe that we are essentially rational, we should reconcile ourselves with nature and heed its warnings and restrictions. In other words, the fact that we never arrived at an absolute truth by the effort of our reason, the fact that this effort tempted us to regard ourselves as absolute, whereby we invited catastrophe and our own destruction (viz. the two World Wars), should have driven it home to us that the attempt to reach absolute truth through our reason is *unreasonable*. If continued, this effort could easily, at this stage, result in the total self-extinction of mankind. It follows that in our present crisis of truth, it is *reasonable* to accept our limitation by our fellowman and to move within the bounds of actuality. We shall then discover that actuality is problematic in that all human truths are related to an individual's or group of individuals' existential situation, and that, therefore, they are contradictory. There can thus be no harmony, and justice lies in the very acceptance of the contradiction in that thereby we do not only accept ourselves, i.e., our true nature, but our fellowman as well, i.e., we then respect his truth, the world or the home which he built for himself, his vital needs and his interests. By so doing, we are at the same time *free* in that we have chosen our true nature, i.e., contradictoriness, and yet are able to listen to the contradiction on the part of our fellowman. By this free act of the will, therefore, we are no longer in danger of becoming the slaves of our own truth, which we fallaciously deem to be infallible because it is the product of our reason. We shall, on the contrary, be able to assume towards our neighbour a sympathetic and understanding attitude.

Taking now the adoption of an understanding and sympathetic attitude towards the truth of our fellowman as a starting-point, we propose to give an analysis of the truths of South African life or actuality in the light of the problem of man and citizen. In so doing, we hope to gain the sympathetic understanding of both Europeans and non-Europeans, and to make them both realize the very actuality of their interdependence, which both sides might fail to experience on account of a progressing intellectualization of South African actuality,

i.e., the contradictory truths of Europeans and non-Europeans. This brief essay is therefore meant as a stimulus for both Europeans and non-Europeans to break through the armour of their own absolute truth and to penetrate each other's spheres of actuality, thus coming to the realization that those spheres make but one South African reality of which they are both inalienable parts. It is in this way that the progressing intellectualization of the contradictory truths of Europeans and non-Europeans, which results in the further problematization of South African actuality, could be changed into an understanding, sympathetic attitude and the acceptance of South African actuality by both parties.

Before we, however, deal with South African actuality as such, it is necessary to give a historic sketch of the situation in Europe; for we shall find that the problem of man and citizen in its changes and modifications throughout European history, from its antique beginning to contemporary times, finds surprising parallels in South African history. Naturally, it is always daring to draw such parallels, and we are fully conscious that there are also marked differences on account of the specific character of South African history. But when we think of the fact that the European settlers, whether Dutch, French, German or English, all imported their ideas as they prevailed in their mother country at the specific epoch when they came to this country, we realize the influence of European history on South African history. And it is this fact that enables us to make certain comparisons with Europe. Thus, in spite of all the differences, the similarity between the historic situation of 19th century Europe and contemporary South Africa is so striking that it pays to investigate it more closely. That is also the reason why we practically end our presentation of the problem of man and citizen throughout history with the philosophy of Hegel and his antipode, Karl Marx. It goes without saying, that we do by no means claim to have given an exhaustive account of the above mentioned problem, neither in Europe nor in South Africa. Apart from the lack of space, this is not our aim in such a brief essay at all. All we want to do is to draw the reader's attention to the true nature of actuality and thereby to the true essence of man. We propose to work out as objectively as possible a phenomenological structure of South African actuality and show how closely it resembles that of 19th century Europe, and we undertake in all modesty to appeal to the moral sense of all South Africans, irrespective of any colour, to accept actuality and to refrain from any attempt to overcome it, before it is too late.

2. The Problem Of Man And Citizen In Europe

In the introductory remarks of our essay we made the attempt to outline the nature of actuality, and we came to the conclusion that actuality, in its densest form, manifests itself by the contradictory truths of men. If we refrain from any kind of systematization of history and do not read into it metaphysical, ontological or teleological

elements, we must admit that it reveals to us the battle-field of life, be it in the form of individual against individual, state against state, one scientific theory against the other, one form of culture against the other, one religious creed against the other. The experience of this state of affairs has always been keenly felt by man. But far from accepting it in its naked reality and becoming conscious of its acute actuality from which he could not escape, and of which he was an integral part in as much as he himself, together with his fellowman, forged this actuality and gave it a meaning, which pointed towards a decision to be free, he tried to overcome it as thoroughly as possible. Man's failure to grasp the meaning of contradictory actuality, the *comprehension* of which, as we have seen, would have led him towards an understanding, sympathetic attitude towards his fellowman, caused him to experience it as a "bellum omnia contra omnes." This idea of actuality roused in man the feeling of anxiety, uncertainty, and of his being thrown into the nothing. Thus man either loses himself in himself, trying to discover the real ground there, e.g., the "self-sufficiency" of the Cynics, Max Stirner's "self from the nothing," Kierkegaard's "truth as an inner experience of faith," Heidegger's "Dasein" (being-there) as a "Sein zum Tode" (being-to-death) or "Sein zum Nichts" (being-to-nothing), or he tries to reconcile himself with his fellowman, which leads to an absorption of the individual by the state, no matter whether the state is represented as the expression of Plato's "Good," Aristotle's "Reason," Hobbes's "Leviathan," Rousseau's "Volonté Générale," Hegel's "Ethical Idea," Marx's "Grossmensch" (Greater Man). In the first case, the state and social conventions were either repudiated or were regarded as an escape into what Heidegger calls the "Man," i.e., into the anonymous. In the second case, man's attempt to overcome the feeling of anxiety and imperfection (which resulted from his bellum-omnia-contra-omnes experience of actuality) by reconciling himself with his fellowman, led to the problem of man and citizen, which problem really gained momentum in the bourgeois society, where man is a private person on the one and a citizen on the other hand. K. Löwith writes:

"Rousseaus Schriften enthalten die erste und deutlichste Charakteristik der menschlichen Problematik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Sie besteht darin, dass der Mensch der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft nichts Einheitliches und Ganzes ist. Er ist einerseits Privatmensch und andererseits Staatsbürger, weil die bürgerliche Gesellschaft in einem problematischen Verhältnis zum Staat existiert. Das Missverhältnis von beiden ist seit Rousseau ein Grundproblem aller modernen Staats- und Gesellschaftslehren und die totalitären Staaten der Gegenwart sind der Versuch einer Antwort auf Rousseaus Fragestellung: wie lässt sich der Mensch, der doch von Natur aus schon selbst etwas Ganzes ist, in Übereinstimmung bringen mit der ganz andersartigen Ganzheit der 'société politique'?"¹

¹ Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, p. 255.

In Greek thought the conflict between man and citizen, i.e., a private person and a citizen, does not really arise because, from the very beginning, man is regarded as a *zoon politicon*. It is true that the state rises from the imperfection of man, which manifests itself in a clash of interests, but this side merely shows the conflicting and dualistic social nature of man :

"The state is possible only because men have common aspirations, but government, and political power, the existence of officials who are given authority to act in the name of the whole state, are necessary because man's community is imperfect, because man's social nature expresses itself in conflicting ways, in the clash of interests, the rivalry of parties, and the struggle of classes, instead of in the united seeking after a common good."¹

The state thus fulfils the rôle of educator, which enables man to gain rational insight into his true needs as a *zoon politicon*, because only as such man realizes himself and lives up to his true nature. Only if his true nature is realized, is he just and in harmony with the Good (Agathon) of which the state is a form of expression. That is why according to Plato :

"The state should be organized like the universe at large and the individual virtuous soul; that is, reason should be in the ascendancy."²

Thus M. B. Foster says University of Fort Hare

"But it is important to guard against misunderstanding of his (Plato's) doctrine. It is misunderstood by most of those critics who accuse him of 'idealizing' the state, or of 'sacrificing the individual' to it. This accusation would be true only if Plato had taught (as some subsequent philosophers have done) that there was a 'good' or an 'interest' of the state which might diverge from that of its individual members, and that in cases of divergence the latter should be sacrificed to the former.³ But Plato's theory is that there is no such divergence. Nature has established such a harmony between the individual and society (she has made him, as Aristotle said later, a 'political animal') that his individual good is attained and not sacrificed by submission to the requirements of social life."⁴

Aristotle agrees with Plato that man is a "social animal," i.e., destined by nature to live in community with others : family, community, state. Only there can human nature fully realize itself. The whole precedes the parts (just as is the case with organisms). From the very beginning individuals exist in the state, and their development is greatly influenced by it. The theory of state of Aristotle does

¹ A. D. Lindsay, Introduction to Aristotle, A Treatise on Government, pp. XII-XIII.

² F. Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p. 91.

³ Here Foster adds in a footnote : "There are a few passages in the *Republic* in which Plato implies this (Book IV, 419-421 ; Book V, 462), but they are exceptional."

⁴ Masters of Political Thought, pp. 51, 52.

not conceal its Hellenistic origin. It is chiefly based on the city-state and the mixing of state and social institutions, state laws and social customs and conventions.

In both cases, Plato as well as Aristotle, another feature must be added to the purely human (individual) and political ones, namely, the religious element: The fundamental difference between the two thinkers is that Plato, by stratifying the social classes according to their inherent virtues: *sophrosyne* (agricultural and commercial class) *andreia* (phylakes), *sophia* (archontes), tries to rule out as much as possible man's natural instincts and drives, and sees the Good in the idea, while Aristotle realizes that to do so would be against nature. He merely requires man to control his desires by reason, by choosing the golden mean. This path of the golden mean is in agreement with nature which is reasonable and good. From this it follows that both Plato, as well as Aristotle, actually add another feature to the purely human (individual) and political, which were fused in man as a *zoon politicon*, thus bridging the gulf between the individual and the citizen of the polis, namely, the religious. For in both cases the polis is the expression of the universe, which Plato's case is governed by the pure ideas culminating in harmony, justice and beauty, that is, the Good, and in Aristotle's case receives its motion by the existence of the Unmoved Mover, the *Actus Purus*, by which motion matter (potentiality) is actualized, i.e., receives its forms which evolve out of each other, every higher form representing a higher intelligence to the previous one. Even as it takes both matter and form to build up the universe, both man's desire and reason cause man to be a social animal, because only as a member of the community can he realize himself in a reasonable way, i.e., by practising moderation, thereby remaining loyal to himself, to Nature or the Good (Divine). By the fusion, therefore, of the individual, the political and the religious element, human striving and the human will are focussed on one goal, *the polis*. There do not exist any different interests between man and citizen, because only as a citizen is the individual a full-fledged man. Nor is there any conflict between state and religion, because the polis has at the same time a religious character, so that an offence against the state was at the same time a religious offence and vice versa.

It was, so to speak, a crime against nature, i.e., against reason or the good (the divine) which were the presupposition to happiness. The identification of the city-state as both a political and religious institution dates right back to its Homeric beginnings, i.e., to the aristocratic period, when the Olympian gods were regarded as the guardians of the city-state, so that the Olympian cult became the official cult of the polis. When afterwards the philosophers attacked the Olympian cult and the city-state, they were prosecuted for *Asebeia*, as were Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Socrates and Aristotle himself. This does, however, not alter the fact that Aristotle's polis clearly has retained

the religious element in accordance with his changed view of the deity and the cosmos.

The union of man and citizen, of private and public interest, which constituted a dominant feature in ancient Greek thought, existed in theory only, but not in practice. In the first place, if this fusion had been complete, it would not have been necessary for the state to educate the citizens for the good and to teach them to subdue and control their individual aspirations. Moreover, the different forms of the city-state, aristocratic, tyrannic, plutocratic, democratic, as well as the class struggle, reflect individual and group interests, which might have all centred around the state; but the question arises, in what form: to seek one's own advantage at the expense of others or to promote the interest of the commonwealth? Plato's and Aristotle's ideal states have after all never been realized. We state all this to show the indomitable power of actuality, which forces man to set out for its conquest over and over again, only to lose it over and over again. But even in theory the union of man and citizen did not last. When Christianity began to posit its truth of faith against the truth of reason of the pagan world, the polis collapsed both in its Greek and Roman form (for the Roman empire was just an enormous enlargement of the city-state of Rome), and the ancient world gave way to the Middle Ages. But the destruction of the unity of man and citizen of the polis caused a deep conflict to develop inside man, which is traceable throughout the Middle Ages, namely, the struggle between reason and faith, this world and the beyond, emperor and pope, state and church. This encroachment of a new world and a new truth upon an old one is described by Rousseau in his "Contrat Social." Löwith summarises Rousseau's view as follows:

"Ursprünglich begründet sich jede politische Herrschaft religiös und jede bestimmte Religion ist ihrerseits auf den Staat beschränkt, in dessen Grenzen ihr Kultus lebt. Das Schicksal des Staates steht und fällt mit dem seiner Götter. Dieses Verhältnis der Übereinstimmung änderte sich mit dem Eintritt des Christentums in die antike Welt. Es trennte die Religion von der Politik und verkündete über jeder irdischen Herrschaft ein himmlisches Königtum. Und seitdem das Christentum in der Gestalt der römisch-katholischen Kirche selber politisch wurde, lebt Europa im Zwiespalt von Staat und Kirche, von Kaiser und Papsttum. Der einer christlichen Kirche angehörige Mensch kann kein voller und ganzer Staatsbürger sein, denn sein religiöses Gewissen widerstreitet dem bürgerlichen."¹

The discrepancy in the case of mediaeval man lies in the fact that on the one hand his will and his striving were directed towards God and the next world, and that he sincerely believed in the pope's vicarship on earth, while on the other hand the same person, more often than not, owed allegiance to an emperor who was a bitter enemy of the pope and who,

¹ Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, p. 257.

like the Salic Emperor Henry IV, was sometimes even excommunicated. Another conflict often arose in the breast of the scholar who no longer could reconcile philosophical with theological truth, like Siger of Brabant or later Giordano Bruno who was burned at the stake for his teaching. There was further a great struggle about the nature of Christian revelation itself, e.g., should you believe this truth because it was absurd, as Anselm of Canterbury demanded, or should you believe in order to understand, because this truth was reasonable, this being the doctrine of Abelard and Thomas Aquinas. There was further the problem of reason and will (Aquinas against Duns Scotus and William Occam), and there was the neo-Platonic conception of a mystic union between man and God (Master Eckhart, Tauler, Seuse, etc.). But viewed on a large scale, there is the contrast between the metaphysical value of man as it is suggested by man's will which storms the heavens, and the limiting and sometimes frustrating factor of man's reason.

These conflicts and contrasts were tolerable as long as the mediaeval world view and social order were intact and as long as each social estate felt that it was appointed by God in a certain place to play its part and to carry out its duty to His everlasting glory; but when things began to change and gun-powder was invented, the revolution of the earth about the sun and wide regions of the world were discovered, new markets found, money re-introduced (it had been used by the ancients) and the printing-press was invented, the mediaeval world declined. But its death-agonies were prolonged. Despite the fact that on account of the above changes the nobility lost its old vital function as the defender caste, which it had held within the mediaeval organism, and that the bourgeoisie in the rising towns soon outstripped the nobles in wealth and education, the feudal character of society continued to exist. The nobles fulfilled a mere decorative function and "adorned" the royal courts, e.g., that of the Versailles of Louis XIV, but otherwise developed into parasites, who lived on the fat of the land and bled white the population by taxing them heavily, till the third estate raised the cry: No taxation without representation! which was echoed from the American colonists who had raised it a short time before the American War of Independence.

It is against this background of an unjust society that we must understand Rousseau's war cry: *Revenons à la nature!* He keenly felt man's estrangement from himself, whom society transformed into a class-conscious being, e.g., a duke, count, baron, bourgeois, peasant, but who was never a human being. In "Émile" Rousseau says for example:

"Dans l'ordre naturel, les hommes étant tous égaux, leur vocation commune est l'état d'homme; et quiconque est bien élevé pour celui-là ne peut mal remplir ceux qui s'y rapportent. Qu'on destine mon élève à l'épée, à l'Église, au barreau, peu m'importe. Avant la vocation des parents, la nature l'appelle à la vie humaine."¹

¹ Les Meilleures Pages de Rousseau, ed. by E. A. Crosby, London, 1933, p. 72.

Rousseau mistrusts society to such an extent and is so scared of its perverting man into a class-conscious being, thus estranging himself from himself completely, that he jealously takes all the necessary precautions of having his *Émile* educated by nature in isolation. He engages a tutor who sees to it that nature's process is not disturbed. It has been objected that this education in isolation is not in agreement with man's nature as a social being. It is, however, not true that Rousseau is anti-social as such. He only opposes the society of his own time. Even his *Émile* is prepared to live in society, but instead of class pride and professional conceit, he learns to know other people and their languages, he visits hospitals and learns the meaning of charity and pity. Finally he is shown God in nature and learns to listen to the voice of his conscience. The fact that he is married to Sophie, who has received an education analogous to his, also points to the fact that he is to live a social life; and is not the family the cell of society?

That to Rousseau the relation of the individual to society is nevertheless problematic is not surprising, especially after he has experienced its pervasive power.

In "Contrat Social" he writes:

"Trouver une forme d'association qui défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même, et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant." Tel est le problème fondamental dont le Contrat Social donne la solution.¹

In other words, Rousseau attempts to reunite the human, political and religious elements which had gradually split apart during the Middle Ages and the gulf between which had been further widened after the mediaeval world had broken down and the national state emerged. But this re-union was to take place in agreement with the new bourgeois world. Thus the new religion could neither be the state religion of the Greek city-state nor the Christian religion of revelation. For this reason Rousseau invents the "religion civile" which is supposed to be a religion of reason and in which the contrast between the religion of man (which is *Émile's* confession and which is true but useless) and the national, polytheistic state religions (which are not true but useful) is merged. But this merging is no genuine organic union, nor is any such possible, because it would be against the nature of actuality, which, it cannot be denied, operates by contrast, conflict and contradiction. The perfect harmony between individual and society will remain for man wishful thinking. It must be relegated to the "Golden Age of the Myth" or the Christian Paradise. We may take it for granted that all theories of a Social Contract fail, because they all aim at overcoming actuality. This goes for Hobbes's "Leviathan," a monster which is able to keep his iron fist on the individual only by a wrong interpretation of actuality as a war of all against all, so that human beings owe their civilized conduct and rational behaviour only

¹ Les Meilleures Pages de Rousseau, ed. by E. A. Crosby, London, 1933, p. 82.

to the state. In other words, on account of this negative interpretation of actuality the stamp becomes more than the gold. And it is also true for Locke's "free consent" which is nothing but a fiction and about which W. T. Jones writes :

"But, if a democracy has to wait upon the free consent of every one of its members, it is no democracy or indeed any government at all : it simply lapses into anarchy. On the other hand, if democracy be the rule of a majority, many men no longer rule themselves ; and this kind of government is quite compatible with the most brutal and cruel of tyrannies."¹

In reference to Rousseau's "solution" of the problem of man and citizen, Löwith points out that Rousseau in the first "Discours" designs the picture of full-fledged citizenship according to the pattern of Sparta and Roman patriotism, and in the second "Discours" he depicts original "homme" in the conditions of a Golden Age—the first attempt at solving this antinomy Rousseau, according to Löwith, makes in "Discours sur l'Économie." But in this work, too, the rights of man are not yet identical with the duties of the citizen. Löwith goes on to say :

"Die Möglichkeit ihrer Übereinstimmung ist das Problem des Contrat Social und des Émile (1762). Zur Herstellung der Übereinstimmung müsste der Eigenwille aller Einzelnen (*volonté de tous*) identisch werden mit dem Gemeinwillen des Ganzen (*volonté générale*), der etwas anders ist als ein bloßer Majoritätswille. Zugleich muss aber auch die "*volonté générale*" identisch werden mit der "*conscience divine*," dem religiösen Gewissen des Einzelnen. Die Einheit des politischen Gemeinwesens mit der christlichen Religion und des Patriotismus mit der Humanität soll schliesslich durch eine "*religion civile*" verbürgt werden. . . ."²

About Rousseau's contradictory distinction between religion of man and national polytheistic state religion, Löwith writes :

"Diesen Widerspruch versucht Rousseau in der *religion civile* aufzulösen. . . . Doch gelingt Rousseau die Vereinigung auch hier nur scheinbar. Er befürwortet einmal die Religion der Menschheit, die sich über alle völkischen Eigenarten hinwegsetzt, und ein andermal die exklusivste Nationalerziehung und Nationalreligion. Die *religion civile*, welche beider Vorzüge vereinigen soll, bleibt ein blosses Programm und ein Kompromiss. Und als Rousseau wegen seiner Stellung zum Christentum angegriffen und genötigt wurde, in den 'Lettres de la Montagne' seine Position zu verteidigen, musste er notwendig scheitern: 'Le patriotisme et l'humanité sont deux vertues incompatibles dans leur énergie et surtout chez un peuple entier.'³

¹ Masters of Political Thought, p. 172.

² Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, pp. 256-257.

³ Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, pp. 257-258.

This problem between man and citizen, which Rousseau clearly formulated for the first time, remained the *enfant terrible* of philosophy. Many a successor of Rousseau tried to solve it. Hegel sought to overcome the conflict between man and citizen by his concept of the state which to him is the result of man's reasonable willing, i.e., as the expression of man's freedom:

"The state is the realisation of the ethical Idea; it is the spirit of the people become visible; it is an Idea of Art, in which the inwardness of the human reason comes forth into outer manifestation."¹

This concept of the state, which shows ancient as well as Christian features, is nothing but an abstraction of the individuals in whom Marx recognizes the community of interest of private man in the bourgeois society. He points out that, as a bourgeois, the modern citizen is no *zoon politicon*, and as citizen he is obstructed from the private person. Thus Marx reverts to Rousseau's distinction between "homme" and "citoyen." In connection with industrialization, Marx discovers that the "droits de l'homme" are no longer human rights but bourgeois privileges. For the "homme" as distinguished from the citizen is the bourgeois. His privileges are called human rights because they are still governed by the idea of the bourgeois struggle against feudalism. But the bourgeois individuals are no social animals, the only bond to keep them together being constituted by their private interests. The political revolution must therefore be supplemented by a human one. The true "homme," however, is the Proletarian, that is, the fourth estate, because he is everything and the bourgeois nothing, and he alone is free from private interests, for only his interests fall together with those of the community.² It is, however, easy to see that Marx, too, failed to do justice to reality. In the first place, by taking his start from the class struggle, he narrows down actuality to a purely economic struggle, so that even the Greek conception of man as a political animal is a wider one than Marx's conception of man as an economic animal. Actuality, however, consists of the contradictory relations of men who cannot help positing their truth in the midst of everchanging circumstances. But the positing of this truth does not occur from a mere economic need, but from a far wider need, namely, to find a meaningful abode in the stormy waters of life. Moreover, Marx arbitrarily decides that his economic animal is only man if he is also a social animal, and here he approaches the Greeks, with this difference that the social animals of the ancients consisted of the masters, i.e., the Greeks, and that non-Greeks and slaves were excluded, nor were the social animals of the Greeks mere economic animals, while Marx's social animals represent the fourth estate and are really economic animals. However this may be, Marx's conception of society is, just like Hegel's, nothing but an abstraction, too, and is merely an inversion of Hegel in that he replaces Hegel's idealist basis by a materialist one. Thus, Jacob

¹ W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 613.

² Cf. K. Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, p. 226.

Hombres, for example, shows that Hegel's doctrine of the self-creation of man from the given reality of nature corresponds to Marx's teaching that, through work, all men are merged into a "Grossmensch" (Greater Man).¹ In both cases, therefore, man inflates himself into a god by fusing with an anonymous metaphysical ground which, for Hegel, is constituted by the absolute spirit and for Marx by society. This process of absolutization on the part of man takes place in the case of Hegel via the individual, and in the case of Marx via the collective. Jacob Hombres says :

"Gegenüber dem bürgerlichen 'Gott' steigt nun der proletarische auf: die Gesellschaft in ihrer unbedingt gesellschaftlichen oder kommunistischen Verfassung."²

We have seen that Löwith mentioned that the answer to the problem man and citizen was given by the great totalitarian systems of the world, which cut the Gordian knot by declaring their respective ideology to be absolute, and which also were the result of other forces of levelling, which led to the self-estrangement of man and the alienation of the world from him, so that he found himself a foreigner in his own "home." These are the anonymous forces of economy, technology, bureaucracy, the mass, etc., which cause the technical method to become an end in itself, which turns men into mere robots and technicians, as is revealed by certain forms of modern literature, philosophy, music and painting.

From the above, it should become clear that any kind of intellectualization and rationalization of contradictory actuality will never remove this contradiction and will only result in the emergence of problems with which man finds himself unable to cope. The reason for this state of affairs is simple. The continual effort of man to achieve complete and permanent mastery over actuality is a contradiction in itself, because contradictoriness is the very nature of actuality into which man is inextricably interwoven. Complete mastery of actuality by man would therefore mean the end of actuality, of life and, therefore, of man. This does not mean, however, that man shall not posit his truths; for he cannot help doing so; for it is precisely man's contradictory truths that constitute actuality; nevertheless it is high time that he realized that he will never achieve complete mastery over actuality, but that in positing his truth and defending it, he depends on the posited truths of his fellowmen. Man should therefore become conscious of the fact that it is not only impossible, but also not desirable at all that he should master actuality; for such "mastery" acts like a boomerang and would result in his own annihilation. There is only one course open to him, and that is the road to freedom in the acceptance of contradictory actuality and thereby himself, instead of entangling himself in a knot of insoluble problems and estranging himself from himself and from the world. We have already seen that the

¹ Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie, p. 25

² *ibid.*

acceptance of actuality by man would enable him to adopt an understanding and sympathetic attitude towards his fellowman by which, as we shall yet see, the problem of citizen and man would not be solved but would cease to be a problem.

In conclusion of this chapter we should like to make a few last remarks concerning the present world situation. It is often deplored that the West, in contrast to the East, has no uniform and systematized ideology, and from this the "weakness" and "impotency" of the West is inferred in comparison to the great impact of a well-systematized and organized Eastern philosophy, which lays claim to absolutism. We have seen from Marx's concept of an economic society, within which man becomes the "Grossmensch" (Greater Man), by what arbitrary means the union of man and citizen has been brought about. Man as an individual simply does not exist, he has been entirely devoured by the social monster. The state does not exist for him, but he exists solely for the state. Can one believe that a social order which demands of man complete self-estrangement and which rests on an ideology that so flagrantly defies actuality will last for good? Has history not taught us the lesson that other ideologies, which likewise laid claim to absolutism, have failed? And what is the reason of such failure? It is the very factors that by many are regarded as a strength of the Eastern system: its uniformity, its pressing everything into one mould, its absolutism and totalitarianism. Judged in the light of actuality, however, it is these very elements that reveal themselves as a weakness. And we regard it rather as a strength of the West that it does not possess a closed ideological system. It is in this respect much nearer to actuality, and it has the advantage of being much more flexible and adaptable than the East. The West does not have to labour under the constant nightmare of its system falling to pieces, because there is no system. It must be clearly understood, however, that this does not mean that the West should not make a concerted effort to contradict most definitely and most resolutely the claim to absoluteness of the East. On the contrary, the West is really under a moral obligation to do so, because only if it fights for freedom or the right of every individual and every nation to contradict, i.e., for the very tolerance and acceptance of contradiction, will it be true to its own nature which consists of freedom. It is therefore obvious that the struggle of the West against the absolutism of the East is conducted not for the people in the West alone, but also for those in the East. For the very fact of this struggle (whether successful or not) symbolises the rights of every individual. If thus the West contradicts the East for the sake of the right of everybody to contradict, by which act it complies with actuality, the East is in a much more difficult position, because its claim to absoluteness causes it to take a stand against the tide of actuality. It must spend a considerable amount of energy on holding together its parts fleeing from each other. This does not mean, however, that in the West the problem of man and citizen is no longer a problem; for there,

too, the levelling forces of economy, technology, bureaucracy and the mass determine the nature of society and thereby the look of the state. It is no secret that, even in the West, these forces are treated by man as an idol, and as long as the magic spell of these forces has not been broken, and as long as they have not been entirely subordinated to man, instead of turning him into their slave as is often the case, they will continue to estrange man from himself and from the world. As long as man is in the first place a manager, technician, scientist, party official, etc., instead of simply a man, the problem of man and society, man and citizen has not been minimized but maximized. And it is in connection with this that philosophy must raise a warning finger, and more and more voices are heard to admonish man to retrace his steps, before it is too late.

3. The Problem Of Man And Citizen In South African Life

A. Introductory Remarks

We dealt with this problem in Europe first, because its nature can best be illustrated by referring to European history in as much as it has been most clearly formulated by European philosophy. And it is in the light of this philosophy that we become conscious in how much the problem, as it exists in South Africa, is of a similar nature and to what extent it differs. We can further establish that the existence of this problem is by no means confined to a multi-racial country, although it may assume a much more acute form there on account of the fact that its inhabitants form no homogeneous social and cultural group. There are, however, certain analogies to European developments as there are bound to be, as, basically, human reactions all over the world are the same. If we now turn to analyse the problem of man and citizen in South Africa, it is of the utmost importance to bear in mind *that we do under no circumstances wish to defend or to condemn. All we intend to do, is to state the problem as it appears to us in terms of South African actuality.* In other words, our sole object is to listen and to observe, so that we may gain a sympathetic understanding of South African actuality which, basically, is the same as other actualities, for the simple reason that it is part of actuality as such. That is also the reason why South Africa must never seclude herself from the rest of the world, but must remain in exchange of the world's truths with its own truths.

B. The Golden Age of the Africans

Although we saw from our previous discussions that there is, within actuality, no such thing as a pure or perfect man living in harmony with himself and his fellowman in a Golden Age, we use this expression in connection with African primitive tribal life as it existed previous to the encounter of Africans and Europeans on the African continent. We decided to use this term because, in this period, African life

expressed itself in an unadulterated form, and one in which social and political organization was of such a nature that the cleft between individual and community, i.e., man and citizen in the Greek and modern sense of the word was minimized to the least possible degree. It may be a great risk to compare primitive tribal organization with that of the Greek city-state, and we are greatly aware of decisive differences, but there are definitely also certain analogies, and the one that is of interest to us here is the practical identification of man and tribesman which corresponds to that of man and citizen in the polis. And even as, in the polis, the identification is brought about by the fusion in man of individual, political and religious elements, the same is true for African tribal society. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard have got the following to say :

“Members of an African society feel their unity and perceive their common interests in symbols, and it is their attachment to these symbols which more than anything else gives their society cohesion and persistence. In the form of myths, fictions, dogmas, ritual, sacred places and persons, these symbols represent the unity and exclusiveness of the groups which respect them. They are regarded, however, not as mere symbols, but as final values in themselves. . . . Myths, dogmas, ritual beliefs and activities make his social system intellectually tangible and coherent to an African and enable him to think and feel about it. Furthermore, these sacred symbols, which reflect the social system, endow it with mystical values which evoke acceptance of the social order that goes far beyond the obedience exacted by the secular sanction of force. The social system is, as it were, removed to a mystical plane, where it figures as a system of secret values beyond criticism or revision.”¹

We can now push the analogy between the polis and tribal society even further, especially there where a pronounced centralized authority coupled with an administrative organisation was developed as among the Ngwato (Bechuanaland Protectorate), Zulu, and Banyankole, in contrast to those tribes where there existed no central government or administrative machinery as among the Logoli, Tallensi (Northern Ghana) and Nuer (Southern Sudan).² It is frequently thought that the rule of a tribal king is a totalitarian one, but nothing can be more erroneous. It is of course true that Chaka and Dingaan were tyrants, but cannot the Greek polis boast of its Pisistratus (Athens) and Polycrates (Samos) too? The fact that government theory is often violated by rebellious individuals, by groups or by tyrants only proves that no system can really remove the actual contradiction that exists between man as an individual and as a member of a political organization, so that every theoretical “solution,” however perfect it may appear, is only a mock solution. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard say :

¹ African Political Systems, pp. 17-18.

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 8 ff.

"The native theory of government is often contradicted by their practice. Both rulers and subjects, actuated by their private interests, infringe the rules of the constitution. Though it usually has a form calculated to hold in check any tendency towards absolute despotism, no African constitution can prevent a ruler from sometimes becoming a tyrant. The history of Shaka is an extreme case, but in this and other instances where the contradiction between theory and practice is too glaring and the infringement of constitutional rules becomes too grave, popular disapproval is sure to follow, and may even result in movement of secession and revolt led by members of the royal family or subordinate chiefs. This is what happened to Shaka."¹

For the sake of accuracy we want to point out that those sacred values or mystic symbols represent the field within which the witchdoctor practises his magic to influence demons and spirits and to make them serviceable in the interest of his client, and within which the chief performs his duties an important one of which consists in enlisting the help of the ancestral spirits for the promotion of the welfare and prosperity of the commonwealth. In other words, when we use the term mystic, we do not mean it in the sense of a mysticism in which the individual tries to overcome the sense-world and the body by delving into his innermost self (meditation), and by so doing tries to fuse with the supersensual, the transcendent, the divine. In African tribal society, it is only these very values that are of a mystical nature, while the witchdoctor's and chief's magic activity possesses a very practical character, namely, to influence demons and spirits by unnatural means (witchcraft) in man's favour. However, as the individual is blended into the whole by these mystical values, we are justified in calling the structure of African society mystic, and we may add that the chieftainship itself was one such mystic symbol.

Having made these few remarks in the interest of accuracy, we may say with impunity that, in tribal society, the individual is just as much subjected to the body politic as the Greek citizen was to the polis. The member of the tribe, though not a political animal in the sense of the Greeks, is nevertheless combined with the whole *on a mystical level*. Therein, we may say, lies the decisive difference between the primitive body politic and the polis. While the individual members of the former are mystically united, so that the tribe so to speak becomes the expression of an irrational world, the Greek city-state is the expression of reason and therefore of a rational universe which is comprehensible by our reason. Only in the vestiges of former religious rites, e.g., the mysteries of Eleusis, the relation to an irrational world manifests itself. This primitive religion, which was practised by the Greeks when they still lived in tribal organizations, was incorporated into the official religion of the city-state, the Olympian cult. In tribal religion the interests of all the citizens converged. Like any mystical religion, it expressed itself by means of symbols, which represent certain mystical

¹ African Political Systems, p. 13.

values which are closely bound up with the kingship. It becomes thus clear that the office of king forms the nodal point or pivot around which everything turns, the sensual as well as the supersensual world :

“Hence people will overthrow a bad king, but the kingship is never questioned . . . If we study the mystical values bound up with the kingship in any of the societies of Group A (that is societies with a central authority), we find that they refer to fertility, health, prosperity, peace, justice—to everything, in short, which gives life and happiness to a people. The African sees these ritual observances as the supreme safeguard of the basic needs of his existence and of the basic relations that make up his social order—land, cattle, rain, bodily health, the family, the clan, the state. The mystical values reflect the general import of the basic elements of existence : the land as the source of the whole people’s livelihood, physical health as something universally desired, the family as the fundamental procreative unit, and so forth.”¹

In the kingship of the African tribe the religious character of the office cannot really be distinguished from its political character. Everything is harmoniously linked up with each other and so interpenetrates that we may perhaps only say: The political character of the kingship follows from its religious character. The main function of the king was the mediation between the ancestors and the tribe, that is why : “The king was in charge of, and responsible for, all national magic . . . These religious and magical duties of the king, in performing which he was assisted by special, hereditary magicians, were vested in the office of kingship.”²

We can thus understand that the tribal king is approached with religious awe and treated with the utmost respect. The Zulu king is greeted as “source of the country” for instance, and the royal salute *Bayede* and the names *inkosi* (king), *ingonyama* (lion) are exclusively reserved for him.³ The king owns the two “sources of life,” the land and the people, but just because he does so, he is also under an obligation towards them. He is their father, so much so that his own children may not address him by that name. And like a father he has to take care of them and to look after them. The king cannot act arbitrarily. He has to abide by the law when giving judgment, and he is expected to accept the advice of his councillors. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard say :

“The forces that maintain the supremacy of the paramount ruler are opposed by the forces that act as check on his powers . . : they are counter-balanced by other institutions, like the king’s council, sacerdotal officials who have a decisive voice in the king’s investiture,

¹ M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, p. 18.

² M. Gluckmann, *the Kingdom of the Zulu*, in : *African Political Systems*, ed. by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, p. 31.

³ Cf. M. Gluckmann, *ibid.*, p. 35.

queen mothers' courts, and so forth, which work for the protection of law and custom and the control of centralized power."¹

And Gluckmann in his essay "The Kingdom of the Zulu" quotes the Zulu as saying: "The people respect their chief, but the chief ought to respect his people."²

The admirable harmony of the universe and its logical order at the top of which we find the "Great One, Unkulunkulu, who had brought men and all things living out of the earth"³ and which stretches down the pyramid via the ancestors, the king, chiefs, head of the clan and the family and its members even to the cattle and the crops, tempts one to compare the universe of the African tribe with that of the Greeks, especially Aristotle. The application of Aristotelian thought in its Thomistic form to African symbolic religion and philosophy has been attempted by Placide Temples in his book "Bantu Philosophy." This, however, is a hazardous enterprise, as we must bear in mind that the African universe rests on a purely mystical and irrational foundation, while that of Aristotle and of Thomas Aquinas is the expression of highest reason. This distinction results in decisive differences. While the African works with mystic symbols, Aristotle and his European pupils work with logical concepts. While "the African does not see beyond the symbols" and "if he understood their objective meaning, they would lose the power they have over him,"⁴ Aristotle and his European scholars aim at knowledge and attempt to understand the world of experience by translating it into logical concepts. But this does of course not mean that it is impossible for an African to think in terms of concepts. All westernised Africans prove that the opposite is true: they have been acquainted from the very start with the European habits of thought and might even find it difficult to understand the way of thinking of tribal society. In other words, we do not by any means contend that a certain method of thought is hereditary and cannot be changed. The opposite is true. Thus, when we speak of the symbolism and the mystic structure of the old primitive tribal society, we refer to its specific habitus of thought in the above sense, which, it is true, was founded on an irrational foundation, but whose hierarchy of vital powers revealed a remarkable logical coherence and down-to-earth pragmatism. We should moreover keep in mind that any primitive society, Greek, Germanic, Celtic, went through a similar stage of thought, and that, even in our advanced culture, mysticism and symbolism play a considerable part. In the last instance everything is only a matter of emphasis. In a primitive culture the accent lies on the irrational without the rational being absent; in modern European civilisation the opposite is the case.

It is this idea of the universe being peopled by spiritual forces,

¹ M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, p. 11.

² M. Gluckmann, *The Kingdom of the Zulu* in: *ibid.*, p. 44.

³ E. A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, p. 112.

⁴ M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, p. 18.

stronger and weaker, good and evil, which are linked with each other in a hierarchical order, that brings about the amalgamation of individual and tribesman, at least in theory, and which causes him to become a "zoon mysticon" in whom the individual, political and religious elements are merged. We called this period, during which the primitive tribal organisation was still intact and had not yet been undermined by European influences, the Golden Age of the African, because he felt himself one with his tribe. Even though naturally clashes between his individual interests and those of the body politic occurred as well as warlike clashes between his own tribes and other tribes, these clashes did not shake his very foundation. They did not touch his world view, and the universe for him remained intact, so that, to a very large extent, he could be himself (one never can entirely); but soon this paradise was to come to an end (through nobody's fault to be sure; but merely through the process of actuality), and when the African on his southward journey met with the European on his northward trek, this encounter was to shake the African's world in its very foundations.

It would be a great mistake, however, to blame either the Bantu or the European for coming to the Southern part of Africa. In both cases their existential position, *ie. in economic and political factors*, in the case of Europeans also scientific and religious interests, caused this encounter to take place. In other words, it was an absolutely contingent occurrence, and it is in this sense that we remarked that it was due to the process of actuality. From this it follows that the argument that either the African or the European does not belong here is childish and nonsensical. We thereby really oppose the process of actuality. Such an argument, from whatever side it may be raised, is bound to raise a quarrel which will only widen the gulf between African and European. It should be remembered by both sections that they both together, by their very contradictoriness, constitute South African actuality, and that this contradictoriness implies an "ought," i.e., the obligation by both sides to accept it, instead of trying to remove it. For are they not its very makers, so that by accepting it, they really accept themselves, i.e., their very nature which is contradictory? In other words, it is their very contradictoriness that refers the European and non-European to one another, that bids them accept each other, that says: Do not try to remove the conflict by either section trying to assert itself over the other, by positing itself as absolute, but accept it as a given by respecting each other's truth, i.e., each other's nature, sentiments, way of life, needs and interests of life, Weltanschauung, etc.

