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**South Africa-based diaspora movements and the pursuit of
democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe**



BY

SITEMBISO IRENE NDLOVU

201407671

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Social Science (Political Science)**

Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

Department of Political Science and International Relations

SUPERVISOR: DR V.B. FERIM

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DECLARATION

I, Sitembiso Irene Ndlovu, student number 201407671, hereby declare that the study is my original work and that all sources of references have been acknowledged by means of complete referencing. This thesis has not been submitted, at any university for a similar or any other degree.

Sitembiso Irene Ndlovu

Signature



29 /March/ 2019

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Date

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Diaspora movements who continue to fight for the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe.



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ABSTRACT

The study investigates South Africa-based Diaspora movements and their pursuit of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe. The study is a qualitative one and made use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included in-depth interviews, Facebook and Twitter posts, whilst secondary sources included textbooks and online journals. The study is premised on both the Political Process and Critical Theories. The study acknowledges that CSOs in general are important key players and have been identified as one of the major actors capable of helping in consolidating democracy. Zimbabwean Diaspora movements have been on the rise due to the mass exodus of its citizens to South Africa following economic collapse and civil strife in the country. The study found out that the civil society and political space in Zimbabwe is mired by partisan use of state security forces, repressive legislations, abuse of human rights and politicisation of the judicial system. These notwithstanding, the study reveals ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have played their part in trying to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe from their base in South Africa. They have employed various strategies and these include submitting petitions, advocacy and lobbying, partnerships and dialogues and making use of the Social media. Some of the breakthroughs recorded include educating Zimbabweans and disseminating information through social media, raising awareness and contributing to policy formation. The study, however, notes that apart from their achievements, they have also faced challenges like inadequate resources, xenophobia, leadership crises and donor fatigue. Key findings inferred that strategies used did not yield desired outcomes, and challenges faced made consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe a daunting task. The study recommends that partnerships between the Zimbabwean government and Diaspora movements need to be introduced and sustained in a way that catalyses a relationship where discussions can take place for democracy to be consolidated in Zimbabwe without any form of hostility from the government.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
AU	African Union
BSA	Broadcasting Services Act
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CiZC	Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSOs	civil society organisations
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
GNU	Government of National Unity
GYU	Gambia Youth for Unity
ICC	International Criminal Court
JOC	Joint Operations Command
LOMA	Law and Order Maintenance Act
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NGOs	non-governmental organisations
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NSM	new social movements
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
PPT	political process theory
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPS	South African Police Service



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UN	United Nations
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Force
ZEF	Zimbabwe Exiles Forum
ZINASU	Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZRYM	Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement
ZSF	Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum



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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Since 1990, most African countries have embraced democracy although with different levels of practice. Accordingly, elections that ensure participatory democracy have been held every four or five years in most African states. Despite this, the democratic terrain in the continent is uneven. There are thriving democracies in states like Mauritius and Botswana, while some are almost degenerating into tyranny in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. This has led some countries to try and consolidate their democracy. The consolidation of democracy begins when a political transition takes place which is normally marked by the installation of a new government as a result of free and fair elections. For a democratic government to be consolidated, it depends on the acceptance by all political actors and a set of political rules including the holding of regular free and fair elections. Although free and fair elections held in Africa do not provide for all the key components of a democracy as components like political equality, human rights and press freedom, among others, are sometimes ignored or overlooked (Cilliers, 2016:2). Therefore, if some key components of democracy are limited it becomes difficult to consolidate democracy.

For African countries to be able to consolidate democracy, there are about five interrelated and equally strengthening conditions that should be met. Firstly, the conditions must exist for development of a free and lively civil society. Secondly, there

must be a fairly independent political society. Thirdly, there must be a rule of law which guaranties citizens their freedom and independent associational life. Fourthly, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Last but not least, there must be an institutionalised economic society (Linz & Stephan in Lubinga, 2014:34). Democratic consolidation depends on the above-mentioned requirements, a commitment which is critical for democracy to thrive.

According to Ibrahim (2015:25), democratic consolidation includes a wide range of requirements including, among others, “reform of state institutions, accountability and transparency of institutions, the strengthening of civil society, division of powers, horizontal and vertical accountability, political culture and democratic socialisation, pluralism and economic freedom”. This can only be achieved when democracy is the only form of governance adopted. On the other hand, Lee (2007:103) stated that democratic consolidation is the “process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition into relations of cooperation and competitions that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectives that participate in democratic governance”. This means that democratic consolidation is achieved when power is allowed to be alternated between or among rivals and there is continuous support of the system despite who is in power at that time.

To achieve a consolidated democracy, the necessary degree of independence of civil and political society must further be rooted in and sustained by the rule of law. The government must respect and uphold the rule of law. Gazibo (2016:34) asserted that

“adherence to the rule of law is one of the most critical indicators of democratic governance. It implies proper use of state power and authority, which ideally are grounded in respect for human rights and high standards of governance, with mechanisms in place to limit arbitrary or authoritative use of power”. The consolidation of democracy is assured if there is a legal structure which has strong roots in civil society and is respected by the state apparatus too. All these factors must be able to support the democratic process especially elections, and electoral processes which is periodic and should be in obedience with the constitution. More than ever, elections and electoral processes, popular participation in governance and constitutionalism are all part of consolidating democracy.



The historic development of African continent has witnessed the transition from the period of transatlantic slavery and then colonialism to the current migration narrative. Globalisation has led to the interaction of Africa and the rest of the world, consequently transcending the boundaries of Africa. This has led to why Africans migrating to other parts of the world now constitute as African diaspora movements (Falola, 2013:1). The term diaspora has been the subject of contentious debate and definitions, the term diasporas applied mainly to Jews and their historical displacement and longing for their own homeland, followed by the Greek and Armenians (Baser, 2016:17). Currently, the term diaspora is used in its more generic sense with reference to any displaced group of people who shared a sense of identity and a connection to their original homeland (Chikezie, 2011:261). For this study, the researcher has adopted Safran's six criteria definition of diaspora. Safran in Baser (2016:17) defined diaspora as “dispersed groups

from an original centre to at least two peripheral places, that maintain a memory or myth about their homeland, that believe they are not fully accepted by their host country, that see the ancestral homeland as a place of return when the time is right, that are committed to the maintenance, safety and prosperity of the homeland and, that have group consciousness and solidarity”.

African diasporas have increasingly become important players in the international political arena. Many states have been recognising the massive contributions their diasporas make economically or politically. Economically, migrant-sending states have been benefiting through remittances. Politically, diaspora movements may lobby host countries to shape policies in favour of homeland issues or to challenge a homeland government. The African Union (AU) has been committed to engaging the diaspora and to make them its cornerstone for African integration and enhancing development in the continent (Ogom, 2009:166).



Zimbabwe is one of the countries in Africa that has a substantial number of people who have migrated to other parts of the world. During the first decade of the millennium, political and economic challenges prompted mass emigration of Zimbabweans. In the early stages of the millennium, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government started a wave of land transfers from white farmers to its war veterans. Alongside this, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), formed in 1999, challenged Mugabe's hold on power (Betts et al., 2016:51). By the year 2000, this further led to the ruling ZANU-PF experiencing one of its major challenges as the economy declined; erosion of rule of law and government became more hostile


towards local critics and CSOs. In addition, the ruling party became more oppressive and human rights abuses escalated as evident in violent election campaigns. Consequently, international sanctions were imposed by the West, capital flight thrived, agricultural productivity declined, and hyper-inflation and high unemployment rates soared. All these problems combined caused living standards to plunge resulting in a massive exodus of Zimbabweans to other countries (Eliassen, 2014:16).

This resulted in a rise of Zimbabwean diaspora movements across the world, their membership is drawn from people who have migrated voluntarily or involuntarily to other countries. Some of these movements attended to the welfare of vulnerable groups, e.g. Zimbabwe Refugee Association. Others were overtly political and opposed the current regime, e.g. Global Zimbabwe Forum; whilst some are focused on development, e.g. Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber (Crush et al, 2015:230). The goals of these diaspora movements were thus multifaceted including: achieving democratic consolidation that was to usher a democratic dispensation where human dignity and civil liberties are respected in Zimbabwe; to fight for the rule of law; and to publicly condemn human rights abuses through demonstrations and petitions helping to achieve democratic consolidation. However, many of these diaspora movements were mainly based in South Africa, the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, among other countries, and they have been involved in pushing for democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.

1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

At the core of democratic consolidation, diaspora movements have been identified as one of the major actors capable of helping in consolidating democracy in Africa. Zimbabwean diaspora movements have been on the rise due to the mass exodus of its citizens following economic collapse and civil strife in the country. Most of its citizens migrated to South Africa and are still yearning to go back and live in Zimbabwe. As a result, this study is motivated by the need to comprehend the role that South Africa-based diaspora movements are playing in their pursuit to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM



The repressive political climate and restrictive freedom in Zimbabwe have necessitated the growth of diaspora movements. They are important platforms that can play an important role in the consolidation of democracy in the country. In spite of this, diaspora movements are under-researched with regards to the contribution that they can play in consolidating democracy. These movements are excellent avenues for citizens to engage with the government, given the years of one-man / party rule, the restrictive freedom stifled political space in Zimbabwe. Scholarly works like those of Robin Cohen and Patrick Manning, among others, are from an economic perspective and very few talk about the diaspora and their political contribution. The most striking gap in other works is the failure to acknowledge the role they play politically. The primary focus is on the positive contribution of diasporan remittances to Zimbabwe's economy. The United

Nations Development Programme (2010:37) states that “cognisant of the potential contribution of the diaspora to national development efforts, the government of Zimbabwe has over the years undertaken a number of initiatives to engage the diaspora to invest in the country”. This study argues that the view is inadequate as it fails to also capture the political importance of the diaspora, for instance challenging dominant hegemonic structures in Zimbabwe.

However, this role can best be played in an environment that provides space for civil society groups to freely operate and where observance of liberal democratic principles such as rule of law and freedom of speech are the norm. Given South African reputation as having one of the most progressive constitutions in the world (Mubangizi, 2006), and its proximity to Zimbabwe, it provides an excellent opportunity to study Zimbabwean diaspora movements. The study thus examined the role of South Africa-based diaspora movements including Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC), Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (ZEF) and Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement (ZRYM) in the quest for the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What are the strategies employed by the South Africa-based diaspora movements in enhancing democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe?
- How has the strategies employed by diaspora movements, been successful in promoting the cause of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe?

- What challenges have diaspora movements encountered in achieving democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe?

1.5 AIM OF THE STUDY

The main aim of the study was to investigate the role played by South Africa-based diaspora movements in their pursuit of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.

1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of the study were as follows:

- To explore the strategies of the South Africa-based diaspora movements in order to enhance democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.
- To discuss successes recorded by these diaspora movements in their quest for the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe.
- To discuss challenges encountered by South Africa-based diaspora movements with regard to achieving democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study notes that even though there is an abundance of literature on diaspora movements, little research has been conducted on the role of the South African based movements in consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe. Moreover, no prior studies have been carried out particularly on the groups of movements selected for this study.

Therefore, this study makes an original contribution to knowledge within the field of diaspora's contributions politically especially in South Africa and Zimbabwe as it identifies strategies used, successes recorded and challenges faced by these movements in their quest to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe. The study ascertains whether these movements have been able to transform at least certain aspects of the democracy like freedom of speech, association, etc. This study is therefore of importance to students, researchers, non-governmental organisation (NGO) communities and policymakers alike. To enhance the significance of this study, the thesis will be available on the University of Fort Hare's online institutional repository. It is also hoped that journal articles will be published from the findings of this study.



1.8 ORGANISATION OF THE FINAL CHAPTERS

Chapter One provides the introduction as well as the background of the study. The statement of the problem, research questions, aim, and objectives are discussed, followed by the significance of the study and delimitations of the study.

Chapter Two presents a comprehensive literature review on issues pertaining to the origins and conceptualisation of CSOs, prevalence of CSOs in Africa, CSOs and the consolidation of democracy, rise of Zimbabwean diaspora movements, strategies used by diaspora movements and challenges faced by diaspora movements. This is achieved by including secondary data from journals, books, and articles which give insight on what has already been written on the topic. Also, it incorporates and discusses the theoretical framework on which the study is premised.

Chapter Three discusses the research methodology used for the study.


Chapter Four explores the state of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.

Chapter Five explores the interventions employed by selected diaspora movements in order to enhance democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.

Chapter Six examines successes recorded by these diaspora movements in their quest to enhance democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.

Chapter Seven focuses on the challenges encountered by these diaspora movements with regard to achieving democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.

Chapter Eight presents the summary of findings, contribution to knowledge, conclusion, and recommendations of the study.



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1.9 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided background information on the history and nature of the research problem and indicated the rationale of the study. Also in this chapter, the research questions, aim, objectives, the significance of the study and the organisation of the final report have been outlined. The next chapter presents a detailed literature review and the theoretical framework which guided the study.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter gave an overview of the study and what the subsequent chapters cover. As stated, this chapter looks at the literature review and theoretical framework respectively. A literature review provides knowledge and ideas that have been established in a particular study, as well as their strengths and weaknesses. Above all, it helps position one's study within the body of literature. Booth et al. (2016:11) stated that the purpose of literature review is “to identify, select and appraise studies of a previously agreed level of quality that are relevant to a particular question. It generally gives the most trustworthy answer to a specific review question and it can identify gaps in our knowledge that require further research. It also communicates the strength of the available evidence and the quality of included studies”. This chapter provides an appraisal of related literature on origins and conceptualisation of CSOs in general and their prevalence in Africa, how they have consolidated democracy, strategies used and challenges faced. Then the last sections of this chapter explain the theoretical framework. Strauss in Anfara et al. (2014: no page) said a theory “provides a model or map of why the world is the way it is, it is aimed at clarifying and explaining some aspect of how the world works”.

2.2 ORIGINS AND CONCEPTUALISATION OF CSOs

The concept of civil society can be traced back to the age of enlightenment and the ideas and thoughts of many political thinkers, among them Locke, Montesquieu, Hobbes, Ferguson, Marx, de Tocqueville and Gramsci. They have conceptualised 'civil society' in different ways, making it a contested concept in academic literature. Ferguson linked the notion to the development and tied its emergence to the decline of despotism and the corrupt feudal order. Masterson (2006:3) said "Ferguson did not make a distinction between the state and civil society, relating his concept far more closely to the market, other theorists sought to refine his theories to understand the emerging phenomenon of civic activism which began to emerge in Europe at the time of French and Industrial Revolution".



On the other hand, Walzer in Edwards (2011:4) described civil society as “the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market”. Civil society transcends market forces and broadens the scope of civil society because it does not only embody markets but also corporations. These corporations are related with social, religious, welfare agencies, educational institutions and professional bodies concerned with civic purposes (Jaysawal, 2013:2). Pelezynski in Monaghan (2012:41) elaborated further and stated that civil society is “an arena in which modern man legitimately gratifies his self-interest and develops his individuality, but also learns the value of group action, social solidarity and the dependence of his welfare on others”. Civil society is considered not a

subsidiary unit of the state but a third independent unit that helps the state in upholding governance and rule of law (Jaysawal, 2013:2). Masterson (2006:4) argued that “John Locke and Thomas Hobbes asserted that the state is in some sense accountable to and therefore should be identified with civil society, although the two should not be seen as identical. Marxist like Antonio Gramsci argues that civil society should be understood outside of the power of the state, whilst de Tocqueville’s liberal philosophy argued that civil society should be understood in at least partial if not significant opposition to the state”.

The London School of Economics gives one of the most comprehensive definitions of civil society. According to the London School of Economics (2006: no page), civil society refers to



the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family, and market, though, in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy, and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.

In short, CSOs are located in the public domain, their actions are often directed at the state and they help generate civic engagement and participation for democratic stability.

CSOs includes, among others, social movements, student unions, volunteer

associations, political parties, trade unions, faith communities, private foundations and non-profit organisations (Awiti, 2016). The next section is an overview of how CSOs became prevalent in the African continent.

2.3 PREVALENCE OF CSOs IN AFRICA

2.3.1 Pre-colonial and colonial period

The relationship between the state and civil society in Africa traces its roots to the pre-colonial period. During the pre-colonial era, Africa mainly relied on traditional leadership and monarchs who believed in doing things collectively as a civil society, which shows that a civil society did exist but might not have been common. The main reason why CSOs were in existence but not that prevalent in pre-colonial period is that traditional leaders were not elected by anyone but were born leaders, inherited or appointed by rulers and could not be challenged. Civil society at that point did not need to be as actively involved in the selection of leaders as it does in the democratic systems of governance that are now dominant in Africa. Makumbe in Zalanga (2018:52) elucidated that “in pre-colonial Africa, civil society and civil society organisations did not exist in the strict sense of the term, except for a few instances where there was wide political consultation before decisions were made. This notwithstanding, most leaders in pre-colonial Africa inherited their positions instead of campaigning for it as we know it in the modern sense”. Pre-colonial African political systems upheld the participation of civil society when it came to major decision making in their communities.

Khosla (2006:65) articulated that "pre-colonial African political systems recognised the role of popular participation in decision-making and governance. Some African societies can be argued to have had consensual political systems which required that major decisions be made only after widespread consultation among the people". This showed the collectivism of community members; however, in other communities leaders would decide on when discussions with the people were necessary and what the subject of discussion would be. Bradshaw et al. (2000:94) reiterated that "the Chief, for the most part, determined when consultation took place and the topics to be discussed". The pre-colonial period had a distinct civil society because almost everything was done as a community, collectively.



During the pre-colonial period, civil society remained mainly undeveloped, informal and socio-economic in focus. The primary aim was to help overcome obstacles and make the environment habitable and survivable. Participation by community members was limited to controlling their natural environment and promoting shared values. Thus, Opoku-Mensah in Wamucii (2014:109) insisted that "civil society as it existed in the pre-colonial period in Africa was composed of community institutions, including self-help and solidarity groups whose primary objective was to cultivate solidarity among members and promote the development of groups or individuals". Traditional civil society in the pre-colonial period existed in communities of shared values where burial groups and conflict management groups among others existed (CIVICUS, 2011:19). Wamucii (2014:109) gave an example of how civil society developed in Africa; she said "Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, reveals that a combination of kinship, age groups,

lineages, self-help groups, trade associations, and communal labour groups were a part of the social fabric in pre-colonial times". This is the civil society that existed in Africa in pre-colonial times where everything was mostly done as a collective; action was based on shared interests for the good and growth of the community. Therefore, without doubt, civil society did exist because of their social organisation but it was not that prevalent then.

