


POLITICAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SUDAN PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION MOVEMENT, SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION
ARMY AND ANYA NYA II: "A NEGOTIATION TOOL FOR
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND PEACE IN POST WAR
SOUTHERN SUDAN".

BY



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MINI-DESERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS IN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE FACULTY OF
MANAGEMENT AND COMRECE, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION.

UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE

SUPERVISOR: PROF. MH. KANYANE

COMPLETED: JUNE 2008

Declaration

I, James Hoth Mai, a student of Fort Hare University, School of Public Management and Development at Bisho campus, declare that to the best of my knowledge the work presented in this dissertation, which is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters degree in Public Administration, is my original work and has not been submitted for examination or a degree at this or any other University.

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Acknowledgements

The third wave of fighting in Southern Sudan started on 16 May 1983 when the government in Khartoum attacked one of the battalions stationed in Bor town on the grounds that the force was defying orders from Khartoum and that its senior officers were in contact with AnyaNya II forces, who were fighting the central government. As a result of that attack, a good number of students left their schooling, took to the bush and joined the newly established liberation Movement in Southern Sudan. Subsequently, all the politicians, students, civil servants and citizens who left the South as result of this rebellion, were trained as militants by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It was the events of June 1983 that led to the formation of the SPLM/A and its subsequent confrontation with the AnyaNya II forces that this study tried to explain.



First and foremost it is my pleasure to thank the founder of the SPLM/A, the late Dr John Garang de Mabior who all along encouraged the rank and file of the Movement to further their education despite the constraints of resources during the war, Dr Garang managed to make scholarships available for this purpose. My gratitude also goes to the current 1st vice president of Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan, 1st Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, the Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, who was the Chief of General Staff of the SPLA during the war, and in that capacity supported me in many ways, especially by granting me study leave whenever I ask for it.

My special thanks go to Dr John Gai Nyuot Yoh, a lecturer at the University of South Africa (UNISA), who encouraged me to research this topic and continually provided me with relevant references for this study. I wish to extend my gratitude to Charles Ile and his dear wife Issy Ile, who was the coordinator for our study programme, assisted by the energetic and talented assistants Shungu Gwarinda and Nomxolisi Maninjwa, without whose support, I would have not successfully completed this study. My special thanks go to my supervisor, Professor Modimowabawa Hendrick Kanyane who guided me throughout the course. In fact, without Prof. Kanyane's excellent guidance, I would have not crossed the bridge.

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


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Abstract

Sudan's conflict has a lot of complexities. The conflict began with North-South war that started on 18 August 1955. The Torit mutiny, which broke out before the independence from the Great Britain on 1 January 1956, marked the beginning of the first civil war in the country (1955-1972), which continued for 17 years, after which the southern region achieved autonomy in February 1972 through the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The causes of the discontent in the south were ascribed, among other factors, to the political and socio-economic domination of the south by the northern Sudan central government, the increment of northerners in administrative areas in the south such as the police, army and heads of public institutions. Southern intellectuals regarded this attitude and these actions as the beginning of another phase of colonization by the northerners.




By late 1982 and early 1983, the latest rebellion in the Southern regions broke out due to four major reasons:

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1. The discovery of Sudan's oil in the South by an American based Chevron Company in 1979. The decision by the central government to construct a refinery for the exportation of the oil and the policy of exploitation of oil resources for the development of the north sparked off an angry reaction from the south.
2. The segregation and discrimination of Sudanese citizens from the South, west and east in the capital of the country. The policy of forced deportation of citizens from these regions of Sudan prompted many of them to join the rebellion in the South.
3. The central government imposed Islamic laws on the Sudanese, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This policy was rejected and resisted by Muslims and non Muslims in the country, and a good number of the Sudanese who openly opposed the imposition of the Islamic laws joined the rebellion in the South.

4. Abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that gave self-government to the south. Because of policies of the central government, the re-division of the Southern Region into more than one region turned the conflict into a south-south dispute. Indeed, the tensions in the South were aggravated by the fact that the central government was able to manipulate some Southern politicians who favoured a federal system by introducing in June 1983, a loosely decentralized system that divided the south into three separate regions. Some politicians were induced into the central government by giving them junior ministerial positions, to silence their opposition and by 1984, all armed factions in the south opposed to the SPLM/A, especially the Anya Nya II, got handouts from the government to fight the SPLM/A.



The main objective of this research is to determine what aspects of the reconciliation between the SPLM/SPLA and Anya-Nya I from 1987-1988 can be used as a model for south Sudanese reconciliation in the post-war era. This is done through presentation of an analysis of the conflict between the SPLM/A and the other Southern Sudanese armed groups and political parties, and how to benefit from these experiences and the utilization of mechanisms used during the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya-Nya II during the 1980s. Moreover, the study aims at identifying effective conflict resolution strategies that could be applied in the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and other political and military groups during the post conflict era.

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Indeed, the study attempts to expose the challenges that are facing the leaders of the SPLM/A and other armed groups as they attempt to deal with their conflict; and tries to trace the role of individual political actors who are potentially instrumental in resolving the conflicts and to speculate on the prospects for the settlement of the conflicts that the SPLM/A and other armed groups are faced with. What are the obstacles preventing the resolution of these conflicts? Who are responsible for creating those obstacles? What could be the mechanisms that are effective to resolve them? And how could this study benefit from conflict resolution mechanisms used during the SPLM-Anya Nya Two reconciliation process in the 1980s?

List of acronyms

Anya Nya II: These were remnants of Anya-Nya I, a military group which refused to accept the Addis Ababa agreement, formed in 1975 after they mutinied in Akobo garrison, killing their commanding officer.

BSC: Bright Star Campaign.

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 2005 between Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Government of Sudan

EDF: Equatoria Defence Force

LC: Leadership Council

FARRA: Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association

NCOs: Non-Commissioned officers

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NLC: National Liberation Council

PMHC: Political Military High Command

PRM/A: Patriotic Resistance Movement and Patriotic Resistance Army

SPDF: Sudan People's Democratic Front

SPLM: Sudan People's Liberation Movement, a guerilla movement based in southern Sudan, formed in July 1983.

SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army, the military wing of the SPLM

SPLM/A United: A splinter group which broke away from Nasir faction led by Dr Lam Akol

SRRA: Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association



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SSIM/A: South Sudan Independence Movement and South Sudan Independence Army

SSLM/A: South Sudan Liberation Army is the military wing of Anya-Nya II based in South Sudan.

UDSF/SSDF: United Democratic Salvation Front/South Sudan Defence Forces



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
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
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ORIENTATION

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

Sudan's conflict has many complexities which date back to the nineteenth century. Many peace initiatives and agreements were signed between the various groups involved in the conflict which culminated in a temporary peace. However, the main objective of this research is to determine what aspects of the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II in 1987-1988 can be used as a model for Southern Sudanese reconciliation in the post-war era. It is essential to present an analysis of the conflict between the SPLM/A and the other Southern Sudanese armed groups and political parties opposed to the SPLM/A. It is therefore essential for the purpose of this study to assess ways of benefiting from these experiences.



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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

In 1992, during the Sudanese peace process in the Nigerian capital Abuja, the late leader of the SPLM/A, Dr John Garang, characterized the crisis in Sudan in the following manner: "No crisis known to human society emanates from a void". The problem of modern Sudan began with the slave trade that was started by the Turko-Egyptian intervention in the early 1820s, an odious trade in human beings that is continuing in some parts of Sudan into the twenty-first century. Hundreds of thousands of black Sudanese people were forced into slavery and many tribes including the Bongo, Kresh and Makaraka, were virtually wiped out. Thus began the painful history of what has now become the Republic of Sudan (Garang, 1992).

Sudan came under European colonial rule in 1898 under the dual rule of Britain and Egypt in what became known as “condominium rule”, with Britain playing the role of senior partner. Like the rest of Africa, this was brought about by force of arms. Under the condominium rule it was found that the Sudan was extremely heterogeneous; a multi-lingual, multi-racial, and multi-religious society. They found that the people of southern Sudan, south of the Blue Nile and the Nuba mountains included groupings such as the Fur, the Masalit, the Zaghawa in western Sudan, the Beja of eastern Sudan and Nubians of the far north, who were all indigenous Africans. At independence in 1956 the last official Sudanese census conducted by the colonial government registered the demographic breakdown as 61 per cent African and 39 percent Arab (Garang, 1992).



Having been pressured to decolonize the country, a conference was convened in Juba in 1947 by the British authorities, with the delegation from the south composed mostly of southern tribal chiefs and elders who were by and large civil servants, to prepare the country for independence. The demand of the Southern Sudanese delegation was the establishment of a federal system of government in Sudan (Wawa, 2005:45). When the southerners realized that the country had become independent and none of their demands had been met, they tabled a motion in the first parliament of independent Sudan, reminding their northern counterparts of their promise that once the country gained its independence the Southern request for federation would be given “due consideration”. Instead, the southern representatives were scornfully told that their request for federation had been found unsuitable and impractical for the Sudan. After that rebuff the southerners took to the bush, and thus began the first civil war that lasted for seventeen years (1955-1972) and ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972. However, the brief peace in the country was interrupted when in

May 1983 the latest rebellion in the Southern region broke out because of the following major reasons:

- Oil was discovered in the south of the country by the American-based Chevron Company in 1979. However, the northern government opted to build the main oil refinery in the north; hence
- the exploitation of oil resources for development in the north;
- the central government imposed Islamic laws on the Sudanese, both Muslims and non-Muslims;
- Abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that gave self-government to the southern part of the country (Madut, 2006:59)



It is important, given the history of conflict in Sudan, to assess the prospects for sustainable conflict resolution in a post-war context between the SPLM/A and other Southern Sudanese armed groups and political parties which were not signatories to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP) on 9 January 2005.

It is to be recalled that the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II had political, economic and social causes. The political causes centred on the power struggle between the leaders of Anya Nya II, which was the only Southern Sudanese guerilla movement before the SPLM/A was established in July 1983. The power struggle was about the hierarchy of the movement, particularly in the top leadership of the emerging movement. Regarding the economic causes of the conflict, Anya Nya II was suspicious that with coming of intellectuals and the subsequent formation of one united movement they would lose all the privileges they

were getting as they were the only main rebel movement in the area on the border between Sudan and Ethiopia and had the monopoly, controlling all the economic resources in that area, including taxation. As to the social causes of the conflict, recruits from the Nuer tribe were the dominant elements in Anya Nya II, unlike the SPLM/A, which was a multi-ethnic organization (Johnson, 2003:62).

There is no doubt that post-war Southern Sudan is likely to witness various challenges to the SPLM/A leadership, among others, political, economic and social. One of the main political challenges is how to reconcile the SPLM/A with various other political and military factions and opposition groups in southern Sudan. This situation is likely to render the interim period vulnerable to military and political tensions. Another factor is the impact that these challenges will have on the implementation of the CPA. This situation is reminiscent of a similar one in which the SPLM/A found itself when it got into a confrontation with the Anya Nya II forces in the early 1980s. That confrontation resulted in fierce fighting between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II which lasted for five years. The conflict was, however, resolved after tedious efforts exerted by the parties to the conflict.

There are therefore several lessons that could be learnt from the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II conflict resolution mechanisms that could inform resolution of the current simmering tensions that threaten to explode into a major conflict adversely affecting all the efforts being made to implement the CPA in Southern Sudan. Therefore the experience and conflict resolution mechanisms used during the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II reconciliation process in the 1980s need to be investigated, to determine whether lessons can be drawn or a framework developed to promote the current peace and nation-building efforts.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Like other liberation movements that emerged from the war, the SPLM/A found itself facing several internal and external tensions in relation to other Southern Sudanese political and military groups (Akol, 2001:27). This state of affairs is likely to have a serious negative impact on bringing lasting peace and unity to Southern Sudan and, as a worst-case scenario, it may also lead to difficulties that may hamper the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in Nairobi, Kenya between the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan on 9 January 2005.



The delicate state of the Sudanese conflict is summed up by Jambo (2004:91), who argues that, "The civil war in Sudan has had at least the following consequences: north-south war, inter-ethnic and inter-tribal conflicts". The civil war and conflict among communities in Southern Sudan resulted in total disruption of the social order and economic activities, collapse of governance and service delivery. However, the recent war in Sudan fought between various factions and communities especially in the south continued unabated for 21 years. Hitherto no conflict, whether political or military, has taken care of good governance, human rights or service delivery. It is therefore important to investigate how previous tensions between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II were resolved in order to better inform current nation-building initiatives and prevent the country from reverting to another bloody conflict.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1.4.1 General objective

The objective of this study is to determine what aspects of the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II in 1987-1988 could be used to develop a model for Southern Sudanese reconciliation in the post-war era.

1.4.2 The specific objectives of the study

The specific objectives of the study are to

- assess the nature of the conflict between the SPLM/A and the other Southern Sudanese armed groups and political parties opposed to the SPLM/A and its impact on service delivery;
- determine possible lessons from past experiences through analyzing the conflict resolution mechanisms used during the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II during the 1980s;
- attempt to provide effective peace, unity and nation-building strategies that could be applied in the resolution of the conflict between the SPLM/A and other political and military groups in Southern Sudan;
- draw lessons from South Africa on how negotiations yielded a peace settlement, democracy and good governance.




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1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

This study will hopefully contribute to the study of post-conflict resolution in Southern Sudan and Africa at large, particularly on the challenges of building unity and nations in multi-ethnic societies. It is important to note that little research has been done on issues of the implementation of peace agreements in post-war Southern Sudan. In this regard, the study will also contribute significantly to the documentation of the history of the Sudan and add to the growing body of knowledge and academic literature on conflict resolution in post-war situations and the implementation of peace agreements in Africa. The findings of this research may assist in informing policy makers and the leadership in the government of Southern Sudan about critical issues in the implementation of the Sudan Peace agreement, so as to address people's social and economic problems in the reconstruction activities and processes.



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1.6 RATIONALE

The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement which was signed by the SPLM/A and the National Congress is a landmark achievement which must be protected and implemented by the parties to it. This study therefore attempts to identify mechanisms that can be used to resolve the conflict between the SPLM/A and the Southern Sudanese armed groups and political parties, which if not addressed may lead to further instability in the country.

1.7 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

While the research focused on printed and primary sources, efforts were made to conduct interviews and questionnaires with those SPLM/A and Anya Nya II leaders and mediators who were instrumental in bringing about the reconciliation between the two parties in 1988. Where it was difficult to gain access to those leaders for interviews, emphasis was placed on accessing published material on the topic. Access to Southern Sudan was limited, however, especially during the rainy season, and where it was difficult by land, air transport was used to access those leaders.



Most post-conflict situations tend to aggravate new internal conflicts among the parties that were involved in the original conflicts, and hence threaten the implementation of the peace agreements signed by the parties. While this is currently the situation prevailing in post-war Sudan, this research did not deal with new internal conflicts in the country. It focused on the identification of mechanisms that could be used to resolve the current conflict between the SPLM/A, the armed groups and other political parties in Southern Sudan. In order to achieve this goal, the study sought to identify and analyze the mechanisms which were used during the 1980s to resolve the SPLM/A-Anya Nya II conflict and the possibility of using them to resolve the current conflict which was the focus of this study.


1.8 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

Chapter One: Introduction and general orientation. In this chapter, an overview of the study and background to the research is discussed.

Chapter Two: Historical Reflections on Conflicts in Southern Sudan. This chapter discusses how the conflict in Southern Sudan started and how it was resolved.

Chapter Three: Literature Review. This chapter reviews the relevant literature on the history of the conflict in Southern Sudan as well as on conflict resolution and nation-building in heterogeneous societies.

Chapter Four: Research Design and Methodology. The theoretical framework of the study, with the focus on the relevant conflict resolution theories, is discussed in this chapter. The selected methodology appropriate for this study, including the instruments employed, the data collection and analysis procedures are also analyzed.



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Chapter Five: Data Analysis. This chapter focuses on the analysis of the findings of the study.

Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendations. Conclusions and recommendations of the study are drawn in this chapter.

1.9 CONCLUSIONS

In the wake of independence Southern Sudan tabled a motion in the first parliament that their request for federation should be given due consideration. However, the consequent refusal to consider the request marked the beginning of the first civil war in the country between the government in Khartoum and the Anya-Nya I rebels (1955-1972).

The current war that ended in 2005 started in 1983 because of the government in Khartoum's refusal to build a refinery in the south to refine the oil discovered in the south by the American Chevron Company, the imposition of Sharia laws (Islamic Laws) on the whole country and the abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement that ended the 17 years' (1955-1972) conflict between government of Sudan and Anya-Nya I fighters.

Like any liberation movement the SPLM/A found itself confronting several internal and external tensions in relation to the Southern Sudanese political and military groups who were not signatories to the agreement signed in Nairobi in 2005. These tensions, if not handled with care, may have a negative impact on obtaining lasting peace and unity in Southern Sudan and may also hamper the smooth implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.



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The general objectives of this study were to determine the aspect of reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II in 1987-1988 whereas the specific objective was to assess the nature of the conflict, draw possible lessons from the experiences through a thorough analysis of the conflict resolution mechanism used during reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and to attempt to provide effective peace, unity and nation-building strategies. However, the research will contribute to the study of conflict resolution in Southern Sudan in particular and Africa in general, focusing particularly on the challenges of building unity and a nation in a multi-ethnic society.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL REFLECTION ON CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant literature on the historical conflicts in Southern Sudan as well as to identify and investigate the methods and mechanisms used during the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and to assess whether these methods and mechanism could be applied to efforts being exerted to resolve the current conflict between the SPLM/A and other Southern Sudanese political and military groups. In this regard, literature on conflict resolution, nation building and the history of the liberation struggle in Southern Sudan will be reviewed.



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In terms of conflict resolution, the mechanisms that were used in the conflict resolution between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and the agreement reached cannot be understood unless a review of the following literature is carried out.

2.2 CAUSES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SPLM/A AND ANYA NYA II

Laue (1987:17) defines conflict as “natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige”. In an African context, conflicts are often related to resources, power struggles, and in some cases, the marginalization of the majority by the minority or vice versa. Political manipulation of the less developed groups by the sophisticated elite may also lead to conflict.

From its inception the SPLM/A witnessed numerous internal conflicts between the forces of 104 and 105 battalions that rebelled in Bor and other areas on the one hand and the politicians who went into exile from other towns in Southern Sudan on the other hand, and between them and the Anya Nya II forces then stationed in Bilpam west of Ethiopia. Leadership crises marked the first problem in the would-be SPLM/A. The leadership crisis referred to above can be divided into two:

- A conflict between the soldiers of 104/105 Battalions commanded by Col. Dr John Garang de Mabior, Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Major William Nyoun Bany and Captain Salva Kiir Mayardit and the politicians under Akout Atem de Mayen, and Samuel Gai Tut.
- A conflict between each group mentioned above and the Anya Nya II found in Bilpam.




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The formation process of the SPLM/A in mid 1983 had witnessed many differences among the leaders, especially when Colonel Dr John Garang called a meeting in Marol cattle camp in Nasir area on 27 May 1983 with 55 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of Bor garrison (105Bn) who rebelled against the government. The meeting was attended by Col. Dr John Garang and Captain Salva Kiir before the arrival of Major Karubino Kuanyin Bol, commanding officer of Bor garrison, who had been wounded during the attack on Bor by government forces on 16 May 1983, and Major William Nyoun Bany, commanding officer of Ayod garrison. Akuot Atem de Mayen was not called to the meeting because the meeting was meant to be between soldiers. When he learned about that meeting, Akuot Atem de Mayen called for a meeting the following day, inviting from the side of the officers only Dr John

Garang and Lt Col. Francis Ngor. Samuel Gai Tut who had arrived the day before, was to attend the meeting from the side of Akuot Atem (Deng, 2005:129).

Colonel Dr John Garang suggested that Captain Salva Kiir Mayardit and Mr Cigai Atem should attend the meeting. However, only Captain Salva was accepted. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the formation of a movement that would lead the struggle of the Sudanese people to a victory. The power struggle started from that meeting. While they were in the meeting the host country, Ethiopia, sent a letter inviting four people, namely Dr John Garang de Mabior, Captain Salva Kiir Mayardit, Akuot Atem de Mayen and Samuel Gai Tut to go to Gambella for an interview to ascertain why they had left their country.




At that juncture, Akuot Atem suggested that they should select a group leader to lead them during that mission. Dr John Garang was of the opinion that they should not select a leader since they were only going for an interview and each one would be asked his own opinion. They could not resolve the matter, so they moved on foot from Marol to Thiajak (Adura) on 18 June where they were picked up by a helicopter on 22 June to Gambella, the venue for the interview. They were taken to Itang after the interview (Interviews with Stephen Duol Choul on 9 December 2005 and Cigai Atem on 18 December 2005).

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While in Itang, a meeting was called towards the end of June by the leaders of different groups that included Anya Nya II of Bilpam, Pakede forces, forces of Gatjiek Wic, the United Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (USSLM) of Kuot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut and the forces led by Dr John Garang. The purpose was to unite those forces under one command to wage a protracted war against the regime in Khartoum. Indeed, during that meeting an agreement was reached in principle that the different groups must be united under one

command, although they avoided discussing the leadership question at the time of the proposed movement. In pursuance of the plan to unite the factions into a solid movement, Dr John Garang went to Bilpam in July 1983 for a meeting with all factions that had met in Itang to discuss the matter. Some of the leadership of Anya Nya II who could not attend the Itang meeting were present. All the factions agreed in principle to have one movement. Questions relating to the nature of leadership and the name of the movement were not discussed (Interview with Lt General Oyay Deng Ajak, 18 May 2007).

Following that meeting, a series of meetings were held specifically to discuss the name that the envisaged organisation would adopt. Several names were suggested including New Forces; 104, 105 battalions, or Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). These discussions did not arrive at agreement on a name.




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Meanwhile the Ethiopian government invited Dr John Garang, Samuel Gai Tut, Salva Kiir and Akuot Atem, who were later joined by Joseph Oduho, to visit Addis Ababa to meet with the Ethiopian authorities. They were asked to present the Manifesto of the envisaged movement to the Ethiopian Government, where they explained the objectives and goals of the proposed organisation. Upon their return from Addis Ababa in August 1983, the five leaders adopted the name "Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)", as the official name of the new organisation. After briefing the different forces then assembled in Itang about their visit to Addis Ababa, the leaders started consultations regarding the leadership of the SPLM/A.