C. The Disintegration of Primitive African Society as a Result of Christianization and Civilization

In discussing this topic, it is not our purpose to give a detailed description of this extremely complex process, this being the task of History and Social Anthropology. And, indeed, excellent work in

this regard has been done. We refer here only to D. Williams's work "The Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, 1799-1853" Fort Hare, 1959. But our approach is the philosophical or more accurately, the phenomenological one. It is our intention to demonstrate by the problem of man and citizen that South African history, as any history in the world, moves in accordance with actuality, i.e., that it proceeds by man's contradictory truths. We hope that thereby we may perhaps be able to make a small contribution to clarify the extraordinarily complicated situation of South Africa and to persuade South Africans to adopt an attitude which will not aim at removing the situation, but which will enable the South African to experience it as *his* situation, of which he is an inextricable part and which is an integral part of himself. If the South African succeeded in doing so, the presence of the situation as a living reality in him would prevent him from dissociating himself from it by rationalizing it, thus converting it into an "objective" problem, thereby blocking the way to himself. Only by accepting the situation as part of himself, will he be himself and therefore free, i.e., not the slave of his own truth; for is he not himself the architect of the existing situation? *It follows that by describing actuality in its South African form in connection with the problem of man and citizen, we are far from defending and condemning.* If in spite of this declaration such an accusation should be made against us, we already here and now categorically reject such a possible accusation as being contrary to our declared purpose. Any possible accusation or reproach of this kind would only make it clear that our intention to work out a purely phenomenological structure of South African actuality has not been understood or does not want to be understood. When we now, for example, discuss the problem of man and citizen as it arises from the disintegration of African society as a result of the process of Christianization and Civilization, it would be a total misconception if any one were to think that the work of the missionaries was detrimental to the African and the arrival of the white man in general a curse instead of a boon. We would have to reply that such a person has not understood the nature of actuality, which is not concerned with right and wrong, good and evil, but simply proceeds to move in terms of change and contradiction. It is thus in our mind useless philosophizing about the merits and demerits of the arrival of the European in this country, or whether his presence here is justified or not. It is simply a result of historic actuality as we have already pointed out, and therefore a fact and should be accepted as such, just as the fact of the presence of the various non-European races, none of which (with the possible exception of the coloured race) is really indigenous to South Africa, should be accepted without demur. We must therefore strongly emphasize that the fact that Christianity certainly has been one of the prominent factors that have initiated the disintegration of primitive African society has nothing whatsoever to do with the truth of the contents of its teaching. The disintegration of primitive African society would have begun simply because actuality as becoming allows

nothing to last for good. Christianity and European civilization happened to be the tools of actuality ; if it had not been for them, then actuality would have used other instruments. And who can say that the disintegration of primitive African society will not in the end prove to have been a good thing for the African, even though it has at present definitely caused a split in the African's personality ?

In the previous chapter we were bold enough to compare African tribal society with that of the Greek polis, and we found an analogy in the fact that the underlying theory of government of both brought about the identification of man and tribesman, individual and citizen, even though in practice the complete fusion of the two seems to be an impossibility. When we pursued the problem of man and citizen further in our discussion of European history, we found that, with the encroachment of Christianity upon the ancient world and ancient thought, the polis collapsed, and the union of man and citizen broke asunder. It separated religion from politics, which in the city-state had formed one unit, and it caused a conflict between state and church. It caused man to split in twain in that he strove for the infinite (God) on the one hand and the world (state) on the other. In connection, now, with the disintegration of primitive African society, it is again the Christian doctrine that initiates the process of disintegration, but here the analogy to the European Middle Ages ends. When the Christian doctrine first began to affect African society it was the Christianity of the closing 18th and the early 19th century. It was a Christianity of an evangelical nature, which had begun its mission work at home against the rational character which the Christian faith had taken on in its Deistic form. But as is always the case with a counter-truth, the evangelical movement nevertheless proved a child of its time ; for, apart from the strong evangelical appeal, it showed a strong philanthropic trend which must be traced back to Rousseau's idea of the " noble savage " D. Williams writes :

"In considering the way in which the Evangelical Revival gave rise to missionary endeavour, one must consider the spirit of an age which preached the Rights of Man as the acceptable basis for the organisation of society, an argument used to justify the American Revolution. . . The ideas of political freedom and of the common rights of men ' rendered preparatory service to the missionary movement by bringing about, in connection with Rousseau's ideals of nature, a change in the estimate of non-Christian and uncivilised humanity, and by making it materially easier for Christian circles to assert the right of all men to the Gospel also.' No longer was the brutish heathen unsusceptible to conversion."¹

We may therefore safely say that African society, which is described

¹ The Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, 1799-1853, p. 6. (The quotation within Williams's text is taken from G. Warneck, Outline of a History of Protestant Missions from the Reformation to the Present Time, 3rd English ed., edited by G. Borson, London, 1946, p. 77).

by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard as a mixed agricultural society,¹ skipped the Middle Ages and was immediately exposed to the impact of a modern civilization of which the most progressive ideas were transmitted to the African.

In other words, in the Christianity of the "Aufklärung" we find closely interlocked Christian ideas with modern political ideas. We shall now have to deal with missionary influence and political influence separately, which latter, though basically of the same effect, differed in the nature of this influence. We shall discuss the influence of the missionaries first, because they were the first that deliberately made the attempt to change the mode of life of the Bantu for the purpose of conversion to Christ, while the government did so at a much later stage for the purpose of peace and order. Its policy towards the Africans was at first of a mere negative nature, namely, to persuade them to respect the Great Fish River and later the Kei River as the border between black and white. In other words, the original policy under Dutch as well as English governors was that of racial segregation on a territorial basis. Nearly all African education, as far as it was practised, was in the hands of the missionaries, and the state eventually gave financial assistance in the form of subsidies. Thus in the Cape the state began to subsidize mission schools in 1854 under Sir George Grey; Natal followed suit in 1856; the Free State in 1898; and the Transvaal in 1903. University of Fort Hare

What now was the effect of the teachings of the missionaries on the African? Naturally it was of a very complex nature, and we are within the scope of this study only interested in what effect Christian religion had on the African in connection with the problem of individual and community, Man and Citizen. We observed that primitive African society was both of a religious and political nature, and that the mystic element was the all-comprehensive power which may be seen as a life force and which manifested and unfolded itself in a hierarchical order of parts. Remove one link of this order and the process of life is greatly disturbed. But if the chief or, even worse, the prestige of the chieftainship was touched, then the whole mystical structure collapsed. We find thus from the very beginning an unsurmountable antagonism between the tribal body politic and the missionaries, the old truth and the new truth, the old way of life and the new way of life, a conflict which even today has not yet been overcome. The chief was driven into opposition to the missionaries, and the failure of the missionaries to make an incisive impression on African society was due to the chiefs' resistance—"Fundamental to the missionary failure in Kaffirland was the attitude of the chiefs."² It thus happens that the native population of the mission stations consisted of "refugees, outcasts and hangers-on," in other words, of a mere handful of Africans. Yet it is worth-

¹ African Political Systems, p. 8.

² D. Williams, The Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Col 1799-1853, p. 322.

while to examine their conduct, reaction and mental condition while living on the mission station, as their circumstances throw light on the split that occurs in them as members of a definite culture, religion and mission society. In this society they were man and citizen in one; on the station they were neither flesh nor fish. They could no longer be men, because, while it is true that pure man exists only in the myth or in Paradise, one can be a man here on earth only within a community whose culture one fully grasps or of which one is a part. The new community on the mission stations was to those uprooted beings no community, as they failed to grasp the meaning of the gospel by the strength of which alone they could have felt to be living in a community again. Nor could they any longer be citizens. For although the "chiefs never renounced their jurisdiction over such Kaffirs as fled to the missions,"¹ they could no longer be citizens, as the Christian life was diametrically opposed to life in the tribe. The consequence was that the proselyte or the would-be proselyte was thrown into a welter of confusion and really fell between two stools. On the one hand, he was despised as a renegade, so that he lived in constant fear of the chief and the tribesmen, and regarded the mission station as a place of refuge (the fear of the chief and of the revenge of the tribesmen often caused him to flee with his family from Kaffirland into the colony); on the other hand, he rebelled against the mission which sought to wean him from witchcraft, polygamy, illicit sexual intercourse, and encouraged him to wear European dress. And though often this opposition to mission rules was caused by fear, the recalcitrant convert still demonstrated his feeling one with the tribe. To substantiate our remarks, let us refer to D. Williams:

"The 'school Kaffirs' lived a precarious dual existence, precarious because they were earmarked by the Kaffirs as fair game. When Gaika visited Chumie in 1825, they stopped work, put on their karosses, and walked about as if they were merely onlookers and not mission inhabitants; they were afraid that the chief might compel them to leave the mission. According to Thomson they were regarded as pariahs, 'altogether alienated in affection and interest from their Country and Chiefs and as fair objects for every species of fraud and injustice.' Sometimes, when demonstrations were at their height around the station, they would flee into the Colony, taking their families with them. The constant anxiety in which they lived...took the form of an unwillingness to accept religious instruction and a refusal to work. Anxiety was coupled with considerable material losses in cattle. There was occasional loss of life. 'The Kaffir chiefs did not protect them.'"²

¹ D. Williams, *The Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, 1799-1853*, p. 326.

² *ibid.*, pp. 324-325.

The two quotations within the text are taken from: Thomson to Acting Colonial Secretary, 29th October, 1828, and: Minutes of the Presbytery of Caffraria, I, 3rd September, 1829.

After reading this, can one still justifiably moan about the falsehood and untrustworthiness of the "Kaffirs?" One might reply that one could expect more of the African to-day, who has been exposed for such a long time to European civilization, without pausing to think that the impact of this civilization on the African had a devastating effect. For him it meant the collapse of a whole world from the debris of which he must construct himself a new one, something which cannot be done overnight. The conflict between the civilized African and the primitive one still exists and has become more aggravated than mitigated, as other civilisatory factors, such as direct political government by the whites, the growth of towns and the development of an industry in those towns, were added. But already in the beginning of missionary work, it was felt that the missions were forming a society within a society. H. Calderwood, in: "Caffres and Caffre Missions with preliminary chapters on the Cape Colony as a field for emigration and basis of missionary operation," pp. 210-211, writes:

"The moment a Caffre becomes a convert, he comes into direct opposition to the institution of his country. Circumstances occur almost every day in which he cannot obey his chief, or yield to the abominable customs in which very much of the chief's influence consists. . . . The pure gospel of the Son of God cannot prevail in Caffraria while Caffre institutions remain entire."¹

This explains the animosity of the chiefs towards the missions: "The chiefs realised this, one of them saying to Calderwood, 'When my people become Christians, they cease to be my people.'"²

Thus the chiefs felt instinctively that, with the arrival of a new truth, a society would form itself around this new truth. Yet we have seen that the first Christian congregations could hardly be called a society because of the failure of its members really to penetrate the deeper truth of the gospel. A group of people becomes a society only if it succeeds in appropriating a truth in such a way that it becomes part of its members and its members part of it. In this connection the question now arises whether the missions have failed in their enterprise? D. Williams answers this question in the affirmative by pointing out the incompatibility between Christianity and tribalism.³ The resistance of the chiefs to the danger they felt Christianity represented to their society, which prevented the immediate corrosion of the African tribal system, caused the missionaries to fail:

"The failure among the amaXhosa was primarily due to the threat posed by Christianity to the Xhosa tribal structure and its customs and rites which made for social cohesion, and which enshrined the authority of the chief. While the Kaffir rites and customs remained intact, Christianity—the propagation of which rested on adminis-

¹ Quoted from: D. Williams, *The Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, 1799-1853*, p. 330.

² *ibid.*, (quotation within text by Calderwood).

³ *ibid.*, p. 553.

tration and preaching, both often inadequate—could not make mass conversions.”¹

But is it entirely correct to say that the missions have failed because the missions made relatively little progress, even when we look at the comparatively small number of non-European Christians to-day in the Republic of South Africa?² The South African missiologist, G. C. Oosthuizen, says:

“In hierdie gistende Afrika is die jeugdige kerk. Hier neem die kerk ’n belangriker plek in as wat in Asië die geval is. . . Orals in Afrika dring Westerse beskawing dikwels as ’n disintegreerende invloed in. Net soos die animistiese leefwyse die invloed van ’n hoër kultuur nie kan weerstaan nie, net so kan dit die sendingaktiwiteite van ’n hoër vorm van godsdienst ook nie die hoof bied nie.”³

The reason of the contradictory verdicts as to the influence of the church and mission in Africa must be sought in the fact that Williams deals with the first half of the 19th century only, while Oosthuizen has the modern period in mind during which missionary activities have been considerably increased. This increase resulted in a number of African churches gradually obtaining independence of their corresponding mother church. Another reason of the missions' failure to make mass conversions, besides the previously mentioned reason of the chiefs' opposition, must be sought in the fact that confusion in the minds of the Africans was increased by the number of various missions representing different churches, sects or denominations. It cannot be denied that there was sometimes unsound rivalry for the Africans' souls, which was not altogether compatible with Christian principles, and this is definitely one of the factors that encouraged African sectionalism. There may be disagreement as to the question of failure or success of the missions if we judge by the numbers of conversions only. However, that is not our gauge here. Actuality does not proceed in terms of failure and success, just as little as it proceeds by right and wrong, good and evil. Thus, whether we call mission activities a success or a failure, the fact remains that the impact of the Christian truth on tribal society caused great upheaval in that society. Not only did it cause the uprooting of a number of individuals who found themselves in a no-man's-land, but in alliance with other civilisatory factors (as we shall yet see) it undermined the status and prestige of the chief to such extent that tribal society, even where it remained intact to the eye, actually became hollow, and the identification of man and tribesman (which, as we noticed, manifested itself in the “zoon mysticon”) was broken to pieces. But this self-estrangement of the Bantu, which

¹ D. Williams, *The Missionaries on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, 1799-1853*, p. 552.

² Of the 14,167,000 inhabitants of the Union there were in 1958, 4,394,000 Protestant and 714,000 Catholic Christians. (Figures taken from G. C. Oosthuizen, *Die Kerk in Gistende Afrika en Asië*, p. 37.)

³ *ibid.*, p. 34.

was caused by a world in which he suddenly found himself a foreigner, need not be "bad" or "evil." It will force the African to set out in search for another truth which will be more in keeping with actuality; for never will he be able to embrace the Christian truth in the form of his European teachers. Just as it bears their stamp, the African will have to put his own stamp on it. But that is a long process; for the time being he still moves more or less in a duality. G. C. Oosthuizen described the transitory stage in which the African finds himself as follows:

"Uit sy eie wêreld beweeg hy tot die wêreld van die witman wat by hom geweldige spanninge en komplekse skep. As nacuurniens lewe hy in die sirkelgang van die natuur wat geen vooruitgang ken nie. Skielik het hy te doen met die beskawingsopvatting van tyd en arbeid. Op die oomblik vind 'n groot deel hulle tussen dié twee standpunte. Die ou wêreld het hy deels vaarwel gesê, die nuwe wêreld verstaan hy nie; die swart man van Afrika in die stede en op die myne leef nie meer ten volle in die ou wêreld nie en hy is nog nie heeltemal deel van die nuwe wêreld nie. Hy is, soos 'n naturellegeleerde dit uitgedruk het, 'n misrabele wese, verskeurd in sy eie vermoed."¹

It is often argued that the missionaries failed to transmit to the African the message of the gospel because they failed to put themselves in the African's place, to identify themselves completely with him, so that they remained strangers to him. The question is, can such an identification be achieved? Our answer is clearly, No! Man is always in a contradictory relation with his fellowman, this being his very essence in which consists actuality, of which he is therefore an integral part. To ask of the missionaries, therefore, to identify themselves with the Africans is to demand of them to jump over their own shadow and to overcome actuality. In positing their truth, they had to be themselves and therefore different from the Africans, because only if their truth were opposed, would it make sense to posit it at all. One could try to assume the style of life of the Africans, as Dr. van der Kemp did, and even marry an African woman, but that did not remove the relation of contradiction which consisted in the conflicting truths of Africans and missionaries. This explains why, in most cases, the attempt on the part of missionaries to live African style ends in failure. Complete adaptation could only take place if the missionary were to abandon his truth. If, therefore, the missionaries could be blamed for anything, it is the failure to realize the essentiality of the contradictory relation between them and the Africans. Because they rationalized it and looked at it objectively instead of merely accepting it, it became a problem which they tried to solve by various devices and plans, thereby only creating problems out of a problem. But let us be fair to the missionaries. They had to convey a truth which was not based on reason but on faith. They found themselves unable,

¹ Die Kerk in Gistende Afrika en Asië, p. 33.

therefore, to adapt and assimilate it to the contradiction of their opponents, as they could and should have done, had it been based on reason (although even in the latter case we fail to assimilate and adjust our truths to those of others and all too often posit it as the only truth, as we do not realize the nature of actuality), but had to insist on its absoluteness and inexorableness. This, of course, aggravated the situation of conflict.

But, as we have already mentioned, the disintegration of tribal society and the dissolution of the "zoon mysticon", which represented the identification between man and tribesman, was not due only to the influence of the missionaries. The power that was mainly responsible for the undermining of the tribal chiefs' power was governmental power. On the frontier the traditional policy of segregation was modified by the gradual expansion of white territory at the expense of native territory, which caused a great number of Africans to live in the white territories and to work on the farms of the Europeans. "Thus, in 1866, the Cape took over British Kaffraria (Ciskei)."¹ In 1879, "Fingoland and Griqualand East had been annexed to the Colony; most of the other districts were under Cape magistrates; disarmament had been carried out fairly effectively and, of all the territories east of the Kei, only the two Pondolands were fully independent."² In August 1845, Sir Peregrine Maitland formally annexed Natal "as a district of the Cape,"³ and "In 1856, Natal was created a Crown Colony by Royal Charter."⁴ At that time, ^{University of Port Clare} ^{Together in Excellence} a full ten years after the annexation, the Europeans numbered no more than 8,000 in the midst of some 150,000 Bantu."⁵ In Zululand the situation was very complicated, but it may safely be stated that, after Dingaan, no Zulu chief was any more independent but subject to the control of European government, whether Boer or British. Thus "Panda had only been suffered to rule Zululand as a vassal of the republic."⁶ "Now, on the death of Panda, Cetewayo had been crowned king of the Zulus by Shepstone and had begun to revive the old military discipline."⁷ This re-militarisation on the part of the Zulus after the pattern of Chaka led to armed conflict with the British. Cetewayo was deposed and taken to Cape Town as a prisoner, but was re-instated after the failure of Wolseley's thirteen chieftain scheme, the chieftains having begun to fight among themselves. Lukas Meyer, who had come with 300 men to the rescue of his Boer countrymen in the midst of these seething troubles, crowned Dinizulu, son of Cetewayo, "as a vassal king."⁸ Finally, in 1897, Zululand was annexed by the British Government.

¹ E. A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, p. 308.

² " " *ibid.*, p. 393.

³ " " *ibid.*, p. 222.

⁴ " " *ibid.*, p. 269.

⁵ " " *ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

⁶ " " *ibid.*, p. 276.

⁷ " " *ibid.*, p. 352.

⁸ " " *ibid.*, p. 402.

These few meagre dates suffice to show the subjection of the tribal chiefs to European jurisdiction and their attempt to resist it if they could, as in the case of Cetewayo. But the subordination of the African chiefs to European magistrates had deeper consequences than mere outward tension, rivalry and conflict. It touched the very roots of the Africans' existence. In the previous chapter we pointed out that the removal of the chieftainship as the all-comprehensive source of the "zoon mysticon" must lead to the transformation of tribal society, even if to the outside world it still appears intact, as it has been drained of its very life source. Now, even if the chieftainship has not been removed officially, the fact that it has been transformed into an executive organ of the government has virtually deprived it of its original meaning and of its vital function, which had consisted in the mediation of the sensual and supersensual world in the interests of the tribe. Even though the chiefs still carry out this function of high priest, their task as executives of the government, who have to see to it that the "truth" of the European in the form of his law is carried out, puts them in no invidious position. They are forced to play a double role in that they have to serve two truths, thereby really serving none. The fact that the magistrate communicates with the tribe through the chief proves our point that it is impossible to transplant a truth, so that it really, in its original form and meaning, becomes part and parcel of others, because this truth is always relative and subjective in the sense that it grows from a given existential situation. It can only be considered by others in such a way that they adjust their own truth to it, or, to put it otherwise, put their own stamp on it. Gluckmann puts it as follows :

"The magistrate cannot cross the barrier between white and black. He talks with his people and discusses their troubles, but his social life is with other Europeans in the district. The chief's social life is with his people. Though he is their superior, he is equal with them as against the whites and 'feels together' with them. 'He has the same skin as we have. When our hearts feel pain, his heart feels pain. What we find good, he finds good.' A white man cannot do this, cannot represent them. The Zulu are ignorant of European history and it can have no value for them : the chiefs, and especially the king, symbolize Zulu tradition and values."¹

Though this sounds as though the king's subjects unanimously support him in his opposition to the magistrate, this is by no means the case. The dual position in which their chief finds himself also causes them to become split personalities and to fall between two stools, and the clash of two truths in the form of two law codes leads them to seek their advantage wherever they can get it :

¹ The Kingdom of the Zulu in : African Political Systems, ed. by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, p. 49.

