



**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*

**Faculty of Management and Commerce**

**Department of Development Studies**

---

**“Poor Implementation of Conflict Resolution Strategies: A  
Challenge for Development in the Democratic Republic of  
Congo (DRC)”**

---

**Thesis Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree  
of Doctor of Social Science in Development Studies in the Faculty  
of Management and Commerce, University of Fort Hare**

**by**  
**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*  
**Mbangu A. Muyingi**

**Student number: 200508479**

**Supervisor: Prof. R. D. Thakhathi**

**2011**

## Declaration

I, **Mbangu Anicet Muyingi** declare that **Poor Implementation of Conflict Resolution Strategies: A challenge for Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

This work has not been submitted and will not be presented at any other institution for a similar or any other degree.

Signature.....



Date.....

16-04-2012.....

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE LIBRARY	
ACC NO:	T002998
BIB NO:	23743931
ITEM NO:	25731063

## Dedication


To my wife, Mrs. N.M. Lorraine Muyingi, and my son, M. Boece Muyingi, for their support, patience, encouragement, endless love, and understanding, my deep gratitude.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## Acknowledgments

I am forever grateful to God the Almighty the giver of all wisdom and knowledge, for granting me the grace and the tenacity to start this work and finish. I thank my supervisor, Professor D. R. Thakhathi for sharing his intellectual wealth that made it possible for me to undertake this work. From the moment he accepted to mentor me, he has made every resource available to me to excel in this undertaking. His role in my personal life has renewed my faith in human nature. Because of his confidence in my ability to do the work, my potentials have been uncovered beyond my wildest imagination during this process. His untiring critical reflection on my work and relentless efforts to sharpen my 'ability to engage' has given me a passion for research and the academy far beyond what I came to Fort Hare with. It will be no exaggeration for me to say that I owe everything I learnt and achieved at Fort Hare to Professor D. R. Thakhathi's support and guidance. Thank you Prof you made me believe I can.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Thanks to Dr. Emmanuel Odjadjare and Ms. Nancy Morkel for taking time to proof read this thesis. It is much appreciated. I am grateful to the Head of Department, Mrs. Monyai, for creating the academic environment that made it possible for me to learn at the Department of development studies. It was her proactive administration that enabled me to register at the department in the first instance.

My gratitude also goes to Govan Mbeki Research and Development Centre (GMRDC) at the University of Fort Hare for providing funding for me to carry out this study and in addition, numerous workshops that helped me to become a better researcher.

To my big brother Talwanga Matiki Theo: thank you very much big brother for all you have done for me. May the good God bless you and give you long life.

My gratitude goes to the leadership of the Redeemed Christian Church of God Love Assembly, Alice: thank you very much for your positive influence that helped me to discover my purpose in living.

My sincere gratitude goes to the wonderful staff from the Faculty of Management and Commerce for all the support rendered and the library team you contributed to this work's success. I owe so much to a lot of people that I cannot finish mentioning, may the good Lord bless you all for the various contributions you made to the success of this work.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


## Abstract

Remarkably little research has been conducted on the potential of conflict resolution, a challenge to development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Underpinned by participatory development and conflict resolution approach the study conceptualizes conflict resolution as a collective effort by Congolese to resolve their conflict in a peaceful manner to achieve better quality of life for the country through making it a better place for development activities. The thesis makes a contribution in the provision of a comprehensive historical account of the events, personalities and environment that formed the policy for conflict that is affecting development goals in the DRC. This historical account is analysed through institutional frameworks to explain the antecedents that have resulted in conflict resolution policy outcomes that exist in the country at the present time.

The study argues that the devastating impact of conflict in the DRC, since its independence in the 1960s has become a central inhibiting factor in the quest for meaningful development. The study shows that the DRC surpasses other African countries in terms of violent conflict and collateral destruction of infrastructure which is affecting political and socio-economic development. Despite the mineral resources within the country and the election that was held in 2006, the DRC remains a country in conflict based on discrimination. The research explores the phenomenon of conflict in the world, particularly in developing nations where people are unable to meet their basic needs. It explores different causes of conflict on the African continent, as well as the crisis of underdevelopment which, to a certain extent, is attributed to the exploitation of African nations by Western powers.

This study also seeks to identify and discuss the major cause of conflict that challenges the implementation of conflict resolution and which is affecting political and socio-economic

development in the DRC. The research shows that discrimination is the main cause of conflict in the country. The study provides a historical background and perspective of the paths that led to the political and socio-economic decline and underdevelopment of the country since independence. The study explores the period of economic growth in the DRC, as well as its economic decline as brought about by conflict. Certain reasons for this economic decline are suggested, of which the most important are the economic policies of Zairianisation and radicalisation which have introduced discrimination within the country. It also focuses on identifying workable conflict resolution mechanisms and policies that can be implemented towards a final cessation of conflict for the promotion of development in the country. In this regard, the main set of data from documents, journals, articles and analyses was scrutinized in order to identify themes, whilst drawing some patterns and conclusions from it.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The results of the study show that development can occur in the DRC if only an atmosphere of peace, justice, security and stability is attainable for the country. The outcome of conflict resolutions or all agreements signed in Lusaka (Zambia) and Sun City (South Africa), in 1999 and 2002 respectively, showed that all the parties involved in the conflict were not there in the signing of the agreement. The result of this is that conflict continues unhindered in the DRC and, in turn, affects the development goals of the country.


The findings indicate that there were a number of challenges facing the implementation of conflict resolution. Key to these are weak institutions, lack of confidence in each member of the government, sustainability problems, poor intergovernmental relations, land ownership, bad governance, high levels of poverty and inequality.

The researcher makes some recommendations to the government and concludes that political and socio-economic discrimination should be avoided in order for development to occur and only an environment of peace, security, justice, equality, and unity will allow Development goals to be promoted in the Democratic Republic of Congo and conflict resolution should be implemented in a peaceful way for DRC to be a better place for development.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## Abbreviations

<b>ABAKO</b>	Alliance de Bakongo (the Alliance of the Bakongo)
<b>ACP</b>	African, Caribbean and Pacific
<b>AFDL</b>	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo –Zaire</i> (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire)
<b>ALiR</b>	Rwandan Liberation Army
<b>ANC</b>	Armee Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Army)
<b>ANC</b>	- African National Congress
<b>ASV</b>	American Standard Version
<b>AU</b>	African Union (formerly OAU)
<b>BALUBAKAT</b>	Association de Luba de Katanga (the Association of the Luba People of Katanga)
	
<b>BBC</b>	British Broadcasting Commission
<b>BCK</b>	<i>Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga</i> (Bas-Congo to Katanga Railway)
<b>BHN</b>	Basic human needs
<b>CCM</b>	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
<b>CIDA</b>	Canadian International Development Agency
<b>CONAKAT</b>	Associations Tribales du Katanga (tribal association of Katanga)
<b>CUF</b>	the Civic United Front
<b>DDR</b>	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
<b>DDRRR</b>	Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>DGI</b>	<i>Direction Générale des Impôts</i> (Income Tax Office)

<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>ECA</b>	Economic Commission for Africa
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West Africa States
<b>EPAs</b>	Economic Partnership Agreements
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FARDC</b>	<i>Forces Armees de la Republic Démocratique du Congo</i> (Democratic Republic of Congo Army Force)
<b>FAZ</b>	Force Armee Zairoise ( <i>the Zairian Armed Forces</i> )
<b>FLNC</b>	<i>Front de Libération Nationale du Congo</i> (Front for the National Liberation of the Congo)
<b>FORESCOM</b>	Forestry Harvesting Company
<b>FSM</b>	Five Stage Model of Inter-Group Relations
<b>FRELIMO</b>	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GECAMINES</b>	<i>Générale des Carrière et des Mines</i> (Congoese State Mining Company)
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>HIV</b>	Human Immune-Deficiency Virus
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INEACT</b>	<i>Institut National d'Etudes Agronomiques au Congo</i> (National Institute for Agronomic Research in the Congo)
<b>ISS</b>	Institute of Security Studies
<b>JMPR</b>	<i>Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution</i> (Youth branch of



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Mobutu's party)

<b>MPR</b>	Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution ( <i>the Popular Movement for the Revolution</i> )
<b>MDGs</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MIBA</b>	<i>Minerais de Bakwanga</i> (Company dealing with diamond extraction and Exports)
<b>MLC</b>	Movement for the liberation of Congo
<b>MONUC</b>	<i>Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</i> (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
<b>MPR</b>	<i>Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution</i> (Popular Movement for the Revolution)
<b>NRA</b>	National Resistance Army
<b>NASV</b>	New American Standard Version
<b>NEPAD</b>	New Partnership for Africa's Development
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>OAU</b>	Organization of African Unity
<b>PPA</b>	Participatory Poverty Assessment
<b>RCD</b>	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i> (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
<b>RD/RELDEP</b>	Relative Deprivation
<b>RENAMO</b>	<i>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</i>
<b>RM</b>	Resource Mobilization
<b>RPF</b>	Rwandese patriotic front
<b>RPA</b>	Rwandese Patriotic Army



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


<b>SADC</b>	Southern Africa Development Communities
<b>SAPs</b>	Structural Adjustment Programmes
<b>SDR</b>	Special Drawing Right
<b>SIT</b>	Social Identity Theory
<b>UDPS</b>	Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social (Union for Democracy and Social Progress)
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UMHK</b>	<i>Union Minière du Haut Katanga</i> (Mining Union for upper Katanga)
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNIMO</b>	Union National de Mongo ( <i>National Union of Mongo</i> )
<b>UNITA</b>	Union nationale pour l'Indépendance Totale de l'Angola (National Union For Total Independence for Angola)
<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## Table of Contents

DECLARATION.....	ii
Dedication.....	iii
Acknowledgments.....	iv
ABSTRACT.....	vi
Abbreviations.....	ix
Table of Contents.....	xiii
Chapter 1.....	1
Orientation to the Study.....	1
1. 1. Introduction.....	1
1. 2. Scholarly Conceptions of Motivations for Action on the basis of Discrimination or Inequality.....	3
1. 3. Explanation and discussion of figure 1.1. Model of collective Action Encompassing RD, SIT, and FSM.....	7
1. 3. 1. From RD to SIT and FSM: Theoretical integration.....	7
1. 3. 2. Collective Action.....	11
1. 4. Problem Statement.....	12
1. 5. Research Questions.....	13
1. 6. Objectives of the Study.....	14
1. 7. Significance of the Study.....	15
1. 8. Methodology.....	15
1. 9. Definition of Terms.....	17
1. 10. Research Approach.....	25
1. 11. Case Study.....	25




**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*

1. 12. Conceptual Framework.....	26
1. 12. 1. Conflict and Development.....	28
1. 12. 2. Conflict Resolution and Development.....	30
1. 13. Limitations of the Study.....	32
1. 14. Democratic Republic of Congo: Historical Background.....	34
1.14. 1. Geography.....	35
1.14. 2. Location of the DRC.....	35
1.14. 3. People.....	36
1.14. 4. Government.....	37
1.14. 5. Economy.....	37
1. 15. Outline of the Proposed Study.....	39
1. 16. Conclusion.....	40
Chapter 2.....	43
Review of Related Literature.....	43
2. 1. Introduction.....	43
2. 2. Literature Review.....	44
2. 3. Theoretical Framework.....	44
2. 3. 1. Institutional Theory.....	46
2. 3. 1. 1. The Evolution of Institutional Theory.....	51
2. 3. 1. 2. New Institutionalism.....	53
2. 3. 1. 3. Rational Choice Institutionalism.....	55
2. 3. 1. 4. Sociological Institutionalism.....	56
2. 3. 1. 5. Historical Institutionalism.....	57
2. 3. 1. 6. Benefits of Institutional Theory.....	60
2. 3. 1. 7. Limitations of Institutional Theory.....	61




**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*

2. 3. 1. 8. Timing.....	63
2. 3. 1. 9. Historical process.....	64
2. 3. 1. 10. Power Relations.....	66
2. 3. 2. Theories of Conflict Resolution and Development Crises.....	67
2. 3. 2. 1. Conflict Resolution Theory.....	67
2. 3. 2. 2. The root Causes of Conflict in Human Society.....	80
2. 3. 2. 3. Structural Conflict Theory.....	83
2. 3. 2. 3. 1. Criticism of Structural Conflict Theory.....	84
2. 3. 2. 4. Psycho-cultural Conflict Theory.....	85
2. 3. 2. 5. Human Security Theory.....	89
2. 3. 2. 6. Evaluation of Neo-realist and Post-modernist Approaches.....	90
2. 3. 2. 7. The theory of State Failure.....	93
2. 3. 2. 7. 1. State Failure Approach.....	94
2. 3. 2. 7. 2. Economic Policies in the State Failures.....	96
2. 3. 2. 7. 2. 1. Economic Policies.....	96
2. 3. 2. 8. Colonialism Approach.....	100
2. 3. 2. 9. The Ideal type Approach.....	103
2. 3. 2. 10. The diffusionist Approach.....	104
2. 3. 2. 11. Historical, Socio-political Background as sources of Conflict in Central Africa.....	105
2. 3. 2. 11. 1. The role of the West in the Intensification of Conflicts in Central Africa.....	108
2. 3. 2. 12. Political and Socio-economic Demise and the rise of Discrimination and Deprivation in the DRC.....	113
2. 3. 2. 12. 1. Explanation of reaction to Discrimination and Deprivation in the DRC.....	115



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

2. 3. 2. 12. 2. The relative Deprivation Explanation.....	116
2. 3. 2. 12. 3. Class and Ethnicity Paradigms.....	116
2. 3. 2. 12. 4. Ethnicity.....	118
2. 3. 2. 13. Theory of Development Approaches.....	120
2. 3. 2. 13. 1. Introduction.....	120
2. 3. 2. 13. 2. The Historical progression of Development Thought.....	121
2. 3. 2. 13. 3. The Modernization Theory.....	121
2. 3. 2. 13. 4. The Structuralist School of Development.....	123
2. 3. 2. 13. 5. The Dependency Theory and the World-Systems.....	124
2. 3. 2. 13. 6. The Basic needs Theory, Global interdependence and the Regulationists.....	126
2. 3. 2. 13. 7. The Neo-liberalism Theory, Sustainable Development and Capabilities.....	129
2. 3. 2. 13. 8. Human Development and Social Capital.....	132
2. 3. 2. 13. 9. A new agenda for a new Millennium.....	133
2. 4. Conclusion.....	134
Chapter 3.....	136
Methodology.....	136
3. 1. Introduction.....	136
3. 2. Historical Research.....	139
3. 2. 1. The Benefits of Historical Research.....	140
3. 2. 2. Limitations of Historical Research.....	141
3. 3. Culture.....	143
3. 4. Research Design.....	144
3. 4. 1. Research Method.....	145
3. 4. 2. Narrative Method.....	145



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

3. 4. 3. Interpretive Method.....	146
3. 4. 4. Archival Research.....	147
3. 4. 5. Periodization.....	148
3. 4. 6. Triangulation and Analysis.....	153
3. 4. 7. Contribution.....	154
3. 5. Conclusion.....	155
Chapter 4.....	156
The Democratic Republic of Congo: A case study of Conflict that Affects	
Development.....	156
4. 1. Introduction.....	156
4. 2. Background to the DRC Conflict.....	158
4. 3. Democratic Republic of Congo's Economy at the dawn of Independence.....	161
4. 4. Production and Industry.....	165
4. 4. 1. Agriculture.....	165
4. 4. 2. Mining.....	169
4. 5. The Democratic Republic of Congo's Economy during the Post-Colonial era.....	174
4. 5. 1. Economic policy of Zairianization.....	176
4. 5. 2. Economic policy of Radicalization.....	180
4. 6. Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic decline.....	183
4. 7. State of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.....	194
4. 7. 1. The Rise and Decline of the State.....	195
4. 7. 2. The Colonial legacy.....	197
4. 7. 3. 1965-1974: State-Building and Horizontal Elite formation.....	198
4. 7. 4. 1974-1980: A shift in the centre of gravity of the State.....	200
4. 7. 5. 1980-1990: Autonomization of the Elite with State decline.....	201




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

4. 7. 6. 1990-1997: Unraveling and collapse of the State.....	202
4. 7. 7. 1997-2001: Civil War and State Collapse.....	204
4. 8. Lack of security and peace.....	205
4. 9. Culture of Impunity.....	206
4. 10. Poor Governance.....	207
4. 11. Social Values.....	209
4. 11. 1. Civil society, Gender, and Peace building in the DRC.....	209
4. 12. Dilapidation and Destruction of Infrastructure.....	210
4. 13. Conflict and Development.....	213
4. 14. Conclusion.....	219
Chapter 5.....	221
Conflict and Development: Conflict Resolution in the DRC.....	221
5. 1. Introduction.....	221
5. 2. The nature of Conflict Resolution.....	223
5. 3. Social Cohesion and Conflict in Contemporary DRC.....	228
5. 3. 1. Service delivery by the State and Public Protest.....	231
5. 3. 2. Fault lines of Ethnicity and Identity in the DRC.....	235
5. 3. 3. Lack of Inter-ethnic Contact.....	236
5. 3. 4. High level of Discrimination.....	237
5. 3. 5. Intolerance.....	240
5. 3. 6. Conflict as a Feature of Ethnic Competition: Implication on Development in the DRC.....	242
5. 3. 6. 1. Struggles for Land resources.....	242
5. 3. 6. 1. 1. Land, Natural resources and Conflict in the DRC.....	242
5. 3. 6. 1. 2. The Struggle for Political Power.....	246




**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*

5. 4. Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Mechanisms in the DRC.....	247
5. 4. 1. The History of Conflict in the DRC from 1990-2003.....	249
5. 4. 2. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in the DRC.....	251
5. 4. 3. Peace Building.....	254
5. 5. An Assessment of Conflict Resolution in the DRC.....	258
5. 5. 1. Global and all-inclusive Agreements in the DRC.....	261
5. 5. 2. Applying the Approaches of Conflict to the DRC Conflict.....	263
5. 5. 2. 1. Nelsson’s partial Peace.....	263
5. 5. 2. 2. Woodward’s root Cause.....	265
5. 5. 2. 3. Walter’s credible Commitment.....	266
5. 6. Conflict Resolution: A challenge to Political and Socio-Economic Development.....	269
5. 6. 1. Political Development.....	269
5. 6. 2. Economic Development.....	270
5. 6. 3. Social Development.....	271
5. 7. Conclusion.....	272
Chapter 6.....	274
Conclusion and Recommendations.....	274
6. 1. Introduction.....	274
6. 2. Summary and Conclusion of the Study.....	274
6. 3. Main Finding.....	277
6. 3. 1. Implications for Stability and Development in the DRC.....	277
6. 3. 2. Achieving Stability for Development.....	277
6. 3. 3. Nation-Building.....	279
6. 3. 3. 1. Addressing the Land problem.....	279
6. 3. 3. 2. African Solidarity and Territorial Integrity.....	280



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

6. 3. 3. 3. The facilitation of Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development.....	280
6. 4. Recommendations.....	281
6. 5. Conclusion.....	289
Chapter 7.....	290
Bibliography.....	290
Online Sources.....	330
Appendices.....	331
Appendix A.....	331
Figure 1: Model of Collective Action Encompassing RD, SIT, FSM.....	331
Appendix B.....	331
Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo.....	331



**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*

## CHAPTER ONE

### Orientation to the Study

*'...conflict resolutions have been among the most serious and formidable challenges facing sub-Saharan African countries as it contemplates its place in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; DRC being no exception. Burdened with the problems of underdevelopment, poverty, debts, the lack of security and stability many African countries are unable to contemplate the future with any sense of confidence, let alone optimism. It is now generally acknowledged within and outside Africa that conflicts are the major impediments to development of many African countries and ...(conflicts) have gobbled up scarce resources and undermined the ability of many African countries to address the many causes compelling of African people.'* (Organization of African Union (OAU))  
*Ahmed Mohiddin, (2000).*




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### 1. 1. General Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is an African country which has experienced conflict since independence; and this is of course a challenge to development goals. The DRC is a country in which effective conflict resolution mechanisms have been and continue to be sought, yet social conflict remains (Mpangala, 2004:17). This obvious fact notwithstanding, the colonial power decided to divide the country in order to effectively control her vital resources for their economic interest. Hence, for administrative convenience, the Eastern Congo was amalgamated. The DRC became independent in June 1960 with a unitary system designed by the colonial ruler which, from the start, was at variance with the aspirations of different ethnic groups in the country (Mpangala, 2004: 20). Today the Congo is made up of 11 provinces, with Kinshasa as the central capital. The country is currently beset by social conflict which stems from the

inability of the central government to provide adequate political and socio-economic security. Hence, there exists a significant lack of development in the country.

Wanyande (1997: 1-2) argues that the costs of the ongoing conflict in DRC, in terms of loss of human life and destruction of social infrastructure, are enormous. He further argues that social conflict is a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aim of the conflicting parties are to neutralize, injure and/or eliminate those who are also contending for these scarce resources. In the DRC, such conflict emanating from political and socio-economic discrimination often results in political instability and an inability to plan objectively for the generality of the Congolese people regardless of their location or ethnic and political affiliations. This obviously has an effect on the development goals of the DRC as a nation.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The problem with conflict in a developing country like the DRC is that it is compounded by issues such as inequality (discrimination), access to resources and allocation of power, which pose a threat to peace, security and the developmental progress of the country. Since different groups and individuals have different interests, the aims of those groups which are purportedly discriminated against are to cause conflict with the groups they perceive as discriminating against them. Fearon (2003: 75-90) argues that conflict occurs when deprived groups attempt to increase their share of power and wealth or to modify the dominant values, norms, beliefs or ideology. Once conflict occurs, scarce resources are inevitably diverted to the purchase of military equipment at the expense of development. To manage and resolve conflict, attempts must be made to dissolve the vicious cycle of political and socio-economic discrimination and other primary causes of conflict in order to promote progressive development in the DRC.

Indeed, conflict in the DRC has its roots in political and socio-economic discrimination and the lack of good governance; that is, the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, and meet their basic needs (Mpangala, 2002: 15). It is with this consideration in mind, as guiding parameters that this study engages in the analysis of conflict resolution as a challenge for development in the DRC.

## 1. 2. Scholarly Conceptions of Motivations for Action on the basis of Discrimination or Inequality

Greater injustice or discrimination will breed greater discontent. This has been the argument of most theories and theorists concerned with discrimination and injustice (Lichbach, 1990). The more popular in this tradition are relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966), equity theory (Walster *et al*, 1978), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the frustration-aggression model (Hepworth & West, 1988), self evaluation theory (Della Fave, 1980) and distributive social justice theory (Hegtvedt & Markosky, 1995). In summary, these theories argue that discrimination for resource distribution produces emotional distress in the aggrieved and forces people to secure a fairer share by violent means (Cramer, 2005). Gurr (1970: 73) argues that *“the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife”*.


Scholars agree that deprivation emanates when a discrepancy exists between what people get and what they believe they ought to get (Gurr, 1970; Hegtvedt & Markovskyy, 1995; Cohen & Greenberg, 1982; Adams 1965; Walster *et al.*, 1978). They also agree that justice exists when there is congruence between expectations and outcomes, and that perception of injustice lead to

emotional distress and, often, attempts to restore justice. Della Fave (1980) put the same argument succinctly when she proposed that justice exists when there is congruence between expectations and outcomes based on normative rules, and that perception of injustice leads to emotional distress and attempts to restore justice.

However, while it is reasonable to expect that the absence of feelings of dissatisfactions may lead to inaction, the presence of these feelings does not necessarily lead to action (Tafjel, 1982; Martin, 1986: 238). In fact, the system justification theory hypothesizes that disadvantaged people are more likely to justify existing social systems (Jost & Hunyadi, 2003). While scholars are in agreement that perceptions of injustice leads to anger and emotional distress, which actors may attempt to remove by attempting to restore justice (Hedgvedt, 1990; Hegtvedt, *et al*, 2003; Homans, 1974; Walster *et al.*, 1978; Hegtvedt & Markovsky, 1995; Adams, 1965), the relationship between discontent and strife (Gurr, 1970) or 'injustice feelings' and 'reactions to inequality or discrimination' has remained a troubled spot in the literature (Wright *et al.*, 1990: 995). Scholars have thus attempted to answer the question: 'what factors mediate emotional response to inequality and resultant actions?' (Hegtvedt, 1990).

The scholarly resolution of this paradox has been guided by Olsen's (1968) dilemma of collective action which proposes that rational individuals will take a 'free ride' where benefits of collective action accrue to all irrespective of their level of participation. While Olsen's proposal seemed to answer the question of why people fail to participate in collective action, it does not explain why some people do (Klandermans, 2002). Gurr (1970), however, posits that the discontent-strife relationship is mediated by the extent of the state's coercive potential,

institutionalization, social facilitation and legitimacy. Zelditch & Walker (1984) confirm that collective support for an allocator (legitimacy) alters perceptions of unfairness and diminishes possibilities of action. Darhrendoff (1974) proposed an inverse relationship between openness of classes and the intensity of conflicts by arguing that the weight and intensity of conflict decreases as social mobility and group openness increases (also; Horowitz, 1985, quoted in Robinson, 2005). Hegtvedt *et al.* (2003) show that reactions to injustice are contingent upon perceptions of the fairness of distributive procedures as well as a comparison of one's justice judgment with that of others.



Results from the Relative Deprivation and distributive justice theories, however, show limitations in their applicability, given the differences in conceptualization of individual and collective feelings of deprivation (Kawakami & Dion, 1995). Resource Mobilization (RM) approaches (McCarty & Zald, 1997) filled this gap by showing that action will ensue only when structural conditions are ripe and resources for mobilization (weapons, money etc.) are available, regardless of ideology or feelings of injustice (Brush, 1996).




Figure 1.1: Model of Collective Action Encompassing RD, SIT, and FSM

RM arguments were stunningly supported by the much quoted work of Ellemers *et al.* (1993). Casting doubts on the validity of feelings as antecedents of action, later works of Mummendey *et al.* (1999) showed that where Relative Deprivation (RD) and Social Identity Theory (SIT) are combined, clearer paths from feelings to action could be discerned. Recently, therefore, the infusion of Social Identity Theory (SIT) into RD research has led to the development of pathways for explaining motivations and impediments to action in terms of a combination of instrumental and effective routes to action. It has thus been found that the extent of ‘group identification’ (Klandermans, 1998, 2002; van Zomeren *et al.*, 2010) and perceptions of group ‘efficacy or empowerment’ (Hornsey *et al.*, 2006; Giguere & Lalonde, 2010) mediate the willingness to engage in collective action or actual action. Stürmer & Sturmer (2009) recently motivated for an additional pathway: ‘emotion’ (also; Smith *et al.*, 2008). Other scholars have argued for supplementary pathways including the willingness to express one’s view or ideology and the protection of sacred values (Ginges & Altran, 2009; van Stekelenburg *et al.*, 2009), in addition to individual enhancement motives (Tropp & Brown, 2004).

Bluic *et al.* (2007: 19) show that while group identification and efficacy influence collective action, the statistical variance contributed to action by these variables has been weak; this indicates that there are other mediating factors meriting attention, besides these instrumental concerns. These studies have therefore not generated effective conclusions about the discontent-strife relationship, thus the ‘trouble spot’ persists in the literature and, in turn, renders virtually all theoretical explanations incomplete. There is, however, a notable exemption in the literature of an analysis of the effects of consensually shared beliefs and social structure in producing and sustaining discrimination or inequality (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). The only notable exceptions to this have been Shepelak & Alwin (1986), Martin (1994), and Castillo (2007) who studied the effects of existential and utopian justice beliefs (egalitarianism and in-egalitarianism) on reactions to injustice. This excludes an analysis of the mediating effect of beliefs that govern the realities of daily life, such as beliefs about causes of conflict. The literature on social movements has, however, downplayed the role of attitudes and beliefs as either motivators or impediments to mobilization to redress grievances. However, matters of attitudes and beliefs are creeping back in the forms of logic, frames and discourse that spur micro-mobilization (Rothenberg *et al.*, 2008).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


### **1. 3. Explanation and Discussion of Figure 1. 1. Model of Collective Action**

#### **Encompassing RD, SIT, and FSM**

##### **1. 3. 1. From RD to SIT and FSM: Theoretical Integration**


While recent theories in the intergroup relations literature attempt to extrapolate their findings to the dynamics of responses to injury, the attempts have been reductionist in that they often explicitly focus either collective or individualistic responses to inequality without integrating how actions proceed in a continuum (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1984). Thus, their postulations are

incapable of grasping all dimensions of disadvantaged-group behavior. Wright *et al.* (1990) argued that these theories (RD, Equity, Distributive justice) failed to provide adequate insights into when disadvantaged group members will choose either individual or collective, or when actions will be normative or not. Action will be normative or non-normative. While Runciman's distinction of ERD and FRD leading to individual and collective action respectively seemed to solve the puzzle, there is evidence that the personal-collective distinction presents challenges in conceptualization and operationalization (Bernstein & Crosby, 1980; Martin & Murray, 1984). Where researchers had in fact achieved conceptual constructs, the link to action remains a 'trouble spot' (Wright *et al.*, 1990; Martin, 1986).



However, the introduction of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) seemed to ameliorate the situation. Social Identity Theory (SIT) proposes two major strategies available to disadvantaged groups and persons to respond to their situation (Hogg & Abrams, 1988: 54; Tajfel & Turner, 1979); individual mobility entailing attempts to join the high status group or social competition involving collective action to change intergroup situation. A third option proposed entails 'social creativity' entailing a reappraisal of intergroup comparison in favour of the in-group. SIT proposes that the choice of option is contingent upon the perceived permeability, stability and legitimacy of intergroup boundaries (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2002: 300). These conditions have been empirically verified by Ellemers *et al.* (1993) who concluded that disadvantaged group members often chose action based on pragmatism (Ellemers *et al.*, 1993: 777), but found no evidence supporting legitimacy. Ellemers and her colleagues concluded that while justice considerations influence people's evaluation of the situation, it does not influence choice of action. This finding challenged widely held theses of SIT and RD which have

held that reaction is contingent upon injustice feelings, while supporting the Resource Mobilization models and its claims of calculated rationality as the basis for action, with injustice feelings as post hoc rationalizations (Martin, 1986). This necessitated a reformulation of RD (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2002: 301) and a reemphasis of the operationalization of RD to incorporate Runchiman's (1966) referential thesis and SIT. Thus recent studies show that group deprivation predicts collective action. The work of Mummendey *et al.* (1999) showed that factors proposed by SIT best predicted individual strategies, whilst those derived from RDT better accounted for collective actions thus combining SIT and RDT enhanced predictability (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2002: 302) thus bypassing the problem earlier posed by the finding of Ellemers *et al.* (1983).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

While SIT has made tremendous impact in predicting action, by identifying instability and illegitimacy as the precursors to the perception of cognitive alternatives and identifying the presence of cognitive alternatives as the determinant of action types it is unable to identify the conditions that will determine which of the alternative responses will ultimately be preferred (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). In addition, SIT is unable to decipher what factors will determine disadvantaged group members' perception of the intergroup situation as illegitimate and unstable and consequently is unable to predict when resultant action will be individual or collective, normative or non-normative (Wright *et al.*, 1990: 995). Taylor & Moghaddam (1987) argued that SIT does not provide conditions under which alternative responses will be preferred or what variables are responsible for perception of legitimacy or illegitimacy of group boundaries and consequently is unable to decipher when reactions will be individual or collective, normative or non-normative (Wright *et al.*, 1990: 995). Taylor & McKirnan (1984) consequently proposed

that the type and nature of reaction by disadvantaged groups is predicated upon the prevalent social philosophy guiding social stratification.


In order to provide a framework that incorporates the distinction between individual and collective actions as well as between normative and non-normative action, a theoretical integration is therefore used in the present study that incorporates the basic reaction model central to RD and its proposition that the deprived actor will react when faced with injustice or when justice norms are violated and SIT's contribution entailing its thesis that action is generally dependent upon awareness of alternatives to the inter-group structure. When these premises are combined with FSM's distinction between actions based on social norms and locus of action, a better explanatory tool is attained. This is especially useful in the present study given that the FSM stages incorporate the dynamics of perception of the overriding philosophy guiding stratification as the causes of changes from one stage to another. These ascription and achievement based philosophies are consistent with the dimensions of perceptions of causes of poverty and as the model proposes, changes in guiding philosophies are analogous to changes in attribution from individual to fatalistic and structural explanations. Taylor and McKirnan's model therefore serves as an appropriate tool for understanding the dynamics of changes in attribution contingent upon deprivation feelings. On the premise that individual attribution signifies support for the status quo and that structural attribution signifies dissatisfaction with the present social structure and is incompatible with collective interest therefore the FSM advocated by Taylor & McKirnan (1984) provide a useful tool of analysis. The basic argument of FSM is therefore provided hereafter.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


### 1. 3. 2. Collective action

Indeed, there are 3 possible outcomes in this stage to explain the collective action encompassing RD, SIT, and FSM. Firstly, where relative power is unchanged, cycle returns to stage 2. On the other hand, the power equation may be reversed in a way that the hither-to disadvantaged group becomes the dominant group. Thirdly all groups may now become relatively equal in status; in a situation like this, constant intergroup comparison with no victor keeps intergroup situation in a healthy state of competition (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994: 148). At this stage therefore relative parity between groups is achieved and access to resources and status are socialized.



This FSM has been used to explain the dynamics of integration of immigrants into host cultures (Schwarzwald *et al.*, 1996; Moghaddam *et al.*, 1987), experimentally manipulated samples of teenage pupils, (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998, 2000, 2002) and women's attempts to achieve social mobility (Tougas *et al.*, 1999). Like SIT, it proposes that the perception of intergroup situation influences the response of disadvantaged group members. The model assumes that the overriding philosophy of stratification is on the basis of individual performance, thus the disadvantaged group's first initial response is inherently individual normative thus it is only where attempts at individual mobility fails that the philosophy of individualism is questioned and consequently collective action is perceived as the only means to redress injury. However results from studies based on FSM have been inconsistent and incongruous. The theoretical assertion by FSM and SIT that permeable intergroup boundaries will enhance preference for individual over collective has not been proven thus indicating a theoretical gap (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2000: 43) and the possibility that the theory intended factor interpretation differently from what scholars had operationalized. Ellemers *et al.* (1993) reported that permeability and stability of intergroup

structure influence action. Their study showed that legitimacy was not a determinant of action. However Mummendy *et al.* (1999) showed that legitimacy had influence on the choice of action among their East German sample. Wright *et al.* (1990) found that disadvantaged groups preferred individual actions to collective action even when advantaged groups were minimally open. Lalonde & Silveran (1994) also showed that collective action was taken only when advantaged groups were perceived to be completely closed. Studies of real life groups showed evidence of collective rather than individual action (Moghaddam *et al.*, 1987; Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998, 2000). Boen & Vanbeselaere (1998) showed that group openness interacted with the normative non normative dimension contrary to the individual collective action distinction. Jackson *et al.* (1996) reported that permeability had no effect on individual action. These disparate results have been adduced to the different conceptualizations of groups used in the different studies (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998), confused manipulations of individual and group disadvantage (Boen & Vanbeselaere 2000: 44 )and the failure to distinguish between different forms of collective action or include enough items in each category of action (Louis & Taylor, 1999). In addition results of experimental studies have been confounded by the fact that in many of the studies, the high status group is presented as an all-powerful party the equivalence of which does not exist in reality (for example, Wright *et al.*, 1990).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **1. 4. Problem Statement**

Conflict constitutes a very topical issue in debates and discussions in the DRC. Its impact on development is complex and dynamic. This is evident from the reality that where conflict exists development is impeded. Conflict in the DRC is an obstacle to development (Mpangala, 2002:20). Unfortunately, while many countries around the world have developed ways to

cooperate peacefully to avoid violent conflict and promote development, other countries (especially in Africa) find it difficult to manage conflict which consequently affects the development of such states. Although intervention by the international community in conflict resolution has succeeded in some African countries, similar interventions have failed in other countries like the DRC. This failure reflects a lack of proper conflict resolution mechanisms and suggests that there are more factors in conflict resolution that need to be addressed (Azar, 1994: 30). For example, there is need to consider how the nature of the African state, power struggles and/or unequal access to natural resources affects the overall prospect of conflict resolution in Africa, and the DRC specifically, in promoting development. The negative effect of conflict on development in the DRC is enormous. The lingering conflict in this country has resulted in a great number of deaths and displaced more people than is evident in any other country in the continent, in recent decades. This challenges the achievement of its development goals, which are; to promote change in some core areas that would help reduce political and socio-economic discrimination and improve the well-being of the people (Mwajiru, 2001: 56). Frank (2000: 45-47) argues that most African conflicts are caused by the combination of inequality and a weak State, which have had a devastating impact on Africa's development. This study concentrates specifically on issues of conflict and its effects on development as a challenge in the DRC, with emphasis on political and socio-economic discrimination as the cause of the lingering failure in development within the DRC.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **1. 5. Research Questions**

Based on the above assertions, this study seeks to provide possible answers to the following research questions:

1. What are the dynamics of the conflict in the DRC?
2. To what extent has this conflict impacted on the development of the DRC?
3. What could be done to effectively resolve the DRC conflict and enhance development?
4. What are the systems in place for the DRC to implement a conflict resolution policy in order to promote development?


### 1. 6. Objectives of the study

In answering the above questions this study endeavors to examine the ongoing search for new possibilities of conflict resolution towards development in Africa, with specific reference to the DRC. The primary focus shall be to uncover the hidden causes of developmental failure in the DRC, where it is apparent that political and socio-economic discrimination negatively impact on conflict resolution, which in turn affects development. This study wants to explore conflict resolution as a challenge to development from an often neglected perspective. The objectives of this study are:

1. To investigate the extent to which conflict has impacted development in the DRC.
2. To develop conflict resolution tools that support peace and enhance development in the DRC.
3. To assess whether there is an adequate system in place for the DRC to implement conflict resolution to promote development.
4. To proffer a practicable solution to the development challenges in the country.

### 1. 7. Significance of the study

The study would contribute to the search for effective implementation of conflict resolution policies in Africa, especially in the DRC, with a view to enhancing development in the DRC. The study also seeks to unpack the challenges facing the DRC in terms of the implementation of a conflict resolution policy to promote development and possible ways of dealing with conflict. The study will also attract the attention of African leaders generally, and Congolese leaders in particular, to the importance of managing conflict and solving it in a peaceful and innovative manner so as to promote development. The study will be mainstreamed into the development process and policy making process in Africa, especially in the DRC government, civil society, and other development agencies. Bearing in mind that the link between conflict and development is a relatively new discipline, there are a lot of areas that have the potential for improvement. The proposed study would be a significant contribution towards the strengthening of African leadership, especially the DRC leadership, towards successfully implementing the policy of conflict resolution in order to promote development. Lastly, the findings of the study will assist policy makers in understanding the extent to which political and socio-economic discrimination cause conflict and affect development.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### 1. 8. Methodology

Any academic study requires a methodology in order to reach a conclusion. In other words, research must have ways of producing and analyzing data so that a theory which is based on fact can be tested, and then accepted or rejected. Thus, methodology is concerned with both the detailed research methods through which data is collected, and the more general philosophies upon which the collection and analysis of data are based (Haralambos and Halborn, 1995: 805).

The difficulty in understanding just what the term methodology means has not been aided by the fact that it is used interchangeably with research methods and is often considered, mistakenly, as synonymous with epistemology. Epistemology here should be looked upon as an overarching philosophical term concerning the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge, and knowledge gathering process between fact and theory. A project's methodology, on the other hand, is concerned with the discussion of how a particular research should be understood as the critical study of research methods and use. This term (method) refers to the choice of research strategy taken by a particular scholar as opposed to other, alternative, research strategies (Grix, 2001: 36). Methodology, therefore, aims to explain the process of scientific inquiry based on the fact of experience acquired by observation and experiment (Cohen et al, 1989: 11).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The primary research method in this study is the historical structural approach or historical-social methodology. Hence, the research will be archival in nature because an archive has long-term value and information received from it can be in the form of documents, letters, electronic documents, government reports, United Nation (UN) statistics, gazettes, etc. and the research will adopt the historical structural approach. The historical approach is a systematic body of principles and rules designed to effectively aid in gathering the source materials of history, appraising them critically, and presenting a synthesis (generally in written form) of the results achieved. In other words, historical method is a system which follows the correct procedures required for the attainment of historical truth. This approach assumes that to examine a social phenomenon, such as conflict and development in the DRC, focus should be placed on structural and developmental holism (Sayer, 1992: 25). The structural analysis looks at the different

structure in the society, and explores how people contribute and interact in the reproduction of social organization in their society. Hence, it is relevant to the study of the DRC.

### 1. 9. Definition of Terms

The key terms are explained in this study to make sure that there is a shared understanding of the concepts.

**The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** is a country situated in central Africa and is surrounded by Angola, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), the Central Africa Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia. Given this description, it is admitted that DRC has an area of 2.340.000 m sq/km, is the third largest country in Africa in terms of population with 71,000,000 inhabitants (MacKulity, 1999: 37).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The country has been in protracted conflict since the 1960s, and this has seriously affected its development goals. Conflict in this country is characterized by widespread acts of killing, such as that of 6,000,000 people (Mpangala, 2002: 17). This catastrophic event is the logical outcome of the political and socio-economic exclusion and discrimination that has generated a large-scale massacre and the flight of Congolese subjects into exile. The roots of conflict lie deep in the history of ethnic identity construction and mobilization under colonial rule. The variety of protracted conflict with different degrees of escalation faced by the DRC is what came to be described as the African First World War (Mpangala, 2002: 10).

**Conflict** is a fluid and ambiguous concept. In Latin, conflict means 'clash or engage in fight'. According to Tom Woodhouse and Tamara Duffey (2000: 21), conflict is a multi dimensional

social process which is a common and essential feature of human existence. When expressed and handled constructively, conflict can act as a catalyst for personal, socio-political and economic development and transformation. When it is expressed destructively, conflict fosters violence and affects development goals, which is the case in the DRC. Rummel (2003: 1-2) argues that conflict is necessary to our understanding and appreciation of reality and human action. Conflict can be treated broadly as a philosophical category denoting the clash of power against power in the striving of all things to manifest and fulfill themselves. Conflict is a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. Miall et al. (2005:80) define conflict as the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. Tom Woodhouse (2000: 22) argues that conflict is the pursuit of incompatible goals by individuals or groups. The use of this definition allows for the consideration of any conflict, whether it is interpersonal or international, pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force, or pursued by the government or civil society. According to Loakso (2002: 35), conflict may be either manifest i.e. recognizable through action and behaviours, or latent, in which case it remains dormant for some time as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangement as governments, corporations, or even civil society. Peter Wallansteen (2002: 209) identifies three general forms of conflict, these are: interstate, internal, and state formation conflicts. Interstate conflicts are disputes between nation states or violations of the state system of alliances. The international community has become increasingly concerned with the rise in frequency and intensity of internal conflicts, which are contributing to the expanding nature, sophistication and, at times, legitimization of interventionist policies. Examples of internal and state formation conflicts include civil and ethnic conflict, anti-colonial struggles, secessionist and autonomous movements, territorial conflicts, and battles over control of government. Today,



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


attention is focused on global conflicts, where non-state groups combat internal and regional organizations (Wallansteen, 2002: 215). Conflict can also be seen as a distinct category of social behaviour of two parties trying to get something they both want but cannot both have. Moreover, conflict can be apprehended as a potentiality or a situation, as a structure or manifestation, as either event or process. Conflict can be understood as a social field phenomenon where reality comprises multiform and interwoven potentialities, dispositions, and powers. In this case conflict refers to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflict, armed conflicts refers to those that involve the use of force (Wallansteen, 2002: 116).



Hence, we can describe conflict as a balancing of vectors of power, of capabilities to produce effects. Yet, it is a clash of powers, not a balance or equilibrium of powers (Rummel, 1975: 320). It is not a stable effect or state of affairs. Conflict is a pushing and pulling, the giving and taking, the process of finding the balance between powers. Most fundamentally, conflict is correlative to power. Power is the capability to produce effects (Rummel, 1975: 320); conflict is the process of powers meeting and balancing. To understand which powers succeed requires comprehending their conflicts; to understand conflict involves untangling the powers involved. As such, as Heraclitus has stated, conflict is universal (Rummel, 1970:250). Our experience presupposes conflict in its generation, in addition to its *apriori* categories based on such development of conflict. On the other hand, learning about ourselves, others, and reality, our growth and development, and our increasing ability to create our own heaven or hell, is possible through conflict. Thus, the desire to eradicate conflict, the hope for harmony and universal cooperation is the wish for a frozen, unchanging world which has all relationships fixed in their patterns with all in balance; one in which we cannot hope for, or plan for, a better tomorrow but

can only follow our inevitable course, which may be likened to the determined ups and downs of a wooden horse on a merry-go-round.

Finally, conflict can be defined as the expression of disagreement over something important to both or all sides of a dispute. In this case the important thing to grasp is that it is entirely dependent on the people involved. It depends on their having a particular point of view, which may or may not have independent facts and evidence to support it, and on how they behave when they encounter an opposing point of view. I shall deal with the impact of conflict on development in terms of the clash of power belonging to human nature in more detail later in this thesis.




## University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

A primary assumption underlying this study is that conflict is a natural, normal and inevitable aspect of human life. It is part of the dynamics of life which drive humanity into the future, or towards development. This implies that conflict as a social and political phenomenon can be prevented or resolved, but not eliminated. According to Stedman (1996: 370), conflict stems from the basic fact of human interdependence. Seeking to satisfy their needs wants and desires, people make demands upon themselves, upon the physical environment, upon other people, and upon whatever organization and institutions appear to be in a position to help them. The challenge is to manage it in a constructive way that allows for the expression of discord and legitimate struggle without violence. One can speak of the resolution and prevention of a specific conflict concerning a particular issue or set of issues. However, Stedman offers insight into the nature of conflict in the DRC when he contends that conflict arises from problems based to all populations: the tugs and pulls of different identities, the distribution of resources and access to

power, the competing definitions of what is right, fair and just (Stedman, 1997: 39). The cost of conflict in the DRC has been estimated at US\$ 1 billion which can be associated with refugees and internally displaced persons who can promote development. Included in this cost is the ineffective management of the economy of conflict-ridden entities. Indeed, this study employs the concept of conflict, in broad terms, to describe violence, war, and all kinds of conflicts.

**Conflict resolution** is a range of processes aimed at alleviating, eliminating or transforming actual and potential violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes for social development and political change. Conflict resolution is concerned with addressing the fundamental causes of conflicts and aims to produce solutions which are mutually acceptable to all parties. Conflict resolution operates at a number of levels or tracks, and encompasses a range of techniques from conciliation to mediation, negotiation, and problem solving.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Conflict resolution implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed, behaviours are changed towards nonviolence, attitudes are no longer hostile, and structures no longer exploitative. The term is used to refer both to the process or the intention to bring about these changes and to the completion of the process. The process of conflict diagnoses its nature and applies appropriate methods in order to:

1. Diffuse the negative emotional energy involved
2. Enable the conflicting parties to understand and resolve their differences
3. Resolve the differences so as to achieve solutions that are not imposed, which have been agreed to by all the parties in conflict, and which address the root cause of the conflict to promote development.

According to Abu-Nimer (1996: 35-52), conflict resolution has been developed as a field since the 1950s and its emergence as an interdisciplinary field can be traced to human relations and inter-group movements which followed the Second World War. He further argues that the creation of conflict resolution as an academic discipline and field of practice grew out of industrial and labour management. Out of this movement, several intervention approaches are being developed and applied to different levels of conflict. However, as it was mentioned above, the main processes of conflict resolution are conciliation, facilitation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Indeed, not all conflicts are harmful. Some may ultimately result in a positive impact on development or social change. According to Onigu Orite and Isaac Olawale Albert (1999: 17), although conflicts have negative connotations many constitute an essential creative element for changing societies and achieving development goals and aspirations of individuals and groups. Conflict resolution involves recognition by the clashing parties of one another's interests, needs, perspectives, and continued existence. The most effective forms of conflict resolution identify the underlying causes of the conflict and address them through solutions that are mutually satisfactory, self-perpetuating, and sustaining. Conflict resolution can also be practiced with a variety of emphases, including but not limited to cooperation, non-confrontation, non-competition, and positive-sum orientation. Serious challenges are found when parties at times favour, for various reasons, the continuation of conflict over its resolution. In such cases, the role of external parties can be critical in creating a balance of power, enacting sanctions or incentives, or acting as neutral mediators or invested facilitators (Miller, 2005: 84). Hence, conflict resolution is a fundamental prerequisite for development and stability throughout the world. The converse is also true in that unresolved conflict breeds underdevelopment and instability.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

**Development**, as a concept, has gone through various evolutions in the process of history and it is complex and dynamic. Although the notion of development has existed for centuries, when growth and modernization were implicitly seen as the prevailing answer to development challenges, global domination became critical in the 1940s after the Second World War (II), as indicated in the United States of America's President Truman's inaugural address which proposed an initiative to 'develop' the South. During this period 'development' was mainly defined as economic development, and eventually became a key word for newly independent countries. The word increased its dimensions of definitions in the 1970s with the notion of the basic human needs (BHN) approach, the new international economic order, and alternative developments. In the 1980s, sustainable developments became one of the key points to define 'development' with the recognition of environmental degradations. In the 1990s, the United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) proposed 'human development' as conceptually supported by Sen's capability approach. Corresponding with these definitions, the concept of development became refined and its importance was confirmed globally in the social summit of 1995.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

These histories of 'development' diversified the term's definitions based on various interests and perspectives. According to the United Nations, 'development' is to lead long and healthy lives; to be knowledgeable; to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community (UNDP, 1998: 5). To define development in this way is to describe the growth of humans throughout their lifespan, from conception to death. Development refers to progress. Geoffrey Kay (1999: 8) argues that national sovereignty can have no real meaning unless it is joined to the idea of development as progress towards a social

and economic equality from which no nation is debarred for natural reasons. This definition adheres closely to the principle of equality and freedom of the individual, without discrimination in a sovereign nation. Nyerere (1997: 60) defines development as an increasing people's freedom. He specified this freedom as national freedom, freedom from hunger, disease, and poverty, and personal freedom such as living in dignity and equality, freedom of speech and freedom to participate in the business of the country.

According to Thomas, cited in Cowen and Shenton (1996: 7), development is an historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over long periods. In other words, development constitutes deliberate efforts aimed at progress on the part of various agencies, including governments, all kinds of organizations and social movements. In contrast, human development is linked to a third perspective of development which views it as freeing people from obstacles that affect their ability to develop their own lives and communities. Development is therefore empowerment; it is about people taking control of their own lives, expressing their own demands and finding their own solution to their problems. Indeed, development is a comprehensive, holistic and participatory process in which the quality of life of people is greatly enhanced in a sustainable manner. It is a process of change from the present situation to an enlarged or refined situation (Sindane, 2009: 7). In this study, development is used in this broad, multidimensional sense of the word. There is an ambiguity in that the term development is used to refer to a state of affairs as well as a process of change. We try to clarify this by referring, whenever appropriate, to a given level of development versus the process and rate of change.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## 1. 10. Research Approach

The research approach can be viewed as the techniques or procedures (methods) used to collect and analyze data. The methods chosen for a study are inextricably linked to the research questions posed and/or the sources of data collected (Grix, 2001: 29).

The main research approach selected for this study is the historical-structural approach or historico-social method. As one can observe, historical-structural research is not based on a particular, unified and methodological concept. Various theoretical approaches and their methods characterize discussions and research practice. According to Grix (2001: 29), subjective view points are the starting point; the course of interactions is the second point, while seeking to reconstruct the structures of the social field, whereas the latent meaning of practices is the third point. In the historical-structural approach, we ought to analyze concrete cases in their temporal and local particularity, beginning with people's experiences in their local context.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Creswell (1994: 6) argues that the historical-structural approach holds that the researcher should remain distant and independent of that which is being researched. The reason for conducting a historical-structural study is its exploratory nature. Since not much has been written about the topic and the population, the researcher seeks to listen to informants and to build a picture based on their ideas (Creswell: 1994: 21).

## 1. 11. Case Study

This section examines the question of conflict resolution and development in the DRC. The contextual focus of the study is a contemporary examination by the researcher of the socio-

economic policies, and an in-depth analysis of the causes of conflict and developmental failure in the DRC, since independence in 1960. Merriam, cited by Creswell (1994: 12), points out that a case study explores a single entity or phenomenon bounded by time and activity, and collects detailed information by using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time. The intention of this study is not to write a history of the period referred to but rather an attempt to analyze the strategies of conflict resolution that could be used by the Congolese in order to fight violent conflict and discrimination so as to promote development.

### 1. 12. Conceptual Framework

According to the theorists, the fact that the first world has reached its current point of affluence, following the industrial revolution, constitutes evidence that the third world can reach similar levels of development. Jonathan (1999: 14) defines development as a process of improving the quality of all human lives; creating conditions conducive to the growth of people's self-esteem through the establishment of social, political and economic systems and institutions; the struggle over these often leads to conflict.

According to Mpangala (2004: 9), the nature and cause of conflict in the DRC can be that of class struggles. Conflict is part of socio-structural conditions (Mpangala, 2004: 12). Mwajiru (2001: 15) argues that conflict in the DRC's political society can be linked to the socio-structural condition of the Congolese. While it has been argued that humans have the tendency to tolerate deprivation as well as the capacity to be aggressive, these tendencies and their expressions are often shaped by social conditions (Mpangala, 2004: 12-15). Mpangala further argues that conflict is the result of socialization and conditioning, a phenomenon of human organization, planning,

and information processing that plays on emotional and motivational potentialities. Giddens (1987: 25) acknowledges unconscious motivation as crucial features of human conduct and incorporated ego psychology into the framework of action which examines the relationship between individual behaviour and group identity.

From the perspective of conflict theory, the perception of conflict and development have been emphasized by Marxist and Functionalist predictions of an erosion of group identity, inequality and rapid social change with increasing modernization. Elu (1986: 54) argues that socio-economic transformation and State expansion may widen and intensify ethnic identifications and stimulate pervasive competition on the basis of these enlarged cultural identities. Indeed, conflict is very often the result of interaction within a society. Elu (1960: 40) further argues that conflict occurs when competing groups' goals, objectives, needs or values clash and result aggression.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

It is important to point out that there are other theoretical strands, besides Marx and functionalist theory, which can be employed for the analysis of conflict and development in the DRC. These include the human needs theory which attempts to analyze the source of conflict in human basic needs such as security, identity, recognition, and development. Mc Michael (1996: 20) argues that there are conflicts and instability in developing countries because people are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. The basic needs approach is an explicit goal of development in the international labour organization report. It focuses its attention on bringing back to the centre of development the society's needs thus providing, not only an opportunity for full physical, mental and social development of human personality (Steward, 2003: 23), but also the minimum resources necessary for building

the capacity of the society, promoting its self-reliance and self-sufficiency, which would lead to social well-being (Willis, 2005: 4). According to this argument, the basic needs approach leans towards ridding the society of poverty, deprivation and conflict. This argument is evidenced by the attempt to bring the society to the centre of the development process, which will avoid conflict and achieve better social conditions of survival (Rist, 1997: 282).

However, this study will argue that the exercise of avoiding conflict requires that the State has the political will and interest in solving conflict in a peaceful manner by providing for basic needs without discrimination. Indeed, the State ought to adapt in order to meet the needs of its citizens so as to avoid conflict and refrain from adopting a top-down approach in addressing the needs of the society because this tendency undermines the capability of the society in regulating their lives and creates further conflict. Instead, the State should encourage discussions on ethnic, race, class and gender issues as part of the process in decision making, in order not only to meet the basic needs of the parties but also to promote development and avoid conflict.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **1. 12. 1. Conflict and Development**

The concepts of conflict and development remain issues of discussion in the affairs of nations which are currently experiencing conflict and bad governance. These concepts are often used for the search of national solutions and development. These terms are also used by theorists to represent conditions or means of collective action, rather than values or ends in themselves. These terms will look ambiguous unless the question as to which of them is an end or a means is addressed. Conflict is considered a means while development signifies an end, i.e. the realization of any value outcome. Rummel (1993: 1-2) explains that conflict is a characteristic of human

existence. It is part of the dynamics of life that drives humanity into the future. Because of its nature, it needs to be dealt with constructively. When associated with violence, destruction and killing, it is no longer a healthy part of living and it affects development negatively. There is no doubt that conflict is harmful to human well-being and results in persistent low development. In contrast, McMichael (1996: 34) argues that development in terms of economy, education, science and culture remains an essential attribute of a sovereign nation in which citizens are given the opportunity to pursue their safety and happiness. In other words, development is construed as a process of enlarging people's choices, enhancing participatory democratic processes and the ability to have a say in the decisions that shape their lives, providing human beings with the opportunity to develop their fullest potential, whilst enabling the poor to organize for themselves and work together. Development is an end to carry out a nation's goals and promote economic growth, equity and national self-reliance (Cowen and Shenton, 1996: 121).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

However, in the case of the DRC, according to Mwajiru (2001: 5), it has been difficult to realize effective conflict resolution mechanisms capable of guaranteeing effective and progressive development in all spheres of national life. The reasons for this are political and socio-economic discrimination and inequality; corrupt leaders who have enriched themselves and mismanaged national resources; in addition to the disregard for human rights and democratic principles, the resultant effect of which has been social conflict nationwide. Conflict has major consequences in all aspects of development that are crucial to the overall well-being of the nation. People who have to promote development lose their physical or social assets; they often flee and become refugees, and lose opportunities to invest in the health and education of those of the younger generation.