From Samuel Gai Tut's perspective, the origins of disagreement between his group and that of Dr Garang and Captain Kiir, emanated from the dispute over the formation of the

leadership of the new movement. Gai Tut's group proposed that Kuot Atem become the provisional Chairman of the SPLM, with Gai Tut and Garang becoming Chairmen of the Military Committee and Chief of Staff respectively. This suggestion was not entertained by Garang's group, which preferred that Gai Tut and his group be in charge of the political wing of the movement which was accepted by the politicians who agreed to a rotating leadership. On the other hand, Akout suggested that it should be done alphabetically which meant Akout first, followed by Gai Tut and then Odohuo. Odohuo objected to this suggestion on the grounds that the leadership would be taken over by the Upper Nile people as Akout Atem, Gai Tut and John Garang who were proposed to lead the army hailed from Upper Nile, while Garang and his group would control the military wing (Tut, 1984:2). The Ethiopian authorities, who were in contact with Dr John Garang through their Embassy in Khartoum in the early days, favoured the idea that Dr John Garang and his group should take the leadership of the Movement. Having failed to convince the Ethiopians and Dr John Garang group to accept their suggestion, Akout Atem and his group decided to desert Itang and went to Sudan on 3 September 1983.



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On the other hand Madut (2006:67) asserts that in earlier days Samuel Gai Tut, Akuot Atem and William Abdalla Choul suggested that they form the political wing of the movement and Gordon Koang Choul who was then the commander of Anya Nya II would be the head of military wing of USSLM. The suggestion was not accepted by Anya Nya II on the grounds that their organization could not take orders from politicians who were civilians. Indeed, Johnson (2003:62) laments that "there were difficulties aligning dissidents combining Sudanese army units and Anya Nya II soldiers in one command under one unified movement". He further asserts that seniority among them had to be sorted out, which was a matter of concern for Anya Nya II.

On the other hand, Alier (2003:292) contends that the differences between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II were that Anya Nya II saw the SPLM/A as a Marxist Leninist organization that aimed at implementing socialist ideals, including the sharing of wealth among the members of the organization. This would mean that the Anya Nya II leaders, who had the monopoly of accumulating wealth and other social privileges, would no longer enjoy such opportunities. The second problem expressed by the Anya Nya II leaders was their fear of potential influence by intellectuals, politicians and professional soldiers who came to the bush from different parts of the South on the grounds that the newcomers would take over their command since the majority of Anya Nya II were illiterate.




Meanwhile, after Akuot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut's group had left for Sudan, disagreements continued between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II soldiers, who were in Bilpam. The latter refused to join the newly formed SPLM/A, until they were attacked by the SPLM/A forces in October 1983 and they then withdrew to Sudan and joined hands with the USSLM forces. There they formed themselves into Anya Nya II forces with William Abdalla Choul Deang who assumed command after the death of Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot Atem respectively in 1984.

2.3 THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SPLM/A AND ANYA NYA II FORCES

In subsequent years, according to Rolandsen (2005:27), the SPLA made many attempts to join forces with the Anya Nya II group, but these often ended with them fighting each other. For example, one of the SPLA commanders, William Nyuon Bany, made a unilateral

decision to initiate a negotiation between the SPLA and Anya Nya II guerrilla forces. He sent a ten-man delegation to William Chuol Deang on 30 May 1984. The leader of the delegation on the side of the SPLA was Captain Gatwec Thijok. The leader of Anya Nya II (William Chuol Deang) arrested the ten-man delegation from the SPLA. He kept them in detention for a long time. While in detention they were brainwashed and Anya Nya II absorbed them into their forces.

Fukui and Markakis (2005:2) indicate that the conflict in the Horn of Africa was fought in the name of regionalism and clanship. In January 1986, Commander William Nyuon Bany made a second contact with the group of Anya Nya II commanded by Gordon Koang Chol. A number of preliminary talks took place between the two officers. The commander of Anya Nya II (Gordon Koang) agreed to disagree with the position of William Nyuon (interview, Riek Machoch, 20 March 2007).



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Besides the regional differences, ideological interests played a significant role in creating discord between the Eastern and Western Nuer. Gordon Koang and his officers did not want unity with SPLM/A because of accumulating wealth and the socialist ideology the SPLM/A was adapting. The Anya-Nya II group favoured a moderate capitalist system and independence Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A group was fighting to change the dictator regime in Khartoum in a united Sudan.

Indirect consultations were also used by Commander William Nyoun and were thwarted by Anya Nya II who, by late 1984, was enjoying support from the government in Khartoum to fight the SPLM/A. By 29 April 1986 SPLM/A had lost control of headquarters at Bukteng in Nasir area, as a result of which the SPLM/A leadership decided to deploy the Yuany battalion

under the command of Captain James Hoth Mai in the area. Fighting continued after the force entered into the area, which lasted for two years.

It is to be emphasised that Public Administration views conflict as antagonistic, or opposition between or among persons regarding goals, issues and perceptions (Smith & Cronje, 2002:48). In the case of the various factions operating in Southern Sudan the conflict centred politically on each party wanting to control the political environment in the south. Economically, the meagre resources played an important role in the conflict, each group wanted to lay its hands on the resources of the south and ethnically each tribe wanted to control the south and make others adhere to their programmes. As a result government institutions as well as service delivery were affected.



Lan (1997:27-35) contends that public administration views conflict as occurring “in many different situations, between and among members of a family, between labourers and management, in political parties, religious groups, in formal organizations and nations and even in a single mind”. Since independence Southern Sudan has been characterized by internal wars with the north, tribal conflicts and inter-tribal conflicts among Southern Sudanese communities. Successive governments in Khartoum have played a significant role in fomenting these conflicts by arming them, and giving them ammunition just by denying the south the right to establish government institutions whereby people would enjoy services.

2.4 THE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE SPLM/A AND ANYA NYA II FORCES

Meanwhile, the command of the Yuany battalion initiated a direct contact with Anya Nya II soldiers, explaining to them the need for unity. As a result of those contacts a letter was written to Anya Nya II leaders in April 1987 by the command of the Yuany battalion suggesting that the two parties stop the war between brothers, and stating the need for reconciliation and requesting that they should respond immediately. The letter was given to a citizen. After three days an officer called Panom Ruac was sent by Anya Nya II confirming receipt of the letter and proposing to send officers from the SPLM/A to indicate that the movement was serious. Three officers were sent with a letter. They were Lt Choul Choap Dhour, Lt Dak Wiu and Lt John Maluit. The letter of that letter was the beginning of the negotiations. Later on Daniel Komaggot who was supporting the Anya Nya II, and David Dak Gai, joined the SPLM/A and were rushed to Kuanylou to help with the negotiations. Complete unification between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II was concluded on 25 January 1988.

In fact, the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II reconciliation arrangements led the Southern Sudan towards a stable unity and away from ethnic conflict. The appropriately structured reconciliation encouraged moderation and discouraged extremists. The reconciliation was successful in the South. As Lederach (2001:842) states, reconciliation was essential for the peaceful change of government in South Africa. Without an agreement on transitional power-sharing, the conflict over apartheid might not have been brought to an end or a new round of killing might have occurred. He continues to say that reconciliation and the strengthening of community relations must go beyond transitional arrangements. In fact, reconciliation

requires the parties to the conflict to think about how to end undesired conflict, how to find creative solutions to specific problems, and how to use both to build something that would benefit both. Again, he defines reconciliation as the process of change and redefinition of relations and therefore, pushes beyond the resolution of particular issues and towards a comprehensive framework.

The confrontation between the two parties during their conflict resulted in horrors that are typical of ethnic conflict, which defy human imagination. These included mass murder, rape and wanton destruction of property carried out by people who previously had lived together peacefully. The people of Southern Sudan must devote their lives to studying the reconciliation process and try to seek answers to the following questions: What political conditions drove the SPLA/M and Anya Nya II to conflict? What circumstances allowed them to settle their differences peacefully?



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Indeed, scholars have developed theories of conflict resolution and political institutions that can manage conflicts to prevent them from turning into violence. As Timothy Sisk notes, in deeply divided societies such as Southern Sudan, where fear and ignorance are the driving forces of ethnic conflict, people tend to identify themselves by their ethnic group, which thus becomes the defining characteristic of social order (Sisk, 2001:24).

Therefore, in order to avoid such conflict, political institutions must allow communities to participate in the military and political process as the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II reconciliation exemplified and they must include the protection of human rights. Only under such circumstances will ethnic groups be likely to feel valued, according to Anstey (2006:35).

Although the road to reconciliation is long and arduous, it is clear that the potential of

interactive conflict resolution can never be realized unless it becomes more than a part time activity of the mediator.

To many the term 'reconciliation' implies the pursuit of national interest. The changes, however, in the nature of the Sudan conflict and a growing sense of urgency in conflict resolution, are driven partly by modern reconciliation and a feeling for the suffering of fellow humans as well as peaceful coexistence. More importantly, the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II reconciliation took many forms other than coercive action. In fact, the leadership of the Yuany battalion officially offered many avenues to prevent manage and resolve conflict which included pre-planned processes, which paved the way for the involvement of the politicians, traditional leadership and development of a framework.



Indeed, in conflict resolution processes, military solution is not crucial to national reconciliation. However, it should also be recognized that war no longer has a monopoly on the use of force and instruments of violence. In the situation of Southern Sudan, the only effective response to the growing range of actors who have the capacity to threaten the unity of state and the communities is to use the reconciliation process to deal with the various conflicts.

Mampuru and Spoelstra (1994:2) indicate that in South Africa all the ethnic groupings have accepted negotiation as an instrument for effecting political change. The political turmoil that wracked South Africa for more than 300 years was brought to an end by negotiations and national reconciliation after the ruling party realized that they could not quell the people's struggle in South Africa by force and while at the same time the ANC realized that to take

over state power was demanding and time consuming so they had to adopt the negotiation approach as was stipulated in the ANC Freedom Charter of 1956.

In Southern Sudan the experience of the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II shares similarities with that in South Africa. As the conflict raged, Anya Nya II realized with time they would not be able to defeat the SPLM/A. On the other hand, the SPLM/A acknowledged that the war by proxy that the Khartoum government was waging through its support of Anya Nya II and any armed group opposed to the SPLM/A, resulted in the two parties engaging themselves to resolve the conflict amicably and unite to wage a people's war against the Khartoum regime.



2.5 IMPACT OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE SPLM/A AND ANYA NYA II ON SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

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Burton (1990:2) defines conflict as behavior that has the potential of being destructive of persons, property and systems. The war between the Sudan government and the SPLM/A that started in 1983 aggravated the crippled system of administration in Southern Sudan. Service delivery was nonexistent until the time when the agreement between the two parties was signed on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya although there has been on and off administration in SPLM/A administrative areas.

Due to the agreement the SPLM/A managed, for the first time since its inception in 1983, to put an effective administration in place. The south was divided into a series of campaigns, codenamed the Bright Star Campaign (BSC). These campaigns were divided into phase 1, phase 2 and phase 3. Each campaign was divided into counties, counties into Payams and

Payams into Bomas. Each administration was responsible for service delivery in the area under its jurisdiction.

The reconciliation was a unique part of a larger experience in which Southern Sudan's political and military practitioners began experiencing the role reconciliation could play during the struggle in which relationships among different groups and tribes could enhance the establishment of government structures and improve service delivery (Madut, 2006:287).

In 1988 when the peace between SPLM/A and Anya Nya II was concluded, the unified movement managed to liberate 90% of Southern Sudan territories and established civil administration and rule of law, and as a result many refugees and IDPs returned to Southern Sudan.



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2.6 THE IMPACT OF THE AUGUST 1991 CRISIS IN THE SPLM/A ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Like any liberation movement SPLM/A was hit by internal conflict ignited by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main helper of satellite states in Africa such as Ethiopia, the main supporter of the SPLM/A. The fall of Mengistu's regime had repercussions for the internal situation in the SPLM/A. Some senior officers read the situation wrongly, that since the bases in western Ethiopia were lost the movement was doomed and would not survive and that western support to the movement would stop due to the alliance of the movement with socialist Ethiopia. A group of officers in Political Military High Command (PMHC) staged a coup against the leader of the SPLM/A, Dr John Garang, in August 1991 for the following reasons:

- Ruling the movement in an authoritarian manner
- There being no democracy in the movement
- Children being recruited into the SPLM/A by force
- Jailing politicians and officers who challenged Dr John Garang's leadership
- Abusing of human rights
- Mismanagement of the movement's funds.

According to Nyaba (1997:89), the second misreading of the situation by the officers was that since there was widespread discontent and dissatisfaction with the leadership among the rank and file in the movement, any move against Dr John Garang was going to be accepted. The SPLM/A split into two factions, the Nasir and the Torit. Factional fighting broke out soon after the announcement and continued until 1994 when due to international and regional pressures the two factions entered into negotiations. Although the international community succeeded in stopping the factional fighting, there were still numerous crises over the years.



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As described by Burton, wars are destructive. Southern Sudan enjoyed relative peace when the SPLM/A merged with Anya Nya II in 1988 and managed to set up an administration that provided services for the population.


2.7 DEFECTION OF COMMANDER WILLIAM NYOUN BANY FROM THE SPLM/A AND SUBSEQUENT DISINTEGRATION OF THE NASIR FACTION

In 1992 the Deputy Chairman and D/C-in-C of the SPLM/A, Commander William Nyoun Bany defected from the Torit Faction, accusing the leader of the SPLM/A of running the

movement alone without involving him and formed his movement called the SPLM/A Forces of Unity and Democracy. Commander William Nyoun Bany was persuaded by the Nasir faction and the government of the Sudan to defect to the Nasir faction in September 1992, making use of his presence in Abuja/Nigeria as leader of the SPLM/A delegation in peace talks with the Khartoum government and the Nasir faction. Commander William Nyoun Bany's group formally signed an agreement calling for unity between the SPLM/A Nasir faction and his group which set in motion the creation of the SPLM/A United of which William Nyoun Bany and Kerbino Kuanyin Bol's groups (ex-detainees who escaped from SPLM/A detention) were a central element. That was in March 1993. However, the SPLM/A

United was formed from the following factions:

- The Nasir faction led by Commander Dr. Riek Machar
- The SPLM/A Forces for Unity and Democracy led by Commander William Nyoun Bany
- The Imatong Liberation Front led by Peter Abdel Rahaman Sule
- A group of ex-political detainees led by Kerbino Kuanyin Bol.



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
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In October 1994, during the Akobo convention, the SPLM/A United was renamed as the SSIM/A.

It is to be recalled that immediately after its formation the SPLM/A United was hit by internal contradictions due to power struggles. The first split centered on the distribution of positions in the Interim National Executive Council (INEC). Equatorians felt that they had been cheated by people from Bhar El Ghazal and the Upper Nile and broke away to form the Patriotic Resistance Movement/Army (PRM/A) in 1993. The second split was the dismissal of Dr Lam Akol on the grounds that he had defied orders from Dr Riek Machar. After his

dismissal Dr Akol decided to retain the name of SPLM/A United when Dr Riek Machar changed the SPLM/A United into the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) in 1994.

The third split in the SPLM/A United occurred when in the process of their continued secret collaboration with the Khartoum government, Dr Riek Machar encouraged Commander William Nyoun Bany to secretly contact the government army in any nearby station to get military supplies to fight Dr John Garang's forces. When Dr Riek Machar realized that the secret was discovered, he accused Commander William Nyoun Bany of collaboration with the Khartoum government. Having felt that he was betrayed by his superior, Commander William Nyoun Bany broke away with some officers of the SSIM/A to form the SSIM/A United and joined the SPLM/A Torit faction or mainstream in 1995.



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2.8 THE FIRST SPLM NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1994

After liberating 90% of the south, it became very clear that the majority of the population under the administration of the SPLM/A needed services. Due to pressure to re-evaluate the movement's principles and objectives after the Nasir split and the need to establish functional administration in liberated areas which would render services to the local population, the SPLM/A held its first-ever national convention in April 1994. Some of the objectives of the Convention included:

- Dichotomy of the SPLM from SPLA, as discussed above that the nature of organization was to fight a war of liberation so the two structures were combined together as one body
- Creation of structures for political, public and economic institutions

- Getting a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the people of the south and other areas that were not part of the south but participating in the liberation struggle.
- Separation of legislature, judiciary and executive functions.

The SPLM/A, as mentioned earlier, was an organization concerned with liberating the poor from the yoke of the successive governments that had come and gone in Khartoum. The SPLM/A was in fact institutionalized in 1994 when more than 800 representatives of people from all over the south and other marginalized areas from the north who were part of the SPLM/A, mandated the movement to speak and fight on behalf of the people.




During the deliberations of the convention, it became clear that all the structures created during the first eleven years of the struggle were for the people, hence could not take care of the needs of the population. As a result of which these institutions became instruments of maintaining the status quo. It is to be emphasized that, as a liberation movement, the three tiers of government and their associated institutions in the SPLM/A were managed on a voluntary basis, since the human resources deployed to run the institutions of the SPLM/A did not receive any financial reward for their services.

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This inability of the SPLM/A administration to pay its employees contributed to major institutional weaknesses in Southern Sudan. The encouragement of civil society to establish NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) to provide services to the community which the government was unable to provide compounded the already acute shortage of critical skills. The NGOs and CBOs attracted the most skilled persons since they provided financial rewards (Deng, 2005:51).

In 1997 the South Sudan Independence movement led by Dr Riek Machar Teny, together with six other factions opposing the SPLM/A, signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Government of Sudan, calling for national reconciliation in the Sudan, self-determination, and free and fair elections. As a result the Coordination Council was established in Juba as the interim government of Southern Sudan. However, the Government of Sudan's failure to implement the agreement undermined its credibility with the Southern Sudanese people and the GoS continued to wage a war by proxy against Dr Riek Machar Teny's forces until he decided to defect and join the SPLM/A in early 2002.



To get a reconciliation started, a third party can identify which parties need to be included in the talks, work out a common understanding of the initial rules of engagement, and arrange for the parties to meet. As a result, the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II Agreement is best understood as a decisive but not final stage in the reconciliation process that continues to this day. In fact, the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II reconciliation produced a credible result. This is further evidence for the proposition that peacemaking starts when both actors gain the inspiration to reconcile. By the same token, the fact that the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II agreement survived the five years' implementation phase testifies to its quality and to the quality of the support it received from all concerned, as well as to the reality of the South Sudanese's readiness for peace.

By the end of 1986 both the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II were rethinking their options and exploring how to promote their interests by means of dialogue, not war. In the summer of 1987 Captain James Hoth Mai, the commander of the SPLM/A forces in the area close to Anya Nya II forces met with the Anya Nya II delegates and had numerous meetings with the

Anya Nya II officials to explore the possibilities for talks. Captain James Hoth Mai followed up by sending officers to meet with the Anya Nya II delegates.

In 2002 the US was already looking at the initial peace moves in the context of its overall regional strategy to reduce conflict throughout the Horn of Africa. The Church leaders also played an important role in the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and the SPDF of Dr Riek Machar Teny. The Church leaders presented their suggested points to the SPLM/A leader, Dr John Garang, and the SPDF leader, Dr Riek Machar Teny. The position of the Church was that the two leaders should not use the armed struggle against each other to change the existing problem in the Sudan, but consider the interests of both parties in negotiations to resolve the conflict. Both wanted a peaceful solution and a democracy based on freedom of expression. All citizens have the right to full participation in the struggle for recognition that the people are sovereign and have the right to choose their government and peace processes based on the need for national reconciliation and unity. Moreover, former President Daniel Arap Moi often provided good offices to open communication between the SPLM/A and SPDF, but both sides took the leading role from time to time. Only in exceptional circumstances would Kenya provide a venue for a meeting between the parties.



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2.9 THE SPLM/A UNITED AND SPLM/A AGREEMENT

The experience of building a durable peace in Southern Sudan should remind us all that negotiation must serve above all to change the character of relations between the parties. Formal reconciliation between SPLM/A United and the SPLM/A was a milestone, showing the road ahead for peace to succeed in the Sudan. They had the courage to move the peace process forward from their formal agreement, despite regional pressure.

After the agreement between the SPLM/A and the SPDF was signed, and as a policy of the movement to pursue different splinter groups to join the SPLM/A, SPLM/A United formally signed the agreement with the SPLM/A on 31 October 2003. Power-sharing contributed to the resolution of the conflict between the two movements. Its leader, Dr Lam Akol, was appointed member of the Leadership Council (LC) and some of his senior officers were appointed in the National Liberation Council (NLC). Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association (Humanitarian Wing of SPLM/A United) was incorporated into the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA).



2.10 THE INTEGRATION OF THE EDF INTO THE SPLM/A

The Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) was one of the several armed splinter groups that were opposed to the SPLM/A. The Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) was found mainly in the Eastern Parts of the Greater Equatoria covering the areas of Lotuka, Lokoya, Acholi, Loluba, Lokoro (PARI), Madi, Bari, Didinga, Boya and Toposa.

Following the historical appeal of the SPLM/A leadership calling upon all the armed groups and political forces to put aside their differences and unite under the leadership of the SPLM/A, the EDF leadership took the appeal seriously and began consultation and dialogue with the leadership of the SPLM/A in Uganda and Kenya. Finally the EDF leadership met with the late hero, Dr John Garang de Mabior in Naivasha, Kenya, in the midst of the heated negotiations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It was at that historic meeting of the EDF leadership with the SPLM/SPLA in Naivasha, Kenya that the modalities for ultimate disengagement of the EDF forces were agreed upon. Thus, the EDF military elements and

political personalities stationed in Khartoum, Juba, Torit, Liria, etc., had to evacuate those locations within the agreed period in order to avoid retaliation by the SAF on those people for challenging the action plan.

In order to expedite the withdrawal of the EDF forces from the above-mentioned locations, a clandestine coordinating unit comprised of both the SPLM/A and EDF military and political elements was constituted. Some humanitarian organizations were also involved in order to cater for the basic needs of the withdrawing forces and accompanying civilian population.



March 2004 marked the official declaration of EDF's joining the ranks and file of the SPLM/A. The announcement was broadcast in the regional and international media, after withdrawal of the EDF forces from Khartoum, Juba, Torit, etc. The EDF field commanders were issued very strong orders to make sure that all the EDF bases and deployments which were in close proximity to the SAF positions around Torit, Khor, Engilizzi, Liria, etc., automatically converted to the SPLM/A administrative and military control.