Colonisation led to a significant turn in the changes of African societies. The colonial era, as a vehicle of modernism, caused a fundamental reformation of Africa's socio-political and economic systems (Neubert, 2014:14). The colonial period by its nature was not tolerant of civil society; instead, it was hostile to any form of criticism or opposition. This is because it opened through a colonial state which was subjective and violent to the people. Fadakinte (2015:136) asserted that "the colonial state was repressive through an authoritarian government that was distant from the people". As a result, the African colonial society was a unit which was comprised of different ethnic groups brought together by colonialism which was different from the prehistoric societies. The uncertain nature and under-development of civil society in much of Africa is the consequence of the colonial origins of the African states and the mixed and divided societies that subsequently emerged (Lewis, 2002:48).

Khosla (2006:65) stated that during the colonial period "indigenous chambers of commerce, professional associations, such as those representing teachers, nurses, lawyers amongst others, small farmer organisations, and student associations and labour unions were founded to spearhead specific organisational interests". Thus, a civil

society had emerged that later provided a critical mass support to the independence movements. This shows that civil society in Africa has been in existence because most leaders of independence movements were actually products of these various CSOs mentioned above that were of a different nature. The oppressive and unruly nature of the colonial state stimulated the transformation of African civil society. The colonial states ruled racially defined citizens who were bound by rule of law and were also under political and economic coercion (Mamdani, 1996). In Zalanga's (2018:53) view "the colonial state excluded African civil society from being active participants in the modern colonial government. Modern educated African elites and urban middle classes organised and formed social movements that challenged the hegemonic and authoritarian mode of governance of the colonial state which excluded Africans". The quest for democracy and good governance was the fundamental element behind the growth, prevalence and transformation of civil society activity in Africa (Orji, 2009:85).



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During colonial rule, African civil societies were once again bereft of their own. There were ethnic divisions, tribalism that consequently led to the severe fragmentation of the civil society (Datzberger, 2016:84). This was something that the colonisers wanted and achieved because they did manage to divide the civil society. This enabled the colonisers to have hegemony over their subjects and consolidate their powers. Mamdani in Helliker (2012:4) suggested that under colonialism "civil society was spatially restricted to the urban centres, existing amongst both white colonizers and indigenous petty-bourgeois elements". Colonial governments throughout Africa destroyed most of the civic groups and organisations. These civic groups were viewed

with suspicion by the colonial rulers, who feared that they could be instrumental in mobilising the colonised against the colonisers (Zhou, 2014:50).

Bratton in Tar (2009:42) said "Africans invented forms of voluntary associations during the colonial period as a response to the disruptive impact of urbanisation and commercialization". Many of these voluntary associations became openly political by giving voice to and protesting against the indignities of colonial rule, and later called for independence. This shows the prevalence of CSOs and how they challenged their colonial masters during the colonial era.

2.3.2 Post-colonial period

The post-colonial period saw quite a number of African states gaining national independence. One would have expected that independence gained would open up space for CSOs to bloom. However, this was not the case in Africa. Most states were either under a one-party system or under military dictatorship and both systems were hostile to dissenting voices. For African states that were under a military dictatorship, it was a result of violent clashes which made the military take over political power from civilian politicians. Thus, the focus of civil society activities changed and attention was now on getting rid of both military dictatorship and one-party systems. Orji (2009:88) mentioned that "in postcolonial Africa, collective action and pressures to strengthen civil society and foster democracy have come mainly from students, intellectuals, workers, professionals".

After independence, the relationship between the states and CSOs was not a conducive one even if they worked together. M'boge et al. (2004:3) appropriately put it by arguing that "a marriage between the CSOs, in particular, trade unions and students unions and religious leaders, with African governments did not last, as CSOs turned into forces of political opposition towards the state". This led to unfriendly relations between the state and civil society. This militant and hostile relationship between states and civil society worsened with the increase in political degeneration on the continent (Matanga, 2000:5). Due to the restriction of political pluralism and the domination of authoritarian governments, one-party states, and personal rule, CSOs found themselves lacking political space to participate actively. Most governments did not allow any kind of advocacy or opposition by CSOs (Maseng, 2010:37). This drove CSOs to become critics of authoritarian African states. Matanga (2000:5) argued this by indicating that "civil society in liberal thought is believed to be a cornerstone of democracy, as it is seen to be capable of providing counter-weight to state power through protecting human rights and expanding the political space".

Makumbe (1998:307) emphasised that "African political leaders were anxious to eliminate or, at the least, effectively control all forms of political opposition in their countries by occupying all possible political space through their parties and the control of state power and institutions". Some announced themselves life presidents, others plundered state coffers in broad daylight. Virtually all of them at one point made use of the state machinery to crush all opposition, including that emanating from their own political parties. Nonconformists were detained or executed. Meanwhile, the people

were becoming increasingly despondent and disenchanted with the oppressive regimes. Political participation was replaced by political apathy. Many CSOs, seeing their role in political life diminishing, stopped their operations (Makumbe, 1998:308).

Nyong'o in Davis (2010:193) insinuated that "the political changes that the African people have been calling for are based on their concrete experiences, years of dashed hopes, frustrated aspirations, misdirected efforts, and fruitless investments". All these things happened because people trusted their governments too much and entrusted them with public resources that the governments squandered for personal gain. Makumbe in Fadakinte (2015:137) also inferred that "the western liberal democracy was alien to Africa and a costly luxury in a backward continent that is in dire need of development". The fact that liberal democracy was 'alien' to Africa led political leaders after independence to be anxious and determined to eliminate opposition and maintain absolute power and control all state institutions. So, in post-independent Africa, when CSOs were developing, there were efforts by the state to suppress and bring them under control. Civil society today exists as a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe, and the driving force of democratisation everywhere is the contention between civil society and the state.

Mamdani in Helliker (2012:4) articulated that "the notion of civil society came to prominence with the Eastern European uprisings of the late 1980s. These events were taken as signalling a paradigmatic shift from a state-centred to a society-centred perspective, from a strategy of armed struggle that seeks to capture state power to one of an unarmed civil struggle that seeks to create a self-limiting power". The collapse of

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the Soviet Union was described by Fukuyama as the “end of history” which saw a wave of democratisation sweeping over parts of the globe from Europe to Africa. The wave of new democracy saw the prevalence of CSOs and made them relevant because they were deemed to be instruments that would help in the democratisation process. This is why it is argued that CSOs in Africa were not an African phenomenon but were brought into Africa by the West to end military regimes and one-party states (Fadakinte, 2015:136).


Khosla (2006:66) pointed out that “the post-Cold War period opened up democratic space in several African states. It witnessed the formation of several civic groups and organisations”. Most post-colonial CSOs were more prevalent during the political liberalisation in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War. CSOs during the post-colonial era were really hands on and made notable changes. Khosla (2006:66) attested that “these civic organisations have taken effective steps in releasing political prisoners, liberalise the control of the media which was earlier under the autocratic authority, the formation of political parties, holding regular elections and drafting new constitutions ”. The emergence of the public sphere in Africa has led to the growth and renewal of civil society. In the early 1990s, civil society was extremely visible in Africa and that was because they wanted an end to authoritarian rule (Fadakinte, 2015:137). Despite CSOs being visible and prevalent at this stage, they were mostly active in the urban areas compared to the rural areas. Mamdani in Helliker (2012:4) clearly put it that “for post-colonial Africa, because of de-racialization and the emergence of broader civil liberties,

the space for indigenous urban civil society has opened up further; however, the rural population has remained relegated to the fringes of civil society”.

Consequently, the idea of civil society in Africa can be seen as emerging in the urban areas and non-existent in rural areas. Chazan in Kew et al. (2013:9) stated that “urban protests of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s that triggered the process of reform were initiated either by civil servants, students, professional organisations, trade unions, or churches, and carried out by a combination of these and other groups in over 20 countries”. CSOs became important mediators for democratic governance through, inter-alia, advocating for rule of law, accountability, and curbing of human rights abuses. Thus, civil society in Africa flourished and helped lead the struggle to overthrow repressive regimes and dictators in the march toward democratic governance. The increased prominence and growth of CSOs put pressure on governments to undertake political reform. They were also central in building political opposition which is important in providing a balance of power on which democracy depends on (Kew et al., 2013:9). The general direction of progress towards democracy was suggested by the gradual increase of basic political rights, which climbed steadily from a low point in 1989 to a peak in 1994. These political changes in Africa could not have happened without the full participation of an active civil society. Hence, civil society is about making democracy thrive, acting as a halfway house between society and the state (Obadare, 2011:13).

2.3.3 Advent of civil society organisations in Zimbabwe

Development of CSOs in Zimbabwe mirrors that of other African countries. The dawn of civil society in Zimbabwe formerly known as Rhodesia dates back to the late 20th century when the two main indigenous groups, comprising the Shona and Ndebele people, formed a resistance against the colonial government by creating associational groups. Recreational groups such as soccer clubs, theatre and music groups and burial associations formed the early civil society development in Zimbabwe. Associative organisations of various kinds like political, trade union, home movement, Bantu Congress and other associations were formed back in the 1930s (Kambeba et al., 2005:63).



These organisations created a foundation for labour mobilisation under trade union movements in urban areas. In 1948, a general strike organised by railway workers signalled the advent of organised labour movements in Zimbabwe (Kambeba et al., 2005:63). The essence of Rhodesia's policies around 1965 was to criminalise politics, especially in Black communities. This actually meant that criminalising political activities diminished prospects of having a functional civil society. Moyo (1993:6) argued that "for Blacks in Rhodesia, political activity became a clandestine affair as they were forced to organise and coordinate their affairs behind closed doors and usually under life-threatening conditions".

During the colonial period, CSOs such as student groups, community organisations and trade unions that were rife in the Black communities were crushed in a bid to relegate

them into political irrelevance. Instead, these movements progressively developed political muscle and ultimately became an important force within the national liberation movement. Hence the relationship between the state and civil society became confrontational and hostile as CSOs after independence pressurised the governments to open space for democratic governance. This was because of the important role civil society played during the nationalist struggles against colonialism (Bujra et al., 2003).

When Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, the political space was inhabited by a weak civil society. After independence, calls for unity did not allow the flourishing of civil society. Any organisation that attempted to oppose the government's way of doing things ran the risk of being accused of dividing the country. Zimbabwean CSOs soon found themselves under pressure from the ZANU–PF government which wanted to consolidate its support base by controlling labour, women's and students' movements (Kambeba et al., 2005:63). The ruling party, ZANU-PF, took advantage and claimed to be the umbrella organisation of all social movements. Subsequently, ZANU-PF went on to challenge CSOs to consider co-opting with the ruling party to show their patriotic commitment (Moyo, 1993:7).

Moyo (1993:7) went on to explain that “social groups which tried to resist ZANU (PF)'s tactic of exclusion by inclusion under the guise of 'one state, one society, one nation, one leader', were branded as sell-outs bent on working for 'the enemy' as the ruling party publicly touted its commitment to a legislated one-party state, especially between 1980 and 1990”. Hence, political independence in Zimbabwe liberated only one part of the state, the government bureaucracy and political leadership which became Black, or

actually ZANU-PF. This led to the diminishing of most CSOs that refused to co-opt with the government because there was no more space for independent action.

The end of the Cold War saw Zimbabwe's CSOs' post-independence bloom in the 1990s as civic activism grew and the pressure was building up for reforms to take place from one-party states and military rule to multi-party democratic states. After independence, Zimbabwe focused on nation building which down the line became an instrument of domination and absolute control by the ZANU-PF, leading to the marginalisation of popular participation. Maseng (2010:46) stated that "the marginalisation of popular participation meant that the post-independence Zimbabwean state failed to meet some determinants of democratisation and good governance such as the expansion of political space for multiple actors to interact and the decentralisation of decision-making systems". The spaces opened up for political participation in the 1990s meant that the emergence of independent CSOs would nurture the idea of political pluralism.

In 2000, there were about 850 CSOs that covered different sectors like governance, human rights, civic education, media, faith-based organisations, women's organisations and gender, labour unions and lastly professional associations. CSOs that cover governance are preoccupied with democracy, political and civil rights, constitutional reform and citizen participation e.g. Foundation for Democracy in Zimbabwe (FODEZI). Those CSOs that deal with human rights deal with violation and abuse of human rights by the state or its agents and seek to redress these issues, e.g. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:22).

Living standards of the Zimbabwean population rapidly declined in the 1990s when the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was launched. This led to social unrest as CSOs began to challenge the state due to their failure to achieve sustainable development. The ESAP triggered further hostile state-civil society relations in Zimbabwe (Kambeba et al., 2005:64). CSOs, in particular the students and the labour movements, became significant drivers for a more democratic Zimbabwe. It is for this reason that Kambeba et al. (2005:64) declared that “civil society became increasingly politically active and developed a more confrontational approach when engaging the government”. Consequently, Zimbabweans witnessed the bond between the government and CSOs becoming increasingly antagonistic. The ZANU-PF became uncomfortable with CSOs advocating for democracy.



In 1998 and 1999, more CSOs emerged such as those aimed at promoting various forms of institutionalisation and to change the political landscape in Zimbabwe. These included forums, women's coalitions and the most significant was the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), which comprised 135 CSOs (Zhou, 2014:50). The NCA challenged the state on constitutional reform and this led ZANU-PF to resent the organisation (Kambeba et al., 2005:64). During the period between 1996 and 1998, Zimbabwe experienced protests, strikes and campaigns by Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) and workers which were openly against the government. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) labour movement forged links with CSOs through the NCA in the quest for a democratic dispensation. The involvement of

ZINASU, ZCTU, and NCA in led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Zeilig, 2010).

Beyond 2000, CSOs saw the enactment of laws that sought to close down democratic space and limit CSOs operations. According to Chingono (2010:199), “never in the history of Zimbabwe had there been so much clamouring for a redress in human rights abuses and the absence of democracy than in the period after 2000”. The purpose of passing these laws was supposed to be for creating an atmosphere for CSOs to operate and to protect the liberties enshrined in the Constitution. Muzondo (2007:1) stated that the laws that were enacted included “the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Broadcasting Services Act (BSA)”. POSA affected opposition parties, CSOs, and the media. The act forbade criticism of the president, gave the police powers to control or prohibit public assembly. Above all, it had unprecedented provisions of sternly limiting freedom of speech, expression, and association which are ironically assured in the Zimbabwean Constitution. On the other hand, AIPPA had a bearing on the licensing of media houses and journalists and had provisions for punishments to be rendered for any false publications (Kambeba et al., 2005:70). In this case, these laws effectively banned CSOs from playing a role in the democratisation process and suppressed key liberties.

AIPPA became an oppressive law that controlled the media and political meetings such as rallies and any gatherings were also stifled through POSA (Matombo et al., 2010: 118). In essence, through its legislations, Zimbabwe has been a repressive country

towards CSOs. As a result, the role of CSOs being able to hold the government to account has been largely ineffective. CSOs have thus experienced political repression ever since the introduction of the AIPPA, POSA, and BSA. These laws actually facilitated state harassment and coercion as CSOs in Zimbabwe are viewed as incubators for a new breed of opposition politicians that had strong roots either from the workplace or the communities at large (Matombo et al., 2010:118).

2.4 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

The concept democratic consolidation has one of the most contested definitions. Diamond in Rigger (2005:22) defined democratic consolidation as “one in which elites, political organisations and the mass public embrace all democratic norms and beliefs and eschew anti-democratic behaviour in the political realm”. A workable definition that guided this study is by Gao *et al.* (2014: no page) who argued that:

Democratic consolidation is a discernible process by which democratic values, norms and principles are firmly entrenched within society, such that political and social actors, both elites and the masses believe that democracy is the only game in town, the only legitimate framework recognised and accepted by all major political forces to seek and exercise political power, and through which democracy becomes standardized and internalized in institutional, social and cultural life. In a consolidated democracy, there may be intense conflicts, but no significant political actors attempt to achieve their objectives by illegal, unconstitutional, or antidemocratic means (Gao *et al.*, 2014: no page).

Civil society organisations have in the past struggled for liberation during colonial rule and presently they are struggling with their quest to consolidate democracy. Shivji (2003:67) lucidly noted that "the contemporary neoliberal discourse has one fundamental blind spot. It treats the present as if the present has had no history. The discourse on democracy in Africa suffers from the same blindness. The struggle for democracy did not begin with the post-cold war introduction of the multi-party system. The independence and liberation struggles for self-determination, beginning in the post-world war period, were eminently a struggle for democracy. Neither formal independence nor the victory of armed liberation movements marked the end of democratic struggles. They continued, albeit in different forms". The struggle for democracy in the post-colonial era was first embraced by minority middle-class elites in many African states which quickly fixed their own positions in the power structures of the newly formed African countries.



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This left vacant the space in which to challenge the policies and practices of African governments as African elites were absorbed into government through the prevailing practice of patronage which developed in the 1960s and 70s. This conspiracy between the state and the emerging middle-class elites saw the continuous and systematic denial of the rights of participation for the majority in many African states (Masterson, 2006:6). Military coup d'états and life-serving presidents became the norm. The deliberate denial of the right to participate in the political governance of their country's affairs spread in numerous African states leading African civic groups and organisations to mobilise and advocate for democratic transformations (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004). The

denial of rights to participate in most African states led to the eruption of violent protests which saw states using violent repression and crackdown determined to silence dissenting behaviour from CSOs against incumbent governments.

When the system of world order changed to Bipolar, many African states realised that they could no longer sustain autocratic regimes and had a choice either to implement transformation which CSOs had been advocating for or to clamp down the CSOs. Masterson (2006:6) noted that "many governments began to implement the reforms which civic groups had long been advocating for, opening up the political space and enabling greater democratic freedoms, in essence opting to engage with CSOs moving forward. The other option, adopted by states such as Zimbabwe, was to increase the intensity of the state's efforts to dismantle and silence the voice of civil opposition to its policies and practices, in essence deliberately choosing not to engage with civil society".

The role of CSOs in the process of democratising was important. They played a significant role in sustaining internal pressures to transform even as the international community pressured African governments at the state level. Mentan (2010:294) reiterated that "although external influences such as the fall of communism and pressure from foreign donors were important it was often the resourcefulness, dedication, and tenacity of domestic civil society that initiated and sustained the process of transition to democratic governance". CSOs had an immense role to play and are now part of the network of institutions that are needed to safeguard civil rights and protect citizens from state arbitrariness.

Moreover, civil society would strengthen the state by contributing to good governance and democracy. CSOs would act as the watchdog over government officials, hold them accountable for their actions and articulate public interests. Van Leeuwen et al. (2012:83) emphasised that "from this perspective civil society not only scrutinises the functioning of the state but might also question its very attributes and powers. The role of civil society then is to constantly renegotiate the mutual rights and obligations of state and citizens, critically assess dominant modes of representation and accountability, and pass for alternative ways of policy making".