Upon this assertion, this study views that conflict resolution and development are virtually inseparable in the scheme of human affairs for effective national development and the prevention of social conflict in a country like the DRC. Sorokin, cited in Rummel (1993: 592), pointed out that conflict is part of the process of change in human relationships. When it is understood, it is easier to find ways to predict, prevent, transform, and resolve destructive forms of it. Thus, the desire to eradicate, manage and solve conflict is the hope for harmony and universal cooperation for lasting peace and sustainable development in the DRC.


### 1. 12. 2. Conflict Resolution and Development

The DRC is a country in Africa which is experiencing conflict and it is also a country in which serious conflict resolution has previously been, and continues to be, carried out. However, conflict is still affecting the country's development. The conflicts have resulted in massive disruption of the social, political and economic fabric of the country (Mial et al, 2005: 57). These conflicts are made worse by the lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms.

Mial et al. (2005: 15) point out that conflict resolution is concerned with addressing the fundamental causes of conflict and aims to produce solutions which are mutually acceptable to all parties. Conflict resolution, indeed, denotes an attempt to bring an end to conflict and promote development. This should in fact be the aim of conflict resolution in the DRC. The failure of conflict resolution affects development in the country. In line with the above, it could be reasoned that the DRC's adoption of the agreements signed in Sun City (South Africa), Pretoria, and Lusaka (Zambia) in 2002 and the election held in 2006 was not to manage conflict and stop

it. Despite these advances, the situation remains extremely volatile in the DRC (Bassey, 2003: 157).

Unfortunately, the ideological commitment to solve conflict and promote development in the DRC is lacking. This is because the main cause of conflict is ill-defined in conflict resolution mechanisms. Rabie (1994: 18) postulates that these conflicts in Africa are rarely resolved because their underlying causes are ill defined and too narrowly conceived. He further argues that we live in a world in which conflict is rarely understood and often mismanaged. This finds expression in the works of scholars of conflict and development theory such as Mwajiru (2001: 5-15) who argued that the lack of effective mechanisms to manage and resolve conflict have a negative consequence on development. Bassey (2003: 157) argues that social conflict generates division, reverses economic progress, impedes development and frequently results in human rights violations.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Much has been said about conflict resolution in the DRC as a means to resolve conflict and promote development. The DRC's conflict resolution should, however, be a departure towards a 'true development'. In this case, development refers to a state of human well-being or the actual process of changing or making progress towards some sort of expansion, improvement and completeness in terms of economic productivity, social well-being, quality of life, and political structure (Przeworski et al., 2000: 17). A true development system allows the country to have good social well-being, quality of life, access to its resources; a good relationship and good manner of manage and resolve conflict. In other words, development should provide an opportunity for people to freely live together and ensure fair treatment. Przeworski et al (2000: 1-3) further argue that development is articulated as an increase in growth, in income, productivity,

consumption, investment, education, life expectancy, employment opportunity, childbirth survival and similar indicators. Mwajiru (2001: 10) argues that conflict resolution in the DRC has never been properly implemented for development to be promoted. To date, the DRC's government seems unwilling to take meaningful action towards resolving and confronting the negative impact of conflict on development. A change, optimistically dubbed 'process of democratization,' has made social conflict more acute and thus destroyed the mechanisms that have regulated the country in the past.



The truth is that there will always be conflict in a country wealthy in natural resources, like the DRC, but when the conflicts are managed and resolved in a peaceful and sustainable manner they may be regarded as dynamic forces which help to propel the development of the country. Therefore, one way of tackling conflict is by adopting a political culture that makes adequate provision for all the interests and groups in a given society, as experienced in the West and North (developed States). To achieve development goals in the DRC, true conflict resolution should be implemented and must help to ameliorate discrimination and promote political and socio-economic development in the country.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **1.13. Limitations of the Study**

The study has limitations in terms of the methodology adopted. Since the study relied on limited sources, there exists a possibility that the evidence under consideration may not provide critical insight. This is because it may have been fraught with some bias and thus led to conclusions that do not provide accurate information related to the conflict in the DRC today. For instance, because of the negative impact of conflict on development in the DRC, the Congolese may

themselves have experienced some limitations. They are victims of oppression and thus emotions rather than objectivity could somehow guide their work; hence, the misrepresentation of fact is possible. Similarly, evidence from the international community may not be completely reliable. The methodology thus required ample time in order to gather adequate and accurate information and cross check this information. One had to evaluate the authenticity of available evidence which requires more time. However, this may not be possible because of time constraints and limited financial resources. In spite of the above limitations, the study will attempt to find the reason that explains the continued conflict in the DRC. To overcome some of these limitations, the researcher will corroborate the evidence gathered so as to prevent the incorrect information from being included in the data base.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

**1. 14. Democratic Republic of Congo: Historical Background (Background note: DRC,  
October 8, 2010)**




Source: Republic of the Congo – Satellite Image. <http://www.google.com/imagres?imgurl>

### 1. 14. 1. Geography

The DRC includes the greater part of the Congo River basin, which covers an area of 1 million square kilometers. The country's outlet to the Atlantic Ocean is a narrow strip of land on the north of the Congo River.

The vast, low-lying central area is a basin-shaped plateau sloping towards the west and covered by a tropical rainforest. This area is surrounded by mountainous terraces in the West, plateaus merging into Savannas in the Southwest and dense grasslands extending beyond the Congo River in the North. High mountains are to be found in the extreme Eastern region. The DRC lies on the equator, with one-third of the country to the north and two thirds to the south. The climate is hot and humid in the river basin and cool and dry in the southern highland. In the region south of the equator, the rainy season lasts eight months from October to May, and in the north of equator from April to November. Along the equator, rainfall is fairly regular throughout the year. During the wet season, thunderstorms are often violent, but seldom last longer than a few hours. The average rainfall for the entire country is about 107 centimeters per annum.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

**1. 14. 2. Location of the DRC:** DRC is a country in central Africa, and is surrounded by Angola, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), the Central Africa Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia. DRC has an area of 2,345 m sq/km; it is the third largest country in Africa in terms of population, with regional capitals like Bandundu, Bukavu, Goma, Maniema, Kananga, Kindu, Lubumbashi, Matadi, Mbandaka, Kisangani, and Mbuji-Mayi. Kinshasa is the central capital of the DRC (MacNulty, 1999: 57).

### 1. 14. 3. People

The population of the DRC is estimated at 71,000,000 and 450 ethnic groups have been identified and named. The largest ethnic groups are Bakongo, Bangala, and Baluba. Approximately 700 local languages and dialects are spoken; the linguistic variety is bridged both by the use of French and the intermediary languages or national languages like Kikongo, Lingala, Tshiluba, and Swahili. About 70% of the population in the DRC is Christian, with 50% Catholic, 20% Protestant. Of the remainder, 10% are Kimbanguist, other sects and traditional beliefs accounts for 10%, while Islam makes up the final 10%.



Before independence, education was largely in the hands of religious groups, especially the Catholic Mission ([www.google.com/imigres?imgurl](http://www.google.com/imigres?imgurl)). The primary school system was well developed at the time of independence. However, the secondary school system was limited and higher education was almost non-existent in most regions of the DRC ([www.google.com/imigres?imgurl](http://www.google.com/imigres?imgurl)). The principal objective of the colonial power was to train low-level administrators and clerks ([www.google.com/imigres?imgurl](http://www.google.com/imigres?imgurl)). Since independence, efforts have been made to increase access to education, while secondary and higher educations have been made financially out-of-reach to many more Congolese citizens ([www.google.com/imigres?imgurl](http://www.google.com/imigres?imgurl)).

According to an estimation made in 2008 ([www.google.com/imigres?imgurl](http://www.google.com/imigres?imgurl)), 21% of the population had received no education (schooling), 46% benefited from primary school, 30% received secondary education, and 3% enjoyed a university education. At all levels of education,

females have an average education of 55%, and males greatly outnumber them with an average of 76%.

Because of conflict which leads to discrimination, the elite who are in the minority send their children abroad to be educated. As a result of violent conflicts, the mortality rate is estimated to be 94.69 out of every 1000 lives, and life expectancy is 47 to 49 years of age ([www.google.com/imgres?imgurl](http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl)). The prevailing scenario suggests that development goals cannot be achieved in the DRC due to violent conflict against the population that is supposed to promote development in the country.



#### 1. 14. 4. Government

The DRC obtained its independence from Belgium on 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1960. The DRC is a highly centralized Republic, with a large chunk of executive power residing with the president. The DRC has had numerous constitutions, constitutional amendments, and transitional constitutions since independence (MacNulty, 1999: 59). A new constitution was passed by the transitional parliament in May 2005. The DRC held a constitutional referendum on December 18-19, 2005 (MacNulty, 1999: 60). The official results indicated that 84% of the votes approved the constitution. The new constitution was promulgated on February 18, 2006 before the election was to be held.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### 1. 14. 5. Economy

The DRC possesses the third largest land area in Africa after the Sudan and Algeria (Nicholas, 2008: 12). It is rich in natural and human resources, including the second largest rain forest in the

world, fertile soils, ample rainfall, as well as considerable and varied mineral deposits. The DRC is a nation endowed with potential resources and vast wealth which would have been used to develop the country, but the country has declined dramatically because of violent conflict due to political and socio-economic discrimination. At the time of its independence in 1960, the DRC was the second most industrialized country in Africa after South Africa, it boasted of a thriving mining sector and its agriculture sector was relatively productive (Adebajo: 1999: 24). The conflicts have dramatically reduced the national output and the government revenue which would have helped to promote development in the country. Conflicts have increased external debt, and have resulted in the deaths of more than 6,000,000 people, associated with famine, disease and malnutrition, all of which affect development goals in the DRC. Foreign businesses have limited their operations due to the uncertainty brought about by conflict, while the lack of infrastructure has created a hostile environment in which to conduct business. Violent conflict has intensified its impact on development by bringing more problems like: discrimination, corruption, inflation, and the lack of transparency in government economic policy and financial operations. According to the United Nations human development report (Nicholas: 2008: 45), human development is the area most affected by conflict in the DRC today. As mentioned earlier, the economy of the DRC relies heavily on mining. But because of the change brought about by president Mobutu in 1973<sup>1</sup>; where he changed the name of the country from Congo to Zaire; he established a new economic system called Zairianization which led to the collapse of the country's economy. The new system was constituted to give all public and private sectors



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

---

<sup>1</sup> The year 1973 was the year that President Mobutu changed everything in the country, by changing the name of the country from Congo to Zaire and this is the year that the economy of the country collapsed because of the establishment of a new system called Zairianization which was to give all public services or administration to the Congolese citizen, especially those of his tribe, then began political ethnization which brought about discrimination. Because of this, the country was brought into a different mode of development management which escalated the conflict.

and their administration to the Congolese people (especially those of his tribe and political clan); this resulted in political and socio-economic discrimination which led to violent conflict that has lasted up to the present time. The economy of the DRC (which relies on mining) is supposed to promote the development goals of the country, instead it fuels conflict. The DRC produces cobalt, copper and industrial diamonds. 70% of coltan in the world is found in the DRC and more than 30% of world diamond reserves (Auty, 2001: 23). Coltan is a major source of tantalum which is used in the fabrication of electronic components in computers and mobile phones. Tin was discovered in the east of the DRC. With all this mining, strategic location, and its potential role as an economic power in central Africa, the DRC would have been developed (Nicholas, 2008: 11). However, the DRC is the poorest country in the world because of the negative impact of conflict on its development.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*


### **1. 15. Outline of the Proposed Study**

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Each chapter builds on the previous one and develops into the next.

Chapter one establishes the foundation for the entire study. This chapter serves as an introduction to the research. It is basically a proposal that entails the nature of the study, the research approaches, a background to the DRC, and an overview of the country to be studied. This chapter considers at how the study can be of value to the DRC and the academic world. The chapter also offers definitions for key terms so as to enhance comprehension. It is expected that every study has its limitation and has a specific scope and, this being no exception, the

limitations/scope of the current study are set out right in the first chapter. This chapter closes with an outline of the proposed study.

Chapter two concentrates on a critical review of the literature on conflict resolution and development. Certain reviews of written literature on conflict and development will be analyzed and discussed to comprehend how the concepts are relevant to the DRC case. A critique of a number of works on conflict and development will be offered so as to give an in-depth appreciation of the subject and to clarify the point of departure, or how this study views the concept. It is in this chapter that a link between a number of texts on the subject of conflict and development are contextualized with the aim of examining the effectiveness of conflict resolution in promoting development in the DRC. The role of the Congolese in conflict resolution is also dealt with in this section of the study.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Chapter three focuses on the research methodology. The research is devoted to the interpretation of the plan of the research. The methodological matters are outlined here. The chapter outlines the research format, data collection tools and sampling methods employed in the study. It is in this chapter that the analysis method which is used is explained. The chapter basically deals with the research techniques that make it easier to validate the work for objectivity and reliability.

Chapter four deals with the study on the Democratic Republic of Congo vis-à-vis its characteristic conflict resolution mechanisms and how conflict has been a challenge to its development. The focus will be on the analysis of conflict and development policies since the 1960s, since this is the period during which the economy of the DRC was prosperous.

Subsequently, the researcher will examine the causes for the failure of development as brought about by the conflict.

Chapter five offers an analysis of the ‘all encompassing’ approach as a possible alternative for addressing political and socio-economic discrimination and conflict resolution. It will explore ways in which discrimination and inequality can be addressed in conflict resolution in an attempt to avoid conflict and promote development in the DRC. Some strategies that can be used in conflict resolution, to prevent conflict and to sustain development in the DRC, will be suggested.




Chapter six discusses opportunities for a sustainable development policy framework. The aim of this discussion will be to develop a conflict resolution mechanism that can be applied by the DRC government in its struggle against conflict. The conclusion will follow. The major findings of this thesis will be summarized, and recommendations will be presented to the DRC government with the intention of fighting against discrimination and inequality in order to avoid violent conflict in the country and to promote development.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## **1. 16. Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the background to the conflict resolution challenges facing development in the DRC. The problem of the development gap was outlined and so were the service backlogs affecting the DRC. The chapter has presented the research objectives that the study seeks to follow. This chapter outlined the conceptual background of conflict resolution and development and has established that conflict resolution is the process by which the Congolese should implement and contribute to the political and socio-economic future of their country. It

has been argued that one of the challenges that the DRC faces, since independence, is the prevalence of conflict that is affecting its development prospects. The killing and displacement of people in this country constitute an obstacle to the advancement of development progress. Hence, in view of the effect of conflict on development, any attempt to solve these conflicts must take into account the equality of human well-being and the development of the country. Secondly, the thesis has two objectives which are to provide an historical account of the impact of conflict on development in the DRC, during the period from 1960 to 2003. The historical analysis includes an explanation of how and why the DRC conflict resolution is a challenge to development goals.



In the ensuing chapter a theoretical framework for this thesis will be provided. The framework is used to study the structure and operation of political and socio-economic institutions in the DRC and to evaluate the influence of institutional factors, within broader environmental factors related to the DRC, on policy formation in relation to the impact of conflict on development in the country. The use of institutional frameworks leads to the second aim of the thesis, which is the use of institutional theory in analysis, to provide an account of the utility of historical institutionalism in the case study. The chapter will be contextual in the sense that it provides as a context for the study specific literature regarding the setting of the study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### Review of Related Literature on Conflict Resolution and Development

*'African conflicts have many domestic or regional causes, in particular the problems of racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious cleavages and stratification, combined with gross inequalities or discrimination in the distribution of power, wealth, and other resources that render conformity or acquiescence to the status quo untenable; aspects involving the means, whether in weapons or the financial ability to procure them, are usually external'* (Francis, M. Deng and William, Z, 1991).



#### 2. 1. Introduction

### University of Fort Hare


*Together in Excellence*

The first chapter of this study was designed to give an introductory overview of conflict and development analysis. It was argued that conflict is characteristic of human existence, that humans are inclined to violent conflict, and that when conflict is understood, it is easier to find ways to anticipate, prevent, transform and resolve it, for development to occur.

The inquiry in this chapter is informed by the hypothesis that conflict resolution models are potentially useful for the promotion of development in African countries generally and in the DRC in particular. This chapter will present the different theoretical frameworks to be assessed for their relevance towards a possible resolution of conflict for the promotion of development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

## 2. 2. Literature Review

For the purpose of general orientation and background, the study is made up of relevant literature on conflict and development, with an emphasis on the struggle against discrimination and inequality, which affects development in the DRC. The use of a literature review will be helpful in carrying out the study. Creswell (1994: 21) argues that the literature used in research accomplishes several purposes. Firstly, is that it shares the results of other studies that are closely related to the study being reported; secondly, it relates a study to the larger dialogue in the literature about the topic, thus filling in gaps and extending prior studies; and thirdly, it provides a framework for establishing the importance of the study, as well as a benchmark for comparing the results of the study with other findings.



## 2. 3. Theoretical Framework

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


This section provides a comprehensive review of the theoretical framework used in the thesis: conflict and development theories will be useful in this thesis, as well as institutional theory. The section commences with a discussion of the evolution of institutional theory and its primary characteristics. It also discusses conflict and development theory, the methodological tools typically associated with each of them, and their strengths and weaknesses. A detailed analysis of the framework of historical institutionalism, as used in the thesis, follows with the provision of an outline of its features, benefits and limitations.

The term 'theory' has several potential meanings. Those suggested by Gernon and Olusegun Wallace (1995: 57) include an explanatory system in which propositions are set forth, a taxonomy or classificatory scheme or a conceptual framework which provides for the orderly

arrangement and examination of data. Carnegie and Napier (1996: 13) argue that the choice of theoretical perspective in historical research is not prescriptive. They write that:


*'if a researcher believes that a particular theory helps to explain the phenomena under discussion, then there appears to be no a priori reason for excluding that theory from being applied'.*

For the purpose of this thesis, reference to the theoretical framework relates to a conceptual framework that facilitates the analysis of significant historic similarities and differences that are found in relation to the DRC conflict resolution as a challenge to development. A number of factors have been considered in the selection of the theoretical framework for this thesis. A variety of theoretical frameworks have the potential to provide insight into the DRC as a case study of the challenges posed to conflict resolution and development. These approaches include: the main theoretical concepts such as the general theories of conflict and development which entails infra-theories such as modernization, dependency, liberalism, neo-liberalism, structuralism, human needs theory, and psycho-cultural theories, among others, that place significant emphasis on development failure or crisis in Africa and on the importance of solving conflict in a peaceful manner so as to promote development. This way of understanding the theories has punctuated development thinking in the context of the DRC, dating back to the period after 1945 and the Second World War which marked the beginning of a new phase in development and has been upheld as the guiding pillar to the future of nations. The period following the war was a time for reflection, re-evaluation and reconstruction. It generated a new awareness that conflict must not be a permanent feature of societies, especially not so much so that it affects development goals.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

While each of these approaches has strengths and limitations, institutional theory is believed to offer the greatest potential for the analysis of the challenge of conflict to development goals. This argument stems from the belief that any political theory of conflict must consider the policy process and policy makers, i.e. politicians and bureaucrats (Hansen 1983:25). Furthermore, Steinmo (1993:10) claims that political leadership and the structure of national political institutions are key factors in the change of countries policy. Accordingly, institutional theory, which originated in the field of political science, has been utilized as the theoretical framework for the analysis undertaken in this thesis. Institutional theory is used in the thesis to study the structure and operation of political and social institutions in the DRC, and to assess the influence of institutional factors on policy formation in the country.



### 2. 3. 1. Institutional Theories


## University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

Institutional theory is widely employed in disciplines ranging from history and sociology, through to economics and political science. In its simplest form, institutional theory may be thought of as a focus on the effects of institutions on political outcomes, such as policy formation.

A wide range of definitions exists for what institutional theory encompasses and what can be classified as an 'institution'. Institutional theory follows '*distinctive forms, processes, strategies, outlooks, and competencies as they emerge from patterns of organizational interaction and adaptation*' (Selznick 1996:2). Selznick suggests that it is necessary to understand these patterns to explain environmental responses. Meanwhile, Thelen and Steinmo (1992:2) write that institutional theory covers '*the whole range of State and societal institutions that shape how*

*political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups*'. Alternatively, the theory may include features of institutions such as relations among government departments or the structure and organization of interested groups such as ethnic groups. Ultimately, the boundaries and definitions accepted will depend on *'the theoretical question of interest, the time scale posited and the pragmatics of a research project'* (Crawford 1995:582).

  
'Institutions' may adopt a number of forms including formal government structures, legal institutions or social institutions. Social institutions are common in all societies, and exist to manage the *'basic universal problems of ordered social life'* (Sills 1968:409). North (1990:3) argues that institutions are *'the rules of the game of society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'*. A further important concept within institutional theory is the claim that *'institutions define individual, group and societal identities, what it means to belong to a specific collective'* (March and Olsen 1989:17). Accordingly, institutions may be thought of as influencing the identity of society and a necessary feature to investigate in order to help explain historical change.

Hall's (1986:19) definition of the concept of institutions is frequently cited, and often claimed as the most comprehensive definition: *'the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy'*. While Hall's definition is widely accepted, it has been criticized for being so broad as to leaving nothing out (Steinmo 1993:12). Steinmo argues that such a wide definition dilutes the concept and *'undermines its analytic utility'* (Steinmo 1993:12). For the purposes of

this thesis a mid-range definition is adopted, which includes both formal and informal organizations, necessarily extending to institutional rules. In part, this is in acceptance that research using historical institutionalism frequently adopts a broad view.

Institutional theory does not claim that political institutions are neutral (Bulmer 1998:369; Steinmo 1993:7). Institutions influence policy making, privileging some interests and directing influence in certain directions. While it is not suggested that institutions are the primary explanatory variable in politics, they do form a context from which political events evolve. Therefore, the institutional structures within any country will influence the policy initiatives undertaken by politicians and bureaucrats (Skocpol 1992: 527). The reasons for this range from individual career interests, through to political motives or intent to gain support of interest groups. Bureaucrats may also be important to the extent that policy development arises from a problem solving process, which bureaucrats may have significant responsibility for or over which they have influence. It is necessary to take into account the behaviours of politicians and bureaucrats in the policy process as both elected and appointed officials are *'not merely agents of other social interests, they are actors in their own right, enabled and constrained by the political organizations within which they operate'* (Skocpol 1992: 41).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Skocpol (1992:41) claims that *'States are authoritative and resourceful organizations ... they are sites of autonomous action, not reducible to the demands or preferences of any social group'*. Accordingly, both politicians and bureaucrats will have ideas and interests of their own, and they will *'devise and work for policies that will further those ideas and interests, or at least not harm them'*. Skocpol further claims that political leaders are likely to adopt policy initiatives that will

be advantageous to them in their political struggles. Accordingly, the thesis incorporates the role that politicians and bureaucrats play in the policy development process of the DRC.

A key point in institutional theory is that institutions themselves do not determine behaviour, instead they provide a context that assists in understanding why actors make the choices that they do (Immergut 1998: 31). Institutional constraints encourage or discourage certain types of decision making processes that then impact on the capability of governments to make strategic policy choices (Weaver and Rockman 1993: 9). Furthermore, institutions influence outcomes from the policy making process, through the determination of constraints and rules. Therefore, the adoption of an institutionalist focus involves taking into account the way that interests and ideas within an institutional context shape and determine the conduct of policy making and policy makers (Parsons 1995: 933).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

A frequently cited example of such a constraint is the presence of ‘veto points’. Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 6) define veto points as areas of institutional vulnerability in the policy process. Examples of these are as instances in which opposition or influence groups can frustrate the policy outcome. Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 6) claim that these veto points vary between countries and are dependent on how different parts of the policy making process are linked; for example, they may be incurred in intermediate institutions that shape political strategies or they may be seen in the ways in which institutions structure power relations among influence groups. Furthermore, internal institutional processes affect the distribution of power within the institution itself (March and Olsen 1989: 17; Thelen 1999: 384). Thelen (1999: 394) writes that: *institutions are not neutral coordinating mechanisms but in fact reflect, and also reproduce and magnify,*

*particular patterns of power distribution in politics ... political arrangements and policy feedbacks actively facilitate the organization and empowerment of certain groups while actively disarticulating and marginalizing others.*

Hall (1992: 108) discusses the struggle for power and resources that exists among various social groups, which can influence policy formation. Hall claims that this struggle is often mediated by political and economic institutions, which influence the direction that the policy takes. Furthermore, the ability of political and economic institutions to treat some groups with preference over others results in an ability to influence policy formation. Institutional theorists (e.g. Hall, 1986; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992) argue that institutional factors can influence policy outcomes in two ways. Firstly, the institutional structure of policy making can affect the degree of power that an actor, or group of actors, will have in policy formation. Secondly, an institutional position affects the interests of the individual actor, by establishing institutional responsibilities and relationships with other actors. Thus, institutional factors affect both the level of influence an actor may have on policy formation and the likely form that this influence will take (Hall 1986: 19).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Pierson (1994: 40) continues this debate when he proposes that '*if interest groups shape policies, policies also shape interest groups*'. Pierson claims that policies provide incentives and resources that may act to facilitate or restrict the formation or expansion of particular interest groups. In addition, Skocpol (1992: 527) argues that the institutional arrangements within a State affect the groups within society that become involved in politics and policy development. Skocpol claims that the relative degree of success achieved relates to the fit between government

institutions and the goals and organizational capacities of interest groups which seek to influence policy making. Interest group activity often follows the implementation of a particular public policy, rather than occurring prior to adoption (Pierson 1993: 598). Accordingly, the timing of such activity may relate to the incentives that either facilitate or restrict the activities of interest groups. These dynamics are clearly seen in the evolution and influence of different interest groups in the DRC.

Institutions do more than just communicate the preferences of particular interest groups; rather they collect and ultimately change them (Hall 1986: 232). Immergut (1998: 7) similarly writes that *'depending on how individual wills are pooled for collective decisions, the final results may reflect the common good, or they may be distorted'*. According to Hall (1986), the resulting policy may not be representative of conflicts, as institutions effectively dilute these struggles. However, institutions are ultimately shaped by the historic struggles that have helped form their ultimate shape and direction. Similarly, ideological appeals can act to bind individuals to an organization (Hall 1986: 272), with many politicians and bureaucrats building policy on ideas with which they are already familiar.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **2.3.1.1. The Evolution of Institutional Theory**

Institutional theory has evolved from an initial focus on the political practices of a State to include a greater focus on behavioural elements. Around the time of the Second World War an institutional approach was the most frequently used framework for the analysis of political or policy environment (Apter 1996: 374). However, from the late 1950s onwards, the focus moved

from the use of the State for analysis to increased attention on behaviour. This created a move towards an understanding of a positive, rather than a normative, view of individual behaviour.

Institutional theories have changed significantly over the past 40 years, in the wake of criticisms attached to original institutional theories. These criticisms include the proposition that they were limited in terms of both scope and method, and had a restricted understanding of the subject matter. Peters (1999: 3) describes 'old institutionalism' as, among other things, normative, structuralist, historicist (concerned with how contemporary political systems were embedded in their historical development), and legalist (concerned with law and the central role of law in governing).



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*


The field of institutional theory is now defined by two main approaches: 'new institutionalism' and 'old institutionalism'. The approach of old institutionalism was to consider how the nature of governing institutions could structure the behaviour of individuals towards a better end (Peters 1999: 3). Old institutionalism consisted of '*detailed configurative studies of different administrative, legal, and political structures*' (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:3). The rationale supporting old institutionalism was that the irrational nature of individual behaviour required political institutions to be formed in order to achieve a collective purpose. Old institutionalism was normative in nature, concerned with how behaviour was determined by structure, and focused on the central role of law in governance (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 3). However, old institutionalism did not encourage the development of concepts that would facilitate historical research and advance explanatory theory.

In contrast, 'new institutionalism' emerged in response, with a wider definition of the subject matter and more diverse theoretical frameworks. New institutionalism has emerged as one of the most prominent research agendas in the field of historical politics, political economy and public policy (Steinmo and Tolbert 1998: 1). The forms of institutional theory that are widely used today are concerned with the role of institutions within society, as well as less formal institutional networks in the formation of policy (Hall 1986: 20).

### 2.3.1.2. New institutionalism

In the 1950s and early 1960s old institutionalism became increasingly marginalized, with the suggestion that formal laws, rules and structures did not explain actual behaviour or policy outcomes. With the emergence of the 'new institutional' approach, it was argued that analysis should focus on the informal distribution of power, attitudes and political behaviour (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 3). The emphasis on observable behaviour became the focus of the behavioural approach and is the point of departure for new institutionalism (Immergut 1998:1; Selznick 1996: 2). New institutionalists do not believe that behaviour is a sufficient basis for explaining the processes and outcomes of government. The foundation of this belief is that behaviour occurs within the setting of institutions and, accordingly, can only be understood through analysis of the institutional influence.


The phrase 'new institutionalism' was coined by March and Olsen (1984) and has been particularly associated with political economy research (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:1). New institutionalism argues that preferences and meanings develop in politics, and indeed all disciplines, through a combination of '*education, indoctrination, and experience*' (March and



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Olsen 1984: 738). Accordingly, preferences should not be considered as relating entirely to external causes and should also be expected to change.

The concept of explaining change through new institutional theory (hereafter referred to as 'institutional theory') starts from the premise that institutions identify and adapt to changing circumstances in their environment through a process of learning (Peters 1999: 33). Threats and opportunities to established behaviour or policy occur from changes in the environment. This contrasts with the old institutional approach, which claims a highly focused reform process, while the new institutionalist approach indicates an almost random nature of change. From this perspective, public institutions can misinterpret the signals from society and accordingly respond in dysfunctional ways (Peters 1999: 33). However, under the new institutionalist model of change, institutions will have multiple opportunities to adjust their behaviour.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

There are a number of variants of new institutionalism, all with different research approaches, but all aiming to explain the role that institutions play in determining social outcomes. Conventionally, these are categorized into three institutionalisms: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism, with roots in the disciplines of economics, sociology and political science, respectively. Despite the different social science origins, the three variations on new institutional themes are essentially complementary and a number of similarities exist between the three approaches, including:

- recognition of the importance of intentions for explaining action (Torfing 2001: 281);

- concern with the difficulties of ascertaining what individuals want and when the preferences expressed in politics and policy are influenced by the institutional contexts in which the preferences are detailed (Immergut 1998: 30);
- the perspective that preferences and identities are influenced by institutions; and
- A central focus on how institutions affect the behaviour of individuals.

### 2.3.1.3. Rational choice institutionalism

The rational choice approach replaced the behavioural approach that dominated from the 1950s to the 1970s. Rational choice institutionalism primarily researches formal institutions, which are viewed as constraining the behaviour of actors. Institutions are seen to hold the solutions to collective action and coordination problems. While maintaining its focus on social and political action, the rational choice approach was aimed at explaining these actions (Torfing 2001: 281). The rational choice approach argues that self-interested actors will make decisions and create institutions that will reduce political or economic costs relative to the benefits gained (Campbell 1997: 15).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Rational choice institutionalists isolate the issue of preference formation theoretically, through the assumption that political actors are rational and will act to maximize their self-interests. Criticisms attached to the rational choice approach include that it does not allow for the changing nature of preferences and that its treatment of social institutions does not take into account the fact that institutions reflect the cumulative experience of a community (Knight 1992: 17). Further criticisms include a lack of focus on power relationships, the inability to explain sub-optimal decision making and difficulty in addressing issues at the macro-level (Pierson and Skocpol

2000: 11). In addition, rational choice institutionalism has been accused of producing elegant theories, while generating little to explain real observed events (Thelen 1999: 372).

#### 2.3.1.4. Sociological institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism, also known as ‘organization theory’ or ‘sociological constructivist institutionalism,’ includes organizational analysis as well as various forms of discourse theory (Torfing 2001: 282). Sociological institutionalism is a response to behaviouralism, which focuses on explaining behaviours in an objective, quantified manner. Instead, sociological institutionalism starts with society and the view that institutions are collective outcomes, not the sum of individual interests (Thelen 1999: 386). This perspective is ontologically grounded in constructivism, as institutions are viewed as socially constructed. Sociological institutionalism adopts a broad definition of institutions and argues that inherent limits of knowledge restrict rational decision making. As a result, institutional rules, processes or standard operating procedures allow individuals to make decisions. Accordingly, within sociological institutionalism, behaviour does not express individual preference; instead it is the result of *‘various coping devices that individuals adopt to overcome their cognitive limits’* (Immergut 1998: 15).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

As found by Steinmo (2008: 163) individuals are not viewed as self-interested, as in rational choice institutionalism, but are more likely to follow a *‘logic of appropriateness’*. In this branch of institutional theory, institutions influence how individuals view the world and how they act within it.

### 2.3.1.5. Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is known for drawing on the work of Marx and Weber. However, within historical institutionalism there can also be found political theorists and sociological historians (Torfing 2001: 282). In contrast to the rational choice and organizational theory approaches, historical institutionalists adopt a focus on the '*relations between politics, State and society in various countries and historical periods*' (Immergut 1998: 18).

Historical institutionalists find the strict rationality assumptions in the rational choice approach confining (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 7). The historical institutionalist approach typically investigates relations between institutions and how these shape the outcomes of interests (Pierson and Skocpol 2000: 15), rather than focusing on a single institution, as is frequently the case in the rational choice approach. In addition, historical institutionalism goes further than the rational choice approach in explaining the historical impact of policies and institutions on future policy development (Torfing 2001: 296); it is also more likely to focus on a small number of cases that have some commonality (Thelen 1999: 373). Accordingly, historical institutionalism is relevant to the methodological approach of the thesis.

However, the thesis uses the 'historical approach' as a theoretical framework. Over the past 50 years, historical institutionalism has become one of the most influential theoretical perspectives in social policy research (Beland, 2005: 1). Historical institutionalists view the institutional organization of the political economy as the '*principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive outcomes*' (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937). Beland (2005: 3) defines historical institutionalism as: *Grounded in the assumption that political institutions and*

*previously enacted public policies structure the political behaviour of bureaucrats, elected officials and interest groups during the policy-making process. This approach views the polity as the primary locus for action, yet understands political activities, whether carried by politicians or by social groups, as conditioned by institutional configurations of governments and political party systems. Political institutions create constraints and opportunities for those involved in policy-making.*

Pierson and Skocpol (2000: 3) argue that there are three important features that characterize historical institutionalism:




1. historical institutionalists *'address big substantive questions that are inherently of interest to broad publics as well as to professional scholars'*;
2. historical institutionalists *'take time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality'*; and
3. Historical institutionalists *'analyze macro contexts and hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes'*, rather than examining just one institution or process in isolation.

University of Fort Hare  
Together in Excellence

A further characteristic of historical institutionalism relates to the claim that motivations of actors are institutionally determined (Campbell 1997: 21). Thus, research using historical institutionalism will frequently investigate how institutional factors shape preferences and interests, which in turn impacts on the distribution of power and the direction adopted by political actors. Historical institutionalism allows for individuals to have motivations that are not always self-interested, which is a significant departure from the rational choice approach (Campbell 1997: 22).

A feature of historical institutionalism is the claim that institutions influence how groups define their political interest. Rothstein (1996: 146) argues that most approaches agree that institutions influence actors' strategies; he writes that *'this is obvious from the fact that institutions determine: (a) Who are the legitimate actors; (b) the number of actors; (c) the ordering of action; and to a large extent (d) what information actors will have about each other's intentions'*. Hall and Taylor (1996: 939) suggest that institutions provide 'templates' for how the world is interpreted:

*The individual is seen as an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed. Not only do institutions provide strategically useful information, they also affect identity, self-images and preferences of the actors.*



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

As with broader institutional theory, an important concept within historical institutionalism is that institutions may constrain politics, but they are never the sole 'cause' of outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 3). Historical institutionalism does not claim that institutional constraints are the only influence on policy outcomes, and is open to the myriad of other variables that play a part in policy formation. Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16) identify four potential sources of 'institutional dynamism', meaning situations where observed variability in the impact of institutions over time, but within countries, can be seen. These are:

1. broad changes in the socio-economic or political context;
2. changes in the political balance of power;
3. a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions; and

4. When political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institutions themselves.

The openness to these variables as found within historical institutionalism increases the potential for a rich, informative outcome to the complexity of political situations as a result of research adopting a historical institutional approach. Of particular relevance to the thesis is the influence of institutions on individual preferences, together with the dimension of power. A number of features are typically linked to historical institutionalism.



#### 2.3.1.6. Benefits of institutional theory

Hall and Taylor (1996: 949) claim that all institutionalist views advance our understanding of the political world, with each having strengths and weaknesses, and providing different insights. The importance of institutions, when considering when and how institutions influence policy formation, is widely claimed (e.g. Weaver and Rockman 1993: 40). The approach is widely used in politics with frequent observations about institutions, how they vary in a country and how they cluster into institutional patterns.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

A number of claims from well-known researchers point to the benefit and applicability of institutional theory to the topic of the thesis; for example, Peters (1999: 73) claims that the historical institutionalist approach has an explicit purpose to deal with the demands of differences across different political systems. Furthermore, Eccleston (2004: 15) argues that a potentially insightful approach to explaining differences in conflict policy has been to '*explore the institutional determinants of State capacity*'.

Hall (1986: 232) highlights a number of factors that emphasize the importance of institutional theory. Firstly, policy is typically formed in response to pressure from interest groups, but the level of influence and force with which the interests are demonstrated is reliant on the structures of the institution from which they arise. Secondly, the interests of individual actors will be influenced by the organization of the institutional structures from within which they operate. Thirdly, as policy making is typically a collective exercise, the outcome is not the product of individuals, but rather of institutions that reflect the influence of a number of individuals.

### 2.3.1.7. Limitations of institutional theory

Despite the apparent acceptance of the application and utility of new institutional theory in relation to historical studies, a number of criticisms have been propounded against the framework; for example, Peters (1999: 33) argues that the new institutionalist perspective does not effectively explain the development of institutions, claiming that to provide a useful alternative to the more individualistic explanations of political life, a theory must be able to say how institutions came into being. Furthermore, Peters claims that the outcomes seen may be the *'result of normal incremental patterns of policy-making found in most industrialized democracies, rather than an explicit influence of institutions over those policies'* (Peters 1999: 64). This is not perceived to be a significant issue as this thesis is not primarily concerned with the development of institutions *per se*. Rather; the focus is on how institutional arrangements have resulted in different policy solutions to common policy problems in the DRC.


It has been suggested that institutional frameworks may explain policy outcomes during periods of stability and instability, but they may not be as effective in explaining periods of change.

Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 15) pursue the difficulty that institutional theory has in explaining change when they propose that *'the problem with this model is that institutions explain everything until they explain nothing'*. The point made by Thelen and Steinmo is that at the moment of institutional breakdown, the 'logic' of the institutional argument moves from 'institutions shape politics' to 'politics shape institutions'. This different conception of the relationship then serves to *'obscure the dynamic interaction of political strategies and institutional constraints'* (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 15). Thelen and Steinmo argue that a more dynamic model is required to capture the interplay between the two variables over time.



As outlined above, it is not possible to claim that institutions are the only influence on policy outcomes, although many writers argue that institutional factors have a significant impact on state capacity and political outcomes (e.g. Eccleston 2004: 19). Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze the significance of institutional variables in conjunction with other factors that are generally regarded as influencing the policy making process, such as conflict and economic conditions, international political systems and policy paradigms (Eccleston 2004: 24). Along with the consideration of domestic political structures, this thesis will take into account other influencing variables, such as the prevailing economic or social factors that are likely to have played a part in the outcome of policy formation at particular junctures. The use of an institutional framework does not restrict this analysis; rather, it facilitates the task. Indeed, Skocpol (1985: 7) claims that the State should not be expected to explain everything; other organizations also form social relationships and impact on political arrangements and, accordingly, a comprehensive analysis must explore activities that interact with the State.

A problem with an institutionalist analysis is that institutions are treated as static variables (Steinmo 1993: 12). Steinmo suggests that institutional approaches are better at explaining what is not possible in a given institutional context than what is possible. The primary criticism is that historical institutional analysis tends to focus on *'historical statics'* and investigating how policy outcomes are different in a country because of their stable institutional configurations and constraints. Steinmo claims the issue may be avoided through the adoption of a historical account of the effect of conflict on development policy outcomes and the political institutions that implement conflict resolution. Steinmo (1993:12) argues that *understanding the ways in which domestic political institutions shape policy choices goes a long way toward helping us understand why, given certain choices, one country takes one path and another country takes another. But looking at these political institutions rarely tells us why these choices were available or necessary in the country in the first place.*



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


The issues raised by Steinmo are mitigated, to an extent, by the use of a 50 year time period, which allows social, political and economic environmental conflict to be considered, together with the policy changes that are impeded by conflict In the DRC. In addition, the use of archival research methods in conjunction with institutional theory is aimed at allowing the background of these choices to be made transparent.

### 2.3.1.8. Timing

Historical institutionalism views institutions as the *'legacy of concrete historical processes'*, thereby allowing questions of temporality into the analysis (Thelen 1999: 382). The importance of timing is highlighted by a number of researchers (e.g. Hecllo 1974; Peters 1991). Modern

social policy is the end result of a complex set of historical changes. To appreciate the cumulative effect of institutions on social policy it is necessary to investigate historical processes over time, rather than investigating events in isolation (Heclo 1974: 14).

Pierson and Skocpol (2000: 5) argue that a particular characteristic of historical institutionalism is its stance in relation to history, claiming that the approach does not just consider the past; but that it looks at processes over time. This investigation of processes over time allows for a wider range of experiences to be considered. The benefit of this approach stems from the relatively infrequent and often slow-moving occurrence of some significant policy changes. Thus, it becomes necessary to investigate a long period of time to encompass all the influencing effects that may contribute to a particular policy output.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*


When examining the effect of conflict on development in the DRC, it is important to be aware of *'the temporal as well as the ideological dimension of political actions'* (Peters 1991:11). Therefore, the thesis incorporates a 50 year period to capture any issues that may be more effectively explained with a broader temporal perspective.

### **2.3.1.9. Historical process**

The historical approach places a greater emphasis on historical process, rather than the equilibrium found in rational choice institutionalism (Thelen, 1999: 384). Historical institutionalists argue that as institutions shape strategies and goals, they in turn structure political situations and influence political outcomes. This allows insight into *'intermediate'* variables that may help to explain the contingent nature of policy development. Immergut (1998:

20) develops this notion by suggesting that *our understanding of particular events and developments is constrained by the large role played by chance. Quirks of fate are responsible for accidental combinations of factors that may nevertheless have lasting effects (Thelen, 1999: 386). In addition, self-conscious political actors ... can divert the supposedly ineluctable march of progress onto unexpected paths. Such contingent developments stand beyond logic and can only be grasped through historical analysis.*

Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985:348) continue the discussion on historical process when they argue that a historical approach is necessary when considering institutions, as nation States share the features of historical persistence and continuity, which is typically attributed to historical research. Generally, the structure of an organization and the relationship of that organization to interest groups often endure through major crises and attempted reorganization.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Researchers using an historical institutionalist approach tend to ask questions about historically situated outcomes of broad interest (Pierson and Skocpol 2000:4). Moreover, researchers using the historical institutionalist perspective often ask why an event occurred, or did not occur, and why '*certain structures or patterns take shape in some times and places but not others*' (Pierson and Skocpol 2000:4). This thesis addresses both of these concepts and fits within Pierson and Skocpol's claim that the focus of historical institutionalism is on explaining variations in important or surprising patterns or events, with the problems often stemming from previously unexplained variations in real-world situations.

### 2.3.1.10. Power relations

The feature of historical institutionalism is the prominent role that the power relations play in analyses adopting the approach (Hall and Taylor 1996:940). Hall and Taylor argue that historical institutionalism has been particularly focused on the way in which institutions distribute power unevenly across groups. They propose that *Rather than posit scenarios of freely-contracting individuals, for instance, they are more likely to assume a world in which institutions give some groups or interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process; and, rather than emphasize the degree to which an outcome makes everyone better off, they tend to stress how some groups lose while others win.*



Immergut (1998:22) uses the example of how institutions and government policies may facilitate the organization of interests by recognizing particular interest groups or recognizing the legitimacy of particular claims. This argument stems from the belief that public policy is not influenced by the '*neutral and convergent exigencies of modernization*' (Immergut 1998:18). As institutional factors impact on political and policy making processes, the result is that some interests will be privileged at the expense of others.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

A further point is raised by Skocpol (1992:531) who claims that policies can reshape institutions, thus making some future developments more likely, and limiting the potential of others. This may result from historical patterns of resource allocation.


Power is an important dimension in this thesis. The investigation of historical process indicates that power distribution among central actors and interest groups in the DRC was a significant

contributing factor to the policy decision making of the time period investigated. This approach to power relations brings us to the next approach which is the theory of conflict resolution and development.

## **2. 3. 2. Theories of Conflict Resolution and Development Crises**

### **2. 3. 2. 1. Conflict Resolution Theory**

Processes of conflict resolution, in Africa, are characterized by three dimensions which include the nature of conflicts, conflict resolution mechanisms and the outcome of such mechanisms. In understanding the nature of conflicts one first needs to identify various types of conflicts. Because conflict is now an important issue in development, it retards development; conversely, development also retards conflict. This double-edged sword gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles. Where development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from violent conflict, making subsequent development easier. Where development fails, countries are at risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war. This is why it is important for conflict to be identified. There have been different ways of identifying types of conflicts. One way is in terms of complexity. Mwajiru (2001: 7) observes that in Africa there are simple and complex types of conflicts. Most of the conflicts have been and continue to be complex. In this type of conflict people are concerned with their protection instead of thinking about the development of the country. The second way is in terms of duration. In this context there are short-lived and protracted conflicts. Protracted conflicts are the most common in most countries in Africa which delay the development goals which are to be fulfilled. Wars of liberation in Southern Africa were protracted conflicts. Civil wars that came after independence in Mozambique and Angola were also protracted; development goals were



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

impeded and people lived in absolute poverty. This is also true of civil wars in Sudan and Somalia. The Rift Valley conflicts in Kenya in 1991/92 and again in 1997 constitute examples of short-lived conflicts. The third way, according to Mwajiru, is in terms of violence. There are conflicts which are violent and those which are non-violent. In a violent conflict, the development process of the country is always prolonged, while refugees stream across borders carrying and spreading the infections to which they have been exposed; for example, for every 1,000 international refugees the host country sees around 1,400 additional cases of malaria. In violent conflict the economy of the country also suffers in other ways: growth rates are significantly reduced and military expenditure is increased in a chain reaction to the conflict. Some people have characterized non-violent conflicts as latent or structured conflicts (Mwajiru, 2001: 10).



## University of Fort Hare


*Together in Excellence*

However, most conflicts which have been the object of critical study and which have drawn greater attention are violent conflicts which have involved bloodshed and which impede development goals, as has been argued above. Although most conflict resolution measures have been taken in relation to violent conflicts, there have also been situations when conflict resolution measures have been made in relation to latent conflicts. For example, the latent conflict between the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF) in Zanzibar from 1995 to 1999 gave rise to a process of peace negotiations under the auspices of the then Commonwealth Secretary General Chief Emeka Anyaoku (Mpangala, 2000). The fourth way of identifying types of conflict is in terms of the scale of the conflict. In this context, conflicts in Africa have been categorized into internal, interstate and internationalized conflicts. Purely internal conflicts are said to be few in Africa. There have been a good number of

interstate conflicts such as wars between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978/79, Ethiopia and Somalia and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Internationalized conflicts are the most common. These are conflicts which, in one way or another, involve other countries or affect neighbouring countries such as the influx of refugees from Rwanda in 1994, and their implications for development goals in the DRC.


Given this conception, most conflicts in Africa have been or are internationalized conflicts. The fifth way is in terms of the necessity or legitimacy of conflicts. While some conflicts are regarded as necessary and legitimate, others are unnecessary and illegitimate. Sekou Toure classified conflicts as either legitimate or illegitimate (Nyirenda, 2000). Legitimate conflicts, as it has been argued in chapter one, are mainly associated with struggles for liberation from an oppressive and exploitative regime. The objective is to liberate the whole society from such domination, oppression and exploitation. The first stage when such conflicts took place in Africa was during struggles for national independence from colonialism. Colonized people, who could not achieve independence through peaceful means, had to resort to armed struggle (Nyerere, 1974: 51). In his speech to the University of Toronto, Canada, in October 1969, the late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, emphasized the fact that, although the principle was to struggle for independence through peaceful means, under situations whereby peaceful means were not possible the use of violence became inevitable (Nyerere, 1974: 51-52).

The second phase of legitimate conflicts through armed liberation began in the 1980s and gained more momentum during the 1990s. This is the time when people in some independent African countries found it necessary to fight against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. The Great Lake Region provides us with typical examples of such struggles. Museveni, the president of Uganda



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

(1997), noted the necessity of establishing the National Resistance Army (NRA) which carried out armed liberation against the dictatorial and oppressive regimes of Obote (from 1981 to 1985) and Okello (from 1985 to January 1986). The objective was to struggle for freedom, democracy and promote development in Uganda. Having failed to use peaceful means of reaching reconciliation with the Government of President Habyarimana, Kagame used the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to carry out an armed struggle against the Habyarimana regime from 1990 to 1994. Since independence in 1962, the Hutu based Government of President Gregoire Kayibanda and Habyarimana had been massacring and persecuting the Tutsi minority and the Hutu moderate, culminating in the 1994 genocide (Kagame, 2002). With similar objectives, Laurent Kabila waged war against the Mobutu regime in the DRC from 1996 to 1997. Illegitimate conflicts are not guided by the objectives of liberating societies from dominating, oppressive and exploitative State systems (Nyejere, 1974: 53). In most cases such conflicts are a product of competing for political power and economic resources. In some situations those who are in power use force to suppress the people, or certain sections of the people, in order to perpetuate their position of power for the advancement of their personal interests. In most cases such conflicts are characterized by divisive ideologies of ethnicity, racialism, regionalism and religious antagonism. Periodic violent conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, since the period of struggles for independence, together with clan wars in Somalia and the post-independence civil war in Mozambique and Angola provide us with typical examples of such conflicts. They are based on reactionary rather than progressive motives.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Another aspect in understanding the nature of conflict is the identification and analysis of causes of conflicts. Various studies which have been carried out in Africa tend to point out economic,

political, ethnic, ideological, resources and religious causes for conflict (Mwajiru, 2001: 11). Of these, economic followed by political causes have the highest ranking as the most common causes. Resources and ethnicity are ranked third and fourth respectively. Ideological and religious factors have the lowest ranking.

It has to be noted, however, that the ranking of causes hold truth only at a general level in the context of Africa as a whole. There are peculiar differences in the context of regions and sub-regions. For example, in the Great Lake Region (Central Africa) ethnicity is likely to rank highly as conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya and the DRC have been greatly characterized by ethnic tendencies. It is also worth noting that in discussing causes of conflicts in Africa it is not enough to enumerate the causes of conflict. It is necessary to examine it in the context of historical origins. This means that these conflicts have to be examined in terms of studying the conditions of African societies during the pre-colonial period and post-independence periods (Kagame, 2002). During the latter period it is important to underscore neo-colonial forces and nation building projects. This approach can, therefore, help us identify normal causes and root causes.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Another aspect which concerns the nature of conflicts is the identification of the main actors in a specific conflict. Actors are those who are involved in a conflict. In most conflicts in Africa the actors include rebel groups, governments, the military, militias, foreign governments and multinationals. Mwajiru (2001: 12) argues that, among the various actors, rebel groups are involved in 93% of the conflicts in Africa, followed by foreign governments which constitute 78%, the military 70% and militias 40%. Multinationals are the least involved as they constitute

only 28%. The involvement of the military goes together with that of governments, while the militias go together with ethnic groups.

To understand the nature of conflict is very important in order to determine the most appropriate, practicable approaches to and mechanisms of conflict resolution. This is because the understanding of the type of causes and actors will prove a useful tool for that purpose. The most common conflict resolution approaches or mechanisms include peace negotiations, mediation and/or facilitation, traditional or indigenous methods, peace agreements and their implementation as well as peace keeping. Peace negotiations and mediations always go together because most negotiations are carried out through a mediator or facilitator. The mediator can be a respected wise individual or an institution. For instance, the mediator of the peace negotiation between the FRELIMO Government and the RENAMO rebel group in Mozambique was an institution. It was a religious NGO in Rome, Italy called Saint Egidio (Romano, 1998). The facilitator for the Burundi Peace Negotiations was a respected individual, the late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, who after his death was followed by Nelson Mandela, the former President of South Africa. However, Mwalimu and later Mandela worked through an institution: the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation.


Mwajiru (2001: 12) notes that among the various conflict resolution mechanisms, peace negotiations and mediation have been the most common in most conflicts in Africa. Peace negotiations can be internally or externally based. Internally based negotiations are those that are carried out within the country where the conflicting parties are negotiating with an internal mediator. The peace negotiations in Sudan from April 1996 to April 1997 provide a good example of internally based peace negotiations. It was a peace negotiation between the

Government of Sudan and five rebel groups (The Sudan Peace Agreement, 1997: 4). Externally based peace negotiations are those carried out through an external mediator or facilitator. Such a negotiation can be carried out within the country or outside the country. The peace negotiation in Sudan was externally based and was carried out in Kenya through the mediation of the Government of Kenya. In Zanzibar the mediations of both 1998/1999 and 2001 were carried out within Tanzania. The first one was externally-based because it was carried out through the mediation of the Commonwealth Secretary General, as noted earlier. The second was internally-based as it was carried out between the conflicting parties, without a mediator.



Besides peace negotiations, another mechanism of conflict resolution is the use of traditional methods. These are methods taken from the traditional African societies resolved their conflicts in the past. They normally made use of wise and respected elders who intervened between conflicting groups, talked with both sides, listened to their concerns and used their wisdom to convince each side to stop fighting. In the case of conflict between ethnic groups (such as an interethnic war), there were traditional symbols such as waving leaves of special trees indicating that one or both sides intended to make peace. The parties could engage in direct talks or could seek the assistance of a respected and wise elder. When they agreed to end the conflict, a ceremony was often organized; this involved feasting with traditional brew and slaughtering cows and/or goats. To ensure the sustainability of the peace agreement between the conflicting clans or ethnic groups in conflict in the traditional system were developed. It has been observed that in Africa there is a resurgence of traditional methods of conflict resolution. In some parts of Africa, traditional methods have been used in 57% of the cases of conflict management (Mwajiru, 2001: 14).

Peacekeeping is another important mechanism of conflict resolution in Africa. Peacekeeping involves the deployment of troops by the UN or by regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), ECOWAS and the SADC, or even individual neighbouring countries. In most cases, the process of peacekeeping follows the signing of the peace agreement in order to ensure its implementation and prevent the re-eruption of the conflict. In Africa, processes of peacekeeping have been increasing. In 1993 to 1994 the UN Security Council sent a peacekeeping force to Rwanda to foresee the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed in Arusha between the Government of Habyarimana and the RPF rebels in August 1993. The peacekeeping task force was known as UNAMIR (Khan, 1998). However, the peacekeeping task force proved a failure as it could not prevent the genocide of Rwanda of 1994. Another example of a peacekeeping task force that failed was the taskforce in Somalia in 1992, known as UNITAF (Mosha, 1998). The task force was deployed after the signing of a ceasefire between two fighting clans, one led by Ali Mahdi and the other by Mohamed Farah Aidid. The task force was the highest UN intervention since its establishment as it constituted a military force of 37,000 troops. The task force was withdrawn in July 1993 due to the heavy casualties it had suffered on the 12th of July 1993, while in confrontation with one of the clan factions. However, there are cases in Africa in which peacekeeping forces have proved successful. Peacekeeping forces deployed by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia have made considerable contributions to conflict resolution processes in West Africa.



University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

In Africa, conflict resolution processes have often been carried out by various institutions. Such institutions include the UN, regional organizations, international and local NGOs and governments. We have already seen how the UN through the UN Security Council deploys


peacekeeping forces. The UN has also been instrumental in financing peace negotiations and the implementation of peace agreements. However, in Africa the role of the UN has often been criticized for being slow in making decisions and its lack of commitment, thus leading to problems such as those experienced in Rwanda and Somalia. When examining the case of the DRC we shall specifically examine the roles of various institutions. In Africa, an important outcome of peace negotiations has been the signing of peace agreements and ceasefire agreements followed by their implementation. In some cases implementation has proven successful while others have failed. South Africa and Mozambique provide good examples of success in the process of implementing peace agreements. In South Africa the Peace Agreement was signed after peace negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the White Government. The two parties had been engaged in violent conflicts during armed liberation as carried out by the ANC and other organisations. A transition period was set and democratic elections were successfully held in April 1994. In Mozambique, the Peace Agreement was signed in 1992 between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO, a rebel group. The two parties had been engaged in a protracted civil war for nearly 17 years. The peace negotiations were carried out in Rome, Italy and mediated by a religious NGO called Saint Edigio (Romano, 1998). After a successful transition period the first democratic elections were held in October, 1994. A good example of the unsuccessful implementation of a peace agreement is Rwanda. As previously noted, the Peace Agreement for Rwanda was signed in Arusha in August 1993 between the Habyarimana Government and the RPF rebel groups with its military wing, the RPA. From August 1993 to April 1994 no serious steps were taken to implement the agreement. The end result was the genocide of April to July 1994 costing between 800,000 and a million lives. It appears that, partly due to pressure from extremist Hutu groups, the



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Habyarimana Government was not committed to the implementation process, which led to the killing. Consequently, this became an obstacle to development goals.