The EDF GHQS which was situated at Gong in the Acholi mountain range was relocated to Magwi, and Magwi became the centre of reorganization and integration of the EDF forces with the SPLA. The SPLM/A leadership appointed the Chairman of the EDF on the prestigious Leadership Council and ten EDF members were appointed on the National Liberation Council. A seven-member committee comprised of both SPLM/A and EDF members under the chairmanship of CDR Salva Kiir Mayardit was constituted. The task of the committee was to recommend integration of the EDF political leadership and cadres into various structures of the Party and Executive Branches of the system. In the same appointment, the SPLM/A chairman and C-in-C constituted a seven-member committee

comprised of senior officers from both the SPLA and the EDF under the chairmanship of CDR Oyai Deng Ajak. The task of the committee was to reorganize the EDF forces without delay and recommend the officers, NCOs and men for integration into the ranks of the SPLA.

The process of re-organizing the EDF took several months but at the end of it a total of 328 officers, and 7500 NCOs and men were finally reorganized and integrated into the SPLA. Among the integrated officers the most senior military rank accorded them was Brigadier General (three of them). All the political leaders and cadres of the EDF were integrated into various structures of the SPLM. The above-mentioned historical process marked the last chapter of what used to be known as the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF).




2.11 JUBA DECLARATION

Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) were a combination of forces consisting of tribal militias who armed themselves against the SPLM/A and forces who had defected from either Dr Riek Machar of SSIM/A or Dr Lam Akol of SPLM/A United. The third group was remnants of Anya Nya II who had never joined the SPLM/A. These components enjoyed the support of the Sudan government to fight the SPLM/A. As a policy of the SPLM/A-led government in the South, power sharing was regarded the most effective tool to bring Southerners together. The SSDF were therefore given positions before any negotiations, county commissioners and members of parliament were named.

In 2005 Moi's Foundation Centre, Kenya, helped to mediate the South-South Dialogue which brought about the Juba Declaration and Unity between the SSDF and GoSS in 2006. In 2005, Salva Kiriir Mayardit, the President of GoSS asked to meet the SSDF Chief of Staff, Maj. General Paulino Matip face to face. It was an opportunity for the two leaders to exchange

information on South-South dialogue positions before the formal negotiations started. President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who eventually wanted to move the South-South dialogue processes into direct bilateral talks without any active mediation, had a opportunity to try out the dialogue. President Moi's role was that of observer rather than mediator. Both GoSS and SSDF leaders issued extremely positive statements on the launching of the dialogue and supported the South-South Dialogue processes, whatever the difficulties. The two sides came together again to continue their dialogue, despite the difficulties the dialogue might encounter. A positive attitude helped the two parties to overcome specific problems.

The Juba declaration was signed on 8 January 2006 and the leader of the SSDF was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C). Others were appointed in government institutions.



2.12 CONCLUSION

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The lessons which were learned and the skills acquired during the Anya Nya II-SPLM/A reconciliation and other Southern armed groups will prove crucial in solving the complex conflicts in the future. It is believed that the SPLM/A's recent experiences in the reconciliation process are likely to be the norm for decades to come. Accordingly, by reviewing my experiences as commander of the Yuany Battalion during the SPLM/A Anya Nya II reconciliation, as well as discussing some of the lessons learned from my experiences with conflict resolution in that mission, it is hoped that people will be able to identify some of the skills that they feel are important for success in these often very complex circumstances. There is a real need of and desire for such leadership by the SPLM/A and the nation to open a whole new era of conflict resolution doctrine. This is a challenge that must be studied by the coming young generation.

This study does not claim that the Southern Sudanese's internal conflicts are shifting downward as some authors suggest. Rather, there are new forces operating alongside more familiar conflict sources at both regional and national levels in the Sudan. The next requirement is to find a vehicle for reconciliation that the coming generations in Southern Sudan will find it attractive, challenging and rewarding enough to persuade them to commit their time and energy to it. Perhaps the best approach would be to work out a dialogue between them. The SPLM/A Anya Nya II reconciliation will also be strengthened to the extent that all can find important opportunities for engaging in common conflict resolution. Our rapidly changing Sudan in which there is still so much instability, poverty and hunger offers ample opportunities for such work. The SPLM/A Anya Nya II reconciliation agreement within the framework of South-South dialogue will continue to prove a model for such joint efforts.



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Despite these striking achievements, SPLM/A Anya Nya II reconciliation remains the main concern; it shall fulfil and bring forth lasting peace and trust among Southern Sudanese indigenous people and equip the forthcoming generation for conflict resolution, that they should remember and learn through the past mistakes committed during the factional conflict that arose between SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. Hopefully the leaders of Southern Sudan still have major roles to play in order to achieve a lasting settlement that may avoid such a conflict repeating itself within Southern Sudanese society.

The SPLM/A has benefited from the internal contradictions that were in the movement and other factions; this can be witnessed through all the agreements signed with different factions, both political and military.

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Public administration frequently deals with conflict in all spheres of government and in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including the household; however, many office bearers in public administration have not been practically exposed to the skills and *raison d'être* of conflict. A large amount of literature exists in related disciplines such as sociology, political science, international relations and labour law but their main focus is on the impact of conflict, the nature of conflict, the role of players in the conflict and conflict resolution. However, they ignore the impact of conflict on public administration and how it affects service delivery. In this sense greater awareness of the possible impact of conflict can help public administrators turn destructive conflict into constructive efforts by strengthening the public administration system at three levels: (a) the system, (b) the organization and (c) human resources, which includes the role of government, its structures, processes and procedures, decentralization, accountability and financial and human resources management. In this way the strengthening of public administration will support, complement and facilitate service delivery.

People in this contemporary world have different ways of solving the conflicting social and political problems. Some of them may have the desire to tackle the problems by investigating the root causes in detail. Some do not take the root causes seriously (Malan, 1997:6). Some people regard all conflict as undesirable and strive to curb conflicting behaviour and its unpleasant consequences.

These theories cover 'failures' in conflict management, coupled with growing pressure of conflicts in the world and lack of international accountability, and public fears have increasingly limited the role of conflict resolution theories. And yet a key role of the social science theories is to identify and assess not only the need to prevent conflict with self or others, but also to establish these theories as public policy and make professional diplomats more generally aware of them.

According to Appleby (2001:830), the involvement of conflict management theory is another one of the assessments of conflict prevention. While writers' involvement in conflict assessment in the field of conflict is an innovative and welcome development, the review has highlighted that one of the profession's greatest challenges is that people responsible for conflict management need to be accountable. Clear channels of reconciliation need to be placed within a framework of professional conflict prevention, while the overall solution is expected to be underpinned by clear and tough evidence-base approaches to conflict assessment and management in a divided society.



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This chapter discusses theories of conflict resolution and its effect on public administration as well as on service delivery. It also highlights peace-building strategies. It has to be recalled that public administration research calls for more attention to be focused on conflict studies.


It is hoped that the review of literature in this chapter will draw out the main issues inherent in identifying the conflict resolution theories relevant to the context of the study.

3.2 DEFINITIONS OF SOME THEORIES

3.2.1 What is conflict?

Conflict is “behaviour that has the potential of being destructive of persons, property and systems”. Burton further contends that “conflict may not be over material goods and symbols that cannot be shared, but over commonly held or universal goals such as identity, recognition, a sense of control through effective participation, security and such basic needs that are known as part of the human developmental process” (Burton, 1986:99).

On the other hand, Laue (1987:17) defines conflict as “natural competition between two or more parties over scarce resources, power and prestige”. In African context, conflicts are often related to resources; power struggles, and in some cases the marginalization of the majority by the minority or vice versa, or political manipulation of the less developed groups by the sophisticated elite.



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3.2.2 What is mediation?


Zarman and Touval (2001:427) point out that mediation is a process where an impartial third party helps two or more parties discuss a dispute and work towards a solution that is acceptable to all parties. Participation is voluntary. Unlike a judge or arbitrator, the mediator does not decide the outcome of the dispute. Mediated agreements tend to succeed because they result from a process that allows parties to create their own solutions.

3.2.3 What is reconciliation?

The literal meaning of reconciliation is to render no longer opposed; bring to acquiescence; to reconcile someone to his fate; to win over to friendliness; to reconcile a hostile person; to

compose or settle (a quarrel, difference, etc); to bring into agreement or harmony; to make compatible or consistent; to reconcile differing statements.

According to Lederach (2001:842). Reconciliation is the process of making consistent or compatible. It is one of the buzzwords on the peace studies circuit and in European post-modern diplomacy. In this rather simplistic approach to war and peace, when the fighting ends the spears and suicide belts are replaced with flowers and songs of hope. Armies are disbanded, prisoners of war are released and borders opened. Summer camps are held and cultural exchanges take place to foster understanding to replace the indoctrination of children to hate. Unfortunately the real world is usually more complicated. In the perverse reality of the people-people conflict, as in similar intense national and religious disputes, the concept of reconciliation is exploited to achieve precisely the opposite of its stated objective.



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
3.2.4 The concept of conflict management

Hopmann (2001:445) sees conflict management as the ability to manage conflict effectively. Conflict management refers to the variety of ways in which people handle grievances - clashes between right and wrong. It includes such diverse phenomena as gossip, ridicule, lynching, terrorism, warfare, feuding, genocide, law, mediation and avoidance. Which of these diverse forms of conflict management will be used in any given case is predicted and explained by the social structure or social geometry of the case. The definitions referred to lead to in-depth discussion of the issues in context

3.3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY

Baker (2001:567) confirms that conflict resolution theory was formulated by a group of experts in international relations and political scientists who set about integrating the literature on achieving mutually beneficial outcomes in a conflict situation in order to create a best-practice prescriptive process for conflict resolution.

One of the key concepts in conflict resolution is the win-win solution. Older approaches were based on the concept of distributive bargaining, where the best joint outcome that could be achieved was a fair division of benefits in which one person's gains were another's losses. This approach engages competitive rather than cooperative processes and leads, at best, to compromise. On the other hand, a win-win solution arrived at by integrative bargaining may be close to optimal for both parties.




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In many conflicts, the underlying issues are not clearly recognized by either party. Optimal solutions can only be found by going beyond the initial bargaining positions of the participants to explore these underlying needs and concerns with the expectation of being able to generate creative alternatives that more adequately address them. Although there is generally a high degree of overlap among such theories, it would be premature to assign a particularly privileged status to any one formulation. Often people in a conflict situation assume that the result of negotiation is that one will win and the other will lose. In such a case it is necessary to reframe the process in terms of cooperative problem solving with a view to arriving at a mutually satisfactory conclusion (Saunders, 1995:39).

To arrive at a win-win solution, it is usually counterproductive to focus on positions. This generally leads to arguments based on rights. It is easier to reconcile underlying concerns, needs, or interests. Fisher, Urn and Patton (1997:40) argue that it is important to avoid criticism, blaming or threatening. The likelihood of a satisfactory outcome is improved when each person feels listened to and valued. Listening skills such as empathy, summarizing, and attentive body language facilitate this communication.

As Kriesberg (1993:287) puts it, the world and its conflicts are complex. It is not very helpful if people stop there without seeking for one mechanism to address them. A great challenge for the international community and regional actors in some war-torn countries is to understand what drives and sustains these seemingly intractable conflicts so that international involvement aimed at helping the parties may resolve these conflicts.



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On the other hand, there is no serious scholar or professional authority who argues for a single theory or explanation of conflict resolution. The classic articles and books of leading scholars on conflict resolution, conflict management, mediation and reconciliation, such as R. Scott Appleby, Louis Kriesberg, P. Terrence Hopmann, Nicole Ball and Harold H. Saunders, argue against single-theory analyses, just as there are no single causes of conflicts.

First and foremost there is the return of hegemonic conflict partners between states that have long characterized the international system, together with rising concerns about how such contests will be conducted in today's fragmented environment. For much of the first post-cold war decade analysts focused, and not without reason, on ethnic and internal wars that formed the overwhelming majority of contemporary conflicts.

According to Kelman (1992:41). the unresolved dialogue among scholars and practitioners about the interaction among conflict management on the one hand and democratization, the rule of law, civil society institution building, and other elements of what can broadly be called governance or nation building on the other hand, negotiated political transitions from oppressive military or one-man rule, place a sharp focus on the significance of these issues since they impose on peacemaking and warring parties alike a seemingly stark choice between priorities and reconciliation, power sharing and justice. He continues to say that the push and pull between conflict management and post-governance issues and reconciliation strategies, dictate that the presence of theories testifies to the fact that we are only just beginning to understand how to reach peace as some peacemaking efforts over the past couple of years have been successful: Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and even the seemingly intractable conflict in North Ireland, which yielded at last to the persistent mediation of two respected outsiders, former US Senator George Mitchell and former Finnish Prime Minister, Harri Holkeri. All efforts, however, have not met with the same success; conflict reigned yet again in Angola despite the agreements that had been reached at Lusaka, despite UN agreement, and despite strong US support for the UN mediator.




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Another example is the efforts of the US to broker a peace settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In the last days of the Clinton administration it was badly derailed by the outbreak of violence in the region. The same players, and the same mediators using the same techniques, have produced very different results.

Montville (1991:120) points out that it is impossible to recognize the full character of your own period as you live through it. He continues to say that reflecting on contemporary ideas about effective policy options, discussions during the cold war revolved around the use of

force and military instruments. However, post-cold war thinking has moved far from these narrow responses. The use of force is costly, even low threshold military activity.

Deng (1995:1-15) asserts that many writers on the subject identify new strategies and tools for conflict management. Together they authoritatively define the potential response strategies and tactics that are available to policy makers engaged in conflict management and prevention. At the same time, some theories of conflict resolution and conflict management are not overall methods or techniques of conflict resolution. Some of the approaches and concepts are problematic. Others are theoretically attractive, but they have yet to prove themselves as successful techniques of conflict management.




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On the other hand, Hopmann (2001:172) states that scholars and practitioners debate over tools of conflict resolution in the context of ethnic conflicts and identify the principal approaches to and practices of power sharing. Hopmann also highlights concerns and problems with reconciliation approaches and practices that have been raised by scholars and practitioners alike, and instances where reconciliation experiments failed.

The DRC, like any country in Africa, has been affected by the colonial legacy. However, the war in the Congo was widespread; it not only involved the Congolese internal forces, but drew in external forces driven by their own political and economic interests. Looking at the external actors, King Leopold of Belgium in the pre-colonial colonial periods contributed a great deal to the conflict by not preparing the Congolese to govern a modern state, and by the manner of granting independence to the country (Clark, 2002:34).

The Congo situation provides us with a good example of how neo-colonial forces created conditions for post-independence conflict and instability. Neo-colonial interests in the Congo are part of the historical root causes of the war in the DRC. Unlike other African colonies and neo-colonies, the Congo was a unique centre of economic attraction. It has very high agricultural potential due to its fertile soil, and a favourable climate for the production of both food and cash crops. It produces a variety of crops including coffee, cotton, palm oil, rubber, sugar cane, maize, groundnuts, tea, tobacco, cassava and bananas. It has huge forests with valuable tropical timber, and huge reserves of minerals such as copper, cobalt, diamonds and gold (McCalpin 2002:38).



Anstey (2006:35) says that on 25 November 1965 Mobutu Sese Seko, chief of staff of the army, staged a coup d'état with the aim of rescuing the country from total collapse; this marked the end of the first Republic and chaotic five years for the new nation (Clark, 2002:44). The long ruinous rule of Mobutu Sese Seko represents another revolution in the cycle of conflict that is characterized by non-development authoritarianism reflecting the incapacities of the Congo's administrative inheritance. However, Mobutu's rule manifested and reinforced a culture of arbitrariness, oppression and violence in the Congo's public life and failed completely to deliver what he pledged to do, that is, to rescue the country from total collapse. Mobutu abandoned virtually all social service delivery functions.

1990 signaled the beginning of the demise of Mobutu, starting with the end of the cold war, when the west put pressure on Mobutu to start with political and economic reform. International financial institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the IMF stopped their remaining programmes. France cut its aid and the World Bank cut ties with him after misappropriation of more than USD 500 million and the strike in the civil service. Mobutu's

crisis management strategy contributed very much to his collapse. The inherited regime went down to its banal economic conclusion through warlord politics and the political culture of kleptomania. The then Zaire was crippled by a regime that had no real concern for the people and the development of their property, and completely failed to look beyond its own survival (Clark, 2002:45).

In May 1997 the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) led by Laurent Kabila seized power and renamed Zaire as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Surprisingly Kabila could not change anything. He continued to rule the country like Mobutu, with political control, patrimonialism and ethnic politics. The state became more fragile than before until he was assassinated. Alusala (2007:29) indicates that the emergence of Laurent Kabila escalated the DRC conflict into a continental one when he failed to build up and strengthen the structure of governance, especially the army, which was foreign dominated at the time, and his foreign policy also fueled the slide back into war in the late 1990s, involving the MLC, RCD-ML (Liberation Movements) as internal actors supported by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, and Laurent Kabila's government supported by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola as external actors.

All states supported the efforts of SADC as an organization from November 1998 to June 1999, supplemented by the initiatives of President Mu'ammar Gaddafi of Libya. Gaddafi held talks at different times with Presidents Kabila of the DRC, Museveni of Uganda and Kagame of Rwanda. Gaddafi insisted that the fighting parties should agree to a ceasefire to be followed by withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC and deployment of international peacekeeping forces. All peace initiatives culminated in the signing of a peace pact by all warring parties in Lusaka on 10 July 1999. Since that time various efforts have continued to

be made to ensure implementation of the peace pact by various initiatives such as the SADC, the government of South Africa, the UN and the international community at large. The relative peace that brought democratic transformation is being thwarted by recent rebellion led by Laurence Mkunde (Assefa, 1998:45).

In this context service delivery was severely affected as managing conflict was hampered by the detailed recycling of failed regimes which was affected by external and internal actors. The current relative peace in the Congo was brought about not purely by military and political efforts, but by integrated settlement that brought all the actors, both internal and external, to the negotiating table. Joseph Kabila contributed to the resolution of the conflict in the Congo to a great extent. His leadership style according to which the current leadership was democratized played an important role in the current political stability in the Congo.



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
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The South African experience in conflict resolution contains important lessons to be learnt. The reality of the South African experience is the fact that a racial ideology of political and socio-economic discrimination and separateness, namely “Apartheid”, was used by the minority government to rule the South Africans for decades.

According to Rothchild (1997:193), both the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) leadership were reluctant to involve a third party in the mediation of the resolution of the conflict in South Africa. The main parties to the conflict were concerned that their interests would be jeopardized by involvement of a third party in the process of their negotiations. The National Party was worried about the fact that external mediation might result in unwanted concessions. As for the African National Congress (ANC), they equally feared that a third party intervener might extract unwanted compromises. The two opposing

parties therefore, surprisingly, agreed on non-involvement of a third party in the resolution of their conflict.

In matters concerning national and international relations, no country or entity should hold onto its interests without giving due consideration to the concerns or interests of others. In this regard, both the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Government subsequently succumbed to the pressure which involved external mediation in the 1980s and 1990s.




Rothchild continues to say that exerting pressure and offering incentives are ways of leading to confidence building and creation of an atmosphere conducive to negotiation between the parties involved in the conflict. As part of such incentives several foreign states contributed in terms of funding and encouragement of activities that enhanced the building of peace and resolution of the conflicts so that the South African parties to the conflict capitulated to the pressure exerted by the international community and accepted external intervention in the process of confidence-building mechanisms. The change of heart on the part of the South African parties did not come easily. It was because the violence in the country was escalating and leading to destabilization of the negotiation process during the transition period.

He continues by saying that an atmosphere conducive to negotiation presented itself in the 1990s when all the opposition parties were un-banned, and Nelson Mandela and other political leaders were released. The new opportunity opened an avenue for conducting the Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). This Conference marked the beginning of a direct internal negotiation process without involvement of formal mediators

from outside. The Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) sessions called for the establishment of majority rule and the white establishment called for power-sharing.

Involvement of the UN and other observers played a tremendous role in the South African peace process by giving useful guidance at critical junctures and working closely with Peace Committee officials and their activities. He mentions that the involvement of international bodies such as the Commonwealth and the United Nations can make important contributions towards creating an atmosphere conducive to peace building and negotiations especially in a deeply divided country like South Africa. However, he maintains that these international bodies could not exert decisive pressure on the parties involved in the conflicts. They just urged the political leaders to engage in direct bargaining. They communicated with other actors, exerted limited pressure, and utilized certain incentives like economic sanctions rather than coercion.



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These are what Rothchild (1997:198) calls incentives for change which are exerted by international bodies on the parties involved in peace building and negotiation situations. He cites the kinds of incentive related to economic and diplomatic realities and the issue of legitimate incentives. These factors help accelerate the negotiation. Thus the South African experience in conflict resolution provides essential tools and mechanisms.

As part of the management of the conflict and in order to avoid going back to war and as a part of national reconciliation and healing the following measures were adopted:

- A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to reconcile the divided society for the common good of the people of South Africa.

- Black economic empowerment was instituted to empower the blacks who were economically disadvantaged during the struggle.
- Black and coloured people and white women were first to be considered in the employment process.

As mentioned by McCalpin, Anstey, Clark, Alusala, Assefa and Child, the current relative peace in the Congo was not brought about by internal factors but through external factors. This was however not the case in conflict resolution in South Africa where the parties to the conflict refused to involve any outside mediation. They opted to engage themselves secretly until they agreed to resolve their problems and manage them. In spite of great challenges, South Africa managed to free itself from apartheid in a peaceful manner and sowed the seeds for a better future for its people. Today South Africa has become a source of inspiration for democracy on the continent.



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The case of conflict in Southern Sudan, however, was resolved using external and internal mediation. The parties to the conflict reached the settlement through winning, compromising and sharing wealth and power. It has to be recalled that during the conflict narrated above, service delivery was hampered as there was no security to render those services. After agreement was reached service delivery improved drastically. Schools and hospitals were built and clean water was provided. In a nutshell, the basic needs of society were provided.

3.4 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, MANAGEMENT AND PEACE-BUILDING

Public Administration literature focuses extensively on how to execute the will of the people effectively, how to deliver public services and how to be accountable and responsive to the public in general. However, there is less emphasis on conflict resolution, conflict management and peace building (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992:23).

On the other hand, conflict resolution literature pays close attention to the different roles played by actors in conflict. These actors are (a) interested audience to the conflict - observers or onlookers (b) parties to the conflict and (c) conflict resolvers, arbitrators, mediators. Interestingly, these categories correspond to different perspectives on the nature of public administrators' work (Deavel, 1994:65). For example, the school of public administration theorists defines the first role of public administration as that of observer which is analogous to the public servant who executes the will of the people from a non-partisan position (Wilson, 1992:40). They don't participate in disputes but they wait for the outcome of the resolution of the conflict and stick to public administration ethics.