Civil society's oppositional role is viewed as an effective strategy for dealing with intransigent governments. Diamond (2016:119) said: "we need to think about the features of civil society that are most likely to serve the development and consolidation of democracy". Governments with enormous powers to control the socioeconomic life of their citizens are feeling the greater pushback from civil society. Democracy definitely has its own defenders, one of which is a genuinely independent civil society, whose essence is said to consist in its capacity to resist state authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Bayart (1996) equally established the relation between civil society and democracy more poignantly by asserting that "the quest for unearthing the dynamics of civil society in Africa would be without purpose outside its potential relationship with democracy". Also, as democracy takes root across the continent, CSOs are more openly playing their watch-dog role (Ighobor, 2016:13).

A large number of CSOs are active in the field of justice and human rights from social, economic, and cultural rights to political rights. Many CSOs have been at the forefront of

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supporting principles of social justice and equity. CSOs played an instrumental part in the rebuilding of democracy in most African states and CSOs are considered as genuine tools for democratic consolidation. Fadakinte (2015:133) attested that “the quest for unearthing the dynamics of civil society in Africa would be without purpose outside its political relationship with democracy. It is because democracy has a weak base in Africa that civil society is being promoted as a possible method of reformatting Africa’s democratic need”. The next section deals with some of the strategies that CSOs use, conditions in which they operate and challenges they have faced.

2.5 THE RISE OF ZIMBABWEAN DIASPORA MOVEMENTS

As mentioned earlier in the first Chapter, the classical use of the word diaspora was only confined to Jews and their experience though it later included the Greek, Armenians and African in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Later in the 1980’s based on Safran’s criteria, diaspora now had different categories which included expatriates, expellees, political refugees as well as immigrants among others. Diasporas are a category of people who have a collective memory of their homeland, are committed to the restoration of their homeland and continue relating to their homeland with the hope of returning there one day (Cohen, 2008:4). This section gives a brief discussion on how Zimbabwe’s diaspora came to be and subsequently formed diaspora movements.

In Zimbabwe, most of the migration that takes place is involuntary because of the different plights that citizens have experienced. These plights range from having an authoritarian government, unabated economic crisis and politically motivated violence.

Crush *et al* (2010: no page) explained that “the accelerating social, political and economic unravelling of Zimbabwe led to a rush for the exits. An economy in free fall, soaring inflation and unemployment, the collapse of public services, political oppression, and deepening poverty proved to be powerful, virtually irresistible push factors for many Zimbabweans”. Popular destinations for most citizens who migrate are South Africa, United Kingdom, USA and Canada though the greater number is in South Africa and the UK. A large scale of migration started soon after the country gained its independence in 1980 when most white settlers left and relocated abroad or in South Africa apartheid era. Second movement was triggered by the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) around the 1990’s, this time most skilled citizens left for better opportunities abroad (Crush *et al*, 2012:4). The greatest number migrated early 2000 and again in 2008 after the controversial and violent elections where most people lost their lives (Miriyooga, 2017:117). Those that moved between 2000 and 2008 are mostly the people that formed diaspora movements.

Their migration meant that they could no longer participate in mainstream politics in Zimbabwe. Consequently, Zimbabwean diasporas lost their right to vote or make any meaning contribution politically. However, they found ways of contesting Mugabe’s regime and so diaspora movements emerged and their aim was to influence homeland politics from their hostland. Diaspora movements’ formation intensifies when atrocities occur in the homeland and may offer different repertoires of contention (Tarrow, 1993:285). These are some of the reasons that have led to the formation of Zimbabwean diaspora movements. For instance, in the UK, diaspora movements like

Zimbabwe Association in London and The Vigil were formed in a bid to influence homeland politics.

Diaspora movements believe that they should collectively be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland back to its safety and prosperity. This is because members of diaspora movements have a notion of returning to their homeland. Baser *et al* (2010:42) affirms that “diasporas are considered to be more active in terms of involvement to homeland politics...especially if there is a struggle in their country of origin, they are more likely to engage in political movements”. Zimbabwean diaspora movements are oppositional in outlook and most of the time they challenge their homeland government and remain organised in their hostland so as to be afforded the platform to operate freely (Baser *et al*, 2010:44). These diaspora movements use different interventions to influence relevant political actors or government institutions so that they respond to enduring Zimbabwean plights. Next section looks at strategies used by diaspora movements.

2.6 STRATEGIES USED BY DIASPORA MOVEMENTS

Diaspora movements use a variety of strategies to help mobilise the public and try consolidating democracy for their home country. Their strategies range from lobbying, media work, and public education campaigns to protests and other forms of direct action like litigation. Zeleza (2013:196) stated that "their tactics cover conventional rallies, marches, concerts, and boycotts, and public relations campaigns in the traditional media as well as digital mobilization". The effectiveness of these strategies also

depends on how democratic the host state is. Again, Zeleza (2013:196) argued that "the more democratic the host state is, the greater the opportunities, all things being equal, for diaspora activists and struggles to exercise diplomatic pressure on the hostland to adopt foreign policies towards the diaspora's homeland that the activist's favour". Through their strategies of public protest activities and lobbying efforts, diaspora movements can become influential actors and help consolidate democracy in their homeland.

2.6.1 Lobbying and advocacy

Lobbying and advocacy is a powerful strategy that diaspora movements use because this strategy addresses systems, rather than symptoms. Lobbying and advocacy mean acting as a watchdog and is concerned with cooperating, establishing networks and partnerships and responding flexibly to public opinions, developing alternatives and persistently pursuing an organisation's goals. Lobbying and advocating for better policies generates positive change for disadvantaged people, groups, and countries. Its influence is huge, and its approach tackles the systematic causes of problems, thus empowering local voices and promoting sustainable democracy. Diaspora movements have the capability to put concerns of the general public on the agendas of government agencies and market players, at the local, national and international levels (The Fair, Green & Global Alliance, 2014:5).

Lobbying is an important tool used by diaspora movements to influence the policy options and strategies for policymakers. For instance, diaspora movements use

lobbying to pressure homeland governments to adopt different domestic and foreign policies that suit their political preferences. Diaspora movements promote and demand democratic and well-functioning public institutions that are accountable to the people, are transparent, and respect the freedom of expression and protest. Through their choice of strategies used, diaspora movements bring information about political and human rights violations committed by governments in their homelands to the attention of the outside world. Diaspora movements' target is mainly the government but they also try to influence international institutions (Newland, 2010:2).

Additionally, diaspora movements use lobbying both for positive and negative ends with regard to the struggles in the homeland. Diaspora movements' lobbying activities are predominantly against the domestic policies of their governments. They typically campaign in the host countries through organising petitions and demonstrations to show their disapproval of the domestic politics pursued by the government in the homeland. They also undertake these strategies to pressure the government in the adopted home country to take disciplinary measures against the government in the homeland such as reducing its economic aid or cutting its diplomatic relations (African Diaspora Policy Centre, 2005:46). The participation of the African diasporan movements in democracy building is thus of utmost importance. In this respect, lobbying serves a useful purpose aimed at saving the people in the homeland from political tyranny and oppression and to help consolidate democracy.

For example, diaspora movements representing the Gambian people have used lobbying and advocacy as a strategy to draw attention from the international community


and from their hostland on what is happening back in their homeland. Gambian diasporan movements like National Resistance Movement Gambia, Gambia Youth for Unity and the Coalition for Change Gambia living in the United States of America and United Kingdom have lobbied the congress and parliament of their hostland respectively. Jaw (2017:87) posited that “the joint lobbying efforts by the various organisations aimed influencing the host states to engage the regime at home has resulted in statements from host countries. In Europe, they lobbied the EU and attended human rights meetings in Geneva, writing reports to counter that of the regime”. These diaspora movements organised several meetings discussing the political situation in Gambia under president Jammeh.



Diaspora movements are also seen as critical actors who act as a bridge between the state and the people for those that operate nationally; and for those that operate transnationally they act as the bridge between the hostland and their home country. The African diaspora movements organise, advocate and lobby where their numbers are sufficiently large and concentrated. For example, the Somali diaspora based in Canada make substantial contributions to Somalia through remittances, humanitarian assistance and participating in conflict and peace building. The Somali diaspora movements have advocated and lobbied the Canadian government to help promote peace building in Somalia. The Somalia Canadian Diaspora Alliance is one of the diaspora movements that has been at the forefront of lobbying and advocating for a sovereign and peaceful Somalia that is politically, socially and economically independent (Abdile, 2014:77).

2.6.2 Protests and petitions

These diaspora movements regularly or occasionally organise forums and large-scale public meetings, rallies and demonstrations to raise awareness and make their concerns visible to the international community. Some call for sanctions and interventions. Public speeches, writing of open letters and petitioning take place according to the political landscape in the home country. They aim at pressuring foreign governments and other international actors like global and regional organisations such as the United Nations or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Kuhlmann, 2010:14).



Protesting is one of the key strategies used by diaspora movements. Protesting is a core strategy they use usually as a result of civic and political discontentment. Protesting plays a vital role in diasporan movements and has increasingly become part of the consolidated repertoire of collective action. For instance, in October 2014 in Burkina Faso, diaspora movements like *Ca Suffit* (It's Enough) and *Le Balai Citoyen* (the Citizen's Broom) took to the streets demanding their president Compaore to step down. This was after Blaise Compaore had been working on amending the Constitution to permit him to run for a third term. Their protests were fruitful as the president did concede to their calls and stepped down (Honwana, 2015:3). Lahusen (2013:33) affirmed that "protest actors call attention to an issue, transgress social order and provoke institutional action, to create a demand for action, a tempo and climate appropriate for mobilising public support and pushing for institutional action".

Thorpe (2017) stated that for a protest to be a success there should be a favourable environment which has four aspects “a democratic regime, a programmatic party system, a polity open to the challenger’s claims, and political allies support”. This favourable environment is a necessity because protests do not take place in a vacuum. It is through protesting that diaspora movements or marginalised communities can have their voices heard as well as demand accountability and responsiveness from relevant authorities or just to raise awareness (Sylvester, 2018). Protests may have less direct but not less rational purposes than simply getting the government to respond to a specific demand. Protests help diaspora movements create as well as renew solidarity ties that are important in overcoming collective action problems. A successful protest delivers great benefits compared to what would happen if diaspora movements did not take any action (Bruhn, 2008:59).



Protests are a window into broader social and political issues. Protests are carried out when the masses take their voices to the streets. Most protests carried out in Africa are a result of economic, political and social pressures. Diaspora movements have moved onto more public open spaces by protesting in the streets and some have successfully overthrown dictatorships. Others have managed to vote out corrupt leaders and in some instances coerced their governments to reverse unpopular decisions (Honwana, 2015:10). Some effects of protests in nondemocratic countries have been clearly pro-democratic. At least some of the citizen mobilisation and protesting in Africa is against efforts by some presidents who wish to prolong presidential terms beyond constitutional

limits, for example what happened in Senegal through the *Y'en a Marre* movement (Carothers et al., 2015:18).

The *Y'en a Marre* (Enough is Enough) movement of Senegal was formed in January 2011 by a group of Senegalese rappers and journalists. It rose out of young people's discontent and became a strong mobilising force against government corruption. It quickly grew into a broader social movement and mobilised young people. It gave them a voice in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections. They organised several protest rallies throughout the country. In June 2011, the *Y'en a Marre* movement successfully led organised demonstrations that forced the withdrawal of constitutional amendments to ensure President Wade's defeat in the 2012 elections (Honwana, 2015:56). The social movement protested for democracy, the rule of law and economic justice. They protested by circulating a petition at one point that had two priorities which were democracy and economic justice. *Y'en a Marre* transcended geographic borders (Mueller, 2018:115). Carothers et al. (2015:16) alluded that "most of the protests in the recent wave nevertheless follow patterns of organization and implementation that seem similar to traditional protest models. They often start with a spark, then swell exponentially, and then persist over time with a smaller, core group of activists staying the course while the others drop out". Protests break into circles of participants, from a small, committed pool of key organisers and activists and to larger spheres of less sustained members.

Another example of a movement that made use of protesting as a strategy is the Zimbabwe Vigil movement. The Zimbabwe Vigil movement popularly known as "The

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Vigil" was launched in 2002 in London, UK. The movement has been meeting every Saturday at the Zimbabwe House in London where they normally protest (Zim Vigil, 2017). The Zimbabwe Vigil movement protests against gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe. The Vigil uses different strategies of protesting to draw attention, like signing of petitions, using banners and posters, flyers, newsletters and demonstrating. The Zimbabwe Vigil movement (2008) reported that "we meet whatever the weather, our colourful posters and banners and the singing and dancing draw lots of attention, we hand out information flyers and newsletters. Our petitions, which focus on human rights abuses and the suppression of democracy in Zimbabwe, have people queuing up to sign them". The movement has signed and submitted petitions to the European Union. One of the petitions by the Zimbabwe Vigil movement (2008) submitted as a way of protesting read as follows "we record our dismay at the failure of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to help the desperate people of Zimbabwe at their time of trial. We urge the UK government and the European Union, in general, to suspend government-to-government aid to SADC countries until they abide by their joint commitment to uphold human rights in the region". They even called for the continuation of Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth.

2.6.3 Social media

Another strategy used by diaspora movements is that of making use of the social media. Social media is a term used to describe any of several online platforms that utilise the technology of the Internet to facilitate social interaction through written, visual, or audible communication. Examples of social media include blogging, podcasts,

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forums, online press releases, and social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube, among others. Unlike the popular traditional media, social media is faster at conveying messages across to a wide population in a short space of time. Diaspora movements are dependent on mainstream media for three interrelated purposes, namely to mobilise political support, to increase the legitimization and validation of their demands, and to enable them to widen the scope of conflict beyond the like-minded. The more diaspora movements are able to get their message across the more they mobilise (USAID, 2014:24).

Networked technologies give the ability to mobilise globally, directly and quickly, they lessen the dependence on mainstream media channels, and they combine advantages that are inherent in broadcast and one-to-many communication channels (Surman et al., 2003:46). The speed at which information can travel to a vast number of people has enhanced the ability to mobilise communities for collective action. The use of these technologies in the Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa in 2011 has been widely documented.

Social media enable diaspora movements to have discussions with people, informing them about their cause and potentially changing their minds. The use of social media cuts costs compared to traditional media and the social networking platforms charge little or no fee to register, allowing diaspora movements to locate and interact with their target audience without having to spend large amounts of money. Diaspora movements need to develop a clear social media strategic plan by identifying the purpose of using this strategy to reach their goals (United Nations, 2010). USAID (2014:24) echoed the

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same sentiments as the UN and alleged that “social media provides a valuable opportunity for civil society organisations to reach their communication goals more efficiently and to engage with their audiences more deeply”. The use of social media by diaspora movements helps improve transparency, accountability, and governance within the organisation. It also aids diaspora movements in directly engaging with citizens through a fast, simple and cost-effective way.

Above all, diaspora movements are able to engage parts of the communities that are difficult to reach using traditional media and create a highly responsive civil society (USAID, 2014:24). The internet heralds a strategic opportunity for the future of diaspora movements as it provides an efficient way to channel information about their activities and engage with donors, government, the private sector and general public. Diaspora movements make use of the social media as a strategy to expand public spaces for citizens to express and voice their opinions. When diaspora movements integrate and make use of the technology, it helps promote democracy and encourage citizen participation.

For example, in Egypt there was a CSO called the April 6 Youth Movement (A6YM) which was formed in 2008 in support of striking labourers. The movement took advantage of social media and used Facebook as their platform. The movement went viral as it gained widespread popularity and managed to coordinate nation-wide protests. They became a well-known movement (Egypt Today, 2017). The group continued to mobilise the masses for continual pressure for democratic reforms to take place. The movement was perceived by the Egyptians as the most dynamic anti-

Mubarak movement. Sanders (2013:172) mentioned that “April 6 was the first Egyptian protest movement which used social media such as Facebook and Twitter for mass-mobilisation and advocacy of democracy and human rights. The movement’s page had attracted 70 000 users”. The reason they used social media was because of state repression that prevailed in Egypt. The April 6 movement later organised the January 25 occupy Tahrir Square protest calling for Mubarak to relinquish power. This protest later exploded into one of the Arab Spring Revolution (Carty, 2014:66). Social media was not only useful for cost-saving dissemination of information but was also used to coordinate the group.

The Gambia Youth for Unity (GYU) is a social movement which was formed in 2015 in the United Kingdom. Their purpose was to host and collectively engage Gambian youths and supporters alike in both the diaspora and in Gambia. Their aim is to support the restoration of genuine democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of law in Gambia. GYU as a diaspora movement rely on the Internet and the use of social media for mobilisation and communication. Taal (2016:202) mentioned that “the internet serves as a key resource for the Gambian civil society diaspora groups to advertise their events and to safely engage people in debates and discussions about political, economic, and social issues in Gambia. The Gambian diaspora have a heavy presence on Facebook and Twitter”. The use of social media allowed the diasporan Gambians to keep both the Gambian population and the international community aware of what is happening in Gambia. Jaw (2017:91) attested that “the advent of Whatsapp and Viber also added another opportunity to the activist to spread information and at the same


time mobilize for regime change. Like Facebook, groups were created on Whatsapp particularly in the period leading to the December 2016 presidential election. While the state censored media houses, social media became an alternative that was heavily utilized by the Diaspora”. Social media played a role in the anti-Jammeh campaign that saw him stepping down from office.

2.7 CHALLENGES FACED BY DIASPORA MOVEMENTS

Civil society in Africa generally has failed to develop meaningfully, unlike their counterparts in most developed countries like the US and the UK. The advent of colonialism made it difficult for CSOs to thrive. Makumbe in MacManus (2018:no page) reiterated that “colonial regimes throughout Africa made strenuous efforts to ensure that no civic groups would emerge in their colonies to challenge them for violating people’s rights, for imposing authoritarian governance and for pillaging the Africans’ human and natural resources”. Even after the end of colonialism, those who took over also pursued to protect their newly acquired power and resorted to one-party systems which thwarted CSOs. This left CSOs with a little time after the end of the Cold War to develop and be able to effectively promote and protect citizens’ interests. Therefore, CSOs have over the years been confronted with multitudes of challenges that have made it difficult for them to function effectively and have thwarted their growth.