In addition to the argument above, conflict resolution has also been among the most serious and formidable challenges facing development in the DRC as it contemplates its place in the 21st century. Burdened with problems of under-development, poverty, discrimination and a lack of security and stability, many African countries are unable to contemplate the future with any sense of confidence, let alone optimism. It is now generally acknowledged, in and outside of Africa that conflicts are major impediments to the economic growth and sustainable development of many African countries. Since various attempts have been made to provide an adequate conceptualization of conflict and development in Africa.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

Ahmed Mohiddin (2000: 3) argues that no single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems on the continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between its countries. They have brought about death and human suffering that is affecting development goals, engendered hate and divided nations and families. Conflicts have forced millions of people into drifting lives as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gobbled up scarce resources and undermined the ability of countries to address the many compelling needs of people.

Indeed, a notable scholarly attempt to dissect conflict resolution in the DRC as a challenge on development, and project its social character, is the work of Biaya. Biaya looked at conflict in Africa as the result of the interaction of political, economic and social instability, frequently

stemming from bad governance, failed economic policies and inappropriate development programmes which have exacerbated ethnic or religious difference (Biaya, 1998). Development crisis in Africa has been linked in recent times to the unsettled condition of widespread conflict and the accelerated syndrome of failed States (Celestine Bassey, 2003: 58). A close look at this indicates that conflict in Africa constitutes an obstacle to development in a sense that the main causes of conflicts are ill-defined in terms of conflict resolution. That is to say that the development goals are linked to the resolution of conflict for it to be accomplished and result in the reduction of poverty, discrimination, and underdevelopment in Africa generally, and the DRC in particular.



According to the proponents of conflict resolution that promotes sustainable development and peace, the main causes of conflict must be identified in a society. Steve Utterwulghé (1999: 1) argues that for conflict to be genuinely resolved and bring about development in Africa, all the main kinds of causes of conflicts must be identified and then fully considered in conflict resolution strategies. Aza (1990: 145) notes that to manage and hopefully resolve conflicts, a comprehensive approach that identifies and tackles their multiple causal factors is necessary.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

While it is agreed that development problems should be thought of as a political issue set in the wider context of social relations between groups or societies; it follows that social relationships (including conflict, interaction, technology, and human geography) shape the terms and parameters of the operation of state development strategies. According to the Department for International Development (DFID, 1997: 16), conflict generates social division, reverses development progress, impedes sustainable development and frequently results in human rights

violations. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2006: 244) argue that the cause of conflict in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to the higher levels of poverty, political and socio-economic inequality and dependence on natural resources.

The widespread conflict in African countries has generated extensive debate in literature about the structural and psycho-cultural factors sustaining the state of quasi-anarchy in these countries (Ross, 1993: 15). Ross further argues that the root cause of conflict is to be found at the interlocking nexus of underdevelopment, structural deprivation (political, economic, and psychological) and communal or identity cleavages. Moreover, according to Lewis Snyder (1984: 154), it is assumed that structural victimization (social, political, and economic inequalities as well as psychological oppression) mainly takes the form of ethnic discrimination in African countries. In his study of political disintegration in third world countries, Lewis Snyder (1984: 155) argues that more germane to the security concerns of multi-ethnic developing States is the estimated potential for separatism. The evidence reviewed so far suggests that the potential for separatist activity is greater in developing societies where ethnic cleavages are already deep and where political discrimination against peripheral communities is widely practiced.

According to this argument, in the DRC, the phenomenon of separatism and discrimination is extremely high from one block of ethnic support to another with the change of rulers and their regime where the catastrophic balance between class or ethnic forces shapes the structure of politics. The substantial violence required to suppress ethnic revolt leads to the phenomenon of a violence trap where identity and violence reinforce each other. In this case, conflict becomes


protracted and development programmes are inevitably paralyzed. According to Aza (1990: 146), protracted conflicts are on-going and unsolvable; they are thus obstacles to development goals. Stephen Ryan (1990: 27) argues that protracted conflict is conflict between ethnic groups which have been going on for some time and which may, to the parties involved, appear to be irresolvable. In this case, re-activating development processes, as Mark Duffield (2001: 36), argues is a non-linear exercise which requires the creation of new institutions and forms of social organization. Duffield (2001: 38) argues further that in conditions of unsettled conflict the interests and opportunities of different identity groups within States should encourage democratic governments that enjoy widespread legitimacy among the population, for fostering consensus on key nation issues and for building mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interest. According to Celestine Bassey (1999), it must be recognized that the foci of development programmes are always political as well as economic. They cannot be separated from the political fabric of a given milieu.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The debate on the causes of conflict in African countries has also been characterized by profound epistemological divergences. Zartman (1991: 21) noted that the conflict triggers which are highlighted include issues such as identity, nationalism, social structure, nation-building, an anarchic and virulently hostile international environment. Charles Tilly (1996: 4) argues that conflict seems to grow most directly from the struggle to establish positions within the structure of power. It is the struggle for access to opportunities and life chances (to the existing right and privileges of society) which define citizenship within the nation-state. These conflicts are the result of the interaction of political, economic and social instability.

Conflict is inherent in human societies. As long as people live together in groups, their interests, aspirations, needs, wants, and ambitions are different. Once the resources and other opportunities are shared unequally, at the expense of the minority or of the group discriminated against, conflict occurs and affects the development goals. Conflict can be manifest in intense political struggles for power and leadership that often result in violence; it can manifest in the scramble for geographical space, scarce national resources or the shrinking national product. In this case, according to Rummel (2003: 20), conflict can be seen as a category of social behaviour of two parties trying to get something they both want but cannot both have. The pursuits of these opportunities and resources invariably entail the control, mobilization and subjugation of the minority or of a discriminated group of people, as well as their frustration at being excluded.



This argument brings us to the next section of this chapter which explores the structural aspects of the competing interests of groups as the cause of conflict in the DRC. It highlights aspects that tend to justify the relative popularity of analyses that portray the conflict as an ethnic/sectional project.

### **2.3.2.2. The root causes of conflict in human society**

It is widely accepted that understanding the root cause of conflict in human society is essential to its successful and lasting resolution, and to sustain development. While there is no unified theory about the causes of violent conflict, there are a number of factors that have been cited as explanation.

The observation that less developed countries tend to experience higher levels of violent conflict has led some scholars to assume a causal link between poverty and war (Alcock & Alan, 1970: 335-343). However, it is accepted that poverty *per se* does not cause conflict. The role of structural inequality or discrimination; that is, economic and social inequality and access to political power, is considered one of the central causes of violent conflict. Analysts often focus on differing group identities such as ethnicity, religion or economic class as a source of conflict. Such identities may also be seen as an idiom through which other interests are expressed. Other factors that have been cited for the propensity towards conflict include the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth; a debate located within the field of development economics, and the prevalence of small arms, highlighted by think tanks so as to seek a safer world (Alcok & Alan, 1970: 339). Finally, the scarcity or abundance of natural resources as well as the role of economic agendas has been explored by a number of scholars (Alcock & Alan, 1970:335-343).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Analysts often locate the origins of violent conflict in broader historical or development processes and look at issues such as State formation in the post-colonial era or the role of rapid market-orientated economic reforms and structural adjustment policies in generating instability and, in turn, conflict (Storr, A. 1968:120). Recently, economist commentators have started to look at issues such as unequal trade relationships between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries and the role this plays in generating economic decline and conflict.

In addition, most individuals who write on conflict seem to agree that the causes of violent conflict include, among other matters, competition for scarce resources; differences in terms of

goals, value systems, and interests; structural imbalances and ambiguity in coordinating social structures. Violent conflict thus emanates from socio-economic inequalities, ethnicity, absence of opportunities for political participation, differences in religious inclinations, fragile government structures, inadequate civic structures, differences in political ideology, and competition over scarce resources (Klingebiel, 2002:8-11). In the same vein, violent conflict is also caused by actual or perceived inequality of control, use, ownership and distribution of scarce resources. It takes place in a heterogeneous society where the dominant group, using its power, enforces its own value systems, symbols, culture and language over other less dominant groups (Anstey, 1991:13-19). As Anstey puts it, violent conflict is caused by 'relative deprivation where a dominant group attempts to enforce its own symbols, culture and language over others in a heterogeneous society.' The lack of an equitable and control of resources as well as access to social services among and between societal groups gives rise to power struggles and contributes to rising levels of mistrust and disagreement, which ultimately leads to violent conflict.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Another source, or root cause, of violent conflict is ambiguity. According to Anstey (1991: 13-19), conflict normally occurs where there is social change resulting in uncertainty with respect to the boundaries of authority, and about what is socially and politically acceptable behaviour. Ambiguity is common in social settings where old ways of doing things are no longer acceptable to a section of the community, and where traditional methods of exercising authority are rejected by a section of society that is unwilling to continue to relate to the group in authority in a subservient way. The consequence of this type of relationship is a prolonged struggle of testing new boundaries in authority-relations between the dominant group and the subservient one.

Predictably, members of the group in authority feel threatened, and seek new ways, or do whatever is in their power, to ensure that they retain authority. On the other hand, members of the subservient group do whatever is in their power to ensure that their concerns and interests are addressed. Invariably, with the passage of time, conflict escalates, sometimes into violence resulting in the loss of life and destruction of physical facilities and communication infrastructures (Anstey, 1991: 13-19).


### 2.3.2.3. Structural Conflict Theory

According to this theory, the competing interests of groups are the primary motivations of conflict. In other words, structural theory maintains that the primary sources of conflict are in the political, social and economic organization of society. Marc Ross (1993: 129) argues that if economic and political discrimination and weak ties of kinship exist in a society, the chance of conflict between groups will be higher and development goals will be impeded. Indeed, discrimination is a deprivation or exclusion of certain groups from contributing and benefitting from development in a specific country. For example, exclusion from participation in political and public life, social and economic organization and access to services brings about conflict.

Michell (1991: 218) notes that the structural approach presents a broader range of underlying factors which may be the cause of a breakout in internal conflict. These causes or factors are important as they lead to conflict. Those factors and causes are economic and social factors; political and institutional factors such as State structure, discriminatory political institutions, inter-group politics, elite politics etc.; security factors (intra-State security concerns, security

dilemma, regional military environment, refugee problems); and ethnic factors (geography, demography, physical geography).

According to the argument above, it is irrefutable that individuals and groups enter into conflict because of real interests. However, in serious conflict such as tribal or ethnic conflict, as is the case in the DRC, material interests are not sufficient to explain the severity, ferocity, and protracted nature of such conflicts. Indeed, conflicts about real interests, as Steve Utterwulghe (1999: 3) argues, take place under certain psychological dispositions and in certain psycho-cultural contexts which serve to influence, substantially, the intensity and duration of conflict and ultimately determine the outcome. Ross (1994: 194) argues that although the identification of structural factors in conflict is rarely well explained by explanations for conflict based on these considerations are often incomplete and therefore misleading. Ross further argues that people do fight about real interests, but the way in which this is done, the intensity of feeling, and the lengths to which disputants go to defend or acquire their due are evidence that pursuit of interests has an important psychological component which is not well understood.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **2.3.2.3.1. Criticism of Structural Conflict Theory**

Brown (1993: 3) explains that structural conflict theory has its limitations. Those limitations according to him are structural features which cannot determine the targets of hostile action. But psycho-cultural dispositions are more relevant to explain the intensity of conflict and the duration that can allow development goals to be fulfilled after the conflict. Brown further argues that structural factors often constitute the catalytic elements or the proximate causes that transform latent conflict into manifest or overt conflict. Features like political transition,

imminent military threat, or mounting economic problems are some of the factors that can act as triggers. In serious conflict, according to Brown, these factors tend to occur in a predisposed psycho-cultural environment. Indeed, the role of competition for real interest is a crucial element in the explanation of conflict. Aza (1990: 145) argues that it is the denial of human needs that finally emerges as the source of conflict. These human needs are usually defined in the literature as needs for effective participation in political, market, and decision-making institutions, physical security, nutrition, housing, etc. Aza adds that structural factors play a critical role in the breakout of conflict but fail to explain the intensity and, in certain cases, the duration of conflict that affects development goals, features which contribute to their apparent intractability and which ultimately influence, substantially, the way to manage and resolve such conflict. Morton Deutsch (1991: 28) notes that any comprehensive approach to understanding conflict will necessarily include consideration of both objective and subjective factors. Thus, according to this view, psycho-cultural theory which is more subjective can help this study in its attempt to understand the extent to which psycho-cultural factors lead to conflict in the DRC.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **2. 3. 2. 4. Psycho-cultural Conflict Theory**

The theory forwards the psychological and cultural forces that frame beliefs about the self, others, and behaviours as causes of conflict. This theory does not exclude other explanations, like a structural explanation. Ross (1993: 18) argues that psycho-cultural conflict theory emphasizes the role of culturally shared, profound 'we-they' oppositions, the conceptualization of enemies and allies, and deep-seated dispositions about human action stemming from earliest development. Ross further notes that conflict takes place within societies characterized by a multicomunal composition and in which discrimination is targeted toward one specific ethnic

group or the majority of the population which is subject to discrimination by the minority in power. It can be assumed that conflict occurs when communities are discriminated against or deprived of the satisfaction of their basic human needs on the basis of their communal identity or political affiliation. Burton (1997: 54) argues that there is conflict and instability in developing countries because people are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. These needs are the needs for physical security, nutrition, political and economic participation, and so forth. The overriding importance of Burton's theory is that it understands that needs, particularly basic needs (such as food, water, shelter and health) unlike interests cannot be traded, suppressed, or bargained for; thus any attempt to do this, leads to conflict on the one hand.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

On the other hand, indeed, supporters of the psychological approach seek to account for the presence or absence of economic growth in terms of general personality traits or an inner psychic state that is characteristic of a particular society (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981: 6). Rooted in Max Weber's classical analysis of the emergence of the protestant ethic, the psychological approach states that the lack of development in a particular society is due to an insufficient number of people who possess the traits that are viewed as essential in order for development to occur (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981: 6). The possession of traits relates to personality. Hagen (1962: 99) defines personality as a complex of qualities other than purely bodily ones which determine how an individual will behave in any given situation. Hagen (1962: 105) argues that several personality traits are associated with economic development. The most important, according to Hagen, are:

- **Need achievement:** this refers to a quality that satisfies an individual in terms of resolving conflicts, manipulating a situation that contains an element that has not previously been dealt with by exercising his judgment and abilities, and attempting to face something difficult in order to test his/her capacity.
- **Need autonomy:** this is a feeling of self-reliance. It makes one independent of the control of one's judgment by others when making decisions.
- **Need order:** this refers to logical achievement with regards to an aesthetic relationship as a whole. A person who possesses this quality may be a good bookkeeper and organizer.



Stockwell and Laidlaw (1981: 7) regard developing countries as traditional societies characterized by authoritarian social structures, in which the ascribed statuses are arranged in a hierarchical manner. As such, there is no expectation of economic growth. These two authors rely on Hagen (1962: 119) who comments that the authoritarian individual perceives the phenomenon of the world as forming a system whose operation is not orderly and perceives the world as not valuing him highly, and sees power as residing in position rather than resulting from accomplishment. Because of the rage and the need to curb it, which these perceptions generate in him, he is high in need submission-dominance and low in need...autonomy and achievement and probably low also in need order, but driven to satisfy it by evading recognition of inconsistencies or discrepancies in his perception of the phenomenon.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

As evident in the above comments and discussion, the psycho-cultural approach emphasizes psychological and cultural traits as two of the causes of conflict, in a given society, that has impeded development goals. According to Aristotle (in Okanya, 1996: 3), social strife and

revolutions are not brought out by the conspiratorial or malignant nature of man, rather revolutions are derived from poverty and distributive injustice. Therefore, when the poor are in the majority and have no prospect of ameliorating their condition, they are bound to be restless and seek restitution through violence. No government can hold stability and peace when it is created on a sea of poverty and discrimination (Ibid). In Africa, the case is that of absolute discrimination and poverty. This means the lack of equal distribution of basic needs like food, clothing, shelter, education and health which can promote development in a country. Conflicts are, therefore, often caused by an attempt to clamour for these basic needs by violent means.




Besides the theory above, Elizabeth Crighton (1991: 127) notes that conflicts are identity driven; Horowitz (1985: 181-182) argues that conflicts result of an underlying fear of extinction that grows out of the experience of being a vulnerable ethnic group living with memories of persecution and massacre. In this regard, Volkan (1991) talks about the fear of dying off; while Rothschild talks about the fear of the future (Rothschild and Groth, 1995: 23). All these fears seem to have the same underlying element which is the fear of the threat of loss of identity. This threat, be it real or perceived, impedes development goals.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Jeanne Knutson (Montville, 1991: 537), a political psychologist, developed the concept of psychology of victimhood and argues that human needs for identity as well as for affection, self-esteem, and esteem of others are components of a sense of safety and security that humans require for normal development. Hence, in order to protect their identity, individuals and groups will behave in a distorted and possibly violent way which will not promote development. The lack of satisfaction of needs puts citizens into an insecure state that brings conflict and affects development. This brings us into the next section which is human security theory.

### 2.3.2.5. Human Security Theory


This part of the study will discuss human security as the cause of development stagnation in Africa. There are two main contemporary theories of human security. On the one hand there is an approach based on neo-realism which emphasizes the primacy of the State within a broadened conceptualization of human security. This approach views people in terms of what they can do to improve human security and avoid conflict for the promotion of development. According to Thompson (2000: 50), this approach is called the new security thinking approach. On the other hand, there is a postmodernist or critical human security approach that is rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics. Thompson argues further that this approach is based on a set of assumptions that are essentially an attempt to dislodge the State as the primary reference of security, while placing greater emphasis on interdependency and transnationalization of non-State actors.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The neo-realist approach to human security has been advocated by structuralists, or neo-realists, such as Barry Buzan (1991: 431). In his seminal work named 'People, States and Fear', Buzan (1991: 432) argues that the 'straitjacket' militaristic approach to security that dominated the Cold War discourse was simpleminded and led the concept to underdeveloped countries. He subsequently broadened this to include political, economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to those that are militaristic. Buzan examined security from two aspects of the international system, these are: 1. the State, and 2. the individual. He (1991: 451) notes that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the sovereign State. This argument proves that the lack of security in a country can bring conflict in this contemporary era, this in turn affects development.

The critical or postmodernist approach to human security advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military determination of threats. Booth (1994: 4) argues that the postmodernist approach to human security must be dislodged as the primary reference of human security, and encompass instead a wide range of non-State actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and just about all humankind. In expanding the concept of security, Booth further argues that human security is ultimately more important than State security. In Booth's view, States and governments must no longer be the primary reference of security. This is because governments, which are supposed to be the guardians of their people's security, have instead become the primary source of insecurity and conflict for many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed forces of a neighbouring country (Booth, 1994: 5). This approach challenges the idea of a State as an effective and adequate provider of security to its people in order to avoid conflict and promote development.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **2. 3. 2. 6. Evaluation of Neo-realist and Postmodernist approaches**

Both approaches attempt to address non-military threats to human security. Their fundamental difference lies in the way in which these analyses point to action. Buzan (1991: 431) argues that the fact that the State is secure does not signify an absence of conflict. Rather, it means that the security of the State, in particular a State that is weak, should continue to remain primary to the citizens, since the main aim is to build the capacity of the State to provide peace and promote development for its citizens. In other words, although the conceptualization of security must make the security of people and human beings its goal, the State, as the means, cannot be dislodged as the primary reference. After all, if the State is to provide peace, development and

maintain security, it has to be secure itself or to use Buzan's words, it has to be or become a strong State (Van Aardt, 1997: 13-28).


In using the concept of the State to be secure, a State can be defined as a conglomeration made up of a government, people and territory. In other words, the whole (that is the State), comprising all its constituent parts, has a reciprocal relationship with the individual parts (Van Aardt, 1997: 20). The State cannot be secure or develop if its constituent parts are insecure or unstable. At the same time, if the State as the institution representing its constituent parts is weak or insecure in relation to other states, its elements means its citizens will also be affected by such weakness or insecurity. Booth (1994: 5) argues that state security is used by governments that posed as guardians of their peoples' security, in order to mask reality and hide what is essentially the security of their regime and its supporters and should therefore be dislodged as a primary referent of security.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

This argument does not mean the termination of the State *per se* as a reference of security. It does, however, suggest that the type of State that has been unable to deliver security to its people should be questioned. It is those governments that do not allow the State to fulfill its functions of statehood that need to be eradicated and dislodged. Booth (1994: 4-5) further argues that the neo-realist approach to human security places human security alongside State security as a twin reference in the theory and practice of security. In equating State and human security, Buzan (1992: 38) makes reference to the fate of human collectivities as being the primary object or reference of security. Human collectivities here are the citizens of a State. The State becomes the reference of security as the representative institution of human collectivities.

In discussing the State as a source of both threats and security for individuals, Buzan (1992: 19) further maintains that citizens ultimately have to decide on the lesser of two evils; that is, either to accept the threats that come from the State, or accept the threats that arise in the absence of the State. According to Buzan (1992: 16) the assumption that whatever threats emanate from the State are likely to be of a lower magnitude than those arising in its absence, grows as society develops around the State, becoming increasingly dependent on it as a linchpin for social and economic structures of security. Buzan (1992: 25) argues that in seeking human security, State and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed. Its bottom line is about survival, that is, the way they promote peace and the development of their citizens.



Buzan's State-centric approach, within a broad framework of security, is useful in so far as it argues that the State is a vital vehicle for the security of its citizens to promote development. However, he introduces the concepts of strong and weak States to show that the creation of strong States is a necessary, yet insufficient, condition for improving individual and national security (Buzan, 1992: 106). In other words, the existence of strong States would not, by itself, guarantee security, but weaknesses in States would certainly encourage and sustain insecurity and underdevelopment amongst their citizens. In this regard, Buzan (1992: 106) draws a distinction between weak and strong States and weak and strong powers. He explains that the strength of a State is determined by the degree of its socio-political cohesion, while the strength of its powers refers to the traditional distinction among States in respect of their comparative military and economic capabilities. This distinction sits awkwardly in an argument championing the State as the case of human security, since the attainment of human security and development requires both a strong State and a strong power. To avoid any confusion as to the unit or

reference of security, it is preferable to lump attributes together (i.e. socio-political cohesion, military and economic capability) and the characteristic distinction between weak and strong States (Buzan, 1992: 98). Buzan further acknowledges that almost all weak or conflict States are found in the South or developing world, where they find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger State.

### 2.3.2.7. The Theory of State Failure




It is not easy to find a definition that thoroughly describes the multitude of theories on failing and failed States, in terms of development, especially when exploring developing or so-called ‘Third World’ countries. There are multiple theories concerning the issue, but not a specific one that is universally recognized. The lack of development in the Third World has, for many years, been blamed primarily on economic conditions. This is why the criticism that was raised was especially directed against dependencia and modernization theories. Even the negative development of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, cannot be accounted for satisfactorily with these development theories (Wimmer, 2000: 33). Since then, the theories of failing and failed States have become a ‘catchall concept’ describing the various shortcomings in the development theories for the negative development throughout the ‘Third World’.

Upon reading books, papers and other materials concerning the topic of failed States and State failure, it becomes apparent that most of the theories name the same or similar aspects that most

often differ only slightly from each other. This section will review important appendages that are relevant to the context of conflict and development.


### 2.3.2.7.1. State Failure Approach

One of the main issues that have to be clarified at the beginning of this section is the meaning of the concept of 'State'. There are two different approaches to be found in the discourse of failing and collapsed States, which build on either the Lockean or the Weberian definition of the State (Eriksen, 2006: 1).



Furthermore, the view of how countries in the 'Third World' should address their future has changed throughout time. While modernization theory, during the 1960s, considered the State as a vital actor in its developmental efforts, this perception changed in the 1980s and 1990s when more neo-liberal theories entered development discourse. Eriksen (2003: 6) argues that many states in the 'Third World' were then identified with 'kleptocratic' features like corruption and organization of conflict, as well as serious problems in bureaucratic inefficiency. The most obvious changes in the strategies concerning development, that mirrored this alteration of perception, were the neo-liberal structural adjustment programs. Zartman and Rotberg, by using the Lockean perception of the State, defined the State as a service provider. However, as soon as it becomes impossible for the State to provide all the services, it can be identified as a collapsed State (collapse here is an approach that identifies State failure in terms of development), because these services include not only the assurance of security, but extend to political participation, infrastructural as well as social services in the area of health and education, all of which promote development.

Eriksen's perception of the State is more ideological than analytical (Eriksen, 2006: 3). This builds upon Rotberg's perception of the State which defines the failure of the State as an inability to provide certain goods and features to its citizens (Eriksen, 2006: 2). Eriksen's criticism is that if the State does not cope with all the responsibilities of service provision to its citizens, that State is called a collapse state which cannot promote development (Ibidem). On that account, this discussion has marked certain gradations in the effectiveness of the State and defining strong, weak, failing and failed States (Eriksen, 2006: 3). Eriksen (2006: 4) argues further that the rise of the modern State in Europe was not really aligned to the provision of services to its inhabitants, and that this is what brought about the conflict of rivalries between European despots. On the other hand, the Weberian approach, as already mentioned, designed the concept of a State as an institution executing effective monopoly of power over its political territory. Eriksen (2006: 4) argues that the ability to maintain power over its territory will determine whether a State is failed or not. In addition to this definition of the State's monopoly of power, Jackson, Krasner and Giddens (Eriksen, 2006: 6) add that the failure of pacification within the State is a means of measurement (Eriksen, 2006:4). Clapham (2000: 1) argues that a failed State is one of those unsatisfactory States that cannot provide services to its people because of conflict.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Many States, especially through the process of decolonialization, became States only by being engaged in diplomatic relations with other States, but with no feature of having executive power over their territory. Moreover, a lot of them have never possessed any necessary attributes of a functioning State because they cannot manage conflict and promote development by providing good services to the people. This would by definition include the possibility to secure and execute a universal valid legal system or even security for its inhabitants by considering internal

as well as external security. On the contrary, many regimes that seized power after independence in Africa used this illusiveness of national sovereignty to exculpate themselves from their political actions to avoid any outside criticism (Lange, 2004: 1). Lange argues further that nation-building in the former colonies is a very complex process that is always influenced by external as well as internal factors. He notes that (Lange, 2004: 2) many countries have hitherto not been able to develop a social, economic and at the same time political system, since the economic adjustments rely on a certain stability within the country.

#### **2. 3. 2. 7. 2. Economic Policies in the State Failures**

This section will discuss economic stagnation in Africa as influenced by post-independence leaders and governments under dictatorships and personal rule, as well as conflict.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **2. 3. 2. 7. 2. 1. Economic Policies**

In order to encourage development and investments in any country, leadership has to put in place the following issues: an environment of security of property, political stability, social harmony, and a respected legal code that protects the rights of the owners or individual. Furthermore, the State has to offer an infrastructure which promotes development such as roads, ports, airports, railways, electricity, water, and telecommunications, and the supply of a well-educated and skilled labor force (Sandbrook 1985: 33-34; Friedman, 2006: 398). The majority of African states has never created, or has failed to create, these conditions (Sandbrook, 1985: 12; Easterly and Levine, 1997:12).

Picard (1994: 8) writes that many African countries chose a model of highly centralized government after independence. Yahaya and Bur (1994: 37) added that African countries accepted the Keynesian macroeconomic model as 'the intellectual rationale for State intervention in the economy.' This model strengthened bureaucracy and created an inefficient and oversized State. Yahaya and Bur (1994: 38) define the Keynesian macroeconomic model as an economic theory stating that 'active government intervention in the marketplace and monetary policy is the best method of ensuring economic growth and stability'. According to Duany (2004: 129), the embracing of theories of a centrally controlled, egalitarian, and socialist society by many African elites after independence was a costly failure. Sadig Rasheed (1996: 116), a development economist at the UN Economic Commission for Africa, writes about the impact of centralized African governments on economic development and argues that the States and their overextended control over economic matters, the imposition of extensive regulations and controls and the exclusive and arbitrary licensing and approval of powers with which public officials are invested in such situations have created ample opportunities for the abuse of office for personal gain. Zack-Williams (2002: 1-2) notes that African States, instead of changing their economic systems after independence, continue with 'business as usual' in that African countries were dependent on goods imported from their former colonizers in exchange for cheap raw materials. According to the World Bank, one of the main failures in post-independence Africa was 'the copying' of rather than 'adopting' Western economic models and policies for African conditions (Mabogunje, 2000: 14).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Meier and Rauch (2000: 65) note that the comparatively poor record on export volumes and the failure to diversify out of primary product exports were the most serious African economic


failures after independence. Sub-Saharan countries accounted for 3% of the share of world exports in 1950. Five decades later, the share is 1.5% (Hoogvelt, 2002: 17). One of the causes of economic decline of many African countries during the 1970s and 1980s was the introduction of fixed and over-valued exchange rates that reduced the profitability of exports (Meier and Rauch, 2000: 65). Guest (2004: 12) notes that, even though it currently consists of a tenth of the world's population, Africa's share of world trade is only 2%.

One of the biggest failures in the majority of African countries was conflict and the abandoning of food production and modernization of agriculture after independence. Ayithey (1998: 138) writes that African leaders saw agriculture as 'too backward and not featuring in the grandiose plans to industrialize Africa.' Instead of supporting local food production, inappropriate policies put 'price controls on food, low producer prices for agricultural exports, and overvalued currencies' (Sandbrook, 1985: 37). Another reason for decline in agricultural production is the fact that many African States own most of the land on the continent. While farmers would invest and plan for long-term benefits if they owned the land, they do not do so since they are not sure if they will be able to benefit of the fruits of their efforts in the years to come (Salin, 2004: 61; Mabogunje, 2000: 140). According to President Mbeki (2005: 9) sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa requires that peasants become owners of the land they work. This would influence their long-term planning, investment, and productivity and address environmental issues such as deforestation and desertification. Ayithey (1998: 10) notes that the agricultural output in sub-Saharan Africa after independence has been growing at less than 1.5%, less than the rate of population growth.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Even though African governments focus on industrialization instead of agriculture, only a few countries on the continent can be called 'industrialized.' According to Amin (1990: 30), only six countries, among them only two in sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa and Zimbabwe), had developed infrastructure 'that can be described as industrialized' by 1990. Amin notes that other African countries have 'insufficient manufacturing units to constitute an industrial network.' Amin (1990: 7) further writes that, in the 1960s, 'the annual per capita growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa did not exceed 1.3%, before falling to 0.8% in the 1970s, and to almost nil in the first half of 1980s.' It shows the regional distribution of negative growth between 1960 and 1988. In this period, the large majority of countries with negative growth were in sub-Saharan Africa. Zack-Williams (2002: 4) argues that in the period of 1991-1998, 'annual average growth in Africa was 1.8%, the lowest growth rate of all developing countries, and per capita GDP growth was negative for most of the 1990s.' According to the economic data, most Africans were better off in the 1970s than in the 1990s and today. Zack-Williams (2002: 4) note that in 1975, the average sub-Saharan African GDP per capita was US \$671; in 1997, it was US \$245. Robert Guest (2004: 6) argues that a median African country's GDP is on average around US \$2 billion, an amount that is often annual output of a larger city in the developed world.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

A study by the National Bureau of Economic Research (1999) paints a grim picture of Sub-Saharan economic stagnation since independence: 36% of the region's population lives in economies that in 1995 had not regained the per capita income levels achieved before 1960. Another 6% are below levels first achieved in 1970, 41% below 1980 levels and 11% below

1990 levels. Only 35 million people reside in nations that had higher incomes in 1995 than they had ever reached before (Mbeki, 2005: 2).

While the poor countries of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America were reforming their economies after the end of the Cold War, thus attracting foreign investments and growing at steady rates, the majority of sub-Saharan countries continued to be unattractive to investors and record minor economic growth, while some countries even declined. In 1995, when US \$231 billion was invested into developing countries, Africa received only 2.4% of this amount (Ayittey, 1998: 210). Amin (1990: 7) argues that since 1985, two-thirds of Sub-Saharan African countries 'do not contribute to any investment effort and do not even provide for routine public services to the level that was maintained in the 1960s.' This section brings us to the colonial approach where the legacy of colonialism is deemed the cause of conflict that affects development goals in African countries since independence.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **2.3.2.8. Colonialism Approach**

Indeed, the primary causes of all types of contemporary conflict in Africa are rooted in the colonial era. This section will discuss the colonial legacy as a cause of conflict which has influenced development stagnation in Africa. It is very important to examine colonialism Approach since the roots of many problems that African countries have faced since independence (from ethnic divisions, conflicts, economic dependencies, to authoritarianism) could be found in the policies implemented by colonial powers. Indeed, it can be argued that colonial powers, in their search for political control, economic exploitation, and cultural domination, strengthened and further polarized group differences, thus creating real feelings of

victimhood, new histories, and eventually strong ideologies. Horowitz (1985: 160) argues that there is a direct link between colonial evaluations of imputed group character, the distribution of group worth, and the readiness for a group to initiate ethnic violence or to use the political system to change the situation. Davidson and Montville (1982: 148) argue that the evaluation by the foreign evaluation of ethnic groups, based on presumed 'racial superiority' and differences in levels of 'civilization,' contributes to a certain humiliation and feeling of weakness on the part of the 'backward' group. Sandbrook (1985: 42) notes that political and ethnic tensions in Africa, after independence, cannot be understood outside of the context of colonialism times. Colonialism often refers to a history of inequality, discrimination, persecution and, in the extreme, massacre. Guest (2004: 111) argues that ethnic conflicts in Africa have roots in the manipulation of tribal loyalties by colonial powers. In order to successfully control large masses with a small number of soldiers and officials, colonial powers used 'divide and rule' policies which left divisions and hatred on the continent.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Indeed, the pathological dimension of inter-ethnic conflict, born out of fear and a threat to ethnic identity, acts as the origin of a psychological escalation process which has evolved and poses significant consequences for the duration and intensity of such conflict. In addition, it has also influenced the outcome thereof, as evidenced by development stagnation. According to Mbeki (2005: 3), one of the main reasons for wars and conflicts in Africa, since independence, has been the creation of arbitrary boundaries and new countries without regard to ethnic differences. Sandbrook (1985: 42) further notes that colonialists, while drawing the modern map of Africa, paid no attention to ethnic, cultural, and linguistic criteria and often put bitter enemies together or divided homogeneous groups into separate countries. Easterly and Levine (1997: 1214) claim

that the high level of ethnic diversity and widespread ethnic conflict stunted economic growth in post-independence Africa.


The goal of African colonizers was not the economic boom and modernization of the continent, but exploitation of African resources and labor that brought about confusion among Africans. This, of course, did not promote development. Mabogunje (2000: 147) argues that, during colonial rule, Africa experienced economic growth but lacked sustainable economic development. Economic growth was fueled by the introduction of crops such as coffee, cocoa, tea, and cotton, as well as the extraction of minerals and other natural resources, together with the development of infrastructure that would support this exploitation. Sandbrook (1985: 21) writes that colonial powers in Africa limited modernization and sustainable development by structuring the economies of their colonies in a self-serving fashion. The benefits they obtained included secure sources of inexpensive raw materials, foodstuffs and markets for their manufactured goods. Mabogunje (2000: 140) further notes that colonialists did nothing to help African countries develop, transform, and adopt their economies to a capitalist system of production or to enable them for sustainable economic growth.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The colonial system was set up in such a way that Africa became dependent on educated Europeans. At the same time, the majority of Africans did not receive any education, while those who were educated became the servants or assistants of their European rulers. This resulted in a shortage of qualified human resources that would assume leadership roles after independence, in order to promote development. Sandbrook (1985: 19-20) gives a few examples: At the time of independence in 1960, the DRC (Zaire) did not have any doctors, lawyers, or engineers. In 1965,

only 700 Nigerians held senior posts in the Nigerian civil service, compared to the 2,300 posts held by Europeans. Ayittey (1998: 41) notes that Tanzania had only 16 university graduates at the time of its independence. The Portuguese left Guinea-Bissau with only 14 university graduates and an illiteracy rate of 97%. Sandbrook (1985: 85) argues that colonial governments ruled through authoritarian administrative apparatuses, with a powerful governor at the helm. After independence, the majority of new African leaders simply continued to rule in the manner of their former colonizers. Political scientist Peter Schwab (2001: 26) writes of the destruction that colonialism left behind in Africa, thus limiting the future success of African States; independent Africa was given little opportunity to begin the era of freedom with much of a chance for political or economic success. Economies were destroyed; resources were all but stolen and removed to the Western metropolises; people were enslaved; ethnic harmony was sundered and often replaced by fratricide; elite traditional dichotomies were provoked as normative and customary authorities were made impotent; politics was treated dismissively; while obsequious politicians were infantilized (Peter Schwab, 2001: 30). Guest (2004: 9) argues that, if it was only colonialism that stunted development in Africa, the continent would have boomed when the settlers left. The legacy left by colonialism has disallowed sustainable development in Africa; this is considered the cause of the majority of conflicts on the continent.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


### **2.3.2.9. The Ideal Type Approach**

This approach groups societies into various types on the basis of characteristics that claim to be indicative of different stages of development. Hence, development is viewed as nothing more than a process of change in which developing countries become more like their industrialized counterparts (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981: 8-9). In other words, the development of poor

countries will depend on their becoming 'westernized' (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981: 9). Stockwell and Laidlaw wonder how this will happen, because this approach does not indicate how a transition from the traditional society to a modern one is supposed to take place. A low level of technology, rigid social structure, fatalistic attitude, and low per capita output are some of the causes of conflict in terms of the nature of the external economic relationship that wealthy industrialized nations have historically established between themselves and poor countries (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981: 11).

### 2. 3. 2. 10. The Diffusionist Approach

Diffusion is understood to be a process through which a cultural item rooted in one society is transferred to another. In its narrow sense, this concept is regarded as a process whereby a less developed country adopts a particular item or items from a more industrialized society in order to improve its own development (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981: 11).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

This approach points out that facts, such as the lack of surplus capital with which to invest in development programmes, possessing a low level of technology, and having a low need for achievement due to a social structure characterized by the status quo, are the main causes of conflict in developing countries. With regard to the diffusionist approach, Stockwell and Laidlaw (1981: 12-15) conclude that there is an ethnocentric aspect to it, in that it expects developing societies to become more like 'western societies' with respect to their attitudes and values, if they are to be developed. While it may be true that many aspects of developing countries' cultural belief systems represent potential obstacles to development, the need for some modification in this respect does not require that they become 'westernized'. From the point of

view of the societal approach to be taken in this study, the diffusionist model is limited by virtue of the fact that it explicitly places significant emphasis on the economic and social structural aspect of the problem, while paying attention to the equally important demographic dimension of the development problem.

Frank (1969: 48) argues that underdevelopment, according to this view, is the original 'traditional' state, as much as it is in the first mode. The tenets of this approach advise people in developing countries to await and welcome the diffusion of development aid from abroad. This approach also stresses that diffusion and acculturation bring about development. Resisting diffusion and acculturation leads to underdevelopment. In terms of the diffusionist approach, it seems clear that no society can be developed without becoming 'westernized'. This could be true if the concept of development is understood in the sense of western countries being the standard. Again, acculturation is a system that sparks conflict in developing countries in the sense that it denies one's culture or identity, which is the main cause of conflict that impedes development goals.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **2.3.2.11. Historical, Socio-Political Background as Sources of Conflict in Central Africa**

According to Dalley (2006: 303-319), conflicts in the African continent have a long history. Mpanjala and Mwansasa (2004: 2) argue that there have been legitimate and illegitimate conflicts in Africa, as argued above. Whereas legitimate conflicts have primarily been concerned with the struggle for total liberation of society from oppressive and exploitative regimes, illegitimate conflicts have not been guided by such objectives. Dalley (2006: 27) notes that conflicts in this category (illegitimate) are prompted by struggles for political power and


economic resources on the basis of ideologies such as ethnicity, racialism and religious antagonism. Mpangala and Mwansasa (2004: 29) note further that conflict in the DRC provides a typical example of such conflicts. Duly (2000: 8) notes that the DRC has been foremost in the number of conflicts going on in Central Africa in terms of scale and persistence, leading some to describe the region as suffering from 'conflict fatigue'.

The regional nature of Central Africa's conflict manifests itself in the fact that, while their origins are internal, civil wars tend to become regional conflicts in this area as they inevitably spill over into other countries in the region, often reinforcing each other. There are several reasons for this scenario. Uvin et al (2005: 70) argue that one reason is the fact that blood, cultural, and linguistic ties rarely correspond to national borders, both because of the arbitrary manner in which political boundaries of African countries were drawn in European capitals during the colonization of Africa, and because of the migratory and refugee flows (resultant of conflicts) which occurred within the countries in the region. Consequently, rebels can easily find refuge in neighbouring countries amongst people with whom they have much in common and, at times, share a cause. He further argued that people often see dynamics in neighbouring countries as a mirror of their own, reinterpreting internal events in terms of those borrowed from outside.

The regional nature of this conflict can also be explained by the deliberate actions of Central African political leaders who support the rebellious groups of their ethnic ties in neighbouring countries in order to weaken opposition ethnic groups in those neighbouring States (Kamukama, 1997: 3). Kamukama further explains this situation by highlighting the fact that all key power holders in the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda (Great Lake/Central African region) rose to

power through violent conflict launched from neighbouring countries; this causes them to be sceptical of anyone else contending for power so that they do all they can to prevent others from repeating their achievements.

However, these are only the results and not the causes of the conflicts themselves. Tracing the causes of Central Africa's conflicts, from a historical perspective, Paul Kagame argues that there are many views as to the causes of the conflicts in the Central Africa region. Some argue that the root cause is embedded in the pre-colonial social and political structures of societies in the region (Kamukama, 1997: 39). Others argue that the starting point in any discussion on the origin of conflicts in the region is the imposition by colonial powers of a system of ethnic identity and political/administrative structures that created divisions within societies in Central Africa. This latter situation, it is said, was perpetuated by the Hutu (citizens of Rwanda) regimes since independence in both Rwanda and Burundi, culminating to the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (Kagame, 2000: 40). Although Kagame accepts that recent years have seen many regions of Africa involved in war and external or internal conflict, he rightly contends that conflict is not exclusively an African phenomenon, neither is it endemic in the Central African Region, and rejects the prevailing view that Africa is conflict-centric. According to Kagame (2009), the conflicts experienced in the region are the manifestation of serious structural weaknesses. Their underlying causes have internal as well as external components. The interactions between the legacy of colonial history and the post-independence models of governance, as well as the international political, social, and global economic milieu in which this interaction occurs, is the appropriate context in which to explore the recurrent conflicts. The structural causes of the




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

conflicts include bad governance, the politics of discrimination and exclusion, as well as widespread State sponsored or State condoned human rights violations.

### 2. 3. 2. 11. 1. The Role of the West in the Intensification of Conflicts in Central Africa


The use of the term ethnicity, has gained much currency in scholarship over 'tribalism'; Jua and Nkwi (2001: 8) argue that ethnicity is a term that describes African specificity, which is being discarded because of its pejorative connotation. Ethnicity is the active sense of identification with some ethnic unit, whether or not this group has any institutional structure of its own, or whether it has any real existence in the pre-colonial epoch. Ethnicity is a fundamental social fact of life. Yet one needs to distinguish between its moral and strategic versions. When conceptualized as internal, these cognitive values engender moral ethnicity.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

Nowhere is ethnicity, as the defining mode of conflict, more tragically evident than in the Central Africa region. Yet, as we now realize, ethnicity as a descriptor of violence is a poor guide to unraveling the complexities of internal conflict situations, their interconnectedness in time and space, and the manner in which they enter the consciousness of both actors and outsiders. The analysis of the historical background to the problem of ethnic antagonism, which has been the primary factor behind violent conflicts in the Central African Region, is substantially related to colonialism. Mpangala (2004: 9) notes that the existence of primordial forms of ethnic groups among pre-colonial African societies in Central Africa is an indisputable fact; but ethnic antagonism and ethnic conflicts of the sort, and on the scale prevailing in the region today, are a colonial creation. However, this fact has not always been welcomed by many, and some analysts have simply dismissed any analysis that attributes current African miseries to

the legacy of colonialism. While it is true, as acknowledged elsewhere in this study, that recurrent and persistent conflicts in Africa especially those in Central Africa are caused by multiple factors, attempts to dissect Africa's current predicaments must revisit the complexity of the past. Thus, one of the fundamental historical questions in Central Africa's conflict revolves around whether ethnic conflicts, at least of the current scale, existed prior to colonial rule in the Region. Kamukama (1997: 39) argues that the historiography of the Central African region provides us with a negative answer to this question. He further argues that the history of Rwanda and Burundi indicates that these societies are made up of three social ethnic groups. The 'Twa', who relate to the pigmies, were the first inhabitants and form the smallest component of the population in both countries. Then came the 'Hutu' who belong to the Bantu group from Chad and Cameroon, and finally the 'Tutsi', who descended from Ethiopia.




## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

It is important to note that even if this region was not a land of peace and bucolic harmony before the coming of colonialism, there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of a systematic ethnic violence as such. There was therefore no particular confrontational relation, and the three groups lived side-by-side, shared the same culture and customs, spoke the same language, had the same clan names and lived together with no land distinctively being the home of any particular so-called ethnic group. According to Mpangala (2004: 27), colonialism invented the ethnicity factor out of the only difference which was visible to them, namely that of the division of labour, where the Hutus were crop cultivators, while the Tutsis were pastoralists and artisans. Mpangala further argues that colonial anthropologists associated the concept of ethnicity or tribalism with a primitive and barbarous mystique peculiar to the African, thus requiring 'a colonial civilizing mission.' However, through indirect rule, or rather the divide and rule system


of colonial administration, the colonialists realized the divisive nature of ethnic identity and, being essentially opportunistic, they opted to take advantage of it for their own interests at the expense of African citizens.

In order to fulfill its motive of producing raw materials and providing markets for European industrial products, the colonial State integrated African societies in the Central African Region into their colonial administrative systems, colonial economy and colonial ideology. In this process, 'racism' and 'civilizing mission' became a common ideology used as an instrument to justify colonialism. Its direct application meant the categorization of social relations into superior, less superior and inferior races for the Whites, Asians and Blacks respectively (Mpangala, 2001: 44). According to Dalley (2003), in order to understand the impact of colonialism on ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts in the Central African region, two aspects have to be taken into account. The first is the colonial ideology of racism. The second is the establishment of political boundaries, which were arbitrarily drawn in the Berlin Conference of 1885 in total disregard of the social, political and cultural interests of ethnic communities in the region. Racism is an ideological notion or dogma that condemns one racial group to congenital inferiority and another group to congenital superiority. While European colonialists in Africa use racist ideology to justify colonial domination, oppression and exploitation, the same racist ideology was used to divide Africans into antagonistic ethnic groups on the basis of superior and inferior categories. Members of each ethnic group in the region were allocated different roles within the framework of the colonial systems in the Members of each ethnic group consideration of superiority and qualities. In Central Africa, where the Belgians took over colonial administration, the system of indirect rule was inherited with necessary modifications. These



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


modifications necessitated various changes aimed at transforming Central Africa into ‘modern’ societies; they also necessitated the introduction of various reform measures. These included a formal institutionalization of ethnicity by dividing society into ethnic groups (Kamukama, 1997: 6). Everyone was then issued with an identity card, stating his or her ethnicity. It was upon production of this identity card that colonial authorities could determine the allocation of various opportunities in society, including schools, civil services, and the like, according to the ethnic group to which one belonged. Kamukama further argues that the system, for example in Rwanda, promoted members of the Tutsi ethnic group as the elite and educated ruling class. The colonial administration reserved ruling positions exclusively for Tutsis through a biased system of education, which regarded the Tutsi as the more superior race of Hamitic origin. Their subjects, the Hutus, were considered as an inferior ethnic group of Bantu origin. Sarkin (2001: 70) argues that racial distinction was based on height and differences in complexion and may have been an attempt to identify and give preference to those perceived as having a ‘more European’ look. The shorter, darker Hutus were classified as Bantu, a term considered analogous to the serfs of medieval European feudalism. The lighter-skinned Tutsis were earmarked for leadership positions because the Belgians ascribed to them a greater intelligence and ability for leadership, while the Hutus were denied any privileges and relegated to the status of peasants. This was the beginning of formalized social stratification on an ethnic basis, changing the once flexible class boundary between these two social groups into a sharp and insurmountable ethnic barrier.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


Cone and Solomon (2004: 51) argue that in the DRC, the role of colonialism in making ethnicity the focal point of identity was not different. When the Belgian colonial administration assumed control over the Belgian Congo, cultural organizations based on ethnic identity were permitted,

making ethnic membership a form of identification. Additionally, ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts in the DRC are mainly a continuation of the same in neighbouring States which, as outlined above, is a colonial creation. These racial distinctions later became the cornerstone for ethnic conflicts that ensued in the entire area, i.e. Central Africa. The second aspect is the link between the artificial nature of political borders in the Central African region (as elsewhere in Africa) and ethnic conflicts. This link is made on the premise that these imposed borders, which disregarded ethnic groups and natural resource distribution, inevitably led to internal ethnic conflicts, territorial disputes accompanied by separatist groups and persistent disputes over natural resources. In this respect, colonial bureaucrats designed territorial boundaries in Africa along cultural tribal units, and imagined them as socio-political units for action (Dalley, 2006: 319). These artificial borders divided people who were under the same political organization prior to colonialism. For instance, the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda-Urundi, who intermingled as one society before the coming of colonialism, were separated; some came under the current Rwanda and Burundi, while others were left as minorities within Uganda and the Belgian Congo (Zaire). Thus, as rightly argued by Kagame, the artificial boundaries created by former colonial masters had the effect of bringing together many different people within nations that were not prepared for the cultural and ethnic diversity (especially when a new regime was going to foster ethnic conflict), and separating language, religious and ethnic communities. In short, in order to protect, defend and prolong their interests, some Western actors in the region have fuelled the conflicts and variously obstructed the peace processes for a long time. In the 19th and 20th centuries' scramble, the brutality, of genocidal proportions, was committed in the clambering after ivory and rubber. In the current scramble, the loot is diamonds, gold, coltan, copper, cobalt, timber, wildlife reserves and fiscal resources (Baregu, 2002: 11). Indeed, the current role of the



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

West in the intensification of conflicts in the Central African region can be summarized into three corners of inter-imperialist rivalries between Western powers in the region. In one corner stands the United States with its quest for global dominance and insatiable appetite for the strategic minerals of the region in order to feed its military-industrial complex; this includes its electronic, aeronautics, nuclear medicine, and missile technology etc. Baregu states that, since the 1960s, Western countries have had geo-political interests in the Central African region. They helped to establish the autocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, who they strongly supported, in the DRC between 1965 and the 1990s. They are also strategically bent on bringing to an end the old colonial spheres of influence as presently defined by British, French and Belgian interests. These realities rendered many conflicts and civil wars in the African continent which impeded development goals.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

**2. 3. 2. 12. Political and Socio-Economic Demise and the Rise of Discrimination and Deprivation in the DRC**

With the advent of the natural resources boom, Congolese masses and government acquired an illusion of wealth. Everyone felt that the DRC is rich and everything is possible and many argued that money is no longer a constraint to development (Anise, 1980). The natural resources scramble is, however, not to last long as years of economic mismanagement brought conflict, discrimination and corruption by an unproductive, decadent, and corrupt ruling class brought the Congolese to the glaring reality of poverty (Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985). Today, the Congolese ask what natural resources have done for them; many in fact argue that natural resources are a curse that fuels conflict, instead of promoting the development of the country (Omotola, 2006: 10). According to various human development indices, such as health, nutrition, infant mortality,

and education, the Congolese are worse off today than they were in the past. This has led many scholars to conclude that the management of the DRC economy now constitutes a real danger to the well-being of its people (Alubo, 1990; Ihonvbere & Ekekwe, 1988). Today, despite the DRC's natural resources and other riches in the country (Orogun, 2004); policies to stem poverty, discrimination and insecurity have failed despite domestic and international interventions in conflict resolution (Agba, Ushie & Akwara, 2009: 2). The Congolese thus suffer in the midst of abundance in spite of the billions spent on poverty eradication initiatives (Osaghae *et al.*, 1998). The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 2000) estimated that 65% of the Congolese people are undernourished. Since the 1980s, poverty has been considered an urban and rural problem with 28% of rural dwellers living below the poverty line compared to 17% of the urban populace, because of the effects brought by discrimination. By the 1990s, however, poverty had become pervasive and was affecting both the urban and rural populace (Ogwumike, 2002). This situation has been further confounded by neo-liberal economic policies and the recent global economic downturn (Agba *et al.*, 2009). The causes of poverty have been theorized to include discrimination and ethnic conflicts, a huge foreign debt burden, natural disasters, poor governance, ill conceived policies and massive unhindered corruption (Ali, Mwabu & Gesami, 2002).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The Afrobarometer (2006) survey found that at the inception of the election held in 2006, after years of military misrule, many Congolese hoped for 'dividends of democracy,' these are: political liberties, better governance, and improved standards of living. However, everything collapsed after the election. Consequently, these expectations have been met with disappointment and frustration as democracy has merely brought political violence, increased


discrimination, corruption, ineffective government and heightened economic deprivation (Agba et al: 2009). Scholars have explained these episodes of conflict and the reaction of the Congolese to these conditions within a number of perspectives.

### 2. 3. 2. 12. 1. Explanations of Reaction to Discrimination and Deprivation in DRC

Since independence, the DRC has had some experience of conflicts (Akpan, 2007). These include the ‘Katanga secession’ uprising in the erstwhile Eastern region in the 1961s, the ‘Tiv’ riots and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. It may be argued that the Congolese conflict (1960-1965; 1996-2003) is the most costly episode of violence in the DRC history. However, Olukoshi (1998: 16) argues that the economic crisis which commenced in the 1980s consequent upon the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) served to undermine State capacity and legitimacy thus removing the structures and authoritarianism, and creating an endless spiral of crisis after crisis (Osaghae, 1995). While most of these episodes have been described as stemming from ethnic and regional mobilization, especially with the recent formation of ethnic militias (Mai-Mai and Tutsi Congolese) masquerading as freedom fighters, the recent crisis in the Eastern region of the Congo has had a significant impact on the ability of the country to retain its territorial and economic integrity. Akpan (2007: 162) aptly describes the situation in the DRC’s Eastern region with the assertion that the region ‘has since 1994s witnessed an almost unbroken orgy of violence and militarization’. Official estimates indicate that since the beginning of conflict in 1996, over 6,000,000 people have died because of conflict (Singer, 2000). While most explanations of this situation have been within the ambit of ethnic identity, class, clientelism as well as discrimination, there have however been limited attempts to utilize a relative deprivation perspective.

### 2. 3. 2. 12. 2. The Relative Deprivation Explanation

Agbu (2007: 13) argues that with increasing deprivation and desolation, consequent upon neo-liberal economic globalization, vast proportions of Congolese urban dwellers were rendered unemployed and 'anomic'. These segments of the population therefore become a ready base for the recruitment of criminals, 'area boys and girls' and members of ethnic militias. Anifowoshe (2000:5) used relative deprivation theory and the frustration-aggression nexus to explain the emergence of ethnic militias in the DRC. He argues that the origin of these militias is attributable to frustrated expectations consequent upon the nation's economic demise; 'mass misgivings over perceived political marginalization, poverty and unemployment, collapse of social infrastructure and State welfare programmes as well as the perceived inefficient and corrupt State security system'.




## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

As the declining economic climate created acute discontent and frustration among the people, military rule repressed people's reactions. However, the advent of democracy was accompanied by the euphoria of expectations of increased political and economic freedom; the frustration consequent upon the failure of the new democratic government to provide the much taunted 'dividends of democracy' gave rise to violence (Anifowoshe, 2000: 6). The relative deprivation explanation has, however, not received as much acceptance as explanations based on class and ethnicity.