The second role of public administration, the role of a party to the conflict is just like the political role of public administrators in which their role fits in with the democratic notion of checks and balances in the government. They level their opinions in a neutral way and exercise their legal position and constitutional rights (Lan 1997:32).

The third role is that of public administrator to assume the role of arbitrator. This role is analogous to the role of public administrator as governor. Public administration theorists

view public administration as part of the governing process of deciding what is to be done and who will take the burden (McCurdy, 1985:8). They always seek resolutions that will reflect justice, public interest, regime values, trustworthiness, righteousness, or resolutions that will be accepted by the parties to the conflict.

The impact of conflict could be visible in global public administration organizations as it has an immediate effect on service delivery. The leading scholars on public administration for promoting knowledge of public administration all over the world indicate that among the various goals of public administration scholars, they consider how to cover the study of the administrative phenomenon in its full context and in all regions of the world with a specific emphasis on the interfaces of administration and development and the innovations required to meet the rapidly changing needs of contemporary public administration.



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Olsen (1983:51) argues that without assessing its success or failure, the goals of public administration are comprehensive: to view administrative phenomena in their full range of context in all regions of the world. This is, indeed, an ambitious goal and it covers, in principle, all the questions the authors have proposed in the literature review. One way to study or visualize the scope of the conflict in public administration is to consider the themes identified through:

- administration and development;
- administrative reform and modernization (innovations - productivity - evaluation);
- public administration and democracy;
- women and decision making in the public sector;
- the history of administration.

He also claims that these themes are quite broad and one may speculate about the problems they actually focus on. However, some scholars identify the broad problem areas that an influential group of practitioners and scholars recruited from around the world consider important. The first focuses on development as a process of economic growth and industrialization that is happening globally both as a cause and a consequence of globalization. On the other hand, Olsen states that some of the writers have been looking at the administrative implications of this process - what challenges and opportunities it poses for states and also for all kinds of non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, the majority of these scholars have not provided a concrete analysis of the debates.




On the other hand, Peter (1995:37) reasons that the second theme turns from the problems confronting public administrators to the methods they use to organize and implement policies, with special attention on the reforms and innovations that distinguish contemporary administrative practices from older and more traditional ones. Volpe (1989:99) argues that although democratization is rapidly expanding around the world, many states are dominated by dictators or ruling cabals. It is appropriate, therefore, to look carefully at the processes of democratization whereby responsibility for public policies devolves on citizens through their representative institutions, posing problems for public administration that differ fundamentally from those of traditional administration based on hierarchic chains of authority.

Increasingly, public administration needs to be based on mechanisms that assure the accountability of officials to citizens and those they serve so that service delivery to all citizens is not hindered. These beliefs, therefore, shift the focus of attention from the old

hierarchical to the modern public administration where all the different interests are accommodated (Handy, 1993:213).

According to Hofstede (1997:78), among the radical changes that democratization has brought to the world are many driven by the expanding power of women in a world traditionally dominated by men and, one might add, by the proliferation of ethnic diversity and pluralism. These trends have important administrative implications, both substantively in respect of the policies pursued by public organizations at all levels, and also instrumentally with regard to the degree that women and minorities are included in the work force, not only to give them equal opportunities, but also to take advantage of their special knowledge and values as factors in the implementation of public policies since women represent 51% in all societies.



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Hood (1998:71) puts it clearly that such changes raise networking problems symbolized by the power struggle. States must not only deal with individuals as atoms in a collectivity, but with groups whose growing power to organize and communicate thrusts them into the vortex of public administration as clients or customers and as officials of the state. Their distinctive interests need to be taken into consideration by government officials and elected politicians, and they must also become partners in the processes of public administration.

The history of public administration may strike readers as the most academic and least relevant of contemporary problems. However, Hood believes a good sense of history also has practical implications. Good historical knowledge not only enables us to understand more about the forces and factors that have produced our current problems and opportunities, but it also enhances our ability to visualize the future and to make plans to cope with emerging

problems. When we relate administrative history to the present modern public administration posted above, one can see that during most of the history of civilization, public administration was oriented to its hierarchical right-hand side only.

As Lan (1997:29) claims, modern public administration, under the impact of democratizing forces, adds responsibility to citizens, through elected officials, to the scope of its inquiries. Finally, in the context of contemporary public administration, social networking and group rights have come forward as the result of globalizing forces. The old public administration formulation is not explicit on this point, but it may be inferred.




He continues by saying that “responsiveness” is yet another key issue confronting contemporary public managers. As concerns about integrity, participation and inclusiveness have spread around the world, the citizenry of almost all countries are demanding more responsive government. In many countries new systems have been put in place to encourage responsiveness from those who deliver public services at grass-roots level.

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The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of great demands for “efficiency and effectiveness” within the increasingly complex environment in which public administrators - be they civil servants or political appointees - must carry out their responsibilities. The emerging demands for greater ethnic and gender responsiveness, the development of increasingly stronger civil society organizations and the growing calls for smaller and lower cost governments have all placed extraordinary pressures on the contemporary public administrator for more efficient government. This is also an issue which we shall examine throughout the study (Volpe, 1989:17).

The civil service today is full of turbulence and turmoil. Those in leading positions are buffeted by unpredictable forces and are under increasing pressure to survive and gain competitive advantage in a context where systems and procedures no longer provide the appropriate answers. He states that those conflicts have radically shifted the priorities for public administration by expanding the locus of action, both above and beyond states and also below them. State bureaucracies remain foundational, but their functions and styles have been significantly re-shaped by the new and expanding structures created under the influence of accelerating globalization. So, according to Olsen, to understand the impact of conflict on public administration in general, we need to look not only at what is happening in state bureaucracies but also at many other levels, including both trans-state and sub-state organizations. Although our understanding and improvement of state-level public administration have already increased dramatically, especially for the more affluent countries, comparable resources are not yet available to study and improve non-state public administration (Olsen, 1983:16).




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Moreover, although many states are well served by institutions and resources dedicated to the strengthening of public administration, many are not, especially in Africa. Although immense strides have been taken in many countries to open their systems of public administration to popular and international discourse by learning from other modern public administrations or well governed states, it is also true that in many countries in Africa the resources needed for such innovations are scarce or unavailable.

However, in the near future, even the poorest states will discover that a small investment in the creation of well-organized public administration resources will prove cost effective and

ensure service delivery. They will be able, by using them, to tap more easily into the world's resources that can be mobilized to help them cope with the huge problems they face to serve their citizens.

As Lan (1991:67) states, most of the substantive discourse on Public Administration as a discipline continues to direct attention to the traditional problems of public management in sovereign states. Nevertheless, as his narrative and some of his articles show, there has also been a lot of innovation and movement into spaces opened up by conflicts in public administration.



However, when one takes a global look at public administration as a process of implementing public policies, it seems clear that in much of the world office holders are still the beneficiaries of political favouritism. A conflict in the field of public administration needs to take them into account.

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3.5 WHAT LESSONS DO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY OFFER?

Some circles literally assume that service delivery in the conflict management environment only creates, worsens, or prolongs the outbreak of violence. However, service delivery contributes positively towards the management of conflict and vice versa. Without services conflict management becomes difficult. The character of conflict management also shapes possible service delivery response according to how the parties see the benefit from the flow of services. For example, between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan National Congress Party (NCP): when the SPLM withdrew its ministers from the

government of national unity, the crisis was considered as part of conflict management, because it did not affect the flow of services in the South or in the North..

The underlying causes of a conflict may lie in an inequitable distribution of resources, rival identities and ideologies, or competition for government power, according to Nelson (2000: 37). Conflicts rooted in ethnic and nationalist hostility are always difficult, as well as hampering the rendering services to the people.

In fact, service delivery should be the centre of attention and the core of conflict management. Although the conflict had international connections, it was fundamentally true that domestic conflict happened between the government and opposition due to lack of service delivery to the people. The most significant international involvement in conflict management was the delivery of massive amounts of humanitarian aid. The international factors affecting the conflict became favourable to a settlement. Gradually the conflict changed from who should deliver the services to the people, to who should be chosen and how it would benefit the parties politically. This kind of service delivery took time during the conflict management period. In concentrating on the conflict among people and parties, the leaders developed a profound understanding of how to resolve this conflict, and they applied this understanding faithfully through effective service delivery to the general population.

On the other hand, the conflict management stage is critical to service delivery, unless the parties to the peace agreement have high commitment, because mistrust can generate insecurity and lack of allocation of resources to the people. This has been in evidence in many peace accords in Africa, for instance, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Agreement, which stated that both countries would accept the movement of goods, services and people. But this

did not actually happen, due to lack of trust and a proper conflict management strategy between the two countries. A major international effort is needed by policy-makers to develop and implement a plan to provide assistance to the population as part of conflict management. Unrealistic expectations and unworkable plans that do not consider service delivery issues in a substantive manner will not lead to stability or improve the lives of people or be considered as effective conflict resolution strategies.

Also, when once looked at; the core of this concept reflects a highly utopian approach that assumes that conflict management will have strong economic and effective service delivery incentives to maintain peace and stability, an expectation unsupported by the evidence and experience of the past decade.



3.6 PEACE BUILDING

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One of the important measures in ensuring peace building is conflict resolution. Conflict resolution presupposes that the state of conflict is already in place and it has, therefore, to be resolved. In other words, the conflict has to be brought to an end and peace has to be restored in the society. Conflict resolution measures usually constitute peace negotiations, the signing of peace agreements and implementation of such agreements. Many peace agreements have been signed on the continent that can be a good reason for hope. We witnessed peace development and economic growth in Mozambique after a peace agreement was signed in 1992; in Angola in 1992, although the citizens are still looking for peace dividends; and the comprehensive peace agreement signed between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in 2005 to mention but a few.

This is the area where public administration should be active in transforming the silence of guns into peace and prosperity, by fostering aims at strengthening emerging democratic institutions, improving government responsiveness, transparency and accountability at all levels and increasing awareness and participation in governance and working towards positive peace which means a peace that promotes reconciliation and coexistence on the basis of human rights, social, economic and political justice, legal reforms, anticorruption measures and reform in public administration and civil society. Management of peace is challenging to public administrators as it is clear that weak government institutions and poor governance undermine growth, service delivery and fuel political and social instability.



Having said that, there are four areas identified for positive peace building, and these are:

- Preventive diplomacy that is to prevent disputes from occurring between parties and to prevent them from escalating into conflict.
- Peacemaking which is to bring hostile parties to an agreement.
- Peacekeeping is the act of deploying United Nations forces with the consent of the parties to the conflict.
- Peace building refers to endeavours, being short or long-term processes of rebuilding war-affected communities. This, however, includes rebuilding political, security, social and economic aspects of a society coming out of war and addressing the root causes of the conflicts as well as promoting social and economic justice, putting in place political structures for governance, the rule of law that will cement peace building, reconciliation and development (Murithi, 2006:13).

3.7 CONCLUSIONS

Many writers in the field of conflict resolution and management identify new strategies and tools of conflict management. They authoritatively define the potential response strategies and tactics that are available to policy makers and engage in conflict management and prevention. At the same time, some theories of conflict resolution and conflict management are not overall methods or techniques of conflict resolution. Some of the approaches and concepts are problematic while others are theoretically attractive, but they have yet to prove themselves as successful techniques of conflict management.



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They also raise issues regarding national reconciliation in areas of conflict to promote conflict resolution as a means to prevent or manage violent conflict in societies divided by ethnic differences. In theory, and in the appropriate political and cultural environment, the concept of reconciliation can be an important vehicle for transforming war and hatred into peace and acceptance. However, it is ridiculous and dangerous to confuse dreams with reality. In reality, the dialogue of reconciliation is still being used as a weapon to justify conflicts. It is my belief that public administration discipline should include and not ignore theories of conflict as it is clear that all conflicts, whether political, economical or social, have a direct impact on public administration and therefore affect service delivery, rule of law and human rights. The boundaries between disciplines and between the public and private spheres have become increasingly blurred over many years, but globalization has accelerated this process and narrowed the gap between them.

The traditional focus of public administration on intra-state policy management within state institutions is no longer adequate. Involving public administrators in conflict resolution and management therefore becomes a necessity to realize service delivery.



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CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter details the research design, population and sampling, data collection methods, data collection procedures, and data analysis method. The research highlights some difficulties encountered during the execution of the study. Findings and conclusion and the research outline of the study appear in a subsequent chapter against this background.



4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN


The research material available at the initiation of this study and a combination of both qualitative and quantitative study design can be broadly categorized into two types: (1) theoretical possibilities; proposing 'potential' uses of questionnaires and (2) case studies reporting on existing documents including primary and secondary sources. Since part of my investigation involved experimentation with oral interviews it seemed prudent to focus more on case studies of existing documents.

The data analysis approach entailed identifying certain aspects or variables in relation to the question stated. The aim was to isolate the variables and then see their effect on the system being investigated. Oral interviews were developed so that all results could be compared. Interviews were then carried out on an experimental subject, and repeated if required or compared to other subjects. However, because the oral interview tool had to have a balance and certain limits it could not take factors outside of the interview into account. The data

analysis approach examined the situation from a more open-ended perspective. The data analysis approach, interviews, and other methods were used to gather information from the people who were involved in the conflict.

4.3 POPULATION AND SAMPLING

The study population consisted of all people who were residing in the areas administered by the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II respectively. The population was enormous. Inferences, assumptions and decisions were therefore made to ensure that it was handled effectively using portions of it as representative, which gave valid results as if the entire population were considered in the defined framework at any given time.




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The size of the sample of the population was 200 people, 100 respondents were from the side of the SPLM/A and the other 100 respondents were taken from the side of Anya Nya II. The 100 respondent were divided into six groups with each group being represented by 20 respondents. Each 20 respondents were categorized according to their occupations. The six categories were: 1. politicians; 2. community leaders; 3. military command; 4. intellectuals; 5. soldiers; and 6. civil population. It was, however, considered that these categories covered adequately the range of people who were influential in their respective areas as well as in the negotiations between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II.

To get reliable information from the leadership of the two movements, the purposive sampling technique was used. The population was clustered according to the six categories as shown in the following table:

Table 1: Categories according to which the population was clustered

S/no	Group of respondents	Number of respondents	Percentage
1	Politicians	5	25
2	Community leaders	5	25
3	Military command	4	20
4	Academics	2	10
5	Soldiers	2	10
6	Ordinary citizens	2	10
Total		20	100



A number of aspects were taken into consideration when assigning numbers to each category, such as level of influence, how knowledgeable, political balance, religious balance, gender balance, etc. All of these were considered to be relevant.

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4.4 DATA COLLECTION


A combination of instruments for data collection was used. These included analysis of content from primary and secondary sources, structured and unstructured questionnaires (open-ended and close-ended), face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, self-administered questionnaires and individual interviews. Furthermore, focus-group discussion, participants' observation, important documents relating to the negotiations and resolutions emanating from those negotiations were used extensively.

a) Questionnaire survey

A questionnaire survey was conducted for a period of two months. This survey targeted politicians, community leaders, military command, academics, soldiers and ordinary citizens. A self-administered questionnaire survey was used to collect data from respondents. The researcher appointed a research assistant to administer the research questions in selected regions in Southern Sudan which were Upper Nile, Northern Bhar-Elgazal, Lakes and Central Equatoria.

b) Interview survey

An interview survey was conducted for a period of two months. This survey targeted politicians, community leaders, military command, academics, soldiers and ordinary citizens. A self-administered questionnaire survey was used to collect data from respondents. The researcher appointed a research assistant to administer the research questions in selected regions in Southern Sudan which were Upper Nile, Northern Bhar-Elgazal, Lakes and Central Equatoria.



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c) The documentation review

This includes official letters and memos exchanged by the two parties before, during and after negotiations. Other published and unpublished sources such as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) relating to the subject and the history of the conflict in Sudan were consulted.

d) Observations


The researcher made observations on the conflict situation and how it was resolved.

4.5 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

Data were collected using different research instruments after due consultation with and obtaining permission from targeted participants, as well as the relevant political, military, traditional and government leadership.

4.6 DATA ANALYSIS

Data collected were verified by applying multiple methods of collection. The triangulation of data was applied to ensure accuracy. Documentary analysis, interviews and questionnaires were used to allow for the validation of collected data. Data were also collected through direct quotations from respondents, in-depth description of emotions, recorded verbatim statements, scenes captured on camera/video, and letting respondents write down what they felt where possible.



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The raw data gathered were grouped and coded for facilitation of interpretation and analysis according to their emerging themes. From the coded data based on themes, clear explanations and careful analysis of the data was done with reference to the literature review.

Analysis of the data captured attempted to isolate cause and effect within that system. This was a more flexible approach and had the ability to capture unexpected outcomes during the analysis that might otherwise have been missed. Data analysis did not normally allow intervention so it involved mainly observation and interviews. Thus the phenomenon that was to be investigated would need to have occurred during the time of observation, or it could not be captured.

A cross-sectional and descriptive method based on the selected design of qualitative case study research was used. It was conducted through photographs, tape and video recordings, field notes, questionnaires and interviews with key officials such as politicians and community leaders, military command, soldiers, intellectuals and ordinary people in the community, books and magazines, published and unpublished articles. The design was cross-sectional in the sense that it cut through SPLM/A and Anya Nya II administered areas. Triangulation was used to ensure the collection of sufficient information for addressing the research objectives as well as to validate the data collected.

4.7 PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS




While conducting the research many problems were encountered. The first problem was the weather conditions in Southern Sudan. Access to most areas in Southern Sudan is very poor especially in the rainy season. Air transport was used but with difficulty as there is not a reliable airline that connects states in the south. The second problem was the behaviour of respondents. Some were reluctant to respond positively to appointments and some turned down the appointments. Some did not want to answer the questionnaires sent to them, and some disappeared completely with the questionnaires. This resulted in a waste of time.

Research assistants were employed to help with the collecting of the information needed for this research. Some assistants, however, demanded immediate payment before they took off from Juba to different locations. It was difficult for the researcher to convince them to do the work as the budget for this work was inadequate.

It was deemed necessary to have research assistants because the research area is vast and due to the nature of the researcher's work it was not possible to cover it personally. Another reason was to overcome the language barriers.

4.8 CONCLUSIONS

The methodology used in data collection consisted of population sampling, data collection methods and procedures, data analysis and semi-structured and structure questionnaires (open-ended and close-ended) and literature review. Although difficulties were encountered in the process of the research as alluded to above, the research methodology used in data collection made the researcher believe that the information obtained was reasonable in the sense that it covered the most needed information on the origin of the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and how it was resolved. The researcher believes that it can also be applied to resolve the conflict between the SPLM/A and other political parties and armed groups opposing the SPLM/A.




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CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANYALSIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This study addresses the conflict that inherently characterized various military groups in Southern Sudan from 1983 to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan in 2005 and its effect on service delivery in Southern Sudan. This analysis includes the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II as well as various political and military forces of Southern Sudan, which received most of their support from various regimes in Khartoum. Given the fact that much of the history of Southern Sudan is unwritten, this research has relied heavily on questionnaires, documents related to the negotiations between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and interviews with eye witnesses who participated in one way or another in the conflicts in Sudan. On this basis quantitative and qualitative data findings were analyzed.




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5.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS


Based on the data gathered from respondents as per questionnaires the findings are transmitted through graphical presentations in the ensuing paragraphs.

Figure 5.2.1 Formation of the SPLM/A




Based on the above graphic illustration, it is clear that the power struggle was linked to ethnicity, and indeed in terms of percentage, the cause of the struggle between the two ethnic groups was 80% ethnicity. According to the graph, 20% was the nationalists who did not care who would become the leader of the movement.

Figure 5.2.2 Service delivery





War is destructive in terms of property, person and systems. As shown in the graphic illustration above, 90% of non-existence of service delivery was caused by war. Relief centres and the seat of government used to be attacked by the GOS army and its sponsored militias that resulted in the evacuation of relief centres, government officials, and the displacement of thousands of citizens from their homes. The 10% mentioned in the graph represents the individual organizations and government institutions that devoted their time and energy to serving the population.

Figure 5.2.3 New challenges




According to the graphic illustration the 20% that may have caused tension were the remnants of the SSDF who remained with the government in Khartoum whereas the 80% were the political and military groups who had joined the SPLM/A, so the chances for renewed tension were remote.

Figure 5.2.4 Unity and leadership




Based on the graphic elucidation, it is clear that the ideology was connected with the sharp distinction between the two groups, Anya Nya II and SPLM/A, and in fact in terms of percentage the cause of disagreement was 70% ideology about having one unified movement with one leader.

Figure 5.2.5 Anya Nya II objectives



As per the graphic illustration, it is confirmed that the objectives of Anya Nya II were not achieved (5%) because the majority of them were illiterate without proper organization and objectives and, most importantly, they were getting help from the government they had pledged to fight to liberate the people of Southern Sudan.


Figure 5.2.6 Power sharing



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In line with the graphic illustration, the promotion and appointment of some Anya Nya II leaders, the absorption of the fighting force and political leadership into the SPLM/A system was the best way to resolve the five years' conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II as shown in terms of the percentage (82%). It was observed that 18% was lured by the government in Khartoum by giving seniors of Anya Nya II high ranks, money and houses in order to fight the SPLM/A.

Figure 5.2.7 Other experiences



Based on the above graphic illustration, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the Republic of South Africa is the best example with regard to the Southern Sudan situation where forgiveness and affirmative action were considered the basis for healing as shown in terms of percentage (75%). According to the graph 25% turned this war and confusion to their benefit as they received a lot of resources. The majority of respondents mentioned that since the Southern Sudanese had experienced numerous splits within their ranks and caused massive destruction in respect of person, property and government systems, those involved in such problem should be forgiven.

5.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

According to one member of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly from the questionnaire survey, the conflict between Anya Nya II and SPLM/A started in 1983 in Itang, Ethiopia,

where the two movements were established. Anya Nya II fighters were the remnants of Anya Nya I who did not return to Sudan after the signing of the Addis-Ababa Agreement in 1972. Some of them came out immediately after they were purged out by the government of Sudan as being incapable of serving in the Sudan military junta due to various limitations which the soldiers perceived as being discriminatory and they had to return to the bush of Southern Sudan to fight. The leaders of Anya Nya II were Samuel Gai Tut, Akot Atem, William Chuol Deng, Gordon Koang Chol and Paulino Matip Nhial whereas the leaders of SPLM/A were Colonel Dr John Garang, Major William Nyuon Bany, Major Kerbino Kwanyin and Captain Salva Kiir Mayardit. Akot Atem and Samuel Gai joined the side of Anya Nya II and were not originally members. They came out of Sudan much later when Anya Nya II was already in the bush, but they were the educated elite of the group. There were many other officers behind the two movements.