One of the challenges currently faced by this sector is that of funding and financial sustainability. While there are no current and reliable statistics on funding to the sector, most organisations rely on a combination of diminishing international funding, corporate

social investment, donations from individuals and a degree of income-generation, often via government contracts. This situation was exacerbated by the 2008 economic recession. Traditional foreign donor agencies scaled down their funding drastically or withdrew completely, mainly due to global recession (Coalition on Civil Society Resource Mobilisation, 2012:22). This fiscal factor reduced the activities and impacts of some diaspora movements. When diaspora movements are in a state of dependence, their independence to make programme decisions is limited, as is their independence to ensure that the right programmes are implemented. Dependence on donor funding may lead donors to control the agenda of the diaspora movements which might counter the objectives of movement.



The dependence on external sources for sustenance can also be a setback for the operation of diaspora movements. The lack of stable funding undermines diaspora movements' hold on professional staff and sustainability of the organisations. Diaspora movements' long-term survival and effectiveness is linked to the availability of funds. Habib et al. (2003:38) viewed civil society as weakened with the shift in funding from "a social justice orientation to one that is largely ameliorative". Stringent funding criteria and demands for rigorous standards of accountability, transparency and financial self-sufficiency imposed by donors on movements, "have the unintended effects of distancing these organisations from the very poor and marginalised constituencies they are meant to serve". Diaspora movements need to be aware that as much as they need donors, donors in return need operative partners in civil society.

Although power dynamics are skewed towards the institution holding the purse strings, it is an interdependent relationship. An additional challenge related to funding is the challenge of absorbing or managing too much funding in too short a period of time. (Maliasili Initiatives et al., 2015:22). Diaspora movements trapped in the web of dependence on external donors have an unpredictable existence. The trend is that with such a predicament for diaspora movements there is an imbalance in loyalty between external donors and local beneficiaries. Diaspora movements that are tied to external donors have less autonomy.

The diaspora movements are also faced with the challenge of lack of human resources in terms of leadership, knowledge, and skills. It is expected that any organisations that wish to engage the state must be well prepared with knowledge and be able to deliver valid arguments. The main asset for a functional diaspora movement is having qualified and skilled personnel who are committed to the movement's mission (Ojo, 2011). Often, the number of people with the capacity to be activists and movements administrators is in short supply. Becoming an activist has a great deal to do with having a deep understanding of one's surroundings and a devotion to working for essential transformation. Most movements that deal with policy changes require knowledge of key issues, thus some level of professionalism and expertise is necessary.

The pool of professionals is small and diaspora movements are unable to attract talented individuals because of financial constraints. Maliasili Initiatives et al. (2015:21) affirmed that “movements are started by passionate people driven by goals of defending rights of local people. But they don’t necessarily have the skills and knowledge to run an

organization, to manage significant sums of money, to understand management culture. This is where it falls apart”. Diaspora movements are challenged through human resource constraints to deal with recruiting and retaining talent and managing and developing people that help them meet the demands of an ever-changing policy environment. Skilled individuals are in relatively short supply, in high demand, and have more rewarding and secure professional opportunities in the private sector or government. movements, as they grow, need a combination of human resource skills to develop and change skills that the founding leaders of movements often lack (Maliasili Initiatives et al., 2015:21). This is a challenge which is a barrier to diaspora movements development and growth.



Another challenge faced by diaspora movements is the inability to sustain their organisations. The divisions within movements lead to disunity and disagreements in terms of decision making and uniting for a purpose affecting the well-being and sustainability of movements. Such internal contradictions within members make it difficult to agree on common positions during the period of engagements. Such disunity weakens efficiency and makes the diaspora movement vulnerable (Omede et al., 2014:221). Sustainability is critical for the success of programmes that are meant to transform the lives of people with a long-term impact.

Another problem is mismanagement of diaspora movements' funding by leaders. There have been accusations of corruption, ranging from lack of transparency in the use of donor funds to outright embezzlement and conversion of foreign donations to personal use. This tends to weaken the diaspora movements' moral right to engage the state and

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
relevant stakeholders. It also deters people of integrity and value from associating with them (Omede et al., 2014:221). Maintaining transparent, accountable and sound ethical standards is useful for strengthening the standing of diaspora movements. This is significant because diaspora movements as watchdogs of society need to set a good example in their effort to safeguard the society as well as for continuity purposes.

Lack of decentralisation by most diaspora movements impedes their growth. The entrenched centralisation of key movements weakens their ability to appraise the full extent of challenges that exist at the sub-national level. It is important that movements in a bid to increase their significance, decentralise their activities and engagements with actors both at the national and sub-national levels. Most of these diaspora movements are concentrated in urban areas. This makes it difficult for the majority of the population, which lives in rural areas to appreciate the role diaspora movements play, absorb their policies and through the process, develop political consciousness and confidence to resist inducement from politicians (Omede et al., 2014:220). The failure to collaborate substantively with communities at the sub-national level leaves movements disconnected from the real issues that face rural communities. Hence, the fact that they are mostly active in urban areas makes it difficult for diaspora movements to convince the rural population to believe in them and at the same time to mobilise them into their organisations.

Another challenge confronting diaspora movements is the need to garner support from different local to international levels. According to Kuhlmann (2010:16), what can be gathered from most studies on transnational diasporic activism is that "most common

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activities and addresses of diasporic activism in their respective host countries are to gain support from international actors, to strengthen diplomatic contacts, to do advocacy work, lobbying and disseminating information to politicians of the host country, to collaborate with national and international human rights and other civil society groups and to reach out to the broader public of the host country and beyond". Advocacy and interaction with British politicians, institutions or organisations or diplomatic representatives of other African states are only a strategy pursued by a handful of activist groups. Diaspora activism in the international arena is very limited and takes place in the form of petition writing. Very few diaspora movements possess the financial means to travel to conferences or meetings in order to lobby international or regional African organisations directly and on a more professional level (Kuhlmann, 2010:16).



Asylum and immigration policies are one of the challenges faced by diaspora movements that operate transnationally. Asylum and immigration policies are some of the conditions limiting the operations of diaspora movements. The rate of asylum recognition has been very low, for example in the case of Zimbabwean asylum approvals in most foreign countries making it difficult for diaspora movement to operate. The majority of asylum applications are either rejected or are still pending (Humphris, 2010:2). Application examinations and cases in which rejected applicants lodge an appeal for decisions on their cases are processed slowly which leaves many asylum seekers in a situation of vulnerability and insecurity. The uncertainty that surrounds their legal status and hence their right to remain in the country permanently can be considered a major factor in restricting asylum seekers' capability to participate in

political activism. Many do not want to jeopardise their asylum claims or be discovered without immigration documents and consequently avoid any situation that could lead to detention or deportation (Kuhlmann, 2010: 20).

The failure of being undocumented makes it complicated for migrants to come into contact or join existing diaspora movements. The diaspora movements operations undergo the trouble of having some of their members and potential members being deported. For instance, members of the Zimbabweans Yes We Can Movement joined a Scotland based Movement for Justice (MFJ) in marching around Brixton in a well-organised demonstration attended by approximately one hundred different nationalities. The protesters were chanting against mass deportation that was being planned by Britain (ZimEye, 2017).




Yet another challenge faced by diaspora movements is ethnic divisions within the movements. These ethnic divisions are mostly notable in Nigerian diaspora movements. For example, there are approximately 62 Nigerian diaspora movements based in Germany that are ethnic based and operate in protecting their ethnic groups as well as promoting peace and unity in Nigeria. Examples of these ethnic diaspora movements include, among others, Edo Community German, Edo Union Freiburg, IGBO Community Union Freiburg and Igbo Forum. There are strong ethnic divisions that exist within the Nigerian diaspora in Germany. Many Nigerians face similar issues and, therefore, a more inclusive body to address those issues would be beneficial in achieving the greatest results. According to Marchand et al. (2015:31), "Nigerians who do not belong to large ethnic groups such as Igbo, the Edo or the Yoruba might feel

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excluded from diaspora events, as an association for their specific ethnic group might not exist in Germany. Working together as Nigerians instead of as Igbos or Edos is sometimes seen as a worthwhile but unachievable goal among organisational representatives”. This challenge does not only affect Nigerian diaspora movements but most African diaspora movements in general have issues when it comes to ethnic divisions. Therefore, it is a challenge replicated in most African diaspora movements. In short, lack of decentralisation, mismanagement of funds, lack of human resources, dependence on external donors and ethnic divisions are some of the challenges that hinder the successful operations of diaspora movements.

2.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK



Theories help to explain, predict and understand phenomena in many cases. Theories also challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical bounding assumptions. A theory provides a background that supports a study and justifies the research problem. Grant et al. (2014:13) stated the purpose of having a theoretical framework as a “guide on which to build and support your study, and also provides the structures to define how you will philosophically, epistemologically, methodologically, and analytically approach the dissertation as a whole”. Therefore, political process theory and critical theory guided this study. The basis of using political process theory was because the researcher was analysing diaspora movements and this theory outlines the reasons behind the formation of diaspora movements and what leads to the activities they carry out. The intention for using critical theory, in the context of the

study, was to uncover the assumptions on how a social world works. For that reason, using both theories helped strengthen the study because political process only looks at how diaspora movements or CSOs in general come into existence and what motivates them which answers part of the study. On the other hand, critical theory helps answer the other part of the study how the diaspora movements function as a civil society in helping consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe. Thus, they complement each other.

2.8.1 Political process theory

Political process theory also known as political opportunity theory is one of the Social movements' theories. This theory looks at how movements mobilise and work to create change. Members of social movements were previously viewed as irrational and deviant people rather than political actors. Political Process Theory regards social movements as a type of political movement in that the origins of a social movement are drawn from the availability of political opportunities. More precisely, this theory looks at the social movement in question to that of the power of the government in control. If the government's position is strongly rooted and is also prone to repressive behaviour, then the chances are high that a social movement might fail. If on the other hand, the government is weak or more tolerant of dissenting behaviour, then the chances are high that any social movement that is born might have the opportunity to grow and flourish (Dobson, 2001).

Political process theory looks at five key components that can determine the success or failure of a social movement. Crossman (2017: no page) identified the components as

political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing processes, protest cycles and lastly repertoires of contention. Political opportunities exist when the system experiences vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities in the system can arise from a variety of reasons. These reasons may include a crisis of legitimacy where citizens no longer support the social and economic conditions raised by the system. It could be divisions among leaders, increasing diversity within political bodies and the electorate, and a loosening of repressive structures that previously kept people from demanding change.

Mobilising structures refers to the already existing organisations, political or otherwise, that are present among the community that wants change. These organisations serve as mobilising structures for a social movement by providing membership, leadership, and communication and social network to the maturing movement. New media, for example mobile phones, and the Internet have changed the ambitions and communication ability of social movements. In particular, the Internet is exploited for online mobilisation and acts of rebellion. Also, because of the Internet, transnational campaigns have grown, are less centrally controlled and more difficult to turn on and off (Della Porta et al., 2006:170). Diaspora movements seek to mobilise the greatest number of demonstrators possible.

Framing processes are carried out by leaders of an organisation in order to allow the group or movement to clearly and persuasively describe the existing problems. Neal (2007:2) validated that "a group needs to describe their grievances persuasively, the diagnostic frame, and present a feasible solution, the prognostic frame". The author also articulated why change is necessary, what changes are desired, and how they can be

achieved. Framing processes foster the ideological buy-in among movement members and the public at large as that is necessary for a social movement to seize political opportunities and make a change.


According to Tarrow (1993:284), protest cycles are “characterised by heightened conflict across the social system; they have traceable paths of diffusion from centre to periphery; are almost never under the control of a single movement; produce new or transformed symbols, frames of meaning and ideology that justify and dignify collective action and around which a following can be mobilised, they are crucibles within which new weapons of social protest are fashioned”. The analysis of protest cycles is particularly useful for an understanding of the development of political violence, frequently one of the protests outcomes. In fact, the forms of violence used tend to vary according to the stage of the cycle. At the beginning of the protest, violent action is usually limited in its presence, small in scope, and unplanned. Typically, violence in these phases is an unexpected consequence of direct action such as sit-ins. As protest develops, violent forms of action initially spread more slowly than non-violent ones (Della Porta et al, 2006:190).

The repertoire of contention, according to Tarrow in Traugott (1995:91), is “The simultaneous skills of population members and the cultural forms of the population. The viability of one of the elements of a repertoire depends on what sorts of things work in a given social or political structure, on what forms of protest have been invented and disseminated in a population and on what grievances a given form is appropriate to express”. Boycotts, petitions, barricades, and demonstrations are dominant in the

landscape of protest. The marches, boycotts, occupations, and other different forms of action used in the campaigns for global justice have something else in common. They are all part of repertoires of contention.

2.8.2 Critical theory

This study was also guided by critical theory which was coined by the Frankfurt School in 1937. Formulation of critical theory incorporated a wide range of thoughts, including those of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Gramsci and Weber, among others. More recently, around the 1980s, it included other critical theorists like Foucault, Cox, Habermas, and Linklater, to mention but a few. During the Age of Enlightenment, various scholars contributed to the progression of civil society. Ferguson introduced civil society as a developed and redefined society, where civil liberties are protected by the government and a certain level of social, political and economic progress has been reached (Laine, 2014:62).



Critical theory according to Baynes (2002:123) refers to “a tradition of social and political criticism...with a commitment to extending the core ideas of liberalism, especially the idea of a free and rational society, to a critique of the institutions and practices of liberal society itself”. Cohen *et al.* (1994:429) who were influenced by Habermas also defined civil society as a “sphere of associations’ especially voluntary associations, social movements, and forms of public communication”. This refers to the action in which individuals through their membership in different associations helps shape their individual and collective identities which in turn give expression to a public

opinion (Baynes, 2002:130). Some scholars including Habermas identified critical theory within social movements though it was not its foundation and it lacked key characteristics like institutional dimension to tackle politics. This is because movements in the East and South emerged struggling for democracy (Avritzer, 2013:141). Cox in Gabay *et al* (2014: no page) defined critical theory as “seeking to examine the social and political complex as a whole”.

Avritzer (2013:143) further states that “the problem faced by a critical theory of civil society was how to retrieve the concept from the Marxian tradition and to create a concept that may have appeal for social movements”. Gramsci includes family in his civil society because to him it is an institution that can in general shape political dispositions of citizens. In addition to family, some key players associated with civil society are churches, unions, social movements, universities etc because of their role in generating ideas needed to maintain stability. Chambers (2002:91) goes on to explain that “now civil society is seen as a system of ideas, values, ideologies, and yes interests understood primarily in sociological and political terms”.

Held (1980:16) maintains that “critical theorists believe that through an examination of contemporary social and political issues they could contribute to a critique of ideology and to the development of a non-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic politics”. Civil society is the platform of resistance and emancipation, for example key actors can be social movements although citizens can share in the action in a public domain (Chambers, 2002: 96). Gabay *et al* (2014: no page) affirms that critical theory “can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order”. Therefore, South

African-based diaspora movements are endeavouring to bring about an alternative order in Zimbabwe by helping consolidate its democracy.

Laine (2014:65) emphasised that "thanks to Habermas, civil society came to be seen as a public sphere, a coercion-free arena for discussion and mutual learning, detached from the systematizing effects of the state and the economy, where people come together to form a common discourse, the public, and in doing so compel to legitimate itself before public opinion". While civil society had been in limbo for decades, it was revived in the 1990s as its role in democracy, democratisation, and development became understood (Jensen *et al.*, 2005:3). The 1990s witnessed not only an increase in NGOs but also a globalisation of new social movements (NSM). Kumar (2000) explained that "even though the NSMs had linked people together to bring about a social change, these movements were able to establish cross-border linkages and operate at international level, thus becoming mega movements of transnational social movements (TSM's)".

Habermasian critical theorists like Friedman, Honneth and Fraser are mainly interested in the civil society that is particularly political, that takes part in discussions about the common affairs which take place in the public sphere, a space accessible to everyone and is autonomous from the state (Pedraza-Farina, 2013:630). Pedraza-Farina (2013:630) alluded that "an autonomous civil society that is open to all, and in which rational deliberation among equals about the common takes place, can critically evaluate and analyse state policy to expose arbitrary state action, unjustified policies, or underlying assumptions or ideologies behind dominant norms". Therefore, a politically-

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oriented civil society preserves democracy by guaranteeing that the state gives reasons for its policies that can survive basic scrutiny in the public sphere.

Many of the African countries like Zimbabwe that have made transitions to democracy are in severe political crisis now because democracy is simply not working to bring about the most needed developmental progress, accountable government, protection of human rights, and political and social serenity that people want. The key task in the consolidation process is returning the primacy of the rule of law because, in its absence, violence, corruption, and anarchy will be the order of the day. According to Ku (2002:531), Hegel and Marx understand civil society as branded by the "explicit principle of particularistic individualism and an implicit principle of communitarianism". Marxism sees property relations and market economy as the basis for civil society whilst Tocqueville stresses a self-governing civil society in consolidating democracy. On the other hand, Locke did not make a distinction between state and civil society but between civil society and the state of nature. For Locke, the separation of civil society from the state is given and it serves to understand the modern form of civil society that plays a pivotal role in checking the state's despotic tendencies (Magure, 2009:30).

Civil society organisations have the influence to socialise their members with participatory norms and instil a sense of effectiveness in their social and political life. Instilling democratic values and behaviours among its members, a diaspora movement can nurture a culture that supports democracy. A diaspora movement has the power to mobilise its members to resist a tyrannical regime. The most important purpose of civil society is to limit and curtail the authority of the government (Bodewes, 2013:25).

Critical theory does acknowledge that there is bad civil society as well. These are groups, unions, movements or associations that develop when they fail to live up to the principles of democracy, when groups promote hate, organise around xenophobia and largely contribute to an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion between or within social actors (Chambers, 2002:105).

2.9 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

CSOs comprise interest groups, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, mass organisations and social movement. In this chapter, a breakdown of the prevalence of CSOs in Africa, in general, was given and it covered the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. The chapter also outlined the advent of CSOs in Zimbabwe and subsequently how Zimbabwean diaspora movements emerged. The chapter illustrated how CSOs have tried to consolidate democracy in general. In their attempt to consolidate democracy, some of the strategies used were identified in this chapter and above all, challenges encountered were outlined.

The study was guided by two theories, the political process theory and the critical theory. The political process theory looks at how movements mobilise and work to create change. The theory pays attention to five key components that help determine the success or failure of a movement. The critical theory is an integrated analysis of social reality which provides a guide on how the economy, social institutions, and culture, among others, interact to produce a social system. The next chapter discusses the research methodology used for this study.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the researcher outlines and justifies the choice and relevance of the research methodology used in the study. In order to fully investigate the role of South Africa-based Diaspora movements and their pursuit for the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe, a detailed research plan was put in place. Having a concrete research plan helped in producing detailed findings with regards to the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe. For that reason, qualitative research methods, data collection techniques, the sampling method and how data was analysed as well as ethics are discussed here.