### 2. 3. 2. 12. 3. Class and Ethnicity Paradigms

The colonial State bequeathed to the DRC at independence powers above all other structures of society, retaining for itself absolute control of massive economic resources (Idowu, 1999). As the State is the custodian of political power needed for accumulation (Ekekwe, 1985: 53), it then


becomes the central actor in the formation and mediation of conflicts. While it has been argued that internal discrimination is the cause of conflict between economic and social groupings in the DRC (Adedeji, 1999: 32), Nolutshungy (1996: 2) avers that the State is central to the process of discrimination. Alavi (1972) argues that, at independence, post-colonial States in Africa inherited a bureaucratic-military apparatus that was overdeveloped in relation to society for the sake of maintaining the subordinate status of the latter to colonial interests. The State thus appropriates economic surplus in the name of development, thus fostering territorial unity and legitimacy (Idowu, 1999). Ake (1985: 43-65) argues that class struggles consequent upon attempts to hijack the State and the consumerist character of the dominant classes are the precursors for instability in the DRC; this proposes that class politics are central to the DRC's problems. Ake (1996: 42) contends that 'instead of being a public force, the State in Africa tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite'. In the same vein, Onimode (1988: 97-125) avers that the class struggle stimulates conflicts in the DRC and is central to an understanding of socio-economic inequality. The DRC, for Onimode, is therefore polarized between the political power holders and the working people, resulting in an intra-class and inter-class struggle between bourgeois and working class ideologies.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

However, the view of the DRC situation as amenable to a class analysis has been contended. Idowu (1999: 43) argues that given the heterogeneous ethnic environment in which these 'classes' have had to engage in struggle, and the fact that ethnic identities tend to be stronger than class identities, an analysis of the Congolese situation using a 'class' prism produces a

jaundiced picture. In a failed State like the DRC<sup>2</sup>, which sustains ethnic parochialism, institutions ultimately collapse and anarchy eventually ensues as ethnic groups contend for power (Snyder, 1993: 12). This causes ethnicity to be held as a superior paradigm for explaining contentions. Idowu (1999: 44) therefore argues that ethnicity transcends other loyalties to become the sole basis of identity. Studies have unveiled mobilization on the basis of religious and ethnic, rather than class identities, as precursors for needless violence and wars in Africa (Idowu, 1999; Ukiwo, 2005). Mobilization on the basis of ethnicity has been used to garner solidarity for in-groups and negative bias and hostility towards out-groups in order to stimulate conflicts in Africa. Therefore, Ukiwo (2005: 4) argues that competition for political power and resources in the DRC is based on ethnic and class identity. This ethnicity and class manifests in a variety of forms, including voting and political party support, community service and violence.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*


### 2.3.2.12.4. Ethnicity

Ethnicity is now regarded as the central prism for analyzing all problems associated with the DRC (Ukiwo, 2005). Thus, much of the social scientific scholarly material on the DRC has been inspired by the ethnicity paradigm. Osaghae (1995:11) defines ethnicity as; 'The employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation'. Ethnicity entails the behaviour of groups with ascribed membership, which is reinforced through self-identification as well as in-group affirmation (Ukiwo, 2005: 21). Nnoli (1978, 1995) argues extensively that ethnic identities and conflicts flourish in the context of economic crisis and poverty. Osaghae (1995) shows how Structural Adjustment heightened the mobilization of ethnic identity in the DRC.

---

<sup>2</sup> DRC is ranked 24<sup>th</sup> on the *Foreign Policy Failed States Index* for 2010. (Accessed @ [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010\\_failed\\_states\\_interactive\\_map\\_and\\_ranking](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_interactive_map_and_ranking) on 12th November, 2010).

Instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity argue that ambitious classes and regional elites manipulate ethnic identities to suit class interests, thereby politicizing it in its quest for State power and wealth (Varshney, 2002; Diamond 1988, Post & Vickers 1973). The implication of this argument is that, ordinarily, people do not engage in conflict except at the behest of the elite. Ukiwo (2005) therefore avers that there is a tendency to exonerate the agency of the subordinate classes in privileging the role of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes leading to what Hodgkin (cited in Jinadu, 2004:7) aptly calls the ‘clever elite/dumb mass thesis’. Isumonah & Gaskia (2001:74) concurred with this thesis; ‘In virtually all the conflicts, the role of ethnic entrepreneurs who mobilize ethnic grievances in pursuit of their material interest has been decisive. Politicians, businessmen and youth leaders have been implicated in virtually all the conflicts. And usually the aim has been to mobilize ethnic grievances to achieve personal and individual objectives, which are often times even subversive of collective communal interests’.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The common feature of such arguments is the centrality of the State and conspiratorial bourgeois elements in fostering violence to suit their goals, a trend that has been reported in studies of conflicts elsewhere in Africa (Mandami, 2001). Osaghae (1995:21) avers that ‘It is the perception of inequality and discrimination held by actors rather than actual inequality and discrimination that leads to action. In some cases, inequalities and discrimination are exaggerated to justify action or mobilize group solidarity...It is not so much deprivation or disadvantage that engenders ethnic action, it is rather the prospects of advancement from them’.

This instrumentalist assumption, which pervades the literature, fails to demonstrate how congruence emerges between the interests of ethnic leaders and those of their followers (Ukiwo,

2005). This would require an investigation into the nature of horizontal inequalities among ethnic groups and the responses of groups to such inequalities. The use of the State as an instrument for private capital accumulation places a high premium on the acquisition of political power (Ihonvbere, 1989), thus intensifying political competition within the dominant class, and engenders intra-class conflicts and political instabilities. The successes of the elite classes, in their instrumental manipulations, have been adduced to an array of factors, one of which is 'clienticism'.

### 2.3.2.13. Theory of Development Approaches

#### 2.3.2.13.1. Introduction



A universal picture to be found in any African country is that conflict is an obstacle to development, where the outcomes of it reflect poor education and/or weak opportunities, lack of infrastructure, and lead to a weak existence. Yet, it is fitting to ask why these conflicts are not properly resolved and why they are still so prevalent in African countries (DAW, 2000; Dulansey & Austin, 1991: 110; Govind & Nathan, 2005: 3; UNDP, 2001: 24; UNDP, 2005a: 61; UNDP, 2006c: 3).

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The concept of conflict is a relatively new concern in the field of development. Those who work on conflict do not work on development. The issue of conflict and development in the African continent is a complex theme that has gained increasing importance in development theory and conflict over the years. However, the way in which conflict resolutions have featured in development thought, and the efforts to address issues that cause conflict in African countries, show no clear linear progression nor were these changes universally embraced. Before we focus

on the role of conflict resolution in development, it is important to take a brief look at development thought over the years, so as to better situate the role of conflict resolution within this process.

### **2. 3. 2. 13. 2. The Historical Progression of Development Thought**

The earliest development policies have their roots in the days of European colonialism, when growth and modernization were implicitly seen as the prevailing answer to development challenges. To a large extent, administrations simply applied the essence of the 19th century's European Poor Laws which allowed that social needs were to be taken care of within the free market while governments busied themselves with maintaining law and order (Moser, 1993: 34).




In practice, this meant that charities tended to step in where limited government assistance failed. In many cases this policy continued even after colonial independence.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **2. 3. 2. 13. 3. The Modernization Theory**

World War II marked the beginning of a new phase in development. The period following the war was a time for reflection, re-evaluation and reconstruction. A new awareness that poverty does not have to be a permanent feature of society, the Cold War (with the First and Second worlds vying for the attention of the Third World), the strain of the population explosion on resources, and the rapid rate with which erstwhile colonies gained independence, were all reasons for a growing interest in development economics (Streeten, 1979: 23). This led, in large, to development emerging as an independent field of study, with poverty reduction becoming a growth industry, so to speak. President Truman's inaugural speech is generally viewed as the seed from which development planning sprouted (Morse, 2004: 71; Willis, 2005: 12). He

proposed that poverty was a global concern and that *'we should make available to peace-loving people the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life...What we envisage is a programme of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing'* (Truman, 1949 as quoted in Willis, 2005: 10). During these early years, solutions to poverty and underdevelopment were sought in the area of economic growth. Although this is historically viewed as a single paradigm, Streeten (1979: 35) points out that this period was a heady time when optimism reigned and ideas and criticisms were proliferated. Factor price equalization, equilibrating forces, economic growth, capital/output and savings ratios, capital accumulation, propensity to save, balanced and unbalanced growth, growth poles, the big push, critical minimum effort, linear-stages theory, take-off and structural change models became the vocabulary of the day and names like Hirschman, Prebisch, Harrod, Domar, Nurkse, Rosenstein-Rodan, Singer, Darian, Kuznets, Schumpeter, Schultz, Lewis and Rostow leading debates in the field (Streeten, 1979:24, Willis, 2005: 15). Industrialization and the creation of a modern society were seen as both the panacea for poverty and the fulfillment of the stewardship notion of empire by preparing the 'locals' for taking over the reins from the colonizers (Morse, 2004: 72, Streeten, 1979: 36). This was done by means of a transfer of technology and skills by encouraging commodity trade (Willis, 2005: 16). The assumptions were:




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

1. That economic growth would lead to an increased demand for labour and to increased income, which, in turn, would trickle down to the lowest levels of society, thereby lifting the standard of living for all, or
2. That government could be relied upon to facilitate an appropriate distribution, or

3. That, after the initial inequality, the rich would create a substantial productive basis from which poverty could be eradicated and inequality addressed (Streeten, 1979: 35).

The result of this modernization approach, apart from the wave of countries that gained independence (102 between 1949 and 1979 (Streeten, 1979: 22)), was economic growth; however, this happened without the anticipated gain in widespread prosperity. This phase of development, with its focus on economic growth and its top-down style of implementation, is known as the modernization era that lasted until the end of the 1960s (Coetzee, 2001: 25), which was also the end of what the United Nations declared to be the Development Decade (Burkey, 1993: 26).




#### 2. 3. 2. 13. 4. The Structuralist School of development

### University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

Whereas modernization theory was based on European experiences, the Structuralist approach, which also originated in the fifties, was the product of the Latin American Structuralist School, with Prebisch, Furtado and Sunkel as its main proponents (Martinussen, 1997: 20). Although it supported the concept of development through economic growth, it argued that free trade was not the answer, since the erstwhile global environment prevailing during European industrialization, and on which the modernization theory was based, had changed or differed from that of many developing countries. Underdevelopment was not regarded as a linear phase en route to development, but rather as a permanent structural characteristic. The permanence of this structure implied that changes would take time and be expensive (Furtado, 1980: 84; Martinussen, 1997: 32). This school of thought also questioned the appropriateness and wisdom of the type of technology being transferred to the developing world, pointing to the close

relationship between such technology and the social structures of their countries of origin (Furtado, 1980: 88). Its proponents were in favour of import substitution industrialization (ISI), which entailed the protection of local industries through tariff barriers, combined with industrial planning, land reforms to alleviate inequalities and discrimination in land distribution and external financial assistance as the path to development, i.e. for Latin America at least (Martinussen, 1997: 33; Willis, 2005: 15). This school, which distinguished between the centre and the periphery as early as 1950s, is seen as the forerunner of the Dependency School of thought (Martinussen, 1997: 33).




### **2. 3. 2. 13. 5. The Dependency Theory and the World-systems**

Dependency theory is in direct contrast to modernization theory, which proposes capitalism as the panacea for conflict and underdevelopment in the third-world. Dependency theory and its successor, world-systems theory, maintain that capitalism caused conflict and underdevelopment in the third-world. Whilst modernization theory is rooted in neo-classical economics, the theoretical approaches mentioned above draw on Marxism (Graaff, 2001: 21). Together these three theories form the historical foundation of development studies (Graaff & Venter, 2001: 18). Both dependency theory and the world-systems theory hold to the basic principles that the world is one unit, rather than a set of separate countries and that capitalism causes conflict and underdevelopment through the exploitation of the Third World by the First World (Wallerstein, 1979: 199 & 1999: 193).

The thrust of dependency theory was that the erstwhile empire-colonial power relations had merely been replaced by core-periphery power relations of the capital system and that unequal

exchange was still the reason for underdevelopment. As per André Gunder Frank, with his notion of ‘development of underdevelopment’ (Chew & Denmark, 1996: 3), underdevelopment in peripheral countries and development in core countries were two sides of the same coin (Frank, 1969: 10; Graaff & Venter, 2001: 24), thus implying that the rich were the cause of the poor. This analysis was applied on both a national and an international level. It was maintained that on a national level, the urban areas developed at the expense of rural areas, while internationally; through unequal terms of trade, the capitalist world conspired to keep the developing world underdeveloped by means of exploitation and the withdrawal of resources and skilled labour to the developed world (Davids, Theron & Maphunye, 2005: 11). The solution (i.e. development) was presented as the deconstruction of these power relationships by cultivating self-sufficiency, industrialization through import substitution, insulation from the international system by ‘delinking’, and the promotion of regional integration and socialist self-sufficiency (Burkey, 1993: 14; Davids et al., 2005: 12; Frank, 1996: 24; Morse, 2004: 76; Streeten, 1979: 10; Willis, 2005: 23). Nevertheless, this theory garnered only limited support due to fundamental flaws (Burkey, 1993: 15; Sachs, 2005: 16) and it lasted only into the seventies. Yet, it brought focus to the prevailing power relations and their negative externalities in the developing world. For example, the so-called ‘dependency thinking’ mindset, of many in developing countries, which holds that governments or aid agencies are expected to develop society, is considered one of the social causes of conflict and poverty, even decades after the end of colonialism and the attainment of independence (Burkey, 1993: 15).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

World-systems theory expanded on dependency theory by adding one more (vertical) layer to international relations; this is the semi-periphery that serves as a buffer between the core and the

periphery (Wallerstein, 1979: 201). Moreover, it identified a horizontal distinction between countries, indicating that there were also inter-country differences within each of the vertical layers. Whereas dependency theory offered only one solution out of the prevailing power relations, namely moving out, world-systems theory offered one more option; that of moving up or down the hierarchy within the prevailing world system. This theory also attracted much criticism, yet it is seen as a more sophisticated version of dependency theory (Graaff & Venter, 2001: 23), highlighting the long-term futility of imbalances in the world system (Wallerstein, 1979: 207).




### 2. 3. 2. 13. 6. The Basic needs theory, Global interdependence and the Regulationists

The seventies brought a renewed perspective on the nature and cause of conflict, together with a realization that the assumptions upon which modernization theory had been based had proved to be incorrect. The dualistic nature of underdeveloped economies, where a modern (advanced) sector existed alongside a traditional (backward) sector, also became abundantly clear (Burkey, 1993: 24). The focus shifted towards rural development and employment as a poverty-reduction strategy towards avoiding conflict. It was, however, soon discovered that unemployment was a Western concept and brought conflict among developing countries, thereby making it inappropriate for analyzing conflict in the developing world. It was noted that ‘the truly poor cannot afford unemployment’ and are ready to fight for their right (Streeten, 1980: 183), thus indicating that inadequate remuneration and unproductive work were an issue. The ‘informal sector’, a term coined at this time, was recognized as a potentially productive labour force, rather than merely another name for the unemployed, thus leading to a renewed focus on the ‘working poor’ and how their incomes and productivity could be increased (Streeten, 1980: 34). This, in

turn, highlighted the links between growth and redistribution, which resulted in a new strategy focusing on conditions under which 'redistribution with growth' could be achieved. This redistribution approach, found to be wanting in terms of poverty eradication, soon made way for a focus on the needs of those living in absolute poverty.

This signaled a distinct departure from the hitherto narrow income-based definition of poverty towards a view of poverty that incorporates a lack of access to resources such as the basic necessities of life (food, shelter and water), access to public services (education, health care and transport), differentiated and continued unemployment as well as nonmaterial needs like self-determination, dignity and participation in decision-making processes (Streeten, 1979: 7). The basic needs approach, as this paradigm was termed, was part of a new school of thought, termed 'Another Development' or 'Alternative Development' that embraced normative concepts of development, i.e. how development should take place, as opposed to the positivist approaches of the modernization and the dependency theories, which limited theories to how development actually transpires (Burkey, 1993: 45). Social inequality also featured as a strong theme in the theories of this school (Martinussen, 1997: 23).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

In concentrating on the specific needs of deprived groups and thereby placing them in the centre of the development process (Streeten, 1980: 27), the basic needs approach focused on the ends, rather than the means to eradicate poverty. It advocated greater focus on the agricultural and informal sectors' production development, while simultaneously urging for increased public service provision, specifically with the needs of the poor in mind (Willis, 2005: 9). The International Labour Organization (ILO) actively promoted the basic needs approach as a more

appropriate solution to conflict and underdevelopment, presenting its tenets at the 1976 ILO World Conference on 'Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress and the International Division of Labour' (Minhas, 1979: 7). The World Bank and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) also embraced the basic needs approach, which laid the groundwork for development to evolve from economic development to human development (Burkey, 1993: 13; Denuelin, 2004: 17).

The 1970s also initiated ideas on global interdependence, driven especially by the 1973 oil crisis and a growing concern for the depletion of resources (Burkey, 1993: 31; Streeten, 1979: 12). It was argued that this interdependency could assume one of three forms, namely demand dependence (also called asymmetrical dependence), supply dependence, and welfare dependence based on comparative advantage. The basic premise of the global interdependence strategy was the transfer of vast amounts of resources to the developing world to stimulate economic growth, which would in turn stimulate demand for products from industrial countries (Martinussen, 1997: 21). One of the products of this era was the demand for a new international economic order which would rebalance international relations in favour of the developing world. The Brandt Commission Report, proposing substantial transfers of financial resources to the Third World, was another development strategy of the time; a strategy regarded by some to have instigated the eventual world debt crisis (Burkey, 1993: 3; Sachs, 2005: 20). A further product of the seventies was the Marxist-oriented French 'Régulation' School. The basic tenet of this school is that capitalism is not a force unto itself, but that it is maintained by a set of social relations and structures that keeps it functioning (Klerck, 2001: 23). The focus thus moved away from the concept of determinism in the market structure to an understanding of the mechanisms that keep




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

capitalism intact. According to regulationists, the 'mode of development' is the function of a regime of accumulation, an industrial paradigm, and of a mode of regulation. They argue that accumulation takes place within a milieu of social norms, the content of these being determined by civil society and institutionalized by the government. The contribution of the Regulationist School lies in its identification of the social conditions within which growth, or expanded accumulation, takes place (Klerck, 2001: 18).

### **2.3.2.13.7. The Neo-liberalism Theory, Sustainable Development and Capabilities**

Whilst these debates continued, the period between 1950 and 1980 saw a drop in living standards for most of Africa, Asia and South America with the result that this period came to be known as a 'development tragedy' (Davids et al., 2005: 5). The scope of development widened and became increasingly multidisciplinary and integrated, the latter was due, in part, to projects focusing on infrastructure building. Perspectives on what development entails were thus expanded (Morse, 2004: 30). After an era of so-called Keynesian-based development approaches, i.e. development approaches embracing top-down strategies, the eighties also brought renewed perspectives on the role of the State, accountability and the free market. This led to yet another paradigm shift in the field of development (and economics in general), known as neo-liberalism (Willis, 2005: 20). The top-down management of development became passé, with micro-intervention, 'people-centered development' and participation becoming the mantra of the day (Davids et al., 2005: 26; Morse, 2004: 30). It was during this time that a myriad of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), viewed as the 'answer to all development issues' due to their grass-roots nature, came into existence (Willis, 2005: 21). Thus, inequality started to feature prominently as a development issue that should be addressed.

Two major strands of development thought stemmed from this period. The first, admittedly with a rather limited audience, was the so-called neo-populist approach (Morse, 2004: 35) which included, amongst others, the actor-oriented theory and the Anti-development, or Post-development School. These essentially criticized the hitherto top-down approaches and moved to promote local participation at all levels of development. The Anti-development School views development as being a 'Northbased' product, forged on what is considered a correct form of development imposed on local communities without regard for local context. The result of this is the destruction of both local culture and the local environment (Willis, 2005: 21). It argues for grass-roots involvement and assigning priority to the views of local communities in development programmes so as to ensure local thinking as opposed to global thinking. Although this paradigm has never gained much of a foothold and has been criticized on many levels, its value lies in its highlighting the manner in which prevailing power relations have influenced development approaches over time (Willis, 2005: 207).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The other neo-liberal line of thought was the paradigm of sustainable development that highlighted the need for a symbiotic relationship between the economy, society and the environment (Martinussen, 1997: 14). The forerunner of this approach was the 1987 Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), which was commissioned by the United Nations (UN) to assess the environmental and developmental problems of the world and to suggest possible solutions (Willis, 2005: 22). According to this approach, development takes care of human needs within the context of a global-village's responsibility to future generations. This replaces the paradigm of development being a desired achievement, attained by some and aspired to by others. It argues for a standard of consumption

that lies within the reach of all people, while also lying within the limits of ecological sustainability (Martinussen, 1997: 28). This approach championed the importance of the individual in the development process, while reflecting upon development as a multidimensional and multidisciplinary process which merges poverty alleviation with environmental protection. This school of thought has resulted in the hosting of two international Earth Summits where action plans were formulated to engage all nations (not very successfully) in sustainable development (Martinussen, 1997: 22; Sachs, 2005: 219).




The criticism of one strategy fits all nature of the sustainable development paradigm led, in part, to the rise of one more of the Alternative Development School's fledglings, the Eco-development School (Sachs, 2005: 220). The proponents of this school argue for the creation of separate and specific development strategies for each ecological region, taking local culture, social and ecological environment and community needs into consideration. It means that there is no international benchmark of what a state of development would entail; this is to be decided by societies themselves, according to their specific cultures and ecologies (Martinussen, 1997: 23). As Burkey (1993: 32) points out, this school recognizes the outer boundaries for economic growth and environmental exploitation, while the basic needs paradigm of development sets the inner boundaries of what is acceptable at a minimum level.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The eighties also brought Sen's introduction of the concept of 'development as freedom' and his capability approach, which marked a true watershed in development thought. His paradigm, which is categorized as part of the alternative development perspective mentioned earlier, takes a broad view on development as the process of expanding human freedoms. In order to attain

development, the ‘unfreedoms’ from which people suffer must be removed from society (Sen, 1999: 10). The freedoms to which he refers include processes, opportunities, political freedom, economic freedom, social opportunity, transparency guarantees and protective security (Sen, 1999: 11). These freedoms enhance the basic capabilities that people have to lead the life they value, and have reason to value (Sen, 1999: 18). Apart from the intrinsic value of freedoms, such freedoms also have an instrumental role as a means to development. The value of this approach lies in the central role it assigns to people in the development process: people are given the opportunity (capabilities) to shape their own future instead of being mere recipients of development programmes (Sen, 1999: 53). Growth and income are therefore neither rejected nor dismissed, but rather supplemented with the concept of freedom (Martinussen, 1997: 23).



### 2.3.2.13.8. Human Development and Social Capital


## University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

Drawing on Sen’s capability approach and earlier alternative development theories, the concept of ‘human development’ was introduced, under the leadership of Mahbub ul Haq, in the 1990 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report. It was argued that economic growth implies the expansion of only one choice, namely income, while human development promotes the enlargement of all human choices pertaining to the economic, social, cultural and political dimensions of life (Martinussen, 1997: 24). It still supports the expansion of income, but it questions the efficacy of the market mechanism to take care of the needs of the poor and, as such, suggested that public policy was required to create a link between increased human development and increased income (Martinussen, 1997: 24). The original concept of human development proposed enhancement in the areas of longevity, attainment of knowledge and

standard of living, but this has since been expanded to include aspects of equality share and empowerment (UNDP, 1995: 12).

The nineties brought the concept of 'social-capital' to the fore. Although it did not constitute a new paradigm, it did add another dimension to the prevailing views on development since social capital can be viewed as both an asset of society and a 'resource of persons' on which claims can be placed (Burger & Booyesen, 2006: 2). The World Bank even went as far as to declare social capital the 'missing link' of development (Willis, 2005: 17).



### 2. 3. 2. 13. 9. A New Agenda for a New Millennium

The declaration of the United Nations, adopted by 189 nations in 2000, drew upon the rich history in development thinking to set up a global development agenda that binds its member States, and, by implication, the international community, to halve global poverty by 2015 (UNDP, 2006: 6). It aims to do so through the achievement of eight development goals, known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The call for the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the achievement of universal primary education, attainment of gender equality and empowerment of women, a reduction in child mortality, improved maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and the development of a global partnership for development. Judged from the international cooperation here it is clear that development thinking has made fundamental progress over time: the eradication of human poverty now stands at par with the acknowledgement of human rights as part of a development strategy (UNDP, 2005: 6).

This concludes the overview of leading thoughts on development from a Western inspired perspective (Martinussen, 1997: 24). With full acknowledgement of the significant body of Third World-based writings on this topic, which will not be covered in this study, it is clear that until such time as different countries are on a more or less equal footing in terms of relative prosperity, new theories on development will continue to proliferate.

#### 2. 4. Conclusion

The different models and theories of conflict and development discussed above contribute to the exploration of the complexities of development. It could be drawn from the above discussions that the causes of conflicts which affect development in Africa, generally, and in the DRC, in particular, are indeed many and varied in both nature and destructive consequences. Some may be deeply rooted in history while others are consequences of the colonial experience or the exigencies of the cold war; or the result of inappropriate policies, bad governance, ethnicity, and political and socio-economic discrimination or inequalities. Some are even caused the as a lack of implementation of conflict resolution, empowerment and citizenship entitlements; the down side of the development and democratization processes; and incompetent, irresponsible and bad leadership.

The various methods, strategies and mechanisms outlined and drawn from policy articulation and institutional involvement are crucial. It is the manner in which one intervention relates to another and how the work of one entity compliments another that should be refined in improving conflict resolution outcomes in order to promote development. The answer to the implementation of conflict resolution - in identifying, preventing, managing or resolving conflicts – in order to

promote development lies mainly in understanding fully and objectively the nature and historical origins of conflict by making good structures of work, through consolidation of different efforts. This chapter has discussed the policy documents guiding conflict resolution towards promoting development and has offered a critique of a number of views on the subject of conflict and development. The following chapter explores the technical aspects related to the research methodology employed in this study.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## CHAPTER THREE:


### Methodology

#### 3. 1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters it was argued that conflict is an obstacle to development. As such, conflict resolution can be used to promote development. In the second chapter a theoretical framework was offered for analytical purposes. In this chapter the methodology adopted to investigate conflict resolution as a challenge to development, in the DRC, will be historical methodology. The methodology is augmented and strengthened by reference to a range of disciplines, such as public policy, history, social change and political science. Reference to a broad range of disciplines is intended to provide greater insight into the topic and increase the validity of the approach used. The inter-disciplinary approach adopted in this thesis is necessitated both by the multi-disciplinarity of the topic under investigation and the intended contribution to the policy debate, which is the aim of the research.

The approach of this study is both of a primary and secondary order nature. Whereas studies of a first-order nature engage in archival recordings or empirical observation, that is, the collection and investigation of immediate experiential data, the approach used in this study consists of a historical analysis of conflict resolution as a challenge to development. Traditionally, conflict is a characteristic of human existence and a process of change in human relationships. It is part of the dynamics of life, which drive humanity into the future. Development is construed as a process of enlarging people's choices, enhancing participatory democratic processes and the ability to participate in the making of decisions that shape their lives, providing human beings

with the opportunity to develop their fullest potential, whilst enabling the poor to organize for themselves and work together. In other words, development is a means of carrying out a nation's goals and promoting economic growth, equity and national self-reliance; or development can refer to a state of human well-being or the actual process of changing or making progress towards some sort of expansion, improvement and completeness in terms of economic productivity, social well-being, quality of life, and political structure. As such, it moves on a second-order level of concepts, methods and practices and only from this perspective does it provide, as it were, first-order insight into the context of such enquiries. It is thus shown that conceptual frameworks are vital to explaining the meaning of the actions and activities of people in various contexts. It follows that the historical analysis of such frameworks – in this case the underlying conflict resolution as a challenge to development will inform the understanding of human relations.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


The basic data on the understanding of conflict and development have been collected through a study of books, journals, and articles relevant to the topic. Though we shall focus on the case of the DRC, this will serve to demonstrate the challenge of conflict resolution analysis to development. Thus, this study is designed to remain on the second-order level. Again, we will only move to a first-order level as far as we explore the eventual empirical consequences of the concepts under discussion.

This chapter commences with a discussion of historical research, including the benefits and potential limitations of this research approach. Further methodological dimensions of the research are also outlined, including the advantages and disadvantages of historical research,

together with the implications of culture when undertaking historical work. The research design and research method are reviewed and the chapter concludes with an outline of the contribution made by the thesis.

Nobes and Parker (2002: 8) argue that historical study is potentially the most important of all. This claim results from the ability of a country to improve its own processes by observing how other countries have responded to similar problems. The DRC is well placed for historical study.

It is situated at the heart (central part) of Africa with an area of 2,345,000 m<sup>2</sup>/km. The DRC is a giant of sub-Saharan Africa, bordering nine other countries. It is also a member of the SADC sub-region organization. The country was colonized by Belgium and was formerly called Congo



Free State, Belgian Congo, Congo-Leopoldville, Congo-Kinshasa and Zaire. It is currently titled the Democratic Republic of Congo. The country is highly centralized with executive powers lying with the president. It has a large population of approximately 71,000,000 inhabitants and

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

about 450 ethnic languages. Furthermore, the DRC has a close trade relationship and includes the greater part of the Congo basin, which covers an area of 1 million square kilometers (400,000 sq.m). The historical approach is used in tracing the background of the DRC in terms of the impact of conflict on development. Features of the historical approach are also evident in that the study covers a period of more than one decade. The analytical approach will also be used to help in uncovering the underlying causes of conflict because a better understanding of the causes of such conflicts would increase the possibility of preventing further conflict in service of the promotion of development.

### 3. 2. Historical Research

The thesis contains elements of political, economic and social history. Political history is evident in relation to the conflict that affects the development goals introduced by the DRC's government, economic history is relevant to the investigation of the background from which policies are structured and social history is necessary in order to contextualize the issue of development failure.

Various perspectives and definitions of historical research exist. Jenkins (1991: 6) claims that history is a series of discourses about the world, which do not create the world; instead they give meaning to it. Carr (1961: 81) posits that *'the study of history is a study of causes'*. Other researchers suggest that history is an enquiry into the past (Jenkins 1991: 6) or that history is the study of the elusive concept of time (Lee 1990: 3). To a greater or lesser extent, this thesis encompasses all these dimensions. The thesis takes the form of a narrative, examining the historical causes of conflict, its constraints and influences, over a 50 years period, in an attempt to outline what has led to the current policy approach for development failure in the DRC.

As historical research focuses on the question of how events came to occur, it is the appropriate method by which historical antecedents to current situations in the DRC are best analyzed. Fleischman and Tyson (1997: 93) argue that past and present events are inexorably linked. Typically, the study of history is credited with the ability to help us understand the past, provide an appreciation of how current practices are developed and help put these practices into perspective (Goldberg 1974: 410; Fleischman and Radcliffe 2003: 19). The path dependency

claims of institutional theory provide the frameworks from within which these claims of historic influence on future events are analyzed.

The primary objectives of conducting historical research are the development of perspectives about current problems (Previts and Bricker 1994: 626) and providing information to assist in explaining the present day situation (Avi-Yonah 2003: 4). The focus of the thesis is on explaining the historical events that resulted in the current situation of conflict which is affecting development goals in the DRC, rather than producing widely generalizable research.



### 3. 2. 1. The Benefits of Historical Research


While historical research is frequently justified on the basis that it attempts to understand the past for its own sake (Napier 1989: 230), a variety of more constructive benefits are attached to the approach. One frequently cited benefit is the ability to search for discontinuities and perform sequential evaluation from the past to the present (Merino, 1998: 606). This may lead to enhance an understanding of current practices.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Some historical researchers argue that the evaluation of historical events enables the identification of directions that may be taken in the future. Conversely, historical researchers also argue that the past is not an indicator of the future. While it is not argued that any element of Orwellian 'control' can be gained from historical analysis, an analysis of the past may provide a better understanding of the mistakes of the past and, perhaps, provide insight into the present. Merino (1998: 606) claims that historical analysis often enables a researcher to detect expected events that have failed to occur. In return, this may highlight any unintended consequences from

an event (Merino and Mayper 1993: 244), which may contribute to our understanding and add to the explanatory power of historical research.

Parker (1997: 112) suggests a number of possible uses for historical studies. These include the potential to reveal parties, practices and outcomes previously ignored. Alternatively, historical research can challenge and potentially overturn beliefs or traditions, and offer some indication of the precedents and previous experiences that may impact on future policies. Furthermore, adopting a historical focus allows attention to be paid to events that may be significant, but are slow-moving. This may be particularly relevant when investigating policy development, which can evolve in an incremental manner. In the absence of a historical perspective, the potential arises for significant elements to be omitted from analysis. The important role that history has to play in understanding the challenge of conflict resolution to development is observed by Mwajiru (2001: 5) who argues that conflict weakens the economy and leaves a legacy of atrocities. It also creates leaders and organizations that have invested in skills and equipment that are only useful for violence. Mwajiru further suggests that conflict resolution mechanisms should be an essential tool in solving the problem of conflicts in the continent. This is a pattern that is clearly seen in the promotion of development in the DRC.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **3. 2. 2. Limitations of historical research**

Along with the benefits of historical research discussed above, a number of limitations have been suggested in relation to accounting for research undertaken with a historical perspective, including the view that '*claims of objectivity are dysfunctional*' (Merino 1998: 604). Historical study inevitably involves '*relatives rather than absolutes; broad rather than narrow views;*

*generalizations rather than specifics; and partial rather than total truths'* (Lee 1990: 4). One suggestion is that objectivity for the historian has a different meaning to that of the scientist or positivist (Parker, 1997: 134), in that it signifies an attempt to represent events as they really were. Parker's view of objectivity implies that researchers will attempt to isolate their philosophical paradigms, political views and social perspectives in order to produce a research output that is representative of history.

A further weakness, but one that is not specific to historical research, is that any perspective is *'always filtered through the lenses of language, gender, social class, race and ethnicity'* (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 21). Accordingly, historical accounts will also have a certain subjectivity, which is suited to, and to some extent expected by, the account provided. Most researchers concur that there are no objective observations; rather observations are socially situated in the world of the observer and the observed. The most objective history will inevitably remain a selection undertaken by the researcher and interpreted with the particular beliefs of that researcher.

The need exists to select facts, from an infinite supply, that are the most relevant for this purpose. In addition, the facts selected for representation of events are subject to the prioritization of the researcher. Furthermore, when conducting historical research, the facts and explanations of facts will always be incomplete (Lee 1990: 4). Potential issues include the quality of records kept, instances where the desired information may be damaged, destroyed or mislaid, or may not have survived the passing of time (Fleischman and Tyson 2003: 35). The potential exists for belief transference in historical research (Fleischman and Tyson 2003: 41; Merino and Mayper 1993:

246). Belief transference occurs when a researcher attributes current concepts to prior periods, and can be problematic when a theoretical framework is used to explain an historical event. Accordingly, when selecting a theoretical framework, the theoretical assumptions must reasonably reflect conditions in the particular time period or the theory will have limited explanatory power (Merino and Mayper 1993: 245). The choice of institutional theory and historical theory in particular to guide the analysis in this thesis is intended to ameliorate the potential for belief transference through the allowance made for historical contingency and timing within the institutional framework.



The primary limitation of conducting historical research is the subjective nature of the output. This subjectivity would appear to be inevitable, as is captured by Stanford (1986: 27) who writes that *the dilemma of historians is that they want to see the past as it actually was but can see it only through the medium of their own and other people's ideas*. Most historians acknowledge that researcher awareness of the limitations of historical research may assist in ameliorating their influence on the research output. In addition, the research design allows for the triangulation of data, which will increase the robustness of the analysis.

University of Fort Hare  
Together in Excellence


### 3.3. Culture

Researchers have noted the importance of culture (together with political, economic and social influences) in shaping the context in which policy operates (Carnegie and Napier 2002; Eddie 1991; Fechner and Kilgore 1994; Gray 1988; Ricoeur 1965). Culture is a variable that has complicated international research. Culture has been defined in many ways, although it is typically considered the *'collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of*

*one group or society from those of another'* (Hofstede 1984: 82). Culture can be considered to reflect the way that people look at the world and their role in it.

The most frequent mode of political structure has been the nation-state, hence the emergence of the concept of a national culture. The use of the DRC as a case study corresponds to both the nation-state definition and the country or State definition, as defined by territorial boundaries.

Bloch (1953: 496) writes that two conditions must be fulfilled in order to have an historical study: a certain similarity between observed phenomena, and a certain dissimilarity between the environments in which they occur. The claim of similar events in the DRC stems from research undertaken by Hofstede (1984: 20) and Gray (1994), cited in Fechner and Kilgore 1994). These studies found that the DRC has significant similarities in most of the variables investigated amongst other countries in conflict in Africa. Further research on conflict affecting development policy, undertaken by Peters (1991), grouped African countries into four 'clusters' based on politics, culture, economics and social structure parameters. This study placed the DRC in the same group, with similar characteristics of conflict affecting development goals.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### **3. 4. Research Design**

The thesis uses the 'most similar systems' research design. This method is based on the idea that within similar 'systems' a number of theoretically significant differences will be found, and these differences can be used for explanatory purposes (Ragin, Berg-Schlosser and de Meur 1996: 755). This study takes as its points of departure the known differences among countries (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 31).

### 3. 4. 1. Research method

This thesis consists of qualitative research. Qualitative research is an activity that locates the observer in the world, consisting of interpretive practices that make the world visible in their natural environment (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 3). In the thesis, visibility is achieved through primary source representations, including archival records. The potential for a country to produce complex relationships which may limit the discovery of meaningful causal relations is acknowledged. The difficulty lies in isolation of a factor, or a number of factors, that appear to produce (or are strongly associated with) changes in the dependent variable (Peters 1998: 29). In this case the dependent variable is the different causes of conflict that are affecting development goals in the DRC which should be addressed in conflict resolution mechanisms. Accordingly, a primary concern of this research design is to eliminate, to every possible extent, the confounding factors in the relationship between variables in the conflict-resolution mechanism that are not major causes of conflict. Peters (1998: 29) claims that this may be alleviated through the use of theory to identify the most likely source of confounding variance. Thus, the adoption of a theoretical framework of historical institutionalism is intended to mitigate, as much as possible, the potential for confounding variables by providing a framework for analysis.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### 3. 4. 2. Narrative Method

A narrative approach is adopted in this thesis. The narrative approach is the traditional method of historians (Funnell 1998: 146). Typically a narrative approach identifies a person, idea or event and traces this concept over a number of years. Narrative enquiry establishes or describes items of fact, with the aim of conveying understanding of the various intents or beliefs that reflect the 'reality' to those involved in the event. It is claimed that narrative has been accepted as the

unavoidable, natural means to write history (Funnell 1998: 142). However, there are differing views about the merits of narrative enquiry; for example, Lister (1983: 50) writes that the account of an event must be suggestive, and must point toward generalization, if it is to be more than trivial. Accordingly, while not suggesting the possibility of generalization due to the complex interactions that are observed in the case study, the thesis provides more than a simple chronological ordering of past events. As with historical research, the key criticism of a narrative approach is the potential to privilege certain perspectives, through the elimination of selected information. While this potential for particular information to be privileged or excluded undoubtedly exists, awareness of this possibility and triangulation in the research design is intended to assist with the management of this potentiality.



### 3. 4. 3. Interpretive Method

## University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

In adopting a constructivist epistemological stance, the thesis highlights differences in the development of conflicts that are affecting development goals, within the individual social contexts of the DRC. Qualitative researcher is a social constructed nature of reality, which is the relationship between the researcher, what is studied and the situational constraints that shape inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 10).

An interpretive approach is adopted in this research. Interpretation seeks to understand the meanings that actors attach to their social situations, their own actions and the actions of others (White 1994: 45). A concerted effort has been made to understand the research topic as 'it really is' and to recognize the fundamental nature of the subject, according to the interpretive

paradigm. Thus, in this research, considerable use is made of different books, journals and other tools, to draw out the contrasting positions of the DRC and to allow the data to 'speak for itself'.

The interpretive paradigm encompasses a wide range of philosophical and sociological perspectives through which it shares the common characteristic of attempting to understand and explain the social world primarily from the point of view of the actors directly involved in the social process (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 227). Accordingly, the interpretive paradigm is that most likely to provide the insights desired from the research methodology and approach.



#### 3. 4. 4. Archival Research

Archived records are the product of *'the chance survival of some documents and the corresponding chance loss or deliberate destruction of others'* (Evans 1997: 87). However, documents are not archived randomly or arbitrarily. Generally, archived documents are those that are legally required to be kept by legislation, under the *Archives Act 1957*, the *Local Government Act 1974* or the more recently passed *Public Records Act 2005* in the DRC.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


Documents from the DRC were predominantly located in the DRC National Library. Due to the period under investigation it was not possible to access some archival material in the DRC, as this material is too recent. This is not considered problematic as the primary documents that were not cited were government documents, such as Cabinet Papers, briefings and internal government discussion documents. In the DRC, significant commentary occurred in the public domain on the various changes to policy in relation to conflict affecting development goals,

which provides an alternative source of information. Documents such as submissions to Select Committees in the DRC were made available and these formed an important part of the analysis.

Newspapers and journals were used to supplement the analysis, as were articles and commentary on the debates of the time. Some archival documents from UN reports, NGO reports, and gazettes were also used for analytical purposes.

### 3.4.5. Periodization

One of the key analytical tools used in historical research is that of periodization. Periodization allows sense to be made of historical events over an extended time frame by separating the chronology into specified time divisions. Research has shown (Pierson 1996: 126) that attempts to illustrate social processes at a single point in time produce a 'snapshot' view that may be distorted in important areas. Accordingly, it is necessary to investigate the temporal aspects of conflicts that affect development.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The thesis focuses on key periods in the DRC's history, when significant changes were made to either the conflict of liberation from colonialism or conflict of liberation from dictatorship or conflict of discrimination and inequality. Dong (undated) elaborate by giving the following historical development:

1960 June - Congo got it independent and Patrice Lumumba became prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president ([www.raceandhistory.com](http://www.raceandhistory.com)).

1960 July - Moise Tshombe declares Katanga province independent and Congolese army mutinies; Belgian troops sent in ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens and mining interests; UN

Security Council votes to send in troops to help establish order, but the troops are not allowed to intervene in internal affairs ([www.raceandhistory.com](http://www.raceandhistory.com)).

**1960 September** - Kasavubu sacked Lumumba out of the office as prime minister.

**1960 December** - Lumumba is arrested.

**1961 February** - Lumumba is murdered, reportedly with foreign complicity.

**1961 August** - UN troops begin disarming Katangese soldiers.

**1963** - Tshombe agrees to end Katanga's secession.

**1964** - President Kasavubu nominated Tshombe as prime minister.

**1965** - During this period changes were made when Joseph Mobutu ousted Kasavubu and Tshombe in a coup d'état.

**1971** - Joseph Mobutu renames the country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko; also, Katanga becomes Shaba and the river Congo becomes the river Zaire.


**1973-74** - Mobutu nationalizes many foreign company and forces European investors to leave the country.

**1977** - Mobutu calls back the foreign investors, without much success; French, Belgian and Moroccan troops help repulse attack on Katanga by Angolan-based rebels.

**1989** - Zaire refused to pay the loans from Belgium, resulting in a cancellation of development programmes and increased deterioration of the economy ([www.us-uk-interventions.org/congo.html](http://www.us-uk-interventions.org/congo.html)).

**1990** - Mobutu agrees to end the ban on multiparty politics and appoints a transitional government, but retains substantial powers.

**1991** - Following riots in Kinshasa by unpaid soldiers, Mobutu agrees to a coalition government with opposition leaders, but retains control of the security apparatus and important ministries.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


1993 - Rival pro- and anti-Mobutu governments created.

1994 - Mobutu agrees to the appointment of Kengo Wa Dondo, an advocate of austerity and free-market reforms, as prime minister.

1996-97 – DRC Tutsi rebels capture much of Eastern Zaire while Mobutu is abroad for medical treatment.

1997 May – Congolese national Tutsi and other anti-Mobutu rebels, who were helped principally by Rwanda, capture the capital Kinshasa; Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo; Laurent-Desire Kabila installed as president.

1998 August - Rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rise up against Kabila and advance on Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Namibia send troops to repel them. Angolan troops also side with Kabila. The rebels take control of much of the eastern DRC after being beaten by Kabila and his allies in the Southwestern part of the Congo.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

1999 – A division emerges between the rebel of Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) supported by Uganda and Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels backed by Rwanda.

### **Lusaka Peace Accord Signed**

1999 July – All the six African countries which were involved in the war sign a ceasefire accord in Lusaka (Zambia). One month after the MLC and RCD both the rebel groups sign the accord.

2000 – 5,500-strong UN force was authorized by the UN Security Council to monitor the ceasefire in the DRC, but fighting continues between rebels and government forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces.

2001 January - President Laurent Kabila is shot dead. His son, Joseph Kabila succeeds him.

**2001 February** -Joseph Kabila get together with Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington. Rwanda, Uganda and the rebels agree to a UN pullout plan. Uganda and Rwanda begin withdraw troops from the frontline.

### **Search for Peace**

**2002 April** – Organization of peace talks in South Africa: Kinshasa signs a power-sharing deal with Ugandan-backed rebels, under which the MLC leader would be premier. Rwandan-backed RCD rebels reject the deal.

**2002 July** – The presidents of the DRC and Rwanda sign a peace deal under which Rwanda will withdraw troops from the East and the DRC will disarm and arrest Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for the killing of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda's 1994 genocide.

**2002 September** - Presidents of the DRC and Uganda sign a peace accord under which Ugandan troops are to leave the DRC.


**2002 September/October** - Uganda and Rwanda say they have withdrawn most of their forces from the East. The UN sponsors power-sharing talks begin in South Africa.

**2002 December** – A peace deal is signed between the Kinshasa government and main rebel groups, in South Africa. Under this deal, rebels and opposition members are to be given portfolios in an interim government.

### **Interim Government**

**2003 April** - President Joseph Kabila signs a transitional constitution.

**2003 May** – The last Ugandan troops depart from Eastern DRC.



**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*

**2003 June** - French soldiers arrive in Bunia, to lead a UN-mandated rapid reaction force. President Kabila nominated a transitional government to lead until elections in two years time. Leaders of the main former rebel groups vowed as vice presidents in July.

**2003 August** – An interim parliament is inaugurated.

**2004 December** - Fighting start in the East of Congo between the Congolese army and renegade soldiers from a former pro-Rwanda rebel group; Rwanda denies being behind the mutiny.

### **New Constitution**

**2005 May** – A new constitution, with text agreed by former warring factions, is adopted by parliament.



**2005 September** - Uganda warns that its troops may re-enter the DRC after a group of the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army rebels enter via Sudan.

**University of Fort Hare**  
*Together in Excellence*

**2005 November** - A first wave of soldiers from the former Zairian army returns after almost eight years of exile in the neighboring Republic of Congo.

**2005 December** - Voters back the new constitution, already parliament-approved, paving the way for the 2006 elections. The International Court of Justice rules that Uganda must compensate the DRC for rights abuses and the plundering of resources in the five years up to 2003.

**2006 February** - The new constitution comes into force and a new national flag is adopted.

**2006 March** - Warlord Thomas Lubanga becomes the first war crimes suspect to face charges at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He is accused of forcing children into active combat.


**2006 May** - Thousands are displaced in the northeast as the army and UN peacekeepers step up their drive to disarm irregular forces ahead of the elections.

2006 June: Official electoral campaigns start in the DRC.

2006 June - The European Union approves the deployment of around 2,000 troops in the DRC ahead of the 30 July polls. All the list of dates and events above justify the impediment of development goals because of conflict.

The justification of the use of a 50 years period stems from the frequently slow movement of conflict resolution mechanisms in providing a good programme for development in the DRC.

The use of the 50 years period provides the contextual background, which is an important historical influence contributing to the directions adopted in the DRC. Accordingly, it is necessary to investigate several decades in order to capture sufficient detail to appropriately assess influential factors in the policy development process.



## University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

### 3. 4. 6. Triangulation and Analysis

Triangulation is the process of using multiple information sources to clarify meaning (Stake 2000: 443). Triangulation can assist with reducing the likelihood of misinterpretation and accordingly enhances research credibility. The collection of data from primary source documents, where possible, assists with the clarification of potential subjectivity within particular data sources.

Triangulation also assists with the external validity of the research, through the mix of various measures. Documents alone may be argued to be an obtrusive measure that produces distorted results due to the writer's awareness of their participation. However, archival research and secondary source documents provide greater validation of the research results. To provide

greater assurance, the research highlights the ideas of the time periods under investigation and the many potential influences that impacted upon the outcomes.

The qualitative data computer programme NVIVO was used for analytical purposes. All primary and secondary source documents were coded in NVIVO to assist with increasing the validity of the research output through the use of an accepted research tool for categorization.

### 3.4.7. Contribution

Methodologically, the thesis offers an historical study of the challenge of conflict to development in the DRC. The topic of conflict history and its affect on the country's development goals, as well as the challenge to development and a general historical perspective, are fields that are neglected in the existing literature. To date, no research has been done in the topic of conflict resolution: a challenge to development in the DRC. Similarly, no research has constructed a narrative of the institutions involved in the situation of conflict in the DRC. Through undertaking an historical research approach to the topic of conflict resolution as a challenge to development, this thesis adds to current policy debate and provides lessons that are relevant to modern conflict resolution management. The narrative is intended to provide insight into problems that have been identified as causes of conflict with a view to promoting development and, accordingly, it fills a gap in the current body of knowledge.

There is benefit to be gained from research that adopts a broader perspective in investigating the social, political and economic variables across the traditional nation. While generalization is limited by the methodological approach of this thesis, replication of such studies raises the

potential for debate on the topic of institutional influence within policy formation. The methodology utilized in this thesis will enhance the understanding of social policy development by providing a temporal aspect to a topic that is typically approached solely from a current perspective. This, in turn, provides insight into the predictability of the impact of particular policies. In addition, the thesis highlights the nature of policy making systems in the DRC, together with the unanticipated consequences of its policy on conflict. While the research does not claim predictive capability, the development of more appropriate theory for policy predictions may be assisted by historical research.



### 3. 5. Conclusion

The thesis describes and analyzes the effect of conflict on development in the DRC, from 1960 through to 2006. The narrative commences with descriptions of the economic, social and political frameworks in the time periods discussed, primarily using secondary source documents. This is followed by a more in-depth investigation of the conflict that is affecting the country's development goals and the changes that occurred between 1973 and 1974, using primary source documents. The interpretive analysis results from a 'historical' approach, using an institutional theoretical framework to assist in analyzing and explaining the different approaches adopted in the DRC.

This chapter has outlined the methodology that this research adopts, including the elements of its research design and research method. The following chapter provides a detailed outline of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a case study of conflict using a theoretical framework of historical institutionalism.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### The Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case Study of Conflict That Affects Development

*'Conflict is very often the result of the interaction of political, economic and social instability, frequently stemming from bad governance, failed economic policies and inappropriate development programmes which have exacerbated ethnic or religious difference'. (ECA, 2007: 4).*



#### 4. 1. Introduction

In the previous chapters, the researcher discussed and introduced the thesis topic, theoretical framework and methodology. The ~~Together in the culture~~ conflict was also discussed. Its causes were examined, as well as the impact of the conflict on development in the DRC. This chapter will, therefore, focus on the issue of conflict and development failure in the DRC from 1960 to 2001.

The DRC possesses significant economic potential which could have been a springboard for development. It is 'endowed with unique biodiversity, vast mineral and forest resources, and rich soils conducive for agriculture' (UN panel of experts, 2001: 6). Yet the country is underdeveloped because of conflict. The economy of the DRC is down from decades of conflict. The conflict in the DRC, which began after independence in 1961 and coincided with the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, has affected development. Its ramification up to date include: dramatically reduced national output and government revenue; increased external debt; and the

death of people due to violence, famine and disease. The DRC has long been recognized as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of its mineral resources but because of bad management, discrimination and conflict the country is underdeveloped. Its mineral wealth is greatest near its Eastern borders and South into Katanga, where the country shares the rich Copper Belt of the Lufilian Arc with neighbouring Zambia. There is a prolific diamond area within the Kasai Crafton area in the South-Central part of the country, along with the North-Easterly Angolan Kimberlite trend (Mines, 2006: 1). As Nest (2006: 17) observes: *“Politics and economics in the Democratic Republic of Congo have always been shaped by the exploitation of its abundant natural resources. Natural resource exploitation lay at the very foundation of the foreign economic interest in the colony, and shaped its link to foreign governments and global markets. From about 1960 to 1990, one mineral (Copper) reigned supreme as the largest source of government revenue and most foreign exchange.”*



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The DRC boasts substantial reserves of copper, cobalt, cadmium, diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, uranium, germanium, columbite-tantalum (coltan), bauxite, iron ore, oil etc. According to estimates by mining researchers, the DRC contains 80% of the world’s coltan reserves, 34% of its cobalt reserves and 10% of its copper reserves, while the gold potential is substantially under-explored (Nest, 2006: 1). Commenting on the importance of the mining sector in the Congolese economy, the IMF (2007: 35) states that: *“The DRC has the second largest reserves worldwide of copper and cobalt (10% of the planet’s entire reserves). GECAMINES’ (a mining company in the DRC) cobalt reserves represent 80% of the global total. The DRC also is the world’s largest producer of cobalt. In 1992, the DRC’s share of world*

*copper production was 2.5%, of cobalt 45%, and of zinc 0.5%. Export proceeds in 1990 amounted about US 1 \$ billion.”*

The growth of mining is hampered by the poor overall management of resources, fraud, discrimination and a lack of structural and legal reforms, in such a manner that the country has not benefited fully from the opportunities provided by rising world mineral prices. As Turner (2007: 44) observes, ‘The mining of copper, diamonds and other resources under Belgian Colonial rule also generated profits for shareholders in Belgium and elsewhere’.



Regardless of its wealth in human and natural resources, the DRC is currently known as one of the poorest countries in the world as a result of the consequence of conflict on its economic development. According to the Human Development Index of 2005, the DRC is ranked 167 out of 177 countries. Years of war have destroyed most of the infrastructure and productivity, while placing the country and its people in a dire economic situation.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **4. 2. Background to the DRC Conflict**

The current conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is related to the history of the country. From the Berlin Conference of 15 November 1884 up to 26 February 1885, the area referred to as the DRC today was made up of people who were organized into chiefdoms, kingdoms or empires, and each group of people was politically and socially organized according to the situation influencing them. Local chiefs served as accomplices for illegal and shameful trade. It is argued that this practice, which persisted up to the 19th century left serious demographic consequences in the country. The Congo State suffered from 1885 to 1908 and this

period was marked by the Leopoldian era in which civil servants subjected the Congolese space to wild exploitation which had disastrous consequences for the DRC.

The quest for red rubber and ivory led to practices such as flogging, hand-cutting, rape and summary executions that violated human rights. These acts discredited the King and his administration and ended up triggering a series of violent movements like the July 1895 Luluabourg revolts, the 14 October 1897 Dhanis revolt, the 17 April 1900 Shinkakasa revolt, the 1932 Pende revolt, strikes in Katanga and in Bas-Congo, as well as the June 1944 Force Publique's mutiny in Luluabourg. These turbulences of an economic and political nature continued until the country's independence (Leslie, 1993: 99) and affected its development programme.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The DRC's history is marked by various conflicts including the 1960 Force Publique's mutinies in Luluabourg; secession wars from 1960 to 1963; and regional insurrections from 1964 to 1968. The period between 1965 and 1997 was marked by Mobutu's dictatorship with the *Mouvement populaire de la Révolution* (MPR, a unique political party) as it will be argued below. The political ambitions of certain politicians, characterized by the abuse of power, led to a political crisis that affected development and the formation of guerilla groups from 1969 to 1970. The poor redistribution of the national revenue and management as characterized by predation, lootings by the Forces Armées Zaïroises (Zairean Armed Forces), in 1991 and 1993, were also considered causes of the crisis.

The dictatorship led to the creation of a multiparty system that included satellite political parties which jeopardized democratic processes. The crisis of the multiparty system and power struggles between political actors and the corrupt elite set the scene for the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de Libération (AFDL) and the 1996–97 Liberation war which involved armies from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

Indeed, the DRC is a result of the change that affected Africa during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. Before the country became a Belgian colony, it was known as the Congo Free State, until the scramble for Africa began on 1 July, 1885. The Congo Free State had been the personal property of Leopold II, the Belgian king. Then, in October 1908, the king ceded the State to Belgium, and it became known as the Belgian Congo, until its independence on June 30, 1960. When the Belgian Congo gained its independence, it was named the Republic of Congo-Leopoldville, and Joseph Kasavubu became the first president, with Patrice Lumumba as the first prime minister. After five years of secessions, political strife and post-independence rivalry, Colonel Joseph-Desire Mobutu took over power by means of a coup d'état, and became the second president on November 24, 1965 (Naniuzeyi, 1999: 678). The country was then renamed 'Democratic Republic of the Congo'. In 1971, President Mobutu renamed the country the 'Republic of Zaire' and restored an authoritarian regime. Towards the end of 1996, a rebel movement began war in the Eastern Congo, then Zaire, especially in the South Kivu region. On 17 May, 1997, the Alliance for the Democratic Force for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), backed by Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, seized power in Kinshasa, and Laurent Desire Kabila became the third president. Kabila renamed the country as the 'Democratic Republic of Congo', the name by which it is still known today. From the above, it could be argued that, due to the



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

violent struggles that engulfed the DRC over time, none of the regimes had the space for or even thought about development goals within the period under review. All of them were busy fighting for ethnic identity, power and wealth. In this part of the study, for the sake of discussing the history, the name Zaire will be used in its context during Mobutu period, before the country was renamed once more as the DRC.