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According to a senior official in the office of the president, while the leadership of the Sudanese struggle was being debated in Itang, the Anya Nya II leaders felt that the Ethiopian government favoured Dr John Garang to become the leader of the movement. This fear, according to one participant who was interviewed was based on the speculation that Ethiopian diplomats in Khartoum met with Dr John Garang prior to his defection from Khartoum and told him that he should go to Ethiopia and launch an effective rebellion against the government of Jafar Nimeri in Khartoum. Anya Nya II leaders had this suspicion in mind when they attempted to negotiate the leadership of the movement with Dr John Garang which was facilitated by the Ethiopian authorities in Itang.

On 3 September 1983, Samuel Gai, Akout Atem, Choul Deang and other officers with about 1500 troops fled Itang for Southern Sudan for fear that they would be attacked and arrested by the Ethiopian forces. They were joined by other leaders of Anya Nya II after they were dispersed from their HQs in Bilpam west of Ethiopia in October 1983. The two forces merged and formed what became known as Anya Nya II. Anya Nya II forces remained permanently in Southern Sudan fighting the SPLM/A alongside of Sudan government forces until their unification with SPLM/A in 1988.

A politician in the Regional Cooperation ministry stated in an interview, “John Garang had credibility as a military man. He was highly respected while still in Sudan because he was once involved in organizing elements of the Sudanese Army especially from marginalized areas to join the Anya Nya II to fight against Khartoum. He was therefore seen by many Southern Sudanese soldiers as the de facto leader of the movement. As the result of this disagreement, Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A were locked in military confrontation that could be resolved only in 1988”.



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In an interview a citizen in Nasir area said that Dr John Garang was humble and polite. He deserved to be a leader, as he liked people. He was always with them and respected them, including their property, unlike the Anya Nya II who always looted people's property.

The interview respondents narrated the events leading up to the conflict between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A, but they did not have any journals or records of these events because keeping record in wartime is very dangerous for personal safety. However, Johnson indicates that Samuel Gai and Akuot Atem left Sudan in the same period with Dr John Garang and

other senior supporters. However, the two leaders joined Anya Nya II to advance their interests.

According to a senior member of staff in the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Ministry of Internal affairs from the interview survey, Southern Sudanese politicians and other Southern Sudanese military groups were under the influence of the Sudanese government and their role could be potentially detrimental to the successful implementation of the CPA because they always allied with Khartoum. These political forces were seen as double agents by the leadership of the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A leaders were afraid the CPA would not be successful if these opposing groups participated at the negotiating table. These two opposition groups, the political and military groups mentioned earlier, could demand to share political power with the SPLM/A equally when they had not participated in the struggle process.



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On the other hand, the questionnaire survey indicated that other Southern Sudanese political forces wanted to reduce the power of the SPLM/A by demanding to be involved in the political process. However, they were not able to sway the SPLM/A from its determination to control the politics of Southern Sudan during the interim period. That is why the three top positions of President, vice-President and Speaker of Parliament are all SPLM positions. The SPLM saw these different political forces as power grabbers, who wanted to harvest what they had not sown.

On this point, Spearman and Heinonen articulate that the factors that block interaction and agreement between parties are self-interest and the complexity of systems in Sudan. While the government of Sudan would have awarded their allies with some kind of tokenistic

power, they also knew that the SPLM/A was the fighting force in Sudan and were they to risk losing SPLM/A at the negotiating table, war could not have been avoided. Therefore, they preferred to work with the SPLM/A rather than with their allies in Khartoum. The government of Sudan was convinced by the international community that the key to the unity of a country with different races was to share political and economic power and introduce social justice for all its citizens. As always, the government of Sudan planned clandestinely to fail the CPA by using Southern Sudanese opposition, particularly the weapon-bearing militias. However, SPLM/A managed to amalgamate the formidable militias in what is known as the Juba declaration on 8 January 2006 and that paralyzed Khartoum for the time being. The SPLM/A watched the opposition in Khartoum very closely to ensure that they (the militias) were not used to cause the CPA to fail. They worked hard to win the militias back to Southern Sudan. According to Montville, a conflict resolution strategy cannot prevail if both sides blame each other for their problems. He further states that trust is very important in the reconciliation process. Whether the militia will come to their senses and unite fully with the SPLM/A is yet to be seen in the future as we head towards the 2011 referendum.




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Whereas the researcher observed that interviewees understood the strategic position of the SPLM/A very well during the negotiation of the CPA and during the implementation of the CPA, he also explained the militia and other Southern Sudanese forces' strategy of trying to reduce the influence and power of the SPLM/A in Southern Sudan. Looking back at what the SPLM/A had done, its leadership had been very smart in avoiding the conflict between Southern Sudanese politicians. However, the SPLM/A must continue to be aware of the politics of divide and rule orchestrated by the regime in Khartoum.

Moreover, Spearman and Heinonen continue to explain clearly how reconciliation can be achieved to gain political points. It is important for the SPLM/A to continue to convince the Southern opposition that it is in their best interests for Southern Sudan to stand together during the interim period. At the same time, the SPLM must watch those who are working to destroy the CPA. According to the interviewee, the leadership of the SPLM was smart to keep away subversive Southern politicians who cared very little about liberating the downtrodden people.

According to the female official in the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Dr John Garang was fair-minded regarding how he dealt with refugees that were loyal to either the SPLM/A or Anya Nya II. There were times when particular soldiers would physically assault refugees who were deemed to be loyal to the Anya Nya II movement. These incidents were taken seriously by Dr John Garang. There was a time he told refugee students to show which of the soldiers had mistreated them so that they could be disciplined. After getting a clear report, Dr John Garang arrested about ten SPLA security officers who were reported to have mistreated the refugees.



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In addition, Dr John Garang was always interested in reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and that is why when the time came for the discussion of unity, he sent a captain from Yoany Battalion who was an indigenous son of Nasir to negotiate reconciliation with the Anya Nya II. In addition, he also sent two politicians from Nasir to speed up the negotiation process between the two movements. Dr Garang's strategy was that the children of the same area may understand themselves better than people brought in from other tribes. His strategy bore fruit as this was the only way Anya Nya II and the SPLM were reconciled in 1988.

According to the letters exchanged between the two movements in 1987, field officers in both the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II signed a truce among themselves. That truce produced real peace between the two movements. According to the interview conducted with field commanders and ordinary soldiers it was said that the two movements fought a devastating war until they reached the conclusion that nothing would be achieved if they continued with this fierce fighting. This was followed by changing attitudes of the fighters towards each other when some soldiers who usually met in hunting places initiated a dialogue between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. When the soldiers returned to their respective barracks they reported how they had been discussing things with elements of Anya Nya II and this encouraged the SPLM/A command to send a letter to Anya Nya II proposing a dialogue.



A company commander in Mujnun Bn (SPLA) stated that on 29 March 1987 they drafted a letter to Anya Nya II proposing a dialogue between the two movements since they had a common goal, that of freeing the downtrodden from the oppressive rule of the northern elite. They received a reply on 18 April 1987. Lieutenant Panom Kuac was the first officer to set a foot officially in the SPLM/A HQs at Kuanylou when he brought a letter from the Anya Nya II commander. The letter said “I am sending you this officer to give you my letter and to confirm the receipt of your letter. Let him come back with your response accompanied by your soldiers. I am sending him carrying his rifle No. 123726, and a long letter dated 18 April 1987”. A very important point mentioned in the letter was that “my cooperation with the Sudanese Army is for my survival. You must not make this as a condition”. This, however, was the beginning of the direct contact between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II.

According to a senior officer of the SPLA in Kuanylou, the response of the command in Kuanylou to the letter sent by Colonel Gordon Kong Chol dated 18 April 1987 was to send

three officers taking the letter from the SPLM/A to Colonel Gordon Kong Chol as requested in his letter to “send me a reply with your officers, our three officers left Kuanylou SPLM/A base on 21 April 1987 for Pandanyang, the HQs of Anya Nya II armed forces. A middle-ranking officer of the SPLA who went on this mission stated that it was on the evening of 20 April 1987 that they were informed that they were going on a mission to Pandanyang HQs of Anya Nya II, accompanying Lt. Panom Kuac who had brought a letter from Anya-Nya II. It was a difficult moment for us to go into the enemy territory without guarantees; however, as military rules dictate we had to abide by the decision of our commander to send us, so we left on 21 April 1987.



However, because of mistrust three days were allowed for our officers to return, otherwise it would be clear that our officers had been arrested and retaliation by means of an attack was the only option available to the command of Yuany Bn. However, our officers returned and brought a letter proposing an immediate meeting of a high profile delegation from both sides to discuss the next step to be taken.

According to the Commander of Pandanyang (Anya Nya II), the conflict between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A had created an environment in which one could not have access to any services, for example, humanitarian intervention, service delivery, local development or infrastructure. Bridges had all been destroyed and there was not even an administration to look after the local needs. A Sergeant Major from the SPLM/A stated that after the return of our delegation with a letter of acceptance of direct negotiations and the readiness of Anya Nya II to talk with us, a meeting was immediately held to discuss how to conduct the negotiations. After a long brainstorming session it was decided that without a cease-fire agreement things would not move. A small committee consisting of eight people was formed

to draft terms for a cease-fire which they did and it was sent to Anya Nya II headquarters in Jikmir on 25 April 1987 proposing that they give their input on the document. They read our document and gave their reply on 26 April 1987, accepting the proposal. We set 29 April 1987 as the date for the meeting to declare the cease-fire.

To avoid being ambushed and losing our delegation as had been done to William Nyoun in 1986, the command of Yuany battalion of the SPLM/A had to send their forces to Malualciengbinyal, a cattle camp situated 8 miles north west of Kuanylou selected as the venue for the meeting, to secure the area to avert any possible ambush or attack on our delegation. On 29 April 1987 they held our first meeting after Lt. Panom Kuac had been sent to Kuanylou and the return of our three officers sent to Pandanyang. The meeting was meant to declare the cease-fire to open avenues for negotiation and to build trust among the members of the two parties by allowing free movement to citizens and soldiers of both sides alike.



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
One chief from Jikmir said that relatives who lived on both sides did not meet even to share their happiness or sorrows simply because the authorities on both sides did not allow them to move and share the services in the areas due to anarchy in the environment. In this meeting a senior officer from Anya Nya II was selected to chair the meeting. He opened the meeting by informing those present on how to proceed with the meeting. A brief introduction was done. After that an opportunity was given to the head of the SPLM/A delegation. A cease-fire agreement was signed on 29 April 1987 and came into force. One of the important points in the cease-fire was the formation of an enlightenment committee to sensitize the population to the initiative taken by field officers of the two sides to resolve the current conflict.

The researcher observed that the interviewee indicated that Dr John Garang was always for the unity of the liberation struggle so that objectives could be achieved. He demonstrated this by ensuring that negotiation was always open between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and by protecting civilians from being abused by some soldiers who wanted to mistreat those thought to be Anya Nya II supporters. It was further observed that the negotiations were successful because all sectors of life were involved such as direct talks at grassroots level, letters of communication at leadership level, contacts among field officers, the realization of the objectives of the oppressed people and the need for unity for quick achievement of these aspirations.



The interview survey was conducted with the SPLM/A generals and some chiefs who cited some essential factors that made the mediation a success. The generals said the SPLM/A ideology was understood through the sincere policies that the C-in-C, the late Dr John Garang had indoctrinated in the minds of the SPLM/A members. Dr John Garang said repeatedly that we, the members of SPLM/A, were continuously fighting the protracted war against the injustice of successive regimes in Khartoum. He made it clear that the objective of the SPLM/A was to fight for the whole of Sudan, not just for Southern Sudan. He used to say that once the south was liberated, he would continue to liberate the downtrodden masses in the north of Sudan and other marginalized areas in the east and west. From the beginning of the disagreement between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A, Dr John Garang did not think that Anya Nya II would pose a threat to the advancement of the SPLM/A. Many battles were fought between them and Anya Nya II had proved to be strong. This made Dr John Garang recognize Anya Nya II to be a force to be reckoned with.

The previous slogans such as “Crush the bandits called ‘Nyagat’” were put aside. Dr John Garang knew that in order for the SPLM/A to succeed, he had to make peace with them. Some leaders of Anya Nya II were not well educated and therefore were pretty adamant on the question of unity with the SPLM/A. Nevertheless, the split of Anya Nya II into two semi-autonomous groups, making them weak, was one of the main factors that made the mediation with the SPLM/A successful in 1987. The overall commander, William Chuol Deang of Anya Nya II was very difficult to negotiate with. Lieutenant Colonel William Nyuon Bany, then the SPLA Chief of Staff and commander of zone three, sent many delegations to him, but he used to respond negatively. The splinter group of Anya Nya II in the Eastern Nuer area was commanded by indigenous officers from Akobo and Nasir. That was why the ground for the negotiation between the SPLM/A and the Eastern group of Anya Nya II was established by indigenous officers from Akobo and Nasir. William Chuol Deang’s forces clashed with the SPLM/A forces in Pangak under the command of Commander John Kulang Puot as a result William Choul Deang was killed in action in 1986. As a result of his death, the rest of his group joined the eastern splinter group and they successfully merged with the SPLM/A in 1988.



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Clearly the war between the two movements was characterized by competition for power in Southern Sudan. James Laue defines conflict as “Natural competition between two parties for power and prestige.” The power struggle that made SPLM/A and the Anya Nya II fight in Ethiopia was the same thing that divided Anya Nya II into two groups (eastern and western groups). The reason for the split of Anya Nya II was because William Chuol Deang wanted his forces to be in his native area of Pow (Pangak) all the time. Choul Deng was a man with the habit of imposing his ideas on his subordinates. Commander James Biel Jock Nhial (from Gajiok) opposed this policy imposed by William Chuol Deang. He told him point blank that

the indigenous sons of Nuer from Nasir and Akobo must leave Pow. A senior Commander from Akobo (Tot Bangoang) also opposed William Chuol Deang's policy.

As a result, the two commanders left with their followers and that is how the eastern group was formed. The earliest evidence concerning the effect of the conflict between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A on the liberation struggle was the power struggle about who would lead the SPLM/A, when the group of Samuel Gai Tut suggested that Akout Atem should chair the political leadership and Samuel Gai Tut become minister for defence, while Col. Dr John Garang took the portfolio of Chief of Staff. This suggestion was refused by Dr John Garang's group who were enjoying the support of the Ethiopian government. The result was that the conflict between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A became the new challenge for the struggle. The new dimension of the conflict influenced and was influenced by the tribal aspects of the South as the liberation became a massive factory demanding the Southern Sudanese presence, as the most important part of the Southern Sudanese presence to be further influenced as the war turned into tribal war.




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During the interview survey the Chiefs said that the conflict had interrupted the smooth process of the liberation and the massive support the guerillas were getting from the population including the supply of food and information and further indicated that government institutions were the first to be destroyed. They lacked basic services such as schools, medical centres and clean water. The Southern Sudan political culture of liberation for the oppressed was to influence the whole of Sudan again, with the new order losing the productive capacity of Northern domination and consequently acting against tribal groups and setting up blockades as penalties for what they considered to be the rebellious tribal population. The Northern political and military advantage played a major influential role

during this period. For example, leaders like Samuel Gai and William Chuol Deng received tremendous amounts of supplies from Khartoum government and this had an impact on the conflict between SPLM/A and the Anya Nya II.

As said by Burton conflicts are behaviours that have the potential of being destructive of persons, property and systems. The first thing that suffered in Southern Sudan after the war broke out was the government system, local administration, and rule of law which collapsed. For example, because of the conflict, the youth who were in possession of guns took the place of chiefs who always settled disputes by disciplining youth who armed themselves and engaged in looting other communities. People were displaced from their homes and took refuge in neighbouring countries. Elders said, the conflict turned into a south-south conflict, instead of a conflict between the SPLM/A and the Sudan government. This caused the liberation struggle to slow down. We could not get services because all the NGOs who used to provide clean water, health services and education as well as supporting government institutions, withdrew from the area.




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According to a middle-ranking officer from the SPLA, during the first week of their group's meeting they spent the time just getting to know each other, including the interest of the two parties in the liberation and what all of them wanted to achieve upon completion of the reconciliation. The first meeting was quite enlightening and while brainstorming within a short period of time they managed to gain trust among themselves. Part of the reason for that success was that the delegations understood the value of peace and reconciliation among the Southern Sudanese people. All members on both sides accepted some useful mental models, agreed upon ground rules, and certain norms of behaviour.

Over time, in the group meetings the delegates learned many concepts that really made a difference to all of them in the group. Primarily, they shared some issues in the group and the issues were discussed without too much dispute. As delegates, they discussed and agreed on certain rules to be applied. These rules helped us interact with each other, provided some foundation which they could all agree upon and which would help them to be more effective and more productive. The following points played an important role in the group meetings:

- They had fun!
- Each delegate honoured time limits. Therefore, things were done on time.
- One spoke; all listened, listened and understood.
- Everyone participated; no one dominated the group meetings.
- They disagreed with each other sometimes, but the delegates were able to manage these differences.



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
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At the end of each group meeting each group would come up with consensus on every point they discussed. This meant that every member agreed with the decision. In fact, reaching consensus did not mean that everyone was happy. However, it did mean that they agreed based on the compromises

The groups kept a list of rules in their meetings as a constant reminder of the norms we had agreed on. Using these rules as a guideline, week by week, the group members were able to make adjustments along the way. Now all of this might seem commonsense. Yet, we discussed and agreed to these rules and arrived at consensus agreement. Explicitly agreeing to such rules really did help. In meetings, people thought twice before starting up side conversations. One spoke while everyone listened. If one person dominated a discussion,

others reminded him or her to give others a turn. Everyone participated; no one dominated. Generally speaking, we started on time and exerted an effort to honour time limits.

The other important elements which were observed were communication among the delegates. The Payam administrator explained that, in fact, we had really very good communication. There were no signs of miscommunication. They had made it clear in their first meeting that they had to exchange suggestions on the agenda so that each party discussed it before any meeting. This was the first thing that the group had agreed to before any other issues.




The researcher observed that generals, chiefs and elders explained all the factors that made the mediation process between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A a success. The policy of reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II was something Dr John Garang initiated and supported at various times. The interviewee said that one of the notorious leaders of Anya Nya II was obstinate about accepting dialogue to take place between the two movements. He said that while Dr John Garang regretted his death, it made the dialogue between the two movements possible. The involvement of chiefs and elders at an early stage in the process was a factor in the success.

The SPLM/A and Any-Nya II conflict resolution strategy will lend itself to the above evaluation process and factors. In fact, both sides achieved their goals. For instance, after the successful conclusion of the merging of the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II, the united movement managed to accelerate the pace of the liberation struggle and managed to liberate 90% of the south from the Khartoum regime, following a strategy of service delivery to the general population in liberated areas, and gaining strong Southern Sudanese support. The collaborative strategy had some good factors. However, there is some need to develop public

service delivery in the South to prevent future conflict. The Southern Sudanese may need to determine new ways of working together for the benefit of their people.

John Laue points out that the nature of conflict lies mostly in natural competition between two parties. The conflict that cropped up within the leadership of Anya Nya II paved the way for peaceful negotiation to take place between the SPLM/A and the Anya Nya II forces commanded by Commander Gordon Koang Chol. Dr John Garang and Gordon Koang Chol made their officers undertake the preliminary discussions. When the time came for the senior leadership of the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II, they simply endorsed what the young officers had embarked on long before.



According to the questionnaires completed by the Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture, it was pointed out that the Southern Sudanese indulged in and created chaotic situations for themselves. He said that women were raped by the Sudanese government forces, as well as forces of the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. Children were taken into bondage by Arab nomads. Villages were burned and resources were depleted and destroyed. The land itself was turned barren by war and ammunition chemicals. Travelling in Southern Sudan was complicated and made difficult by warlords and bandits who either looted the travelers or demanded that they pay fines for passing through their villages. Life in Southern Sudan during the years of the struggle was not worth living. Everything was complicated and fragile as though peace would never return to this land. Public administration was destroyed. All Southerners know what war can bring and what it is capable of bringing. One would hope that these lessons make a lasting impression on southerners so that war does not happen again in Southern Sudan.

One war in particular would be hard to fight and that is the war among southerners because it only benefits the government of Sudan said a war veterans. Both say the factional fighting in Southern Sudan provided a time of rest and opportunity for Khartoum, who used southerners to fight each other. He went on to say that Khartoum government gave arms to the militias to fight either Dr Riek Machar or Dr John Garang's forces. Paulino Matip was a commander of the militia in the area of Bentiu who fought the forces of both Dr Riek Machar and Dr John Garang. After the CPA was signed, Paulino Matip signed a peace agreement with the chairman and C-in-C of the SPLM/A and President of the Government of Southern Sudan, General Salva Kiir Mayardit. He is now (Paulino Matip) the deputy C-in-C of the SPLA and one would hope that all other militias would follow his example so that southerners do not fight among themselves. One of his commanders Gordon Koang Chol and others, have preferred to remain with the central government in Khartoum. However, it is imperative that the SPLM/A actively engages in seeking reconciliation with other militias that still espouse the Khartoum government so that they can join their brothers and sisters in Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A must employ conflict resolution strategies with these groups being used by the Khartoum government.



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Montville states that lack of a conflict resolution strategy means the continuation of conflict among groups or parties and the continuation of suffering of the people. As the lessons of the unification strategies that brought about unity between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II are a living testimony, the SPLM/A should have a south-south reconciliation strategy in order to bring them into the fold. It was the commander of Yoany Battalion, Captain James Hoth Mai, who designed the strategic plans that brought about complete unification of the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. Perhaps the SPLM/A should use similar personalities to bring about unity among the militias.

As the researcher observed, the Director General in the Ministry of Agriculture mentioned some of the atrocities committed by the people who possessed guns in the war zones of Southern Sudan and the destruction of the systems of governance that were supposed to render services to the population. At this point in time, the Government of Southern Sudan is almost at the point of disarming all civilians. Parents who have been separated from their children are now together and going through a healing process. Civilians are now breathing the breath of freedom. The Government of Southern Sudan is disarming civilians so that there can be law and order. Rape and related sexual abuses have been significantly reduced if not eliminated, as crimes are now punished in Southern Sudan. Children who were captured as slaves by Arab nomads and Murle are being freed since the agreement between the central government and the government of Southern Sudan. The village tyrants are no longer a threat to the ordinary people. They must follow the government policies and orders or risk being punished.