3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN

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Creswell (2007:37) stated that “qualitative research begins with assumptions, the possible use of a theoretical lens or the study of research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. To study this problem, qualitative researchers use an emerging qualitative approach to inquiry, the collection of data in a natural setting sensitive to the people and places under study, and data analysis that is inductive and establishes patterns or themes”. Denzin et al. (2000:3) said that qualitative research is “a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world


visible. These practices turn the world into a series of representations including field-notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world". This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, trying to make sense of and interpret phenomena based on the meanings people bring to them.

Qualitative research is useful for understanding a range of societal issues. The qualitative analysis of today's stories and yesterday's historical documents is integral to understanding significant societal events such as social movements (Tracy, 2013:6). Qualitative method has its own unique attributes which include but are not limited to the importance of context, researcher as the data-gathering instrument and flexibility of the research design. The way the research is conducted either by making use of in-depth interviews, observations, focus group discussions or how a story is being narrated depends on the context from which data was obtained and interpreted. Qualitative research places the researcher at the centre of data-gathering though they are guided by written guidelines of what to consider exactly. The researcher as a data-gathering instrument provides an opportunity to develop an in-depth understanding which is beneficial for analysis and interpretation of the outcomes. Flexibility in qualitative research design allows the research to be modified or adapted by the researcher (Roller et al., 2015:4).

Qualitative research is excellent for studying contexts a researcher is curious about but has never before had a valid reason for investigating. Qualitative data provides insight into cultural activities that might otherwise be missed in structured surveys or

experiments. Most importantly, good qualitative research helps people to understand the world, their society, and the institutions. Qualitative methodology can provide knowledge that targets societal issues, questions, or problems and therefore serves humankind. In short, the qualitative method is appropriate and helpful for achieving a variety of research goals either on their own or in a complementary relationship with other research methods (Tracy, 2013:5).

Despite the strengths, there are also weaknesses noted. Qualitative research is highly dependent upon insight and interpretation, and this type of research is highly vulnerable to subjective bias on the part of the researcher. The nature of qualitative research makes it challenging to determine if the research is being conducted properly. Another problem is that qualitative research has a high degree of flexibility and it does not require a highly structured format, hence much controversy is associated with the approach (Rwegoshora, 2014:145).



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With a view to understanding South Africa-based diaspora movements and democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe, this study made use of a qualitative research approach. The rationale for using this method is because it enabled the researcher to gain a broader understanding of South Africa-based diaspora movements and their quest to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe. The nature of the study at hand was more exploratory and because the study sought to comprehend the experience of organisations, in this case selected diaspora movements, the qualitative methodology was more suitable.

The study at hand is purely qualitative and is a case study of South Africa. South Africa was chosen on the basis that it is one of the countries which has a significant number of Zimbabwean immigrants who later formed diaspora movements in their host state. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, and Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement are the identified South Africa-based diaspora movements that were selected for this study. These identified diaspora movements have since their formation been working on consolidating democracy in their home country which made them more appealing to the researcher as their work covers the researcher's area of study.

A case study is a concentrated analysis of an individual unit. Rwegoshora (2014:139) alluded that "case studies are an analysis of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods". Case study research allows research questions to be addressed using multiple sources of data. Yin in Remenyi (2013:2) provided one of the most useful definitions of case study as "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used". Case studies may be descriptive or explanatory and involve an in-depth investigation. A case study provides an organised way of looking at events, collecting data, analysing information, and reporting the results (Rwegoshora, 2014:140). A case study also needs to have a specific storyline which flows coherently from the introduction and background of the research right through to the methodology, to the data collection and so on (Remenyi, 2013:8).

The use of a case study has its advantages and disadvantages. Gagnon (2010:2) identified some of the advantages associated with case studies as “being able to produce an in-depth analysis of phenomena in context; support the development of historical perspectives and guarantee high internal validity and is it adaptable to both the context and the researcher”. The case study also has its limitations that have been identified by Gagnon (2010:3) and he noted that “it is time-consuming for both the researcher and the subjects, and the external validity of the results is problematic, for it is difficult for another researcher to reproduce a case study”. Despite its weaknesses, it is essential in narrowing a very broad field of research into one easily researchable subject.



3.3 DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUES

A good research is determined by the data that drives it, hence, choosing the right techniques for data collection makes a difference. There are different data gathering techniques available for qualitative research. These techniques include the use of documents, observation, interviews, questionnaires and focus groups, among others. However, for this study, the researcher made use of documents and in-depth interviews to gather data.

3.3.1 Primary data

Social research is an activity that is undertaken to find an answer or explanation regarding a particular social phenomenon. It involves systematic collection of data for

the purpose of understanding a social phenomenon. It involves the use of documents as sources. These are wide ranging and include both primary and secondary documents like official government publications, books, newspapers, legal documents, reports and personal diaries, among others. Robinson (2015:187) asserted that “Documents provide crucial links between the past and the present and particular insights into aspects of change and continuity”. The use of documents offers multiple perspectives on a problem or topic. It can also be used to provide reference or background material to a research problem. The main classification of documents is to separate primary and secondary sources (Robinson, 2015:187).

Blaikie (2010:160) described primary data as “data generated by a researcher or researchers who is/are responsible for the design of the study, and the collection, analysis and reporting of the data”. One of the greatest advantages of primary data is the ability to control the information being collected in order to ensure that key issues are addressed. Primary data allows the researcher to ask questions most relevant to the topic under investigation and decide from the information collected what is worthy to be included in the study (Beer et al., 2014:193). Primary data also has its drawbacks for instance data collection may be expensive and time-consuming. The primary sources that the researcher used for this study include official government regulatory frameworks like the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, newspapers, petitions submitted, Facebook and Twitter posts as well as memorandums. Above all, in-depth interviews were one of the major sources for primary data.

3.3.1.1 *In-depth interviews*

Morris (2015:no page) asserted that in-depth interviews involve “a researcher asking questions and following up on the responses of the interviewee in an endeavour to extract as much information as possible from a person who has expertise on the topic the interviewer is interested in”. Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Structured interviews are controlled, with fixed, pre-planned questions. Semi-structured in-depth interviews involve some planning, but there is freedom to vary the sequence of the interview based on the participant’s responses. Unstructured interviews are the least rigid and involve little to no pre-planning (Mack *et al*, 2005:29).

The researcher used structured in-depth interview because it is similar to a conversation where two people are discussing a topic of mutual interest in a more relaxed set-up. This allowed the conversation to be more open and honest. It allowed the respondents to have some leeway in the discussion but the researcher directed the conversation. This was done to ensure that more relevant information was conveyed which covered the study within the allocated time. Above all, in-depth interviews allowed the respondents to tell their story in their own words and the researcher managed to probe more where clarity was needed.

An in-depth interview has both benefits and limitations. Some of the benefits include respondents being able to talk freely and in detail about their experiences and it targets the respondents’ perceptions and feelings rather than the social conditions surrounding those experiences. It allows the involvement of the researcher to access rich personal

data (Kaar, 2012:2). Seidman (2013:7) said about the benefits of in-depth interviews that “the interview gives the researcher access to interviewees’ thoughts, reflections, motives, experiences, memories, understandings, interpretations and perceptions of the topic under consideration. It gives the researcher the opportunity to establish why people construct the world in particular ways and think the way they do”. Limitations of in-depth interviews include, among others, respondents presenting inaccurate information. Data gathered cannot be generalised to the population. In-depth interviews are expensive, transcribing is costly and time consuming (Morris, 2015:no page).

The researcher prior to conducting in-depth interviews contacted participants through emails, phone calls and others the researcher was referred to by other participants. Average time that each interview took was between 45-60 minutes reason being most participants are under the working class. Therefore, the researcher utilised their lunch hour and conducted the interviews from their various workplace whilst some were interviewed from their movement’s office for example, participants from CiZC.

3.3.2 Secondary data

Secondary sources used by the researcher included, among others, textbooks and journal articles. According to Barker et al. (2012: no page), “secondary data refers to data that has been collected for a particular purpose but is available for other researchers to reuse and analyse”. These offered the researcher the chance to explore issues in more depth. Secondary data enabled the researcher to conduct research without having to be present during the historical event. Using secondary data helped

the researcher explain the context for primary research and also in making comparisons. Secondary sources actually provided information for the background as well as literature review. Additionally, these sources worked as a starting point for primary research and helped validate primary data obtained. Thus, Barker et al. (2012: no page) asserted that “collecting primary data replicating the methods of an existing study enables us to compare findings with the existing dataset to explore trends across time, different scales or countries”.

The limitations of secondary data that the researcher encountered was that some of the sources that were consulted did not reflect directly the researcher’s aim and in some instances the way questions were asked was also different to that of the researcher. Blaikie (2010:161) stated that “the most fundamental drawback stems from the fact that this previous research is likely to have been done with different aims and research questions. It may also have been based on assumptions, and even prejudices, which are not readily discernible, or which are inconsistent with those of the current research”. Another limitation faced by the researcher was failing to access some sources that would have been helpful in validating primary data or providing a starting point for some sections of the study. Barker et al. (2012: no page) again stated that “other sources may be accessible only with special permission, which may require lengthy negotiation or trips to specific locations to access the data”. Therefore, the researcher had to be thorough in eliminating biased or prejudiced information. Cross examination of secondary data vis-à-vis primary data from respondents was meticulously carried out to ensure validity and reliability of the study.

3.4 SAMPLING METHOD

In qualitative research, only a sample of a population is selected for any given study. The rationale of using a sample of a population is to make inferences about a larger populace from a smaller one. The study's research objectives and the characteristics of the study population determine which and how many people are to be selected. A sample design is ideal for obtaining a sample from a given population. It is for this reason that according to Kothari (2004:55), sampling is "the technique or the procedure the researcher would adopt in selecting items for the sample". Sample design lays down the number of people to be included in the study. Sample design is determined before data is collected (Kothari, 2004:55). There are many sample designs from which a researcher can choose like quota, convenience, purposive and snowball sampling. For the purpose of this study the researcher used purposive sampling.

3.4.1 Purposive sampling

Etikan et al. (2016:2) described the purposive sampling technique, also called judgment sampling, as "the deliberate choice of a participant due to the qualities the participant possesses. It is a non-random technique that does not need underlying theories or a set number of participants. Simply put, the researcher decides what needs to be known and sets out to find people who can and are willing to provide the information by virtue of knowledge or experience". It is used in qualitative research and involves identification and selection of individuals or groups of individuals that are well informed in the researcher's area of interest. In addition to knowledge and experience, is the

importance of availability and willingness of identified individuals to participate. The idea behind purposive sampling is to focus on people with particular characteristics who will be able to assist with information for the relevant research (Etikan et al., 2016:2). The logic of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research, thus the term purposeful sampling (Patton, 2015:264). Purposive sampling was used in identifying the key people who were interviewed from the selected diaspora movements who were knowledgeable enough to assist the researcher.

3.4.2 Sample size

This refers to the number of people to be selected from the populace to make up a sample. The size of a sample should neither be too large nor too small. It should be optimum. According to Kothari (2004:56), an optimum sample is one which “fulfils the requirements of efficiency, representativeness, reliability, and flexibility. While deciding the size of sample, researchers must determine the desired precision and also an acceptable confidence level for the estimate”. The size of a population variance needs to be carefully considered as in the case of a larger variance, a bigger sample is usually needed. Costs too dictate the size of sample that a researcher can draw from and hence, financial constraints must be taken into consideration when deciding the sample size (Kothari, 2004:56).

The aim of sampling in qualitative research is to get information that is useful for understanding the difficulty, depth, differences, or context surrounding a phenomenon, rather than to represent populations as in quantitative research (Gentles et al., 2015:1782). The researcher conducted in-depth interviews with three members from the three selected diaspora movements and thus interviews were conducted with nine people. Out of the nine participants, eight were male and one female. Interviewing three members from each organisation was important in order to exhaust data and corroborate the information obtained. The researcher did not continue at the end of the nine interviews because it was ascertained then that the point of data saturation had been achieved.

3.5 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS




Qualitative data analysis, according to Flick (2014:6), is “the classification and interpretation of linguistic or visual material to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it”. Qualitative data analysis is also useful in discovering and describing issues in the field. Analysing qualitative data has numerous aims like to describe a phenomenon in detail. The analysis of qualitative data can also focus on comparing several cases to determine what they have in common or what differences exist between them. It may be to identify the conditions on which such differences are based (Flick, 2014:6). The researcher used document and content analysis techniques.

Document analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning to an assessment topic. Analysing documents incorporates coding content into themes similar to how focus groups or interview transcripts are analysed. These primary documents may include mission statements of organisations, reports, Facebook posts, flyers etc. (O'Leary, 2014:no page). The aim of document analysis is to gather facts. The documents are examined by the researcher to answer the main questions of the study. Commonly, the documents are studied with some question or hypothesis in mind. For the researcher of this study, document analysis did not involve the need to collect new data and thus it saved time and was less expensive. This is because document analysis can be done at any time during an evaluation, and was useful at the beginning of this study when the researcher was trying to understand why the area of interest is the way it is. Documents are an excellent source for the purposes, rationale, and history of a programme. Doing document analysis is usually a useful lead to collecting new data and it is this process that contributed to the researcher being able to identify a gap that paved way for this study. Above all, document analysis helped in the validation of data gathered.

Krippendorff (2013:24) defined content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the context of their use”. In content analysis, researchers examine artefacts of social communication. Typically, these are written documents or transcriptions of recorded verbal communications. Content analysis increases a researcher's understanding of a particular phenomenon. At first, content analysis was regarded as a quantitative technique and later it proved useful as

a qualitative technique especially in the political field, in ethnographic research and for discourse analysis (Krippendorff, 2013: 25).

Content analysis requires a context within which the available texts are examined and can answer research questions. The most important advantage of content analysis is that it can be practically discreet (Berg, 2004:269). The researcher organised the data according to content elements and analysed it. This helped the researcher to examine patterns in a replicable and systematic way. Since the researcher carried out in-depth interviews and transcribed the data, content analysis was useful as it looks into transcribed texts. It provided the researcher with insight into complex models of human thoughts. Drisko (2016:6) postulated that “content analysis seeks to develop carefully specified categories that are revised and refined in an interactive, feedback-loop process to ensure credibility and usefulness”. The researcher, in turn, had the opportunity to learn about how subjects of textual materials view their social worlds.



3.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF DATA

Validity in qualitative research indicates how sound the research design, methods and instruments are, and that findings obtained represent the phenomenon being measured. Bradburn (2016) stated that “validity borders around research congruency, a tight fit among research details, research evidence and research conclusion”. Validity requires quality control of knowledge throughout its gathering and analysis process. Therefore, checking for validity ensures information obtained and analysed stands ground from other claims and covers much of the area of interest. Reliability in qualitative research

refers to consistency in findings though it is better off used in quantitative research. Consistency is the key to understanding reliability (Zikmund *et al.*, 2013:301). Qualitative research is mostly valid and reliable to the researcher than to their people because the reality is that people construct within their own social contexts. Therefore, to make sure there is validity and reliability, the researcher made use of different methods and instruments to gather and analyse information. Cross-referencing was done on primary data vis-à-vis existing secondary data to ensure there is conformity.

3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Researchers have an ethical responsibility to their study population. The reason for this is that social researchers investigate the social lives of other people. Therefore, researchers must safeguard the rights, privacy, and welfare of the people and communities that form the centre of their studies. Mostly, concerns about research ethics include issues of plagiarism, harm, consent, privacy and the confidentiality of data (Berg, 2004:43). This study paid attention to informed consent, confidentiality, and anonymity as well as plagiarism.

3.7.1 Informed consent

Mack *et al.* (2005:9) defined informed consent as a “mechanism for ensuring that people understand what it means to participate in a particular research study so they can decide in a conscious, deliberate way whether they want to participate. Informed consent is one of the most important tools for ensuring respect for persons during

research”. The researcher made sure that respondents were aware that they were participating willingly and they had the right to withdraw from the interview at any point with no repercussions. The researcher was aware of the dangers associated with participation in social research and therefore consent was obtained in writing. The researcher made sure that consent was granted before the interviews began and briefly explained the purpose of the study as well as the amount of time the interview might take. Above all, the researcher had an ethical clearance certificate which granted permission to conduct interviews.

3.7.2 Confidentiality and anonymity of participants

Berg (2004:65) explained confidentiality and anonymity respectively – “Confidentiality is an active attempt to remove from the research records any elements that might indicate the subjects’ identities. Anonymity means that the subjects remain nameless”. The researcher and the participant must have a clear understanding concerning the confidentiality of the results and findings of the study (Maree, 2010:307). All participants’ information and responses shared in the course of this study were kept private and abbreviations of selected diaspora movements were used in analysing the data as a way of safeguarding respondents’ identities.

3.7.3 Plagiarism

Plagiarism is one prevailing form of misconduct in research, especially qualitative research. The Oxford dictionary (2012) describes plagiarism as “the practice of taking someone else’s work or ideas and passing them off as one’s own”. Replication of

sentences and phrases without credit constitutes plagiarism. Katju (2011:45) stressed that “a student must not adopt, reproduce ideas, opinions, theories, formulas, and graphics or pictures of another person without acknowledgement”. The researcher is aware that plagiarism violates academic integrity and is akin to theft. The researcher used the plagiarism detecting tool, Turnitin, to rule out chances of unacknowledged copying. According to Harris (2017:10) “a fundamental requirement of academic work is that you clearly distinguish your words and ideas from those of the sources you use. Citation provides the basic mechanism of distinction”. Therefore, for this study, the researcher enclosed all verbatim text with quotation marks, paraphrased texts and acknowledged authors whose works were consulted. Above all, the researcher did abide by the university's rules that prohibit plagiarism.



3.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

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In conclusion, this chapter presented a detailed plan of the research design used in this study. The qualitative research design adopted for the study was described as well as the case study used for this research. The chapter also presented forms of data gathering methods used for the study, which included primary and secondary data. Further, the chapter discussed purposive sampling that was used and the sample size determined; analysis of gathered data that was carried out using document and content analysis. Further aspects covered by this chapter were research ethics for the study, which included having an informed consent, ensuring confidentiality and anonymity and lastly guarding against plagiarism. Also in this chapter, the researcher gave a

breakdown of all methods incorporated as well as their strengths and limitations. The next chapter focuses on the state of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe in general.