#### 4. 3. Democratic Republic of Congo's Economy at the Dawn of Independence

As *Congo Belge* (Belgian Congo), after the country altered its status from the Congo Free State, the newly renamed State was highly prosperous in economic terms. Leslie (1993: 99-100) observes that many Belgian financial groups succeeded in obtaining generous incentives to develop the mineral resources of the Congo. It has been noted that the development of infrastructure occurred alongside the development of the country's natural resources. With regard to the exploitation of mineral resources and infrastructure in the Belgian Congo, Leslie (1993: 99-100) writes that:

*In 1902 the Group Empain agreed to establish a railway – the chemin de fer du Congo Supérieur aux Grands Lacs (CFL) – in the Eastern part of the country. In return, the company secured 4 million hectares of land and extensive mineral rights. Four years later the financial Conglomerate Société General de Belgique launched three major undertakings: the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière (Forminière) and the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (BCK).*

Arrangements were made in such a way that the UMHK was granted mineral rights in the Southern part of Katanga, the very extensive copper deposits site, while Forminière received a

ninety-nine year monopoly over any mineral deposits that could be found within a period of six years in an area covering 140 million hectares, which equals half of Belgium. At the same time, BCK was granted the mineral rights for 21 million hectares in the Kasai basin, for a prospective rail line. The agreement was made in such a manner that the Belgian State provided all the capital needed for construction of the railway, and the BCK was responsible for the construction and operation costs (Leslie, 1993: 99-100). As soon as the BCK railway project reached Elisabethville (current Lubumbashi), copper exports from Katanga began and by the year 1923, the Belgian Congo became the world's third largest producer of copper. The exporting of copper alone from the mining area of Katanga represented 50% of the total exports of the Congo (Leslie, 1993: 100). Discussing the economic development of the Congo during that period, Leslie argues that at the same time, agricultural products such as palm oil, cotton and coffee became well established as exports. The expansion of roads and rail networks enhanced economic growth, which would be beneficial for war efforts during World War I (Leslie, 1993: 100). It was at this time that the large Belgian financial groups took their opportunity to become firmly established in the colony. This was the case with, for example, Société Générale (General Company) in 1928, which controlled 70% of the local economy; an involvement that could be compared to that of the Oppenheimer Group in South Africa (Leslie, 1993: 100). Even though the economic situation in the country was fairly prosperous, local people were not treated well. There was discrimination. The colonial authorities prevented them from carrying out many activities. As Leslie (1993: 99-100) comments: *Congolese were legally restricted to production of raw materials, whereas processing and marketing could be undertaken by only foreign companies. The native population was confined by the State to shifting cultivation (working a plot of land until the soil was depleted, then moving to another plot) and temporary wage labor. Such*




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

*policies were not implemented without local resistance. A serious revolt by Pende (a population of ethnic group in the DRC) in the Western Congo, for example, resulted in over 500 deaths and the imprisonment of local chiefs following the repressive intervention of the local Force Publique.*

After World War II, the economy of the Congo became very strong. By the early 1950s, in terms of industrial development, the Congo was second only to South Africa (Leslie 1993: 101). By 1953, it became the leading African producer of minerals such as cobalt, diamonds, tin, zinc, and silver, as well as the second largest producer of copper after Zimbabwe (formerly, Rhodesia). Cotton (1957: 2) argues that at the end of the Second World War, the Belgian Congo was in a strong economic position as a result of the prosperity DRC natural resources of strategic materials had brought her during the shortage years. But it was not until after 1950 that the pace of her economic development really started to gather momentum. The introduction of the Ten-year Plan laid the foundations of a modern State, equipped with new power and transport facilities, and endowed with a series of social welfare schemes far in advance of most African territories.

The Ten-Year-Plan of the Belgian Congo, which was conceived in 1947 and published in 1949, aimed to provide the basic economic necessities for modern life, in order to raise the standard of living of the local population. It entailed the equipping of the colony with modern power and transport facilities as well as the provision of improvements in the fields of agriculture, housing, higher education, and social benefits (Cotton, 1957: 34).

During the colonial period, therefore, the Belgian Congo was able to boast of being one of the richest territories on the African continent. With its tremendous reserve of natural resources, especially minerals, and with its reputation for political stability, the Belgian Congo had a great impact on the world market and even became an attractive territory for capital investment (Cotton, 1957: 2). Huybrechts, Mudimbe, Peeters and others (1999) argue that the Congolese economy was actually one of the most industrialized economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. For thirty years preceding independence, the average economic growth, between 1929 and 1959, was 13%. The colonial economy of the Congo possessed two characteristics: an industrial sector that was heavily dependent on imported capital equipment and a rural sector which focused mainly on agriculture. However, the Congolese natives did not enjoy the benefits of the natural resources which God had bestowed on their land. Leslie (1993: 101) illustrated this as follows:



University of Fort Hare

Together in Excellence

*The native Congolese had been marginalized economically, while the small European population (1% of the total) held 95% of the capital assets and accounted for 50% of the national income. Finally, the economic resources of the State, including land, were overwhelmingly in the hands of the giant corporations operating locally. The financial fortune of the colonial government was tied to the mining sector. Union Minière alone provided the government with 70% of its foreign exchange... The cumulative effect of these trends was a system that soon began to show signs of strain.*

During the colonial period, unemployment was not evident in the Congo. Although it was present in cities such as Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), which attracted unskilled labour from the surrounding countryside as a result of the high wages and fascination of big cities, one cannot sense the presence of unemployment (Cotton, 1957: 6). Even

though there were some cases of unemployment in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, this was not really noticeable, because civic authorities enforced restrictions on immigration into cities. Traveling from rural areas to the cities required proper permission and a travel document from the authorities. This document had to state the city to which a person was going and the duration of his/her stay there. Consequently, immigration to the cities was not easy, and this helped reduce the rate of unemployment in the cities. The restriction on immigration to the cities forced those living in rural areas to focus on agricultural work in their respective milieu, instead of crowding cities with job seekers.



#### **4. 4. Production and Industry**

##### **4. 4. 1. Agriculture**

The quantitative and qualitative development of Congolese agriculture has been remarkable ever since the colonial period. This phenomenon is due to the implementation of scientific methods set up by INEAC, the National Institute for Agronomic Research in Congo, and certain specialists in the private sector. As a matter of fact, agricultural production doubled within twenty years. From 1936 to 1957, exports grew from 320,000 to 720,000 tons (Fédération des Entreprises Congolaises, 1960: 52). Cotton (1957: 17) stresses the importance of the implementation of advanced ideas for the development of agriculture:

Governmental, or para-statal, assistance is directed primarily towards African cultivators, while the technical assistance, research and experimental experience of INEAC (Institut National d'Etudes Agronomiques au Congo), an officially sponsored agency, is available to assist farmers in the development of agriculture along modern scientific lines. In recent years, the farming of cash crops has been accelerated by the possibility of sale in foreign markets. The official policy

is to guarantee minimum prices to the African farmer for those crops which he sells to European concerns for processing and distribution. This system is well exemplified in the rich cotton-bearing lands of the North East and the Kasai, where the crop is cultivated by Africans and sold to the Belgian-owned COVENCO (Comptoir de Vente des Cottons du Congo) organization for ginning and distribution on world markets. The cultivation of oil-bearing palm trees is carried out on the same basis.

In terms of quality, Congolese agriculture has achieved much progress, in such a manner that it competes with foreign products on the international market. Introduced through scientific exploitation, Congolese agriculture has proved itself to have a marked impact on development. Cotton (1957: 18-19) classified agricultural products in 1955, during the colonial period, as follows:



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


**Palm Oil Products:** European plantations of oil-bearing palm trees amounted to 136,000 hectares in 1955, mostly in Leopoldville, Equateur and Orientale Provinces, along the banks of the Congo and its tributaries; those under African control comprised about 67,000 hectares. The total amount of palm oil produced was 196,000 tons and about 120,000 tons of palm kernels. Processing plants for palm oil are to be found in Alberta, Elizaberta, Brabanta and Flandria, along the Congo and its tributaries, and belong to the Huileries du Congo Belge, a subsidiary of Unilever.

**Cotton:** The total area allocated to cotton cultivation in the Belgian Congo in 1955 was 350,000 hectares, mostly in the Kasai and Orientale Provinces. This is a crop farmed exclusively by Africans, and one in which European supervision is leading to improved yields. In 1955, the total cotton crop amounted to 145,000 tons or about 417 kilograms per hectare.

**Coffee:** The 'robusta' type of coffee is farmed extensively in the North-Eastern Congo and the Kivu, while lesser quantities of 'arabica' are produced in Kivu. In 1955, European plantations amounted to 43,000 hectares of 'Robusta' and 10,000 hectares of 'Arabica,' with 40,000 hectares devoted to young plantations. The Congo crop in 1955 amounted to 30,000 tons, of which over 27,000 tons came from European plantations.

**Rubber:** Hevea rubber cultivation attracts both Europeans and Africans. The total area under production, in 1955, was 53,000 hectares, of which Africans owned 7,000 hectares. The most important plantations were in the Equateur and Orientale Provinces. Production in 1955 was 28,000 tons, which represented an increase of 16% from the previous year.

**Cocoa:** This is concentrated in the Leopoldville and Equateur Provinces, along the banks of the Congo River, and is essentially a European crop. The area under cultivation in 1955 was about 21,000 hectares, yielding a crop of about 3,600 tons.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


**Ground nuts:** This is a crop grown by Africans all over the Congo. The area under cultivation is concentrated in the Bandundu province and the area is about 300,000 hectares, with a yield of about 180,000 tons a year. Unsatisfactory world prices have prevented producers from obtaining reasonable cash yields for this crop.

**Rice:** The area devoted to rice has been growing each year, and the tonnages produced have also risen. Cultivation is concentrated in the Orientale and Equateur Provinces, which together produce almost 70% of the crop. The total crop in 1955 amounted to 200, 000 tons, and it commands a ready sale in the urban centres, and big mining concerns, such as Union Minière, purchase large quantities to give as rations to their employees.

**Fibres:** These are chiefly grown in the Leopoldville and Orientale Provinces, but the amount planted is subject to fluctuation, according to price. Recently, the crop was about 10,000, divided equally between urena and punga.

**Tea:** Tea cultivation is an exclusive European activity, and there are many plantations in the Kivu highlands, where the acreage and yields show progressive increases. The figures for 1955 were 3,000 hectares, an approximately 860 tons.

**Sugar:** Sugar is grown almost exclusively in European plantations which, in 1955, amounted to 3,500 hectares producing 18,000 tons. This crop supplies most of the local needs, and is locally refined. Production will soon be increased in the Eastern Congo, where a new refinery will come into existence.




**Maize:** This is chiefly a native crop, grown primarily in the Kasai, Oriental and Leopoldville Provinces, as well as Ruanda-Urundi. The area sown is about 550,000 hectares, which yielded a crop of about 320,000 tons in 1955. Only 80 tons of this was for commercial purposes. The supply of maize exceeds demand, and prices are low.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

**Manioc or Cassava:** This is the staple food of people throughout the Congo, but particularly in the Leopoldville and Kasai Provinces, where alternatives are few and far between. It is estimated that the 1955 crop yield was 7,5 million tons.

**Bananas:** The importance of bananas is growing each year, especially the plantain variety that is grown by African farmers. In 1955, 2 million tons were produced, largely in the Orientale, Equateur and Kivu Provinces. Table bananas are grown in the Mayombe region of the lower Congo by European concerns, which export substantial quantities to Belgium.

The purpose of developing agriculture in the Belgian Congo was to feed the population. Although some products such as maize, bananas, cassava, rice, etc., were destined for local consumption, items such as palm oil, rubber, coffee, cotton, and cocoa were intended for exportation. In 1957, their percentage of value exported was stated by the Fédération des Entreprises Congolaises (1960: 53) as follows: “Coffee 12, 1 %, Palm oil 9, 7 %, Cotton 7, 6 %, Rubber 4, 2 %, Cocoa 0, 5 %.” The above report clearly suggests that development in terms of the cultivation of coffee was far beyond that of other products. This development took place between 1950 and 1957. During this period, the production of coffee doubled, while local consumption was insignificant. In 1957, coffee exports increased to 67,000 tons (Fédération des Entreprises Congolaises, 1960: 53). As far as the welfare of the population was concerned, nobody spoke of famine or poverty and conflict during this period. The population could obtain the minimum quantity of food needed to stay alive. With regard to the local market, Cotton (1957: 21) wrote that: *“Local markets within the Belgian Congo have become increasingly important as the population and the nation income increases. This applies not only to such articles as manioc, maize, bananas, sweet potatoes, etc., which are formerly reckoned chiefly as articles for local consumption, but also to a wide range of African products. Judging from the latest returns, international markets are becoming more and more commercialized. Since the local market was fuelled by agricultural products, as previously mentioned, it is doubtful that famine or poverty was in existence, which is currently the case in the DRC.”*




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### 4. 4. 2. Mining

The mining sector has been central to the Congolese economy since the early decades of the twentieth century (Turner, 2007: 44). The wealth of the Belgian Congo was drawn from its

minerals, as well as its mines. The industries of the colonized territory were exclusively in the hands of the great Belgian societies, among which the Société Générale and the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) were named GECAMINES after the independence of the Société Générale. The UMHK mining concession covered many thousands of square miles in the Katanga province and operated in the different mineral beds of Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), Jadotville (Likasi) and Kolwezi (Cotton, 1957: 21). Later, the extraction of diamonds would start in Kasai; gold was mined in the North-East of the territory around Watsha, while tin and associated minerals were extracted from the Maniema and Kivu regions. The extraction of copper, cobalt, uranium and other minerals in Katanga was handled by the Union Minière (Cotton, 1957: 21). These mining products were all exported. Further details of the production of minerals in the Belgian Congo in 1955, as Cotton (1957: 22-25) indicates, are:



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

**Copper and Cuprous Minerals.** The only producer of copper in the Belgian Congo is the Union Minière du Katanga, which owns a concession amounting to 20,000 square kilometers, with the mines centering around the cities of Elisabethville, Jadotville and Kolwezi. The total production of the UMHK in 1955 amounted to 235,100 tons. The copper ingots produced at the Lubumbashi smelter are further refined in Belgium by the Société Générale Métallurgique de Hoboken at its installations in Olen.

**Cobalt:** The Union Minière is the sole producer of cobalt in the Congo. The deposits occur alongside the copper-bearing ores in the Kolwezi group of mines, and produced 8,600 tons in 1955 or about 75% of the world's production. Production comprises 5,100 tons of granulated metal produced electrolytically at Jadotville-Shituru, and 3,500 tons of metal recovered from cobalt alloys in the Panda electric furnaces at Jadotville.

**Zinc:** This is found to be mainly associated with copper in the deep UMHK Kipushi mine near Elisabethville on the Northern Rhodesia frontier. Some degree of refinement is carried out at Kolwezi by the Société Métallurgique du Katanga (METALKAT), a subsidiary company of the Union Minière. In 1955, production of zinc amounted to 115,000 tons of concentrate, with 61% zinc content. The METALKAT electrolytic zinc works produced 34,000 tons of electrolytic zinc of almost pure quality, compared with only 7,800 tons in 1953 and 32,000 tons in 1954.

**Cadmium:** Is also produced as a by-product of zinc by METALKAT and SOGECHIM (another subsidiary of the UMHK) and, in 1955, production amounted to 166 tons.

**Uranium:** is produced by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga at its mine in Shinkolobwe. This is an underground mine which had been used for many years to produce radium and pitchblende, but production is now concentrated on uranium. At the outset, the ore reputed to be 60% pure, but less valuable ore is now being extracted. The veil of secrecy surrounding any mention of uranium and Shinkolobwe after the war led to a vastly exaggerated perception of the value of the mineral. It now seems clear that it is no longer a major source of revenue for the Union Minière, and its importance to the Congo economy is not significant. No figures of production are available, and it is almost impossible to secure permission to visit the mines, where the labour is carefully controlled and strictly segregated. In conjunction with the Société Générale Métallurgique de Hoboken, a process has been perfected for the production of nuclear pure uranium for use in atomic reactors. By-products of the Shinkolobwe mine include platinum and palladium.

**Manganese:** Manganese ore, which is produced in Katanga, is of growing importance. There are two main deposits: the first, exploited by the Société Minière du Beceka, is in Kasengi, and the second, mined by the Société de Recherche Minière du Sud-Katanga (SUDKAT), is situated in




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Kesekelesa in the South-West of the province. Kasengi entered into production in 1950 and has produced nearly 200,000 tons of manganese ore of only 50% purity. The total production in 1955 amounted to 462,000 tons. The ore is exported down the Bengwela Railway to Lobito in Angola, where modern mechanical loaders have recently been installed.

**Lead:** SUDKAT also exploits lead, a metal which is not of much importance, in Kasengi. It is processed in Jadotville and is used to meet local requirements.

**Tin:** Important tin ore deposits are found in the Katanga province, the Maniema region of the Kivu and Ruanda-Urundi. In 1955, production was valued at 1.3 billion or 8% of the colony's total mineral wealth. Over 85% of all tin is derived from the processing of cassiterite, and the remainder from cassiterite mixtures and from columbotantaline and wolfram. Of the 18,000 tons of tin produced in the Congo in 1955, 4,500 tons came from the Katanga province, 11,300 tons from Maniema and 2,200 tons from Ruanda-Urundi. Manono is also the site of a cassiterite smelter, in which tin production in 1955 amounted to 3,000 tons.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

**Gold:** Gold is found in the North-East of the Belgian Congo, particularly in the Uтури highlands and in Ruanda-Urundi, and beds stretch as far South as the Maniema region of Kivu. Some gold is also produced on the southern border with Angola. Production in 1955 amounted to 11,300 kilograms. The main producer of gold is the Société des Mine d'Or de Kilo Moto, which is responsible for about two-thirds of gold production in the Congo, which accounts for only 2% of world production and is subject to strict public control. Gold is only sold through official channels.

**Diamonds:** Both gem and industrial diamonds are found in the Congo, particularly in the Kasai province, around Tshikapa. The main company engaged in the exploitation of diamond deposits is the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo (FORMINIÈRE), which belongs to

the Union Minière group and therefore to the Société Générale. This company also acts on behalf of the consortium de l'Entreprise Kasai-Luebo (E.K.L.). They run 49 mines, 35 of which belong to FORMINIÈRE, and the remainder to E.K.L. In 1955, the production of gemstones amounted to 628,000 carats, while that of Lubumbashi, or industrial diamonds, amounted to 12,413,000 carats.

**Coal:** There are only a few coal deposits in the Belgian Congo, and those that do exist are only used to provide for local industry. The main area for coal is around Albertville. In 1955, production reached a total of 480,000 tons, which was an increase of 100,000 tons on the previous year's figure. The quality is low grade. Besides these main mining activities, Cotton (1957: 25) reported that the Belgian Congo also possesses a certain amount of minerals for which a market is found within the colony. This is the case in Bas-Congo, where raw materials extracted from quarries provided local industries with cement, as well as the production of bituminous sand, which increased to 17,700 tons in 1955.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Economic activities in the Belgian Congo were not limited to agriculture and mining. They were extended to manufacturing industries, as well as transportation. For this study, the researcher is of the view that agricultural and mining activities have furnished a clear picture of what the development of the DRC looked like at the dawn of its independence and at the present time. It is again important to note that famine and poverty were not significant issues during the colonial period but they are today because of conflict in the country. Famine and poverty are relatively more significant issues that consequently affect development programmes.

#### 4. 5. The Democratic Republic of Congo's Economy during the Post-Colonial Era


When the DRC became independent in 1960, its economy was one of the most promising in Africa. Its annual GDP was estimated to have an annual growth rate of 6%, and to last for many years. Ikambana (2007: 32) argues that at the time of its independence, the DRC was one of the most industrialized countries in Africa, with a vast range of industries in different sectors: minerals, food and agriculture, textiles, cement, chemicals and industries providing for all of Black Africa's construction and electricity. The average annual income was estimated to be US \$680, and the rate of industrialization was 41%, with relatively high standards of infrastructure, especially in the health and welfare sectors. Unfortunately, the Second Republic contributed negatively to a decrease in the average income to US \$ 100, and reduced national industrial productivity to its lowest since 1974. With reference to the economic standing of the DRC, Ikambana (2007: 32) comments that: *"The economy was prosperous, and the results were spectacular. The country's food supply was self-sufficient, and many products were being exported (e.g. coffee, rubber, palm oil, cotton, and the like), contributing 40% of the State budget."*



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

After its independence, between 1960 and 1966, the DRC experienced a number of political difficulties in terms of conflict. These were the years of secessionist movements during which the country registered a loss in its economic activities. This loss was visible in the annual growth rate of the GNP, which was 6% at the time of independence but 4% during the movements of secession (Ikambana, 2007: 32). Up until the emergence of the Second Republic, the DRC still boasted a strong economy. The military coup d'état by Mobutu, then a Lieutenant General in the Congolese army, established peace as well as territorial integrity, putting an end to post-

independence political disorder. The rich mineral province of Katanga, which claimed its independence from the rest of the country, was returned after Mobutu's reprisals, assisted by the United States and Belgium. Mobutu justified his military coup d'état in the name of national order and security in a country wounded and divided by civil war between regional factions. This coup d'état was somewhat of a resolution of the conflict in that period, without solving the main causes of conflict that brought the country's development down after independence. Ikambana (2007: 32-33) describes the start of economic activities in the Second Republic: *"The rebuilding of State institutions, monetary stabilization, and most importantly, the rebound in copper production created a more favourable climate for economic growth. The new regime slowly started investing in sectors necessary to boost the national economy. However, future mismanagement of national resources revealed a hidden side of the new political system. Most of these investments over long term resulted in obstruction to industry, an increase in debt, and the deterioration of the national economy."*



University of Fort Hare  
 Together in Excellence


The period from 1968 to 1974 was a time of economic growth for the DRC, as well as the height of Mobutu's popularity within and outside the country. During this period, the price of copper, Congo's chief export, was high, and investors were attracted to the country. This resulted in a massive inflow of Western capital. With the euphoria of a better future for Congolese citizens, the government began to overspend in the early 1970s (Leslie, 1987: 62).

#### 4. 5. 1. Economic Policy of Zairianization

After its independence, all the economic resources of the DRC were exclusively in foreign hands. The government embarked on what it claimed to be a quest for economic sovereignty and economic development, through Mobutu's policy of authentic Zairian nationalism. This led the government to re-evaluate the status of conglomerates such as Union Minière, with the idea of transferring their resources to locals and State control. The purpose of this was to develop the economy in such a way that the DRC would become a powerful State and a leading regional economy in Africa (Leslie, 1993: 104). The economic policy of nationalization or Zairianization of national enterprises, as dictated by Mobutu's regime in 1973, as well as the radicalization of the same economic policy in December 1974, deepened the crises faced by a young and promising economy. They resulted in the obstruction of the industrial sector, as well as the fall of the country's economy. Zairianization allowed the regime to take over any enterprise run by a non-national, while radicalization allowed the regime to take control of all units of production and distribution (Ikambana, 2007: 33). Ikambana adds that: *"As a result, the country's long-term economy became entrapped by significant debt, a negative underground economy, an imbalance between currency production and national wealth production and, finally, a complete deterioration of natural wealth (2007:33)."* Not only did Zairianization and radicalization contribute to the decline of the economy in the DRC, but they also exerted a significant negative impact on the development of the DRC (Ikambana, 2007: 33).

Furthermore, the decline in productivity in key areas had a profound negative effect on the development of the country. This was due to the government's failure to implement sound economic policies. Zairianization and radicalization seem to be even more complex phenomena.


There are various reasons why it is difficult to analyze these issues. Most often, State services and institutions never express the willingness to disclose any information needed for research, under the pretext that the subject demands discretion by the State (Lukombe, 1979:10). Commenting on the phenomenon of Zairianization, Yabili (1974: 2) argues that it was first of all an economic revolution, with reference to foreign economic interests and the 30 November 1973 economic measures. Thereafter, it became a social revolution aimed at ironing out social inequalities and discrimination within the country.



The economic policies of 30 November, 1973 were announced in the last part of Mobutu's 20,000 word speech to members of the Congolese (Zairian) parliament. These policies were divided into three categories: the first category contained some new policies which included, for example, the Zairianization of plantations, livestock farming, farms, quarries, and forest exploitation; refining of copper, management of GECAMINES, insurance, maritime transportation, and so forth. The second category consisted of policies that already existed, but whose implementation had not been effective. These policies were related to commerce, charter companies, and associates of the Union Minière. The third category comprised policies whose purpose was to reinforce previous decisions, for example; mandatory automobile insurance, the creation of the Companies Maritime Zairoise, the regulation of the work of foreign companies, etc. (Yabili, 1974: 6). During the period of Zairianization, many companies in which the DRC had possessed shares together with Belgium became 100% Congolese; they fell under the control of Mobutu's tribe or ethnic group, which brought about conflict in Zaire. This was the case with the MIBA, a diamond extraction and exports company; the FORESCOM, a company dealing with timber exploitation; the BCKL, a company specializing in the extraction and exporting of

copper and other minerals, etc. All the companies affiliated with GECAMINES, and GECAMINES itself, now belonged to Zaire. On 30 November, 1973, decree no. 73-365 was signed by President Mobutu, appointing a native by the name of Uamba, a mining engineer, as the manager of GECAMINES. This company, since its establishment, has been able to support more than 50% of the total budget of the country.

According to Mobutu, with regard to some of the companies in which the Congo had shares with Belgium, Belgium never retrocede or return the Congolese shares. This was the case with the company Interfor, which on May 16, 1968, became Indufor (Yabili, 1974: 11-12). Zairianization was one of the reasons that Mobutu wanted to regain the Congo's shares from Belgian companies doing business with the Congo.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The economic policy of Zairianization was intended to promote economic freedom in the country because, as stated by Mobutu, 90% of the economic activities in the country were in the hands of expatriates. Mobutu based his economic reform on Article 22 of the constitution, promulgated on June 24, 1967, which stated that properties of private enterprises that represented an essential national interest could be transferred by decree to the Republic or to a more public person, by means of paying to the owner an equitable indemnity (Lukombe, 1979: 16). Zairianization and radicalization are the two economic policies, among other factors, that destroyed the development of the DRC due to the fact that President Mobutu did not take careful consideration for the implementation of these economic policies. As a dictator, nobody in the country could contest this economic reform. With regard to the abovementioned facts, Leslie (1993: 105) comments that:


*Undoubtedly the most far-reaching policy in the government's drive for economic autonomy was Zairianization. In a speech before the Nation's Legislative Council on November 30, 1973, Mobutu announced plans for the seizure of those small and medium-sized enterprises in Zaire that remained in foreign hands – commercial ventures, plantations, transportation companies, and construction firms. This strategy was clearly aimed at the expatriate entrepreneurial class in Zaire, which consisted exclusively of Greeks, Portuguese, Italians, and Jews— many of whom had migrated to Zaire during the colonial period. Measures were announced for adequate compensation, but as it turned out many financial settlements were not made until well over a decade later.*



The idea behind Zairianization was sound, but the policy was poorly implemented. State officials were given no indication of how the programmes should be executed, until a few weeks later when local administrators were issued instructions to conduct a census of foreign-owned enterprises. Leslie (1993: 105) adds that: *“Although the scheme was presented as a positive step along the road to economic independence, it soon became clear that the government's goals were highly political and self-serving. Distribution of the approximately 2,000 businesses involved was based on political influence. The bulk of the companies therefore went to individuals at the top of the regime's hierarchy – including, incidentally, Mobutu himself and members of his family.”*

Within a few months, the disastrous effects of the Zairianization policy became more evident. Since businesses were simultaneously allocated to both regional and central governments, in this confusion, many firms were handled by more than one prospective *aquereur* (owner). As they

could not successfully manage their businesses, many *acquereurs* quickly liquidated the inventories and financial resources of the acquired businesses, or merely abandoned them (Leslie, 1993: 105). Given that the attribution of Zairianized enterprises to Zairians especially Mobutu's ethnic group was made on a political basis, the new owners or acquirers generally lacked experience in business management (Muamba-Ntolo, 1980: 351). The Zairianization policy was really a failure in terms of its implementation, and its effects harmed Congolese development. This brought conflict amongst the Congolese people, especially due to the political maneuvering of the president whose implementation of the Zairianization policy was lopsided and self-serving.




#### 4. 5. 2. Economic Policy of Radicalization

The Political Bureau of the Popular Movement for the Revolution (PMR), which was a unique political party, did not turn a deaf ear to critiques aired against Zairianization regarding its negative political and economic impact on development (Muamba-Ntolo, 1980: 352). By the end of 1974, the failure of Zairianization was being acknowledged both in and outside the country. The local press attacked the greedy and conspicuous consumption of the *acquereurs* (Leslie, 2007: 106). At this time, Mobutu came up with another economic policy called 'radicalization', which is in fact a complement, if not a continuation, of Zairianization. Discussing radicalization, Leslie (1993: 106) contends that:

*Radicalization was essentially a ten-point programme to address major Zairian 'scourges' such as unemployment, inflation, social injustice or discrimination, and individualism. In what he claimed was a war against personal enrichment, Mobutu declared that MPR officials and other*

*top civil servants had to surrender businesses obtained through Zairianization to the state and confine their activities to agriculture.*


However, the evidence showed that the target of radicalization was not to return businesses that had been acquired by the Zairian elite to the state, but rather to Belgian-owned companies that had been established in the country since the colonial era, and which had not been affected by Zairianization. The aim was for the firms representing all key sectors of economy to be taken over by the state. At this point, Belgian businesses in the country were seriously affected by radicalization measures. In return, the parent companies of Belgian firms confiscated under Zairianization and radicalization cut off credit, and the Belgian office dealing with export insurance for shipments to the Congo suspended its operations as an expression of dissatisfaction with the Congolese (Zairian) government. It is against this background that the DRC (formerly Zaire) began to experience serious economic difficulties (Leslie, 1993: 106). Leslie adds that although certain foreigners did regain their businesses, the economic disruption caused by the government's policies was something that the DRC could not afford. Zairianization measures were conceived of in an attempt to exert State control over the mineral sector which, in fact, was the heart of all Congolese economic activities (Leslie, 1993: 106). Leslie (1993: 106) argues that the desire for economic autonomy was laudable, and with a less self-serving political elite and a technically competent business class, some level of economic independence might have been achieved. According to Huybrechts et al (1960-1980), the economic policy followed over the past twenty years widened the gap between the main parts of the population – the farmers and workers on the one side, and a small group of upper class people on the other, where the bureaucracy of business was sufficiently privileged to gain many advantages. These authors add



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

that the factors involved in the ongoing inequalities of income distribution are due to the kinds of economic, political, and social policies adopted. In terms of Zairianization and radicalization, the IMF (2007: 36) states that: *“The suicidal measures of Zairianization and radicalization taken by the regime in power, contributed in their turn to halting the take-off of the productive sectors by introducing a climate of mistrust, especially among expatriate economic operators, and hence triggering capital flight.”*

Similarly, according to Muamba (1980: 354): *“Radicalization, however, did not improve the catastrophic economic condition brought about by Zairianization: disruption of internal trade, mismanagement, shortages, layoffs, production decreases, and inflation. On the contrary, the situation got worse. Radicalized enterprises, though under government control, were managed by the same inexperienced Zairians. Furthermore, many radicalized enterprises were subsidiaries of European trading companies which had not yet paid damages since Zairianization. So, radicalization made relations between them colder and colder and ultimately disrupted the stock supply.”*



University of Fort Hare  
Together in Excellence

The Zairianization and radicalization measures contributed to the severity of the economic and financial situation already created by the past economic, investment and budgetary policies of the Mobutu regime (Katwala, 1979: 272). These economic measures not only harmed the development of the DRC, but also weakened the private sector, the principal source of wealth and job creation in the country.

#### 4. 6. Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Decline


The DRC, since its independence on June 30, 1960, has experienced difficulties with the complicated nature of external attempts to implement a development policy package in the midst of domestic and international constraints. As Leslie (1987: 61) notes: *“The political turmoil of the early 1960s caused severe dislocations in the Zairian economy and social development, resulting in falling production levels, low export earnings, government overspending, and inflation. With the restoration of some measure of political stability, an IMF stabilization programme was adopted in June 1967, supported by a one-year stand-by arrangement for \$ 27 million. The programme aimed to re-establish economic growth, and with a very favorable world market for copper that resulted in significant increases in government revenues, no drawings had to be made under the stand-by arrangement.”*



### University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

During the rule of the late President Mobutu, corruption was institutionalized throughout Congolese society, and the exploitative nature of the regime and the pervasiveness of patron-client politics distinguished the DRC from other African countries. The political system, set up by the State, favored the ruling elite in order to maintain power and consolidate its economic base (Leslie, 1987: 6). Leslie (1987: 6) describes the behaviour of the elite during the rule of Mobutu: *“This group, with its ‘bullion fixation’, sees development assistance as yet another means to accumulate personal wealth. Hence, what is considered to be simply bureaucratic disorganization and economic mismanagement by external actors such as the Bank and the IMF is to Zaire’s ruling elite a rational policy of ‘organized disorganization’ designed to maintain the status quo. Thus in Zaire, the World Bank faces what might be described as a hostile domestic environment.”*

The mismanagement of the economy in the Congo was directly associated with the privatization and personalization of the State by President Mobutu. As the country's leader, he felt entitled to dispose of public property and funds as though they were his own (Nzongola, 2004: 11). Nzongola (2004: 11-12) adds that: *"There were instances in which public officials would unexpectedly but pleasantly be surprised to learn that the president, in his magnanimity, had decided to cede to them as a gift the government villas in which they resided. Lives could be changed and the State impoverished with a stroke of the presidential pen. Thus, a large number of State properties were privatized, whose beneficiaries often proved how grateful they were by reciprocating with gifts of money and other resources to the president's family."*



Examining the desperate economy of the country, Nzongola (2004: 12) further argues that *Mobutu and his government officials used an enormous amount of money, mostly produced locally from the country's resources, including diamonds, gold and electrical power, to neutralize their enemies, and that much of this money never went into the State treasury.* As an example, it was estimated that a sum of between US \$40 to 60 million was generated each month from mining and petroleum revenues in 1996. Yet, by the end of July of the same year, the government of Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo claimed to have raised less than US \$150 million for the 1996 budget, two-thirds of which supposedly came from customs revenue. One wonders where the rest of the money went. As far as Mobutu's wealth was concerned, Kapstein (1980: 6) observes that *there has been no reliable estimate of Mobutu's personal wealth. There is a report which asserts that 25% of all government funds went into a special presidential account, and he dispensed with these funds at will. A great deal of money allocated to his office went into his own pocket, and probably even more went into buying loyalty from his henchmen.*

Leslie (1987: 8-9) argues that, *after more than twenty years of independence, the economic picture of the DRC was still bleak. This is a paradox because, in terms of its natural resources, the DRC is one of the richest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, as mentioned earlier. It is very unfortunate that, in spite of seven IMF stabilization programmes, seven attempts by the Paris Club at re-scheduling, one formal re-scheduling by a Western bank in the London Club, and six major devaluations of its currency, the Zaire (currently Congolese Francs), the economic and debt crises continue to exist.*



During the early 1970s, the government of Zaire undertook several ambitious and disastrous development projects, which were all financed by external donors. One of them was the construction of a steel mill at Maluku (Leslie, 1993: 104). In this regard, Leslie (1993: 104) reports that: *German and Italian contractors began construction on a steel mill at Maluku...to process iron ore from rich deposits in Haut-Zaire and Kasai (provinces of the DRC). Because of the very favorable feasibility study conducted by an Italian consulting firm in the late 1960s, President Mobutu had become personally committed to the scheme, even though in strict economic terms the local market seemed too small to justify the investment. In spite of investor scepticism, the government decided to proceed, bearing the entire cost of the \$ 250 million project. Although the steel plan was proclaimed a major achievement by the regime, it turned out to be a white elephant. The facility could not process Zairian ore because of inappropriate equipment and therefore had to depend exclusively on imported scrap. As a result, it never operated at more than 10% capacity, and by 1980s the plant had closed.*

The World Bank and IMF had been instrumental and active actors in advocating market-oriented reforms and liberalization programmes, in order to restore economic stability and development in the DRC. In their policy conditions, matters such as monetary control, decreases in public spending, massive devaluations, as well as the sweeping liberalization of the international market, international trade and control were included (Mommen, 1996: 285). Mommen further adds that: *“In spite of all these reforms, Zaire failed to cope with economic decline and impoverishment. Although Zaire was one of the first African countries to adhere to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions, its economic transformation process was frustrated by its foreign indebtedness, falling export earning, and the inability of the ruling bureaucratic class”* (Mommen, 1996: 285).




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

In 1986, after protesting against the IMF's policy, which he perceived as being inhumane, Mobutu mobilized Third World opinion against the SAPs and cancelled the application of IMF guidelines after the country's failure to meet its commitments in this regard. Consequently, in 1987, the IMF suspended its financial intervention in the DRC (Mommen, 1996: 293). Mommen argues that the main problem in the DRC was the outflow of capital. This totaled US \$2 billion between 1983 and 1987. By 1987, the DRC had become an important international debtor, with a foreign debt of US \$8.63 billion (Mommen, 1996: 293). Examining the causes of the financial crisis during this period, Mommen (1996: 295) further argues that: *“As consequence of the economic crisis, export earnings declined and caused a sudden breakdown of State finances. Five intrinsically linked causes were at the very origins of financial crisis of the State. First, a shrinking taxable base caused by the crisis in the copper industry and falling export revenues; second, the foreign debt burden; third, the overall decline of industrial and agrarian production;*

*fourth, high inflation rates making impossible a calculation of taxable incomes; and fifth, the increasing importance of levying personal taxes by powerful people in and outside of the Zairian administration.*

Another factor that contributed to the decline of Congolese development was that the requirements for a mining company's investment remained high, and the government tried to compensate for this shortfall through an increase in foreign lending, as well as inviting foreign investors to float GECAMINES, the main mining company. At the same time, the copper price




fell in the international market, while the DRC was not the only copper-producing country in this market. Other copper-producing countries increased their output, and foreign investors became very sceptical of investing in the Congo's bankrupt mining sector (Mommen, 1996: 295) since

University of Fort Hare  
Together in Excellence

the economic situation in the DRC did not show any improvement. As Mommen (1996: 296-297) argues: *"In 1993 Zaire's foreign debt amounted to \$ 10.7 billion. Since 1992 debt servicing had stopped and in 1993 arrears totaled some US \$ 640 million (US \$300 million to IMF, US \$ 300 million to the African Development Bank (ADB), US \$ 40 million to the World Bank). Zaire never paid more than a fraction of its loans, except in years it received large amounts of exceptional foreign aid. Meanwhile Zaire had contracted a high interest loan of some US \$ 200 million brought together by a consortium of Arab bankers."*

As evident, the economic situation in the country was rapidly deteriorating. Around 1967, one Zaire in currency was worth US \$ 2, but in the early 1990s, the Zairean currency became worthless. Mommen (1996: 303) states that economic decline in the DRC was accelerated by predatory practices and corruption, since Mobutu was backed by major Western powers until

1989. In light of this situation, the SAPs were unable to halt the overall decline of the Congolese economy. The SAPs encountered many difficulties, some of which were external, while others were internal. Among them was the lack of willingness by the government to curtail its spending and the financing of the deficit in the government's budget by means of an increasing reliance on domestic bank funds, which in turn provoked a sharp expansion of the money supply, as well as an acceleration of inflation. Leslie (1987: 9) views the development decline in the DRC in terms of the nature of the regime. He explains: *Given the country's strong resource base, the persistence of the crisis can be understood only through an examination of the nature of the regime. What initially was seen as a typical military coup has evolved into a highly personalized, authoritarian form of rule, in which Mobutu has been able to frustrate internal opposition and manipulate external Western allies by taking advantage of their competing interests. Further, Mobutu and his clique engage in systematic illegal extraction of State's resources. This behaviour permeates the entire society, and institutionalized corruption is often seen as the means of survival by the average Zairian, in the face of harsh economic realities.*




University of Fort Hare  
Together in Excellence

According to Leslie (1978: 62-63), *the turning point for the Congolese economy arrived in 1974, owing to several factors (which began in 1973): the falling price of copper in the international market; the economic disruption caused by the closing of the Bengwela railroad during the Angolan civil war; the rising cost of oil and other key imports; and the reduction of economic productivity and distribution, due to the economic policy of Zairianization of many foreign owned businesses. All this plunged the country into a development crisis.*

The government adopted a one-year stabilization programme. This programme was aimed at economic recovery, with the following conditions: that 42% of the Congolese currency be devalued in terms of a Special Drawing Right (SDR), that the import and government spending levels also be cut, as well as a shift in investment priorities in favour of agriculture. In spite of this change in priorities, the economy did not show signs of improvement (Leslie, 1987: 63).

In March 1977, when the copper belt region of Katanga (formerly Shaba) was invaded by FLNC forces (Shaba I), followed by a second Shaba invasion in 1978, bilateral creditors, led by the United States, France and Belgium, started to seriously question Mobutu's ability to secure foreign investments, as well as his regime in general. The second Shaba invasion demonstrated the government's inability to control the mining region of Katanga. Furthermore, the poor economic performance proved that the country could not meet its international obligations without sweeping economic and structural changes (Leslie, 1987: 64). According to the World Bank study in 1979, the decline of the DRC's economy began in 1975. Several attempts by the IMF to boost the economy of the country, in 1977, were made in vain. Under the aegis of Belgium in Brussels on June 13-14 and November 9-10, 1978, the Paris Club and certain private banks, by means of consultations, attempted to consolidate and reschedule agreements in 1976 and 1977, as well as to ease the burden of servicing the debts owed to them. Before the consultations were held, the Congolese government, since 1977, had formulated an emergency plan known as 'Plan Mobutu', a three-year plan for implementing investment programmes (World Bank Country Study, 1979: 2).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


With regard to the decline of the mining sector in the Congolese economy, the IMF (2007: 35-36) comments that: *Except for the expanded activities in artisanal gold and diamond mining, industrial mining production has collapsed in its entirety. The copper production of GECAMINES dropped from 465,000 metric tons at a price of US \$ 2,855 a ton (in 1990) to 19,000 metric tons at a price of US \$1,800 a ton (in 2002), with serious consequences in the economic and social areas. With the bankruptcy of GECAMINES, Katanga Province underwent a profound socio-economic transformation. The entire population of Katanga mining region, which was dependent on that enterprise, was plunged into absolute poverty overnight. The restructuring and regulation of the mining sector initiated throughout the country in 2004 have led to the expropriation of small farmer landholdings to the benefit of other mining sectors and mining concessions, to widespread fraud, and to unconscionably one-sided contracts.*



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

Another factor to be taken into account with regard to the decline of Congolese development is the process of democratization in the 1990s. This plunged the country into a conflicting process of multi-party politics and a proliferation of labour unions, which led to frequent strikes and a climate of widespread insecurity throughout the country (IMF, 2007: 36). On 24 April, 1990, Mobutu announced his plan to institute a series of reforms which would include lifting the ban on independent political activity. At this time, the outcry against his dictatorship was escalating, and people in the country rallied in support of his political demise. Zaire's National Conference was determined to strip Mobutu of all but ceremonial power, and to proceed with the nation's transition to democracy. In his attempt to thwart this effort, Mobutu set into motion a series of massacres across the country, perpetrated by his personal security and armed forces, which he used to intimidate, repeatedly postpone, and defy the National Conference.

The disagreement between Mobutu and the democratic opposition, led by former Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, created a power vacuum. Government ceased to exist, and lawlessness reigned throughout the country. In the midst of this chaos, foreign businesses were taken over. In December 1992, Mobutu stripped Tshisekedi of his post. Zairian troops went on a rampage and plundered Kinshasa and other cities, causing foreign businesses to leave the country in droves. The West then froze Mobutu's foreign funds, and cut all ties with the dictator. The cabinet surrounding him was opposed to the political change that had taken place. While the majority of the Zairian population aspired to a radical change in the political system, a powerful minority of Mobutu loyalists opposed political change, in order that their newly acquired privileges could be retained. This turmoil, in the eyes of the international community, appears to suggest that the democratization of Zaire was a failure and the achievement of development goals was impossible. Ikambana (2007: 49) argues otherwise.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

*Zaire's democratic process did not ultimately fail. Instead, it met and successfully confronted an obstruction of the democratic process – this is, an obstruction that threatened to hinder the attainment of a political system of the people and by the people characterized by assuring the citizenry's participation in the country's administration, a guarantee of basic human rights, a respect of the law by minorities, and the choice to freely elect and control its governors.*

This was a warning sign that discouraged many investors. It would be unfair to place blame solely on the government of Zaire for its failure to honour the structural adjustment programme and its indebtedness, and hold its lenders, namely the World Bank, IMF and other financial institutions, including the WTO, blameless. In most cases, these institutions, instead of becoming a solution for developing countries, became a burden which had to be carried by the

impoverished population. Kapstein (1980: 7) observes that: *“In mitigation, one must point out that it is not all Zaire’s fault. Ten years ago, international lending organizations were pressing all kind of expensive loan packages on the less developed countries, and many trace Zaire’s downfall to the ambitious \$ 400 million Inga-Shaba power project started in the early seventies.”*

The comments of critics on the IMF policy conditions are not always in favour of borrowing countries. The IMF management would like recipient countries to own the policy conditions much more than they have done, while genuine ownership can only be achieved if the countries in question participate in the making of policies. Unfortunately, the IMF usually imposes policies against the wishes of the governments of these countries. The consequence is that many developing countries, if not all, are neither growing nor developing. For many, the situation is bleak. Khor (2008: 2) argues that *the failure of the IMF and other international financial agencies to prevent such crises should be recognized as one of its major flaws, and this should be rectified. Indeed, the failure of the IMF in preventing the global financial system from going down the road of such rapid regulation and liberalization (with the consequences of currency instability, volatility of capital flows, and financial speculation), and instead of presiding over this road that was taken, is a major mistake... At present, debtor countries are at the losing end. They are not organized among themselves, and are often caught in a crisis without enough time or sufficient knowledge to think and plan properly. In contrast, creditors and creditor countries are well organized among themselves, and they organize to obtain maximum return for their loans.*



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


Critics also claim that the IMF is generally indifferent, if not hostile, to their views of democracy, human rights, and labour rights, since the IMF considers economic stability to be a precursor to democracy, an argument discarded by critics. Commenting on the manner in which the IMF and World Bank operate, Radin (2002: 1-2) writes that: *The agencies are not accountable to anyone but top financial officials of the wealthiest nations, they make decisions in closed meetings and they fail to produce the desired results...Widening the worldwide gap between rich and poor, installing 'terminator genes' in crops so that poor farmers cannot save seed from year to year, jeopardizing monarch butterflies in an effort to grow pest-resistant corn – all are examples of what the protesters now gathering in Washington see as a global corporate mentality running wild at the expense of self-determination and self-sufficiency of ordinary people.*



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

Molina and Pereira (2008: 7) argue that *the practice of attaching conditions to grants and loans undermines ownership and imposes inappropriate policy choices. Conditionality is an infringement on national sovereignty, and has not been effective in inducing economic policy reform. The use of conditionality by Washington-based international financial institutions means that other bilateral donors usually turn to the World Bank and IMF to determine their own economic policy conditions.* Molina and Pereira (2008: 13) add that: *“The Fund continues to push for privatization and liberalization of poor nations’ economies, interfering with decisions which should be freely taken by countries according to domestic priorities and needs. Among the loans approved during the last three years, almost a quarter of all conditions required policy reforms related to privatizing or liberalizing.”*

Another criticism by Molina and Pereira (2008: 17) is the lack of coordination between the two financial institutions: *“Lack of coordination between the Bank and the Fund has been a long-standing problem. Over the last twenty years, as many as nine reports have been issued to address this problem... Cross conditionality is not an example of good coordination, but rather an example of how the Fund is stepping into areas where the Bank has greater competences. It evidences the absence of division of labour between the two institutions and the waste of resources in duplicating their efforts to push the same reforms in poor countries.”*




With regard to the WTO, critics further show the relationship between massive, odious debt and poverty in developing countries, together with the effect of the current form of globalization that marginalizes a vast majority of people around the world. Critics always point out that beneficiaries of world trade are largely wealthy people in Western nations and transnational corporations, while the majority of people throughout the world will not benefit.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Moreover, the predicament of the citizens of many poor countries has worsened under the policies of economic globalization prescribed by the World Bank, IMF and the WTO. It should also be noted that the debt of dictators in developing countries involves the lending of billions of dollars by the IMF, World Bank, and other multinational banks and international financial institutions to brutal dictators all over the world. This was evident in the case of Zaire (DRC), wherein Mobutu received much financial support from the West.

#### **4. 7. State of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo**

To portray the existing political, administrative and socio-economic situation in the DRC, it is necessary to refer to its history. This consideration pays particular attention to the Berlin Conference of 1885 and to the policy of the former colonial power which kept the country stagnant, thus facilitating the exploitation of its abundant natural resources by creating division amongst the Congolese themselves. The regime of President Mobutu was characterized by ineffective political, administrative, economic and social governance with catastrophic consequences for the country's human, social, environmental, administrative and mining capital brought about by the colonial power. From 1993 onwards, the political upheavals, wars and various rebellions which erupted against the background of inter-ethnic and inter-community tensions, especially in the East of the country, culminated in the reduction of the Congolese State to its simplest expression.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Wars, armed conflicts and rebellions with their trail of lost human lives, refugees and displaced persons, exacerbated individual and collective poverty and frustrations, human rights violations, the recourse to violence including sexual violence and the tendency to informalize the economy.

##### **4. 7. 1. The Rise and Decline of the State**

The history of the post-independence period of the DRC needs to be reinterpreted in light of the processes of accelerated State collapse of the 1990s. Much of the rich scholarship undertaken during the rule of Mobutu was devoted to a critical analysis of the rise of dictatorial authority, an anatomy of elite corruption, a documentation of foreign complicity in the maintenance of dictatorship and an effort to understand the peculiarities of Mobutu's personal authority. When


rereading the history of the DRC today it is important to ask new questions such as: why the Congolese State *survived* for thirty years under Mobutu's rule and what underpinned what now seems like a rather long period of relative peace within much of the present day territory of the DRC? This can inform debates about the possible directions of change today, after a period of destructive civil war.

It can be argued that, the Mobutu years can be understood as an era of aborted State-making. The ebb of State authority in post-independence Congo is a continuation of the tension between the establishment of a unified 'Congolese' elite with a reference point in Kinshasa and institutions designed to exercise centralized authority over the whole territory on the one hand, and processes of 'Autonomization, to use Peemans' (1997) terms, where elites articulated and utilized institutional arrangements based on historically founded or invented sub-national identities based on ethnicity (tribalism), region and language. When central State organizations were weak, in terms of their control over resources and coercive power, provincial and regional organizations, networks and groups which appealed to alternative institutional arrangements filled the void and expanded their power.

By drawing upon the most important scholarship in the French language, this section explores the changing networks of power behind the Congolese State and how the exercise of public authority changed over time as well as how this process was determined at strategic moments, by the economic trajectory discussed above, while also influencing the direction taken by economic change. We then consider, the key dimensions of State functions related to the provision of security and the provision of services with a focus on education and health.

#### 4. 7. 2. The Colonial Legacy

The colonial legacy was to establish a basis for a State but not a nation. While the analysis of pre-colonial and colonial history was discussed above, it suffices to say that Belgian colonial rule, notoriously paternalistic and violent (Hochschild, 1998), attempted to impose a centralized authority over what had previously been a society ruled by local ‘strongmen’ (Willame, 1994) where networks of ethnic and tribal clusters were characterized by territorial mobility (Vansina, 1991). As in other colonial territories in Africa, the Belgian colonial authorities created strong chiefdoms, where none had previously existed (Willame 1997; Braeckman, 1996), transplanted cooperative ethnic groups from one region to another (for instance, Kasains to Katanga) (Nkamany A Baleme, 1997), and encouraged tribal delineations of the population to consolidate colonial authority. Virtually no forms of social organization were permitted other than those based on tribe and ethnicity, which had a determinant effect on the shape of the post-independence political landscape.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

While colonial rule succeeded in creating a fairly centralized State administration, it left no room for the development of a nation. As labour unions and political parties were prohibited under colonial rule, the multiple tribal associations (e.g. CONAKAT, ABAKO, BALUBAKAT, and UNIMO) became important arenas of political mobilization during the struggle for independence, which brought discrimination into the post-colonial era (Nkamany A Baleme 1997). Congolese ‘nationalism,’ at independence, was not only directed against the colonial power but also had an ethnic and often separatist imprint. For many contestants for power, the goal was not only to accede to independence but also to secure a privileged position for one’s own ethnic group in the post-colonial order.

#### 4. 7. 3. 1965-1974: State-Building and Horizontal Elite Formation

Given the ultimate decline of the State and economy by the end of Mobutu's 32 year reign, it is often forgotten that the Congo, then Zaire, experienced its only significant period of State-building during his first decade in power. After he seized power with the backing of the notorious "Binza Group" and Western powers, Mobutu's regime consolidated authority across the entire territory of the country. The number of provinces was reduced, with a significant reduction in the power of local networks and a concerted effort was made to marginalize traditional authorities. Mobutu's government set out to build a modern public administration dependent on the centre. This would ensure that officials did not serve in their territories of origin. While there was some effort to maintain an ethnic balance in appointments, those who held office served as officials of Zaire, not of their locality. Significantly, Mobutu passed a radical inclusive citizenship law that provided a basis for the integration of communities in the Eastern Congo, further marginalizing traditional authorities who promoted exclusionary policies towards the peoples of Rwandan origin, who had settled in the region over time.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

From the point of view of political economy and a comparative understanding of development, Mobutu was implementing a strategy designed to construct a centralized system of patronage, which would allow the State to capture rent and discipline wealth holders, thus subjecting them to a national project. This is, essentially, the pattern that was followed more successfully in developmental latecomers like South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. Within the context of a single ruling party, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR), he created horizontal networks incorporating selected army officers, politicians, trade unionists, intellectuals and businessmen into the new regime. The regime nationalized the former Belgian Union Minière in 1967 by

creating Gecamines, which controlled the most important export earners: copper and cobalt. Further nationalizations followed as industrial production expanded, not only in mining, but in several lines of manufacturing. Land was nominally nationalized, which sent strong signals to traditional authorities who presided over rural lands through customary rights.

The regime made significant gains in expanding education, achieving 92% enrolment in primary schools and an impressive expansion of secondary and tertiary educational sectors. The health service delivery were also significant, not only with a radical enlargement of educated health personnel, but also a 95% rate of vaccination against childhood diseases and the establishment of a primary health care system that was envied in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.




## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

This period saw greater achievement for it to be dismissed as 'shadow play' by a purely avaricious regime. whilst some of his more grandiose projects were seen as 'white elephants', like the massive Inga-Shaba power project, these have to be evaluated not only on economic criteria (and possibly the levels of graft associated with them), but also on their 'integrative' rationale. Mobutu saw the project as a major means to ensure control over Katanga interests. Peace and security was established throughout the territory during this period as Mobutu retained the position of General and exercised direct command over the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ). However, in this respect, born of the fear that the biggest threat he might face to his power in the future would emerge from the armed forces, he never developed the force into a strong and disciplined organization – this became one of the central problems of his regime as time went on. Mobutu fails during this early period: (1) like in so many developing countries at the time, Mobutu's regime relied far too heavily on debt-financed development, which proved even more

debilitating than elsewhere given the President's erratic approach to economic policy; and (2) despite plans to the contrary, the regime neglected any significant push to improve agricultural productivity and rural economies.

#### 4. 7. 4. 1974-1980 A Shift in the Centre of Gravity of the State


Mobutu's State building project came to a virtual halt with the onset of economic crisis provoked by a major crash in copper prices, an enormous increase in the cost of oil and significant economic mismanagement. A long period of economic decline set in, and the per capita GDP of the early 1980s was about a third of its level in 1962. A radical informalization of the economy began, with a rapid expansion of smuggling, even in such cash crops as coffee.



While the State continued a process of 'Zairianization' by expanding the range of nationalizations, Mobutu was forced to shift to a new form of clientelism to maintain power, given the constraints on the national budget. With the reduction of central government resources, Mobutu abandoned the project of the horizontal integration of elites and moved towards what Peemans called, 'networks of ethno-central penetration'. He sought to consolidate his power through the multiplication of vertical networks based on ethnic and regional affiliation, thus reviving the tribalist logic at the core of the State. This was when he began unduly favouring his own ethnic group from Equateur in both administrative and military offices; leading to the personalization of State enterprises such as Gecamines and the Central Bank and the looting of such government owned enterprises by regime insiders.

It was at this point, too, that there was a proliferation of separate security forces and the reinforcement of the presidential guard, which the President hoped could be used against one

another so as not to threaten his position. Patterns of differential pay and the failure to pay soldiers at all led to the corrosion of the armed forces. Emboldened by the regime's weakness, armed separatist revolts re-emerged in Shaba (Katanga) in 1977 and 1978 and could be put down only with the help of French and Moroccan troops. The first signs of elite opposition formation emerged at this time when Etienne Tshisekedi, resisting Mobutu's efforts to buy off Luba Kasains with State posts, emerged as a focal point for critics of the regime. Concurrently, the Catholic Church, which had been supportive of the regime, maintained a distance, although it did not engage in open opposition. Mobutu was able to maintain authority by granting regional power brokers more leeway and access to resources, as these brokers were organized in vertical networks based mainly on ethnic ties.