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The government of Sudan is not cheered by the improvement of the situation in Southern Sudan which is why they are trying to build up militias again to create chaos in Southern Sudan. The militias were fighting the SPLM/A for the interests of the Sudan government. Many known southerners who could have been a bulwark in the struggle to save their people have accepted being used by the Sudan government to kill their own people. The researcher appreciates the action taken by some leaders of the other armed groups to join their brothers and sisters who have established a government in Southern Sudan in their capital city of Juba.


Montville articulates that opposing groups of people can come together if the conflict resolution strategy is properly planned. The proper conflict resolution mechanisms could

have been utilized, but the Marxist regime in Ethiopia did not want that to happen. They had wanted to impose their own wishes and interests on the Southern Sudanese. This made southerners kill themselves for a long time. Although Dr John Garang had wanted to reconcile with Anya Nya II, he was forced to implement the wishes of the Ethiopian leadership. This is a lesson which southerners cannot forget. After the signing of the CPA, southerners are committed to using democratic ways of conflict resolution.

A variety of responses were given by retired generals and other senior officers who were in both Anya Nya II and the SPLA through questionnaires and interviews. According to them, the guerrilla leaders of Anya Nya II (the Anya-Nya Patriotic Front) living in Bilpam did not like the system of organized movement. They had wanted to be free to do whatever suited them without any accountability. The leadership of Anya Nya II, prior to the arrival of Dr John Garang and his colleagues from Sudan, was kept at Bilpam by the Ethiopian authorities. They were not really fighting the government of Sudan, but were rather engaged in banditry, looting the property of the civilians of Southern Sudan and abusing them physically, sexually and psychologically. As a result, the leaders of Anya Nya II were very hostile to the Southern Sudanese intellectuals who were with them for fear that if the intellectuals took control of the movement, their banditry would be curtailed.

Abel Alier points out that the difference between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II was that Anya Nya II saw the SPLM/A as a Marxist-Leninist movement that would divide all their wealth including their wives and share it with other people. The interviewees agreed with Alier's statement in that the fear of redistribution of wealth was there once the intellectuals controlled the movement. The Marxist-Leninist regime of Ethiopia was interested in working with groups that were opposed to the government of Jafar Nimeri in Khartoum. When mutiny

broke out in Southern Sudan in 1975, the Ethiopian government supplied the mutineers of Akobo with one hundred automatic guns. The Ethiopian authorities ordered them to attack a Sudanese military garrison at the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. In 1976, the Ethiopian government had an interest in making southerners form a political movement based in Ethiopia to fight against the government of Sudan that harboured the Ethiopian dissidents fighting the government of Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian government had wanted the Southern Sudanese intellectuals to come and form the movement. Gordon Muotat Mayen, Elia Duang, Agolong Chol, and Francis Mayar were invited to come to Ethiopia to establish a political movement for Southern Sudan. *At that time* Muotat was living in England. Elia Duang was living in Italy and Francis Mayar and Agolong Chol were living in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 1981-1982, the Libyan government became interested in the Southern Sudanese who were opposed to the regime of Jafar Nimeri. Colonel Gadhafi, President of Libya, recruited and trained southerners as mercenaries who would go and bomb Khartoum.



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The Libyan officers had to go to Itang and Bilpam in Ethiopia to train Anya Nya II soldiers as guerillas who could act as mercenaries at any given time. The Ethiopian government allowed the Libyans to become involved in such activities because, like them, the Libyan government was against the Khartoum government. The members of Muotat's group who opposed this policy were rounded up and thrown in jail by the Ethiopian security in Addis Ababa. Those who were put in jail were Moses Malek, Thuch Mawien, Johny Jock Reath, Bol kiir Diew, and Hoth Guor luak. They were jailed because they refused to be trained as mercenaries. They knew their mission was to be trained as liberators to free the oppressed people of Southern Sudan.

As the researcher observed, the interviewees observed properly the way Anya Nya II officers behaved in their camp at Bilpam. They relied entirely on orders given by the Ethiopian authorities of Gambella to do anything. They did not have plans of their own. They never wanted intellectuals to form the movement into an organized political system. They thought they were doing well when they enriched themselves with cattle and numerous wives. Since they were not educated, they did not realize that Dr John Garang would transform their movement into a scientific revolution. But Ethiopians saw in the end that these Anya Nya II leaders were not able to lead a meaningful revolution and when the intellectuals came, they were chased out of Ethiopia and Garang became the undisputed leader of the revolution until his death in July 2005.



According to an interview conducted with elderly members of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Sudan, the resolution of conflict practiced during the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II negotiations was based on choices and willingness rather than compulsion, and traditional conflict resolution strategies were used intensively. The relationship between the two movements in the initial stages was characterized by voluntary initiative. The two movements accepted relinquishing certain demands in order to reach to a compromise. The elders gave many examples about the framework of conflict resolution as listed below.

Box 5.3 The Conflict Resolution Framework

- Subjective conflict
- Objective conflict
-- pure competition
- pure cooperation
- mixed types

Types of conflict

- Unstructured conflict
- Partially structured conflict
- Structured conflict
- Revolutionary conflict

Conventional strategies for resolution of conflict

- Litigation and executive orders
- Punitive sanctions on offending behaviour

Avoiding conflict escalation

Alternative resolution strategies

- Common goal establishment
- Consensus-building
- Joint problem-solving
- Negotiation
- Informal arbitration
- Mediation
- Non-binding ministerial
- Conflict enlargement
- Conflict containment
- Partnering
- Outlets for emotions

Roles of actors in the conflict


- Observers
- Arbitrators
- Parties to conflict

Subjective conflict: does not appear as a tangible conflict but the parties perceive the existence of the conflict.

Objective conflict: is regarded as actual conflict but it may or may not be recognized.

Pure cooperation conflict: can possibly disappear when the situation is understood. If the community wants to build a cultural centre, their participation, empowerment, partnerships, coordination, information-sharing, common goal establishment, and prioritization of opportunities are ideal methods for solving the problem.

Pure competition conflict: if the weaker party understands the issue, it will decline from facilitating in its resolution. Historically, the tendencies to resolve these conflicts are war, oppression, deception, rationalization of opportunities for the future. Compensation is pure competition that can be changed into mixed motives. Conflicts can possibly be grouped into four types: unstructured, partially structured, fully structured, and revolutionary conflict. In the unstructured conflict, parties are not confined by any rules. Their choices can be impulsive and emotional. In fully structured conflicts, conflicts are clearly defined; the parties are fully subjected to some rules, social norms, and ethical standards (Lan 1997:29).




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However, conflicts can be prevented as said by that there are two kinds of prevention. Firstly, there is primary prevention which is an attempt to keep a problem from occurring in the first place; secondly, secondary prevention, which attempts to stop the development of new problems while working on an existing one.

With lessons learned from the past conflicting relationship between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II, the parties in Southern Sudan have learned a great deal about how to prevent, manage

and resolve conflicts. The strategies the elders discussed are similar to the contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms used internationally.

According to the questionnaires completed by the generals in the SPLA, there are many opportunities for Southern Sudan to develop a conflict resolution system benefiting from the experience of SPLM/A and the Anya Nya II. One of the effective tools is the community-to-community conferences which can bring harmony in the south. For example, the Wunlit Peace Conference between Nuer and Dinka, Leliet between Murle and Nuer to mention but a few, brought harmony and durable peace among those communities.




The researcher's observation suggests that according to the interviewed elders the agreement between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II came into effect through enthusiastic officers of the two movements. They developed mutual trust without any threats from either side. The relationship was simultaneous since the initiative came from the ordinary soldiers. Southerners were learning to rally behind their leaders. Parties that formed the Government of Southern Sudan are subjected to laws legislated by members of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Sudan. This structure provides rule of law, order, discipline, and indicates how disputes can be settled in a lawful manner. It would have been possible for the Ethiopian government to prevent the conflict from arising between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. They could have prevented it by creating a respectful dialogue between the political leaders of the SPLM/A and the Anya Nya II leaders.

In his questionnaire responses, a professor at the University of Juba talked in general about how conflict could be resolved among the parties in Sudan. He said that one way to resolve conflicting issues was to think in terms of factors that blocked interaction and agreements

among parties. The task of the mediators might be to resolve conflicts by having the parties address each of these blocks. In each instance, the work of the entrusted professional would be to find ways for parties to arrive at solutions themselves. In mediation, all parties to the dispute must arrive at their own solutions to the dispute.

According to the interview conducted with a citizen from the civil society commission, the cumulative impact of the power struggle and more than five years of conflict between the SPLM/A and the Anya Nya II has been extensive and borne almost entirely by the people, with debilitating consequences. This includes a militarized environment, millions of internally displaced persons originating from the South, and for those who have persevered, the displacement has resulted in a total lack of service delivery, a relatively stagnant economy and an absence of strong and sustainable government institutions as those institutions were eroded by the war. In particular, the informal system of public administration and service delivery was systematically eroded and fell into disarray. State public administration did not adequately deliver the services to the people that the situation demanded.



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In August 2006 the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, said that “In relation to the conflict in the Middle East, political resolution of conflict secures peace and stability. The people of Southern Sudan have formed a coalition government that embraced all the political parties. All the parties gear their energies and interests through economic development of Southern Sudan. The control of the resources in the south will be handed over to responsible state governments. In a true federal arrangement, each state or province has power over controlling its own resources. As the situation calms in Southern Sudan after the interim period, the government of Southern Sudan will also relinquish some federal powers to reflect true federalism”.

Onduku (University of Bradford, UK,) contends, “A culture of peace is based on the belief that we can build a better society through discourse, mutually beneficial interaction and determination of common values, developing skills of dialogue and negotiation and broad based peace education”. Political and the military wings of Anya Nya II and other militias have not achieved their objectives. All the people of Southern Sudan are equally promoting the culture of peace, economic development and social justice. The government of Southern Sudan is peacefully disarming civilians who possess weapons so that law and order can be maintained.



Courtesy poses important questions that can help the disputants to understand their issues: When and under what circumstances did the problem occur? How long has it existed? What factors are associated with its occurrence? The conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II started in 1983 and the cause of it was the power struggle. The people running Anya Nya II were predominantly uneducated and were afraid of what the intellectuals could do if they were to lead the movement. Instead, they wanted to put intellectuals and career military officers under their leadership, which was limited in scope and could have achieved the objectives of the national liberation struggle. That was why the Ethiopian leadership decided to build Dr John Garang to lead the movement as he had all the qualities required to lead. However, the group of Anya Nya II under Commander Gordon Koang Chol fought against the SPLM/A for five years from 1983 to 1988. The group of Anya Nya II under Commander Paulino Matip Nhial fought against the SPLM/A for 23 years, from 1983-2006, when they joined the SPLM/A after the CPA was signed in 2005. After the CPA, the Southern Sudanese seemed to be working together in good faith as they watched the difficult implementation of the CPA with the North.


The researcher observed that the interviewees used their experiences on how conflict could be resolved between the parties in dispute. They explained the alternatives that the disputants should use when resolving their conflicts. They pointed out the role the mediators could play in resolving problems among the parties. Regarding the Southern Sudanese problems, the Marxist government of Ethiopia would have made the two movements address all the problems that could hinder their coming together. They said the mediators could make the parties solve their problems one by one in the formal meetings. However, the Ethiopian government was not a neutral mediator. They took sides and that was why their mediation did not materialize.



Conflict resolution has provided a comprehensive synthesis of the situation, challenges, opportunities and requirements for sustained service delivery. The University of Fort Hare determined one of the priorities for post-conflict Southern Sudan to be supported for strengthening the rule of law and public administration to promote service delivery to all the citizens. This transitional public administration framework established good service delivery and the rule of law as the cornerstones for lasting peace, unity and democracy.

Rice says that the political turmoil in the Middle East could be calmed through political agreement. Political settlements seem to hold water when it comes to conflicts involving military confrontation. The Southern Sudanese leaders reached political agreement among themselves and it appears evident that it will continue to hold. The leaders in the south are coordinating their activities in promoting development.

Onduku (University of Bradford) contends that a country can prosper if the culture of peace is predominantly accepted by the whole community. Peace is prevailing in Southern Sudan now because the different armed groups have joined the SPLM/A. A culture of peace is the only slogan southerners are using now for handling the implementation of the CPA and the internal peace in the South. The government of Southern Sudan is pushing the intellectuals to rehabilitate the downtrodden masses. It is entirely possible that once dividends of peace accrue to the public, the culture of war could be minimized. Although the problem between southerners appeared to be that there were different political and military parties, the real problem may have been between intellectuals and the uneducated class. It also appeared to have been about the objectives of the movement. Once the objectives were clear, the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II resolved their problems.



5.4 CONCLUSION

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It is clear from this chapter that the cause of the conflict between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A was basically fuelled by the power struggle and the negative role played by the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan in putting pressure on both sides to kill each other rather than negotiate peace among themselves. Taken from the issues raised in the chapter, the conflicts between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II were gradually resolved in two phases. The first phase looked at the peace initiative that brought a significant agreement between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II, and was initiated by Captain James Hoth Mai of the SPLM/A and Commander Gordon Koang Chol of Anya Nya II. That ended the major war between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. However, some members of Anya Nya II who refused to join the 1988 agreement remained working with the government of Sudan and fought the SPLM/A, but not on the scale it used to. On the other hand, the second phase looked at the negotiations

initiated by the President of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit. He reached a final agreement with all the different armed groups of Anya Nya II and later became SSDF on 8 January 2006 and all were integrated into the SPLA and the government of Southern Sudan structures.

To this end, conflict resolution provided a comprehensive synthesis of the situation, challenges, opportunities and requirements for sustained service delivery, public service development and determined one of the priorities for post-conflict Southern Sudan to be supported for the strengthening of the public administration to promote service delivery to all the citizens.




In the main, the Government of Southern Sudan is striving for development and making rapid progress with the rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced people who were traumatized by the situation since 1983 and are keen to improve service delivery to all citizens in Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas. The lessons learned in resolving the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II could be replicated in similar situations, not only in Southern Sudan, but also in other parts of the world where leadership rivalry abounds.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The conflict in the Sudan between the north and the south of the country has been going on for numerous years. Millions of lives and much property have been lost. Years have passed without any service delivery such as health and education infrastructure, clean water and security for the people of Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas in the country. However, while the conflict has been north-dominated, the southern front has not always been united in their quest for freedom. There have always been factions with different interests and intentions which have complicated the national liberation agenda for Southern Sudan.



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Firstly, the nature of the conflict between the SPLM/A, other southern Sudanese armed groups or other political forces and their impact on the service delivery in the post-war and CPA era in the Sudan are addressed and assessed respectively. Secondly, the experiences of conflict resolution between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II in the second half of the 1980s were investigated and lessons drawn. This includes drawing lessons on the experience of South Africa on how they managed to unite their ranks and peacefully resolve their differences and see what aspects of their process could assist Southern Sudan to emerge victorious and render quality services to the people despite the differences between the political forces in the country.

6.2 CONCLUSIONS

Chapter one underlines the definition of the problem and details the significance of the study. Southern Sudanese have been terribly exploited not only by the Islamist-dominated regime in Khartoum, but also by the imperialist governments of Britain, Turko-Egyptian condominium, and the Egyptian-British condominium rulers. All these oppressive regimes imposed their will on the people of Southern Sudan and entwined them in their tentacles. They imposed divide-and-rule policies which have implications for south-south relations today in terms of dividing people along tribal lines and encouraging them to fight each other on petty issues. When Sudan became independent in 1956, the British colonialists handed over the power and administration of the whole country to certain sectarian cliques in Northern Sudan. These sectarian cliques did not abolish the oppressive colonial practices; as a matter of fact, they continued the same brutal practices that Britain used to subdue and quell southern discontent.



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In other words, the white colonizers were replaced by Arab colonizers and the southern Sudanese did not feel independent in 1956. It was in the light of this discontent that southerners in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) mutinied against the upcoming Northern Sudanese-dominated administration just before independence of the Sudan on 18 August 1955 at the southern garrison town of Torit. After the mutineers had been overpowered by the government forces who were well armed and many in number, they fled into the bushes of Southern Sudan and formed the movement called the 'Anyanya I.' This first war lasted for 17 years, from 1955-1972, until the signing of the 1972 Addis-Ababa Agreement which

provided autonomous status for Southern Sudan and this dramatically improved service delivery in the South.

The second Sudanese civil war officially started on 16 May 1983 because of the following reasons:

- The discovery of oil in the south in 1979. The government in Khartoum wanted to build the refinery in the north, however. That was attested to by the southerners.
- The imposition of Islamic laws in the country for Muslims and non-Muslims.
- Abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that had given self-government to the south.




The war between the Sudan government and the SPLM/A lasted for 21 years. From the beginning of war, the policy of the SPLM/A was to maintain two-pronged strategies in dealing with the government of Sudan: (1) to negotiate diplomatically and in good faith with the Sudanese government to end the war peacefully if the demands and the aspirations of the people of Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas were met; and (2) to maintain military confrontation and campaign with the government of Sudan to force them to negotiate with the SPLM/A in good faith. As the war intensified, the international community became involved in seeking a peaceful resolution to the war in Sudan. As outlined in the previous chapters, various attempts were made to negotiate peace between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan, but the most triumphant negotiation was the IGAD peace process which culminated in the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005.

Given the history of the conflict in Sudan, this study was meant to determine what aspects of reconciliation between the SPLM/A and the Anya Nya II in the 1980s could be used as a

model for Southern Sudanese reconciliation in the postwar era and to assess the nature of the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II and other Southern Sudanese armed groups and political parties and their impact on service delivery as well as drawing lessons from other countries. The chapter concludes by highlighting the limitations of the study and the difficulties encountered during the research process.

Chapter two concentrates on the historical background of the conflict in the Sudan in general and Southern Sudan in particular; the internal conflict among southern Sudanese also complicated the national liberation agenda for a very long time. A severe conflict erupted between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. Anya Nya II were remnants of Anya Nya I soldiers who either refused to return to Sudan after the signing of the 1972 agreement or were purged upon arrival and refused entry into the Sudan Armed Forces. The Marxist government of Ethiopia provided the two movements with arms and brought about a superficial reconciliation between the two parties, but the question of leadership was a crucial point that kept the two movements apart. Southerners on their own resolved their conflicts by entering into a series of negotiations. The first phase of negotiation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II took place in the year 1987. The negotiation was successful and about three-quarters of Anya Nya II made their decision to join the popular movement of the SPLM/A. The other armed groups of Anya Nya II chose to join the SPLM/A after the CPA was signed by the SPLM/A and the Sudan Government in 2006. The SPLM/A made an excellent strategic move to reconcile with all the other armed groups in Southern Sudan after the signing of the CPA as their independent existence would have complicated the implementation of the CPA in Southern Sudan and could result in denying services to the population.



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
The techniques southerners used at the time of reconciliation between the forces of the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II, and later after the signing of the CPA with different armed groups, have become the norm for solving any problems between political parties in Southern Sudan today. The reconciliation process has been adopted as a culture by the present Southern Sudanese generation of leaders who are struggling to adapt to democracy and rule of law and to improve service delivery.

Chapter three discusses theories of conflict resolution, management and how to mediate and reconcile opposing parties. Many writers in the field of conflict resolution identify the root cause of the people's problems primarily in unequal distribution of resources or distribution of wealth in society.



The problems faced by the people of Southern Sudan were experienced by individuals, families, groups and communities, but were seen to be rooted in the core of the Sudanese structures which favours those who have and exclude those who have not. The Sudanese state has been run as a homogenous system in which diversity; tolerance and acceptance of differences were treated with disdain and in fact were oppressed with vigour and brute force. These were the triggers for instability and war in the country. Individual southerners and marginalized and oppressed Sudanese in general, were forced to advocate for themselves and for others who face similar circumstances. This kind of camaraderie in collective liberation can be used as a bastion to promote relations not only among individuals in the south, but also across the country where people can commit themselves in dialogue, sharing and healing, and thus contribute to the improvement of their lives and peaceful co-existence in Southern Sudan.


This study demonstrates that in the Sudanese conflict system the major contradictions are the radicalization and ethnicization of state power, and lack of accountability and multinational democracy. Southern and Western Sudanese have respectively struggled to dismantle racial ethno-national hierarchy, colonial domination, racial hegemony and those institutions that have been legitimated by the ideology of racism. The lesson learned is that the SPLM/A also has to recognize the necessity of the construction of legitimate states that are accountable and democratic, and reflect a multinational society. As the late Dr John Garang stated, without an accountable, democratic and legitimate state, there cannot be peace, justice, and balanced, sustainable development.



As many writers have stated, the creation of public administration is another way of resolving conflict as any kind of administration is in the public interest. It is the management of governmental affairs or issues at all levels, national, regional and state. In other words, it is the operational and the most obvious part of conflict management. It has a very important place not only as an instrument of good governance but also as an important mechanism for pressing and prompting the welfare of the communities in the area of need for good public administration. The chapter ends by stressing that the study of public administration is relevant to the very existence and changing functions of the government. It is not possible for a state to exist without a legislature, or an independent judiciary, and no state can exist without public administration. Lack of good public administration in the Sudan may bring the entire country to a downfall. In other words, no government in the modern world can hope to maintain peace without a strong and effective administrative system, nor can an administrative system exist without the support of those it was established to service.

Chapter four deals with the design and methods which were used to gather data for the analysis of the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II in the 1980s and other armed groups which opposed the SPLM/A before signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005 in Kenya. Qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were used that included questionnaires, existing primary and secondary documentary sources, interviews and closed and open-ended questions.

The data analysis approach was used to identify certain aspects or variables in respect of the questions asked. However, oral information was developed from many sources so that all the results were compared, the interviews were also carried out on an experimental subject and done again as the situation required or compared to other subjects. This had the benefit of being explicit and being able to see the numbers and statistics of the results.



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The data analysis approach examined the situation from a more open-ended perspective and was used to gather information from the people who were involved in the conflict. Research was carried out and conducted through field notes, interviews and questionnaires with key officials such as politicians, community leaders, military command, soldiers, academics and chiefs. Printed material such as magazines, published and unpublished articles related to the study were also consulted. This was done using cross-sectional and descriptive methods based on a selected qualitative case study design.