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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN ZIMBABWE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The dawn of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 was welcomed by most citizens with great jubilation, expectations, and anticipation of freedom and prospects of progressive development. Their liberators had given up their own freedom to fight against the colonial powers that ruled and oppressed their people (Makumbe, 2012:3). After independence a plethora of CSOs emerged. Most of the CSOs that operated after independence were humanitarian and developmental oriented like, among others, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Organisation for Rural Association for Progress (ORAP) and Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) respectively (Coltart, 2006). These CSOs brought about change to previously marginalised groups. CSOs then had a good relationship with the government because they worked in close collaboration. Masunungure (2014:9) asserted that "in the eyes of the post-independence government, the regime viewed them as allies or partners in development". They often filled a vacuum left by the government, for instance by providing welfare, educational or health services. The government would not have managed to reach their goals without the help of CSOs because they played a complementary role.

However, citizens' celebrations were short-lived after their liberators had savoured power and preferred maintaining the status quo. This led to a collapse of the relationship that had existed between the government and CSOs. Sachikonye (2003:99) alluded that political developments in Zimbabwe had largely been played in what is known as "neo-patrimonial political system in which autocracy is a distinctive feature of the style of rule of President Mugabe". Mugabe and his regime harshly diminished the democratic space and curtailed CSOs by often harassing and threatening them for simply disagreeing with his authoritarian government. CSOs suddenly became the enemy of the state and were in most cases regarded as "imperialistic tools" if they criticised the government (Coltart, 2006).

CSOs often build up an expansive alliance that pushes an authoritarian state into making significant reforms (Makumbe, 2012:3). Again, Sachikonye (2003:99) emphasised that "authoritarian regimes do not easily succumb to that pressure; they often seek to restrict the autonomy of CSOs, which then leads to struggles for democratic rights". Mugabe and his party asserted their power in various ways that made consolidating democracy to be difficult. Their efforts included but were not limited to using state security forces, corruption, media censorship etc. Therefore, based on the research conducted, the purpose of this chapter is to describe how democratic process was stifled and the need to pursue consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe.

4.2 THE REPRESSIVE CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE IN ZIMBABWE

The issue of democratic consolidation has become an important field especially in Africa. Africa's history is largely shaped by its liberation struggles and the rise of such movements that ended up becoming ruling parties. In the case of Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF has been the ruling party since independence. Mugabe's regime became an authoritarian ruling party showing disregard for democratic procedures and institutions. Bratton et al. (2008:42) described Mugabe's regime as "a militarized form of electoral authoritarianism". Electoral authoritarianism is when regimes practice authoritarianism behind the institutional disguises of representative democracy. Multi-party elections are held at national level periodically, yet liberal or democratic standards are violated in a systematic way (Schedler, 2013:1). Similarly, Gumedde (2007:12) affirmed that ZANU-PF became "the symbol of the descent of African liberation movements into brutal dictatorships". Mugabe and his party had the conviction that ZANU-PF would rule permanently and hence their use of violence and repression. Below are some of the identified impediments to the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe, prompting CSOs to operate beyond their borders.

4.2.1 Partisan use of state security forces

State security forces play a crucial role in the implementation of the law to protect all people against human rights violations. The Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013 obliges all security forces to perform their duties without fear or favour and in line with both regional and international bodies. However, in Zimbabwe, this has not been the case

with respect to state security forces. The security forces in Zimbabwe are comprised of Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF), the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the Joint Operations Command (JOC). They have had a history of partisanship on behalf of the ZANU-PF and even go as far as pledging allegiance to the party. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:226) echoed that at one point “the then commander of the ZDF, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, flanked by commanders of Zimbabwe National Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, together with directors of Central Intelligence Organisation openly announced, at a televised press conference, their unequivocal allegiance to ZANU-PF as a political party”.



Contrariwise, section 208 sub-section 2a-d of the Zimbabwean Constitution (2013:100) clearly outlines that “neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions act in a partisan manner; further the interests of any political party or cause; prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause, or violate the fundamental freedoms and rights of any person”. The prejudice of the security forces has turned into abuse against opposition parties as well as CSOs. The Human Rights Watch (2014) noted that “Although the new constitution obligates the security forces to be politically neutral and impartial, this constitutional requirement has been disregarded. Beyond the open endorsement of ZANU-PF, in advance of the 2013 elections, security forces intimidated, beat, and committed other abuses against Zimbabweans perceived to be supporting the MDC or critical of the government. Members of the security forces have committed these abuses with almost absolute

impunity". Though the Constitution strongly points out what is expected from the state security forces, the use of force and violence has been rife.

A case in point is the ZRP which was established under section 219 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe in 2013. Its duty is to preserve internal security and maintain law and order, protect life and property, preserve peace, prevent and detect crime, arrest offenders and subdue civil unrest (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013:104). Despite having their duties outlined for them, the ZRP have been doing quite the opposite. The force has on numerous times obliged to the interests of Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. These law enforcement officers have purportedly disregarded their powers and illogically used excessive force against defenders of human rights or activists, members of the opposition political parties, lawyers for human rights and ordinary citizens.

Chitimira et al. (2016:17) reiterated that "the ZRP was associated with the arbitrary use of excessive force and numerous cases of torture, assault and violence against human rights activists and defenders, members of opposition political parties, and those who criticized government policies". The involvement of the ZRP in the violation of human rights in Zimbabwe was not unintentional because the then Commissioner of Police, Augustine Chihuri, was a strong ZANU-PF supporter who was loyal to both Mugabe and the party. Compagnon (2011:70) asserted that "the commissioner of police, Augustine Chihuri, himself a former combatant in the liberation war, claimed in January 2001 that he was a ZANU-PF member". For that reason, there was the deliberate use of force in stopping anyone who was against Mugabe and the party.

Human Rights Watch (2013) reported that “the leadership of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, led by Commissioner General Augustine Chihuri, has actively pursued a partisan political agenda on behalf of ZANU-PF. On May 1, 2013, in response to media reports that the security forces had met with Tsvangirai to discuss security sector reforms and the role of the security forces after the elections, Chihuri declared that the security forces would never meet with the prime minister and that anyone who reported on or raised the issue risked arrest”. Its leaders were openly pro-ZANU-PF, hence, it was easy to torment civil society and opposition parties. Since the Constitutional obligation of the police is to guarantee and protect all people’s human rights without fear or favour, the ZRP is expected to work within the Constitutional directive. It is compulsory for the ZRP to work and meet citizen’s expectations. However, the mentioning of ZRP during Mugabe’s era brought a bitter discussion over how they selectively have applied the law.



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Makwerere et al. (2012:4) claimed that “Police powers entail great responsibilities and impact heavily on their relationship with the public. If the police do not respect human rights or fail to apply human rights standards, the relationship with the public will be impaired and will make policing difficult. Effective policing requires maximum co-operation with the public”. Sadly, this has not been the case in Zimbabwe and has heavily hampered citizens’ efforts to consolidate democracy. Chitimira et al. (2016:17) reported that “in 2011 the ZRP violently disrupted a peaceful prayer meeting in Harare with teargas and canisters when they stormed a church hall during prayer for peace and dispersed the congregation, which included several church members and community

leaders”. The ZRP has also often barred demonstrators from marching in the streets, dispersed them by using tear-gas, police dogs and rubber bullets, among other repellents.

On July the 14th 2016, the ZRP deployed their officers in the CBD of Harare where vendors were protesting. The police beat and arrested 16 street vendors including Sten Zvorwadza, Lucy Makunde and Wadzanai Mangoma, the leaders of the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe (NAVUZ). Charges of inciting public violence were brought against them. The government had taken a stand to remove all unlicensed street vendors – and this in a country with over 80% unemployment rate. This clampdown was marked by arbitrary arrests, beatings and even destruction of goods (Human Rights Watch, 2016:3).



The police are a broken, largely unethical force in which most people have little faith. According to the U.S. Department of State (2014), “Corruption occurred at every level of the police force but took different forms, depending on position, rank, or location. At the lower levels, corrupt officers extorted nominal to exorbitant fines from the public for varying claimed offences to augment their low salaries. Armed police routinely erected roadblocks, claiming to be looking for criminals or smuggled goods. In many cases, police arbitrarily seized goods for their own consumption or extracted bribes from commuters”. Police have made in-country movement difficult by often mounting illegal roadblocks nationwide along most major roads. In urban areas, a single road could have several checkpoints within a few kilometres. Regardless of court bans against spot

finer, police have collected penalties for minor faults ranging from five dollars to a couple of hundred dollars and demanded instant payment.

Several reports by the media and CSOs documented growing evidence to show that the ZRP are being used to support ZANU-PF's determination to hold on to power at all cost. According to Karekwaivenane (2017:236), the Human Rights NGO Forum observed that "The ZRP has acquired a poor reputation, both for assaulting citizens exercising their constitutional rights of expression and assembly and for being thoroughly partisan, allegedly under the direction and control of the State President and the ruling party". CSO activists as well as political opposition supporters, mainly MDC people, reported that they had been kidnapped and intimidated, beaten and tortured by the police. The police would decline to act against ZANU-PF supporters who were accused of political violence, and instead, they arrested opposition party members who were victims of political violence when they came to lay charges (Karekwaivenane, 2017:236). Compagnon (2011:70) emphasised that "Police station commanding officers were under instructions not to assist assaulted MDC members and not to act against ZANU-PF supporters acting violently". Such actions have damaged the reputation of the police as an institution of the state. The ZRP needs an urgent reform to restore the integrity of the force.

Another security cluster is the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF), under a ZANU-PF member, retired General Constantino Chiwenga who is the former ZDF Commander and currently one of the vice-presidents of the country and Minister of Defence Forces.

The current President Emmerson Mnangagwa is the Commander in Chief. ZDF's

functions are outlined in the Defence Act and entrenched more in the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. Politically, ZDF is answerable to the President as well as the Parliament (Chitimira et al., 2017:15). The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 in section 212 states that the function of defence forces is “to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interests and its territorial integrity and to uphold this Constitution”. Whilst in section 211 it is stated that the defence forces must “respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons and be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to the civilian authority as established in the Constitution”.

According to the U.S. Department of State (2014) “The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force constitute the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF). They are responsible for external security, but the government sometimes uses them for domestic operations”. Their local operations have been mostly showing their support for the ruling party. This is so because some senior members of the ZDF have been directly or indirectly involved in different acts of torture-related political violence against activists and members of the opposition parties during general elections in Zimbabwe.

For example, Chitimira et al. (2017:15) reported “that the ZDF soldiers were deployed across the country to mobilise support for the ruling party by coercing, intimidating, beating and torturing people during the 2008 general elections, especially in the rural areas”. The main reason behind their behaviour is due to the fact that their ZDF leaders openly pledged their allegiance to former president Mugabe of the ruling party ZANU-PF. The International Crisis Group (2013) also reported that the ZDF “declared allegiance to Mugabe and vowed not to recognize any winner lacking liberation war

credentials, a reference to Morgan Tsvangirai”. This shows their strong partisanship with the ruling party. Their allegiance is so far stretched to an extent of being present at annual party conferences of ZANU-PF, an act that contravenes what is enshrined in the Constitution.

Also, Zimbabwe’s ZDF leadership played a critical role on behalf of the ruling party ZANU-PF in the violent presidential runoff campaign in 2008. Since then, under the Government of National Unity (GNU), it has continued to openly and consistently support Mugabe and his party while demeaning Tsvangirai and his party (Human Rights Watch, 2013). During the wave of protests that took place in 2016, they also took part in carrying out crackdowns on activists and participants, intimidating and torturing those suspected of taking part in any protests. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2017:3) reported that “On the 10th of September 2016, Norest Musemwa, was abducted from Hopley farm by six Zimbabwe National Army soldiers who took him from his house and tortured him inside a white minibus accusing him of being a member of Tajamuka”. The ZDF has therefore played and continues to play a major role when it comes to helping the ZANU-PF consolidate power.

Another key security cluster unit is the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) which is an intelligence organ that was formed in 1963 during the colonial Rhodesian era. Tendi (2016:7) asserted that “from inception, CIO was highly politicized because one of its functions was to act as a political instrument in the colonial state’s resistance against pressure for black majority rule”. After independence, the organisation was assimilated into the new Zimbabwe and unfortunately, they even integrated the politicisation of the

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organisation. The CIO became worse under ZANU-PF as it was militarised and was directed by Retired Major General Happyton Bonyongwe from 2003. This means the CIO has been militarised for over two decades.

Human Rights Watch (2013) noted that “within Zimbabwe’s security forces, it is the CIO alone among, the intelligence services which has no legislative framework guiding its institutional setup and operations, there is little information available on its functions”. This means that the CIO conducts their duties arbitrarily because there is no legislative accountability (Chitimira et al, 2017:13). Nare (2011) reported that the MDC once disputed the CIO’s unregulated operations and the non-existence of a framework “the MDC formations claim that the CIO, which is administered through the office of the President, is not covered by any legislative framework”. They subsequently called for a new law to regulate the unit. However, the CIO is inherently classified and is faithfully tied to the presidency and ZANU-PF and free of any concrete guideline by the legislation or government (Asylum Research Consultancy, 2015:52).

A report by Asylum Research Consultancy (2015:53) alleged that the CIO agents and moles regularly monitored political and other meetings. It stated, for example, that CIO personnel at times assumed faculty and other positions or pretended to be students at public and some private universities to threaten and gather intelligence on faculty members and students who critiqued government policies and actions. CIO officers regularly attended classes in which noted MDC activists were lecturers and students. In response, both lecturers and students often practised self-censorship. The CIO also

regularly followed and intimidated people working with international and local human rights organisations and opposition parties (Asylum Research Consultancy, 2015:53).

Civil society leaders and media also reported on the CIO conducting investigations and intelligence gathering on their work and on other people and groups within civil societies and political parties. The CIO, together with the ZRP and ZDF have been involved in the kidnappings, tormenting, beatings, and harassment of professed ZANU-PF opponents, mainly civil society and MDC followers. The CIO was used for spying purposes especially during the Government of National Unity (GNU) period from 2009 to 2013. Tendi (2016:5) highlighted the importance of CIO surveillance, “these state surveillance activities were part of an eclectic ZANU-PF strategy to regain control of urban local government structures, following electoral losses in preceding years”. This was done because most local government officials belonged to the MDC. The CIO hoped to gain inside information that would help ZANU-PF gain control of those government structures.

Furthermore, the CIO stepped up their mass surveillance on civilians through phone-tapping, intercepting emails and scrutinising activities on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Such actions were taken following the disputed elections of July 2013 where ZANU-PF had an outright victory. The Zimbabwe Independent (2013) reported that “soon after elections, the situation was unpredictable as ZANU-PF was unsure of the people’s reaction, so CIO tightened surveillance to intercept communications”. This was done because there was paranoia within ZANU-PF following their victory. Hence, they did not know how the masses would react and so

they resorted to monitor phone calls and social media activities especially of individuals they thought were a threat.

Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2013) reported that “Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court established that, CIO agents abducted and tortured Zimbabwe Peace Project Director Jestina Mukoko, a prominent human rights campaigner in December 2008 in an attempt to induce a false confession”. Mukoko was in charge of collecting information on political violence, especially names of perpetrators and their victims, and to help the victims deal with the abuse. It was further alleged by ZANU-PF that after compiling all the information, she would send it to organisations in Britain and have it published online (Mwanaka, 2013:97). This was the sole reason that had her and others of her Zimbabwe Peace Project members abducted and tortured by the CIO. The CIO has been labelled by citizens as the most brutal and partisan of all state security forces. It has managed to permeate all levels of society and its operations are bounded by the cover of secrecy (Masunungure et al., 2012:140).

Another important security unit is the Joint Operations Command (JOC) which was formed in 2000 as an apolitical unit. JOC is a high-level decision-making body which brought together the Commander of ZDF, Commissioner-General of the ZRP, Director-General of CIO and further added representatives of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) and Emmerson Mnangagwa who was then the vice-president and Minister of Defence Forces. Sachikonye (2011:48) briefly outlined how JOC originated, stating that “JOC was first established in colonial Zimbabwe in 1966 in response to incursions of nationalist guerrillas. At that juncture, it was a

structure under which the police, army, air force and intelligence co-ordinated their operations against the nationalist movement. After 2000, JOC co-ordinated responses to what was perceived as an opposition threat as well as from other forces that loathed Mugabe's regime". JOC further politicised state securities and made them to be troopers of a particular party and also militarised the state. This was a pure violation of the existing constitutional framework under which state security personnel are forbidden from active participation in politics as organised units (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:228).

Masunungure et al. (2012:138) agreed with Sachikonye on why JOC was formed and he stated that "The body was formed to coordinate the security sector activities aimed at resolving the perceived threats stemming from both external and internal forces. The military began to organise internally along the lines of operational zones to control the growth and development of the opposition and maintain the hegemony of ZANU-PF". Militarisation of these security organs meant that the political space for opposition parties and other civic groups had now also been militarised. This is due to the fact that JOC is all about ensuring the survival of ZANU-PF.

JOC played a vital role during the violent 2008 elections. ZANU-PF had lost the major presidential seat to Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T party. There were rumours that during the March 2008 elections, Mugabe had accepted defeat. Tendi (2010:258) claimed that "Mugabe's first response to his loss in the March election was to initiate meetings between the MDC and ZANU-PF to discuss conceding defeat and the possibility of power-sharing". Despite this claim, the rumoured peace-making moment was short lived because JOC influenced a violent crackdown against opposition

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followers as a way of retaining power, especially the presidential seat. Earlier on, just before the 2008 elections, the military had made it clear that it was not going to recognise 'sell-outs' referring to the MDC party (Tendi, 2010:258).

Former commander of the ZDF, retired General Chiwenga, who was also a member of JOC was quoted in Masunungure et al. (2012:139) saying "Elections are coming and the army will not support or salute sell-outs and agents of the West before, during, and after the presidential elections...We will not support anyone other than President Robert Mugabe, who has sacrificed a lot for this country". General Chiwenga's predecessor, General Vitalis Zvivanashe, had previously echoed the same sentiments during the 2002 elections. Zvivanashe said "Let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone, with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people" (Masunungure et al, 2012:139). Thus, Chiwenga was merely reiterating his predecessor's thoughts.

JOC was behind the planning and execution of Operation Makavhoterapapi (Operation whom did you vote for). The strategy to the campaign, Operation Makavhoterapapi, was coined around what they code-named CIBD (Coercion, Intimidation, Beating and Displacement). The whole operation was to identify and punish individuals who voted against Mugabe during the March 2008 elections. Masunungure in Sachikonye (2011:49) affirmed that "It began in the rural areas, and within them, in the three provinces of Mashonaland West, East, and Central. Incidentally and ironically, these

were ZANU-PF strongholds from Mashonaland provinces. The violence spread to other provinces and from rural areas spread to urban centres. In a tragic sense, the whole country was unified, in violence, and its pattern was the same, indicating a central point of organisation and execution". Such incidences instilled deep fear among citizens as their freedom was abused to such an extent that it became difficult to either express which political party they supported, or participate in anything that was political. The violence was so bad, to an extent that most people equated it with what happened during the Gukurahundi era. JOC was now the real power behind Mugabe and its aim was to have a submissive civil society.