### University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

#### 4. 7. 5. 1980-1990 'Autonomization' of the Elite with State Decline

By 1980, Mobutu's regime was already subject to a permanent presence of the International Monetary Fund in the central bank, the customs offices and the Ministry of Finance and by 1983 the government was the recipient of a World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme (Pourtier, 1997: 7). During the period of 1980, little was left of the State administration Mobutu had earlier created and possibilities to hold together alliances based on vertical networks in the regions evaporated with the evaporation of central State resources. Even as Mobutu made important concessions to regional power brokers, like introducing a new exclusionary citizenship law to placate tribal power brokers in the Eastern Congo, vertical networks of power in the provinces began to operate on their own, further empowering traditional authorities and their efforts to accumulate land by expelling those they deemed 'foreigners'. Structural adjustment included the

legalization of artisanal mining and it was estimated that more gold was smuggled out of the country than officially exported.

Mobutu weakened the sites of opposition and win back allies through actively promoting tribalist and ethnic rivalries. He divided the Kivu region into three provinces in a move that effectively granted traditional authorities considerably increased powers, promoting this as a case for 'decentralization and development'. Conflicts were made worse in the region by the operation of both Garang's SPLA from Sudan and Museveni's NRA from Uganda on the territory. These moves have put into motion a process of internecine conflict in the region, which would later provide the sparks for the devastating wars that beset the country in the 1990s.




#### 4. 7. 6. 1990-1997: Unraveling and Collapse of the State

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The 1990s provided the 'knock-out' blow to Mobutu's regime. It began with a sharp reduction in foreign aid as former international supporters of the regime pushed for political reform and the introduction of competitive politics. With the virtual drying up of resources within the central State the processes of autonomization of regional networks massively deepened and those elites formerly attached to Mobutu turned their attention to capturing sources of wealth accumulation and legitimation in the provinces. The turn to multiparty politics in the 90s thus encouraged a massive reactivation of ethno-regional mobilization. Most new parties were ethnically and regionally grounded and tribalism re-emerged as a major vehicle to compete for power. Essentially, socio-economic problems like unemployment and land access were recast in tribal terms, as evident in Katanga and the Kivus. Mobutu continued to attempt to pit one tribal group against another. In an effort to weaken his then strongest political opponent, Etienne Tshisekedi,

a Luba from Kasai Orientale, Mobutu's supporters in Katanga where unemployment was rife due to the implosion of Gécamines, blamed the urban Luba population for stealing jobs. This led to ethnic conflict which resulted in approximately 5,000 deaths and the displacement of 1.3 million people in 1992-93.

Local violence over land access in the Kivus broke into full-scale warfare in 1993 opposing so-called 'native' agriculturalists, particularly the Hendu against 'non-native' Banyarwanda. This led to the death of thousands and approximately 140,000 displaced people. With the massive influx of refugees on the heels of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, including the intact armed forces of the former Rwandan government and the interahamwe (is a group ethnic from Rwanda) militias that had perpetrated the genocide, Eastern Congo became a nightmare. Congolese populations of Tutsi origin became a target for the Hendu, Hema and other tribal groups like the Nande who resented their socio-economic position and were a target of the Hutu forces that had fled Rwanda.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The 'national economy' was in a condition of implosion with sharp declines in the GDP following the contraction of production in every sector except mining. Even in this arena, the export of diamonds overtook all other exports. Most economic transactions in the provinces occurred with sites over the border, while regional power brokers captured what they could in payments derived from the movement of goods. Transactions in the unofficial economy, by the early 1990s, were estimated to be worth three times the value of the official GDP. In Kasai Orientale, the implosion of Gécamines provided the Luba with the opportunity to corner the diamond industry, which had become the country's most important export earner, even though

trade remained dominated by foreigners with Kasai being the major base of the opposition party, Union de Democratie et de Progre Social (UDPS). The Luba were regarded with an explosion of suspicion by reviled ethnic groups. Even Bas-Congo saw a revival of 'Kongo nationalism', not witnessed since the 1960s, and the outbreak of violent demonstrations in Kinshasa in 1996.

Mobutu hung on to power only because of the rivalry between opposition, and regionally based, elites. However, when Uganda and Rwanda decided to back Laurent Kabila in an armed campaign originating in the Eastern Congo, the regime collapsed.



#### 4. 7. 7. 1997-2001: Civil War and State Collapse

The regime of Laurent Kabila never consolidated authority over the territory after Mobutu's departure. Kabila's military campaign had the backing of a broad regional coalition including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and Eritrea. However, after taking power, the regime was almost entirely dependent on Rwanda and Uganda. Most of Kabila's fighting force was made up of Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge from the Kivu region. Regional power brokers from the Kivus, who had long labeled people of Rwandan descent 'foreigners', along with other regional power brokers in other parts of the country began a xenophobic anti-Tutsi campaign. This led Laurent Kabila to break with Rwanda and Uganda and expel Rwandaphones from his regime, in May 1998. He turned to three other ethno-regional groups for support: the Katanga network from his home region; the 'Kasai network'; and the Kinois from Kinshasa. Eventually, he relied on support from the Mai-Mai, local armed groups often loyal to particular traditional authorities, and even the interahamwe.

The Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge almost immediately formed the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD) with backing from Rwanda and launched an offensive in August 1998. Kabila's forces, especially the Presidential Guard, were no match for the RCD, whose soldiers had been at the heart of the force that won him power, and he retained his position only with the support of Angola and eventually Zimbabwe and Namibia. Kabila and his allies were pitted against the RCD-Goma, which had the support of Rwanda, the RCD-ML which was supported by Uganda and the Mouvement de Liberation Congolais (MLC) of Jean Pierre Bemba, also backed by Uganda.



The civil war completed the informalization of the Congolese economy and saw the rise of new 'merchants of war' who allied with one or another of the contending parties to the conflict. What was left of rural markets, trading networks and mineral extraction was all shaped by patterns of ethnic power brokerage and transactions between Congolese actors and interests from belligerent external powers involved in the war.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


#### **4. 8. Lack of Security and Peace**

It is evident that throughout the DRC, insecurity affects the welfare of most communities and people on all levels: social, economic, and psychological. Insecurity turned into violence when war broke out on the Eastern borders of the country in 1994. There is no doubt that the insecurity which has spread all over the country is a consequence of this war. This insecurity has led to the displacement of a large number of the country's population. On the Eastern borders of the country, poverty could also be viewed as an outcome of continuous displacement due to the war, because people move from one place to another in order to find shelter, often without taking

anything with them, when war breaks out,. The conflict experienced in the DRC, since 1998, has exerted a negative impact on the well-being of its people, especially their psyche which has in turn affected development goals throughout the country (IMF, 2007: 19).

#### 4. 9. Culture of Impunity

The above-mentioned survey has identified a culture of impunity as another factor that contributes to the increasing conflict in the country that is affecting development goals. It has clearly been stated that: *A pervasive culture of impunity is seen to foster corruption, injustice, and people's exclusion/marginalization or discrimination. Widespread impunity in the DRC is seen as a key contributor to widespread abuse of power at various levels of management in State affairs (IMF, 2006: 8).*




### University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The IMF report on the DRC asserts that people are adamant about the culture of impunity in which they live, because they believe it encourages evil practices such as corruption, injustice, and exclusion. This culture is observed as a major factor behind the suffering endured by people (IMF, 2007: 20). Government has been unduly passive, to the extent that citizens have started to act as if there was no law in the country. The judiciary cannot do its work because of the corruption and interference of politics in judicial matters. This culture of impunity has created a class of people who are untouchable, for whom prosecution is not possible. These untouchables could be national citizens or foreigners who have connections either with government officials or high-ranking members of the army or police.

#### 4. 10. Poor Governance

The participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) findings show that poor governance is regarded as a result of ineffective public administration. In other words, a dysfunction in public administration, which is riddled with corruption and the abuse of political power, translates into a violation of basic human rights. This, in turn, undermines and reverses efforts to promote economic and social development (Poverty, Insecurity and Exclusion in the DRC, 2006: 17). In terms of poor governance, the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002: 23) states that:

This is the most frequently cited cause of conflict is affecting development goals. It is held responsible for the lack of human capabilities in health, education, the environment, nutrition, governance management, culture, human and financial resource management, and social and road infrastructure. It is noted that the image of Congolese public administration is extremely negative. The state of basic public services not only fails to meet quality standards and deadlines, but has also become a source of corruption. Throughout the country, there is no guarantee of access to these services. The neglect of civil servants and State employees, for several decades, is at the root of the current situation with regard to public administration. The worst thing is that the wages paid are paltry and meaningless when it comes to sustaining people's lives; there is a lack of client centeredness and career management, and physical working conditions are unsatisfactory; while job descriptions and duties are poorly defined. With regard to poor governance, the inefficiency of the judicial system, up to the level of an officer of the court, is also apparent. The judicial sector has experienced a meaningful increase in extra-judicial settlements in terms of court decisions not enforced, as well as the mistrust of the judicial system."



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Other factors are the massive violation of the principle of equality of all before the law, poor management of human resources and the careers of officers of the court, as well as the absence of training programmes which reinforce capacities and public awareness campaigns on the operation of the judicial system. These are the flaws that undermine the justice sector (IMF, 2007: 30-31). Poor governance not only exerts a negative impact on administrative governance, but also reaches all other sectors, such as the social, political and economic, sectors.

Another matter for consideration here is mismanagement. As noted, the late president Mobutu used the resources of the country for his own benefit. This has been illustrated by Wrong (2002: 10), who discloses that, in 1978, an IMF official discovered that the governor of the Central Bank of the DRC ordered GECAMINES, a State company, to deposit its export earnings directly into Mobutu's personal account. With regard to this issue, Koyama and Clark (2002: 203) assert that the widespread corruption, economic controls, and the diversion of public resources for personal gain during the Mobutu era thwarted economic growth. Some of the blame should also be put on President Laurent Kabila's disastrous economic mismanagement, including the introduction of unrealistic price controls, regulation of foreign exchange market, and the printing of money to finance government budget deficit.


In addition, a special report on the DRC, by the Food and Agricultural organization (FAO) (2000: 4), states that the use of an overvalued exchange rate in government and formal business transactions has had the adverse effect of driving hard currency out of the banking system. This fuelled the conflict and nothing went into government coffers, instead of into the black market. This situation has exacerbated the scarcity of essential products, like fuel, with prices controlled

through the official exchange rate. This led an IMF mission, in February 2000, to recommend, among other things, the harmonization of official and parallel exchange rates for the Congolese franc, in order to gradually lift the price control of petroleum products.

#### **4. 11. Social Values**

Factors perceived as the second most important cause of conflict in the DRC and which are related to this issue include social behaviour, ways and customs, and social values in general.

These factors are also perceived to constitute the root of gender inequality, and a decline in governance in the fields of culture and leisure, as well as human and financial resource management. They are, in fact, blamed as the basis of the destruction of socio-economic and physical infrastructures which could promote development (Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002: 23). With regard to gender inequality, as one of the negative aspects of social values, Akinboade (2005: 255) comments that the Issues of...cultural traditions, environmental influences, socio-politics, and historical conditions are combine to create conflict, are intertwined in a vicious cycle. Without this wide understanding, the solutions will be difficult to proffer. It is argued that gender discrimination provides a common thread linking the contributing factors, and that could be used to work out effective solutions. Gender barriers not only limit women's participation in governance and decision-making, but also reinforce the power gap, thus keeping women in a position of inferiority.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

##### **4. 11. 1. Civil Society, Gender, and Peace building in the DRC**

Gender equality in the DRC is often perceived as being solely a “women’s issue” and a matter of political correctness rather than a fundamental right that is necessary to the development and

implementation of effective peace building strategies. It is generally believed that responsibility for incorporating gender issues into peace building programmes rests entirely with women. Collective efforts at achieving gender equality in peace building processes are further undermined by the widely held perception that the gender aspects of projects can best be delivered by women and civil society. However, no progress has been made to engender peace building and social justice concerns in the DRC. While civil society's peace building efforts have been also relatively weak so far, activists from the sector have never contributed significantly to governance, security sector reform, DDR, peace building, and state building. This is to say that civil society in the DRC does not played a role in mobilising social capital to hold the government accountable and make it more responsive to public needs. Furthermore, civil society groups have never delivered services to prevent and resolve conflict, and have never promoted democracy, human rights, and the rule of law since the country is in conflict.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **4. 12. Dilapidation and Destruction of Infrastructure**

This factor has also contributed significantly to the decline in social and cultural values, and has exerted a negative impact on health, environment, access to safe drinking water, electricity, and the socio-economic infrastructure, etc. These all constitute elements of development (Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002: 23). This can be understood by observing the state of schools and sanitation facilities as well as that of roads throughout the country. A major priority of the DRC is the improvement of the poor condition of the transport infrastructure, without which economic growth cannot be sustained. The IMF report (2007: 34) states that: The transport system is made up of 16,238 kilometers of navigable waterways, 5,033 kilometers of railways dating for the most part from the colonial era, 145,000 kilometers of national and

regional roads and 200 secondary rural roads, 7,400 kilometers of urban thoroughfares, and 270 airports throughout the country, including five international airports (in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Goma, and Gbadolite). This transport system in the DRC no longer provides the economic and social sectors with infrastructure and services which are conducive to trade of all kinds, or which improve the mobility of persons and goods, because of the effects of conflict.

It seems that the Congolese do not have a sense of ownership. It is very easy for them to destroy, in a short space of time, something that took a lot of time to build. One may recall the destruction of General Motors and other companies during the looting that took place, in 1992, in Kinshasa. This resulted in thousands of Congolese people becoming unemployed which, in turn, led many into a state of poverty.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The devastating social consequences of conflict in the DRC, as seen above, have become a central inhibiting factor in the quest for meaningful development. Mpangala (2004: 25) argues that statistical comparison of the DRC has revealed that DRC surpasses other countries in terms of violent conflict and the collateral destruction of infrastructure for economic development.

The Congo conflict has had a negative impact on the development of the country. The first war of the liberation of the Congo which started in 1996, against Mobutu's dictatorship, had a negative impact on the development of the DRC. It ushered in a new wave of illegal exploitation of the country's resources by foreigners, aided by the Congolese. Laurant Desiré Kabila, then rebel leader, backed by the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian armies overthrew the late President Mobutu on 17 May, 1997 and assumed the leadership of the country. Few months later, President Kabila summoned Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers to return to their respective

countries. Unhappy with the decision, they decided to invade the Eastern Congo. As Turner (2007: 40) observes: *“The UN panel suggests that the first war was important also in giving the Rwandan and Ugandan military officers an idea of how easy it was to obtain riches in Congo. Several informants told the panel that Uganda’s decision to take part in the second war, in August 1998, was defended by high-rank officers who had had a taste of the business potential of Congo... Starting 1998, aircraft began flying to Congo from the military airports at Entebbe (Uganda) and Kigali (Rwanda), transporting arms, military equipment, soldiers and merchandise, according to the panel. On the return trip they carried coffee, gold, diamond traders and business representatives, and occasionally soldiers.”*



During the second war, in 1998, President Kabila extended an invitation to some allies to stand with the DRC. Countries such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Libya and Namibia responded positively and sent their armies to intervene in the DRC alongside the DRC’s army. Nest (2006: 102) likewise comments that: *“The Congo war has also had a negative effect on market entitlements, including people’s assets, what they gain from their labor, and the prices they pay to get essentials such as food and other services. Many belligerents have forced cultivators to sell their crops at depressed prices and have coerced local miners into relinquishing a portion of their finds to armed groups. As land and trading routes came under the control of armed groups, civilian economic opportunities were further constrained. Since cultivators could not have easy access to their land, food in the Eastern Congo as well in the other part of the DRC became a serious issue because of conflict.”*

#### 4. 13. Conflict and Development

The low standard of living experienced by the majority of the population in developing countries is singled out as the key issue in development. Economic development cannot only be explained by outlining economic factors, while the concept of development includes more than mere changes in economic indicators. Most people who study the development of the country do so because they feel that the present levels of poverty, misery, and injustice are simply unacceptable (Szirmai, 1993: 1-3). Implicit in the use of the term 'development' is the notion that some countries and regions of the world are extremely poor because of conflict, whereas other countries, representing a relatively small segment of the world's population, are very prosperous. Any discussion about development is always tied to a number of basic questions such as: Why are poor countries poor and rich countries rich? Why do poor countries lag behind rich countries in the development of their standards of living? How can poor countries become more prosperous and self-reliant and avoid conflict amongst themselves? How can poor countries catch up with rich countries? All these questions suggest that the concept of development refers to the economic growth of the national per capita income (Donnison, 1982: 6).

Development is a way of avoiding conflict; removing poverty and helping the poor rediscover their human dignity. As such, Donnison (1982: 8) writes that: *To keep out of poverty, people must have an income which enables them to participate in the life of the community. They must be able to, for example, keep themselves relatively removed from conflict, they must be well fed and dressed sufficiently enough to maintain their self-respect.* When discussing development in the context of conflict, Narayan (2002: 50) believes that *the engagement of men and women to live together without injustice or discrimination could be a way to reduce the negative effect of conflict on development while at the same time creating a path to development.* Sen (1988: 28)

views development as a process of improvement with respect to a set of values or, in comparison to the relative level of development in different countries, a comparative state of being with regard to such values. He adds that *“the assertion that development is a more normative concept which will be measured differently by different people constitutes a serious charge, but is one which affects all areas of social sciences and is not unique to development studies”* (Sen, 1988: 28). According to Reitsma and Kleinpenning (1989: 23), *a country should consider itself developed when the material and immaterial needs of its populace have been reasonably satisfied. They view development and underdevelopment as moving in opposite directions, with ‘developedness’ and ‘underdevelopedness’ as respective results.*



Reitsma and Kleinpenning define development as a progressive process that consists of a series of parallel and successive changes which enable an underdeveloped country to become developed. On the other hand, they state that underdevelopment is a retrogressive process which eventually leads to a state of underdevelopedness. They consider both developedness and underdevelopedness to be relative concepts, in that every country or society may be said to be underdeveloped when it is less developed than it could be (Reistma and Kleinpenning, 1989: 23). Reistma and Kleinpenning (1989: 23) highlight the fact that in 1960, the American geographer Richard Hartshorne argues that in even the richest and most advanced countries, not all material and spiritual needs are satisfied for everyone in all parts of the country. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reach an envisioned and utopian situation of complete developedness, because there will always be new needs that emerge. (1) Development is a never ending process of change which has progressed further in some parts of the world than in others. The result is a continuum ranging from comparatively advanced countries, often referred to as ‘core’ countries,


via a wide variety of moderately developed countries, which may be labelled 'semi-core' and 'semi-peripheral' countries, to comparatively backward or 'peripheral' countries. (2) The development stage (high, moderate, or low), in which a country finds itself, represents a multidimensional situation in which important needs (food, shelter, clothing, health, education, recreation, social security, personal freedom, religion, culture, etc.) are satisfied to a larger or smaller degree. (3) Since development is a continuing process, the meaning of developed varies with place and time. (4) Fully developed societies do not exist. All we can say is that a particular society may be moving toward a higher level of developedness or a high degree of needs satisfaction for more people (Reistma and Kleinpenning, 1989: 24).



In order to compare developedness and underdevelopedness, one should choose a standard for measurement. In this regard, the First World has been chosen as the norm against which to measure developedness. Responding to this, Reitsma and Kleinpenning (1989: 24-25) point out that: *In the First World as well as the Third World, people have accepted First World standards of material and immaterial well-being as the norm. And what is more, that is the norm which the Third World countries feel they should aspire to reach. To put it in different words, Western development has become synonymous with development, while progress has become synonymous with change in the direction of Western levels of productivity and prosperity.*

Underdevelopment is a complex and burdensome phenomenon to explain. Even if one makes use of all the theories that have been put forward over the years, the concept is still difficult to understand. Underdevelopment is viewed as a growing discrepancy between raised expectations and the existing level of needs satisfaction, regardless of how low this level may be (Reistma and

Kleinpenning, 1989: 24). Bednarz and Giardino (1988: 69-72) assert that it is not easy to evaluate and measure the role that resources play in the direct development of a country. According to Bednarz and Giardino (1988: 68), the development of Third World countries is probably a function of the cultural system operating on the available physical resource base. Thus, although one accepts the importance of mineral resources as a basic requirement for industrialisation, it has been found to be very difficult to use this as a predictor of economic development and an indicator of the well-being of a population.



Bednarz and Giardino's argument is logical, in the sense that development is not a function of the natural resources a country might possess. A country such as the DRC, with all the different resources that it commands, has nonetheless been ranked among the poorest and conflicting countries in the world. This raises questions such as: Why are Third World countries that possess many natural resources still in a state of underdevelopedness? Is it possible for Third World countries to take responsibility for their own development, without expecting foreign aid? Nash (1986: 190) responds to these questions, by proposing that: *Many believe that the future development of the Third World and the easing of Third World poverty depend upon the West's provision of foreign aid. Bauer has objected to the use of the word 'aid' in connection with official transfers of wealth from one government to another. For one thing, much of this alleged 'aid' turns out to be aid for little more than the private bank accounts of well-placed officials and politicians in Third World nations. As Bauer sees it, foreign aid is much more likely to obstruct than to promote...the development of the Third World and the relief of poverty.*

In terms of the above mentioned argument, Nash is not in favour of wealth being transferred from the wealthiest countries to the poorest ones. He contends that bad governance and mismanagement will not allow common people to benefit from the wealth that might be thus transferred. It is unfortunate that Nash does not suggest what Third World countries can do to become self-sufficient.

Underdevelopment is, in many ways, restrictive. Sometimes, it affects the thoughts and beliefs of the underdeveloped in such a manner that they start thinking negatively about their future.

Negative thoughts generally drag people down and bring conflict.



In his definition of underdevelopment, as quoted by Reitsma and Kleinpenning (1989:36), Senghaas, in his book written in German, defines underdevelopment as the structural heterogeneity of peripheral social formations and the concomitant obstruction of the autonomous development of productive forces resulting from the international division of labour caused by the dominance of the capitalist mode of production. This definition has been objected to by Reitsma and Kleinpenning (1989: 36-37) who contend that there are serious objections to this sort of definition. First of all, they argue that the concept of underdevelopment is given a meaning which it did not originally possess. According to Senghaas, the basic feature of underdevelopment is not poverty, low productivity, and rapid population growth but, rather, structural heterogeneity and a lack of autonomous development. Reitsma and Kleinpenning view Senghaas' definition as implying that there is only one factor which allegedly causes under development; this is the constraining effect which capitalism exerts on indigenous development. According to Reitsma and Kleinpenning, autonomous development, whatever that may be, is not


better than dependent development. Senghaas' definition, with its built-in explanation, argues that countries like China and Mongolia cannot be considered underdeveloped because they are barely integrated into the capitalist world system and are not dominated by foreign capitalist interests. This argument is also discarded by Reitsma and Kleinpenning. According to Senghaas, underdevelopment came with the rise of capitalism. Since he ascribes underdevelopment to an external factor, i.e. capitalist penetration, he also denies that internal factors might have played an important role. Structural heterogeneity, which may be described as the interwoven coexistence of the modern, capitalist mode of production and the traditional, pre-capitalist mode of production which enables the former to dominate and exploit the latter, is found not only in the Third World, but also in the First and Second Worlds. Reitsma and Kleinpenning have made relevant remarks in their objections to Senghaas' view on underdevelopment, but it should be noted that the concepts of development and underdevelopment only came into existence after the invasion by Western colonial powers in several parts of the world. The root cause of this invasion was not to help "develop" underdeveloped parts of the world, but to exploit them for the benefit of their own countries. Even though raw material from developing countries is not viewed by some Western researchers as a key element that boosted Western development, its positive impact on the development of Western countries cannot be denied.

Today, Colombia and the DRC are the greatest worldwide producers of columbite tantalum, a combined mineral used for computer chips and cell phones, yet the first beneficiaries of this mineral are the developed countries. While computer chips are made with this mineral, less than 1% of the population of the countries in which the mineral is produced own computers. It is true that Western countries are not responsible for the underdevelopment of the Third World, but



displacements from areas affected by the war (FAO, 2000: 1-2). Conflicts have dramatically reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. Millions of people have been killed, unaccounted numbers of the population have been injured and the country's infrastructure has been destroyed by decades of mismanagement, insecurity, poor governance, lack of peace as well as authoritarian and corrupt rule.

The implementation of a conflict resolution strategy is very important for the stabilization of the political, economic and social environment, failing which any development efforts will be in vain (IMF, 2007: 59). It is the responsibility of the Congolese people to address, in conflict resolution, the main causes of conflict for the promotion of their development goals. A failure to do so will condemn the Congolese to starvation, death and underdevelopment.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The next chapter offers a discussion of conflict resolution in conflict in the DRC. It also focuses on development in situations in which justice is not applied and people live under extreme discrimination; this brings about conflict and underdevelopment, despite the natural resources with which the country is endowed.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Conflict and Development: Conflict Resolution in the DRC

*'The deceptively simple question then of how to decide when conflict resolution is effective, often not one that can be answered easily (Ross, 2004: 2)'.*

*'However, the most challenging part of our journey on the road to development, particularly the building of a workable moral consensus, will be reconciling the expectations of the historically disadvantaged with the vested interests (and rights!) of the historically privileged class (Esterhuyse, 2004:192-193)'.*




#### 5. 1. Introduction

### University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

Conflict resolution is an issue which has become topical in debates and discussions on Africa generally and the DRC in particular. This is not only because Africa is characterized by many conflicts, but a consequence of the realization that in most cases the conflict has a negative impact on Africa's development. Thus, conflict resolution mechanisms have become increasingly important in solving conflicts in the continent. Mwajiru (2001: 5) argues the following of the importance of conflict resolution: *'One of the distinguishing features of Africa's political landscape is its many dysfunctional and protracted social and political conflicts. This problem is made worse by lack of effective mechanisms to manage these conflicts. Where they exist they are weak and, thus, social and political relationships in the continent have been disrupted. This has had negative consequences, including the interruption of the development and the diversion of scarce resources to the management of these conflicts'.*

This chapter therefore intends to examine the situation concerning the levels and nature of social conflict and conflict resolution mechanisms for the promotion of development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). What do conditions tell us of the state of conflict in the DRC? Do they indicate successful conflict resolution? There has been great euphoria, especially internationally, over the bloody election of 2006 in the DRC, the promulgation of a failed constitution, and relative political and economic instability in a country that has been divided and continues to be divided by civil war. There are, however, rumblings in and outside the country concerning the ongoing instability which is affecting development programmes. How can one best describe the state of the DRC at this time? Are these tensions normal? Are they to be expected given the country's past? Can a proper conflict resolution and management process resolve the current instability in the country? As a case study, the choice of the DRC is not accidental. As it is known, the DRC is among those countries in Africa which have experienced protracted conflicts since independence in 1960, regardless of the development programmes at place in the country. It is a country in which serious conflict resolutions have been, and continue to be, carried out. However, conflict remains especially in the Eastern part of the country and affects the development of the entire country. This is because the main cause of conflict is ill-defined and, consequently, makes conflict resolution a big challenge which in turn affects development goals in the DRC.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Furthermore, the DRC is a country of the Great Lake Region (GLR), a region which is known to lead in Africa in terms of the scale and magnitude of its political conflicts (Mpangala, 2000). To this end we will examine conflict resolution and development in the DRC. We will examine the vexing question of what conflict resolution 'looks like'. We will explore the ideas of a number of

leading conflict resolution scholars, including Burton (1979, 1984, 1988 a, 1990 a, 1990 b, 1990 c, 1997), Mitchell (1981, 2002) Lederach (1997), Deutsch (1973) and others. The works of sociological scholars, such as Peter Berger (1998), writing on social cohesion, will also be taken into account into order also provide pointers on the nature of conflict resolution, and the application of those ideas to the DRC. In the main, however, we will be drawing on the ideas of analytical conflict resolution scholars.


The study will follow this by drawing on a wide selection of source materials, to indicate the state of resolution or otherwise, of the DRC conflict and the manner in which it affects development in the country. Similarly, a number of recent opinion surveys including those of Lombard (2004), and Hofmeyer (2005) as well as news reports of events in the country, at this moment that the DRC is struggling with the issue of development, will be drawn upon in this examination. We will be searching especially for additional signs of the resolution of conflict, as the scholars of analytical conflict resolution would understand the word, or for their absence. Finally, we will attempt to construct a scorecard matrix, indicating the extent to which conflict resolution has taken place in the DRC. First, we need to examine the literature on the concept of conflict, particularly the literature within the conflict resolution approach, in order to determine whether the theoretical requirements for conflict resolution have been met.

## **5. 2. The Nature of Conflict Resolution**

What does conflict resolution mean? How much social cohesion is necessary for one to say that a conflict is truly resolved? This is a question that must be asked and answered before one can


adequately grapple with the more specific question of whether conflict resolution has been properly tackled in the DRC.

Taking a broader view of the literature at the outset, and central to the focus of this chapter, is the issue of the degree of social cohesion (a necessary condition for the promotion of development in any society) necessary as a yardstick to evaluating the extent to which conflict resolution has taken place in the DRC. This observation is acknowledged by Peter Berger (1998: 353) who states that the degree of normative consensus necessary for social order is a disputed point of sociological interpretation. Berger further argues that 'a central school of thought in sociology, most cogently represented by Emile Durkheim and his disciples, has always maintained that any society will fall apart that does not have a 'collective conscience' - that is, a common body of norms adhered to by most of its people.' This position that we will call the 'consensualist view' is echoed by Davidson and Rees-Mogg (1997: 359) who wrote that societies tend to experience the most successful periods in their history when collective social morality is shared. They went on to write that 'Such morality not only perform specific functions such as reducing inequality or discrimination, and helping to support family and social structure, but gives citizens a sense of responsibility and direction'. Supporting this view, Esterhuysen (2004: 194) writes that 'What is needed is a national consensus on and commitment to, a set of legitimizing values that will underpin the process of transformation'. However, this 'consensualist' view is offset in the literature by an opposing position that argues that 'a modern society cannot aspire to such normative unity and can function well without it, as long as there is agreement on a set of procedures by which conflicting interests and ideologies can be adjudicated.' In fact, pluralist theorists of politics regard diverse norms and values positively, as a source of societal strength,



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

as long as these take the form of 'cross-cutting social cleavages' (Apter, 1977: 302). Reflecting upon such a context, Berger (1998: 353-354) writes of an alternative, 'traffic-system' model of social order, where citizens adhere to the procedures which adjust the competing norms and values. In this sense there is a normality which is an aspiration, and which may be realized while the society is economically prosperous and its political stability remains relatively unthreatened. However, 'normality' is unfortunately rarely a permanent state of affairs. When it becomes threatened, for whatever reasons, the question of shared norms quickly attains new urgency. When members of a society are required to make sacrifices for the society as a whole, their willingness to do so will depend on the degree of value consensus that underpins the legitimacy of the political system (Berger, 1998: 354).




## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

As will be made explicit below, there are those who are concerned about a lack of shared norms in the DRC, while at the same time there are those for whom the country should be able to sustain tolerable levels of social conflict, so long as the institutional 'traffic system' works. We next move to a discussion of the nature of conflict resolution as it appears in the work of analytical conflict resolution scholars.

Analytical conflict resolution literature, in common with much of the literature on social conflict in general, devotes a great deal of attention to aspects such as the causes of conflict, the nature of conflict, its processes, and ways of resolving it. Comparatively little attention is given to the end-state of conflict resolution, i.e.: how do we know when conflict is resolved? Some of the lack of clarity on the nature of resolution has to do with the fact that, according to Ross (2004: 7), it is useful to distinguish between the 'internal' criteria for successful resolution (how these actions

affect the people that are supposed to promote development) and the 'external' (how these actions impact upon the wider conflict) criteria of conflict resolution. Most resolution practitioners are far better able to spell out their internal criteria for success than they are able to explain their external ones. And yet, the whole point of conflict resolution revolves around bringing about these 'external' changes and development. Discussing the views of the analytical conflict resolution approach, Rubenstein and Blechman (1999: 3) reflect upon this situation when they point out that '*no particular vision of the Good Society compels the practitioners.*'




We have, in chapter two, however, closely examined the corpus of literature of the analytical conflict resolution school, in an attempt to extract from that body of literature the various elements that these scholar-practitioners present as the necessary conditions for conflict resolution. Some of these elements relate to structural conditions, such as the importance of restored relationships. Others relate to the procedural elements, such as specific problem-solving processes that must be applied if conflict resolution is to materialise, and that should be sustained, and institutionalized if conflict prevention is to occur. A third category relates to the importance of structural transformation, encompassed in constitutional arrangements, and democratic governance. Yet another category relates to the presence of distributive justice in the post-conflict society.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

In summary, seven key propositions can be reproduced about the nature of a resolved conflict. It can be listed as follows:

- First, there is a procedural element, in terms of which the conflict is resolved according to a certain highly prescriptive process: the facilitated analytical problem-solving workshop.

- Second, a resolved conflict would present evidence of restored relationships, and be characterized by the presence of Burton's notion of 'valued relationships.' This is what proves to be the most challenging in the DRC.
- Third, a high level of identity, and related needs satisfaction, through maximization of autonomy and the self-determination of groups would be evident.
- Fourth, there would be a high degree of distributive justice characterized by increasing equality and decreasing poverty.
- Fifth, ongoing analytical 'prevention' problem-solving processes, designed to bring about basic human needs satisfaction through the continual adjustment of social institutions to meet the needs of individuals and groups, would continue.
- Related to the above, but deserving special mention, Burton has indicated that special constitutional provisions should be provided for minority groups in deep-rooted conflict.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

A resolved conflict does not imply a future without any form of conflict. There is, upon examination of the list above, two levels of conflict resolution implicit in the work of the analytical conflict resolution school. The first level is the hope for results of pre-negotiation interventions: the classical problem-solving workshops that will enable a negotiated settlement to take place. This first level is the result of episodic problem-solving interventions. Beyond this, however, is the second level; the level of conflict transformed in the long term: the result of ongoing, institutionalized problem-solving, with the presence of restored and valued relationships.

### 5. 3. Social Cohesion and Conflict in Contemporary DRC

Some of the major disturbing challenges to social cohesion in Africa today are conflicts arising from ethnic differences; when there is no social cohesion, development programmes are impeded and conflict resolution is impossible. In the case of the DRC, one cannot fail to observe that the country is multi-ethnic with a plurality of ethnic groups, each with its own distinct cultural identity which poses problems for the country and its development goals. In almost every African country, it is not difficult to identify a complex presence of a multitude of ethnic communities.




In a country like the DRC, where there are more than 450 languages and dialects, each ethnicity is generally identified by its language. The presence of such a multiplicity of ethnicities in the same country means that Africans inevitably find themselves with vast differences in languages, customs and cultures. Indeed, as Waruta (Mary, 1999: 12) observes, these differences concern not merely tribal matters of life, but some moral codes considered central in the cultural fabric of various peoples. Some practice circumcision, while others consider the custom barbaric, while some of the things eaten by certain people are considered taboo by others. What is most significant in the variation of the African people is the fact that some of the languages they speak, even when they happen to be neighbours, have no affinity whatsoever.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

From the perspective given above, the DRC has not yet clearly made remarkable strides in its accommodation of political and socio-economic conflict. A liberal democracy, based on one of the world's most progressive constitutions has been established in Western Countries which are committed to the protection of human rights all over the world. In contrast, in the DRC, the


constitution is not able to protect even the status of four official languages (Kikongo, Lingala, Tshiluba, and Swahili). The levels of discrimination and inequality are significantly high. The fight for power, identity, natural resources and land is still going on in the DRC today. Elections were held in 2006 but conflict continues, especially in the Eastern Congo, and a high degree of political instability still continues throughout the country; this is, of course, affecting development goals because of the lack of social cohesion. Economic policy is not well managed within the limitations of market orthodoxy, and economic growth is not well maintained.



Furthermore, a number of observers point to issues that continue to threaten the DRC's stability and impede conflict management which consequently affects development. Aspects like a lack of social cohesion, lack of reconciliation and the resolution of conflict remains. This gives one serious cause for concern. We will analyze a number of these below. The society has changed markedly since 1990 and, to some extent, one can agree with Biaya (1998: 327) that the DRC has worsened when he writes of post-colonial ethnicity in the DRC: many of the issues that confront DRC now sound like those of before independence and add to it the question of discrimination and lack of social cohesion. A number of challenges rooted in DRC history are still facing the DRC up to now; however, we can identify a series of problems that are not solved including discrimination amongst the Congolese themselves. These are important, and bear a detailed examination below, as they point towards a number of aspects of Congolese society that are highlighted as fault lines in the sections below.

There is, for instance, tension between the central government and ethnic groups that are allegedly discriminated against. Because of the tension there is an enormous development

challenge that faces the country, with high levels of poverty, a continuing lack of access to basic needs like clean water, electricity and housing especially in marginalized communities. Bernstein (1998: 199) writes, for instance, that the 'major crisis lies in unemployment'. All the DRC governments that have come into power after independence have inherited a demoralized civil service that lacks the necessary skills to build a productive nation. Simultaneously, these governments have been committed to the introduction of some form of discriminatory action e.g. the implementation of zairianization (nationalization of companies and services), which affects conflict resolution mechanisms and, in turn, challenges the development programme of the country. In this context, Bernstein further argues that ethnicity is a criterion of selection for opportunities in the DRC. This is what brings more conflict and affects its development goals. For that reason, it is impossible for such country to build a detribalized State based on a constitution that is silent on ethnicity; because some people have special privileges based purely on their ethnic affiliations. Secondly, the State will never allow independent organizations or opposition parties that criticize its policies to continue to operate (Bernstein, 1998: 199). Bernstein maintains that there are five other factors working to undermine some of the most basic rules that hold a society together. The first factor is the state of inequality or discrimination in the system. Discrimination, as it impinges on security, is regarded as important by a number of commentators on reconciliation and has negative implications for the satisfaction of human needs. The second factor is the continuation of a lack of service delivery and the inability to pay for services rendered. This relates to the government's neo-liberalist policies and the frustration born of the need for distributive justice. The third factor is the general level of corruption in and around the State but, more broadly, in the society as a whole. The following discussion represents a number of fault lines that indicate a lack of true resolution of conflict in the DRC,



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

and which deserve the concerted attention of political leaders, if the Congolese must achieve sustainable peace and development. The reason for the selection of these issues is that each reflects directly on elements of analytical conflict resolution. Although the aforementioned will be dealt with as separate issues, the reality is that they often overlap and reinforce each other in various ways.


### **5. 3. 1. Service delivery by the State and Public Protest**

The specificity of Belgian colonial rule had far-reaching implications for the post-colonial DRC State. In contrast to former French or English colonies where the process of political emancipation had started after the Second World War, the Belgium Congo suffered from a flagrant lack of service delivery in contrast to pre-colonial States with educated elites able to run the country after independence (Tshimanga 1997). Education had been left to missionaries and, at independence; there was not a single Congolese physician or engineer in the DRC (Nohlen 1993: 739-741).

The Mobutu regime's initial period of State-building included the impressive development of service delivery in general. The State assumed control of education, including tertiary education, with significant expansion in access. By 1968/69, primary school enrolment (6 to 14 year-olds) reached a level of 92 %, while 8,401 students were educated at universities (Banque National du Congo, Rapport Annuel 1968-1969: 65). A national health system and a social security system, which employed 500.000 employees (1968-69: 69), was created; this included building the biggest hospital in Africa, the 'Mama Yemo hospital,' in Kinshasa for instance. It is often forgotten that by the late 1970s smallpox was eradicated, the DRC achieved an impressive 95%

coverage in vaccination against childhood diseases and the country was generally regarded as a model for primary and community health care in the developing world (Persyn and Ladrière, 2004). Today, many of the health care professionals who were trained during the Mobutu years are working in South Africa.

With the collapse of the country and the major industries, because of conflict, the challenge of reconstructing service delivery is all the more difficult today. During the mid-1960s, major State-owned enterprises such as Gecamine and Minière de Bakwanga in Kasai (Miba), which generated most of the country's earnings, had to provide workers and their families with housing and free healthcare (Braeckman, 2006). However, since the DRC government's goal to provide human needs in service delivery has collapsed or failed in the 1980s, these services have deteriorated or ceased to function, and the government has generally not replaced them.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Indeed, the protests concerning poor service delivery in the DRC since the mid-1980s, to this day, bear with them Bernstein's 1998 prediction (1998: 199) that: *'The big normative test came when, at the micro level, the government of the DRC gets tired of the trade-off between endless consultation with 'the community' and actually getting projects off the ground; and at the macro level, government finds it harder to deliver on a massive scale than it originally thought and pressures rise for less-than-democratic measures to quell popular discontent.'* There have been extensive protests and conflict around the issue of lack of service delivery and housing at the local government level - at which discrimination takes place even at urban centres - since the 1985 election that brought Mobutu into power once more after his previous regime (Cull, 2006: 9). These protests actually gained momentum, and the 1990s saw violent protest action around

the country, with the army often accused of overly harsh retaliation against protesters. This comes as no surprise. Nicole (2005: 86) writes that *'When one examines the depth and breadth of poverty in DRC and the backlogs in basic local service provision, the surprising feature is that open conflict is more widespread.'*

The focus of the protest activity is the central government which is criticized for its inability to provide an acceptable level of service delivery and for allowing discrimination to occur among the population of the DRC. Though not necessarily problematic in and of themselves, it is noteworthy that these protests too often turned violent, and the government's reactions to the protests were equally violent, thus causing social decline in the country and affecting its development programme. The central government, instead of redressing the issue of lack of service delivery or halting discrimination in an attempt to remedy the situation, reacted very heavy-handedly; they acted in a similar fashion to the colonial governments of the past, by killing innocent people. It has used 'heavy' policing tactics with tear-gas and bullets, and has threatened to launch an investigation into the possible agency of a third force provoking political unrest. The protest action and the violence that accompanied it continue well up to 1997 when Mobutu's government collapsed.

The workers strike and mass action among the population in the early 1990s led to the death of many around the country. For some critics who assumed a position to the left of government, the situation became extremely serious. According to Patrick Bond (2005: 306), for instance, State repression and judicial harassment of social movements occurred, and increased in the 1990s. Bond quotes Naomi Klein: 'There is a huge amount of struggle going on in DRC today. There

are movements exploding more especially in the Diaspora. They are resisting discrimination and privatization of human need, and demanding justice across the country. They are reacting against all the broken promises of the DRC government, that DRC should be a secure State without inequality or discrimination’.

The government is spending a lot of money on their private security and affordable housing so as to keep the rich from the poor. Though these sentiments may be an overstatement of the situation, reflection upon the ongoing conflicts that characterize many states highlight that there is some cause for concern, given the deep-rooted nature of the conflict in DRC, and the high levels of violence that do occur.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

In the context of the unrest, Nicol (2005: 86-96) points to the need for the government of the DRC to bring the issue of service delivery into conflict resolution processes, in order to deal with the ‘rising wave of popular protest.’ This underlines the fact that government is not in touch with the needs of its constituents, and that communications have broken down. In the period before independence in 1959, various protests were undertaken to promote dialogue around issues of service delivery. However, with the passage of time, these have largely been rejected as ineffectual, compared to the politics of protestation and confrontation. The structures of conflict resolution that were built in the past would have been able to address the matters of service delivery, among other issues, if they were maintained and improved upon with the passage of time. Yet, they fail to address the problem squarely. These issues of service delivery indicate an inability on the part of government to provide service delivery; its tendency to control protest in forceful ways, the failure of discussion and negotiation as a means of conflict resolution, and by

implication, from the analytical conflict resolution perspective, indicate the absence of 'preventive' measures of conflict management in the DRC.

### 5. 3. 2. Fault Lines of Ethnicity and Identity in the DRC

Many of the instances of conflict that occur in the country still take place along the fault lines of ethnicity and social identity constructed during the colonial era and which continue to affect the development programme after independence. While one would not expect issues around ethnicity, prejudice and inequality to disappear overnight, Claude-Helene Mayer in her investigation of the continuing role of identity in conflict in Africa in the post-colonial era, (2004: 349) states that: *'experiences from the colonial-past determine especially intercultural conflict experiences'*. According to her, this is evidenced by the repeatedly surfacing themes of ethnicity, status, and feelings of inferiority/superiority. For that, it is a surprise that 50 years after the end of colonialism, the issue of ethnicity remains of such penetrating importance in the construction of perceptions, identity and conscience in everyday conflicts in the DRC. Mayer (2004: 349) further argues that her data leads her to the conclusion that the terminology and contents of ethnic affiliation are continuously reconstructed and perpetuated, as they are continually passed on through various forms of socialization.

Mayer (2004: 355) finds the remarkably high number of conflicts caused by self and other images noteworthy, and goes on to write that 'These constructs strongly affect not only perceptions, potential expressions, and interpretations of everyday situations but also the spirit of development. Her data also reveals categories of thought on ethnicity, and feelings of inferiority and superiority 'which are to be interpreted as consequences of 'colonial' and intra psychological

identity conflicts' (2004: 355). This evidence points towards a lack of resolution of the conflict, especially insofar as people continue to think in terms of ethnic identity, define themselves accordingly, and continue to act in terms of their group memberships.

These findings are largely borne out by the work of Lombard (2004a, 2004b), Hofmeyer (2005) and Gibson (2004), who examine indicators of the resolution of conflict made in the past in the DRC. Ethnic divides contribute towards a high degree of social, political and economic discrimination and inequality in the country; this made the resolution of the conflict impossible and affected the development goals of the country. One of the implications of this situation is the tenuous and difficult nature of relationships among ethnic groups and the lack of trust towards the government.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*


### **5. 3. 3. Lack of Inter-ethnic Contact**

As far as ethnic contact is concerned, there is a large percentage of Congolese people who reported never talking to their compatriots of other ethnic groups, especially the Banyamulenge ethnic group, and more than half of all Congolese people never socialize with people who do not belong to the same ethnic group as themselves; this percentage is on the increase in longitudinal studies. Additionally, approximately 60% of the Congolese 'continue to struggle to understand their fellow Congolese from other ethnic backgrounds' (Lombard, 2004: 50, Hofmeyer, 2005: 51). Again, this is supported by Gibson's finding that 'if conflict resolution requires interethnic understanding, then Congolese did not resolve their conflicts' (Gibson, 2004: 122). So, one of the factors to solve conflict in the DRC is the inter-ethnic contact; the way in which the Congolese interact amongst themselves will determine the way conflict is resolved in order for

them to work towards the promotion of development. This will determine the way to avoid discrimination among Congolese citizens.

#### 5. 3. 4. High Levels of Discrimination


The levels of discrimination have remained extremely high in the DRC and have resulted in conflict. Despite the conflict, around the country, which is opposed by those groups that are discriminated against, there is still no solution to the discrimination. After 50 years of independence, the discrimination wave is clearly more than a transitional phenomenon, and the public outcry over discrimination is growing (Spies, D. and Sonjica, N., 2006: 1, The Herald, 17 April, 2006). This has a negative impact on the development of the country. Furthermore, one of the worst aspects of discrimination in the DRC is that if one does not belong to the privilege ethnic group, it is difficult to gain opportunities like work or studies, etc. It is particularly difficult if one does not speak the language of the privileged group. Clearly, much discrimination is related to the high levels of poverty and unemployment in the country, but the high levels of discrimination have more to do with ruptured relationships and unresolved hostility that point to an incomplete resolution of conflict in the country. Pierre du Toit (2001: 127) has made a similar point by claiming that *'mere materialist interpretations of the roots of discrimination are inadequate, that the social-psychological dimension needs to be considered as well, and that the roots of such violent actions need to be traced to the structure of the overt political conflict preceding the inauguration of democracy and the nature of the transition from that conflict.'*



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

One particularly worrying manifestation in this regard, is the increasing incidence of violence since the 1960s that has been initiated by discrimination. This has seen a number of violent episodes resulting in the deaths of innocent citizens like women, old people, and children.

Analyzing the results of her survey, Lombard (2004) reports that people of the DRC feel threatened by high discrimination levels; 60% believe that discrimination is one of the most important problems that should be considered in conflict resolution, while 80% believe that discrimination is a serious threat to democracy and affects development goals in the DRC. Again, there are human needs implications. High levels of discrimination frustrate the basic human need for security. There is also evidence to suggest that much of the discrimination leads to violent conflict and human rights violations. According to Lucas (2003), who cites Andy Dawes, 'the vast majority of those who are fighting in the DRC today or since the 1990s are people who are discriminated against in one aspect of nation building or the other'.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Indeed, the objective of the dictatorship and zairianization reform in the DRC, brought about by Mobutu, was to exclude perceived enemies from the government and the resources it controls. The oligarchy ruling in the DRC represents only a tiny fragment of the society and a large segment of the society is excluded from, or discriminated against, participation in the political process and development programme. Consequently, this resulted in conflict in the country. According to Nelson Kasfir (1976: 227), 'departicipation' is the most striking feature of political change since independence in the DRC. The political arena shrunk as the DRC actively promoted departicipation by 'strengthening the central administration' and assuring the 'desuetude of participatory structures'. The incorporation of kith and kin into the ruling oligarchy


and the exclusion of other ethnic groups from enjoying the prerogatives of power generated problems of ethnicity, clanism, regionalism, etc. Elaborate programmes of successive political exclusion (Ibrahim, 1993) were implemented and the vast majority of the DRC lost their individual and collective rights to full participation in the political, civil and economic lives of their country.

Congolese political systems became increasingly characterized by the narrowing of the social and ethnic base of Mobutu's men and an expansion of those groups and segments of society that were excluded from political processes and development programmes, or significantly marginalized. Mobutu was a dictator who surrounded himself with people from his own ethnic group. At the time of independence, few people outside of northern Equateur would have heard of the Ngbandi ethnic group. After thirty two (32) years of Mobutu's rule, the Ngbandi are well-known as Mobutu's 'tribe'. Mobutu began with military and police leadership skewed toward his Equateur region and neighbouring Orientale province, but purges and selective promotion led to further skewing. By the late 1980s, the heads of 44 'special' services were all Ngbandi. The Special Presidential Division was, reportedly, recruited almost entirely from the Ngbandi (Turner, 1997: 10). This discrimination posed fundamental problems related to the denial of equity and social justice; problems that led to violent conflict in the country and affected development programmes whilst creating destructive divisions among the citizens. Mobutu, in the last days of his reign, used power to destroy and terrorize the population, which consequently caused the economic development of the country to digress, thus leaving his opponents with no option but armed resistance in removing him from power. After Mobutu, the Laurent Kabila lead regime (in 1997) would have brought the issue of discrimination into the process of conflict



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

resolution which was held in Lusaka for lasting peace and development in the DRC. This failed and another unrest and violent conflict started in 1998. All these conflicts are in search of equity and justice in the country. Gradually, repression and resistance were converted to violence as State institutions broke down and the law of the jungle, (or maybe that of the desert), took over. The central problem that was posed by exclusion and/or discrimination was the issue of domination. Those who were left out through the use of State power quite rightly defined their position as one of political subordination and felt compelled to fight for their rights (Ibrahirn and Pereira, 1993). Hence, for development to occur in the DRC tolerance should be allowed among citizens; and no one should be more qualified than anyone else to be a Congolese citizen. The failure to tolerate one another will bring more conflict and consequently impede the development programme of the country.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

### **5. 3. 5. Intolerance**

Gibson and Gouws (2003: 24) have targeted political tolerance levels as an important indicator of reconciliation in the country. They point out that 'Tolerance is more indispensable in heterogeneous societies than in homogeneous societies because in societies with deep divisions, the potential for conflict is so much greater'. Linking this to the DRC, they further state that '*In DRC, the potential for conflict is embedded in the political culture, in that ethnic groups are artificially separated from one another, leading to misunderstandings based on a lack of interaction with one another and a lack of knowledge of political differences connected to ethnicity. Under such conditions, tolerance is necessary to foster peaceful coexistence.*'

According to Gibson (2004: 208), however, 'Congolese are deeply intolerant of ethnic and political differences, and many are not ready to accept the virtues of the liberal half of the liberal

democracy equation (majority rule plus minority rights or minority rule and majority right)'. For Gibson (2004: 209), it remains surprising that the rule of law is associated with minoritarianism in the DRC. His findings indicate that intolerance, strong majoritarianism, and disregard for the rule of law go together in the minds of many Congolese, and he draws the logical conclusion that this is not a formula for the successful consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights in the country for the promotion of development.

Gibson and Gouws (2003: 62) maintain that the particular danger of Congolese intolerance is that it is confined to the extremes of the Congolese political spectrum. The implication of this is that a concerted effort has to be made on the part of the Congolese political leadership, to project tolerance by their own actions, and to act in a way that will unite, rather than divide, the different segments of Congolese society.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

During the 2006 election in the DRC, for instance, we saw a clear display of intolerance between the two main political leaders (Joseph Kabila and Jean Pierre Bemba) bringing the country into chaos and leading to the death of innocent citizens in Kinshasa. There has been ongoing violence among supporters, of the two leaders, who cannot tolerate each other. For conflict in the DRC to be resolved in a peaceful way and for development to be promoted in the country, Congolese need to be tolerant of one another. Without tolerance they cannot expect peace and sustainable development in the country.

### **5. 3. 6. Conflict as a Feature of Ethnic Competition: Implication on Development in the DRC**

Ethnic competitions almost invariably involve a struggle for resources, irrespective of the expressive metaphor within which the resource is subsumed. However, such competitions or struggles may involve violence. Violence here refers to actual physical attacks on persons or the wanton destruction of lives and property. Thus, as Otite (1975) argues, an analysis of ethnic relations must account for the unequal access to sources and opportunities for economic survival.

The questions that arise are:

1. Under what circumstances do ethnic competitions in the DRC give rise to violence and
2. What are the implications of such violence on development in the country?



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

This section will focus on ethnic competitions in the DRC. The idea is to elicit whatever patterns may shed light on the role of conflict in such competitions.

#### **5. 3. 6. 1. Struggles for Land Resources**

##### **5. 3. 6. 1. 1. Land, Natural Resources and Conflict in the DRC**

It may be asked why this section chooses to focus on access to agricultural and pastoral land as a source of conflict, when other factors seem to be far more important sources of conflict in the DRC. In addition to various economic and political issues – ranging from the military and economic strategies of neighbouring countries, to the nature of the state in the DRC (a classic case of a ‘weak state’) and the historical relationships among ethnic groups - there are natural resources of much greater value, and much more ‘lootable’ character, than agricultural or pastoral land. Many are found in the conflict zones of the DRC. These include diamonds, gold,

cobalt, cassiterite and coltan. Moyroud and J Katunga (2002) argue that: *'natural resource wealth can generate as well as further perpetuate wars and conflicts... the illegal exploitation of coltan have added to the complexity of the war in the DRC... Measures must be taken in order to respect and implement the existing regulatory framework for the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC... a regional framework regulating the exploitation of natural resources wealth; and the equitable distribution of benefits must be put into place.'*

Other organizations, including the UN, have documented the important role of natural resources in fuelling conflict in the DRC by paying for the operational costs of armed forces, and contributing to national or private coffers in those neighbouring countries that intervene in or invade the country (report of United Nations Panel, 2001). Jackson (2003) argues that the wealth generated by the exploitation of the country's riches helps to sustain conflict. In addition, control over these valuable resources is directly fought over between different armed groups. The various battles between Rwanda and Uganda, in Kisangani for instance, are thought to have been a struggle over control of the diamond industry and the domination of natural resource-based industries by members of a particular ethnic identity. This is a source of grievance to many, including the Mai-Mai militia groups. A mechanism by which precious resources act as structural or proximate causes of conflict in the DRC should be identified in order to solve conflict. Why then look at land? The reasons are several:

1. The 'causes' of conflict (which are numerous, and interlinked in dynamic relationships) may, for convenience, be categorized as either a). 'Triggers' of violence, which are generally sudden and often unexpected events, and act as catalysts for a move from tension to overt violence; b). 'Proximate' causes, which tend to be highly visible and are

commonly identified as the reasons for violence or conflict; or c). 'Structural' or 'background' causes (S Verstegen, 1999). The latter are less visible, and generally provide a conducive environment in which conflict may take place. Insecure or insufficient access to land, because of discrimination, is a significant factor in the impoverishment of thousands of rural people, particularly in areas where natural resources can be found. As mentioned previously, migration (both internal and external) has been a feature of Congolese life over the last two centuries. Particularly through migration, for industrial and commercial agricultural purposes under Leopold II and in the colonial period, thousands of people were moved permanently out of their indigenous rural spheres, without being satisfactorily or permanently incorporated into the industrial or urban sphere, or granted secure claims to the land in their new milieu (Sida, 2004). Also, entire households lost their access to land which was generally guaranteed under customary laws. The reduced access to land in areas of North Kivu, for example, worked in concert with other socio-economic forces to produce a highly mobile population of young men with few economic opportunities, who were ready to be recruits for armed groups (Van Acker and Vlassenroot, 2000).

2. In the case of Ituri Territory, the contested purchase and expansion of agricultural and ranching concessions have been identified as one of the proximate causes of conflict. These relatively recent controversies are by no means the first land issues to be cited as grievances that have undermined ethnic co-habitation in the area. However, the section situates these land-related factors within a wider context, which includes external (domestic and foreign) interference in local affairs, and competition for gold mines and other valuable 'point' resources.

3. The present conflict in the DRC has radically changed access to land patterns through a number of mechanisms, including forced displacement; shifts in the level of authority enjoyed by different customary and administrative leaders; and changes in the various social, economic and political structures that allow people to enjoy the benefits of agricultural and pastoral production (such as market access). Conflict produces new competition for land, as part of a wider renegotiation of the local economic space and re-drawing of ethnic, class and other 'boundaries' between groups (Tilly, 2003). This is especially the case because land was turned from a source into a resource for the perpetuation of conflict.