“ A man who considers the chief to be biased against him, favours the magistrate as impartial ; but for him the chief is the source of justice when the magistrate enforces an unwelcome law. The people rally to the chief when they oppose measures such as the reduction of bride-wealth. If the chief tries to force labour from people, they compare him unfavourably with the magistrate who pays for the labour he employs.”¹

This passage clearly suggests the disintegration of tribal life, the declared purpose of which was to work for common interest with the assistance of magic of which the king was the chief officer, and in which the African was man and tribesman in one. The double rôle, now, thrust upon the chief, which greatly impaired his status and prestige, made it possible for the tribesman to break the unity of the tribe by starting to pursue his own interests instead of those of the community, which latter had before coincided with his own interests. In this way he lost his identity, and he found himself right in the midst between two truths, a typical reflection of actuality in times of transition, i.e., the transformation of a truth. Again we must emphasize, therefore, that this dual position of the chief is nobody's fault at all. The part played by the chief at present is neither good nor bad, but is merely the result of the process of actuality. It was inevitable that the impact of European civilization and form of administration brought about a change of the chief's position. At the present moment this position is still somewhat obscure and cannot very well be defined, as on the one hand the chief is still bound up with the old tribal tradition ; on the other, he has been challenged by the European forms of government and civilization, and it is a fact that a number of chiefs have already received a Western education and some are in possession of university degrees. It is of course impossible to state exactly what the future position of the chieftain will be. There are various possibilities : He might continue to oppose Western civilization, thus becoming the centre of all the conservative forces within African society. This attitude might be taken up by some of the older chiefs. It is unlikely that the younger generation of chiefs will adopt the same stand. Their being westernised themselves and yet being rooted in the tribal tradition, could even place them in an advantageous position in this age of transition : They so to speak symbolise the present, i.e., the very process of transformation and westernisation that is at present taking place within African society. They might thus serve as a link between the past and the future, i.e., it might be the chiefs who lead their people to a more modern way of life.

But the chief's position was questioned by another group of people, namely, the African intelligentsia which had gradually emerged from the once much-despised “ school Kaffir ” of the missions :

¹ M. Gluckmann, *The Kingdom of the Zulu in : African Political Systems*, ed. by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, p. 50.

"Any schooled Zulu is in general much readier to accept European innovations than are the pagans. . . Some better educated Christians measure the chief's value by the materialistic standard of the practical work done by Government and hold that the chiefs are reactionaries opposing progress and they favour a system like the Transkeian Bunga. . . . In general it may be said that most schooled Zulu regard the magistracy with more favour than do pagans, but among the best educated Zulu, who come most strongly against the colour bar, there is a tendency to a violent reaction to their own people and culture and values away from the Europeans."¹

The group cited above may be compared with the European "Aufklärung." They often find themselves in conflict, not only with the chief, but with a large section of their own people, especially the older generation. The fact that they, too, are split into a number of factions pursuing various aims, should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness or incapability. How could it be otherwise at this stage of transition? It should rather be regarded as a symptom of their frantic search for their own truth, which they will have to formulate if the present chaotic situation is to become meaningful for them again. For only if in this, their new truth, they have found another home, another abode and thereby a measure of continuity and stability, will they automatically be members of a community again. This truth cannot, however, be formulated for them; for then it can never be part of them and they part of it, but they must find it for themselves in the midst of the conflicting situation of actuality. But in formulating this truth, they should be clearly conscious of the nature of actuality which causes all truths to be relative truths, no matter how much men might insist on the absolute character of their truths.

From the above it follows that, though the educated Africans may represent only a comparatively small group, it is in the ideas and aspirations of the intelligentsia that the nature of actuality as continual change is likewise reflected. But it also manifests itself in the great number of Africans that work in towns as servants or in the mines, and who are thereby also in direct contact with the European way of life.

In her essay that appeared in the journal *Africa*, entitled "African Chiefs Today," L. Mair conceives the position of African chiefs as a symbol which suggests the changes of the time and within African society. Though it is true, she says, that outside South Africa the chiefs, too, may represent resistance to a foreign regime or the authentic aspirations of their people, and in the case of tribes touched little by European civilization they still constitute the only national symbol while certain small groups demanding authority rally around them and present a difficult problem to certain West African Governments,² on

¹ M. Gluckmann, *The Kingdom of the Zulu in: African Political Systems*, ed. by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, p. 51.

² Note that L. Mair's essay was written before a great number of West African territories were granted independence.

the whole they are regarded by modern governments as reactionary. In South Africa on the other hand:

“On fait des chefs un symbole d'un tout autre genre. La tentative de renouveler leur autorité et de les transformer en chefs populaires est l'expression de la philosophie *d'apartheid*—la croyance, dans la mesure où les Blancs et les Noirs ont des différences inhérentes, le progrès africain ne peut avancer que dans les voies tracées par sa propre culture.”¹

And when she continues to say:

“Il est évident que l'autorité héréditaire doit disparaître en Afrique comme partout ailleurs, mais pour ceux qui s'occupent actuellement du gouvernement, cette situation de conflit entre les chefs traditionnels et les chefs élus constitue un des plus gros problèmes à résoudre.”²

she has thereby clearly stressed the contradictory nature of the African intelligentsia, who partly oppose the hereditary chiefs. For it is from among this group that the new leaders will be chosen. Whether this constitutes, however, such a great problem as L. Mair believes to be the case remains to be seen. For we saw that, especially in South Africa, many of the chiefs, too, move in a new direction, with the aim of developing a more modern and westernised form of society, which may well result in changing the chiefs' position completely and which might even make possible an approachment between the chiefs and the intelligentsia. In any case the processes of actuality are complex and no human being will ever be in a position to forecast exactly how it will eventually shape. But what we can do is to make clear to ourselves the actual state of affairs in South Africa, i.e., to realize the fact that all parties concerned—chiefs, African intelligentsia, European authorities—contribute their share in shaping the South African destiny, and that this occurs through the contradictory nature of these organs. It is now precisely this rôle as architects of South African actuality which imposes upon them the ethical “ought,” i.e., the obligation to serve the whole and not only particular interests. In other words, the particular interests, which each of these groups represent, should be subjected to the commonwealth of the whole. For this purpose it is necessary that none of the parties concerned should posit its truth as absolute, but that each section consider the interests of the other parties as well, instead of claiming that its interests alone are of importance, to which the interests of the other parties must be sacrificed. This self-restriction alone, which should be practised by all the parties and groups of interest concerned, represents true freedom. In this act of the free will the ethical command of actuality is fulfilled.

¹ L. Mair, *African Chiefs Today*, in: “Africa,” Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, July, 1958, p. 206.

² *ibid.*

D. The Contemporary Situation

In this chapter we propose to discuss the impact of the European truth on the African, as it has been formulated in the latest past. When discussing the problem of man and citizen in connection with European history, we found that Rousseau tried to overcome the distinction of "homme" and "citoyen" by the "religion civile," and Hegel by comprehending the state as an ethical idea which was the expression of the rational willing of all individuals, and in which, therefore, the individual was merged. Hegel's philosophy was an idealist philosophy. He argued that the whole universe was nothing but the self-expression and externalization of the "absolute spirit" which by a cyclic movement returns to itself. The movement of the absolute spirit, therefore, constitutes its will for liberty, i.e., to be again by itself, undivided into parts (concepts). In the process of its self-liberation, the absolute spirit moves through various great phases which each constitutes an end in itself and heralds the beginning of a new phase: the oriental phase is thus superseded by the antique phase from Thales to Proclus, and this is in turn replaced by the Christian period which culminates in the Germanico-Christian era, in other words, in Hegel's time or in Hegel's philosophy. As this historic world spirit is reason, it follows that each of these periods is real and reasonable; for only that which is reasonable is also real. Each period follows from the other, the previous epoch being suspended by the one rising out of it. The Christian epoch is the epoch of fulfilment, namely, the fusion of the human and the divine, the finite and the infinite, this being the aspiration and the aim of each period, oriental and ancient. In this fulfilment the spirit is free and has returned to itself. Here history, philosophy and theology are merged, and as this process takes place in man's consciousness according to the dialectical method (for he is the historian, philosopher or theologian), it follows that the self-liberation of the spirit is at the same time the self-creation of man in freedom. This Christian epoch is initiated by Christ in Whom the fulfilment was realized; for He was God and man all in one. Löwith describes Hegel's stand as follows:

' "Mit dem Eintritt des christlichen Prinzips ist die Erde für den Geist geworden; die Welt ist umschifft und für die Europäer ein Rundes.' Die christliche Welt ist eine 'Welt der Vollendung,' denn 'das Prinzip ist erfüllt und damit ist das Ende der Tage voll geworden.' Erst der christliche Gott ist wahrhaft 'Geist' und zugleich Mensch, die geistige Substanz wird in einem einzelnen geschichtlichen Menschen Subjekt. Damit war endlich die Einheit des Göttlichen und Menschlichen zum Bewusstsein gebracht und dem Menschen als einem Ebenbild Gottes die Versöhnung geworden."¹

According to this God inhabits and works in man. He causes man to free himself from the sensual world and leads him to grasp the pure

¹ Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, pp. 46-47.

idea.¹ Accordingly, subject and object are merged in him. He is both man and citizen only within the absolute. That is why every crime is a negation of that which is reasonable, i.e., the state, and punishment the negation of this negation.

But Marx strongly objected to this philosophy. For him Hegel's philosophy was not a fulfilment, but, on the contrary, it was an impasse which announced the dawn of a new period. He argued that Hegel had rationalized reality which to him was most unreasonable, as is shown by the class-struggle, i.e., the economic exploitation of a majority, the reactionary attitude of the bourgeoisie and the progressive attitude of the proletariat. It is, therefore, not reality that must be rationalized, but reason must be realized in reality. By so doing, philosophy annuls itself and merges with the practice of the existing non-philosophy, i.e., it becomes practical theory. The having-become-philosophical of the world requires an as complete becoming-worldly of philosophy.² It follows that, for Marx, Hegel's man is no man but the "Un-mensch" who is entirely estranged from himself, whom he projects into the clouds.³ This "Un-mensch," now, is identical with the bourgeois, who, according to Marx, is, we have already seen, no "homme" in that he is not a "Gattungswesen," i.e., a political animal aiming at the general interest, but represents a class of people who are held together by their needs and private interest. The political emancipation of the French Revolution must therefore be completed by a human one. For Marx "homme" is only the proletariat in whom private interest is identical with general interest. We have already pointed out how narrow Marx's concept of "homme" is, and that it really comprises only one class of people, the proletariat, and transforms man into an economic animal.

What should catch our eye immediately is that Marx forwards his truth as absolutely as Hegel. For Marx the proletarian revolution, which is to result in a classless society, is the return of the Golden Age, where we find perfect man again. It does not occur to him that his truth is only a relative truth which arises out of the situation of his time and which he would never have been able to formulate without Hegel. It is thus also relative to Hegel's truth. Marx, too, does nothing else but rationalize an existing contradictory situation and transforms it into a problem for which he seeks a solution which again is highly problematical.

If we here and there repeat what we have before stated, we hereby wish to apologise to our reader. However, we venture to say that the conflict of the 19th century, as it became evident by Hegel's and Marx's doctrine, in different forms and under different flags, is repeating itself

¹ Cf. J. Hommes, *Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie*, p. 18.

² Cf. K. Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, p. 109.

³ Cf. J. Hommes, *Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie*, pp. 23-24.

at the present time in South Africa. We propose to discuss the present crisis in South Africa by referring to this parallel. We are fully conscious of the differences that exist, but remind the reader of the basic structure of actuality which is everywhere and at every time the same.

Out of the large blast furnace of history there arose triumphantly in the end the Afrikaner nation. To survive, it had to wage a struggle of life and death against overwhelming odds, just as Prussia survived the onslaught of Napoleon's forces and emerged in the end victoriously. The struggle of the Afrikaner is too well known to need retelling here. But what is of interest to us is that, even as the new Prussia built itself a truth in the form of Hegel's philosophy, the Afrikaner nation constructed itself a truth in a religious form. But if we pause to think that Hegel's philosophy was really a rationalized theology and that his absolute reason is grounded in the Christian religion as well, then we realize a similarity between Hegel's truth and the religious truth of the Afrikaner. To-day the Afrikaner no longer merely posits his truth against the other truths that constitute South African actuality, i.e., Africans and other non-European sections as well as the English-speaking section, but he has now arrived at the stage of consolidating his truth, i.e., of applying it to the other sections. But before we say any more about this, we must ask the question: What is the truth of the Afrikaner like? It is firmly rooted in Calvin's theology and its foundation is the will and the law of God.¹ Man sinned out of his own free will, but God had mercy upon him and, out of grace, gave man the law, so that he could gain salvation if he lived accordingly. But man was too weak to live by the law, thus gaining salvation. Therefore, out of grace again, God sent his Son, Who came to fulfil the law, thus saving man, that is, the believer. God's command and will are therefore the law of history, natural law and divine law all in one; for Christ is the fulfilment of history, i.e., He will judge the quick and the dead on doomsday. He is natural law, because He had to suffer death; and He is divine law, for He rose from the dead. There is thus no fundamental difference between religion and ethics, moral law and civic law, church

¹ This does of course not mean that we find a Calvinist outlook in all Afrikaans speaking universities. It is mainly the Universities of Potchefstroom and Bloemfontein where we find an outspokenly Calvinist orientation. In Potchefstroom, for example, it is H. Doyeweerd's "Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" and Vollenhoven's thought that constitute an eminent part of philosophical teaching. A prominent critic on the philosophy of the idea of the law at the same university is H. G. Stoker who posits his "Wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee" against Doyeweerd's and Vollenhoven's "Wetsidee." He warns against regarding the cosmos in the light of the law only; it is not only subject to the law, but is also created. But he, too, regards the law as existing in the cosmos, as forming an integral part of the cosmos and as being valid for the cosmos. (Cf. *Die nuwere wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, Pretoria, 1933*; *Die wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee, Pretoria, 1933*; *Beginnels en metodes in die wetenskap, Potchefstroom, 1961*).

and state. Despite fundamental differences, Hegel and Calvin agree in this syncretic trend which merges the Christian and worldly institutions, but while Hegel rationalizes Christianity, Calvin christianizes the world and reason. Hegel starts with highest reason of which man is a part. He is thus able to create himself in advancing dialectically to the pure idea. Through the idea the absolute becomes conscious of itself, and man is free. Calvin begins with the absolutely free will of God, Who created the world and man. Both have their ground entirely in Him and have to behave according to His will and His law (predestination). In other words, while Hegel starts from a rational a priori, Calvin starts from a religious a priori as he finds it in the Bible. E. A. Venter says :

“Die Heilige Skrif is die bril waardeur die denker die werklikheid moet betrag . . . Die Christelike staan nie teenoor die menslike nie; dit is die herstel en vernuwing daarvan. Die Skrif roep nie net op tot die reformasie van die godsdienstig-sedelike lewe nie; die principia vir die ganse lewe is gegee in die Skrif wat ‘volle en onwrikbare gesag’ het. . . . Suiwre selfkennis en suiwre kennis van die kosmiese werklikheid is afhanklik van, en berus op die suiwre Godskennis. Elke ‘an sich-stel van die naturalis ratio staan gelyk aan ’n verwerping van die soewereiniteit van God. Die uitgangspunt vanwaar die wysbegeerte die oorsprong, eenheid en samehang in die tydelike realiteit wil verklaar, kan slegs in die absolute religieuse a priori gevind word.” Excellence

In other words, Calvin's man, in sharp contrast to that of Hegel, is anything else but self-sufficient. He is absolutely dependent on God's will and grace, who can save him without his merit or condemn him as a sinner. Man thus becomes, so to speak, a legal animal in a religious sense. He is only man and citizen if he abides by the law. It is thus not surprising that Calvin stresses obedience to authority, because each authority exists only through God's will, and he can do so because, really, there is, according to his doctrine, no fundamental difference between church, state and social life :

“Dieselfde beginsel word toegepas op die samelewingsvorme waar Calvyn die prinsipiële riglyne vir die leer van soewereiniteit in eie kring neergelê het . . . Soos elke verband 'n eie innerlike aard en lewenswet het, besit hy ook 'n oorspronklike gesag-en bevoegdheidsfeer wat nie van een van die ander lewenskringe nie maar regstreeks van God ontvang is,” says E. A. Venter.²

Any sinner or lawbreaker is, therefore, not really a man or a citizen, he is really nothing, in that he moves away from God. Only God can possibly restore him through His grace. Calvin's preference for law led him to lay particular stress on the Old Testament.

If we now keep in mind the following cues : God's will, law, grace, predestination, religious a priori as determining the truth of the

¹ Die Ontwikkeling van die Westerse Denke, p. 86.

² *ibid.*, p. 87.

Afrikaner, the latter's attitude and way of acting become clear to us. On the ground of the religious a priori underlying his truth, he could not but consider his truth as absolute. God's will led him to this country in order to become the trustee of the heathen. E. A. Venter says about Calvin's attitude towards the pagan philosophers:

"Die brokstukke van waarheid wat hy by hulle opmerk en ook waardeer, is niks meer nie as 'klein vonkies... wat die mens weerhou van verder af te dwaal;' dit is reste van die algemene openbaring wat, kragtens die *gratia communis* van God, ook die heiden ten deel geval het ten einde hom van totale ontarding te red."¹

Accordingly, the heathen were also capable of salvation, if properly guided and if they learned to live by the law of God as it is revealed in Holy Scripture. It was, therefore, the duty of the Afrikaner, whom God's will had led to this country, to teach the heathen the law of God. It is therefore not surprising to the Afrikaners that they survived all the trials and tribulations which they doubtlessly experienced; for obviously, if they were predestined to spread civilisation among the heathen, they would be enjoying God's grace. And the religious a priori of the Afrikaner was formulated by the historian, F. A. van Jaarsveld, as follows in one of his lectures which I attended:

"Das Geschichtsbild der Afrikaner ist aus dem religiösen Bewusstsein des Afrikaners entstanden. Für den Afrikaner bedeutet Geschichte Verantwortung vor Gott, weil Gott der Souverän der Geschichte ist."²

There are definitely a number of factors that have contributed towards the contemporary racial policy of the government, but we are convinced that its historical roots must be sought in the religious truth of the Afrikaner. As Calvin remarks in: "There are no South Africans." The privilege of the Afrikaner Nation to guide black humanity on the way to salvation becomes a privilege of the white skin as such. In other words, heathenism, barbarism, etc., came to be identified with a coloured skin as such. And if the Afrikaner nation was to fulfil its duty towards God, it had to keep itself pure. For only if it did not allow itself to be ploughed under by the black heathen, could it carry out God's will and commandment. According to the Old Testament the Jews, too, were forbidden by Yahveh to mix with other races, because they were God's instrument, and did not a comparison between the Jews and Afrikaners obtrude itself? And it is interesting to note that among the arguments forwarded in favour of apartheid by Dr. M. W. Retief, which appeared in *Op die Horison*, September, 1954, pp. 86 ff. and which are critically discussed by B. B. Keet in: *Whither South Africa*, the abovementioned comparison is indeed contained.³ If we subject the rest of the arguments to a close scrutiny, we shall find that

¹ Die Ontwikkeling van die Westerse Denke, pp. 84-85.

² Quoted from: G. A. Rauche, Das Problem der Nationalitäten und Rassen in Südafrika, in: Afrika Post, April, 1958, book I, p. 28.

³ p. 29.

the cues we gave from Calvin's doctrine in reference to the religious truth of the Afrikaner are all borne out indeed: The first refers to God's will and to God's law,—

"God willed that there should be separate nations. . . Are we then justified in trying to wipe out lines of division? Shall we not be acting in disobedience to God's decree?"¹

The next deals with God's grace,—

"God's guidance in the lives of believers. . . Our forefathers were people of strong religious convictions. . . it was soon borne in upon them that there should be a dividing line."²

This dividing line enabled them to lead a life according to God's will and saved them from extinction. We give only one more argument which is the most important one:

"Our awareness of a vocation. . . We as whites have a vocation towards the underprivileged races living in this country. . . It is our conviction that we, as white people, are the guardians of the non-whites, that we must protect them against dangers and that we must promote their interests. Our first duty towards them is to bring them the blessings of the Gospel. If all lines of division were to be wiped out and we were to disappear from South Africa, we could not fulfil this calling. The fulfilment of our calling is therefore dependent on our survival as a white nation in this country, and for that apartheid, or development along one's own lines, is necessary."³

It is of course self-evident that there are other factors, besides the religious one, which contributed towards the outlook and way of life of the Afrikaner as we find it to-day, but it seems that the religious factor was one of the strongest in determining the attitude of the Afrikaner to the non-European. It was this factor which caused the Afrikaner to conceive the idea that it was his duty to adopt towards the African a benevolent attitude of *trusteeship*. He came to feel that God had entrusted the African to his care. He began to feel responsible for him, and considered it his duty to lead him towards a Christian civilisation. G. D. Scholtz says:

"Hierdie strewende na meer beskawing en ontwikkeling mag die nie-blanke nie ontsê word nie. Sou die Afrikaner dit wil doen, sal hy teen een van die vernaamste beginsels van sy godsdiens sondig."⁴

There is no question that the Afrikaner takes very seriously his task of acting as guardian and trustee of the African. His sincerity in this connection cannot be denied. It is thus understandable that he feels hurt and offended when his actions and measures concerning the African are interpreted in such a way that doubt is cast on his integrity. We venture to say that the failure of foreign opinion to understand the importance of the religious factor for the historic development of the

¹ B. B. Keet, *Whither South Africa*, p. 20.

² *ibid.*, p. 21.

³ *ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴ G. D. Scholtz, *Het die Afrikaanse Volk 'n Toekoms?*, p. 157.

Afrikaner truth as well as the fact that most of the Western countries see South African conditions chiefly from their rationalistic point of view are two of the main reasons for the misunderstanding that reigns between South Africa and the West. There can be no doubt that the measures of the government as regards the African to-day spring from a high sense of responsibility and are inspired by the idea of trusteeship which, we believe, has its origin in the deep religious conviction of the Afrikaner.

From the idea of trusteeship the present policy of the government partly explains itself, as well as its hesitation to listen to foreign opinion. For the carrying out of God's will cannot be questioned. It must needs constitute an absolute truth. And, frequently, cabinet ministers have referred to the religious and cultural mission of the Afrikaner nation or the white man in South Africa. The South African government has made it abundantly clear that it stands on a Christian platform.

So even if officially state and church are separated, co-operation is so close that it is very difficult to be really received into the Afrikaner nation without belonging to their church. The church, so to speak, constitutes the leaven of state and society, so that a good man, a good citizen and a good Christian form one inseparable whole. The church as administering the law of God is the binding link. In the law of God, as it is revealed in the Bible, the gulf between man and community is bridged. The Afrikaner may be designated as a legal animal in the religious sense. *Together in Excellence*

Why now did we say that, despite fundamental differences, there are certain analogies with Hegel? In the first place, the Afrikaner truth, as it has developed historically, is as absolute as that of Hegel, as it is founded in God's will and sovereignty, and therefore as self-contained. If it remained unchanged, there is the possibility that, even as Hegel's philosophy, it might fail of actuality and land itself in isolation. There is the danger that it forgets that it is the child of actuality, i.e., that it arose from the conflicts with the English, the English-speaking section in the country and the non-Europeans. As far as the former are concerned, they only constituted a potential threat to the Afrikaner as long as they were backed by a mighty Empire. This Empire is no more, therefore Afrikaner nationalism has lost one of the challenges by which it grew. It is now, on the contrary, trying hard to win over the English-speaking South Africans to form a common front in the face of the threat to its existence which is constituted by the non-Europeans, and not altogether without success; for most of the English-speaking people are South-African born and really favour racial segregation.¹

¹ Naturally, the roots of the ideas of racial segregation in the case of the English-speaking section must be sought somewhere else, they may be traced to scientific eugenics as developed by Galton, and to economic, cultural and political factors. (Cf. Hannah Arendt "Origins of Totalitarianism" and "Das Problem der Nationalitäten und Rassen in Südafrika" by G. A. Rauche in: Afrika Post, April, 1958, book I.

even though British tradition prevents them from admitting it or at least causes them to vote anti-government. As the anthropologist J. W. Mannhard puts it: "To equality (with Africans) all parties are opposed." (Perhaps this is not quite true to-day.)

This attempt on the part of the government to unite all Europeans under one flag was meant, when previously we pointed out that the Afrikaner truth has arrived at the stage of its consolidation. But this effort even stretches to the non-Europeans. They, too, are supposed to be won over to government policy, naturally not with the aim of being integrated but, on the contrary, of recognising the advantage of remaining a homogeneous group to themselves. And it is in this respect that the Africans might prove more flexible; for there is no doubt that, at present, they constitute the element which is not consolidating a truth, but searching for a new one. In this connection we must keep in mind, however, that the process of actuality has also had its effect on Afrikaner truth as described above, and that it looks as though this truth is losing its absolute character, which it had assumed in the process of its historic development. It may be argued that the gradually advancing relativisation of the Afrikaner truth was implicit in its very absolute character, in the sense that, through its divine mission of leading the African to salvation, a relationship was established between the Afrikaner and the African. The absoluteness of Afrikaner truth consisted in God's command and God's will that the Afrikaner nation should lead the black man to God. There is thus no "distinction among men, save such as has been imposed by God Himself, in that He gave one authority over the other." In other words, Calvinism is by nature democratic. It is incompatible with slavery and, politically, proclaims the liberty of nations. It does not "rest until both politically and socially every man, simply because he is man, should be recognized, respected and dealt with as a creature created after Divine likeness."¹ It follows that, in order to carry out God's will, the Afrikaner (as we have already seen) must keep himself apart from the African, but it lies in the very nature of God's word that the gap between him and the African gets narrower and narrower as the latter advances on the road of Christian civilisation. In other words, the authority with which God has endowed the Afrikaner, in order to lead the African to Him, is a temporary authority which diminishes in proportion to the African's coming of age:

"Die regte van geen mens mag misken word nie, daar mag ook op geen gebied van die lewe sprake wees van altyddurende onderhorigheid nie. In die lig van Rom. 15: 1 en van 1 Kor. 8: 9-13 het die sterkere 'n plig teenoor die swakkere. Die Heilige Skrif toon egter ook aan dat die mindere 'n plig teenoor die meerdere het (bv. die kind teenoor die ouer of voog). Die regte en geleenthede

¹ A. Kuyper, Calvinism, as quoted by G. D. Scholtz in: *Het die Afrikaanse Volk 'n Toekoms?*, p. 156.

van mense moet tred hou met die groei van hul sin van verantwoordelikheid en plig met die oog op selfbestemming.”¹

Our argument of the advancing relativisation of the Afrikaner truth is not only borne out by the fact that there are among the Afrikaners those who take up a more or less critical attitude towards apartheid. It is the very policy of apartheid itself which at the same time relativises the Afrikaner truth, i.e., causes the Afrikaner to see himself in relation to the African and the other non-European sections of the country. It may thus be argued that separate development indicates the recognition on the part of the Afrikaner of African truth, that it is the African's right to live his own life and the inevitability of his development. It could be seen to demonstrate the willingness of the Afrikaner and of those other Europeans subscribing to the same concept of apartheid to abandon their claim to absoluteness and to make sacrifices in favour of the non-Europeans. It could be conceived as an attempt to lessen the tension and conflict between European and non-European. But it must be observed that thereby the contradictory relation between European and non-European cannot be removed. Whether for the latter apartheid is acceptable as a truth and as a form of co-existence with the whites, will depend on their respective needs and interests as they develop out of their existential situation. It can, however, not be denied that there are many Africans who in apartheid see the only possibility of co-existence between black and white. If apartheid does not merely want to be a rationalisation of the naturally existing contradictory situation between black and white on the part of the white man, it must be acceptable to the black man. In other words, it must see the situation also from his point of view, and it must consider his vital needs and his interests. This it can, however, only do if it is not dogmatic and theoretical but practical, and if it works out the South African destiny in consultation with the African. There are hopeful signs in this direction, no doubt, but we would like to see the disappearance of the mutual suspicion and we would welcome a yet greater measure of openminded discussion in the interest of all parties concerned. It is no secret that, especially part of the African intelligentsia, regards this attempt on the part of the government to come to terms with the non-Europeans with great suspicion. It fears that the racial conflict is to be allayed on European rather than African terms. And on account of this suspicion, some of the African leaders make the mistake of positing their truth as absolute today as the Europeans might have done in the past. Even though this is perhaps an understandable reaction to the Europeans' attitude in the past, the logical consequence of their doctrine is the denial to the Europeans of their existence, their interest and vital needs, in brief, their truth as it has grown on South African soil; and seen in this light apartheid also demonstrates the determination of the European to survive. Apartheid may thus be said to have a positive as well as negative aspect. Its positive side

¹ G. D. Scholtz, *Het die Afrikaanse Volk 'n Toekoms?*, p. 156.

would consist in the recognition of the African's right to live his own life and the inevitability of his development, while its negative side would consist in the suspicion a great number of Europeans harbour as to the true aims of some of the African leaders. Any attempt, however, on any one's part to disregard completely the truth, the interests, the culture, way of life, right of existence of another individual or group of individuals constitutes a violation of the "ought," i.e., the moral command, of actuality. Even as the European should take into consideration the African's truth as described above, the African should consider and try to understand the truth of the European. Any such relative truth is a long process of historic development. The Afrikaner truth, therefore, also is the product of a number of existential situations in the past which as such are absolutely contingent, e.g., the economic and political situation of the Netherlands, which in the 17th century led the Dutch East India Company to establish a half-way station between the homeland and the East Indies; the conflict between Dutch and English, which again was the result of history, i.e., resulting from the political, economic and social conditions in England and France (French Revolution, Napoleon), which made it necessary for the English to acquire the Cape; the conflict between the English and the Africans, the Boers and the Africans, the Boers and the English government and missionaries on the border, which eventually led to the Great Trek, and later between the Boers and the English about the South African Republic, which led to the Boer War, etc. It follows that the Afrikaner truth is no better and no worse than any other truth, whether English, German, French, African. It is the result of the process of actuality, which operates by the contradictory truths of individuals (even of husband and wife, parents and children, etc.), scientific truths, cultural systems, national truths and denominational truths. And it is therefore high time that human beings ceased to attach moral labels of good and evil to each other, which mean nothing else but that my own truth is good and any one else's, which does not agree with mine, evil. It is high time that the human race came to an intelligent understanding of the contradictory nature of actuality, which is constituted by man's own contradictory nature. It teaches us that it is not for us to judge our fellowman and our fellow nations, but that we are judged by actuality, i.e., we are inevitably punished if we transgress its boundaries. In other words, the moral world is represented by the halt of actuality, which we all experience in the form of contradiction on the part of our fellowman. If all the parties that participate in shaping South African actuality clearly realized the "ought" of actuality, and therefore acted responsibly, i.e., in consideration of the other, his vital interests and needs, the doctrine of apartheid would forfeit its existential ground from which it has grown. From the above it follows that the culture and way of life of the Afrikaans-and the English-speaking South African are integral components of South African actuality. The leaders of the Africans, therefore, do not act responsibly if they disregard them or even aim at their complete removal. Such an attitude will lead to a

further sharpening of the conflict. It will transform the natural contradiction that exists between European and African into an insoluble problem, which will only end in violence. And even if by violence the European truth should be terminated, the Africans must not be under the illusion that thereby all tension and all conflict will have been removed. Actuality will not allow itself to be deceived. There will be conflict and tension in some other form. The process of contradiction will go on. We have already previously remarked that the world has become too small to allow an event to be without effect on the rest of the world. Thus, apart from the internal strife that is highly probable to break out among the Africans after the removal of the European contradiction, the Africans involuntarily invite other parties of the world to take an active interest in African affairs, parties which would not hesitate to offer the blessings of their truth, which they sell as absolute, and which, in the case of refusal of acceptance on the part of the Africans, would certainly resort to rigorous means to impose their truth. Of course, nobody knows what will exactly happen in the event of the removal of the European truth from South African soil because of the complexity of actuality, but one thing is certain: the process of actuality will go on, and any dream of lasting harmony, of the final removal of conflict and contradiction is just an illusion.

What now is the parallel which we can draw here between the situation as it existed in 19th century Europe and the present South African situation? Even as Hegel's philosophy made the attempt to justify the existence of the Prussian state and therefore to the Prussian conservatives meant completion and fulfilment, but was criticised and questioned by the young Hegelians, e.g., Feuerbach, Ruge and Marx, who stressed the untenability of the existing conditions and anticipated the future, the majority of the Afrikaners and many English-speaking people endeavour to preserve their truth and thereby the status quo, i.e., racial segregation, while especially part of the African intelligentsia feel that there will soon be a new "break of dawn" and turn their faces to the future, thus contradicting the Afrikaner truth and that of the Europeans in general. The situation is, however, much more complicated in that there are doubtlessly Africans who are pro-apartheid as well as Europeans that are against. But the non-European should realize that his future is inevitably bound up with that of the European and that the removal of the latter will not mean a "solution," but that the conflict could even increase. He should accept the willingness of the European to recognise the African's truth, i.e., his right to live his way of life and the inevitability of his development or his coming of age, which willingness now doubtlessly exists. And the European should beware of telling the African what is good for him. He should try to understand the African's aspirations and wishes as they spring from the African's own situation and existential need, not from his own. In other words, what we would like to see develop is a yet greater measure of free and open discussion between non-European and European on the South African actual situation which they have after all built in common, i.e., a respon-

sible discussion of their mutual needs, interests and difficulties in the spirit of an understanding sympathetic attitude on the part of all parties concerned. If this were to happen, any suspicion that at present might dictate an attitude on both sides which leads only to further complications will be broken down and a spirit of mutual esteem and friendship could be developed. If such were the case, then there would be no longer an existential ground for any theory of segregation on any one's part; for such responsible action would prove a high moral standard of all parties concerned. They would give evidence of their maturity by abstaining from trying to solve the existing conflict unilaterally, i.e., by one single party trying to impose its truth on the other parties as a solution of the crisis. Moreover, they would prove that they are aware of their common task which may be said to consist in *co-operation in contradicton*. In other words, it is the very task of working together in the crisis they experience in common, which welds them together into a true community of interest.

There is yet another parallel that can be drawn to 19th century conditions in Europe, namely, the increasing industrialisation in the towns and the cities, and it is in this respect, above all, that the English-speaking section comes into the picture of South African actuality, because they are predominantly in business. In a certain sense it may be said to be true that the Africans that work in the mines or as watch boys, domestic servants, etc. correspond to the European proletariat of the 19th century. This is a fact that these people feel as uprooted as the part of the African intelligentsia we discussed previously, if not even more so. Those Africans living in urban locations find it hard to form a real community, as their only "truth" is to survive economically. To form a community, however, a strong spiritual truth is necessary. That even the Marxists understand despite their "materialism."¹ But, in the urban locations, there is all too often an economic war of all against all which often erupts into crime. It is true that the government has done a great deal to alleviate and improve the situation in the form of new housing schemes, hospitals, schools, employment schemes, but yet the real community spirit is still lacking, which can only be built around sound spiritual values. A genuine community spirit has nothing to do with the mass-psychosis and herd instinct one often finds in the large cities, and which may be easily mistaken for a community spirit. The mass has a levelling effect on the individual. It paints everything grey in grey and causes the individual to lose his identity. He becomes part of an enormous id. It is such de-personalised beings, who lead but a shadow existence, whom we encounter only all too often in the urban African locations.

The second category of Africans we find in the city are those who

¹ The religious character of the Marxist doctrine has been most efficiently described by Jacob Hommes, *Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie*, in: *Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst*, book 22.

have come there for only a limited period of time to earn money and then to return to their kraals. They live in the compounds of the mines or work in the factories, in department stores or shops, as watch boys, flat boys and domestic servants. Those are the people that with one foot still stand in the life of the tribe and with the other in the middle of European civilization, and this duality often is of detrimental consequences for themselves as well as for the tribe. Often they fail to return home and vanish in the great city. Sometimes they fall victim to crime, and even if they do come back home, a rankling feeling of emptiness and frustration frequently remains. It is many of these who carry on the further corrosion of the tribe and often give trouble to the chief. All in all there is no question that a great number of these people become not merely alienated from the tribe, thereby losing their identity, but in the city, too, they find a foreign world in which they are never allowed to be equals and to share, and in which, although they work there, they will always remain onlookers. It is the urban Africans who are most susceptible to the communist doctrine, and although they might not produce a Karl Marx in answer to the challenge of white civilization, they might produce leaders that are greatly influenced by Karl Marx. Besides, a half-understood or a misunderstood Karl Marx may cause more harm than the real Karl Marx. But there is also the danger that these leaders will be directly influenced by the present interpreters of Karl Marx where there is little left of him. It is therefore of no avail to entrench oneself behind one's truth in whatever form, but it is the call of the hour to keep oneself open to actuality and look it right in the eye. Let us always remember that we are ourselves the architects of actuality. This is not said in blame of anybody; for actuality moves beyond reprimand and reproach, but it is said to show that African behaviour is nothing but a reaction to our truth, which, as we saw repeatedly, we cannot help positing. The reaction of the urban African, now, may be regarded as the answer to the European's economic and technological truth. It may be compared with the response to industrialization of the working class in the 19th century Europe. Hence the danger on the part of the urban African to embrace the Marxist doctrine or a pseudo-Marxism; for the strength of appeal of this doctrine precisely lies in its one-sidedness, i.e., in interpreting everything from the economic angle. It is therefore worthwhile to ask how Marx would interpret South African conditions.

In the first place Marx would point out that the Europeans are not men at all but "Un-menschen," i.e., capitalists, who are held together by need and private interest. They pose as society, and their ideology is nothing but the super-structure of their peculiar economic situation, which is conducive to the exploitation by them of the productive class (the African town labourers). He would further say that the true men (hommes) are the Africans, because only they are political animals, i.e., only their interest falls together with the common interest of all the society. Only the Africans, therefore, can be man and citizen in one.

They represent the future and the capitalist the past in the economic class struggle from which one class dialectically rises out of the other. With the victory of the labouring class completion would have been reached and the dawn of the communist era would have set in with a classless society, the common ownership of the tools of production, an equal distribution of consumers' goods without money as a means of exchange, no state organs, soldiers, police, prisons, because in such a society there would be no room and no cause for crime. Naturally, this is the ideal and highly utopian. To reach this stage, the socialist stage would have to be reached first to prepare and educate people for the final stage. This education will chiefly consist in the effort of transforming man from an individual with individual economic interests into a collective being with common economic interests. It is through his work that the individual is linked with the collective. To reach this socialist stage, both the power of the "capitalists" and the old tribal society, which is based on primitive methods of agriculture and is therefore unable to cope with the exigencies of modern industrial society, would have to be broken down. This task would be entrusted to the African industrial proletariat, together with the agricultural proletariat, would have to form the vanguard of socialism in the form of the communist party.¹ As to the present situation of the African labourer, Marx would say that he has to sell his labour, thereby estranging himself from himself as a human being. His product is not his own, but belongs to the owner of the business, factory, farm, etc.; it turns into a commodity as which it becomes independent. It reaches its consumer via the salesman, for whom it has only value as means of exchange. The commodity is the fetish of the capitalist world. It reflects the social relations. The worker, therefore, does not exist as a human being, but merely as commodity and capital. What he is outside his work is of no interest for national economy. He can never produce in the creative sense of the word, but is forced to sell himself on the labour market. He is pushed below bare subsistence level, thereby sinking below the dignity of human life. And yet, according to Marx, the worker depends on the capital. If it does not exist for the worker, the worker, too, ceases to be, as he exists only as a worker. Capital and labour belong together like two hostile brothers. The one cannot do without the other. The capitalist, too, is the slave of the labourer's work, which represents an increase of his wealth.

Naturally, we are aware that the African might make use of other methods than Marxist to break down the truth of the Europeans, especially since the educated African will certainly discover the on-sidedness of the Marxist system and its being no more than a system among other systems. The assertion to-day by certain ideologists, who

¹ The idea of the communist party forming the Proleterian vanguard of socialism as well as the alliance between the industrial and agricultural proletariat is Lenin's.

claim to be Marxists, that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is alone of scientific value and in this sense absolute, becomes highly questionable. Wherein does the one-sidedness of the Marxist doctrine, let alone that of so-called Marxist ideologists, consist ?

1. In its being rooted in 19th century conditions, which have long since been overcome by actuality.

2. In arbitrarily explaining everything in the light of economics, thereby transforming man into an economic animal.

3. In levelling the individual by declaring that he only becomes man by merging his interests and wants with those of an industrial society, with which he is linked through his labour. It is thus this industrial society, the collective, which, as we saw, represents the "Grossmensch," i.e., the economic "id," which has a religious and dogmatic character, and into which the individual is entirely absorbed.

4. To reach the final stage of communism, it is necessary that society pass through the socialist stage first. There, the individual must be prepared for the final stage, i.e., he must be transformed into an economic animal, this being a complete defection from actuality, even as the communist stage represents the same ; for the realization of this last stage presupposes the elimination of any kind of contradiction between individuals, a condition which is entirely against man's nature. Thus we are afraid that the transformation of man into an economic animal will not only prove an impossibility, but it cannot possibly be desirable for him either, because it is unnatural. The experiment that is at present being carried out in the East by force already reveals its shortcomings, and appalling cracks begin to appear in the imposing edifice, despite the force applied. Actuality cannot be deceived. It moves on in spite of man's continual attempt to transform it into an absolute truth.

It is thus to be hoped that the African intellectual will understand the lesson of history qua actuality. And there are hopeful signs in that direction, when moderate proposals are made on his part to remove the tension in which he finds himself as to the question of man and citizen. And we must understand that, as long as he is compelled by the white man's truth to move within a no-man's-land on account of his de-tribalization, he will continue to respond and to make all imaginable efforts to overcome the conflict in which he finds himself. The existence of certain African organizations and the attitude adopted by a number of African intellectuals and students should be interpreted in this light. The African intellectual feels that the truth of the white man deliberately aims at perpetually excluding him from ever becoming a citizen and therefore a man again. That is the deeper reason why he distrusts the educational policy of the government as laid down by Bantu education, however honest and sincere it may be, and we do not for a moment doubt that it is. This suspicion of Bantu education is expressed by one of the spokesmen of the detribalized intellec-

tual group, whose lecture the author attended at Umpumulo Training College, but whose name he has unfortunately forgotten. Speaking on the criticism of African education previous to Bantu education and of the westernised intellectual African section on the part of the Commission on Native Education, 1949-1951, and on other certain prominent Europeans, he states :

“Hence, in the case of this criticism also, it is clear that there is an implicit expectation that Bantu education shall promote cultural difference and, hence, equality between the whites and the Africans. This is implicit in the criticism of African education for orienting the Africans to a ‘highly developed and progressive Western civilization’ (which must be the exclusive preserve of the whites) and the plea to the Africans for the idealization of a disintegrating and tribal ‘Bantu culture.’ There is also the implicit expectation that Bantu education shall guarantee the time-less guardianship and domination of the white man in South Africa. This is implicit in the criticism of African education for cultivating ‘Synthetic African Westerners’ —in view of the role they play with regard to the security of the whites in their dominant position.”

And the consciousness of this African intelligentsia as regards their special mission is implied in the following :

“The ultimate aim is to eliminate the ‘stray minority’ of synthetic Westerners by making its development through education impossible. Yet, why must this stray minority of Westernised Africans be eliminated? In other words, this is the critical and articulate group of Africans. It is the African leadership. If the whites must retain their position of leadership and dominance, they must eliminate any African leadership that challenged their leadership and threatened their domination.”

However unfounded this distrust and suspicion on the part of this particular section of the African intelligentsia may be, the fact is that it exists, and as long as it exists, no true co-operation between black and white is possible. An educational programme, however excellent it may be, is hardly of any avail if it is not accepted by the people concerned and as long as it is regarded with suspicion and scepticism. It is these that must at first be removed. The European must, by his action, convince the African of the unselfishness and the disinterestedness of his guidance, which the African doubtlessly still needs. On the other hand, the African should realize that he is still in need of this guidance on the part of the European. He should not, from a feeling of resentment against the European, allow himself to overshoot his mark, to overestimate himself and his present achievement, thereby greatly misjudging his own position. Such kind of self-deception cannot possibly lie in the African's interest.

In other words, the problem of the training and education of the African requires the same tact, self-control, open-mindedness and honesty on both sides, European and African, as all the other existing

problems, frictions and contradictions. The European should lend his assistance to the education and training of the Africans without ulterior motives. He should not merely tell the African what sort of education and what kind of educational programme is good for him, but he should enter into consultation with African academic and educational leaders and should listen to *their* needs, interests and wishes; for the people concerned should progressively be allowed a greater measure of responsibility in determining their own educational programme. It cannot be prescribed by the European alone. But it must be stated in all fairness that recent developments show that mutual consultation in the educational field is taking place in an ever increasing measure.

The African, on the other hand, should also act with the greatest circumspection and self-restriction. In the first place, he should ask himself the question, whether his suspicion is really justified, and he should seriously try to break down this wall, which will prevent him from regarding any action and attempt on the part of the European to help with distrust. Blinded by his suspicion, he will be unable to judge the measure and advice of the Europeans on their own merit and in their true meaning, which inability is often disadvantageous for the African. He should, therefore, not summarily ban all suggestions and recommendations on the part of the European in this country, simply because they come from him and therefore must needs be suspect. In other words, it is not only for the European to try to understand the existential position of the Africans, but the African, too, must make an honest attempt to judge the true value of the European's actions, suggestions, recommendations. We have repeatedly stated that actuality refers one individual to the other and one group of interest to the other. Any attempt on the part of the Europeans, in whatever field, to come to terms with the Africans is doomed to failure unless there is the same willingness on the part of the Africans. They should, therefore, in the first place listen to the Europeans in this country before they listen to overseas opinion, because it is with them that their existential situation is bound up. The people living overseas, on the other hand, are not existentially involved in the South African situation. They do not themselves experience South African actuality, nor do they directly contribute towards shaping it. They are remote, and they are therefore inclined to intellectualise the South African situation and to offer a solution according to *their* truth, which is sometimes not free from ulterior motives, i.e., motives that represent *their* interests and not the interests of the South African people.

In the field of education, therefore, too, it is above all a matter between both Europeans and Africans to shape together the future educational situation of the country. But thereby the African must be honest to himself in some other respect, too; he must clearly recognise his limits of knowledge and achievement. He must not, from a wrong feeling of inferiority, allow himself to labour under delusions as to his

true educational position, which might cause him to reject to his own detriment any advice in educational matters which comes from the European side.

Concluding Remarks

Once more we beg not to be misunderstood. *We do not defend or condemn, accuse, judge, support or reject. All we intend to do is to describe as accurately and dispassionately as this can be done the phenomenological structure of South African actuality, with its dangers and pitfalls.* Its ethical implications were pointed out when discussing the character of actuality as such. And if we look at this actuality with a cool head, the situation in South Africa summed up in a nutshell presents itself as follows :

Out of the circumstances of history the white man came to posit his truth as against that of the black man : In the course of this process the white man established a state and thereby also became a citizen. At the same time the white man's truth initiated the gradual process of the transformation of the black man's truth, i.e., tribal society. This led to the ever-increasing self-estrangement of the African on the one hand and to anxiety and uncertainty in a westernised world, with which he found himself suddenly confronted and which was foreign to him, on the other. The moment he ceased to be a "zoo-mysticon," he found himself in a no-man's-land, where he felt that he was neither man nor citizen. At present, therefore, to find a new meaning, a new abode in which to inhabit and to feel secure, the African intelligentsia is frantically searching for new values of life, in short, for a new truth. As, however, the white man's truth seems to have been a self-contained truth, at least in the past, there is not only the danger that it represents a defection from actuality, but that it will cause the African to posit his counter-truth in a form as absolute as that of the European, the result being an ever-increasing estrangement between African and European and an ever-increasing sharpening of the conflict. To avoid catastrophe, therefore, which is nothing but the way of actuality to overcome the absolute truths of men, both parties should realize the relativity of their respective truth. They should become conscious of the fact that they both are the architects of this actuality. That is to say, they have created it by positing their contradictory truths which clearly reveal their mutual interdependence. They are therefore an inherent part of actuality, which only exists through them and by which alone they exist. Any intellectualization or rationalization of the existing contradictory situation on the part of the white or the black man only converts actuality into a problem. Instead, the various groups of interest, which represent South African actuality, should make even closer contact than is the case at present, whereby the vital needs and truths of all the parties concerned will be discussed and adjusted in such a way that they serve the whole. This aim, however, can only be

achieved if each party concerned exercises the necessary self-control and evinces a respect and esteem for the vital needs and interests of the other group. As actuality is not static but dynamic, such a close consultation of the various groups of interest is of the highest importance. Thereby any possible freezing of the situation by a theoretical "solution" of the conflicts of the actual situation will be prevented. Such a freezing would merely serve to obstruct actuality, because it is not static but dynamic. The hour calls for immediate, positive courageous and responsible action on the part of all the parties concerned in the interest of the South African common wealth. Just as perpetuating the status quo on the part of the white man will not enable the European to escape from actuality, the Africans' "problems" will not be solved by the removal of the European from this country: actuality will see to that.

From the above it follows that there is only one way to avoid a possible stalemate and frustrating deadlock, namely, to realize clearly the nature of actuality, because by so doing the true nature of man reveals itself, and to accept actuality, instead of trying to run away from it. This may sound very simple, but yet it is the most difficult thing to do. For, as many philosophers have realized, e.g., G. Marcel, M. Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, man tends to see the problem first, before he sees actuality. In other words, he never realizes that which is immediately present to him, but only that which is distant from him, i.e., the object, the "Man" as Heidegger would call it, or the "problem" as Marcel would say. It is these anonymous "ids" into which man seeks to escape, thus becoming a "Utopian being" as Ortega y Gasset would put it. Thus man does not see actuality as immediately given to him, as part of himself: It does not therefore occur to him that its contradictory nature lies in man's very essence, but he looks at it as an object about which he thinks in order to overcome its contradictory nature. He does not become conscious of the fact that this would mean to overcome himself, his own essence.

If the European and the African realized that South African actuality is the result of their contradictory relation and was therefore woven by them, if they experienced it as part of themselves and knew themselves part of it, which identified them as that what they each are and yet united them, this would not remove actuality, but would no longer let it appear an insuperable problem. The consciousness of mutual dependence would lead to reciprocal respect and tolerance. It would cause the Europeans to abandon all claim to the absoluteness of their truth, and prevent the African from constructing a truth which again lays claim to absoluteness. Both sections would listen to each other and keep themselves open to each other's truths, i.e., needs and wants. By so doing, they would at the same time listen and keep themselves open to actuality and its everlasting change. They would develop each other's truths in consideration of each other's vital needs and requirements, which lie in the basic desire of the individual to be a man, which he can only

be if at the same time he is a citizen, as should have become clear from our previous discussion. This is what is meant by the adoption of a sympathetic mutual understanding between African and European. For even if one cannot overnight discard a truth that has historically grown throughout the centuries and is part of actuality, one can adjust it to the needs of changed circumstances and thus modify it in consideration of the other's needs. This is what is meant by positing one's truth in responsibility in which we are free, i.e., safe from becoming the slave of our own truth, and in which, at the same time, we permit others to be free, i.e., to posit their own truth. This is the ethical implication of contradictory actuality. The reconciliation thereby with one's own nature does not, however, mean the suspension of actuality, because it is no reconciliation in harmony: for it is the very essence of man's nature to be contradictory. If we all realized this, then a great deal of our troubles would be eliminated. In the above sense, it would for instance be immoral on the part of the African leaders if they demanded from the European concessions which would aim at the removal of Europeans altogether, because we have already said before that the Europeans' presence in this country is the result of actuality and should be accepted as such. In contrast to the rest of the African continent, except perhaps Southern Rhodesia, the European came to South Africa not merely as a colonial overlord for the economic exploitation of the country, but to find a home in a country which belonged to none of the races that live there at the present time. And it must be conceded that he won this country not the easy way, but by wrestling with nature for its possession and pressing on it his stamp to a greater degree than happened elsewhere in the rest of the African continent. On the other hand, it would be as immoral on the part of the Europeans, if they refused to listen to the just demands of the Africans by deliberately keeping them in subordination and by denying them the right of citizenship as soon as they are ready for it—that is, as soon as they have constructed from their actual or existential situation a responsible truth, a truth which safeguards their own freedom as well as that of the non-African races and which prevents them from becoming the slave of their own truth, i.e., from positing themselves absolute. For history's lesson in this respect teaches us that man is only a man if at the same time he is a citizen. In what way this citizenship should come about must be left to the exigencies of actuality. If the disintegration of tribal life further increases, as the process of actuality seems to indicate, then new ways and possibilities must be explored for the African to realize himself as man and as citizen. For after all the disintegration of the old African society is not their own fault, but the process of actuality. In other words, it was initiated by the impact on it of European culture and civilization. This is also the reason why Christianity and tribal society in its original form are incompatible; for not only was it the message of the Gospel that initiated the process of disintegration of tribal society, but the latter is founded on heathen practices, which Christianity is bound to

destroy. And does not the Afrikaner nation also consider it its bounden duty to spread the Gospel among the pagan Africans, so that their souls be saved? It cannot therefore be interested in preserving African society in its old tribal form, i.e., based on paganism. It is therefore improbable that the process of tribal disintegration can be reversed. Thus the South African situation commands the closest co-operation between African and European. That is the great lesson South African actualiy teaches us.

Postscript

But even if it is impossible for man to construct an absolute truth, and even if all his truths remain relative ones, no matter in whatever absolute form he posits them, he yet can *believe* in an absolute truth. But such a believed truth must not be man-made either, because this would mean nothing else but putting a religious cloak around a fallible human truth. It follows that *the* truth, which can never be known but only believed, must be a revealed truth. In the pure Christian truth, therefore, only, cleansed from all denominational and confessional slant, which in the end is nothing but reading into scripture a relative human truth, actuality is overcome; and by the faith in this truth only, are we true brothers and sisters, i.e., are we bound together by pure love. In this truth we could also include non-Christians; for do not all genuine religions agree in their basic elements, do they not all desire the love and brotherhood among men? Despite the fact that it is the Christian's duty to spread the gospel, who is he to say that he is better than the non-Christian? By the Christian faith only, the contradictory relation that exists between men is changed into one of genuine mutual love. This is the true miracle performed by Christ. Naturally, the state of perfect love among men will never be realized in actual life on account of the sinfulness of our nature, but must come to man through God's grace, so that man can do nothing but live in expectation of it. But common faith in Christ, in Whom actuality is overcome and the perfect state of love is realized, will place man in a better position to remain loyal to himself, i.e., to the immediate presence to him and in him of actuality, and he will therefore not try to put himself absolute and to overcome it, but he will realize that he is confined to actuality and will bear this burden as his cross. In other words, if man directs his eyes to Christ's suffering on the Cross on his behalf, out of love for him, then the sharp edge of his truth will be blunted and the sting will be taken out of his speech. This is why a genuine community can only be built around the love of Christ. In this love, which became manifest by Christ's patient and obedient suffering to the bitter end for the sake of all men, the duality of the individual as man and citizen has been transcended; for by his faith in Christ, the individual has given himself up to *the* truth, which is not of his own making and therefore outside actuality. By faith, therefore, man is transformed into a Christian. It binds men together into a higher community which is beyond the conflicts of the earthly community.

THE YOUNG GENERATION AND THE FUTURE

1. Introductory Remarks

The title of this paper must not lead the young generation to believe that it is our intention to pose as prophets. Rather the opposite is true. This paper is written in deepest concern about the future of the young generation, because it is felt that they nurse expectations which will never be fulfilled. Unfortunately, however, the danger exists that these illusory expectations drive the young people into irresponsible action and cause them to adopt an intransigent attitude of self-righteousness, which cannot possibly be in their interest. In the light of this state of affairs it would be an act of great irresponsibility, were we to presume to point out the path for youth on which to travel in the direction of progress. It is, on the contrary, our duty to warn youth of all false prophets and to discourage it from sailing a course which will never reach a port, but may end in utter despair, frustration and disaster. We are fully aware of the great probability that our message will be thoroughly disliked by the young people because of their habit of regarding themselves as torch bearers, as those that carry into the future the cultural goods of their forefathers under new norms and values. But we have to take that risk, and it is the call of the hour to withstand the protest and contradiction on the part of youth. It is our duty to point out to the young generation that such an attitude is to run away from the actuality of life and therefore from themselves. It is our critical task to disclose the origin of such an attitude on the part of youth, to discuss its consequences, and to draw the attention of youth to the actual situation in which they are and in which the expectation of the future reveals itself as a most practical and sober concern, which has nothing to do with the theoretical dream worlds that are mostly offered to youth and after which they all too frequently hanker.

2. The Origin Of The Idealistic And Theoretical Attitude Of Youth As Regards The Future

When we study the history of man, and especially of Western man, it appears to us as though there were a definite continuity, a plan which pointed towards a certain aim. What is it now that gives history this appearance? We could give the answer: man's creative nature. But what does that really mean? We thereby refer to man's uncertain condition in the midst of the actual process of life. His ever changing surroundings, which he perceives by his sense impressions, cause him to become uncertain both of his surroundings and himself. The chaotic nature of the outside world threatens to dissolve him into nothing. To be, to exist, therefore, man is forced to build himself a house in which to live. He does so by arranging and ordering this world in such a way that it bears his own stamp, so that it is familiar and meaningful to

him and offers him shelter.¹ Thus the child builds his imaginary world of play and make-believe in which he is happy and in which he holds a central position. The adult builds his life around his family, his work and the society in which he lives (the state). The scientist makes the attempt to arrange the physical world by "natural laws," the artist "creates" an aesthetic world, the philosopher "constructs" imposing edifices of "truth" and the theologian seeks to "systematise" our "experience of faith." The result, now, of all the "creative" activity on the part of man constitutes that which is commonly called culture.

When these various systems of culture are studied retrospectively by the historian,² they become an *object* of investigation; for they constitute his material, which he seeks to arrange and in which he seeks to recognize objective features which could be accepted as true by all men. In other words, what the historian hopes to find when studying these venerable historic systems of culture is the meaning of history. For if such a meaning could be found, then man would no longer grope in the dark as to the meaning of his life and as to his purpose in this world. The idea that his life is meaningless and that his existence is without purpose is unbearable to man. In this sense, now, on the part of the historian to trace the objective features in history and to enquire into the general meaning of the various historic systems of culture, all subjective elements, as they were, which induced man to arrange and to order his surroundings had to be suspended. They constitute only a disturbing factor or a stumbling block to the tireless effort of the historian searching for the meaning of history. After those irritating subjective factors have been excluded, the veil of secrecy seems to have been lifted from the cultural systems. They appear to afford evidence as to the purpose of man in this world. The impression is created as though generation after generation of statesmen, scientists, artists, philosophers and theologians have been making their respective contribution to the erection of an imposing edifice of reason, which, they hope, will be completed some day by some generation in the distant future. It is this view of history that causes man to believe in progress; for progress presupposes a goal towards which to progress. This aim now is the eventual triumph of reason and thereby the gradual perfection of mankind. Reason was seen by the historian to be the essence of history. It was the continuum that linked up the classical era with the Middle Ages and the modern times. Plato and Aristotle constructed a rational universe which, therefore, could be understood by all men,

¹ In this respect the reader's attention is drawn to the works of Bollnow, *Die neue Geborgenheit*, and St. Exupéry, *Citadelle*, but we wish to state that we do not agree with the metaphysical nature of Bollnow's "Geborgenheit" and St. Exupéry's "Citadelle."

² Historian is used here in a wide sense. It means more the historian of culture or the philosopher of history than the historian proper who seeks to arrange and to interpret the mass of historic data.

contemporaries and future generations; Thomas Aquinas conceived God as being the originator of the rational insight of man; in the era of Enlightenment reason became the supreme being as well as the substance of the world, and the world operated like the mechanism of a clock-work (natural laws); Hegel saw in history the absolute spirit returning to itself; and in contemporary times the substance of the world is seen in the space-time relationship between events, which are expressed by the mathematical formula. It must be especially emphasised that the Christian faith, too, was rationalised and historicised by theology, so that it fitted into the general picture of progress, and the German philosopher Eberhard Grisebach has shown that the contemporary dialectical theology is no exception.¹

By rationalising and historicising the Christian faith, Christianity was humanised, and we were able to speak of a Christian culture and a Christian humanism, but thereby the original meaning of the Christian message was lost. The historian came thus to regard the classical epoch of the Antique as the fountain of Western culture and as the cradle of human and historic reason. It was idealised as the world of justice, harmony, beauty and truth. Its educational value was stressed again and again by educationists, who by its example sought to inspire the young generation. Thanks to the rationalisation of the Christian faith by theology, the historian is in a position to trace the continuity of classical learning in mediaeval culture. The buttressing of the Christian faith in the Middle Ages by ancient philosophy in its neo-Platonic or Aristotelian form represents a fusion of two absolutely opposed principles, namely, reason and faith, which was to prove the mark of all Christian theology, causing it to move the Cross and its original meaning into a theoretical and historic sphere. But to the historian it appeared as though the antique spirit was continued on a higher level and that the goal, absolute truth, which the ancients had set out to reach through their own efforts, had now been revealed to man by God's loving grace. Thus the historic process received a religious note. History was conceived to move in the direction of God's kingdom. This view starts with Augustine's "City of God" and culminates in Hegel's concept of the absolute spirit which through the historic process returns to itself, sweeping mankind along; for man's mind is part of this absolute spirit. But even there where the "decadence of culture" is realised, as in the case of Spengler, Berdyaev, Toynbee and Schweitzer, as it was also realised by St. Augustine in his time, this decadence gives room for a new belief, a new religiosity, or a transfiguration, i.e., the "transfer of the goal and values to the supersensory Kingdom of God"² in Toynbee's sense and the transfiguration of West-

¹ Cf. *Schicksalsstunde des Abendlandes*, pp. 131 ff. and *Zwei Vorkämpfer Kirchlicher Theologie* (zu Erich Przywara's *S. J. Analogia entis*), contained in: *Freiheit und Zucht*, pp. 321-339.

² P.A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, on A. J. Toynbee, p. 119.

ern culture by the strength of potential Russian religiosity in Berdyaev's sense. And if we analyse thoroughly the "atheist" Marxist philosophy, we shall find that it is a creed as well. It evinces a blind trust in progress and has set up as a deity the collective as the "Grossmensch" and the ideal stage of communism as paradise.¹ It seems that in Russian communism the Western idea of progress has allied itself with Russian messianism, i.e., to liberate the world and to bestow on it the blessing of Russian culture.

After having shown that the rational aspect of history reveals to the historian the feature of progress, i.e., the gradual perfection of mankind by reason and faith combined, we are in a position to point out the origin of youth's idea of being torchbearers of culture, i.e., to carry on the culture of their forefathers under new norms and values, which simultaneously elevate mankind onto a higher plane, so that it becomes more civilised and humanised and lives together more harmoniously and more happily. *This origin is to be found in the rationalistic historicism of man, i.e., to read into the historic cultural systems a continuity which points to a systematic and gradual unfolding of the reason of the world, thereby simultaneously bringing about the gradual perfection of man.* It is in the blind trust of reason and its ultimate triumph that progress consists. In other words, the origin of the young generation's confident and positive attitude, as regards the future, can be traced to the overestimation of reason by man and to regarding it as absolute. It is in the process of history that this absolute character of reason becomes manifest. It is understandable, therefore, that the young people regard themselves as the agents of history and messengers of reason. In youth, the old times, the old cultural and ethical values have been overcome. They imagine the break of a new dawn, with them a new era is opened. They inaugurate a future in which mankind will be more and more reasonable, i.e., more civilised and therefore more happy. Can we therefore blame the young people for their confidence, hope and their enthusiasm, if they believe themselves to be the torchbearers of progress? Can we hold them responsible for their great expectations of the future, perhaps even for the hope that it will be their generation that will achieve the last perfection of mankind and that will solve the remaining riddles of the universe, to reveal the last secrets of life and to remove the conflicts among men? Is it surprising, therefore, that the young generation is too self-confident and self-righteous, despising the older generation for its lack of understanding and its backwardness, while the older generation is forever complaining about the smart Aleck attitude, the ungratefulness, the lack of responsibility, circumspection and wisdom of the young generation? It seems to me that this attitude on the part of youth must be blamed on science, history, philosophy and theology, which are all guilty of claiming to lead man into paradise,

¹ As to the religious character of the communist ideology consult Jacob Hommes, *Kommunistische Ideologie und christliche Philosophie*

where there is no more conflict, contradiction, suffering, etc. But before we ask what to do about this state of affairs, it is worthwhile to discuss the consequences of the attitude of the young generation as described above.

3. The Consequences Of The Historic Attitude Of Youth

These are already indicated in the previous chapter, but in view of the ultimate aim of our discussion to refer youth to the existing situation instead of to a theoretically constructed future, it is necessary to go more into details. The most important consequence of the historic attitude on the part of youth is that thereby they must necessarily posit themselves as absolute. As they are the vessels of history, in which rôle they advance the culture and effect the further progress of mankind, they cannot possibly be wrong. The result is that youth is often inclined to treat with scorn any advice or contradiction on the part of the older generation, who in their eyes are retrogressive, i.e., they live in the past, in the cultural values created by them. Youth, on the other hand, live in the future, i.e., they are about to create new cultural values along the road of progress and the gradual perfection of mankind, and they are going to live with those values, instead of those created by the old generation. But as the old generation is still alive and lives side by side with the young generation, and as the old generation still holds the key posts to communal life, e.g., as the father and mother in the family, as managers in business, the masters in trade, the teachers in the school, the professors in the university, the government of the country, there must needs be conflict. For in view of the historic attitude of youth, they must needs protest against the "intolerance" of the old generation, while the old generation will forever seek to restrain youth and to counsel moderation; in other words, they will always contradict what they call the young people's extremism. Thus in the family there is conflict between father and son, mother and daughter about such problems as work and play, the profession to be chosen by the child, the marriage to be contracted by the son or the daughter, which is nothing but a war between tradition and modernism, older values and newer values. It is the same war that is waged by the scientist, artist, philosopher and theologian of the older and the newer schools. On a political level this war finds expression in the existence of the more conservative and the more progressive or liberal parties, pro-government and anti-government sections of the people.

Naturally, in this struggle overlapping takes place, and we always find young people who willingly follow their parents, and who are "conservative" in their cultural outlook rather than "progressive"; the same goes for political conviction. We also realise that there are many members of the older generation who like to be considered "modern" and "progressive," and who, come what may, side with youth. We all know educationists and professors of that kind who enthusiastically

march in the ranks of youth. But all this can easily be explained; for after all the older generation is in a position to inculcate its values and traditions into the younger generation. But sooner or later, to a lesser or stronger degree, the child will come to doubt and question the standards of life of his parents and thereby the way of life of the older generation in general. On the other hand, the older generation also had been brought up in the spirit of a rationalistic historicism, and its face had been turned towards the future, so that it is not surprising that we find many a "futurist" among the older people who closes ranks with youth. But strangely enough, each generation seems to have the feeling that its era is the most perfect one and that, therefore, the young generation cannot possibly improve on it, but can only be destructive. This conservatism on the part of the older generation may perhaps be explained from the phenomenon that each generation in having constructed their cultural values seem to believe that they have found the *truth*, and as there can only be one truth, it is useless for the young generation to set out to find a new one. Moreover, from the psychological point of view, one does not like to see a world destroyed which one has created oneself, in which one has lived and moved, which was familiar and meaningful to one and in which one experienced some sense of security. For the destruction of one's own world is almost equivalent with the destruction of oneself.

In other words, in spite of the overlappings that occur as regards a more conservative or a more modernistic outlook of the older and younger generation, there does exist a basic contradiction between young and old, the origin of which also must be sought in the rationalistic historic attitude of man in general. There can, therefore, never be a harmonious society. For when the cultural and ethical values of the older generation have been replaced by those of the younger generation, the younger generation has become the older generation of a younger generation which has grown up in the meantime, and which now in turn questions the way of life of their fathers and mothers. And the overlappings that occur between the generations even corroborate our view, namely, that the expectation of youth that during the life time of their generation further progress will be made, that mankind will be more reasonable and more perfect, that conflict will be lessened and that mankind will move nearer to the ideal of harmony, if not perhaps reach it entirely, is a phantom, a dream, the chasing of which is a useless undertaking.

There is no such thing as an absolute reason which unfolds itself in a historic process. Progress or the increasing perfection of mankind as well as a harmonious community of men have been revealed as an illusion. These features have been read into history by the historian or the philosopher who overestimates reason and absolutises it. He has arbitrarily suspended all those factors which do not fit into his logical and ontological picture of history. He has thereby distorted the true nature of man which he one-sidedly conceives to be rational, while reason is really

only man's rational disposition which enables him to constitute his contradictory rational principles from his respective existential situation. It is now those that lead him to the concept of reason, which therefore is really nothing more than a generalisation of man's rational disposition as it manifests itself in man's performance of purposeful acts in a given situation.

The consequence of the rationalistic historic attitude taken up by youth (an attitude which is to be blamed on the identification of history and reason) is that, thereby, youth is absolutely misguided and misled, because the young man or the young woman is erroneously led to believe that he or she alone is in conformance with history and reason. Youth, therefore, comes to think that it alone acts reasonably, so that anyone trying to obstruct its way, which, according to youth's belief, leads into a more reasonable future, must be struck down. Youth conceives itself to be the advocate of pure reason and thus posits itself, i.e., its new values or its "truth" as absolute. The young people, therefore, often become crusaders of the truth, which they believe they alone possess, and sometimes are even quite zealous in advancing their cause. They frequently become intransigent in their attitude and inaccessible and unapproachable to anyone who disagrees with them. All fruitful discussion that could arise from the living together of older and younger generations is cut off. Youth is prone to scorn the older generation, while the older generation is inclined to serve youth only the negative element. In the light of this artificial barrier which on account of the rationalistic historic attitude of youth has now been erected by youth and which induces them to embark on a dangerous course where their ship could easily be wrecked because they fancy themselves in possession of the absolute truth (viz. the catastrophes of Europe, i.e., World Wars I and II), we must now ask the question :

4. What Must Be Done About This State Of Affairs ?

To answer this question, we must at first subject to a critical analysis the idea that history in any form, directly or indirectly, aims at the perfection of man. In other words, we must be sceptical towards any notion of progress and towards any rational and teleological conception of history. For we have seen that any such notion has its origin in one-sidedly conceiving man's nature as rational and in trying to objectivise history by supporting or overcoming all subjective factors, thus reading into it a rational or teleological structure of some form or other. Not only Hegel but Dilthey, Simmel, Eucken, the neo-Kantians (Rickert, Windelband), the neo-Hegelians (Croce), the Marxists, the neo-Thomists, and even the Existentialists (Jaspers) are guilty of this offence. And we have already mentioned that the modern theologians are no exception.

It is now our contention that there is in history no plan, no aim nor progress, nor does it represent in any form the unfolding of world reason. If we do not arbitrarily exclude the subjective factors in history

or try to overcome them by transcending ourselves, then an absolutely different picture is revealed to us. We shall then find that history represents the battlefield of life. It consists of man's individual truths, which he posits in the face of the opposition on the part of his fellowman. We have already seen that in the midst of change and uncertainty man constructs himself a world in which he moves, which is familiar and meaningful to him and in which he feels secure. These worlds are always built in contradictory reference to the fellowman. In the family each of the children must assert himself or herself against his or her brothers or sisters, and, as we have already noticed, against his or her parents. The adult competes with others in the professional world, the artist develops new styles in opposition to other styles, the philosopher builds new world views in contradiction to others and the theologian attempts ever fresh systematisations of faith, thereby combating, condemning and negating others.

If we look at history without any preconceptions and try to understand the various cultural systems from their respective historic situation, then we shall discover the struggle, conflict and contradiction that dominated the classical era just as much as any other historic epoch. Already Nietzsche and Schelling pointed out the Dionysian feature in Greek culture, which existed side by side with the Apollonian trend. But it is Jacob Burckhardt who warns us against all systematisation in history and who tarnishes the false glitter of the aureole that is woven around classical culture as the inexhaustible fountain of culture from which the human race can drink indefinitely on its long tiresome journey along the path of harmony and perfection, and which affords new inspiration when there are signs of fatigue on this long journey. History, according to Burckhardt, is of an enigmatic character. He rejects any kind of "law" in history and cautions us against all optimism of progress, despite the fact that in its grim reality he does recognize the continuity of the spirit which uses as its tools men like Constantine, Charles Martel and Rubens.¹

Grisebach, too, in the one-sided interpretation of the Antique as a harmonious, rational and homogeneous culture by historians and educationists recognizes the danger that thereby man might be led to overestimate himself, as indeed he did. To realize the justification of Grisebach's misgivings as regards the interpretation of history,² we only have to think of such epochs as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the blind trust in the economic, scientific and philosophic achievements of the 19th century. And always the catastrophe followed. The humanism of the Renaissance went under in the atrocities of the Thirty Years' War, the reasonableness of the French Revolution was beheaded by the French

¹ Cf. E. Grisebach, *Jacob Burckhardt als Denker*.

² Grisebach's ideas as they are described here are found in his works: *Gegenwart, Freiheit und Zucht, Die Schicksalsstunde des Abendlandes*, and especially his lecture: *Das Moderne in der Kunst*.

guillotine during the Regime of Terror and the creed of progress of the 19th century was rudely destroyed in the trenches of the First World War as well as in the Russian snow fields and the African desert of the Second World War. Not only had European culture as a whole proved an illusion, but science, too, had revealed its Janus face, i.e., it had proved that it was not only man's friend, but could also be man's inexorable enemy. In connection with Greek culture, Grisebach points out its uncertain questioning and contradictory character. In Socrates he sees the personification of the disturbing element. Christianity in its true form Grisebach conceives to be the very contradiction of antique culture with its quest for truth. The Cross did not represent a system or a man-made cultural edifice, but it pointed to the naked practical life of man, i.e., his relation with his fellowman, by which man became sinful and guilty and by which he suffered. The Cross pointed to the end in whose shadow man lived and from which again and again he tried to escape. But Christ obediently and faithfully suffered the end on the Cross. He had weak moments, it is true, but His divine nature was revealed by being able to endure what Grisebach called the embarrassment of man, i.e., the revelation of the hopeless contradictoriness of his truths and the futility and folly of his historic expectations. Christ is often compared with Socrates, but Socrates died for a human truth which was carried on by the following generations and was remembered and praised as an example of virtue and duty. Christ, on the other hand, died for the vanity of all human truths and therefore of rationalistic historic truth. He lived the example of absolute obedience to God and faith in that which is promised by God. It is, therefore, in the passion of Christ that God reveals Himself and that death is overcome. In other words, Christ dies for all men in that by His death all their contradictions are ended and perfect peace reigns, a peace which is higher than all reason. Grisebach deplors the fact that theology has brought faith and revelation within the reach of human reason and has so created a Christian culture and Christian humanism, which again split up hopelessly into contradictions, as is proved by the various church dogmas that fight each other tooth and nail. In other words, Grisebach wants to break through to practical life. He wants to leave behind any kind of historic reminiscences, he exposes the human truths as unreal and misleading, in short, as dream worlds. He wants to remove all those artificial barriers and to destroy all theories, until he experiences actuality in the contradiction of his fellowman, for which he must keep himself open, in the expectation of being able to bear it. This is for him the call of the hour. He thereby moves within the category of contingency which is anti-historical and outside historic time. The peace which he thereby hopes to gain links up with the word of peace Christ spoke on the Cross when he interceded for his tormentors saying: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." Thus the Cross has no historic meaning but practical significance, i.e., it is meaningful only for the man who has left all theory

behind, and who is actively engaged in actuality. For to such a man the only hope is to stand through the termination and limitation of his ego by his fellowman to the bitter end, as the only possibility of experiencing peace. To the one that has realised the necessity of this experience of contradiction, the Cross suddenly assumes the central position of his life; for in it all his hope and expectation is already fulfilled.

We see that it is Grisebach's purpose to prevent us from chasing a phantom of truth, which we shall never reach, but by which we divide ourselves hopelessly, become fanatics and cool-bloodedly kill each other, and all that in the name of truth, human rights, liberty, culture and even God. That is why the Second World War to Grisebach constituted a "crisis of truth."¹ He, therefore, wants to unmask our truth as an untruth and refer us to actual life, i.e., the everyday relationship with our neighbour, and he sees our whole future not arising from the historic past and merging into a historic future, but from my present everyday relation of contradictoriness with my fellowman, whose contradiction I expect to be enabled to bear in the future. This future does not lie on a historic and theoretical level, but on a practical one which eventually might afford me peace.

Thus the young man who might have harboured high-flying ideals and conceptions of truth is suddenly disillusioned. He is told that there is no one who can lead him into such a truth, that to chase after it is dangerous. Instead, he is referred to the actual situation in which he finds himself, i.e., the contradiction he experiences every day on the part of his fellowman, to whose opinion he should keep himself open, instead of hardening and closing himself to it. And it does not matter whether this fellowman is older or younger. For in the actual situation of life there is not, as in history, a chronological succession of the young to the new generation, but they live side by side in the same situation.

It is highly probable that the young people will not like this outcome, and we warned from the beginning that the message we had to deliver was not one that was of an elating and edifying character. But we are in a position to make allowance for a characteristic in man without which we think he cannot exist at all, and which will be more in conformance with that which the young generation feels. We believe that Grisebach has spoken too much from an apocalyptical or perhaps even from an eschatological position. By that we mean that we gain the impression from his writings that he conceived the period in which he flourished, that is the period from the First to the Second World War, as the final bankruptcy of our truth and of all our wisdom, so that a complete about turn was inevitable. Moreover, he saw the only worthwhile expectation not in the hope of the ultimate perfection of mankind and a golden age but in the expectation of an experience of peace. He was naturally

¹ Besides *Schicksalsstunde des Abendlandes*, cf. *Was ist Wahrheit in Wirklichkeit?*

suspicious of all constructiveness on the part of man, thereby demanding of man something that is perhaps impossible, namely, to overcome his constructive nature, i.e., to posit himself as a self and to build his own truth, his own house or his own world. This characteristic of man to him represented an obstacle to and an evasion of actuality, i.e., the contradiction on the part of the fellowman, which man might eventually come to suffer in perfect resignation. In other words, the coming to an end of man's self through the contradiction of his fellowman represented for Grisebach the only true reality. In it man experienced peace. But we must ask: Does not this experience of the termination of one's own self, the enduring to the very end of the suffering inflicted on me by the fellowman, mean the end of man? Should we only act or rather not act, but merely obey and suffer in expectation of the end which will bring us peace? And even if we cannot answer the ethical "should," we must ask: Is this not against our nature? It seems to us as though man cannot free himself of the historic view, because he himself is the maker of history (the future) in the face of history (the past). In other words, man is essentially historic. He himself is becoming. He comes and goes and posits his truth in contradiction to other truths which were built in the past, thereby provoking new contradiction in the form of fresh truths posited by others in the future. And it is when we include this characteristic of man, that we can make allowance for the urge of youth to build a new world in opposition to the old one. But let us quickly add here that, by making this concession, we do not mean that the young people now should resume the chase after an absolute truth, which we have exposed, together with Grisebach, as an illusion. We also refer youth to actual life, but we do not believe that we should only live in the expectation of the end.

When we entered upon our discourse, we pointed out that each individual builds his own private world, by which he becomes more or less certain of himself and which represents his truth. Also groups of people bound together by a common fate, a common political or religious creed, e.g., families, nations, political parties and religious denominations, posit their respective truth. Scientists, artists, philosophers and theologians respectively posit their truths in the form of laws of nature, aesthetic truths of nature, world views and systems of faith. Now all these truths are relative in that they arise from a specific historic situation. And what is more, they have all been built in answer or contradiction to another truth: the child against his parents, husband against wife, family against family, nation against nation, or one political party against the other, one religious creed against the other. Scientists vehemently oppose each other when it comes to the interpretation of their results; artists criticise each other's methods of creation; philosophers argue about truth, reality, validity, knowledge, good and evil, and construct conflicting world views; and theologians quarrel about the authenticity of the scriptural texts, Jesus as a historic person

and Christ as a divine person, and last but not least about the nature of true faith. And yet in this apparent scandal of man and his history man's true nature is reflected. It becomes evident from man's history and the history of his cultural systems that his true nature is not rationality but contradictoriness, but not in Grisebach's so-called practical sense which only makes allowance for the experience of this contradiction in the expectation of bearing it, but in the sense that the fellowman is both my negation as well as my affirmation.

Grisebach wanted to terminate all individuality in favour of the community. But we hold that without individuality there is no community. In other words, it is in the face of his fellowman that man builds his world. By positing his truth, the fellowman challenges man to build his world and to defend it against the fellowman. In other words, the challenge of the fellowman induces man to call out a distinct halt to him, and man in turn is bidden halt by the fellowman. But the *no* is simultaneously a *yes*, i.e., a recognition of each other's sphere or individuality, and each one becomes conscious of himself by the contradiction on the part of the fellowman. From the contradictory relationship that exists between me and the fellowman, which is both negative as my limitation and affirmative as the confirmation of myself as an individual, it follows that the fellowman and myself are both the architects of actual life. In other words, it is our contradictory truths that constitute the actuality of life, for it is they that create a specific situation. One man alone is therefore never the creator of a situation. It takes always two or more. A situation consists of the contradictions among individuals or groups of individuals that live side by side. In other words, by creating the situation, the contradictory individuals become an inextricable part of it and the situation part of them. It is *their* situation. It follows that every attempt to overcome it by a one-sided rational truth, where man possibly transcends himself, is futile and condemned to failure. For any attempt of establishing an absolute is nothing but an attempt to evade actuality or transcend it. But actuality does not allow itself to be transcended, it punishes man for every attempt to do so. We have already enumerated the catastrophes that followed each attempt to absolutise the truth. There is in this world no such thing as a truth but merely contradictory relative truths, i.e., the relative worlds constructed by contradictory individuals, which create a situation. To overcome such a situation would mean to overcome nature, life and the individual, i.e., oneself. In other words, it would always constitute the termination of actuality, the human truths. *We have thus to refer the young generation to actuality, i.e., to the very situation in which they are, instead of directing their attention to a future which is entirely hypothetical. We have to point out to them that their future is bound up with the existing situation of the present.*

For it is in the present that the young generation must formulate their truth, i.e., build their world. But they must do so with the greatest responsibility, if they wish to make sure of their freedom and the

freedom of mankind. But this cannot be done by positing their truth as absolute on account of harbouring a false and illusory idea of history. Man can only remain free if he accepts the actually existing situation of which he is an inextricable part, because he is its maker. The young generation must, therefore, realise first that, without the existing world of the older generation, they would not be able to build their own world. In other words, youth is only in a position to protest against something and to contradict it if such something, in this case another world of values, exists. We have, however, seen that the values of the parents do not simply disappear, but continue to live side by side with the values of the younger generation. Thereby a situation of conflict is created by both parties. And it is in this respect that both architects of actuality realise the relatedness of their respective truths to their respective positions. Instead of claiming their self-constructed worlds as absolute, by which they themselves become the prisoners of their truth, they become free in adopting a responsible attitude towards each other. By this is meant that, instead of trying to down each other and to assert themselves over each other, they keep themselves open to each other and listen to each other.

Once the older generation realises that it is just the course of natural events that no human truth will remain uncontradicted, that no cultural system and values will last for good, it will accept the situation, i.e., that contradiction on the part of youth is natural. It will then shift its position and adjust it to the new situation by making certain reasonable concessions to it. It will seek to discuss the situation with the young people. It will not merely "instruct" the young generation by offering one "absolute" system, but it will try to answer their questions honestly and openly in the light of their own experiences. It will endeavour to understand the genuine needs of youth, and even offer advice and help in the construction of their new world. But it will warn the young people not to nurse any false, illusory and romantic expectations, and it will refer them to the actual situation in which they are. It must point out to them that it is only natural when they start constructing their new world, when they work out their new values, and when they posit their new truth. But youth must never forget that this new truth can never be absolute; it is the result of a specific actual situation. They must realise that, as soon as they have posited their truth, it will be questioned again by the older generation, sections of the same generation and by the younger generation. In other words, the task of parents, school and university is to refer youth to the actual situation in which they are. In the family the child finds ample opportunity to experience in a small and familiar circle the contradictoriness of life as well as of human nature. There he will build his world in opposition to his parents and his brothers and sisters. There he will have to learn to defend it against any encroachments on the part of his relations and to delineate it clearly. At the same time he will, in the interest of the family, have to make concessions, to exercise self-control

and to recognise and respect the regions of his relations' self. If the child is older, he may have to assume certain tasks and duties to be carried out in the interest of the whole family. Thus the family reflects the free community. Here we find the contradictory situation between older and younger as well as contemporaries, we find already the problem of mine and thine, of who is to do what kind of work, etc. And it is in this smallest of all communities that the child is given his first opportunity to be responsible and therefore to be free. For it is there that he will have to keep himself open and to listen to his parents and his brothers and sisters. It is there that he must learn self-control and that all his actions are judged in relation to others. In other words, it is in the family that the child first learns to accept the actual situation, instead of trying to overcome it by positing himself as absolute. And if he continues to behave in the same way as a member of the larger community, the town in which he lives and the state of which he is a citizen, then we should have a natural free community in which contradiction is not overcome by some ideology which parades as absolute truth and thereby frequently, in the name of freedom, kills all freedom, but in which contradiction is accepted, respected and listened to by all citizens as the true guarantee of freedom.

It is, therefore, the task of the teacher and professor to show his students the contradictory nature of the sciences, the arts, philosophy and theology. In history he will show how man again and again had to build his truth and his world in opposition, to other existing truths, and how his truth and world were in turn contradicted by others. He will demonstrate how, in building his truth, man again and again sought to transcend himself and that such attempts were followed by the collapse of cultural epochs, i.e., Plato's and Aristotle's sublime structures were followed by the collapse of Greek culture and political conquest by foreign states; Thomas Aquinas' rational theology at the same time heralded the disintegration of Scholasticism; Hegel's theological rationalism was at the same time the beginning of the disintegration of the bourgeois culture and values. The teacher and professor will then expose as an illusion both progress and the unfolding of reason in history. He will refer his students to their present situation which is historic in as much as in it the young people again must build their culture and their world. In other words, they must find *their* values and *their* truth in the face of previously existing ones, and their truth will in turn be contradicted by a future generation. The world which is built by the young generation cannot be built for them by the teacher, professor or anybody else, but it is for the young people themselves to construct it; for it is at the same time an expression of their self. But they must realise that thereby they will build a world in which *they* are going to live, which is meaningful and therefore true to them. But they must build this world in responsibility, i.e., they must listen to the older generation as well as to their contemporaries i.e., groups and sections of other young people in other parts of the world, including some in


their own country who may question and contradict their truth.

It is for this reason that there should be between parent and child, teacher and pupil, professor and student an exchange of opinion, question and answer rather than mere formal education and teaching. It is, however, only if the young generation becomes conscious of the situation in which it finds itself and of which as its architect it is an inextricable part, that it will be free from the illusory truth of history as the unfolding of human reason and therefore of progress. It will then never cherish any expectations which will never be fulfilled, but its expectations will arise out of the actual situation, namely, out of the necessity of having to build a world for itself in the face of an existing one. Instead of adopting an attitude of arrogance and self-righteousness, instead of ignoring the fellowman and expecting to remove all tension and conflict by realising the absolute truth, the young people will be modest, they will act responsibly, i.e., they will, in building their truth, keep themselves open for the contradiction of others, and they will be free from illusions themselves and will guarantee the freedom of others, of the older generation, of their contemporaries and of those to come. Once actuality has been accepted as a limit and it has dawned upon man that he is an integral part of it, he will not strive to remove natural conflict, thereby creating insurmountable problems and inviting a catastrophe which at the present stage of science and technology may well end in the extinction of all mankind, but will content himself with being the architect of actuality. That is all he can really know or rather experience.

From the above the great responsibility which lies in the hands of youth clearly outlines itself. It is no longer the responsibility towards a historic spirit which entrusted the task to the young generation of being the torchbearers of cultural values and of reason, but it is the responsibility towards the fellowman and towards all men, the older, the contemporaries and those to come. This responsibility calls upon the young generation to make a decision in favour of freedom, i.e., to keep themselves open for the truths and the contradiction of others, because the continuation of life is ensured only by the acceptance of this contradiction; for this very contradiction is the guarantee of everyone's freedom, including my own.

If, however, the young generation continues to lay claim to absoluteness (which claim resulted from its rationalistic historic attitude) and seeks to overcome a situation of which it is an integral part and which it has itself helped to create, namely, the conflict in which it finds itself with others (the older generation and contemporaries), it will thereby really try to overcome itself, i.e., actuality. As, however, actuality cannot be overcome, such an attempt can only lead to another catastrophe, which at the present stage may be fatal to all men. It is in this sense that the young generation holds in its hands the fate of mankind. The decision which it makes is thus of the greatest consequence. May youth be guided in its actions by the greatest circumspection and dis-

cretion, and may it grasp the ethical implication of each actual situation i.e., that the contradictoriness of man commands him to be modest, respectful, understanding, self-controlled and loving; for real love is nothing but to curb your ego and thus to make a sacrifice in favour of your fellowman. It is this deep concern for the young generation and for all mankind as far as their expectation of the future is concerned which caused us to refer them to actuality, i.e., not to turn their face towards an impossible goal, the full unfolding of reason and the further perfection of man, but to become aware that his true nature is contradictoriness, which causes us to construct our relative truths and worlds in the face of previously existing ones. By so doing, we become the architects of our own actual situation. Our expectation, therefore, should be focussed on our fellowman, who, whether we like it or not, will question our truths, worlds and cultural values again. It is in this sense that the young people's expectations should be focussed on contradictory actuality, instead of an absolute truth which is based on the overestimation of the rational nature of man and which overlooks his contradictory character. It is in this sense that the appeal is made to the young generation, to accept their actual situation by which they accept themselves.



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WHAT IS DEMOCRACY ?

(A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITION)

In this brief paper our intention is not to give a historical survey of democracy; for the description of the rise and development of democracy is obviously the task of the historian. As philosophers we must put the question : What is democracy ? And we propose to give an answer to that question. The fact that the historian is in a position to describe the rise and development of democracy, the fact, therefore, that there is a history of democracy suggests that democracy is nothing that can be defined in the same way as one can define the behaviour or motion of a physical body such as a stone (as is done by physics) or the extension and area of a geometrical figure such as a triangle (as is done by mathematics). And yet if we intend to answer the question : What is democracy ? we must be able to arrive at a definition. It is of no use to say : Democracy is the rule of the people. This is nothing but the literal meaning of the word democracy. But throughout history this rule of the people presents itself in many various forms. And have we not even been told by dictators that true democracy has been realized only under their regime, as they have been entrusted with the power they wield by the overwhelming majority of the people ? This shows the inadequacy of the definition of democracy as rule of the people. If we want to arrive at a definition which is more than a mere analytical proposition and which is based on experience and therefore even points in a practical direction, we should try to find the common structure that is observable in all the various forms of state that have passed under the name of democracy and then investigate this structure as to its value and practicability.

We all agree that democracy is a form of state. This being so, we should, with a view to ascertaining the common structure of all forms of democracy, first ask the question : What is the origin of the state ? Plato answers : The imperfection of human nature. What does this answer mean ? It points to the fact that each state tries to overcome the conflict, tension and contradiction that naturally exist from individual to individual and therefore between the individual and community by subsuming the individual under some symbol or principle by the mediation of which the gulf between man and citizen is healed, and by virtue of which the individual participates in the whole community. Thus in the old African tribal society it was the mystical character of the chieftainship, as the link between the supersensual world and the sensual world, through which the individual member of the tribe was blended with the tribe as such. In the Western monarchy of despotic nature, it was the idea of

kingship through the grace of God that turned individuals into "subjects" to quote a few examples. In the case of democracy, now, it is the definition of man as a rational animal that turns him into a political animal. In other words, the realization that all men possessed reason caused society itself to become an expression of such reason. To put it otherwise, society became an abstraction under which the individual was subsumed and into which he was harmoniously blended if he acted reasonably! That is, if he used his reason to control his egoistic impulses and desires, and if he conformed to the rational ideal of society. It becomes thus understandable that the collective expression of ancient Greek reason, the polis, was primarily seen to have an educative function and even a religious function. It sought to educate the individual to act reasonably, that is to conform to the customs and conventions of the polis, and it was even the true object of worship; for all prosecution for asebaia (impiety) was in reality political in character (Socrates). Both Plato and Aristotle also conceive the state as a primarily educational institution in the above sense, except that they expect the individual to conform with *their* rational principle, i.e., Plato's Agathon and Aristotle's Golden Mean.

And whether we take now Political or Civil Society, which comes into existence by the majority of reasonable individuals who conclude a contract, which puts men from a state of nature (in which they possess unrestricted freedom as individuals) into that of a Commonwealth (in which they delegate powers to the Legislative, or the Magistrate appointed by it), or whether we choose Rousseau's Volonté Générale, an abstraction that likewise arises out of a contract, it does not matter; each time we end up in an abstraction of society. In other words, despite the individual foundation of each democratic system, the individual is swallowed by a bloodless and pale collective, remote from pulsating life, such is the levelling character of the above rational principles. It went so far that, during the French Revolution, reason was worshipped as "Être Suprême," and in Auguste Comte's sociology society itself is worshipped as the "Greater Being."

From the above we have now established the structure of the various democratic forms of state, i.e., that which they have in common: *To overcome the gulf between individual and community, man and citizen, they all subsume the individual under some rational principle, because all human beings possess reason and can therefore be blended into this rational principle.* This still holds true to-day, as the philosophical and ideological roots of our modern Western democracy lie in the 17th and 18th centuries. Thus Locke is the father of the present English parliamentary system, Voltaire and Rousseau the advocates of human rights, Benjamin Franklin one of the authors of the American Declaration of Independence of 1776.

As to the adequacy and practicability of the method of subsuming the individual under a rational principle, we must, in the light of our above remarks, express great doubt. In the first place, we hold that, in

the above form, democracy fails its purpose, which may be said to consist in being the guardian and protector of individual freedom and the basic human rights. It has in its above sense the tendency to become a dogma which practically puts human reason as absolute and which, together with the increasing industrialisation and mechanisation of society, threatens to level individuals, to transform them into automata which mechanically carry out their assigned job in the interest of the collective, and which are taken care of by the state in the same routine manner. Father state becomes a welfare state and more and more takes over the function of the pater familias. The family is more and more undermined and morality undergoes decisive changes (Cf. B. Russell, *Marriage and Morals*). Modern technical means, e.g., radio and television, enable the state to influence the citizen all the time. The modern methods of bureaucracy, i.e., the rule of the paper form, illuminate the last corner of individual privacy. And we could name many more features, e.g., the progressing nationalization of private enterprise, of the means of production, and of education, which point in the same direction: The increasing power of the democratic state and its subtle domination of the individual, who is completely swallowed up by it.

All these are appalling features which so to speak cut off the roots of all true democracy, namely, individual freedom and self-realization, true freedom of speech and opinion, privacy and as little interference on the part of the state as possible. The worship and overestimation of human reason have turned democracy into a *dogma of the salvation of mankind through reason* the application of which is supposed to work everywhere and at any time. But there lies the cardinal mistake we make. In the first place, even in the democracies, the one-sided absolutisation of reason enables the state to become more and more dictatorial, as we have seen. In Britain the Labour government, through establishing the welfare state during its last period of power, certainly increased the power of the state. In France the abuses of Parliamentarianism caused the nation to entrust certain dictatorial powers to President de Gaulle. In Germany the old man Adenauer still holds a firm grip on the nation despite his 87 years and a democratic constitution, and in Soviet Russia, which also claims to be a democracy, open coercion is exercised to make the individual conformable to the demands of the state or rather the Communist Party. In the second place, events in certain parts of Africa have made it doubtful if democracy qua absolutised reason works in this continent. For democracy in the form of absolutized reason has grown on Western soil very gradually and historically, together with Western science, technique and economics. Is it surprising that its abrupt application to African conditions is bound to fail?

But do not misunderstand us, we are not saying that democracy in this continent is impossible. What we are saying is that it seems unlikely that it is possible in the above form, and that eventually the African must find his own form of democracy; for have we not seen that the

Western form itself has grown into something which contradicts its original purpose and therefore needs to be reformed ?

When we now speak of such reform, we actually are seeking another definition of democracy than the previous one, which said that what all forms of democracy had in common was : *To overcome the gulf between individual and community, man and citizen, by subsuming the individual under some rational principle, because all human beings possess reason and can therefore be blended into this rational principle.* And perhaps our new definition will make possible the application of democracy to all human beings. But to achieve this, the exclusively rational structure of democracy must be replaced by a much broader structure, and it is now our intention to develop this structure.

As a first point in this connection we would like to point out that reason is by no means the only characteristic of man. He is just as much irrational as rational, if not even more so. To overemphasize reason, therefore, leads to a rationalism which ignores and neglects other important aspects of life. We must clearly realize that our reason is not something that is afloat and that can be separated from our sense-perceptions, sensations and inner drives, impulses and desires, but that it is firmly anchored in them. Reason is thus always relative to our peculiar physical constitution, our surroundings, our upbringing. In short, reason has primarily the task of converting chaos into cosmos, i.e., to shift, order and arrange the mass of sense impressions, feelings and ideas that penetrate our mind. By arranging them into a coherent and meaningful whole, we construct and build our world, in which we are at home, which is familiar to us and offers us some temporary security. Saint-Exupéry has compared this abode of ours with a fortress in the desert which has continually to be defended against the advancing desert (chaos) which seeks to devour it.

It follows that man is forced to assert himself continually, his world, his truth. It is therefore impossible for our reason to reach absolute truth, i.e., truth free of contradiction; to declare therefore that reason is infallible and objective permanent truth, must mislead man.

In addition, we have already mentioned that there is no such thing as a democracy, but that its various forms and their governing rational principles are historically rooted and therefore relative.

It follows that we must dig deeper, if we wish to find the true essence of man. Man's nature cannot possibly be exclusively rational, so that he can be subsumed under a rational principle which is considered absolute and infallible. Man is less and more than that. He is less in that he is incapable of reaching absolute truth by his reason, and he is more in that he is the architect of actuality. He is not merely a rational animal, but an acting animal, and purposeful action includes reason. We called man an acting animal because his purpose in life is to posit his own truth in the above sense. But he can only do so in the face of the counter-truth of his fellowman. Without him man would be mute. He speaks because he is challenged by him; his self-constructed world is threatened by him. The fellowman is therefore the contradiction

of man. He both negates and affirms him, limits and expands him. The individual must thus always be considered in the light of the contradictory relation in which he stands to his fellowman. It is this very relationship that weaves the pattern of life, which consists of man's contradictory worlds and truths, be it in ordinary life, in science, arts, religion, etc. It follows that man is essentially contradictory and that, if we try to subsume man under one absolute principle, we act against his very nature, and we stand in the way of life and actuality. We must therefore conclude that the attempt to bridge the gulf between man and his fellowman, individual and community by blending the individual harmoniously into some abstract rational principle or concept, is a vain undertaking, as it is against man's nature and actual life.

We must, therefore, make no attempt to eliminate the contradictoriness that exists from individual to individual, but we must acknowledge and accept it. It is this very relation of conflict which is the broader structure of any healthy, sound and free community. Only if we realize and accept man's true nature as consisting of contradictoriness, is the freedom of the individual, the foundation of every true democracy, ensured, because by limiting each other and yet confirming each other, individuals are prevented from positing their truth in an absolute way.

Naturally, if we accept contradictoriness as the new broader structure of the community, the individuals will have to act in a highly circumspect and responsible manner. *Together in Excellence* We must learn to be of the highest moral integrity. If the animal part of our nature tempts us to posit our truth and our world as absolute and infallible with the aim to down our fellowman and repress him, we must realize that we act thereby against our own interests. For not only do we need our fellowman as a confirmation of ourselves and not only do we require his truth to orientate us by it, but by declaring ourselves absolute, we kill actual life and freedom, not only the freedom of our fellowman but also our own, because then we become the slave and the prisoner of our own truth. By keeping ourselves open, therefore, for the truth of our fellowman, by listening to him and trying to understand his situation, we do not only ensure his individual freedom but our own too. If we take such an understanding attitude, he will assume the same, and he will keep us away from the temptation to posit our truth and ourselves as absolute.

By assuming the above attitude, we are true to ourselves and to actual life of which we are an inherent part in as much as we help to weave it. We cannot, we shall not and we must not try to remove the contradictory relation that exists from individual to individual; for in it lies the very safeguard of individual freedom, which consists in being able to be true to oneself, that is one's contradictory nature. And it is this individual freedom which is the very core of every genuine democracy. Now, this contradictory relation must not be confused with a problem. The difference between the two is that the former is inherent in us and

we form an integral part of it, the latter is a mere product of the mind and is distant from us, so that we can look at it. In other words, the natural contradictory relation that exists between me and my fellowman can easily be converted into a problem, if we try to remove it by some truth, i.e., scientific truth, ideological truth or project, through which we hope to bridge this gulf, which, however, is at the same time a bridge in itself, namely, the very bridge of actual life. Any attempted solution in the above sense leads to the blocking of the way, not only to our fellowman but ourselves, in short, to actual life the very essence of which is contradictoriness.

In any genuine community, therefore, which alone is worthy of the name of democracy, any truth, project, scheme, ideology, which lays claim to absoluteness, will not only be discouraged, but will be combated and contradicted by all its members. Above all, philosophy in this respect can be of invaluable service to the community, not only by helping to construct a truth from the given situation in which the community finds itself to make possible for its members a living together and co-operation in contradiction, but also by assuming the role of a guardian of freedom, i.e., by refuting at once any claim to absolutism on the part of any one. Only in this way can the existence of a true democracy be insured. It will be a community which is always alert and responsive to the exigencies of the changing conditions of life, and it will be a happy community in its freedom. For if the relation of contradictoriness is accepted in a *positive* way, not merely in resignation, and if its full meaning to each of us is realized, then a spirit of friendship can be developed, not despite but because of contradiction. If we base democracy on the relation of contradictoriness in the above sense, then there can be no danger of dictatorship. If we base it however exclusively on the principle of reason, then there is always the danger that it suddenly changes over into a dictatorship. Remember the lessons of history. The originally democratic Rome developed into an autocratic empire which retained some democratic trappings. The democratic spirit of the French Revolution was drowned in the bloodshed by the guillotine under the Regime of Terror. Remember the recent example of Germany and observe the writing on the wall to-day all over the world, including this continent. What therefore is true democracy ?

It cannot be merely defined as *the rule of the people*, as we have seen, because this rule of the people is so vague that dictatorships flourished under the same flag. We, therefore, had to find the structure of democracy first, i.e., that which all forms of state that passed under that name had in common.

We found that, in the past, democracy was based on the rationality of individuals, and the structure of democracy was *some rational principle under which individuals were subsumed, and in which they could be blended by virtue of their reason*. We saw the inadequacy of this definition, the dangers it implied, and the wrong and misleading direction into which it pointed (it estranged man from himself, from his own

nature and actual life, he lost his identity as an individual and was swallowed up by some abstract principle or concept).

Democracy should, however, be based on the relation of contradiction as it exists between individual and individual.

Democracy could then be defined as: *A Community the individual members of which guarantee each other's freedom by conforming to their being essentially contradictory, and who therefore act responsibly, i.e., in full consciousness of the fact that, through their c/ntradictoriness, they weave the pattern of life of their community of which they are therefore an inherent part. To safeguard their freedom of contradiction, they refute, reject and combat most resolutely any claim to absoluteness on any one's part and any truth, scheme or ideology which parades as absolute.* We believe that only if we define democracy in the above sense and base it on a structure that is common to all human beings, it will be applicable everywhere and to all people in the world. And only a democracy of this form will ensure the freedom of all.



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
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