4.2.2 Repressive legislations



Zimbabwe has experienced incomparable economic, social and political changes. These changes saw the enactment of new legislation and in some cases the amendment of existing law. Most of the changes were detrimental to the citizens who had over the years become impatient with the deterioration of democracy. Citizen participation in any aspect of life, especially political was now guided by partisan pieces of law. These laws, instead of protecting the populace, limited human rights (Mapuva et al., 2012:127). Some of these laws include the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act among others.

The POSA of 2002 replaced the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) of 1960 which was a Rhodesian law that was adopted in the new Zimbabwe after gaining its

independence in 1980. Initially LOMA only served to pursue white minority interests whilst blacks' rights were downtrodden. LOMA's purpose was to stifle public gatherings, impose curfews and even prohibit meetings, among other restrictions. Mugabe used LOMA to subdue rebellion against his regime (Mapuva et al, 2012:135). There was also the Official Secrets Act (OSA) which was later adopted under AIPPA and which led to the closure of many media houses (Muchena, 2013:70). All this happened during the tenure of Professor Jonathan Moyo who then was the Minister of Information.

POSA forbids being disrespectful towards the office or person of the President, expressing words which are likely to challenge regulating authority and communicating false or prejudicial information to the state. In practice, many individuals have been detained and charged under these laws. Such laws cause individuals and organisations to censor themselves or engage in selective and thorough appraisals before communicating any information in the public sphere (Asylum Consultancy, 2015: 87). For example, in August of 2015, three journalists were detained by the police because they had covered a union-led demonstration over job cuts and they were even warned that they could share the same fate as Itai Dzamara, an activist and journalist who was abducted in March 2015 (Freedom House, 2017:784).

Human Rights Watch (2014) noted that "both the power-sharing government prior to August 2013 and the new administration have failed to amend repressive laws, such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act, which severely curtailed basic rights through vague defamation clauses and draconian penalties".

AIPPA oversees the operations and general conduct of the media in a way that leaves the media with little space to do their work. More so, contravening the Act carries a minimum penalty of two months in prison or a fine of US\$ 10 000. Also, contravening POSA has a stiffer penalty of up to 20 years behind bars (Muchena, 2013:71). Failure to make changes or rescind these laws harshly restricts freedom of association, assembly and access to information.

Police sometimes use unwarranted force to dissolve demonstrators, resulting in injuries. The political space continues to be tightly controlled by the state and its forces. For example, the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) CSO encountered repeated restrictions on its freedom of expression and assembly. In February 2013, about 30 members were beaten by ZRP officers while taking part in a peaceful march. This continued throughout the year and at one point, in September 2013, members were arrested twice in one week for peaceful marches. In November 2013, numerous members of WOZA were beaten in Bulawayo as they peacefully protested under their new right to petition enshrined in the Constitution of 2013 (Asylum Consultancy, 2015: 114). These sections of legislature were used to deny people their rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, despite assurances under the new Constitution of 2013.

According to Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2014:12), "On 13 February 2014, police banned a protest march organised by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association and 60 other Civil Society Organisations to demonstrate against the abuse and misuse of public resources by local authorities and some parastatals. The ban was put into

effect in spite of ZimRights having notified Police of its intention to stage the demonstration in Harare. Police argued among other reasons that ZimRights did not furnish the police with information on the regalia the protesters would be putting on". The provisions of POSA in section 24 of the act, regarding public gatherings, simply requires that the police should be notified a few days prior to meeting. Despite this provision, the police deliberately disperse people and often give vague excuses for doing so (Muchena, 2013:72).

Citizens have the freedom to demonstrate and petition their grievances. Just like the Arab Spring, Zimbabwe also had its wave of protests especially in 2016. Unfortunately, these protests did not yield the desired results because the police quickly moved in and repressed the rising dissenting voices. A total of 40 cases were reported in relation to the abuse of freedom to demonstrate and petition. On the 1st of September 2016, the police issued a ban on peaceful protests and marches with immediate effect in central Harare. Activists did not leave it lying and took the matter to the High Court where it was declared unconstitutional which meant the ban was lifted. However, on the 13th of September, the ban was imposed under POSA and the ban lasted till December 2016 (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2017:7). Even though there was a ban in place, this did not entirely stop activists and opposition parties from mounting pressure on Mugabe and his government.

Again, press freedom in Zimbabwe remains regulated and access to information continues to be closely controlled. The new Constitution provides for freedom of expression and access to information, subject to some limitations. However, an

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otherwise draconian legal framework continues to obstruct the activities of journalists and media houses. The 2002 AIPPA requires all journalists and media houses to register, and gives the Minister of Information comprehensive powers to decide which media houses can operate legally and who is able to work as a journalist. Unlicensed journalists can face criminal charges and a sentence of up to two years in prison (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:126).

Human Rights Watch (2014) argued that “sections of AIPPA and POSA that provide criminal penalties for defamation, or for undermining the authority of, or insulting the president, have routinely been used against journalists and human rights defenders”. Activists and journalists continue to be wrongly prosecuted and charged under these laws. Zimbabwe’s laws impede heavily against journalists and media houses’ freedom, with the media being exposed to far too many legal limitations making it hard for them to carry out their watchdog role. AIPPA has made it extremely difficult for journalists to publish any news without being charged. This in turn has weakened investigative journalism (Mpofu et al., 2013:84).

The government continues to curb freedom of the press and continues to regulate the state-run media tightly. In Mugabe’s reign, high-ranking ZANU-PF officials used the media to intimidate violence against critics of the government and regularly threatened independent media houses with the forfeiture of their licences for criticising ZANU-PF and Mugabe (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:127). Apart from the above claim, no journalists are allowed to practise without certification. The Commission has the powers to deny anyone they do not like to get accreditation (Mpofu et al., 2013:84).

4.2.3 Human rights abuse

Chapter 4 section 66 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 includes the following provision in relation to the freedom of movement: every Zimbabwean citizen has the “right to enter Zimbabwe; immunity from expulsion from Zimbabwe; and the right to a passport or other travel document. Every Zimbabwean citizen and everyone else, who is legally in Zimbabwe has the right to move freely within Zimbabwe; reside in any part of Zimbabwe, and leave Zimbabwe”. However, in reality, the state has complete control over travel and residence. The government has seized the passports of its domestic opponents and foreign critics are routinely expelled or denied entry (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:140).



Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) noted that “even after the formation of the GNU, state forces have acted as protectors of ZANU-PF, while unlawfully arresting ministers of MDC parliamentarians, party supporters, journalists, civil society activists and ordinary citizens”. A number of individuals, including former government officials, prominent businessmen, human rights activists, MDC members, and human rights lawyers, left the country and remained in self-imposed exile due to fear of persecution (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:141). Although irrational and politically motivated incarcerations and arrests have dropped, they have not stopped entirely and the laws are applied quite selectively to MDC supporters and CSOs opposed to ZANU-PF.

Authorities often did not allow detainees swift or regular access to their lawyers and often communicated to lawyers who tried to visit their clients that detainees were

unavailable, especially in cases involving MDC members and civil society activists. Often, authorities moved detainees overnight or during weekends from one police station or prison to another, and police declined to reveal the new location to families or lawyers. Authorities sometimes denied family members access unless accompanied by an attorney, and at times, family members were denied access in politically sensitive cases. Detainees were often held in solitary confinement (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:71).

Arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions, and false charges have been used increasingly as tools to silence individuals and groups working to promote human rights. Independent journalism is under threat with journalists regularly arrested and charged (Amnesty International, 2014). For instance, Itai Dzamara, a pro-democracy activist, journalist and a human rights defender was abducted on the 9th of March 2015. He was the brains behind Occupy Africa Unity Square which led a number of peaceful demonstrations regarding the worsening political and economic situation in Zimbabwe in 2014 and 2015. He lobbied for Mugabe to resign and for changes to the electoral system. Police and ZANU-PF supporters beat him on numerous occasions. The worst assault was in November 2014 when about 20 uniformed police handcuffed and beat him with baton sticks until he lost consciousness. When his lawyer tried to mediate, the police beat him up, breaking his arm (Human Rights Watch, 2016:2). On the fateful day he disappeared, witnesses claim that he had been abducted from a local barbershop in Glenview, Harare. The suspected security agents handcuffed him forcing him into a truck with obscured licence plates (Human Rights Report, 2015:3).

Sometime in 2016, Itai Dzamara's younger brother, Patson Dzamara, was also arrested. Chitimira et al. (2017:11) narrated that 'Most recently, Patson Dzamara was arrested and allegedly tortured by the members of the security services in April 2016 after he staged a peaceful one-man demonstration to request the release of his brother Itai Dzamara, who had allegedly been abducted by security officials in 2015'. Since then, no one knows the whereabouts of Itai Dzamara and the state also denies knowing of his whereabouts or any involvement. However, The Zimbabwe Mail (2018) reported that Professor Jonathan Moyo, who is currently in exile, said the following on his Twitter handle "In March 2015 Mohadi told Government that Dzamara was likely abducted and taken out of Zim in a staged anti-government plot. That March ED (Mnangagwa) told Parly (parliament) ZRP were after culprits. It later transpired Dzamara was abducted by MID under Chiwenga, now VP with Mohadi. So ED and his VPs must ACCOUNT". Strangely, when Moyo was still in government he dismissed the accusations that Dzamara had been kidnaped saying he possibly left the country. However, now that his pointing fingers at specific individuals, citizens are so keen on seeing what next will happen. Will the truth be revealed or forever concealed is the question people are asking.

Lengthy pre-trial arrest remained a problem, and some detainees were imprisoned for several months before hearing or sentencing due to a shortage of magistrates and court interpreters, poor administrative procedures, and political reasons. For instance, as of October 2011, four of 29 MDC-T activists arrested in May 2011 were denied bail on six occasions and remained in custody for 29 months. Rebecca Mafikeni, MDC-T Youth

Assembly deputy organising secretary, died of illness in August 2011 while in custody (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:85).

The Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) also reported that “teachers were intimidated with threats of physical harm into supporting a particular political party during the parliamentary and presidential elections in July 2013. For example, in Mashonaland Central province, teachers were drafted into ZANU-PF structures and forced to campaign for the party against their will. On voting day, they were told that they should plead illiteracy so that they could be assisted to vote by ZANU-PF supporters”. The country’s teachers, lecturers, and students teach and learn under threats of arrest, abduction, torture, or assassination by police and state-sanctioned youth militias. Schools and colleges became militarised environments (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:110).



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The political climate in Zimbabwe is not conducive for any positive development to take place. The researcher observed that elections are highly manipulated and always accompanied by violence against citizens. Given the history of electoral violence and intimidation, Masunungure et al. (2012:17) argued that “the Zimbabwean electorate yearns for free, fair and credible elections that produce an uncontested outcome”. Human rights abuses have diminished political participation by citizens and civil society, shaping a fearful citizenry. There is widespread police brutality as well as police corruption. There is a restriction on press freedom, curtailed freedom of expression as well as harassment of opposition. Masunungure et al. (2012:17) reinforced this claim and stated that “every dimension of political liberties has registered a steep decline, with

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people feeling the sharpest decline in respect of freedom of speech”. The confidence in democratic liberties is being gradually replaced by a resurgence of political fear (Bratton, 2010:3). This is confirmed when people have to be conscious of what they say politically and also to whom they are talking. Above all, human rights abuses have dampened citizens’ will to participate politically.

The new Constitution warrants civil liberties including freedom of speech, press and media and assembly as well as association. However, there is tight control of electronic media and further controls on mobile telephone communications. Such mass tailing has affected the ability of opposition political parties as well as CSOs to organise and the lack of privacy afforded to them had a huge bearing on consolidating democracy (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2014). Concerning internet content, it is rarely blocked or filtered. The law authorises the government to monitor all communications in the country including internet transmissions, and the government sometimes limits access to the Internet.

Freedom House (2014) noted that “Despite the lack of internet censorship, in a week leading up to the 2013 elections, the telecommunications regulator Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) reportedly issued a directive to the private mobile phone provider Econet, to block the dissemination of bulk SMS messages sent through its international gateway and internet café owners reported slow internet connectivity”. Also, in 2011 the Zimbabwe government blocked Blackberry’s internet services for Zimbabwean registered Blackberries including its messaging services because these services were encrypted and did not comply with

the interception of the Communications Act which allows the government to intercept and monitor communications (Asylum Consultancy, 2015:128). This shows the extent to which basic human rights are belittled in Zimbabwe.

Serious concerns remain, including political violence, and harassment of political opposition, journalists, judges, human rights defenders and ordinary citizens. Many international human rights indicators still rank Zimbabwe among the worst countries in the world in terms of violations of civil liberties, political rights and press freedom (Human Rights and Democracy Report, 2015). In 2016, there was a new wave of protests that took place whereby citizens engaged in social movements such as the hashtag This Flag (#ThisFlag) led by Pastor Evan Mawarire and the hashtag Tajamuka/Sesijikile (#Tajamuka/Sesijikile) led by Promise Mkhwananzi, among other protests. These protests were mainly against the deteriorating economic conditions. And both these movements vowed not to stop protesting till Mugabe stepped down (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2017:1).

State security agents moved in to quell the protests and resorted to the use of force, arbitrary arrests, abductions and torture. In the process, Promise Mkhwananzi and Evan Mawarire were arrested. The Dawson (2016) reported that “Mawarire, one of the key players in the stay-away protest, was arrested on 12 July on charges of inciting public violence and disturbing the peace. Charges of subversion were added at the last minute”. Such a move saw about 200 lawyers volunteering to represent him in court, whilst thousands of protesters donning their flags patiently waited outside for the verdict. He was eventually found not guilty and released.

Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum documented some of the incidents that took place during the protest wave of the #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka/Sesijikile. According to Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2017:3), “On the 29th of August 2016, the victim was grabbed by three men and bundled into a car along Harare Street in the CBD. They drove around Harare interrogating him asking why he had been to the courts and his links with Evan Mawarire. He was finally left at his home and advised to stay away from politics”. There was a rise in cases of abduction during this wave as security forces embarked on a mission to identify activists as well as citizens who organised and participated in these protests.

4.2.4 Politicisation of the judicial system

The Zimbabwean judiciary system has seven courts and they are from the highest to the lowest, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, High Court, Administrative Court, Labour Court, Magistrates Courts and Customary law Courts (Saki et al., 2016). Judicial independence is vitally important for the fair administration of justice and for the upholding of the rule of law. Cox (2006:567) mentioned the reasons behind judiciary independence as “to guard against abuse of executive power, to halt legislative erosion of fundamental human rights, and to provide assurances to the public that judges are impartial and fair in their decision-making processes”. Zimbabwe’s Constitution 2013 also states that the judiciary should be independent for rule of law to prevail and for good governance.

Court cases in Zimbabwe take a long time to be finalised as they are regularly postponed. Selective application and interpretation by law enforcement officials and the Attorney General's office limit access to justice and the freedom of political actors opposed to ZANU-PF. Several high profile court cases highlighted these problems (Human Rights and Democracy Report, 2015). The politicisation of the judiciary to make a complaint is contrary to the rule of law and the administration of justice. The intimidation of judges who pass verdicts that are different with the ruling party's interests is a matter of concern. Mugabe openly condemned judges who acted in a way which he remarked as being unfavourable to the ruling party (Hofisi et al, 2017: no page).


Legal experts claimed that defendants in politically sensitive cases were more likely to receive a fair hearing in magistrates courts than in higher courts, where judges were more likely to make politicised decisions. ZANU-PF partisans used intimidation to force magistrates, particularly rural magistrates, to rule in the government's favour. Other judicial officers such as prosecutors and private attorneys also faced pressure in politically charged cases, including harassment and intimidation. Some urban-based junior magistrates, however, demonstrated a greater degree of impartiality and granted MDC and civil society activists bail, against the government's wishes (Asylum Research Consultancy, 2015:59).

Zimbabwe's civil societies have been trapped in the middle of a political tug of war and the legality of their work is repetitively challenged by the state media. They were claiming that the CSOs were part of an unlawful regime change plan by the west opposing Mugabe's policies. Such allegations were followed by police invasions,

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incarcerations and dragging court cases. The trials of activists did not necessarily result in sentences, but efficiently paralysed the organisations through regular court attendances of the leaders. This created fear of long-term imprisonment amongst activists (Amnesty International, 2014).

The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, but this right has often been compromised due to political pressure. Defendants should enjoy an assumption of innocence under the law until proven guilty; however, this right is not always respected. Trials have been held by magistrates or judges without juries and were open to the public except in cases involving minors or state security matters. Advisers in lieu of juries could be appointed in cases in which the offence could result in a death penalty or lengthy prison sentence. Every defendant has the right to a lawyer of their choosing, but most defendants in magistrates' courts did not have legal representations (Human Rights Report, 2015:11).



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For many years, Zimbabwe was well-known as one of the few African states which upheld a truly independent judiciary. The judiciary system like the security forces is now highly controlled by ZANU-PF and corruption is widespread. According to Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) "The Supreme Court and High Court frequently passed verdicts that ran against the government line or even forced the government to withdraw a certain measure. This independence has, however, been consistently eroded since 2000, when the ZANU-PF led government first demanded the membership of the Supreme Court and then replaced its independent members with government cronies. In the review period, few if any judges in the Supreme Court or High Court can be considered

independent". These judges were close to ZANU-PF and to Mugabe, who in return rewarded them with farms, houses etc. Judges who ruled against ZANU-PF risked losing their job like in the case of Justice Fergus Blackie a former High Court Judge who condemned the invasion of white-owned farms by ZANU-PF supporters. He was arrested on corruption charges and consequently lost his job (Kunambura, 2017).

Section 164 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) clearly states the independence of the judiciary. It states that "The courts are independent and are subject only to this constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially, expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice", among other points listed. Section 165 subsequently establishes the principles guiding the judiciary. Thus it reads that in exercising judicial authority, members of the judiciary must be guided by some of the following principles "justice must be done to all, irrespective of status; justice must not be delayed, and to that end, they must perform their judicial duties efficiently and with reasonable promptness. When making a judicial decision, a member of the judiciary must make it freely and without interference or undue influence". The new Constitution provides for an autonomous judiciary, but executive influence and meddling remain a problem. The ZANU-PF is guilty of meddling and choosing when to abide by court rulings. The party made it public that it will defy court rulings it does not like. Kunambura (2017) stated that Mugabe once said, "We will respect judges where the judgements are true judgements". ZANU-PF does not respect this, instead they undermine both the judiciary and the Constitution whenever it suits them.