4. Access to land (either as a productive resource, speculative investment or as a source of collateral for credit) has been one of the agencies of power. It is therefore important in understanding the political economy of the DRC. Control over land, as a resource with multi-dimensional aspects (as a community territory, an economic resource, a source of administrative revenue, or as a social asset, for example) is significant in terms of ethnic identity-formation, the powers and revenue-streams of local customary leaders, and the market penetration of rural economies. In areas such as the Kivu Provinces, for example, access to land is intimately bound to perceptions of national identity. The stories of the 'Banyarwanda' and 'Banyamulenge' are, to some extent, stories of local struggles for land and the 'rents' accruing from land. At the same time, they point at the structural roots of political exclusion or discrimination. Examining land access, therefore, allows for a deeper understanding of the overall governance context within which the conflicts in the DRC have emerged.

### 5. 3. 6. 1. 2. The Struggle for Political power

Before and after independence the DRC State was dominated politically, economically and socially by the colonial power of Belgium. From the time of Belgian colonial rule, Congolese have derived little if any benefit from its natural wealth. Instead, they have suffered since the country has got it independence an unbroken succession of abusive political administrations, military authorities and armed political groups that have looted the country and committed human rights abuses with impunity since the 1960s. King Leopold II accumulated vast personal wealth without ever setting foot on Congolese soil. The Belgian rulers of the DRC, then the Belgian Congo, from 1908 to 1960 used slave labour to plunder its rubber, ivory and timber. After independence, in 1960, the long presidency of Mobutu as it was argued above made the country notorious for cronyism and corruption. When Mobutu came into power in 1965, a sustained period of institutionalized corruption, discrimination and misappropriation of State resources began. A large proportion of the revenues from State companies, such as the copper and cobalt company Gécamine, went straight into the pockets of Mobutu and his closest allies instead of the state treasury (Amnesty International Report, April 1, 2003).

The impact of corruption and discrimination is felt on the citizens of the DRC. Today, Mobutu is deposed and dead, but his legacy lives on. His family holds his fortune, and the Congolese owe his \$13 billion debt. In a nation with an annual income of \$110 per capita, each resident theoretically owes foreign creditors \$236 (David Malin, 2001). Since then, there have been many internal conflicts as a struggle for political power in which all sides (government and opposition) have been supported by various neighbours. Since 1990, the Congolese are demanding a good government which will hear their cry and redress the political imbalance between them and bring peace and development to the country.

When Laurent Kabila came to power in May 1997, toppling Mobutu with the aid of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, it was hoped that a revival would be seen in the DRC and that political power would be established. Instead, the situation deteriorated. Kabila also abused the power that was given to him by his allies by transforming into a dictator and entrenching mismanagement, corruption and discrimination. The consequences of that political action were the continuation of conflict and the assassination of Laurent Kabila. Today, conflict is still common in the DRC; it is a strategy employed to obtain political power. People are still fighting in their struggle for political dominance. Amnesty International (Report of the UN Panel of Experts, April 2001) argues that the effects of and tactics seen in the conflict have been many including:



University of Fort Hare

- Shifting alliances as needed to achieve economic exploitation;
- Repeated military operations and violence, including rape, and other forms of attack on civilians, in areas rich in mineral resources;
- Disrupting humanitarian assistance;
- Pillage as a strategy of war;
  - Looting often accompanied by torture, killings, rape
  - Targeting harvests
  - Stealing from medical centers
  - Planned and coordinated attacks and robbing villages
  - Systematically pillaging food aid
- Killing people for resisting extortion;
- Public services have predictably collapsed;

- Ethnic rivalries have been fueled by economic interests;
- Forced labour and displacement;
- Sexual exploitation; and many more.

#### 5. 4. Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Mechanisms in the DRC

The analysis of conflict resolution and peace building in the DRC entails a complex process. The complexity arises out of the fact that since 1996 the country has been involved in a complicated war situation. The complexity became more serious when the war erupted the second time in August 1998 as it involved more than six countries, some supporting the government of the DRC, while others supported rebel groups that intended to overthrow the government of Laurant Kabila. In the process of the war many armed groups emerged along ethnic lines.



### University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

The complexity of the war gave rise to the complexity of conflict resolution mechanisms that would allow for the promotion of social and economic development goals. First, it had to involve various international organizations such as the SADC, the AU and the UN. It also had to involve individual countries. The complexity is even greater given the different economic interests by actors in the war as well as other actors not directly involved in the war. Despite the complexity of the situation, in this section, the study will examine the issues of conflict resolution and peace building processes as a challenge to development. We shall begin by looking at the historical perspective of conflicts in the DRC since 1996, while concentrating on the various processes of conflict resolution measures including peace negotiations, mediations, peace agreements and strategies of implementing such agreements. We shall examine the efforts and measures of peace building as well as providing recommendations for future efforts.

#### 5. 4. 1. The History of Conflicts in the DRC from 1990-2003:

The assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961, as the first Prime Minister of Congo after independence in 1960, marked the beginning of political instability in the DRC. This instability is still affecting development programmes today. Lumumba was a uniting national leader with progressive programmes for the independent development of Congo. A period of ethnization of politics began after his assassination; this entrenched discrimination among ethnic groups in the country. Even before independence the Belgian colonial power had pursued the policy of dividing the people along ethnic and regional lines for their economic interests. The people of the Congo remained unaware of this. During the struggle for independence Congolese actively discouraged the emergence of nationwide political parties (Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Workshop Report, 2002: 7). The assassination of Lumumba was part of neo-colonial strategies towards disrupting unity, stability and development in the DRC. The ethnization and regionalization of politics were consolidated during Mobutu's nearly 32 years of dictatorship, as argued above. During this period, Mobutu played one group off against another in a complex game of shifting patronage in order to perpetuate his dictatorial rule (ISS, 2002) and the country's development programme was ignored.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Major violent conflicts in the DRC began in 1996 when, in October of that year, Laurent Kabila decided to fight against the government of Mobutu, beginning from Eastern DRC (then Zaire). Supported by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, Kabila established a military alliance called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). He mobilized the Banyamulenge of Eastern Congo who had been discriminated against by other ethnic groups and threatened by Mobutu to be repatriated to Rwanda. Due to the tendencies of ethnic

discrimination by the Mobutu regime the Banyamulenge and other seemingly marginalized ethnic groups around the country decided to go into armed conflict with Mobutu in a bid to remove him from power. Given those grievances they were easily mobilized by Kabila to fight against Mobutu.

The eruption of war in October 1996 marked the first phase of the war in the DRC. This phase ended with the overthrow of the government of Mobutu, and Kabila was proclaimed the third President of the DRC (Mpangala, 2004). The second phase of the war began in August 1998. This phase of the war broke out on the 2nd of August 1998. Soldiers in the Eastern DRC launched an armed rebellion against the government of Laurent Kabila. Fighting erupted in a number of cities such as Goma, Bukavu and even Kinshasa (The East African, 4th August, 1998:1-2). Uganda and Rwanda decided to support the rebels. This was due to misunderstandings that had developed between the government of Laurent Kabila, on one hand, and the governments of Uganda and Rwanda on the other (African Confidential, 10th July 1998, Vol.39 No. 14:4-6). The capture of Kinshasa by the rebels was saved due to entry into the War by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in support of the Kabila Government. This made the war highly internationalized thus killing more than 6,000,000 people and displacing 20,000,000 others. This also led to the destruction of valuable infrastructure of the country (Mpangala, 2004). For some time, even Chad supported Kabila. The entry of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia is said to be due to the principle of providing assistance to a SADC member (Punungwe, 1998: 5-8).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The second phase of the war ended with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 1999. The third phase of the war followed and, to some extent, was carried out concurrently with the second phase of the war. This phase involved various groups in the Northern and Eastern parts of the DRC. These included anti-Kabila coalition groups, rebel groups aiming to overthrow the governments of Rwanda and Burundi and local militias, some of which were associated with the Kinshasa regime (ISS, 2002: 4). The Mai-Mai, for instance, fought in order to expel the Rwandan forces from the soil of the DRC; they thus gained the support of the Kinshasa government. This is the phase of the war which has taken a long time and remains complicated today.




#### 5. 4. 2. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in the DRC

During the period of war, conflict resolution initiatives can be traced to two stages. The first stage begins with the eruption of the second war in August 1998. We do not find any conflict resolution initiatives during the first war until the overthrow of the Mobutu regime and the fight was so intense during this period that the remaining infrastructure in the DRC was systematically destroyed; the natural resources were used to fuel conflict at the expense of development.

The first stage conflict constitutes the period from August 1998 to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July, 1999. The first stage of conflict was mediated by the Southern African Development Commission (SADC) and President Gaddafi of Libya . The initiative began with holding a number of Summits and other meetings of the SADC. The first was on the 7th and 8th of August, 1998 at Victoria Falls, Zambia. The summit was attended by SADC Presidents as well as the Presidents of Uganda and Rwanda. The second stage of conflict was the meeting of


defence ministers called by President Mugabe, as the then chairman of the SADC Organ of Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, held in Harare, Zimbabwe. It was in that meeting that it was decided that any SADC country that was able to assist Kabila in the war should do so; thus leading to the measures taken by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia.

Other summit meetings were held on September 7th and 8th at Victoria Falls, and then 13th and 14th September in Mauritius. During the two summits, support and appreciation was given to the SADC countries which supported Laurent Kabila in the war (Munungwe, 1998). From September 1998 to June 1999 a number of other summits and meetings were held with the objective of finding a solution to the Congo war by the SADC. Munungwe (1998) further argues that from November 1998 to June 1999 President Muamar Gaddafi of Libya also took steps towards conflict resolution. He held talks at different times with Presidents Kabila of the DRC, Museveni of Uganda and Kagame, then the Prime Minister of Rwanda. As a result of these initiatives, President Museveni signed a ceasefire agreement with President Gaddafi in May 1999. Gaddafi insisted that warring parties agree on a ceasefire to be followed by the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo and the deployment of international peace keeping forces. The second stage of the conflict resolution initiative constitutes the period after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 to date. The Lusaka Agreement tried to address external and internal concerns, identified real issues and the interconnectedness of various agendas. However, it failed to pave the way to a lasting solution to the Congolese Conflict. All these agreements were weak because they left the implementation to the belligerents themselves, thus creating possibilities of sabotaging the process.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Conflict resolution steps which were taken during this second period included the appointment of ex-president Masire of Botswana as the mediator in the Congo crisis. He was appointed by the AU. Masire faced problems because some parties, including Laurent Kabila, did not accept him. The Lusaka Peace Agreement came to be reconfirmed in February 2001. On the basis of the Lusaka Peace Agreement a national dialogue was initiated to take the concerns of all parties into consideration. These parties were the Government, the rebel groups, the Mai-Mai, and the Rwandan Liberation Army (ALiR). At the same time, the security concerns of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda had to be taken into consideration. In January 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph Kabila succeeded him. This change opened a new chapter in conflict resolution initiatives. While his father believed in continuing the fighting until a military victory against the rebels was secured, Joseph Kabila swiftly adopted a more diplomatic approach (ISS, 2002: 5). The national dialogue led to a series of negotiations including those of Sun City, South Africa, from April 2002. In the same month, the Kinshasa Government signed a ceasefire agreement with the MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) rebel group under the leadership of Jean Pierre Bemba. Another important peace agreement was signed in Pretoria in August 2002. The importance of the Pretoria Agreement was that it greatly addressed issues of the Lusaka Agreement, particularly in terms of ensuring its implementation. Another matter of importance in relation to this agreement is that it committed Rwanda to withdraw its forces from the DRC and for the Congolese government to support the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of ALiR I and ALiR II. The two groups were identified, by the Lusaka Agreement, as negative forces (ISS, 2002).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

In short, during this period, development programmes have been relegated to the background. In terms of achievements, the negotiations, agreements and national dialogue led to the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces, ceasefire agreements and disarmaments. Mechanisms of conflict resolution, during a transitional period with a transitional government, have been established. A relative state of peace was restored. Problems faced by this new era include the position of the UN as touching point of political and military support from members of the UNSC; this resulted in a lack of influence on and sustainability of gains made in the changing political events. Another problem was the weakness of the various peace agreements such as the Lusaka Peace Agreement, the Pretoria Agreement and the Sun City Agreements. Their main weakness is that they have failed to recognise and address serious issues which create conflict in the DRC, such as discrimination.




## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

This problem is linked to that of the complex situation in the area. Discrimination against some ethnic groups and the security concerns of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, the alliance between Mai-Mai and the Rwanda Liberation groups, the Interahamwe, the Banyamulenge nationality issue and so on. The fact that the Lusaka Agreement and some other agreements viewed the Mai-Mai, the ALiR I and II and other similar groups as negative forces has also created complications for the disarmament and demobilization of such forces.

### **5. 4. 3. Peace Building:**

Although the role of the UN in peace keeping is part of conflict resolution processes, in this context we shall also regard it as one of the early steps in peace building processes. In its role in the Congo crisis, the UN established a UN Mission known as the MONUC. The MONUC is


basically a peace keeping mission through the deployment of peace keeping forces. The mission is essentially an observer mission and not a peace enforcement mission (ISS, 2002: 11). The MONUC has been carrying out its work in four phases. In the first phase it involved the deployment of military observers (MILOBs) and liaison officers. This phase was completed by the end of 2000. During the second phase, 2001-2002, new ceasefire lines were drawn and completed. During the third phase, in 2003, the mission has been monitoring and verifying the ceasefire lines using 90 MILOB teams. The third phase has mainly been concerned with the DDRRR programme. The DDRRR is an acronym for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the armed forces in the DRC. This constitutes the main focus of the MONUC during the third phase.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

Arising out of the objectives of the third phase, the strength of the MONUC's force was raised from 4,250 to 8,700 by December 2002. The authorized strength set in January 2002 was only 5,537. The strength was raised to that level in order to enable the mission to extend its activities in the DRC, especially in the Eastern Congo where the situation is very complex. It can be argued that the implementation of the DDRRR was not carried out solely by the MONUC, but through the coordination of various governments, UN agencies and NGOs. However, in carrying out its activities, the MONUC has been experiencing a number of problems. One is poor logistics, particularly transport infrastructure. The DRC is a very large country, the third largest after Algeria and Sudan. Besides being large during the 32 years of Mobutu's dictatorship, transport infrastructure, as well as other forms of infrastructure such as education, health and water supply were not developed. The MONUC has, therefore, depended primarily on expensive air transport.

The second problem has been the principle of voluntarism in carrying out the DDRRR programme. This means, for instance, that armed groups have to be disarmed on a voluntary basis. Those that are not willing cannot be disarmed. Some leaders of military groups would like to continue fighting. The third problem involves the complexity of some of the armed groups. For instance, the Interahamwe forces require identifying the masterminds of the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and those of the lower ranks who were also involved in the genocides. There are also normal refugees not involved in the genocide. All these different groups need different modes of repatriation. Some need to be sent to the Arusha UN tribunal, some to be repatriated to a third country, while other notably normal refugees are to be repatriated to Rwanda for resettlement.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

The fourth phase of the MONUC was expected to be carried out during 2004. The main objective of this phase is to ensure transition to peace building. This should involve the process of reintegration of the armed forces and the establishment of a new national army. However, the success of the fourth phase will depend on the success of the third phase. It has been observed that the successful implementation of the DDRRR process is critical to building peace and a sustainable development in the DRC and the whole Great Lake Region (ISS, 2000: 13).

Other important aspects in peace building, in the DRC, include the building of democracy and ensuring socio-economic development. Thus far, the main preoccupations have been with military aspects in order to put to an end to the situation of violent conflicts. After the first democratic elections and the establishment of new national State machinery, preoccupations with building democracy and carrying out socio-economic development should be carried out in

earnest. Establishing a democratic society would entail three types of transitions. One is the transition of the multiparty system. During the period of establishing multipartism, under Mobutu, hundreds of political parties were formed. This situation certainly needs change. Conditions need to be created for fewer viable parties that can seriously compete in democratic multiparty elections, to emerge. The second transition requires transformation of civil society in order to have a serious and vibrant civil society organization with a national character. In some regions, such as the Eastern Congo, it is said that civil society organizations are vibrant due to the vacuum created by weaknesses of the central State under Mobutu. Such civil society organizations are regional and possibly ethnic in character.




The third transition should involve leadership and legal instruments. Due to the violent conflicts and the history of the country, leadership is markedly of a military character. Most of the leaders of the armed groups do not have the following of the people at the grassroots level. Such leadership needs transformation. As far as legal instruments are concerned, there is a need for the establishment of a new constitution which represents the views of a wider spectrum of society in the DRC. It also requires the reform of other laws. As far as socio-economic development is concerned, the first step should be the implementation of all agreements and the report of the panel of experts who investigated the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC. The panel was established by the Secretary General of the UN in response to the resolution of the UNSC. The report identified two types of illegal exploitation of resources. One is by various armed forces involved in the war inside the DRC. The UN Ambassadors of Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda rejected the report as their armies were implicated. The second implicated Western companies that have taken advantage of the war so as to extract the resources

of the country. The report provides recommendations as to how this illegal exploitation should be stopped. It emphasized that illicit exploitation of the resources of the DRC should be stopped and the resources, including mineral wealth, should be directed towards the development of the country and its people.

The second step in ensuring socio-economic development should be concrete national policies and strategies of socio-economic development. The Congo is said to be foremost in Africa in terms of its richness of economic resources, including mineral, agricultural and forest resources.

The Congo is rich in a variety of minerals, as discussed above. It has the largest river basin in the world. Its vast, thick, equatorial forests are among the leading rich timber resources in the World. Thus, the potential for fast socio-economic development is very high.




### 5. 5. An Assessment of Conflict Resolution in the DRC

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is an example of one of the worst humanitarian disasters on the African continent. The DRC has endured a long history of violence and misery stretching back to the horrific Belgian colonial rule of Leopold II and continuing to this day. This has destroyed the basic infrastructure in the country. The conflict and the actors may have changed over time, but the situation in the DRC requires serious and prompt attention.

There have been several attempts at conflict resolution to bring peace and promote development in the DRC, all of which have been relatively unsuccessful. All the Agreements signed in 1999 and 2002, were intended to facilitate the transition of the militaristic country into a democracy and end the conflict, while working towards development goals (IFHR 2008: 5). Nine years after signing the Agreements, the conflict and general instability in the DRC continues. Indeed, conflict in the DRC is highly complex and involves a myriad of actors and issues and, as such,

any potential resolution will have to be a holistic one where all the relevant aspects of the conflict must be considered. Only then will peace agreements follow, such as the 1999 and 2002 Agreements, and a post-conflict reconstruction strategy would have to be followed to avoid a relapse into conflict. The African Union (AU), through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has adopted a framework to deal with issues of post-conflict reconstruction. However, historically, discrimination in the DRC has been the reason for fighting and natural resources the means to maintain it, and yet they have been largely neglected in peace agreements and post conflict reconstruction. This section will focus specifically on the failure of conflict resolution as a challenge to political, social and economic development, although it is acknowledged that a holistic approach is needed.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

An overview of the conflict in the DRC has already shown its impact on development, followed by an analysis of conflict resolution and peace Agreements in an attempt to ascertain whether or not they have met the requirement for peace that will promote development in the country. The roles of the AU, UN, NEPAD, and SADC have also been discussed. The aim of the analysis was to identify the strengths and weaknesses in current proposed conflict resolution strategies with the objective of achieving future conflict prevention strategies in the DRC and in Africa as a whole. Indeed, it has been argued that since the beginning of the colonial era, at the end of the 19th century, the DRC has been ravaged by one-sided violence, instability, and armed conflict which have affected development in the country. It has also been argued that in the coup d'état in 1965, Mobutu seized power. His regime was characterized by corruption and ethnic strife. These difficulties, coupled with a massive influx of refugees from the genocide in Rwanda, in 1994, ultimately led to the uprising in the East. In 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, backed by the Rally for

Congolese Democracy (RCD) and Rwanda, ousted President Mobutu (MONUC, 2009). Soon after, the RCD, made up of Rwandese Tutsis and Congolese Banyamulenge Tutsis, accused the new Congolese president of tribalism and of betraying his people. With the military support of Rwanda and Uganda, the RCD emerged in opposition to President Kabila Laurent, who enjoyed support from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Autesserre 2008: 4). The rebel group seized half of the country by 1998. At the same time, other rebel movements emerged, such as the Liberation Movement of the Congo (MLC), which was led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and backed by Uganda (MONUC 2009).




The Lusaka Peace Accords of 1999 established a ceasefire among these state actors and called for their withdrawal from Congolese territory. The agreement also created MONUC (*Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo*) (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) the United Nations Assistance Mission in the Congo which was tasked with implementing the ceasefire – disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration process – and facilitating the political transition. In 2001, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph Kabila, became the new president and continued to oppose the Tutsi and Banyamulenge groups in the east which further fuelled their rebellion (Autesserre 2008: 4). Despite the Lusaka Peace Accords, conflict continued in the country. The situation deteriorated into a civil war involving multiple disputants including government troops, the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), indigenous fighters such as the Mai-Mai, the MLC, and a variety of other armed groups. These various militia groups, having splintered further into factions and umbrella organizations, continue to fight in the eastern DRC.

This argument above shows how the Lusaka Agreement was weak in its inclusion of all parties in the conflict into the resolution, for the promotion of development in the country.

### 5. 5. 1. Global and All-Inclusive Agreements in the DRC

Despite the complexity of conflict resolution, the international community has attempted to moderate the DRC conflict through both peace negotiations and accords. Global efforts to deal with the conflict have included various tools of conflict management, such as international intervention, sanctions on small arms, negotiations and peace settlements. The agreement signed in Lusaka (Zambia), Sun-City and Pretoria (South Africa) in 1999 and 2002, respectively, tried to establish a ceasefire among the implicated actors in an attempt to end the conflict in the DRC (Amnesty International 2007: 8). Mediated by the United Nations, these agreements went beyond a ceasefire as they attempted to address key issues affecting the stability of the Congo; these are matters such as the deterioration of governance, the breakdown of political order, corruption and tribalism in the security sector, and weak and undemocratic national political institutions. MONUC was again responsible for the disarmament and disengagement of armed parties (Durch 2006: 247-248). The Sun-City dialog formed a transitional government among the warring parties, which was established in June 2003 (MONUC 2009; Onana and Taylor 2008: 501; Amnesty International 2007: 6). This settlement was a power-sharing arrangement that focused on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants, the integration of the armed forces, and a variety of other security sector reforms (Onana and Taylor 2008: 501). MONUC was unable to successfully implement political and military reforms, which were the terms of the dialog in Sun-City (Conflict Resolution). The transition government was plagued by deep and systemic tribal discrimination, factionalism, parallel command structures, rampant

corruption, military and ethnic rivalries inherited from the war, and prolonged by weak institutional capacities (International Crisis Group, 2009). As a result, in early 2004, rebel leaders, such as General Laurent Nkunda of the RCD, refused to take up their political positions and report to Kinshasa. Other militias, like the Mai-Mai, refused to accept the command of military leaders who represented various components of the government (MONUC 2009). By June 2004, the fighting in the Eastern provinces of the DRC was reignited. The RCD, for instance, did not agree with the transition process and rebelled by invading Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. Other armed groups, such as the FDLR and the Mai-Mai, expanded their hold on certain territories of this province. According to the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, these rebel groups have continued low-level fighting ever since the ceasefire broke down in 2004 (Group of Experts 2008: 7-10 and 19-20).



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

By November 2008, fighting amongst the RCD, the FDLR and the FARDC intensified. This continued after the elections were held in 2006. The RCD increased their stronghold over a series of towns and villages near Goma, the capital of North Kivu, and the FDLR and Mai-Mai also expanded their presence in the province of South Kivu (BBC November 10, 2008). The situation was further complicated by the presence of natural resources, such as coltan, cassiterite, gold, diamonds, copper, and cobalt which were used to fuel the conflict. The armed groups were allegedly financed by the profits gained from this illegal mining industry (Global Witness 2009).

As a result of the conflict in the DRC, over 6 million people have been killed, 20 million have been internally displaced, 370,374 have become refugees, and approximately 17 million people are presently malnourished, all of which affect the development goals of the country (Thomson

Reuters Foundation 2008; Alertnet 2008). The deaths from the conflict are a direct consequence of fighting and the indirect result of other factors such as disease, starvation and underdevelopment. Thomson Reuters argues that with the ongoing one-sided violence and massacres of civilians, the conflict in the DRC is said to be the deadliest conflict since the Second World War (Thomson Reuters Foundation 2008; BBC March 19: 2009).


### **5. 5. 2. Applying the Approaches of conflict to the DRC Conflict**

To investigate why conflict resolution failed in the DRC, it is important to test three approaches in conflict management literature, specifically, Nilsson's 'partial peace', Woodward's 'root causes', and Walter's 'credible commitment' arguments. The analysis below demonstrates that conflict resolution approaches, applied in the DRC thus far, were ineffective because they did not include all parties in the conflict, neither did they address the root causes of the conflict. Moreover, they failed to provide a credible third party to ensure security and enforce the internal political, military and territorial terms of the settlement. The following section will apply these theories to the case of the DRC.

#### **5. 5. 2. 1. Nilsson's Partial Peace**

Nilsson's 'Partial Peace' models will be simplified for the purpose of this research. The author outlines the negotiation process in terms of bargaining, by which the participants in negotiations try to anticipate the actions of all other actors in the conflict, including those outside the peace agreement. For this reason, the signatories have an idea of the violent challenges that they may face and are thus taking these possibilities into account when signing the deal. Therefore, the independent variable is the rebel group's inclusion or exclusion in relation to the resolution of

conflict and the dependent variable is the duration of this peace accord, defined by the signatories' adherence to the settlement (Nilsson 2008: 485-486). The independent variable may be determined by investigating which groups were included in the negotiation, which ones were not, and which of those groups returned to conflict. The Agreement in Lusaka was signed by the Government of the DRC, the RCD, the MLC, the political opposition, civil society, the Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (RDC/ML), the Congolese Rally for Democracy/National (RCD/N), and the Mai-Mai (GIAT in the DRC 2002: 2). Pertinent rebel groups, active in the region, did not sign the accord; these include the National Congolese Army (ANC), Congolese People's Army (APC), and the FDLR, among others (Democratic Republic of the Congo: Fact file 2007).



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Despite the negotiation, a number of rebel groups continued to fight in the country. By 2004, the tenuous peace arrangement had collapsed and clashes occurred between groups that were both included and excluded from the settlement. One excluded party, the FDLR, is responsible for higher-level fighting, massacres, one-sided violence and arson in the Eastern DRC. These incidents have provoked the signatories to return to conflict (OHCHR 2007: 13). By early 2004, three signatories in particular; the RCD, the FARDC, and the Mai-Mai, resumed conflict against the FDLR and amongst themselves. In May and June 2004, the RCD invaded the Eastern Congo. Among other incidents, the RCD has been involved in higher-level fighting with the FARDC (Autesserre 2008: 4). Thus, regardless of their commitment to the accord signed in Sun City (South Africa), some signatories continued fighting with each other and with an excluded party. The evidence shows that the partial peace was unable to hold, thus providing no support for

Nilsson's (2008: 480) 'partial peace' approach which maintains that even if parties are excluded and continue to fight, they will not affect the signatories' commitment to peace.


### 5. 5. 2. 2. Woodward's Root Causes

The second approach to be considered is Woodward's 'Root Causes' argument which holds that root causes may have cultural, economic or political dimensions. For instance, an ethnic identity group may feel culturally repressed, economically deprived or politically marginalized in relation to another group. Woodward's theory holds that addressing these grievances will not bring greater success in ending civil wars. The independent variables, in this case, are the peace accords which are disregarded for the root causes of the conflict, defined as the rebel group's grievances. Nkunda claimed that he must 'protect his ethnic community' which he believed is discriminated against or threatened by various local and national Congolese armed groups (Autesserre 2008: 4). This rebel commander deeply mistrusted the national government in Kinshasa and feared 'that the Banyarwanda community in Eastern DRC may be the target of central government-inspired ethnic violence' (Amnesty International 2007: 32). Such statements illustrate that Nkunda's principal grievance was the insecurity of his ethnic group because they had been the target of the FDLR's massacres (OHCHR 2007: 13). Moreover, the FARDC was equally responsible for 'reprisal killings ... against Banyamulenge (Tutsi) soldiers and civilians' (Onana and Taylor 2008: 508).

The Sun City accord explicitly dealt with the political exclusion of armed groups and their fear of judicial proceedings by integrating them into the transition government and granting general amnesty (Amnesty International 2007: 10-24). However, grievances of the involved ethnic

communities were by no means the focus of the resolution, which dealt with the building of national unity through the inclusion of all actors in the political realm rather than addressing the grievances of specific parties, such as Nkunda's RCD. Indeed, all the agreements failed to address the explicit grievances of any particular armed group (GIAT in the DRC 2002: 3-5).

Moreover, the dependent variable for Woodward's 'Root Causes' is the signatories' adherence to the peace accord. Despite the signing of the accord in 2002, a number of rebel groups resumed fighting by June 2004. The peace settlement collapsed as various signatories, such as the RCD, the FARDC, the Mai-Mai, and the FDLR clashed amongst themselves. One signatory in particular, the RCD, escalated its fighting. The RCD claimed that its grievance, the protection of its ethnic group was ignored by the negotiation of all agreements and that the FDLR and the FARDC threatened these ethnic communities (OHCHR 2007: 13). Nevertheless, this case counters Woodward's proposition that addressing the root causes of a conflict will not improve the outcomes and effectiveness of peacemaking interventions. In fact, it showed that neglecting the warring parties' grievances may worsen the peace accords' likelihood for success.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

### 5. 5. 2. 3. Walter's Credible Commitments


Lastly, Walter's 'Credible Commitment' argument contends that internal political, military, and territorial commitment and credible third party security guarantees are required to persuade combatants to implement the terms of the peace agreement. This means that the independent variables are the credible internal commitment to implementing the political, military, and territorial terms of the agreement and the external security guarantees. The dependent variable is adherence to the conflict resolution.

The first test involves the independent variable of political, military, and territorial terms of the agreement which is made up of four conditions, as discussed above. When applying these conditions to the case of the DRC, it is clear that two out of the four have not been met. First, the rebel groups must be allotted control of key ministries. In the case of the Nkunda-led rebellion, his faction was given significant representation in the chambers of parliament and one out of four vice presidencies (GIAT in the DRC 2002: 16-17). However, in the winter of 2004, RCD Commander Nkunda refused to 'take up his appointment as a regional military commander in the transition' which contributed to a crisis and the initial escalation of violence (Onana and Taylor 2008: 508). Next, Walter claims that military integration is required for peace. Although, the accord established a restructured and integrated national army, the RCD and the Mai-Mai refused to integrate into the new army because it was plagued by corruption, tribalism discrimination and parallel command structures (Onana and Taylor 2008: 501-503). Thus, complete military integration did not happen. Third, the accord allowed factions to maintain some regional autonomy over areas previously under their control. Lastly, the signatories of the agreement were able to distinguish which groups were serious about power-sharing by determining whether competing factions signed the accord or not. Therefore, only two of these four conditions have been met. This means that the test was the inverse of the argument. Walter's proposition argues that the implementation of the political, military, and territorial terms of the agreement is a necessary condition for peace and the promotion of development. This is the case for the DRC Conflict, which was re-ignited in 2004 when Nkunda refused his appointment and invaded the Eastern DRC. Therefore, this test supports this part of Walter's theory. The next part of the 'credible commitment' theory requires that a credible third party guarantee the security of the signatories in order for peace to last and development to occur. In the post-signing disarmament



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

process, the parties were faced with a security dilemma. Disarmament made them vulnerable to other warring parties that may not have laid down their arms, such as the FDLR. This created the need for a third party to guarantee security and to implement the political, military and territorial terms of the agreement. This third party was MONUC. When the agreement was signed in 2002, MONUC's strength was only about 5,000 which was insufficient for a country the size of the DRC (Onana and Taylor 2008: 502). MONUC was generally unable to deal with the conflict. For instance, after the agreement was signed, a crisis arose in the Ituri province in May 2003. There was in-fighting between Hema and Lendu ethnic militias, "more than 400 people were massacred in two weeks. MONUC was barely able to protect its own personnel, let alone the population of Bunia" (Berkman 2006: 161). Incidents like this illustrated that MONUC was incapable of guaranteeing the security of the various groups in the disarmament process (Berkman 2009: 161). Likewise, MONUC's efforts to create a buffer zone to block Nkunda's advance failed (Onana and Taylor 2008: 508). The thin-spread and 'limited deployment of MONUC forces had failed to restore security (Amnesty International 2007: 47). Therefore, although the argument holds that credible third party security guarantees may constructively contribute to the peace process, the DRC conflict illustrates that these guarantees are a necessary condition for peace and sustainable development. Without them, the peace process will be hampered, which upholds Walter's hypothesis.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## 5. 6. Conflict Resolution: a challenge to Political and Socio-economic Development

At this juncture, let us examine the impact of conflict and the shortfalls of the agreement or the resolution of conflict in the DRC in respect of its political, economic and social development aspects.

### 5. 6. 1. Political Developments

One of the core problems facing conflict resolution in the DRC is the quality of peace agreements. Sadiki Koko (2007) argues that: *'parties to African conflicts themselves hardly agree to talk and solve their differences. In most cases, the facilitation teams find themselves not only dictating the terms of negotiation to parties, but also 'imposing' the outcome, with or without clear agreement between them. This situation partly explains why African peace processes fail to address the core issues of the conflict, that is, the root causes, and simply fail in many cases.'*



University of Fort Hare  
Together in Excellence

The first step of the agreement was the adoption of a ceasefire, followed by the disarmament of rebel groups and the creation of a unified national army. Although this step is necessary in order to create a stable environment for economic growth, the objective is entirely unrealistic when considering the goals of the various rebel groups in the DRC. There remain a substantial number of rebel forces that pose a danger to the safety and security of Congolese groups, in North and South Kivu in particular and in the country in general. The other major problem, once again related to a lack of government support, is that banditry is rife and there is no alternative means of protection. The peace agreement did not take into consideration the reason why groups on the ground believe they needed arms. Laurent Nkunda's rebel forces, for example, still deem it

necessary to protect its ethnic group in the Eastern Congo (IFHR 2008). The Sun City agreement's one-plus-four model was designed to give all parties representation at a national level and thus create a system where compromise would achieve a democratic consensus on development. Koko's objection with the Post Conflict Reconstruction system seems valid in the case of the DRC, as Lilly notes that the one-plus-four formula is considered to have been unsuccessful as all the leaders were inflexible, which led to fiefdoms (Lilly 2005: 371). Each party was concerned with ensuring that they have got a piece of the wealth rather than focusing on how to develop the country as a whole.




### 5. 6. 2. Economic Developments

The DRC has shown a negative real GDP growth rate over the years because of conflict: In 2005 the growth rate was 6.5% which remained fairly constant until it dropped dramatically to 2.7% in 2009, as a result of the global economic crisis (The Economist 2010). The negative growth rate seems to be rarely indicative of a thriving new developing economy. A closer look at economic growth does, however, suggest that it is not stable. The DRC's exports are comprised of 38.3% cobalt; 35.4 copper; 11.9% crude oil; and 10.7% diamonds (The Economist 2010). These statistics illuminate the DRC's significant reliance on the country's rich mineral deposits for economic growth. The fact that the DRC's economy remains as dependent on natural resources as it was a decade ago begs the question of whether the government is serious about its goal of poverty reduction – as stated in the Sun City Agreement. Collier (1998) argues that although there are many causes of civil strife ranging from ethnic polarisation to religious factionalism, the intensity and duration of conflict is influenced (Guenther 2008: 348). The government has been unable to clamp down on rebel groups, in the East of the country, who sustain warfare

through illegal resource exploitation to fuel the conflict. A point also worth considering is the government's failure to implement the outcome of the agreements that were signed to stop the conflict, which is consequently destroying the economy of the country.

### 5. 6. 3. Social Developments

The United Nations Human Development Index (UN-HDI, 2010) measures the level of human development, which is useful when examining whether or not any of the visible economic growth has translated into positive developments for the Congolese people. The first dimension of the HDI is the measure of life expectancy and wellbeing. The index shows that the average life expectancy in the DRC is 47.6 years. This low average life expectancy is indicative of the years of conflict endured in the DRC; many dying directly as a result of conflict, or indirectly from causes such as malnutrition and disease. The second dimension looks at education. The average adult literacy rate is 67.2%, which is not a particularly good score. What is more alarming is that the gross school enrolment is only 48.2%. This trend could lead to a drop in literacy rates. The last dimension of the HDI is the GDP PPP (Gross Domestic Product Purchasing Power Parity). The GDP suggests a relatively poor standard of living in the country (UN HDI 2010). It also confirms that the wealth generated in the country is not equally distributed amongst the people.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The conflict in the DRC displaced millions of people as argued above. In 2009 a joint DRC-Rwanda military operation to dismantle the FDLR troops in the Eastern Congo led to a renewed wave of displaced people, estimated at approximately two million. Although cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC in an attempt to curb rebel conflict is a positive step, it is

important to emphasise the enormous impact these displacements have on social development. Many who are able to return home are unable to access services and economic opportunities (Refugees International 2010). This is because the strategy adopted during the peace accord signed in Sun City was not implemented properly. The primary goals of the agreement would have been security, political transition, governance, participation; socio-economic development; human rights, justice, reconciliation, coordination, management and resource mobilization.

### 5.7. Conclusion

The injustice, discrimination and conflict in the DRC are overwhelmingly evident. Conflict is, in itself, a consequence of an unjust society that does not promote peace and sustainable development. Since the establishment of the transition government, after the Sun City agreement in South Africa, the Congolese people have continued to live in the midst of extremely violent conflict which is affecting their development programmes. One wonders why the country cannot be developed, considering the wealth of natural resources with which the land is endowed.

Discrimination, lack of service delivery, lack of interaction among the Congolese themselves, lack of cohesion, and the mismanagement of State resources have been viewed as another source of conflict in the country. Despite the sound agreements or resolutions of conflict that have been put in place since the transition period, none of these have been successfully implemented. The reason for this is that all the institutions and services put in place to combat discrimination and other causes of conflict have not been able to operate independently. There is still interference, either by the office of the President or powerful government ministries. Conflict resolution in the DRC has been a challenge because of these interferences. It should be identified as a tool that

could be used as a means to bringing peace and sustainable development. All the agreements signed in the DRC should be organised into inclusive structures to serve as a watchdogs over the institutions put in place to bring change or development in the country for the benefit of the Congolese people who have endured hardship for such a long time.




University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## CHAPTER SIX

### Conclusion and Recommendations

#### 6. 1. Introduction

This section of the study presents a summary of the major research findings on conflict and development drawn from documents analyzed, together with the insights from the Literature review. The Chapter presents the main findings of the study, research conclusions and makes recommendations on the basis of these conclusions. Suggestions for further study are made on areas that were not explored by this research. Again, this concluding chapter encapsulates the main arguments by providing some concrete recommendations in an attempt to assist the finding on the path to the prosperous future that the DRC deserves.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### 6. 2. Summary and conclusion of the Study

The research investigated Conflict Resolution as a Challenge to Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It has investigated the challenge that conflict resolution had encountered in its bid to stop conflict in the DRC and create an enabling environment for development to occur. The study also evaluated the mechanisms that were employed or used by the DRC government and the international community to resolve conflict since the country gained independence in 1960. At the outset, the thesis proposed to address the question of how conflict is an obstacle to development in the DRC and how the main cause of conflict was not addressed in previous attempts at conflict resolution especially in the agreements reached in Lusaka (Zambia) in 1999 and in Sun-City and Pretoria (South Africa) in 2002. It also set out to provide an insight into the extent to which discrimination is the main cause that is creating

conflict in the country since President Mobutu got into power in 1965 and how it (discrimination) challenges conflict resolution and impedes development goals in the country.


The study also discussed the phenomenon of conflict in the world; particularly in developing nations where people are find it difficult to resolve conflict in peaceful ways that promote development. It was observed that the Third World is most affected by the issue of conflict. The study observed that the crisis of underdevelopment, in Africa can to some extent be attributed to the exploitation of African nations by the Western powers during the colonial period. It was noted that internal factors within the continent had also contributed to the issue of conflict as an obstacle to development. It was also observed that underdevelopment in Africa has created a growing discrepancy between expectations and the existing level of needs and satisfaction, regardless of how low this level might be.



## University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

Despite the wealth in human and natural resources that can be find in the country, the DRC remains one of the most unstable and poorest countries in the world because of conflict brought about by discrimination. The considerable period of economic growth experienced in the early part of the Mobutu regime notwithstanding, the DRC was soon plunged into a lingering period of instability and economic decline due to unsustainable policies introduced by the same government in the twilight of the regime. Some reasons for this economic decline include the economic policies of Zairianization and radicalisation which brought about discrimination in the country; policies that were intended to promote economic freedom and social development in the country but could not, because Mobutu did not take the time to think carefully about their implementation. These policies instead harmed and destroyed the economy and social development of the country.

The researcher then probed deeper to explore the institutionalization of corruption, lack of social cohesion and service delivery throughout the entire Congolese society and the exploitative regime of the late President Mobutu, which was encouraged conflict in the country. It was observed that mismanagement, privatisation and personalisation of the State by Mobutu were predictive of the future of the people in the DRC. The thesis explained that the result of violent conflict in the country from 1996 to 2003 which killed 6,000,000 people and displaced 20,000,000 is another factor that aggravated the conditions of development in the country and challenged conflict resolution. The study was subsequently steered towards the challenge of resolving conflict in a peaceful way to promote development in the DRC.



The thesis was underpinned by participatory conflict resolution and Development Theory with emphasis on actors' effort to resolving their differences in a peaceful way such that brings about dignified and better human settlement by avoiding discrimination which is the main cause of conflict in the DRC. A number of related approaches were investigated and the central bedrock of the framework was the centrality of collective effort to end conflict in peaceful way for a sustainable development to occur in the DRC. While this was the guiding theory, other models were explored as they were considered to have a contributory effect in the success of conflict resolution that brings about peace and sustainable development in the DRC.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


The conclusion was that no theory is sufficient in itself to inform successful conflict resolution implementation for the promotion of development. As discussed under the literature review each theory had a contributory effect to the appreciation of the subject matter. This is also true considering the multidisciplinary nature of Development.

### 6. 3. Main Findings

The findings on the main questions of the study are summarised in the following paragraphs.

#### 6. 3. 1. Implications for Stability and Development in the DRC

The finding of the study showed that, nearly all parties in conflict in the DRC breakout along the line of ethnic identities thereby deepening discrimination in the country. This is why conflict resolution becomes problematic and development goals are impeded. It was observed that the attitude of the Congolese State especially towards her responsibility to mediate between interest groups leaves much to be desired. The study revealed that because economic resources are not equitably distributed and the reward system tends to favour only those who are in control of the State's political apparatus, conflict is inevitable. Therefore the government of the DRC must play her role in such a way that promotes justice, security, equity and good governance in the country if development goals must be accomplished.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

The research indicated that natural resources are not the basis for conflict, but are there to fuel it. There are deliberate manipulation of ethnic groups to create and exacerbate division and discrimination among Congolese.

#### 6. 3. 2. Achieving stability for Development

To achieve stability for development in the DRC, this thesis argues that conflict resolution policy should be implemented without discrimination along the line of ethnicity in the country, and development policy should be designed to be participatory. The main goal of conflict resolution should be to bring to the table all the parties in conflict without exclusion, and resolve the main

cause(s) of conflict, for a sustainable development. The study support that all the agreements signed, and the constitution, including other legal and policy documents should oblige the government at all levels to carry out her activities in such a manner that people driven development is realised. The result of the study showed that the policies of conflict resolution should put development goals as a core issue during their formulation and implementation by government at all levels.


In order to achieve some measure of stability, development and to consolidate the peace process in the DRC, the priority should be to introduce reconstruction actions aimed at addressing the worst effects of conflict at the national level. This would achieve a measure of stability based on common effort thereby facilitating a base for broader socio-economic development. Reconstruction and developmental actions of the communities should be conducted within the wider context of socio-economic development. The study argues that in order to effectively eradicate violent conflict in the country, mechanisms need to be created which should on one hand deal with the investigation of incidents and the causes of conflict and on the other hand actively combat the recurrence of conflict.

The thesis suggests that the management and resolution of conflict in the country should represent a crucial phase in the process of restoring peace, sustainable development and prosperity to all Congolese. It suggests again that the leadership of the country must show adequate and prompt concern over the plight of all disadvantaged persons and groups. It was also argued that a situation where some people are above others, flaunt their unfairly or corruptly acquired wealth with impunity and show brazen contempt for the feelings of other people is not

only unacceptable but provocative and will perpetuate conflict. The study advocated the need for ethnic groups to be provided the opportunity to renegotiate their co-existence in a federal system of government if stability and development must be achieved.

### **6. 3. 3. Nation-Building**

The study showed that the challenge that Congolese people are facing now is that of nation-building. How should they create their nation? What should the basis be on which the nation should be built to avoid conflict? After conducting an overview of the current situation in the DRC, the researcher has come to believe that the following elements are important, if not crucial, in serving as a basis for nation-building or for the DRC development: Justice and Patriotism. The study found out that through justice and patriotism a country can be easily developed.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **6. 3. 3. 1. Addressing the Land problem**

The study showed that the challenge posed by land need to be addressed with a sense of urgency; conflict resolution without intervention in this aspect will amount to a waste of effort and resources. The government should ensure that in terms of policy there is a smooth process of redistributing land to avoid conflict among citizens. Postponing this move may not only delay effective conflict resolution implementation but will also delay the development goals to be achieved. The growing impatience with the land process especially in the Eastern Congo may open the issue into some opportunistic and dangerous politics that may threaten national stability of the country that may lead to her balkanization.

In terms of policy, the government should prioritise land allocations for interventions that will directly benefit the wider community than individual gains. Viable community projects, be it tourism or agriculture, should not be hindered by land ownership. Amicable ways of addressing land ownership should be explored with some urgency so as to reduce huge inequalities in the communities that has resulted in conflict and disaster in the country. The issue of land should be resolved in a way to bring peace, justice and sustainable development in the DRC.

### **6. 3. 3. 2. African Solidarity and Territorial Integrity**


The study reveals that without unity and solidarity with other African countries development in the DRC is impossible. It would be difficult to build up and develop the nation without solidarity and unity. In order to develop the Congolese nation, the finding of the study shows that the people of the DRC should stand as one people and one nation. East-West schisms should be eliminated. Job positions should be distributed not according to ethnic or clan considerations, but rather on the basis of qualifications. The study believes that it is time for the Congolese people to hold hands to resolve their conflict in peaceful way by including everybody for rebuilding and develop their country in unity. In so doing, the country will be developed, uplifted and the fight against the common enemy, discrimination and poverty, will be feasible.

### **6. 3. 3. 3. The Facilitation of socio-economic Reconstruction and Development in the DRC**

The study finds out that reconstruction and development projects in the DRC must actively involve the affected or the discriminated communities through a process of inclusive negotiations involving recipients, experts and donors; the community must be able to conceive, implement and take responsibility for projects in a coordinated way as close to the grassroots as possible.

The study support that the projects at a national level should require the co-operation of all Congolese irrespective of their political or ethnic affiliations. The people within local communities must see local organizations working together on the ground with common purpose. Parties with constituency support in an area must commit themselves to facilitating such approach to development projects.

The study suggests that reconstruction projects must work on the ground at national level. This requires a combined effort by all political organizations and affected or discriminated parties to raise the required level of capital and human resources for development. Public and private funds will have to be mobilised for this purpose. To achieve sustainable development all individuals must be assisted and encouraged to accept responsibility for their socio-economic well-being. Each actor must define and accept his/her role and there must be an acceptance of responsibility for and co-determination of socio-economic development. This development initiative should in no way abrogate the right and duty of governments to continue their normal development activity, except that in doing so they should be sensitive to the spirit and contents of any agreement that may be reached.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

#### **6. 4. Recommendations**

Based on the collected data and the reviewed literature, the recommendations of the study are presented as follows:

The DRC seems to be regarded as a country that is ineffectively governed because of the culture of impunity. The government of the DRC should eradicate this culture and avoid any interference in judicial matters. It should leave prosecutors to do their work independently and

peacefully. The government of the DRC should promote democracy and avoid arbitrary arrests and the violation of human rights, in all its forms. It should be reminded that no one is above the law and that government officials are also subject to prosecution whenever they transgress the law.

As part of a programme to eradicate poverty, the government of the DRC should develop programmes that deal with the welfare of its people, such as housing, transportation, food and so forth. The government of the DRC should make sure that its poverty reduction strategy is implemented and bears fruit; reports on any improvement regarding the situation of poverty in the country should be made available and published in the media to ensure transparency. The government of the DRC should provide the necessary means for the functioning of institutions such as the Court of Auditors, the General Inspectorate of Finance, the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission, etc. These institutions and strategies should operate independently from the office of the President or government and their reports should be submitted to Parliament. These institutions and strategies should not be intimidated by the office of the President or by the government.

Concerning the issue of conflict, the general guideline on issues to be dealt with is to move from immediate issues related to violent conflict and the peace process toward the pre-emption of violence and then toward integrating into the overall need for socio-economic development. A sub-committee should be created. That sub-committee should identify areas, at community level, where they could begin facilitating the co-ordination of the following issues: reconstruction of damaged property; reintegration of displaced persons into the community; expansion of

infrastructure to assist in consolidating the peace process; and community involvement in the maintenance and improvement of existing community facilities and the environment. The sub-committees should facilitate crisis assistance that will be linked to socio-economic development in the following areas: dealing with the immediate effects of violent conflict and its resultant social effects, displaced persons and homelessness; and instances in which infrastructure is itself a spark to violence, e.g. water, electricity transportation, schools etc.

In addressing the above issues, attention will have to be paid to: the equitable allocation of state resources, including state-funded development agencies (physical and financial) for both public and community-based initiatives; mobilisation of additional resources both public and private; the cumbersome nature of governmental structures in the provision of resources and services; the position of poor and marginalized groups, land, its accessibility and use; basic housing; the provision of basic services; education; health and welfare; job creation and unemployment; and the availability of land for housing and basic services. The sub-committees should identify potential flash points and co-ordinate socio-economic development that will defuse tension e.g. squatter settlements: squatter settlement-township interfaces; hostels: hostel-township interfaces, provision and maintenance of basic services and rural resource constraints. The sub-committees should identify areas of socio-economic development that would prevent violent conflict. The sub-committee would attempt to ensure that overall socio-economic development is cognizant of the need to reinforce the peace process and defuse the potential for violent conflict.

Government officials in the country should be patriotic and seek first of all the interests of the Congolese people rather than their own. The government of the DRC should set an example of

transparency; declarations regarding assets should be made by all members of the Executive in compliance with Article 99 of the Constitution and be published. The constitutional court, which receives them, should be given the right and resources to check the declarations and to monitor them. The government of the DRC should make sure that all Congolese people benefit, in one way or another, from the wealth in the country. Distributive justice should be at the top of its priority list.

The DRC government must define a national vision for peace-building that is articulated and owned by its 71 million people, and which reflects an understanding of the root causes of the country's conflict. The Congolese government should prioritise peace-building activities as part of a societal transformation that alters relationships between the state and its citizens positively, and facilitates more equitable power-sharing. The government must also establish a regular budget with adequate controls to reinforce state authority, properly manage resources, and combat widespread corruption; the UN Peace-building Commission, in collaboration with the AU and SADC, should help the Congolese government to build effective institutions which would manage its immense natural resources. The Commission should also seek to strengthen partnerships between the UN, the EU, and other external actors in order to prevent the destabilising regional and international exploitation of the DRC's natural resources.

The UN Security Council should maintain a peacekeeping presence in the DRC. This presence should possess a credible deterrent capability, and the capacity to oversee a secure election that will be held this year (2011), especially in the provinces of Orientale, North and South Kivu; SADC, the AU, the UN. In addition, the EU must establish an effective division of labour to

support peace-building efforts in the DRC. The AU and SADC must provide political, technical, and financial assistance for peacekeeping and peace-building activities in the DRC. They should also develop and coordinate a joint strategy that allows the Congolese to identify their priority peace-building issues and take ownership of the process; the evolving strategic partnership between South Africa and Angola should be deployed to strengthen SADC's peace-building role in the DRC. While South Africa's bilateral engagement with the DRC should continue to be strengthened for the benefit of the region, this role should not be allowed to undermine the relevance and legitimacy of SADC's multilateral engagement with the country; the Congolese government must demonstrate the political will and commitment to plan and implement comprehensive strategies for DDR and security sector reform. These strategies should take into account local contexts and needs and include tailor-made DDR programmes to meet the special needs of groups such as women, children, and the disabled. Lessons can usefully be learned from DDR and SSR efforts in fellow SADC countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Peace-building in the DRC must address gender disparities, mainstream gender, and strategically focus on gender-oriented activities. In engendering peace-building, the DRC government needs to strengthen and implement coherent, coordinated, and consistent approaches that address the root causes of conflict, build a culture of peace, justice, security, equality whilst realigning regional and international support for peace-building efforts, in order to promote development in the country. Support from the African Union's Gender Desk and the UN Development Fund for Women should be provided to the DRC's ministry of women's affairs in order to combat impunity for perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence; the establishment of a vibrant

civil society and effective political opposition must be supported to rebuild the DRC and develop it. Congolese civil society actors should work with local communities and institutions to create and secure the policy space necessary to promote a more accountable and responsible state, as well as the rule of law. The Congolese government must strengthen partnerships with civil society actors in order to develop and implement a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction plan. Moreover, the government of the DRC must formulate a comprehensive strategy for rebuilding its national criminal justice system. Kinshasa should open strategic discussions with the International Criminal Court and the international community on managing crimes that fall outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. In this respect, the government must define and strengthen its post-conflict local alternative justice systems, which will require the drafting and implementation of more effective national laws to enhance the Congolese judicial system. Regional and international donors should also provide support in building the operational capacity of the DRC's judicial and legal institutions. Meanwhile, transitional justice mechanisms in the Congo must address the challenges of judicial and institutional reform. These mechanisms should reinforce the voices of the poor and marginalized, as well as address the country's structural, socio-economic, and political inequalities. Finally, the DRC must build an effective and professional electoral commission that can promote democratic, inclusive, and competent electoral systems for development to occur. SADC, the AU, the UN, the EU, and other donors should support the Congolese government's commitment to elections by helping to prepare the country's political parties to accept the outcomes of polls, and by ensuring that timeout elections are held in 2011. In addition, the DRC can learn useful lessons from the electoral process of 'best practices' and successful examples of democracy within political parties in other SADC countries.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


This study strongly recommends that, in general, a definite focus be placed upon the satisfaction of basic human needs in the DRC. This will provide a non-ideological or neutral focus for policy instruments through which to address some of the ills of the current Congolese situation. Specifically:

- We recommend that a stronger emphasis be placed on reconciliatory rhetoric on the part of political leadership. Leadership often comes across as excessively partisan to intolerance, and the ethnisation of group, and is not explicitly reconciliatory.
- An examination of the economic development policy, that goes further to satisfy human needs.
- An urgent addressing of the issue of reparations for those who bear the brunt of violent conflict era abuses must take place. Such reparations should be financial and material, where appropriate, but must also put forward the notion that reparations can also be symbolic. In this spirit, simple triumphalism should also be avoided, in favour of an approach that addresses the identity and needs for belonging of all Congolese people. Monuments to democracy and peace would be more appropriate than those erected to political heroes.
- A greater emphasis should be placed on conflict resolution in the country as a whole; but particularly in the educational system. It is in education that conflict management and resolution skills must be given a prominent position in life-skills training, and where a conflict resolution approach is taken to the teaching of history, for instance.
- The overwhelming need for the development of conflict analysis and handling skills in local government must be met by extensive skills training programmes. This should address the tendency for tensions in the area of state delivery to be contained and, ultimately, resolved within a constructive, basic human needs framework.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*


- Centres for the study and peaceful resolution of conflict, peace studies and related issues should be established with government funding. These could be built around concepts similar to that of the United States Institute for Peace, or the UN Peace University campuses in various countries.
- Academic programmes and courses on conflict and its resolution, alternatives to violence, and non-violent communications should be offered in the DRC; far more extensively than they currently are.
- Finally, and perhaps most importantly, conflict management should be built into society through the establishment of a network of peace centres, or dispute resolution centres, staffed by volunteers, but with professional support. Such a conflict management system would more than cover its costs, by facilitating efficient and durable decision-making processes, and avoiding many of the deadlocks that currently delay the delivery of government services to communities throughout the country. The architecture of the DRC National Peace Agreement might provide a model for such a conflict management system. Perhaps, when all is said and done, we need to accept that there are limits to the management of social conflict. To finally resolve conflict would be impossible, futile and of questionable value. To institutionalize conflict management to the extreme would be to stifle development. It would be to limit change, and sustain conditions of discrimination or inequality, oppression, and so forth. It is a truism of most social theory that conflict never truly ends. Perhaps that is after all the greatest weakness of the notion of conflict resolution. Conflict can be managed, but certain tensions will always remain. These will continue to give life to the social processes in the new DRC.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## 6. 5. Conclusion

Conflict resolution and development are serious concerns for the present and future of the DRC. Commitment to the resolution of conflict, for the promotion of development, is more than just a policy in the DRC. There has to be a concomitant change in the mindset of leaders of the DRC towards the perception that conflict should be managed and resolved in a peaceful manner which allows for development to occur in the country. The study is convinced that, without a peaceful resolution of conflict and the implementation of its agreements, any programme for socio-economic development, the eradication of poverty or fight against corruption and discrimination will be ineffective.