The presented data were based on various evaluative interviews or handwritten reports by both senior members of the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II leaders, assessment of oral reports collected from both parties and feedback from civilian leaders. On the presentation and evaluation of interviews, findings showed that although the majority of SPLM/A and Anya

Nya II were interviewed, not much was written on the subject. In actual fact, some senior officers indicated that they no longer kept the official records of reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II because of lack of a permanent official location. The reliability and objectivity of interviews were also brought under scrutiny and found helpful. The usefulness of such interviews and reports were that they reflected the rights and the views of both the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II. Finally, chapter four concludes by explaining the effectiveness of techniques used in data gathering throughout the survey, interviews, reports, magazines and oral interviews. These were challenges that were encountered in the data gathering process.



Data obtained through the methods highlighted in chapter four were examined and presented in chapter five. A clear picture of the study is visible in this chapter, of whether the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II was used as a model to reconcile the SPLM/A and other armed groups and political parties who were not signatories to the CPA. Potentially most important, the process of sustained dialogue can be adopted for use in other conflicts. Much of the credit for making the process transferable must go to the SPLM/A leadership and Anya Nya II leadership who had drawn on the experiences of other people and made use of them. Indeed, that process has already inspired a wide variety of efforts, including a reconciliation project.

Whatever the requirement to deliver or defend a formal party position, those individuals gradually learned, not without difficulty, to talk and think together and ultimately, to engage in common analytical and policy-relevant work. One of the early examples, in the reconciliation between Anya Nya II and the SPLM/A was a small meeting between Yuany Battalion commands and Anya Nya II delegates in 1987. Each side was particularly

concerned about the conflict between them. The meeting provided real instances. Traditional methods of conflict resolution were used and commitment of leadership was realized and was instrumental in the success of the negotiations.

However, in Sudan as part and parcel of the global world, experiences from different countries on how they resolved their internal conflict were consulted, and this worked very well. It was realized that sharing power and resources was a strong tool in resolving conflict. The SPLM/A and Anya Nya II dialogue reinvented itself several times to make it more effective. It is now in the process, a very complex process, of doing so again. This was a dialogue for addressing the deep-rooted human needs and identity conflicts that increasingly divide the haves and the have nots as far as services are concerned, the included and the excluded, and proponents of different needs. The SPLM/A and Anya Nya II reconciliation, as a vehicle for public service delivery in the multilevel dialogue process, can be felt more widely by the public administration scholars who have experienced it. It should be the first significant efforts along the future development in the Sudan to develop other levels of what some scholars call the multilevel dialogue process. Despite these achievements, the majority remain concerned above all about the absence of a good service delivery strategy.



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6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on critical issues raised in the study, the following recommendations are made:

- a. It is important always to indicate that in reconciliation environments such as the one between the SPLM/A and Anya Nya II, the organization that pioneers the liberation struggle or the main force in the country must be seen by its opponents to be a suitable alternative. In the case of the SPLM/A, Anya Nya II leaders were persuaded

to talk with the SPLM/A, when they became convinced that the SPLM/A was indeed genuine, and had capabilities and the ability to wage a war of liberation, even while Anya Nya II was still fighting it. The involvement of local people seemed to be vital, therefore those who will be engaged in solving disputes must consider it.

- b. The opposing elements within and outside the organization must be provided with meaningful dividends as an incentive for peace between the two parties. This incentive can take different shapes, depending on the nature of the conflict. One of the most operational aspects that must be taken into consideration is sharing wealth and power with the opposition. Continued dialogue between the parties should be encouraged and be done through consultation so that everybody is aware of what each party is doing.



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- c. It is always recommended that the stronger party must keep its promises and should be the one to compromise and forgive the weaker party. This was the case in Southern Sudan where the SPLM/A had to encourage its foe to join it and share all the resources and power if the implementation of the peace agreement was to be carried through. It is therefore recommended that a win-win situation should be fostered.
- d. Conflict resolution and reconciliation should be linked to effective service delivery, and the agreements reached should provide a framework as to how such services should be delivered.
- e. In conflict resolution situations compromises and forgiveness are vital, especially in divided societies. Traditionally in Southern Sudan spiritual leaders and elders always

chaired those meeting of reconciliation and thereafter asked the parties to the conflict to forgive themselves and bury the past. A truth and reconciliation pact as in South Africa should be maintained and, where possible, amnesty should be granted.

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
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


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ANNEXURES
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**FORT HARE UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT
BISHO CAMPUS**

Interview questions

This questionnaire serves as part of mini dissertation to be submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Public Administration and management.



Topic of study

Political Reconciliation between Anya-Nya II and Sudan people's Liberation Movement and Sudan people's Liberation Army: A Negotiation Tool for National Reconciliation and peace in post War South Sudan;

1. Why the civil war and conflict among communities in Southern Sudan resulted in total disruption of social, economic activities and eroded government institutions?
2. How does the tension between SPLM/SPLA and Anya-nya II was resolved?
3. How does it help to resolve the tension between the SPLM/SPLA and other armed groups and political parties in Southern Sudan

4. Is there any lesson that can be drawn from other countries to resolve the tension between SPLM/SPLA and other armed group and political parties in southern Sudan?
5. What were possible mechanism used to reconcile the SPLM/SPLA and Anya-nya II?
6. Has the agreement between SPLM/A and Anya-Nya II in 1988 improved the service delivery?
7. What is the impact of CPA on the conflict between SPLM and NCP?
8. Given the experiences of the political leadership in Southern Sudan in mediation and conflict resolution, what are the chances that southern Sudan can develop conflict resolution system of its own to prevent conflict in the future?
9. What are in your opinion could be the reasons why some elements from former SSDF who have joined the GOSS in 2006 refused to join and remain loyal to SAF and NCP?
10. Generally comment as to how the conflict could be resolve in the country for lasting peace?




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**FORT HARE UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT
BISHO CAMPUS**

Questionnaire

This questionnaire serves as part of mini dissertation to be submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Public Administration.



Topic of study

Political Reconciliation between Anya-Nya II and Sudan people's Liberation Movement and Sudan people's Liberation Army: A Negotiation Tool for National Reconciliation and peace in post War South Sudan;

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Formulate your responses per questions posed. You are advised to use the back of the page if there are any additional comments that you may want to make.

1. There are conflicting views with regard to conflict in the country, some emphasizing political differences, while others had tended to cite socio-economic causes. What were the immediate causes of the conflict in your personal opinion?

2. Power struggle and ethnicity were considered to have dominated the disagreements between the leaders of the two organizations, to what extent were these two elements instrumental in fueling the conflict and did ideological differences contributed in your opinion to the escalation of the conflict?

Yes	
No	

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3. The period leading to signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) had witnessed sharp differences between the leadership of the SPLM/A and leaders of the other political and military groups who were not signatories to CPA, what in your opinion the causes of the conflict are?

4. In your opinion, does the perpetual conflict problem have an impact to service delivery?

Yes	
No	



5. What were possible mechanisms used to reconcile the SPLM/A and Anya-Nya II?

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6. What were in your opinion the reasons that led to the success of the mediation between the SPLM/A and Anya-Nya II?

7. Given the experiences of the 1980s mediation between the SPLM/A and the Anya-Nya II, what lessons can South Sudan learn in order to better promote management of the ethnic conflicts?



8. The CPA has provided for the establishment of multi-party system in Southern Sudan, do you think that the new emerging political parties, which include former military armed groups, will bring new tensions in Southern Sudan?

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Yes	
No	

9. There were several explanations and reasons given as to why the Anya-Nya II leadership refused to join the SPLM/A in 1983, what were the main reasons in your view for the Anya-Nya II leadership refusal to unite with the SPLM/A?



10. Was the attempt made to unite the leadership of the two organizations in 1983 successful?

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Yes	
No	

If no, why?

11. Given the experiences of the political leaderships in Southern Sudan in mediation and conflict resolution, what are the chances that Southern Sudan

can develop conflict resolution system of its own to prevent conflict in the future?



12. Are the objectives of Any-Nya II achieved and impactful so far?

Yes	University of Fort Hare <i>Together in Excellence</i>
No	

13. Can early promotion of power sharing between A2- SPLA/M stove off violent? If so, when, and how?

Yes	
No	



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14. Is there any lessons we can learn from South Africa truth and reconciliation process which led to successful democratic government since 1994?

Yes	
No	

If yes, what are those lessons, and if no, why?

15. Generally comment as to how the conflict could be resolved in the country for a long lasting peace settlement.




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SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
AND SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY



SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION AND CULTURE




Ref. No. SPLM/PRES/02
Date: 29/08/1997

**DECLARATION ON RECONCILIATION AND RE-UNIFICATION WITH THE
SPLM/A**

CONVINCED of the need for reconciliation and re-unification of the SPLM/A as enshrined in the famous Torit Resolutions of September 1991;

RECALLING the Historic Lafon Declaration of April 1995, aimed at the reconciliation, re-unification and re-integration of individuals and factions and forces into the SPLM/SPLA and the granting of amnesty to all concerned and



IN VIEW of the far reaching Resolutions of the SPLM/A first National Convention on Democratization and observance of fundamental Human Rights within the SPLM/A including the establishment of responsible and accountable institutions based on the principles of justice, equality and transparency; and

CONSIDERING the subsequent process for the implementation of the said memorable resolutions through convening of the Conference on Civil Society and the organisation of Civil Authority in April /May 1996 including SPLA senior officers conference followed by the recent SPLM/Church Dialogue at Yei in July 1997;

WE the undersigned after a series of consultations with the Chairman and C-in-C of SPLM/SPLA Dr John Garang De Mabior and his deputy Cdr Salva Kiir Mayardit which started in January 1996 and ended on 25 August 1997 hereby declare that:

1. The process of reform in the SPLM/A based on principles of democracy and respect for Human Rights is serious, genuine and satisfactory,
2. The right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan and other marginalized areas remains a principal objective of the SPLM/SPLA.
3. The successful liberation of the said people is our national duty.
4. Both SSFF/A and the Independents Group are hereby formally dissolved.

WE HEREBY appeal to:-

(i) All members, supporters and sympathizers of our respective organizations and other factional groups to join the SPLM/SPLA immediately.


(ii) All other oppressed people in the Sudan to join hands under the SPLM/A and its great leader **Dr John Garang de Mabior** to finally and rapidly defeat all enemy forces of the NIF including their allies and stooges and rid the country of Islamic fundamentalism, religious bigotry and terrorism.

(iii) All nationalistic sons and daughters of the Southern Sudan who might have been misled by other people should delink from the enemy and return to the SPLM/A.


(iv) The people of South Sudan and other marginalized areas are called upon to dismiss both the **Charter of 10th April 1997** and the **Agreement of 21st April 1997** between the Sudan Government and the surrender groups as treacherous and a sell out based on deceit and manipulation and conceived in bad faith by Dr Hassan El Turabi and without making any concrete guarantees.

Issued in Nairobi this 29th day of August, 1997.





1. **Dhol Acuil Aleu,**

Former Leader of the Independent Group


2. **Dr Richard Banya K. Mulla.**

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Former Interim Chairman and C-in-C SSFF/A.


3. **Dr Sebit Sendani,**

Former Secretary General SSFF/A.

Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) And the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF)


January 8, 2006

PREAMBLE

The SPLA and SSDF having met in Juba between the 6th and 8th January, 2006 and fully aware of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG's).

Committed to upholding and defending the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its full implementation;

- ▣ Motivated by their desire for peace, reconciliation and unity among the people of Southern Sudan;
- ▣ Determined to end all forms of conflict and hostilities among themselves, so as to usher a new era of hope, stability and sustainable development in Southern Sudan;
- ▣ Further determined to build trust and confidence among themselves and to avoid past mistakes that have led to divisions and internecine conflict between themselves and among the people of Southern Sudan in general;
- ▣ Cognizant of the fact that the SPLM led Government has already included members of the SSDF in the institutions of Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States to ensure SSDF participation;
- ▣ Acknowledging that the people of Southern Sudan have a common destiny;
- ▣ Inspired by the struggle and the immense sacrifices and suffering of our people in defence of their land, freedom, dignity, culture identity and common history; and
- ▣ Remembering our fallen heroes, heroines and martyrs who paid the ultimate price for the freedom of our people and to ensure that these sacrifices are not in vain;



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Do hereby make the following Declaration to be known as **the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration:**

Complete and unconditional unity between the SPLA and SSDF.

- ▣ Agree to immediately integrate their two forces to form one unified, non partisan Army under the name of SPLA as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
- ▣ Immediate and total cessation of all forms of hostilities and to ensure that all their forces and persons under their control observe and comply with this declaration.
- ▣ Guarantee freedom of movement of people, goods and services in all areas in Southern Sudan.
- ▣ Declaration of general amnesty covering any criminal acts committed during the past period of hostilities between the two forces.
- ▣ Appeal to any armed persons or groups outside the two forces to join the process of unity and reconciliation in order to promote peace, stability and development throughout Southern Sudan.
- ▣ The unified Movement shall mobilize the people of Southern Sudan behind this agreement and to support its implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION

In implementation of this declaration the two parties agree to form the following committees:

1. High Political Committee

There shall be a High Political Committee to oversee the overall implementation of this unity agreement. It shall be established by the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in - C of SPLA in consultation with Major-General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF.

2. Military Technical Committee

There shall be established a Military Technical Committee consisting of equal numbers to implement the terms of this declaration. It shall be established by the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in - C of SPLA in consultation with Major General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF. The Joint Military Technical Committee shall report to the High Political Committee and handle inter alia the following issues:

Integration of SSDF into the SPLA and its command structures and all its component units including the Joint Integration Units.

- Harmonisation of ranks and deployment of forces and to report to the principals.
- Handle issues of demobilisation and downsizing of forces in accordance with the provisions of the CPA.
- Report to the High Political Committee on all matters relating to this Unity Declaration.

3. Administrative and Civil Service Committee

This committee shall deal with the integration of non military personnel of SSDF into the Civil Service of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States.

Call on the National Congress Party and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) calls upon its partner the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to support this agreement which has been guided by the provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG's). The decision by the SSDF to be integrated into the SPLA is a legitimate decision which will consolidate peace and security in Southern Sudan and the Sudan at large. The two parties signatory to the agreement call on all other Sudanese political forces to support this declaration.

Appeal to the International Community

The two parties also appeal to the international community to support this agreement as it will consolidate peace in the Sudan and bring about lasting peace among the people of Southern Sudan.

H.E Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan, Chief of Staff of Southern Sudan, Chairman of the SPLM and Commander- in-Chief of SPLA.

Major General Paulino Matip Nhial President of the Government of South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)

Witnessed by

Mr. Aaron R. Tuikong S.S. Chief Executive, Moi Africa Institute (MAIN)

THE LAFON DECLARATION

APRIL 27, 1995



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THE LAFON DECLARATION

(April 27, 1995)


31/4/95

I. PREAMBLE.

Deeply concerned about the 1991 split and the damage it has done to the Movement and the suffering it has caused to our civil population, the Lafon SSIM/SSIA officers, NCOs and men took revolutionary action on 31/3/1995 against the enemy Convoy "Surra-ni-Mutagin" in order to expedite the unity of our people:

Convinced that in order to achieve our freedom, there must be complete reunification of the Movement, and reconciliation and peace within and among our civil population, and that this is the yearning of the people of Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas, and in response accordingly:

Aware that our people are capable of forgiving themselves on both sides of the split in the interest of their greater good; and that we can achieve reconciliation and unity by ourselves, as we did in 1988; and



In order to prevent our common people from the present NIF Government, or any other subsequent oppressive regime of the Old Sudan in Khartoum, from continuing to exploit our minor differences and continue to divide, rule and conquer our people and land;

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We, the Joint Committee of SPLM/SPLA and SSIM/SSIA officers, here after referred to as the Committee, make the following agreement, which shall be called the Lafon Declaration, in memory of the historic Lafon Action against Government forces on 31/3/1995, and accordingly recommend it to both leadership of the SPLM/SPLA and SSIM/SSIA, hereafter referred to as the Leadership, for approval.

II. CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND CEASE-FIRE.

The Committee, meeting in Chukudun from April 23 to April 27, 1995, resolved, and recommend to the Leadership the following:

1. To declare total cessation of hostilities and a permanent cease-fire in all areas of conflict to come into immediate effect from 1500 Hours today, April 27, 1995.
2. To form a Cease-fire Commission.
 - a. The Cease-fire Commission shall be composed of seven (7) members, three (3) from each side, plus a Chairman mutually agreed upon.
 - b. The cease-fire Commission shall monitor any violations and report them to the Leadership.

The Cease-fire Commission shall be based in Duk Padiet as its HQs, and shall have five sub-branches in the border areas of Bentiu County with each of Yirol, Tonj and Gogrial Counties, a fourth in the area of Panru with the rest of Bentiu County, and the fifth in the area of Atar with the rest of Fangak County.

d. Each sub-branch of the Cease-fire Commission in Para 2(c) above, shall consist of seven (7) members, and shall be formed by the local authorities of the area concerned, and in coordination with the Cease-fire Commission, and its members may be drawn from military, personnel, civil administrators, chiefs and the clergy.

3. To urge all other factional groupings to join the Lafon initiative and observe this call for cessation of hostilities and cease-fire.

III. REUNIFICATION OF THE MOVEMENT

The Committee resolved, and recommend to the Leadership the following:



1. To declare immediate reunification of the Movement to come into effect from 1500 Hours today, April 27, 1995.
2. To call upon all other factional groupings to join the Lafon initiative in order to bring about the total reunification of the Movement in the shortest time possible, and thereby shorten the period of struggle and the suffering of our people.

IV. REINTEGRATION OF FORCES.

The Committee resolved, and recommend to the Leadership the following:

1. There shall be integration of forces and the integrated forces shall come under one command with immediate effect.
2. Where reintegration of forces is possible, such as in the Lafon area, the forces shall be integrated immediately, and where reintegration requires time, the units of SSIA will remain in their present positions under their current commanders.
3. The Committee is conscious of the issue of military ranks, as well as in the political and administrative structures, and recommend that the modalities for the re-integration of military ranks, and political and administrative structures, be worked out by Joint Technical Committees to be formed by the Leadership.


4. In the meantime, regarding military ranks and in the interests of practicality, the Committee recommends that officers retain the ranks they held as of April 27, 1995, until such time the Joint Technical Committee on reintegration of ranks shall complete its work.


V. AMNESTY, RECONCILIATION AND PEACE.

The Committee resolved, and recommend to the Leadership the following:


1. To declare a general and unconditional amnesty, covering the period from 28/8/1991 to 27/4/1995, to all sides of the split, so that nobody may be prosecuted or punished for actions committed during this period.
2. In areas where there is inter-tribal or inter-sectional conflict, the Committee urges the Leadership to initiate grassroots contacts and socialisation modalities to bring about full reconciliation among and within the civil population and with their army, so that there is peace, stability and development in the country.
3. There shall be free movement of people, goods and services all over Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, and the Committee urges the Leadership to put in place the necessary structures of civil society to achieve this aim.


VI. SIGNED THIS DAY, APRIL 27, 1995.

(1)  27/4/95
 CDR Oyay Deng Ajak,
 Chairman,
 SPLM/SPLA Committee.

(2)  27/4/95
 CDR Gatdor Kiec Wuor,
 Chairman,
 SSIM/SSIA Committee.

VII. THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE APPROVED THIS DAY, APRIL 27, 1995.

(Signed)  27/4/95
 Dr. John Garang de Mabior,
 Chairman/C-in-C, SPLM/SPLA,
 Chukudum, New Sudan.


(Signed) 
 CDR William Nyuon Bany,
 Chief of Staff, SSIM/SSIA,
 Chukudum, New Sudan.

4

A. SPLH/SPLA COMMITTEE IN THE JOINT COMMITTEE

- (1) CDR OYAI DENG AJAK (CHAIRMAN).
- (2) CDR ABDEL AZIZ ADAM AL-HILU (MEMBER).
- (3) CDR PIENG DENG KUOL (").
- (4) CDR KUOL DENG KUOL (").
- (5) MR. MARIO MUOR MUOR (").
- (6) A/CDR YAR CHUOL RUEI (").
- (7) A/CDR NYUON KUAC CHIAR (").
- (8) A/CDR PETER PERNYANG DANIEL (").
- (9) A/CDR ACIEK ANOT DENG (").
- (10) CAPT MARENG DENG AKURI (").
- (11) CAPT OLIVER ALI DIKO (").
- (12) 1ST LT ANTHONY JOSEPH E'ANDU (SECRETARY).

B. SSIM/SSIA COMMITTEE IN THE JOINT COMMITTEE

- 
- (1) CDR GADOR KIBO MUOR
 - (2) CDR CHARLES LAM CHOL
 - (3) CDR MALUTH KUETH
 - (4) CDR STEPHEN GAWAR MARYOK
 - (5) CDR GAIKUOTH GAWAR
 - (6) CDR EIMANUEL AMBROSE UCHOLIMOI
 - (7) CDR JAMES MALITH GATUOK
 - (8) A/CDR GARDIN YUO
 - (9) A/CDR EXODUS MATHLANG
 - (10) A/CDR JOHN LORECH LELEA
 - (11) 1ST LT STEPHEN OYOR TOR
 - (12) 2ND LT ALAJABU YAGUB KACHO

NAIROBI DECLARATION ON UNITY BETWEEN THE SPLM/A AND EDF

The First (1st) Deputy Chairman and Chief of General Staff of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA; Cdr Salva Kiir Mayardit.

AND The Leader of the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF), Dr. Theophilous Ochang Lotti

RECALLING the Declaration made by the Chairman and C-in-C of the SPLM/A, that the year 2002 A.D should herald the beginning of reconciliation, forgiveness and unity for the people of the Sudan in general and South Sudan in particular;

RECOGNIZING the agreement on Security Arrangements between the GOS and SPLM/A of September the 25th 2003, particularly the relevant paragraphs 3(, 7 (a) and 7(regarding the status of Southern Armed Groups;

CONVINCED that the unity of our people is not only a necessary but also an essential condition for the liberation process;

FULLY AWARE that a united Southern Sudan will accelerate the resolution of the ongoing conflict in the Sudan, through a just, genuine and lasting peace in the country;

HEREBY agree on the following:

1. Immediate merger of the two Movements under the historical name of the SPLM/A.
2. Affirmation of the Right to Self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan including Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Funj Region and other marginalized areas of the Sudan.
3. Use the impending Peace Agreement as a vehicle of democratization and transformation of the country.
4. Agree that decentralization of any system up to the grassroots level is prerequisite for good governance, transparency and accountability.
5. The need for a fair and equitable distribution of power and wealth throughout the country and in the South in particular.
6. The determination of ridding Southern Sudan and other parts of the Sudan of foreign-armed groups in order to create conducive security conditions for the IDPs and Refugees to return to their homeland.
7. On the important role that the SPLM/A plays in the NDA and other political forces in the country.