The people of the DRC do not deserve the threat that has been imposed on them. The resources available in the country, good quality leadership and a little political will should be sufficient for the country to flourish.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Conflict resolution should take into account the main cause of conflict which is discrimination. Natural resources are there to fuel conflict but are not the real cause of conflict in the DRC. The Congolese government should work to make the DRC an environment of peace, security, justice and equality to all the Congolese so that the development goals will be achieved in the country. Without these factors it is impossible to discuss development in the country.

UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE  
HOWARD HILL LIBRARY  
PRIVATE BAG X1322  
ALICE 5700

## CHAPTER 7

### Bibliography

#### Documents, Books, Journals, Periodicals, and Dissertations

- Abu-Nimer, M. 1996. Conflict Resolution Approaches: Western and Middle Eastern Lessons and Possibilities. **American Journal of Economics and Sociology** 55(1): 35–52.
- Adam, F; Gupta, D; and Mengisteab, K. 1999. Globalization and developing World: An Introduction. In **Globalization and Dilemmas of the state in the South**, eds, Francis Adam, Satya Dev Gupta and Mengisteab. London: Mecomillan.
- Adams, J.S. 1965. Inequity in Social Exchange. In Berkowitz, L. eds. **Advances in Experimental Social Psychology**. Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press.
- Adedeji, A. 1999. Cleansing Africa's Rivers. **University of Fort Hare** 5(1): 6-8.
- Afrobarometer Survey. 2006. Performance and Legitimacy in Nigeria's New Democracy. **Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 4**, pp. 1-14.
- Agba, M.S., Agba, A.M., Ushie, E.M., & Akwara, A.F. 2009. Poverty, Food Security and the Rebranding Question in Nigeria. **Canadian Social Science**, 5(6): 1- 9.
- Agbu, O. 2007. Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria. Uppsala: Elanders.
- Ahunwan, B. 2003. Globalization and Corporate Governance in Developing Countries. Ardsley. New York: Transnational.
- Ajulu, D. 2001. Holism in development: African perspective on Empowering Communities. California: Marc.
- Ake, C. 1985. The Present Crisis in Africa: Economic Crisis or Crisis of the State? In

Ihonvbare, J. eds. **The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa.**

Lagos: JAD Publishers.

Ake, C. 1996. **Democracy and Development in Africa.** Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Akinboade, Oludele A. 2005. **A Review of Women, Poverty and Informal Trade Issues.** In East and Southern Africa. **In International Social Sciences Journal**, 57 (2): 255-275.

Akpan, W. 2007. **Ethnic Diversity and conflict in Nigeria: Lessons from the Niger-Delta Crisis.** African Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7(2): 161-191.

Alavi, H. 1972. **The State in Post Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh.** New Left Review, 74: 50-65.

Alcock, N.Z. & Alan, G.N. 1970. **The perception of national power.** In **Journal of Conflict Resolution**. 14 (2): 335-343.

Alcock, P. 2006. **Understanding Poverty.** New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Anstey, M. 1991. **Negotiating conflict: insights and skills for negotiators and peacemakers.** Cape Town: Juta and Co. Ltd.

Ali, A. G., Mwabu, G. & Gesami, R. K. 2002. **Poverty Reduction in Africa: Challenges and Policy Options.** Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium, March – AERC Special paper 36. Accessed @ [www.aecafrika.org/documents/sp36.pdf](http://www.aecafrika.org/documents/sp36.pdf). ISBN 9966-944-97-4 (pp. 1-48).

Alubo, S.O. 1990. **State Violence and Health in Nigeria.** **Social Science and Medicine**. 31(10): 1075-1084.

Amin, S. 1990. **Maldevelopment: Anatomy of Global Failure.** London and Tokyo. Zed Books and United Nations University Press.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Amnesty International. 2007. DRC: DDR and Reform of the Army. Relief Web.

[www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid=K6XP3KD&file=Full\\_Report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid=K6XP3KD&file=Full_Report.pdf) HII

Anifowoshe, R. 2000. Urban Violence in Nigeria: The Case of the O'odua Peoples

Congress (OPC) Militia. Paper presented at the Conference on **Industrialization, Urbanization and Development in Nigeria, 1950–1999 and Beyond**, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos, November 15–16.

Anise, L. 1980. Esubsidization: An Alternative Approach to Governmental Cost

Containment and Income Redistribution Policy in Nigeria. **African Studies Review**. 23(2): 17-37.



Apter, D. 1977. Introduction to Political Analysis. Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers Inc.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Apter, David, E. 1996. Comparative Politics, Old and New. In R Goodin and H-D

Klingemann (Eds) **A New Handbook of Political Science**. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Autesserre, Severine. 2008. The Trouble with Congo. **Foreign Affairs** 87, no. 3 (May/June).

Avi-Yonah, Reuven, S. 2003. "Tax Stories and Tax Histories: Is There a Role for History in Shaping Tax Law?" **Michigan Law Review**, 101(6):2227.

A World Bank Country Study. 1979. Zaire: Current Economic Situation and Constraints. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Ayittey, G. 1998. **Africa in Chaos**. New York. St. Martin's Press.

Ayoob, M. 1996. Regional Security and the Third World, London: Croom Helm.

Azar. 1994. **Conflict resolution and ethnicity**. Praeger: London.

Azcarate, de Luis. 1986. **The World Bank in Adjustment and Economic Growth in Africa**. In **Africa and the International Monetary Fund**, eds. Gerald K. Helleiner. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

BBC. 2010. **Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo**. Internet:  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country\\_profiles/1072684.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072684.stm). Access: 11 February 2011.

BBC. 2009. **UN to back attack on Congo rebels**. January 28,  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7855367.stm>.

*Banque Centrale du Congo*, varied years from 1975 to 2003. ***Rapport Annuel***.

Baregu, M. 2002. **The Clones of Mr. Kurtz: Violence, War and Plunder in the DRC**.

***African Journal of Political Science***, vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 11-38.

Bassey, C.O. 2003. **The Nature and Dynamics of Civil War in West Africa**: in Aniadu  
*Together in Excellence*

Sesay (ed) ***Civil Wars, Child Soldiers and Post Conflict Peace Building in West Africa***,  
Ibadan: College Press.

Beaudouin, Steven M. 2007. **Poverty in World History**. New York: Routledge. Bassey,  
C.O. 2003. **The Nature and Dynamics of Civil War in West Africa** in Aniadu Sesay (ed)  
***Civil Wars, Child Soldiers and Post Conflict Peace Building in West Africa***. Ibadan:  
College Press.

Bednarz, Robert and Giardino, John R. 1988. **Development and Resources in the  
Third World**. Jim Norwine and Alphonso Gonzalez, eds. Winchester: Unwin  
Hyman.

Beland, Daniel. 2005. **“Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutional Perspective”**.  
***Social Policy and Administration***, 39(1):1.

Berger, P. E. 1998. **The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in**

**Pluralist Societies.** Boulder: Westview Press.

Berkman, Tobias. 2006. The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the

Responsibility. TheHenry, L.Stimson. September,<http://www.stimson.org/ub.cfm?id=346>.

Bernstein, M. & Crosby, F. 1980. An Empirical Examination of Relative Deprivation

Theory. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 16: 442-456.

Bernstein, A. 1998. South Africa: Normative Conflicts, Social Cohesion and Mediating

Institutions. In Berger, P. E. (Ed.) The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and mediation in Pluralist Societies. Boulder, Westview Press.

Bhalla, A. S. and Lapeyre, Frederic. 2004. Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World.

New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

University of Fort Hare

Biaya, T. K. 1998. Ethnicity and the State in Africa. In Okwudibia Nnoli (ed.) Ethnic

Conflicts in Africa. Senegal: CODESRIA.

Bliuc, A., McGarty, C., Reynolds, K. J. & Muntele, D. 2007. Opinion-Based Group

Membership as a Predictor of Commitment to Political Action. **European Journal of Social Psychology**, 37: 19-32.

Bloch, Marc. 1953. Towards a Comparative History of European Societies. London:

George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Boen, F. & Vanbeselaere, N. 1998. Reactions upon a Failed Attempt to enter a High Status

Group: An Experimental Test of the Five-Stage Model. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 28: 689-696.

Boen, F., & Vanbeselaere, N. 2000. **Responding to Membership of a Low-Status Group**: The Effects of Stability, Permeability and Individual Ability. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 3: 41–62.

Boen, F., & Vanbeselaere, N. 2002. **The Relative Impact of Socio-Structural Characteristics on Behavioral Reactions against Membership in a Low-Status Group**. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 5: 299.

Booth, K. 1994. **A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations**. Southern African Perspectives No. 30, CSAS.

Braeckman, Colette. 1996. **Terreur africaine. Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire : les racines de la violence**. Paris: Fayard.

Brown, M. 1993. **Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict**. Cambridge: Mit Press.

Brown, S. 2005. **Economic Transformation Audit: 2005: Conflict and Governance**, Rondebosch, Institute for Reconciliation and Justice.

Brubaker, K. Pamela. 2007. **Globalization at What Price?** Cleveland: The Pilgrim.

Brush, G. 1996. **Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences**: Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 4: 523-545.

Bulmer, Simon, J. 1998. **“New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European Market”**. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5(3): 365.

Burger, P & Booysen, F, 2006. **‘Ties that bind’**: a transactional approach to social capital, *Social Dynamics*, 32(2): 197-217.

Burkey, S. 1993. **People first. A guide to self-reliant, participatory rural**

development. London: Zed Books.

Burrell, Gibson, and Morgan, Gareth. 1979. **Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis**: Elements of the sociology of corporate life. London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Burton, J. 1984. **Global Conflict**: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.

Burton, J. 1990. **Conflict**: Human Needs Theory. London: Macmillan.

Burton, J. 1997. **Conflict Explained**: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Burton, J. W. 1979. **Deviance, Terrorism and War** – The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems, Oxford, Martin Robertson.

Burton, J. W. 1988. Human Needs versus Societal Needs. In Coate, R.A. and Rosatti, J.A. (Eds.) **The Power of Human Needs in World Society**. Boulder: Lynn Rienner.

Burton, J. W. and Dukes, F. (Ed). 1990. **Conflict**: Readings in Management and Resolution, London, Macmillan.

Burton, J. W. 1997. **Conflict Explained**: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime, and Their Prevention, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Buzan, B. 1991. **People, States and Fear**: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Buzan, B. 1992. **People, States and Fear**: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Campbell, John. 1997. **Recent Trends in Institutional Political Economy**. The

**International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy**, 18(7/8):15.

Chew, SC & Denmark, RA (Eds.). 1996. **The underdevelopment of development**,

**Essays in honour of Andre Gunder Frank**. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Carnegie, Garry, D., and Napier, Christopher, J. 1996. "**Critical and Interpretive**

**Histories**: Insights into accounting's present and future through its past". **Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal**, 9(3):7.

Carnegie, Garry, D., and Napier, Christopher, J. 2002. "**Exploring Comparative**

**International Accounting History**". **Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal**, 15(5):689.

Carr, Edward, H. 1961. **What is History?** London: MacMillan and Co Ltd.

Castillo, J. 2007. **Legitimization and Justice Ideologies in the Context of Extreme**

**Economic Inequality**: Three developing Countries in Comparative Perspective. **Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Classical Chinese Garden, and Portland, Oregon, USA. 4<sup>th</sup> July.**

CIA. 2009. **Democratic Republic of the Congo**. CIA World Factbook.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html>.

Clapham, Christopher. 2000. **Failed States and Non-States in Modern International**

**Order**. **paper presented at the conference**. Failed States III: Globalization and the Failed State. April 7-10. in Florence. Italy

[http://www.comm.usc.edu/mstohl/failed\\_states/2000/papers/clapham.html](http://www.comm.usc.edu/mstohl/failed_states/2000/papers/clapham.html)

Clapham, C. 2001. **War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea**. **Failed States**

**Conference**. Florence. 10-14- April 2001.

Coetzee, JK, 2001. **Modernization theory**. In Coetzee, JK, Graaff, J, Hendricks, F &

- Woods, G, 2001. **Development theory, policy and practice**. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, R. & Greenberg, J. 1982. The Justice Concept in Social Psychology. In: J. Greenberg & R.L. Cohen (eds.) **Equity and Justice in Social Behavior**. New York: Academic Press.
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1998). On Economic Causes of Civil Wars. Oxford. Economic Papers 50: 563–73.
- Cone, C & Solomon, H. 2004. The state and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. **South African Journal of Military Studies**, vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 51-75.
- Cotton, J. R. 1957. Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi: Economic and Commercial Conditions in the Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Cowen, M.P. and Shenton, R. W. 1996. Doctrines of Development. London and New York: Routledge.
- Cramer, C. 2005. Inequality and Conflict: A review of and Age-Old Concern. Identities, Conflicts and Cohesion Programme Paper, Number 11.
- Crawford, Sue, E.S. 1995. 'A Grammar of Institutions'. **The American Political Science Review**, 89(3):582.
- Creswell, John W. 1994. Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. London: Sage.
- Crighton and Martha. 1991. The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. In **Comparative Politics**. Vol. 23. No 2. P. 127.
- Dahrendorf, R. 1974. Über den Ursprung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen. In: R.

Dahrendorf (ed.) *Pfade aus Utopia. Zur Theorie und Methode der Soziologie.*

*München*: Piper.

Dalley, P. 2006. Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 27, No. 2.

Davidson, W. and Montville, J. 1981-1982. Foreign policy according to Freud. In **Foreign policy**, 45: 145-157.

Davids, I, Theron, F, & Maphunye, KJ, 2005. Participatory development in South Africa, a development management perspective. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.

Daw (Division for the advancement of Women), 2000. The feminization of poverty. Fact Sheet no 1. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations.  
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followupsession/presskit/fs1.htm>.

Della Fave, L. R. 1980. The Meek Shall not Inherit the Earth. Self-Evaluation and the Legitimacy of Stratification. **American Sociological Review**, 45: 955-971.

Deng, F and Zartman, I.W. 1991. Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution.

Denneulin, S, 2004. Human development, participation and gender.  
[www.fas.harvard.edu/~freedom/teaching](http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~freedom/teaching) Accessed 22 October 2004.

DEUTSCH, M. 1973. The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Deutsch, M. 1991. Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences. In **New Direction in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Transformation**. London: Sage Publisher.

Denzin, Norman, K., and Lincoln, Yvonna, S. 2005. The Discipline and Practice of

- Qualitative Research. In N Denzin and Y Lincoln (Eds) **Handbook of Qualitative Research** 3rd Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- DFID. 1997. **Eliminating Poverty**: White Paper on International Development, Department for International Development. London, HMSO: United Kingdom.
- Diamond, L. 1988. **Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic**. Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Duany, J. 2004. **The Refugee Problem**. In **African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century**. London. Zed Books. Pp. 125-139.
- Duffield, M. 2001. **Global Governance and the New Wars**, London: Zed.
- Dulansey, M. & Austin, J. 1991. **Small-scale enterprises and women**. In Overholt, C, Anderson, MB. Cloud, K. & Austin, J. (ed.), 1991. **Gender roles in development projects. A case book**. Connecticut, USA: Kumarian Press.
- Duly, G. 2000. **Creating a Violence-Free Society: The case of Rwanda**. **Journal of Humanitarian Assistance**, available at <<http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/c/c090.htm>>. last visited, September 8, 2009.
- Durch, William J. 2006. **Are we Learning Yet? The Long Road to Applying Best Practices**. In **Twenty-First-Century Peace Operation**. 573-608. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Du toit, P. 2001. **South Africa's Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence**. Basingstoke, Palgrave.
- Easterly, W. and Levine, R. 1997. **Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions**. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4. Pp. 1203-1250.
- ECA. 2007. **Accelerating Africa's Growth and Development to meet the MDGs: Emerging**

Challenges and the way forward: **An Issues Paper for the Conference of African Ministers of Finance**. Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 March – 1 April.

Eccleston, Richard. 2004. **The Thirty Year Problem: The politics of Australian tax reform**. Australian Tax Research Foundation Study No 42.

Economist Intelligence Unit. 2010. **The Democratic Republic of Congo: Country Report**. Internet: [www.eiu.com](http://www.eiu.com). Access: 5 April 2010.

Eddie, Ian, A. 1991. **“Asia Pacific Cultural Values and Accounting Systems”**. **Asia Pacific International Management Forum**, 16(3):22.

Ekekwe, E. 1985. **State and Economic Development**. In: C. Ake (ed.) **Political Economy of Nigeria**. New York: Longman.

Elbadawi, I and Sambanis, N. 2000. **Why are there so Many Civil Wars in Africa?**

Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict. *Journal of Africa Economics*, 9, 3, October. pp. 244-269.

Elu, J. 2000. **Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa Analysis and Prospects for the future**. In *Journal of Third World Studies*. Vol. 17. No 4. March. p. 2.

Ellemers, N. 1993. **The Impact of Socio Cultural Variables on Identity Enhancement Strategies**. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 4: 27 – 57.

Eriksen, S. 2005. **The Congo War and the Prospects of State Formation**.

Rwanda and Uganda compared. **Paper No. 675**. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

[http://www.nupi.no/publikasjoner/notater/2005/the\\_congo\\_war\\_and\\_the\\_prospects\\_of\\_state\\_formation](http://www.nupi.no/publikasjoner/notater/2005/the_congo_war_and_the_prospects_of_state_formation) (letzter Zugriff: 20.06.2007).

Eriksen, S. 2006. The Theory of Failure and the Failure of Theory: State Failure. In the **Journal of Theory and Practice**. Vol 4. p.55.

Esterhuysen, W. (2004). Recovering the Soul of the South African Nation. In Sicre, F. (Eds.) **South Africa at 10**. Cape Town, Human and Rousseau.

Evans, Richard, J. 1997. In Defence of History. London: Granta Books.

Falola, T. & Ihonvbere, J. 1985. The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic. London: Zed.

FAO. 2000. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2000. Fapohunda, J. & Lubell, H. 1978. Lagos: Urban Development and Employment. Geneva: International Labour Organization.

Fearon, J. and David, L. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. In **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 75-92.

Fechner, Harry, H.E., and Kilgore, Allan 1994. The Influence of Cultural Factors on Accounting Practice". **International Journal of Accounting**, 29:265.

**Fédération des Entreprises du Congo**. 1960.

Fleischman, Richard, K., and Tyson, Thomas, N. 1997. "Archival Researchers: An Endangered Species?" **The Accounting Historians Journal**, 24(2):91.

Fleischman, Richard, K., and Radcliffe, Vaughan, S. 2003. Divergent Streams of Accounting History: A review and call for confluence. In R Fleischman, V Radcliffe and P Shoemaker (Eds) **Doing Accounting History: Contributions to the development of accounting thought**. Amsterdam: JAI Elsevier Science.

Fleischman, Richard, K., and Tyson, Thomas, N. 2003. Archival Research

Methodology. In R Fleischman, V Radcliffe and P Shoemaker (Eds) **Doing Accounting History: Contributions to the Development of Accounting Thought**. Amsterdam: JAI Elsevier Science.

Francis, M. D. and William, I. Z. eds. 1991. Conflict Resolution in Africa. Washington, DC: The Booking institution.

Frank, A. G. 1969. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Modern Reader.

Frank, AG. 1969. The development of underdevelopment. In Roberts, JT & Hite, A, 2000. **from modernisation to globalisation**. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Frank, AG. 1996. The underdevelopment of development. In Chew, SC & Denmark, RA (Eds.). 1996. **The underdevelopment of development, Essays in honour of Andre Gunder Frank**. Thousand Oaks. Sage Publications.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Frank, H. 2000. Primordialism, Evolutionary theory and ethnic violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and constraints for theory and policy: In **Canadian Journal of Political Science**. Vol. 33. No 1. March. P. 40.

Friedman, T. 2006. The World is flat. A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Fukuyama, Francis 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.

Funnell, Warwick. 1998. "The Narrative and its Place in the New Accounting History: The rise of the counter narrative". **Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal**, 11(2):142.

Furtado, C. 1980. Development: theoretical and conceptual considerations. In

Pajestka, J & Feinstein, Ch (Eds.), 1980. **The relevance of economic theories. Proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association in collaboration with the Polish Economic Association at Warsaw, Poland.** London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Gernon, H., and Olusegun Wallace, R.S. 1995. International Accounting Research: A Review of its ecology, contending theories and methodologies. **Journal of Accounting Literature**, 14:54.

Gibson, J. L. 2004. Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation. Cape Town: HSRC Press.



Giddens, A. 1987. New Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Basic Book.

## University of Fort Hare

Giguère, B. & Lalonde, R.N. 2010. Why do Students Strike? Direct and Indirect

Determinants of Collective Action Participation. **Political Psychology**, 31(2): 277-247.

Ginges, J. & Atran, S. 2009. What Motivates Participation in Violent Political Action:

Selective Incentive or Altruism? **Annals of New York Academy of Science**, 1167:115-123.

Global Witness. 2009. Metals in mobile phones help finance Congo atrocities.

[http://www.globalwitness.org/media\\_library\\_detail.php/718/en/metals\\_in\\_mobile\\_phones\\_help\\_finance\\_congo\\_atrocities.](http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/718/en/metals_in_mobile_phones_help_finance_congo_atrocities)

Goldberg, L. 1974. "The Future of the Past in Accounting". **The Accountant's Magazine**, 73(820):405.

Graaff, J. 2001. Theorizing development. In Coetzee, JK, Graaff, J, Hendricks, F &

Woods, G. 2001. **Development theory, policy and practice**. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Graaff, J & Venter, D. 2001. Understanding the world systems. In Coetzee, J K, Graaff, J, Hendricks, F & Woods, G, **Development Theory, policy and practice**. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Gray, S. J. 1988. "Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems Internationally". *Abacus*, 24(1):1.

Grix, J. 2001. **Demystifying Postgraduate Research**. Birmingham: The University of Birmingham.

Gurr, T. R. 1970. **Why Men Rebel**. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Guest, R. 2004. **The Shackled Continent: Africa's Past, Present, and Future**.

London: Macmillan.

University of Fort Hare

Hagen, R. Community Shelters: The Balm and The Trap. *The Nation*. 194 (8): 160-167

Hall, Peter, A. 1986. **Governing the Economy**. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hall, Peter, A. 1992. The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional

Analysis and British Economic Policy in the 1970s. In S Steinmo, K Thelen and F Longstreth (Eds) **Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Peter, A., and Taylor, Rosemary, C. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms". *Political Studies*, 44(5):936.

Hansen, Susan, B. 1983. **The Politics of Taxation: Revenue without representation**.

New York: Praeger Publications.

Haralambos, M. and Halborn, M. 1995. **Sociology themes and perspectives**. London: Harpers Collins.

- Hecllo, Hugh. 1974. Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hegtvedt, K. 1990. The Effects of Relationship Structure on Emotional Responses to Inequity Social. *Psychology Quarterly*, 53(3): 214-228.
- Hegtvedt, K. A. & Markovsky, B. 1995. In: K.S. Cook, G.A. Fine, & J.S. House (eds.) Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, pp. 257–280. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Hegtvedt, K., Clay-Warner, J. & Johnson, C. 2003. The Social Context of Responses to Injustice: Considering the Indirect and Direct Effects of Group-Level Factors. *Social Justice Research*, 16(4): 343–365.
- Hepworth, J. T., & West, J. G. 1988. Lynchings and the Economy: A Time-Series Reanalysis of Hovland and Sears (1940). *Journal of Personality Social Psychology*, 55: 239–247.
- Hofmeyer, J. 2005. Reflecting on the TRC. *SA Reconciliation Barometer*, 4, 2.
- Hofstede, Geert. 1984. “Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning”. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 1(2):81.
- Hogg, M. A. & Abrams, D. 1988. Social Identification: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes. New York: Routledge.
- Homans, G.C., 1974. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Hornsey, M.J., Blackwood, L., Morton, S., Obrien, A., Mavor, K., Paasonen, K. & Smith, J. 2006. Why do People Engage in Collective Action? Reviewing the Role of Perceived Effectiveness. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 36(7): 1701–1722.

- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. **Ethnic Groups in Conflict**. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Huybrechts, A; Mudimbe, V. Y.; Vanderlinden, J et al. n.d. **Du Congo au Zaire 1960-1980: Essai de Bilan**. Bruxelles : CRIPS.
- Idowu, W.O. 1999. **Citizenship, Alienation and Conflict in Nigeria**. **Africa Development**, XXIV (1 & 2): 31-55.
- IMF Staff Monitored Program (18 July 2006)  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=19444.0>.
- IFHR. 2008. **The Democratic Republic of Congo: Breaking the cycle of impunity**. International Federation for Human Rights, Number 490 (2).
- ISS. 2002. **Searching for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo**. Workshop report.
- Ihonvbere, J. & Ekekwe, E. 1988. **Dependent Capitalism, Structural Adjustment and Democratic Possibilities in Nigeria's Third Republic**. **Afrika Spectrum**, 3: 273-291.
- Ikambana, Peta. 2007. **Mobutu's Totalitarian Political System: An Afrocentric Analysis**. New York: Routledge.
- Immergut, Ellen, M. 1998. **The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism**. **Politics and Society**, 26(1):5.
- International Monetary Fund. 2007. **Democratic Republic of the Congo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper**. IMF Country Report No. 07/330, September 2007.
- International Crisis Group. 2009. **Democratic Republic of the Congo**. January 27, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1174&l=1>.
- Isumonah, V. A. & Gaskia, J. 2001. **Ethnic Groups and Conflicts in Nigeria: The South-South Zone**. Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies.

Jackman, M. 1996. **Individualism, Self-Interest, and White Racism.** *Social Science Quarterly*,  
77(4): 760-768.

Jackson, Stephen. 2003. **of Doubtful Nationality. Political Manipulation  
of Citizenship in the D.R. Congo.** Unpublished manuscript.

Jenkins, Keith. 1991. **Re-thinking History.** London: Routledge.

Jinadu, A. L. 1994. **The Dialectics of Theory and Research on Race and Ethnicity in  
Nigeria.** In: P. Rateliff (ed.) **Race, Ethnicity and Nation: International  
Perspectives on Social Conflict**, pp.163-178. London: UCL Press.

Jost, J. & Hunyady, O. 2003. **The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative  
Function of Ideology.** *European review of Social Psychology*, 13(1): 111-153.

Jua, N., & Nkwi, P. 2001. **Levelling the playing field. Combating racism, ethnicity,  
and Different forms of Discrimination in Africa.** Yaoundé, Cameroon: International  
Center for Applied Social Sciences, Research, and Training.

Kawakami, K. & Dion, K.L. 1995. **Social Identity and Affect as Determinants of Action:  
Towards and Integration of Relative Deprivation and Social Identity Theory.  
Theory and Psychology**, 5: 551-557.

Kagame, P., 2002, **the Great Lakes Conflicts: Factors, Actors, and Challenges:  
Inaugural Lecture at the Nigeria War College, Abuja, 16<sup>th</sup> September, 2002.**

Kagame, P. 2009. **Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.** In **The African  
Executive**. September 8, 2009.

Kapstein, Jonathan. 1980. **Zaire: Continuity World Headache.** Braamfontein: The  
South African Institute of International Affairs.

Katwala, Ghifan J. 1979. **Bureaucracy, Dependency and Underdevelopment in**

Zaire. Ph.D. Dissertation. Berkeley: University of California.

Khan, S. M., 1998. Lessons of Peace-Keeping in Rwanda: Paper for Workshop on Learning from Conflict Resolution in Africa held in Arusha, Tanzania.

Khor, Martin. N.D. 2008. A Critique of The IMF's Role & Policy Conditionality. *Global Economy Series (4). Third World Network.*  
<http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/geseries4.htm> Accessed on 12/03/2008.

Klandermans, B. 1989. Grievance interpretation and success expectancies: The Social Construction of Protest. *Social Behavior*, 4: 113-125.

Klandermans, B., Sabucedo, J. M., Rodriguez, M. & De Weerd, M. 2002 (a). Identity Processes in Collective Action Participation: Farmers' Identity and Farmers' Protest in The Netherlands and Spain. *Political Psychology*, 23: 235-251.

Klerck, G. 2001. The regulation approach. In Goetzee, JK, Graaff, J, Hendricks, F & Woods, G, 2001. Development theory, policy and practice. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Klingebiel, S. 2002. Crisis prevention and conflict management: new fields of Development cooperation. *Development and Cooperation.* (5): 8-11.

Kluegel, J. R. & Eliot R. Smith. 1986. Beliefs about Inequality: Americans' Views of What Is and What Ought to Be. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.

Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koko, S. 2007. The one-plus-four formula and transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *African Security Review*, Volume 16 (1).

Koyame, Mungbalemwe and Clark, F. John. 2002. The Economic Impact of the Congo

War. In The African Stakes of The Congo War, John F. Clark, ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laakso, L. 2002. The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe, In: **Journal of Modern African Studies**, 40, 3.

Lange. 2004. A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals. **Australasian Journal of Philosophy**, 82: 227–41.

Lange, Klaus. 2004. Einführung“. In: *Politische Studien*, Heft 393, 55. Jahrgang, Januar/Februar S. 19-21 .

Lalonde, R. N. & Silverman, R.A. 1994. Behavioural Preferences in Response to Social Injustice: The Effects of Group Permeability and Social Identify Saliience. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66: 78-85.

Lederach, J.-P. 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lee, T.A. 1990. Accounting History and Thought. New York: Garland Publishing Inc.

Leslie, J. Winsome. 1987. The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries: The Case of Zaire. Boulder: L. Rienner.

Leslie, J. Winsome. 1993. Zaire, Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State. San Francisco: Westview.

Lister, Roger, J. 1983. “Accounting as History”. **International Journal of Accounting**, 18(2):49.

Leyvine, R. (1997). Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda. in **Journal of Economic Literature**. 35: 688-726.



- Lewis, S. 1984. Arms Exports for oil import? The test of a Nonlinear Model. In **Journal of Conflict Resolution**. Vol.28. No. 4. P. 154.
- Lichbach, M.I. 1990. Will Rational People Rebel against Inequality? Samson's Choice. **American Journal of Political Science**, 34(4): 1049-1076.
- Lombard, K. 2004. Across the Divides of Perception: The Strategic and Moral Demands of Reparation at the End of the TRC. In Doxtader, E. and Villa Vicencio, C. (Eds.) **To Repair the Irreparable: Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa**. Claremont, David Philip.
- Louis, W.R. 2009. Collective Action-and then What? *Journal of Social Issues*, 65(4): 727-748.
- Luca, P. (2003). Adolescence and youth: Challenges in post-conflict SA. **HSRC review**, 1.
- Lukombe, Nghenda. 1979. Zairianisation, Radicalisation and Retrocession en Republique du Zaire. Kinshasa. Presses Universitaires du Zaire.
- Mabogunje, A. 2000. Institutional Radicalization, the State, and the Development Process in Africa. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA. Vol. 97, No. 25. Pp. 14007-14014.
- MacNulty, M. 1999. The collapse of Zaire: Implosion, revolution or external sabotage? *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1.
- Mamdani, M. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda. Oxford, Kampala & Cape Town: James Currey, Fountain and David Phillip.
- March, James, G., and Olsen, Johan, P. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The organizational basis of politics. New York: The Free Press.
- March, James, G., and Olsen, Johan, P. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational



University of Fort Hare  
 Together in Excellence

factors in political life". *American Political Science Review*, 78:734.

Martin, J. 1986. The Tolerance of Injustice; in J. Olsen, C. Herman & M. Zanna (eds.)

**Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: The Ontario Symposium**,  
vol. 4, pp. 217-242. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Martin, J. 1994. Inequality, Distributive Justice, and Organizational Illegitimacy. In:

**J.K. Murnighan (ed.) Social Psychology in Organizations**. Englewood, Cliffs, N.J.:  
Prentice-Hall.

Martin, J. Brickman, P. & Murray, A. 1986. Moral Outrage and Pragmatism: Explanations for

Collective Action. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 20: 484-496.

Martinussen, J. 1997. Society, state and market. A guide to competing theories of  
development. London: Zed books.

Mayer, C.H. 2004. Artificial Walls: South African Narratives on Conflict, Difference  
and Identity: **An Exploratory Study in Post-Apartheid South Africa**, Stuttgart, ibidem  
Verlag.

Mbambi, Nsundi Pascal. 2006. The Conference Nationale Souveraine in Zaire and  
the Convention for a Democratic South Africa: *A comparative Study through Claude  
Lefort's theory of Democracy*. Master's Dissertation. Johannesburg: University of the  
Witwatersrand. Unpublished.

Mbeki, T. 2003. Statement of President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the  
**Concluding Session of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue**, 2 April 2003. <http://www.gov.za>.

Mbeki, M. 2005. Underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa – The Role of the  
Private Sector and Political Elites. Cato Institute. No. 85. Pp. 1-10.

McCarthy, J.D. & Zald, M.N. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A

Partial Theory. **American Journal of Sociology**, 82: 1212-1241.

McMicheal, P. 1996. **Development and Social change**: A Global Perspective.

Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Merino, Barbara, D. and Mayper, Alan, G. 1993. "**Accounting History and Empirical Research**". **The Accounting Historians Journal**, 20(2): 237.

Merino, Barbara, D. 1998. "**Critical Theory and Accounting History**: Challenges and Opportunities". **Critical Perspectives on Accounting**, 9:603.

Mial, H. Ramsbothan, O. and Woodhouse, T. (2005). **Contemporary conflict resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflict**. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Miller, C. 2005. **A glossary of terms and concepts in peace and conflict studies**. Geneva: University for Peace.

Minhas, BS, 1979. **The current development strategy**. In *Porto Alegre Colloquium, 1979. toward a new strategy for development*. New York: Pergamon Press.

Mines. 2006. **Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo**. Kinshasa.

Mitchell. 1991. **Recognizing Conflict**. In Woodhouse (ed) **Peacemaking in a Troubled World**. Oxford: Berg Publisher.

Mitchell, C. R. 1981. **The Structure of International Conflict**: London, Macmillan.

Mitchell, C. 2002. Problem-Solving. In Cheldelin, S., Druckman, D., Fast, L. (Eds.) **Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention**. London, Continuum.

Mitchell, C. R. 2002. **Beyond Resolution**: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform. In **Peace and Conflict Studies**, 9, 1 - 18.

Mohiddin, Ahmed. 2004. **Innovations in Governance and Public Administration for Poverty Reduction: Overview of Concepts, Issues and Practical Implications**: in United Nations (2004). **Searching for Innovations in Governance and Public Administration for Poverty Reduction: Concepts, Experience and Lessons for the Future**.

- Moghaddam, F.M. Taylor, A.M. & Lalonde, R.N. 1987 **Individualistic and Collective Integration Strategies among Iranians in Canada.** *International Journal of Psychology*, 22: 301- 313.
- Molina, Nuria and Pereira, Javier. 2008. **Critical Conditions: The IMF maintains its Grips on Low-Income Governments.** A Paper. European Network on Debt and Development. April 13, 2008.
- Mommen, André. 1996. **Zaire's Economic Decline and Ill-Fated Liberalization Policies. In Liberalization in the Developing World.** Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto and Andre Mommen, eds. New York: Routledge.
- Moser, C. 1993. **Gender planning and development: theory, practice and training.** London: Routledge.
- Mosha, F. G. N. 1998. **Lessons Learnt From Experiences of Conflict Resolution and Peace Making in Africa - With Special Reference to Somalia.** Paper for A Special Workshop on Conflict Resolution in Africa; Arusha.
- Montville, J.V. 1987. **Track Two Diplomacy: The Development of Non-Governmental, Peace Promoting Relationships.** Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State.
- Montville, J. 1991. **Epilogue: The Human Factor Revisited. In Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies.** New York: Lexington Book.
- Morse, S. 2004. **Indices and indicators in development. An unhealthy obsession with numbers.** London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.
- Mpangala, G.P. 2002. **Conflict in Africa.** Vub University Press: Der-es-Salaam.
- Mpangala, G. 2004. **Origins of Political Conflicts and Peace Building in the Great Lakes**

Region. Institute of Development Studies. University of Dar Es salaam. **Paper presented at a Symposium on Ramifications of Instability in the Great Lakes Zone Arusha:** Unpublished paper (On file with Author).

Muamba-Ntolo Kalambayi. 1980. **Authoritarian Rule and Nation Development: A Case Study of the Dilema and Development in Zaire**. A Ph.D. Dissertation. Albany: University of New York.

Mummendey, A., Kessler, T., Klink, A. & Mielke, R. 1999. Strategies to Cope with Negative Social Identity: Predictions by Social identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory. **Journal of Personality and Social Psychology**, 76: 229– 245.

Mwajiru, M. 2001. **Conflict management in Africa**. Centre for conflict resolution research: Nairobi.

Naniuzeyi, Mabiengwa E. 1999. The State of the State in Congo Zaire: A Survey of the Mobutu Regime. In **Journal of Back Studies**, 29(3): 689-699.

Napier, Christopher, J. 1989. “Research Directions in Accounting History”. **British Accounting Review**, 21(3):237.

Ndaywel E Nzie. 1997. **Histoire du Zaïre. De l’héritage ancien à l’âge contemporain**. Duculot, Louvain-la-Neuve.

Nest, Michael. 2006. **The Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Dimensions of War and Peace**. London: Lynne Rienner.

Nicol, L. 2005. **Ethnic Politics in Nigeria**: the Realities of Regionalism. In Capital Scholar.

Nilsson, Desiree. 2008. Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements. **Journal of Peace Research** 45, no. 4: 479-495.

Nkamany, K. and Baleme, V. 1997. **Pouvoirs et idéologies tribales au Zaïre**. Paris: Karthala.

- Nnoli, O. 1978. **Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu**: Forth Dimension Publishers.
- Nobes, Christopher, and Parker, Robert. 2002. **Comparative International Accounting, 7th Ed.** Harlow: Financial Times/Prentice Hall.
- Nolutshungu, S. 1990. **Fragments of Democracy**: Reflections on Class and Politics in Nigeria. **Third World Quarterly**, 12(1): 86-115.
- North, Douglass, C. 1990. **Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nyerere, J. K. 1997. **Freedom and Development (uhuruna Maendeleo): A selection from writings and speeches 1968-1973**. Oxford University Press. Dar-es-Salaam.
- Nyerere, J. K., 2000. **In the Daily News of June 9, 2000**.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja Georges. 2002. **The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila – A people's history**. Zed Books, London, New York.
- Nzongola, Ntala Georges. 2004. **From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Second and Revised Edition. Current African Issues**, 28. Uppsala : Nordika Afrikainstitut.
- Ogwumike, F.O. 2002. **An Appraisal of Poverty Reduction Strategies in Nigeria**. *CBN Economic and Financial Review*. Vol. 39 No. 4. <http://www.cenbank.org/out/publications/efr/RD/2002/efrvol39-4-4.pdf>.
- Olson, M. 1968. **The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups**. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Olukoshi, A. O. & L. Laakso (eds.) 1996. **Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa**, **Uppsala**: Nordic African Institute.
- Omotola, S. 2006. **The Next Gulf ? Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalypse and Rising**

Tension in the Niger Delta. **Occasional Paper Series: Volume 1, Number 3.**

Onana, Renner and Hannah Taylor. 2008. MONUC and SSR in the Democratic

Republic of Congo. International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (August): 501-516.

Onigu, O and Albert, I. O. (Eds). 1999. Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Onimode, B. 1988. The Political Economy of the African Crisis. London: Zed Books.

Orogun, P. 2004. Hegemony and Hybridization in Modern African States: Democratic

Deficits, Culture Conflicts, and Economic Malaise in South Africa and Nigeria. **Being a Paper Presented at International Studies Association 45th Annual Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 17 – 20 March**

Osaghae, E. 1995. Structural Adjustment and Ethnicity in Nigeria. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute.

Osaghae, E., Isumonah, V. & Albert, I. 1998. Liberalization Policies and the Changing Structures of Legitimacy in Nigeria. A publication of the National Institute of Social and Economic Research. Ibadan: Bummsay Ltd.

Parker, Lee, D. 1997. “Informing Historical Research in Accounting and Management: Traditions, philosophies and opportunities”. **The Accounting Historians Journal,** 24(2):111.

Parsons, Wayne. 1995. Public Policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

Patrick, B. 2005. Elite transition: from apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa. Pietermaritzberg: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press

Peters, B. Guy. 1991. The Politics of Taxation: A comparative perspective.

Cambridge: Blackwell.

Peters, B. Guy. 1998. **Comparative Politics: Theory and methods**. Basingstoke:

Macmillan Press Ltd.

Peters, B. Guy. 1999. **Institutional Theory in Political Science**. London: Pinter.

Picard, L. 1994. **The Challenge of Structural Adjustment**. In Picard, L. and Garrity, M.

(ed.). **Policy Reform For Sustainable Development in Africa: The Institutional Imperative**. Colorado. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Pp. 1-18.

Pierson, Paul. 1993. "When Effect Becomes Cause: Political feedback and political change". **World Politics**, 45(4):595.

Pierson, Paul. 1994. **Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pierson, Paul., and Skocpol, Theda. 2000. **Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science**. Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Meetings, Washington D.C., August 2000.

Pierson, Paul. 1996. "The Path to European Integration: A historical institutionalist analysis". **Comparative Political Studies**, 29(2):123.

Post, K. & Vickers, M. 1973. **Structure and Conflict in Nigeria**. Bungay, Suffolk: The Chaucer Press Ltd.

Pourtier, Roland (1997): **Du Zaïre au Congo: un territoire en quête d'Etat: in Afrique contemporaine, n°183, pp.7-30.**

Previts, Gary, J., and Bricker, Robert. 1994. "Fact and Theory in Accounting History: Presentmindedness and capital market research". **Contemporary Accounting Research**, 10(2):625.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

- Przeworski, Adam, and Teune, Henry. 1970. **The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry**. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Przeworski, A, Alvarez, and Michael, E. 2000. **Democracy and Development: Political institutions and Well-being in the World**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rabie, M. 1994. **Conflict Resolution and ethnicity**. Praeger: London.
- Radin, Charles A. 2000. **Critics Say IMF, World Bank Leave Struggling Nations Dependent**, *Global Policy Forum* <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwiwto/wbank/bwi00-1.htm> Accessed on 23/11/2008.
- Ragin, Charles, C., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., and de Meur, Gisele. 1996. **Political Methodology: Qualitative methods**. In R Goodin and H-D Klingemann (Eds) **A New Handbook of Political Science**. Oxford University Press.
- Rasheed, S. 1996. **Development, Participation, and Democracy in Africa**. South Africa. Africa Institute of South Africa and Foundation for Global Dialogue.
- Reitsma, H. A. and Kleinpenning, J. M. G. 1989. **The Third World in Perspective**. Assen: SCM.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1965. **History and Truth**. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Rist, G. 1997. **The History of Development**. London: Zed Books.
- Robinson, J.A. 2005. **Social Identity, Inequality and Conflict**. *Econ. Gov.* 2: 85-99.
- Romano, A., 1998, **Peace is Possible: Lessons From the Mozambique Peace Process**, **Paper for the Workshop on Learning From Conflict Resolution in Africa**, held in Arusha, Tanzania.
- Ross, R. 1993. **The Culture of Conflict**, New Haven: Yale University.

Ross, M. 1993. Action Evaluation in the Theory and Practice of Conflict Resolution.

**Peace and Conflict Studies.**

Ross, M. 1996. Management of conflict: Interpretations and interests in comparative perspective. New Haven: Yale.

Ross, M. H. 2004. Some Guidelines for Conceptualizing Success in Conflict Resolution Evaluation. **Peace and Conflict Studies**, 11, 1 - 18.

Rothenberg, S. & Scully, M. & Zang, T. 2008. Mobilization of the Wealthy to Contest Income Inequality. Paper Presented at the 13<sup>th</sup> Annual International Association of Business and Society, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.

Rothschild and Groth, A. 1995. Pathological Dimension of Domestic and International Ethnicity. **In Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 110, No1.

Rothstein, Bo. 1996. Political Institutions: An overview. In R. Goodin and H-D

Rubenstein, Richard E. and Frank O. Ojelema. 1999. Introduction: Conflict Resolution and Social Justice: in Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 1-7.

Rummel, R.J. 1993. Dimensions of conflict behaviour within nation. **In Journal of conflict Resolution**. Vol. 10. No 2. p. 65-73.

Runciman W G. 1966. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Ryan, S. 1990. Ethnic Conflict and international Relations. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Salin, P. 2004. The Illusion of Development Assistance. African Geopolitics. No. 13. Paris. Or.Ima International. Pp. 57-65.

Sarkin, J. 2001. Towards Finding a Solution for the Problem Created by the Politics of Identity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Designing Constitutional Framework for Peaceful Cooperation. Conference paper at the

University of Pretoria on 25–26 July 2001,  
available at <[http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/32/2/year-2001/dokument\\_id-5094/index.html](http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/32/2/year-2001/dokument_id-5094/index.html)> last visited, September 8, 2009.

Schwab, P. 2001. Africa: **A Continent Self-Destructs**. New York. Palgrave.

Schwarzwald, J., Kedam, P. & Fisher, S. 1996. **Inter-Group Perception of Israeli and Russian Migrant Students**. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 20(3/4): 427- 440.

Sandbrook, Richard (1985) **The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Sayer, A. 1992. **Method in Social Science: A Realistic Approach**. London: Routledge.

Sachs, JD, 2005. **The end of poverty. Economic possibilities of our time**. New York: Penguin Press.

Selznick, Philip. 1996. **"Institutionalism Old and New"**. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41(2):270.

Sen, AK. 1999. **Development as freedom**. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shepelak, N.J. & Alwin, D.F., 1986. **Beliefs about Inequality and Perceptions of Distributive Justice**. *American Sociological Review*, 51: 30-46.

Sills, David, E. 1968. **International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 14**. London: The Macmillan Company.

Singer, R. 2000. **"Militias Fracture in Nigerian Society"**, *The Christian Science Monitor*, Special (March 14, 2000). Accessed @ <http://csmweb2.emcweb.com/2001/03/14/fp6s1csm.shtml>.

Skocpol, Theda. 1985. **Bringing the State Back In**: Strategies of analysis in current

research. In P Evans, D Rueschemeyer and T Skocpol (Eds) **Bringing the State Back In**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1992. **Protecting Soldiers and Mothers**: The political origins of social policy in the United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Smith, H., Cronin, T. & Kessler, T. 2008. **Anger, Fear, or Sadness**: Faculty Members' Emotional Reactions to Collective Pay Disadvantage. **Political Psychology**, 29: 221-246.

Snyder, J. 1993. **Of Citizenship and Citizenship**. **The Tempo**, Lagos, September-October.

Spies, C. and Sonjica, N. 2006. **South Africa's National Peace Accord**: Its structures and Functions. IN Barnes, C. Eds. **Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking**. Conciliation Resources.

Stake, Robert, E. 2000. **Case Studies**. In N Denzin and Y Lincoln (Eds) **Handbook of Qualitative Research** 3rd Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Stanford, Michael. 1986. **The Nature of Historical Knowledge**. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Inc.

Stedman, S. 1996. **Conflict and conciliation in sub-Saharan Africa**. In **The international dimensions of internal conflict**, ed. M. Brown. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen, and Longstreth, Frank. 1992. **Structuring Politics**: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steinmo, Sven. 1993. **Taxation and Democracy**: Swedish, British and American approaches to financing the modern state. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Steinmo, Sven., and Tolbert, Caroline, J. 1998. **Do Institutions Really Matter?** Taxation

in Industrialized Democracies". **Comparative Political Studies**, 31(2):165.

Steinmo, Sven. 2008b. What Should the State Do? A political economy of ideas and

Institutions. In J Campbell and P Naargard (Eds) **Institutions and Politics**. Copenhagen: DJOF Press.

Stewart, F. 2003. Conflict and the Millennium Development Goal. In **Journal of Human Development**. Vol. 4. No 3. February. Pp. 325-351.

Stockwell, Edward G. and Karen A. Laidlaw. 1981. Third World Development: Problem and Prospects. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Storr, A. 1968. Human aggression. New York: Atheneum.

Stürmer, S. & Simon, B. 2009. Pathways to Collective Protests: Calculations,

Identification or Emotion? A Critical Analysis of the Role of Group-Based Anger in Social Movement Participation. **Journal of Social Issues**, 65(4): 681-705.

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Streeten, PP. 1979. Development ideas in historical perspective. in Rothko Chapel

Colloquium. 1979. Toward a new strategy for development. New York: Pergamon Press.

The Southern Sudan Foundation, 1997, The Sudan Peace Agreement, London.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. 1979. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In: W.G. Austin, & S. Worchel (eds.) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, pp. 33–37. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H. 1982. Human Groups and Social Categories. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In: S. Worchel & W.G. Austin (eds.), **The Psychology of Intergroup Relations**.

Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tamara, D. 2000. Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping. In Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds., **Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution**. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Taylor, D.M. & Mckirman, D.J. 1984. **A Five Stage Model of Intergroup Relations**. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 23: 291-300.

Taylor, D. M., Moghaddam, F. M., Gamble, I. & Zellerer, E. 1987. **Disadvantaged Group Responses to Perceived Inequality: From Passive Acceptance to Collective Action**. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 127: 259-272.



Thelen, Kathleen, and Steinmo, Sven. 1992. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. In S Steinmo, K Thelen & Longstrech (eds) **Structuring Politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics". **Annual Review of Political Science**, 2:369.

Thompson, J.B. 1984. **Studies in the Theory of Ideology**. Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Thompson, L. 2000. **Theoretical Approaches to Security and Development**. ISS Monograph No. 50.

Torfiging, Jacob. 2001. "Path-Dependent Danish Welfare Reforms: The contribution of

the new institutionalisms to understanding evolutionary change". **Scandinavian Political Studies**, 24(4):277.

Tougas, F., Brown, R., Beaton, A. & St-Pierre, L. 1999. **Neosexism among Women**: The Role of Personally Experienced Social Mobility Attempts. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25(12): 1487 – 1497.

Tropp, L.R. & Brown, A.C. 2004. **What Benefits the Group Can Also Benefit The Individual**: Group Enhancing and Individual Enhancing Motives For Collective Action. **Group Processes Intergroup Relations**, 7: 267-282.

Tshitereke, C. (2003). **The Origins of War in Africa**: In *African Security Review*, vol. 12 No. 2, pp.81-90.

Tshimanga, Charles. 1997. **Notes sur les élites au Congo/Zaire depuis l'époque colonial**. In *Congo-Afrique*, vol. 37, n°318, pp. 453-468.

Turner, Thoms. 2007. **The Congo War: Conflict, Myth and Reality**. London: Zed Books.

Ukiwo, U. 2005. **On the Study of Ethnicity in Nigeria**. CRISE Working Paper, No.12.

United Nations. 2001. **Report of the Expert Panel on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the D.R.C.**, S/2001/357. New York.

Utterwulghe, S. 1999. **Rwanda's protracted Social Conflict**: Considering the subjective perspective in conflict resolution Strategy: **Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution**. Issue 2-3 August.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 1995. **Human Development Report 1995**. New York: Oxford University Press.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2001. **Road map toward the**

**implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration**, United Nations

General Assembly A/56/326. <http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml>.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2005. **The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005**. New York: UNDP.

[http://www.mdgender.net/resources/monograph\\_detail.php?MonographID=39](http://www.mdgender.net/resources/monograph_detail.php?MonographID=39).

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2006d. **Timeline: progress against Gender violence**.

UNDP : « **Rapport Mondial sur le Développement Humain** ». Economica, La Découverte, New York, Paris, 2002, 2005, 2006 et 2007/8.

Uvin. P *et al.* 2005. **Regional Solutions to Regional Problems: The Elusive Search for the Security in the African Great Lakes**. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 29 No.2.



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

<http://www.undp.org/rblac/gender/history.htm> Accessed 17 December 2006.

van Stekelenburg, J. Klandermans, B. & van Dijk, W. 2009. **Context Matters: Explaining how and why Mobilizing Context Influences Motivational Dynamics**. **Journal of Social Issues**, 65: 815-838.

Van Aardt, M. 1997. 'The emerging security framework for Southern Africa: Regime or Community'. **Strategic Review for Southern Africa**. XIX.


Van, Acker F. and Vlassenroot, K., 2000. **Youth and conflict in Kivu: Komona clair**, *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, <<http://www.jha.ac/greatlakes/b004.htm>>.

Varshney, A. 2002. **Ethnic Conflicts and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India**. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Vansina, Jan. 1991. **Paths in the Rainforests**. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Vansina, Jan. 1991. **Sur les sentiers du passé en forêt: Le cheminement de la tradition politique ancienne de l'Afrique équatoriale, Enquêtes et documents d'histoire africaine**, n° 9. (Louvain: Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve).

van Zomeren, M., Leach, C.W., & Spears, R. 2010. **Does Group Efficacy Increase Group Identification?** Resolving the Paradoxical Relationship. **Journal of Experimental Social Psychology**, XXX, 1-6.



Volkan, Vamik. 1991. **The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Tools of Unofficial Diplomacy**. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books

University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

Wallerstein, I. 1979. **The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: concepts**

for comparative analysis (1979). In Roberts, JT & Hite, A, 2000. **From modernisation to globalisation**. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Wallerstein, I, 1999. **The end of the world as we know it**. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Walster, E., Walster, G.W. & Berscheid, E. 1978. **Equity: Theory and Research**. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Wanyande, P. 1997. **State driven conflict in the greater Horn of Africa**. Revised paper presented at the USAID Organized workshop on conflict in the Great Horn of Africa May 21-23. Methodist House: Nairobi.

Weaver, R.K., and Rockman, B.A. 1993. **Do Institutions Matter? Government capabilities in the United States and abroad**. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

- Willis, K. 2005. **Theories and Practices of development**. Rutledge perspective on development. London: Routledge.
- Willame Jean Claude. 1994. **Chronique d'une opposition politique : l'UDPS 1978-1987**. CEDAF, Bruxelles.
- Willame Jean Claude. 1997. **L'Automne d'un despotisme : pouvoir, argent et obeissance dans le Zaïre des années quatre-vingt**. ». Karthala, Paris.
- Willame, Jean-Claude (1997): **Understanding the Unending Crisis in Zaire**. In **United States Institute of Peace**. Zaire. Predicament and Prospects. Peace works no 11 Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace. pp. 1-22.
- Williams, Rowan. 2006. **Speech on Penal Policy**, at Worcester Cathedral, Monday 17th July 2006. Worcester, UK. <http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/710>.
- Wilungula B. Cosma. 1997. **Fiji 1967-1986, Le Maquis Kabila**. Cahiers Africains, CEDAF– L'Harmattan, Bruxelles.
- Wimmer, Hannes. 2000. **Die Modernisierung Politischer Systeme**. Wien.
- Wimmer, A. 2001. **Modernization as a case of Transformation in Elwert**, G., Kohli, M. Krauth, W. H. And Shelkle, W. (eds). **Paradigms of Social Change: Modernization, development, transformation, evolution**. FrankFurt: Campus. 77-89.
- White, Jay, D. 1994. **On the Growth of Knowledge in Public Administration**. In J White and G Adams (Eds) **Research in Public Administration: Reflections on theory and practice**. London: Sage Publications.
- Woodhouse, Tom. **"Critiques of Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping"** In **Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution**, edited by Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, 269 s. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
- World Bank. **Report**. 1999

World Bank. *Report*. 2003.

Wright, S., Donald, T. & Moghaddam, F. 1990. Responding to Membership in a Disadvantaged Group: From acceptance to Collective Protest. **Journal of Personality and Social Psychology**, 6: 994-1003.

Wrong, Michael. 2002. In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz. London: Fourth Estate.

Yabili, Yalala Asani. n.d. Code de la Zairianisation: Recueil de Textes et Règlements des Décisions du 30 novembre 1973 et du 30 décembre 1974. Lubumbashi : Mwango-Hebo.

Yahaya, A. and Bur, A. 1994. Nigeria: Civil Service Reform and Development. In Picard, L. and Garrity, M. (ed.). **Policy Reform For Sustainable Development in Africa: The Institutional Imperative**. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Pp. 37-50.



University of Fort Hare

*Together in Excellence*

Zack-Williams, T. 2002. Africa at the Millennium. In Zack-Williams, T., Frost, D., and

Thomson, A. (ed.). **Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities**. London. Pluto Press. Pp. 1-14.

Zelditch, M., Jr. & Walker, H. A. 1984. Legitimacy and the Stability of Authority.

**Advanced Group Processes 1: 1–25.**

## Online sources

Human Rights Watch Country Report on the DRC

<http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl>

<http://www.humanrightswatch.org/doc?t=africa&c=congo>

Arms Trade Resource Centre: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War

<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm>

Amnesty International: Republic of Congo-A Past that Haunts the Future

<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR220012003>

CBC News: Democratic Republic of the Congo Timeline

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/congo/>



University of Fort Hare  
*Together in Excellence*

## 2. Appendices

### Appendix A

Figure 1: Model of Collective Action Encompassing RD, SIT, and FSM.

### Appendix B

#### Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo