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8. Recognize and support the important role being played by the civil society for the betterment of our people.

9. The promulgation of democratic constitution in Southern Sudan that guarantees basic Human Rights and civil liberties of the people of Southern Sudan, similarly for the other parts of the Sudan.

10. To harmonize the political, military, and administrative structures of our unified Movement.

Modalities of implementation

The two parties (SPLM/A and the EDF) further agree on the following modalities to effect the declaration:

1. Immediate merger of the forces of the EDF into the SPLA.
2. Immediate secession of the hostilities between EDF and the SPLA.
3. Formation of Technical Committees to work out detailed recommendations on the following issues:
 - (a) Integration of military forces.
 - (b) Integration of political and administrative structures.
 - (c) organization of conferences for reconciliation and unity among the people in the whole of Equatoria Region, Southern Sudan and the rest of New Sudan in the context of South-South dialogue
 - (d) Reorganizing and streamlining humanitarian institutions of the two Movements.
4. The Technical Committees shall present the recommendations to the Leadership of the two Movements for approval within one month from the date of their formation.



Finally, the two Leaders call upon the International communities, the NGO fraternity (both International and Indigenous), friends and people of goodwill to support our endeavor to realize peace, unity and stability in the New Sudan.

Done March 5th 2004

Sign By:

1. Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit, Deputy Chairman and COGS SPLM/A
- 2) Dr. Theophilous Ochang Lotti, Chairman and C-in-C of EDF

DECLARATION

ON

UNITY BETWEEN THE SPLM/A AND SPLM-UNITED

Two high-level delegations of the SPLM/A and SPLM-United led by Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit, first Vice Chairman of the SPLM and Chief of General Staff of the SPLA and Cdr. Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM-United respectively, meeting in Nairobi, Kenya,

HAVING EVALUATED the situation of war and peace in Sudan and the way forward for the just resolution of the conflict;

CONVINCED that the unity of our people is vital for the success of the liberation struggle;

AWARE that a united stand is the only sure way to bring the war to a just and speedy end;



HEREBY AGREE to an immediate merger of the two movements under the historical name of the SPLM/SPLA. The movement shall espouse, inter alia, the following principles:

1. Recognition of the IGAD peace process as the only viable and most credible forum for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan.
2. The right of self-determination to the people of Southern Sudan including Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Funj Region and other marginalized areas.
3. Achievement of a democratic transformation of the country, during the interim period, predicated on justice, equality, respect of human rights and the rule of law.
4. The system of rule in the country be secular and decentralized.
5. Strengthening of internal democracy within the political organs of the SPLM at all levels.

NK IR

6. Commitment to the South-South dialogue in order to bring about reconciliation and unity among the Southerners.
7. Reaffirmation of the continued role of the SPLM/SPLA within the NDA and also to establish meaningful relations with the other political parties in Sudan.
8. Support of the civil society organizations in recognition of their important role in the society.

IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES


The two parties further agree on the following measures to effect the declaration:

- 1- Immediate merger of the forces of the SPLM-United with the SPLA.
- 2- To constitute technical committees to effect the merger as follows:
 - (a) integration of military forces
 - (b) integration of political structures
 - (c) integration of the FRA into the SBRC
- 3- The Technical Committees shall present their recommendations to the two leaders for approval within one month from the date of formation.


FINALLY, the two leaders call upon all groups and individuals to join the unity process and upon the international community, international and indigenous NGOs, friends and people of good will to support this initiative on peace and unity.

Done on October 31st, 2003.

Signed By:



Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit
First Vice Chairman of the SPLM and
Chief of General Staff of the SPLA.



Cdr. Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin,
Chairman and C-in-C of the
SPLM-United.

DECLARATION

NAIROBI DECLARATION ON UNITY BETWEEN THE SPLM/SPLA AND SPDF

The leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army SPLM/SPLA, Dr John Garang de Mabior

AND

The leader of the Sudan People's Democratic Front and Sudan People's Defence Force (SPDF), Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon;

MEETING in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 5 - 6th 2002 on their own without the benefit of external mediation and pressure;

HAVING EVALUATED the situation of war and peace in the Sudan and the way forward for the just resolution of the conflict;

CONVINCED that the unity of our people is paramount for the success of the liberation struggle;

CONCERNED of the recalcitrant and bellicose attitude of the NIF regime and its rejection of the Right of Self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan including Abyei, and Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and other marginalized areas of the Sudan, while imposing at the same time an Islamic state in the country;

ALARMED by the determination of the NIF regime to impose an Islamic state and dictatorship on the people of the Sudan and perpetuate it by all means;

DETERMINED to halt the vandalization and wanton looting of our oil and other natural resources and their use for prosecution of the war by the illegitimate, fascist and Islamic Fundamentalist regime in Khartoum;

FULLY AWARE that a united stand is the only sure way to bring the war to a just and speedy end;


HEREBY AGREE:

To an immediate merger of the two Movements under the historical name of SPLM/SPLA and on the basis of the following principles:

1. The administration of the Sudan as a Confederal/Federal United Secular Democratic New Sudan during an Interim Period, as a form of an Interim Unity.
2. Self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan including Abyei, Southern Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile and other marginalized areas, which has been accepted by all the political forces in the country;


RMTD

3. The New Sudan of justice and equality for all regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or gender, as an aspiration by many Sudanese, but one that is without prejudice to the Right of Self Determination;
4. Reaffirmation of the critical importance of continued SPLM/SPLA role within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which is currently the sole potential vehicle for realisation of the vision of the New Sudan.
5. Reaffirmation of the IGAD Peace Process and Declaration of Principles (DoP) upon which it is based, as the most credible peace process that will bring about a just and lasting negotiated political settlement in the Sudan.
6. Unity of the people and their struggle;
7. Participatory democracy;
8. Respect of institutions, separation of powers and collective leadership;
9. Decentralisation (Regionalism/Federalism) as the system of governance in the liberated areas;
10. Respect for and promotion of human rights;
11. Establishment and supremacy of the rule of law;
12. Establishment of a judicial system independent from the army and the Executive;
13. Creation of an enabling environment for the growth of civil society;
14. Peace through development, promotion of free market economy and private enterprise, and provision of social services;
15. Mobilization of all the human and material resources in the liberated areas and the Diaspora to step up the liberation struggle;
16. Recommend to the next SPLM National Convention the issue of electing democratically political leaders (local Councils, Commissioners, Governors, etc.) to run the affairs of the people in a framework of democratic governance;
17. Freedom of delivery of relief and humanitarian assistance to the needy;
18. Reorganisation of the army into national formations and local defence forces;
19. The army shall be part of and subordinate to the political organ of the Movement;
20. The above principles shall be interpreted in the context of the liberation struggle.



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IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

The two parties further agree on the following measures to effect this Declaration:

1. In conformity with this declaration, there shall be immediate cessation of hostilities and coalescence of previously antagonistic military units into a single entity to engage enemy forces in combat operations;
2. To conduct immediate military operations against forces of the NIF regime, as well as to intensify all other forms of struggle;
3. Free Movement of people, both civilians and military, in all the liberated areas, including traders, and free movement of goods and services;
4. To constitute forthwith, technical committees to work out detailed recommendations on the following issues:

- (a) Integration of military forces,
- (b) Integration of political structures and governance systems,

R. M. T. B.

DECLARATION

(c) Streamlining of humanitarian institutions;

SAFETY AND SECURITY

- The Technical Committees shall present their recommendations to the two leaders for approval within one month from the date of their formation.
- We call upon groups and individuals to join the unity process;
- We declare the year 2002 as the year of reconciliation, peace and unity among our people and appeal to all to join and actively promote this process.

FINALLY, the two leaders call upon the international community, international and indigenous NGOs, friends and people of good will to support this initiative on peace and unity.

Made under our hands this 6th day of January 2002.

SIGNED):

Handwritten signature of Dr. John Garang de Mabior



Handwritten signature of Dr. Rick Machar Teny-Dhurgon

Dr. John Garang de Mabior
Chairman & C-in-C, SPLM/SPLA

University of Fort Hare
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Dr. Rick Machar Teny-Dhurgon
Chairman & C-in-C, SPDF

DATE: 6/1/2002

DATE: 6/1/2002

PRESS STATEMENT

JOHN GARANG REMOVED FROM THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SPLM/A.

A - For the last eight years, John Garang has been running the Movement in a most dictatorial and autocratic manner. He oppressed, humiliated and degraded the people and turned a popular struggle into war-lordism and a reign of terror. A big number of members of the Movement are under detention for many years for no reason other than differing with John Garang. A consummate liar, Garang's deeds do not match his words and what he preaches at home and abroad are contrary to the reality on the ground. The direct result of Garang's one-man show is a simmering discontent among the rank and file of the Movement. His megalomania and misguided policies alienated many and marginalized a wide cross section of members and potential members of the Movement. Garang was leading the Movement to doom.

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B - In order to save the Movement from imminent collapse, it has been decided to relieve John Garang from the leadership of the SPLM/A. He is no longer the leader of the Movement. The struggle will henceforth be waged with a clear sense of purpose to achieve equality, justice and freedom under a democratic set-up.

C - The following immediate steps shall be undertaken:

1. The interim leadership shall call and make arrangements for the holding of a convention which will be attended by the members and sympathizers of the Movement from inside the country and abroad. The convention will discuss and adopt the policies of the Movement, define its structures and elect its leadership.
2. Strict adherence to the respect of human rights and the rule of law. In this respect all those detained by Garang will be immediately released.

3. The militaristic policies of John Garang will be thrown into the waste basket. There shall be an immediate demarcation of military and civil administrations.
4. The SPLM shall give more impetus to the relief effort provided by Operation Lifeline Sudan, ICRC and other International relief agencies in Southern Sudan.
5. The SPLM together with the concerned parties shall promptly address the question of returnees who recently fled from Ethiopia and are now in south-eastern Sudan.
6. To strengthen and delegate the necessary powers to the SRRA so that it can operate as a purely humanitarian organization.
7. The indigenous and foreign church organisations are called upon to double up their spiritual and relief activities in SPLM-administered areas.
8. We call upon the international community to help us in the provision of education and health services to the children in the SPLM-administered areas.
9. The SPLM offices abroad shall be revamped to reflect the new policies of the Movement.
10. The SPLM shall pursue a foreign policy that will seek friendship with other countries.
11. The SPLM shall relentlessly strive to attain a peaceful settlement to the present Sudanese conflict. All options shall be kept open provided they lead to permanent peace.
12. The SPLA shall be reorganised in order to persecute the armed struggle more effectively. It shall adhere to the respect of the Geneva conventions and the international laws.
13. We appeal to all who could not join the Movement because of the misguided policies of John Garang that the doors of the Movement are now wide open for them. In particular, the Anya-Nya 2 and the government militias are welcome to join hands with the rejuvenated SPLA.



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D - We assure all friends of the Movement, that there is no split whatsoever. Whatever noises being made against the change are nothing more than a storm in a teacup and have no foundation on the ground. Like any other dictator, Garang has surrounded himself with a coterie of opportunists, simpletons and flatterers. It will take him and them some time to realize that their dream world is at an end.

E - Finally, we reiterate that our move is for renewal and democratization within the Movement. We cannot remain behind when the winds of democracy are blowing all over Africa and the world at large.



Handwritten signature and date: 28/8/91

1. CDR. RIEK MASHAR TENY THURSON

2. CDR. LAN AKCE

University of Fort Hare

3. CDR. ~~BORETO~~ *Together in Excellence*

Handwritten signature

August 28, 1991.

"Man dies in all those who stand silent before a tyranny."

- Professor Wole Soyenka.

Introduction

The SPLA was born in 1995 to wage a people's armed struggle against oppression, misrule and dictatorship. These ideals caught the imagination of the disadvantaged Sudanese in general and the Southerners in particular. It, therefore, came to no surprise when the masses of our people joined the newly born Movement in large numbers. It was incumbent on the Movement to turn the people's anger into a genuine social revolution of profound proportions. Today, eight years on, things have turned sour. What went wrong?

No organization, least of all one waging a revolutionary war, can be run successfully without collective leadership. This sounds obvious enough, yet it is precisely what is lacking in the SPLA/M. All the powers are in the hands of one man, John Garang. The Movement has no political structures, genuine democratic debate is stifled, an anti-intellectual crusade is waged and terror is let loose. In short, the revolution has been emptied of its contents and turned into war-lordism and a police state. Garang believes he is the Movement and the Movement is him. Others in the Movement are used to his whims dictate. Immerse deep in his megalomania and ~~to~~ *Together in Excellence* himself into believing that he can take everybody for a ride. As a matter of fact he is a novice in Sudanese politics and knows very little about the Sudanese complex social and political traditions. This handicap would not have been that serious had he been humble enough to listen to wise counsels and genuine advice. Far from it, he felt he knew all and did not need any advice from anybody. He was busy building a cult of personality around himself, feeling very much at home with simpletons and nincompoops who sing him songs of praise to satisfy his sick ego.

The direct result of Garang's misrule and the marginalization of all is the present feeling of alienation and discontent among a wide cross-section of the Movement's membership. This feeling overflowed outside the Movement and many who were considering to join the Movement held back. The Natural question that poses itself is: Why were such excesses allowed to continue unchecked that long?

First. Many in the Movement thought that Garang will heed to common sense and change his ways. Second, it was thought that a confrontation with him and his henchmen may lead yet to another undesirable division within the Movement that v can only benefit the enemy. Many reasoned that the sacrifices made so far in the course of the struggle are so great that unity must be preserved as the only guarantee to final victory. Garang exploited this nationalistic feeling and turned it to the pursuit of his personal and parochial interests. He misread the craving

for unity as an open licence for him to do whatever he wants with impunity. Now, after eight full years—the life of two parliaments in Sudanese politics—almost all in the SPLA are convinced not only that Garang will not change but also that if no action is immediately taken the Movement is doomed to collapse. Garang has discredited himself sufficiently that the rank and file in the Movement recognize him for what he is: a liability to the revolutionary struggle. The Movement without Garang is united and effective more than any other time before.

The crimes committed by John Garang are so many and would take volumes to recount. It is, however, imperative to highlight some outstanding issues to shed light on the situation. The following is an attempt to do so.

One-man, no-system dictatorship

The statements and speeches of John Garang are full of reference to democracy within the Movement and its commitment to multi-party democracy. In actual fact he has been running the Movement in a most autocratic and whimsical manner. For instance:


1. The Movement has no political structure at all. The so-called "Political-Military High Command" does not exist. It has never held a single meeting and some of its members have never seen it. All decisions on strategy, policies and plans are taken by him alone. Needless to say, there has never been any conference held by the Movement on any level. Any serious call for discussion is arrogantly dismissed as a waste of time and that the Movement is not a parliament!
2. All the powers are in the hands of one man. Be it anything from the Chairman and C-in-C down to the storekeeper of the munitions store. He prides himself of being the commander of detention centres; an inenviable job!
3. He is the Director of Radio SPLA as well as its news editor. Any contribution to the radio must be sanctioned by him personally. This strange arrangement put off many prospective contributors leading to the very poor standard of presentation and objectivity of the erstwhile popular Radio SPLA. It has been turned into a personal enterprise to air out personal opinion and biases and to settle old personal scores.
4. Finance donated to the Movement by friends are kept by him and nobody also knows the exact amount and how the money is spent.
5. He is always suspicious of intellectuals and sees them as competitors to him in the Movement. This is why he surrounds himself with sycophants and nonentities. Most of the intellectuals are either undeployed or deployed in unchallenging assignments.
6. The external assistance the Movement has so far received coupled with its own resources would have been adequate to revive the basic services in liberated areas in fields such as education, health, etc. But this is not the case because of Garang's dislike of organization and active involvement of intellectuals.

The inefficiency labelled on the SRRA is due to the lack of delegated authority. Garang insists on having the last say even on trivial day-to-day matters of the SRRA and would want to have a yes-man in charge. In line with his general dislike of any semblance of organisation, the SRRA lacks structures just like the SPLM because he is afraid that the SRRA may grow into a well organized and efficiently run body ^{outside} of his direct personal control.

8. Corruption in the highest echelons of the Movement is the order of the day. This is to be expected in a situation where there is no accountability of any sort. Personal loyalty, to be bought if necessary and possible, is what counts.

9. Having hijacked the leadership of the Movement in 1983, Garang has since been scared to death of opening up democratic debate in the Movement least this may lead to replacing him. This is the motive behind his intense dislike of democracy, organization and intellectual debate within the Movement.

10. Garang has never ever trusted the people struggling with him nor those he claims to be fighting for. He derived his power from elsewhere. He failed to understand that no revolutionary war can be waged for the people; it has to be waged by the people.



11. High Command members are not informed of Garang's visits abroad before they occur and consequently they do not know of his absence. After the visits no proper briefing about the visit is given to the FWIC. In the same vein, other delegation on missions abroad never report to the FWIC. Thus, members of the FWIC are not in picture of the political and diplomatic activities of the Movement abroad.

12. SPLA offices abroad - especially in the West - are wanting in organization and lack of sufficient authority to represent the Movement. This is due to the fact that Garang does not lend them the necessary support. Most of these offices grew out of personal initiatives of those concerned and since they were not hand-picked by him their loyalty is suspect.

13. In late 1987, Garang abandoned the conventional ranking system of military officers ostensibly to break away from the old Sudan. The real intention was to pave the way to pole-vault his supporters, most of them juniors officers, into positions of responsibility so that his control is absolute. Promotions, according to the order were to be on merits and exceptional achievements. This was a lie, since then he has been making arbitrary promotions that made a mockery of the system among the forces.

14. One of Garang's fancy projects is the so-called "FACE Doundation". It appeared out of the blue in 1990 as a begging publication with his photograph prominently shown on the opening page. It is claimed to be an SPLM education project. The claim could not be further from the truth. This bogus project was neither discussed by the High Command nor by any of the hundreds of teachers that swell the ranks of the Movement. It is one of Garang's tricks to get himself some money.

Militarism

The Movement was born to struggle for the attainment of set political objectives by military means. However, Garang has mistaken the ^{means} for the objectives as the following facts clearly show:

1. Political work among the troops and among the population is relegated to the lowest of priorities. This is hardly the way to wage a revolutionary people's war.
2. Garang insists that to be a full member of the Movement one must undergo military training. This is unrealistic as there are many people who could serve the Movement more effectively in a non-military capacity. By following such a misguided policy many who would have joined the Movement are barred out.
3. From the very start of the Movement there was a general campaign of hatred against the politicians who joined the Movement and discouragement of those who have not. This campaign was initiated and fanned by Garang and his henchmen out of the fear that they (the politicians) like other intellectuals will hijack the Movement.



Human rights violations

The eight years that make **University of Fort Hare** have been a reign of terror and oppression being unleashed **Together in Excellence** Movement by its leader. For example;

1. Some people who joined the struggle were summarily executed without the due process of law. Examples are: Lokurnyang Lado, Doctor Juac Erjok and James Bol Kur. Others, like Benjamin Dol Akok and Manasseh Manyang Dhiou, died under torture.
2. Officers are arrested on the most frivolous reasons and are thrown into jail without charges to stay there for long periods. Some of them have been tortured and a good number lost their lives in the process.
3. There is a large number of members of the Movement detained for having politically differed with Garang and not with the Movement. Some of them have been under detention for more than six years and some, such as Lt. Col. Victor Bol Ayolnom, died in custody. All these arrests and detentions are decided and effected by him and his henchmen without consultation or information to the so-called FEMC.
4. Arbitrary detention and wanton torture is pursued to inculcate a state of fear among the rank and file of the Movement so that none speaks out against the excesses of Garang and his henchmen.
5. The liberated areas in Equatoria are now under malevolent occupation and naked oppression run by close relatives of Garang and his confidants. Competent Equatorians are exiled outside Equatoria by Garang himself. He erroneously believes that such draconian measures will cow down the Equatorians.

6. The people in liberated areas send their children to refugees centres in order to get proper basic education that Garang had failed to provide at or near home. While undergoing education this heartless dictator takes them out of schools and recruits them into the army. Such an odious act is contrary to all accepted norms and is an abuse to the confidence the parents put in the Movement. Juvenile soldiers, traumatised by the experience, become a constant menace to themselves and to the society. This is a gross and serious violation of human rights.

The way forward

Having rid itself of autocracy, the SPLA will carry on with the struggle for justice, equality and freedom. The following are among the immediate steps and measures to be undertaken:

1. To open the doors of the Movement wide for all to join and contribute, each according to his/her ability and aptitude, towards the achievement of the Movement's objectives.
2. To draft and adopt democratically a constitution for the Movement. The constitution will be accompanied by a set of principles, code of conduct, etc. to specifically define the powers and organ of the Movement.
3. To organize the structure of the Movement on a democratic basis. In particular, of wide participation of the population in the running of their affairs to be cornerstone in any administrative policy to be adopted.
4. To strengthen the SPLA and to delegate authority for it to function effectively as a purely humanitarian organization.
5. To pay greater attention to the provision of services, especially health and education, in liberated areas.
6. Strict adherence to the respect of human rights. In particular justice and the rule of law must be upheld.
7. Immediate abolition of the present officer's ranking system and to revert to the conventional ranking system. In the civil field a separate ranking system will be adopted.
8. On the peace process, the Movement will continue to explore all avenues that may lead to a peaceful resolution of the present conflict. Whereas the Movement is committed to realizing a united secular Sudan, the SPLA will neither impose unity nor ^{will} fight to the last man to achieve it. It takes too to tango. Politics being that art of the possible, the Movement rules out no option provided it can lead to a permanent peace.




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9. As part of the organization of the structures of the Movement, the offices abroad will have to be strengthened and given sufficient mandate to accurately and promptly present the Movement's position in the countries they are in.
10. Commitment to multi-party democracy in the post-war era.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is amply plain that the crisis the Movement is in today is of making of one and only one man; John Garang. He has been holding us at ransom dragging the whole nation into an abyss. We must join hands to jettison him out to save our people and our country from imminent defeat.

In particular, we appeal to all the SPLA officers, ICOCs, and men who out of nationalism patiently suffered Garang's autocracy to stand firm and united in getting rid of such a monster. To all the patriots who could not join the Movement because of the misguided policies of this dictator, we say that your waiting will not be long. Your contribution to the struggle is invaluable and, hence, very much welcome. Together we shall struggle for the rights of our people and a just society for all to live in peace.



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