The meddling with the operation of the courts meant that cases brought forward by citizens were less likely to succeed. Regardless of all the frustrations, individual citizens, opposition parties and CSOs did not stop approaching the courts. The objective of their continued approach to the courts was not to get a favourable court ruling as this had proved to be pointless. However, their objective was to secure an authoritative record of events which could be used to get justice at some point in the future when a less compromised judiciary was in place (Karekwaivenane, 2017:237). Coltart, MDC Secretary for Legal Affairs (2006: 23), stated that “The cases pride a valuable record for the future as they detail numerous human rights abuses including crimes against humanity. The time will come when evidence will be used to secure justice on the behalf of the thousands of Zimbabweans who have suffered under the brutal ZANU-PF regime. The time will also come when the same evidence will be used to bring to justice those responsible for these human rights abuses and crimes against humanity”. This means there is still a beacon of hope that some people might face the law once judiciary integrity has been restored, otherwise as it stands citizens have lost faith in the judiciary system.

4.2.5 Militarisation of elections

Transparent, free and fair elections with indisputable outcome are central to any country’s transition and are a vehicle of developing as well as consolidating democracy. The greatest challenge faced by Zimbabweans has been the holding of credible, free and fair elections since 1980. However, the issue of elections worsened post-2000. Masunungure et al. (2012:125) viewed elections held post-2000 as “elections without a

choice, which are a mere institutional façade of democracy”. Elections are an important component of democracy and not an end in itself. Bratton in Masunungure et al. (2012:126) clearly put it that ‘while you can have elections without democracy, you can’t have democracy without elections”. Thus, not holding elections makes democracy lose its essence.

The electoral competition became intense after 2000 when the MDC was formed and proved to be a contending party for ZANU-PF. This hardened the ZANU-PF party and they took a drastic measure of militarising the electoral arena. At first, the state security forces, that is the police, military and intelligence concealed their partisanship towards ZANU-PF (Masunungure et al, 2012:128). Fast forward to the 2008 run-off presidential elections which were by far the most violent elections since Zimbabwe had gained its independence. Most MDC supporters were targeted and abducted or tortured and the worst cases were of people who were maimed for simply supporting Morgan Tsvangirai and his party.


The 2008 incidences can best be described in what Diamond (2016:150) called pseudo-democracy. He explained pseudo-democracy as regimes that “lack an arena of contestation sufficiently open, free and fair so that the ruling party can readily be turned out of power if it is no longer preferred by a plurality of the electorate”. The first elections that were held on 29 March 2008 perceived victory for Tsvangirai and his MDC party. On realising that there was a possibility that MDC-T had won, Mugabe and his ZANU-PF did everything within their power to frustrate and confuse everyone from international and regional bodies to the citizens of Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF and its

sympathisers deliberately delayed the announcement of results. When the results were finally released, MDC-T had won but the flipside of it was that the candidate had failed to meet the required threshold that would guarantee an outright victory (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:158). Subsequently, it led to the presidential run-off elections. Bratton et al. (2008:51) described the presidential run-off elections as an “electoral cleansing”.

The parliamentary local government elections were fairly trouble-free and the outcome was timely announced and generally accepted by all. The hotly sought-after presidential seat brought with it a lot of unwarranted drama. The run-off election was marred by extreme and incomparable state-sponsored violence and intimidation that inculcated deep and widespread fear in the electorate throughout the country (Masunungure et al., 2012:131). This forced Morgan Tsvangirai to pull out of the race and in the process erode the credibility of the elections. The 2008 violent elections made quite a number of people to shy away from voting with fear of reliving what transpired at the time. Thus, there have been continual calls from opposition political parties, CSOs and donor communities for electoral reforms to be put in place. Apart from elections being militarised, the electoral space is also constrained by the draconian repressive laws POSA and AIPPA that were explained earlier on. These repressive laws collectively infringe upon fundamental political freedom and civil liberties. If there is going to be an electoral reform, the above-mentioned laws must be repealed so as to enhance effective citizen participation.

4.3 THE FUTURE OF CSOs IN ZIMBABWE

The Zimbabwe government under Mugabe and ZANU-PF was authoritarian in nature and is intolerant towards CSOs' activities. This is illustrated by their use of violence towards CSOs which is carried out by state security forces that are pro- ZANU-PF. CSOs are permitted to carry out independent activities although the space is restricted. The repressive legislations actually guide and limit the much needed space because of laws in place like POSA and AIPAA. Kuzhanga (2013:52) mentioned that "it is worth noting that the intolerance by the government in allowing CSOs engage independently in their activities is carried out in an indirect way through the use of laws like AIPPA and POSA". There is also the abuse of human rights, politicisation of the judicial system and the militarisation of elections that have all contributed to the downfall of most CSOs. CSOs based in Zimbabwe need to find ways to adapt to the existing political environment for them to survive.



Given the above-mentioned impediments that have mired the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe, the onus is now on CSOs in Zimbabwe to at least try and make changes that will restore democracy. ZANU-PF has over the years diminished CSO spaces following their call for a one party state, calling CSOs to join the party as a way of showing their allegiance. Moyo in Chirimambowa et al. (2014:74) summed it up by stating "some organisations bled to death because they failed to find and political space for independent policy action arising from self-organisation without state tutelage". The CSOs need to reinvent bearing in mind the closed spaces for CSOs endured in the last decades under an independent Zimbabwe. CSOs have become

used to political repression and violence directed at them by state security forces and unending court cases levelled against them. Some CSOs have managed to brave the attacks whilst others succumbed to the pressure (Kode et al., 2017). The CSOs in Zimbabwe need to reconfigure and perhaps revisit concepts like democracy, rule of law, good governance and human rights and project them in a way that will give CSOs a new voice and a more sustainable future (Chirimambowa et al., 2014:88).

4.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter described the state of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe. Some impediments were briefly explained. Partisan use of state security which includes ZRP, ZDF and CIO; repressive legislations, human rights abuse, politicisation of the judicial system and militarisation of elections have played a role in impeding the consolidation of democracy. The above impediments have made it difficult for democracy to be consolidated and also diminished the space for CSOs to operate freely. Therefore, CSOs need to change their strategy and adapt to the existing political environment for them to survive. Having identified some of the impediments that make it difficult for CSOs to operate within Zimbabwe, the next chapter provides a detailed analysis on strategies used by South African based CSOs in their quest to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER FIVE: BACKGROUND AND STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY SELECTED DIASPORA MOVEMENTS IN THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN ZIMBABWE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter enlightened us on the state of consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe. It identified some of the factors that have been impediments to the efforts of CSOs based in Zimbabwe in consolidating democracy. This chapter acknowledges the existence of diaspora CSOs and pays attention to the strategies used by South Africa-based diaspora movements in enhancing consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe. Before identifying strategies used for the purpose of this study, a general description is given below on how other diaspora movements have vested interests in their homelands, and how they have consolidated democracy in their homeland.

Looking at some West African countries for instance, Gambia has a notable number of diaspora movements that have shown political interest in their homeland. The military rule that was used in the country informed diaspora political activism which saw the rise of different diaspora movements. Diaspora movements included the Coalition for Change Gambia (US/Senegal based), Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Gambia (US based), Gambians for Democracy and Development (Norway/Sweden based) and Gambia Youth for Unity (US/UK based). All the mentioned diaspora movements had one thing in common which is the willingness to bring back and

consolidate democracy in their homeland. These diaspora movements have engaged different strategies like protests, lobbying host states as well as international organisations and using the Internet as a mobilisation tool. Their efforts yielded positive results because they managed to influence the drive to restore and consolidate democracy, which in December 2016 resulted in Yahya Jammeh's government losing elections. This mapped the road to a new political dispensation for Gambians (Jaw, 2017:114).

Other examples include movements like the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Civil Liberty Organisation (CLO) and Campaign for Democracy (CD) which are some of Nigeria's diaspora-based organisations. These diaspora movements, among other Nigerian pro-democracy groups based in the UK, US and Canada, are a central locus of political mobilisation that played a pivotal role in removing military governments in Nigeria during the 1990s. These diaspora movements have all worked towards the development and above all survival of democracy. Adebayo et al. (2016: no page) accentuated that "through identification with the homeland, diasporas wherever dispersed often direct their civic engagements toward home countries and invest in homeland politics". These Nigerian diaspora movements, like other civic organisations, have also used various strategies such as social media, lobbying, advocating and even protests. They normally protested in cities across the America and Europe as a way of trying to promote and consolidate democracy in Nigeria (Adebayo et al., 2016: no page). However, for the purpose of this study, diaspora movements identified and whose strategies were explored are Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (ZEF), Zimbabwe

Revolutionary Youth Movement (ZRYM) and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC). Political process theory helped in explaining how these diaspora movements were formed, what motivated them and choice of strategies they used in their pursuit to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe.

5.2 AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED CASE STUDIES

Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (ZEF) was formed in 2003 by a group of displaced lawyers, and political and economic refugees, who are resident in South Africa. Their objectives are to combat impunity and achieve justice and dignity for victims of human rights violations occurring in Zimbabwe, with particular emphasis on the exiled victims; to advocate, lobby, litigate and document human rights abuses on Zimbabweans – mostly those who fled the country; to provide any other assistance necessary for the dignity and well-being of all exiles from Zimbabwe, in particular victims of torture, political violence, and other human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. Above all, their main objective is to cultivate and foster a sense of national pride and patriotism among Zimbabwean exiles with a view to facilitating return to Zimbabwe after democracy has been restored (Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, 2016). Their targeted population is the Zimbabwean immigrants because these are people who have been persecuted either for opposing the government or for being members of the opposition and forced to flee to ensure their safety.

Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC) was registered in Johannesburg in 2004 though it was initially formed in 2001 back in Zimbabwe. CiZC works on human rights issues,

political freedom, electoral reform, democratic governance, peace, and development. Their main aim is to enhance civil society's capacity to deal with socio-economic and political crises, through encouraging well-coordinated strategic planning and action; to promote freedom and democratic values through encouraging dialogue, tolerance and the shaping of ideas by Zimbabweans from all walks of life (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003). Additionally, they also carry out research on socio-economic and political issues affecting Zimbabweans locally and in the diaspora.

Their vision is to see a democratic Zimbabwe and they believe that civil society has a critical role to play in nurturing and sustaining a culture of respect especially for principles and values of good governance, openness, and accountability within Zimbabwe. CiZC works locally, regionally and internationally but their main focus is on Zimbabwe (Peace Direct, 2017). The following is CiZC's breakdown of what their organisation is all about:



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“Our mission is to coordinate civil society efforts to find a lasting solution to the multi-layered crisis in Zimbabwe and build a new democratic social, economic and political order. CiZC has three primary objectives and these are to be a one-stop shop for information on Zimbabwe and this information is used by Zimbabweans in the Diaspora, policymakers and the media. The second one was to be an institution or to be an office that connects Zimbabweans in the Diaspora to issues back home as in doing advocacy on Zimbabwean issues together with Zimbabweans in the Diaspora with the hope of influencing the region and international community. Then the third one was to be a link between Zimbabwean civics, diplomatic community and the media through advocacy, lobbying and many other activities”.

Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement (ZRYM) was formed in South Africa 2008.

ZRYM outlined the objectives of their organisation as follows:

“When the organisation was formed our objectives was to create a platform for the young people to observe and express what was unfolding back home. As we understand mostly 60-80% of the population is composed of the young people, so we were trying to come up with a platform which can highlight what is unfolding home in terms of the misrule by Mugabe. How the ZANU-PF have mismanaged public funds and the eruption of corruption at an alarming rate within the country. Another objective was to shed light to the world at large on what was really happening in Zimbabwe. Human rights abuses were rife at that time people being decimated or displaced. Since the media and repressive legislation in Zimbabwe got so tightened, it was very difficult for us to clearly express to the world what is going on because the ZANU-PF militias, CIO, ZRP, and ZDF were targeting opposition forces. Hence, Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement’s mission is to bring back the democratic dispensation and tranquillity to Zimbabwe”.

The above-mentioned diaspora movements have one thing in common when one looks at their objectives, they all want to ultimately restore democracy in Zimbabwe. Their quest to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe is best understood from the political process theory (PPT). This theory helps to unpack the crisis that led to the diaspora movements’ formation. For a movement to be in existence there should be political opportunities which propel the need for action to be taken. Political opportunities as defined by Tarrow (1994:85) are “those dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”. Crossman (2017: no page) gave a clearer description of what may be deemed as political opportunities e.g. “a crisis of legitimacy

where citizens no longer support the social and economic conditions raised by the system; loosening repressive structures that previously kept people from demanding change”.

Thus, it is evident that ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM were all formed as a result of political opportunities arising. The gross violations of human rights by Mugabe’s regime, repressive legislation, militarised elections, crumbled economy, partisan use of state security forces and judiciary are some of the ‘political opportunities’ that led to the formation of these diaspora movements. The reasons behind the formation of these diaspora movements affirm the theory because it shows that indeed political opportunities form one of the most important aspects for the existence of any CSO.

The PPT also acknowledges that movements can either fail or succeed even if the political opportunities are there. If the government’s position is strongly rooted and is likely to use oppressive behaviour, then the odds are high that a social movement might fail. If, on the other hand, the government is more tolerant of dissenting behaviour, then the odds are high that any social movement that is formed might have the opportunity to grow and succeed (Sen et al., 2016:127). Now that these diaspora movements have identified the political opportunities that led to their emergence, they serve as the mobilising structures that provide the people with leadership, membership, and communication. A mobilising structure is one of the key components of the PPT. McAdam (1999: ix) stated that “by mobilising structures I mean those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective action”.

Mobilisation actually expands the support base from those initially affected to convincing others that the issues raised affect them as well, directly or indirectly. After ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM, had undergone the mobilising phase and managed to gain support from the people, these diaspora movements had to go through the framing process. The framing process is when leaders of these diaspora movements need to clearly describe existing problems that have led to the need for a call of action. From the perspective of PPT, Neal (2007:2) reinforced the framing process and said: "at a minimum, a group needs to describe their grievances persuasively, the diagnostic frame, and present a feasible solution, the prognostic frame. Large movements often provide master frames, such as civil rights, which subsequent movement and groups can easily refer to". Thus ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM described their grievances and what they need to do as highlighted in their objectives provided earlier in this section. It is through framing processes that issues are outlined and solidarity is fortified within the diaspora movements, prior to taking action using various strategies that are thought to best serve the issues raised.

5.3 VARIOUS STRATEGIES USED BY ZEF, CIZC AND ZRYM

There are various ways by which diaspora movements influence and consolidate democracy. Diamond (2016:119) said: "we need to think about the features of civil society that are most likely to serve the development and consolidation of democracy". This statement indicates that there is no single perfect model on which democracy or consolidation of it is achieved. Democracy is achieved in various ways and therefore, strategies used by diaspora movements in trying to achieve as well as consolidate

democracy vary. Thus, based on the research conducted, the essence of this chapter is to discuss the different strategies identified that ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have used in their quest to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe.

5.3.1 Protests

Political protesting is the use of several tactics such as demonstrations, petitions, striking, sit-in, and boycotts, among others. According to Porta et al. (2006:165) protests are “sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalised power relations”. This is the route that ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have used. Through protesting, these diaspora movements call attention to issues and provoke action to be taken. All three diaspora movements, selected as a case study mentioned using protesting as a strategy and they all went on to break down the various ways in which they protested. The PPT outlines the importance of protesting because these are ways of expressing the views and demands of the masses under well-mobilised structures which in this case are the identified diaspora movements, namely ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM.

The different methods of protesting are called repertoires of contention. Traugott (1995:91) elucidated that repertoires of contention are “The simultaneous skills of population members and the cultural forms of the population. The viability of one of the elements of a repertoire depends on what sorts of things work in a given social or political structure, on what forms of protest have been invented and disseminated in a population and on what grievances a given form is appropriate to express”. In short,

repertoires of contention are the forms of collective action developed within the experimental context of protest cycles like demonstrations, petitions, etc. Thus, the researcher chose to elaborate more on the repertoires of contention which are the various ways of protesting used by the selected diaspora movements like petitioning and demonstrating etc.

5.3.1.1 Petitioning

A petition is a formal written request, signed by many people, appealing to authority in respect of a particular cause. Smith (2012:225) defined petitions as a “hybrid of advocacy letters and proclamations, prepared for many people to sign”. Petitions intend to inform people about a cause and draw their interest, to gain the support of people who will sign their names to the petition and above all for their cause to be recognised by the person, organisation or institution receiving the petition. Petitions often deal with topics around politics or government, human rights, environmental issues, religion, consumer rights among other issues (Smith, 2012:225). The ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM have once partnered and submitted petitions with other existing South Africa-based diaspora movements like Zimbabwe Refugee Association and Zimbabwe Action Movement, among others. In April 2008, they submitted a petition to the Zimbabwean Embassy in South Africa and the sample of the petition is attached at the appendix section. The contents of the petition as documented in Kubatana (2008) read as follows:

We, the people of Zimbabwe, driven into exile in South Africa are:

Concerned that Zimbabwe faces a deficit of democracy and governance.

Alarmed that the crisis in Zimbabwe is of such magnitude that the country is on the blink of an explosion, this may have drastic consequences for the entire region;

Noting that our compatriots trapped in the country are under a siege of a military nature when ironically we should be celebrating together our independence from colonialism 28 years ago on the 18th of April;

Observing that since the 29th of March when we went to the polls, Presidential election results have not been released;

Cognisant of the fact that since HE President Thabo Mbeki's pronouncement that there is no crisis in our country, many Zimbabweans have lost faith in his ability to remain impartial towards a resolution that buttresses the will of people of Zimbabwe out of its man-made catastrophe;

Acknowledging that the Southern African Development Community with all good wishes intends to assist Zimbabwe out of its man-made catastrophe;

Further acknowledging international support to this end, and the non-partisan support towards a democratic Zimbabwe by among others Amnesty International, International Bar Association and Human Rights Watch:

Hereby:

1. Call upon the present, illegal structure running the country unconstitutionally through the Joint Operations Command to step down;
2. Implore the SADC, AU, UN Security Council and the above institutions to expeditiously come out in defence of the ordinary people of Zimbabwe; and to demand that the results of the Presidential election be released immediately and in the event of a run-off, to demand international supervision of the whole process;
3. Further implore the above-mentioned institutions and organisations to take all practical measures necessary, including those that may be difficult ones, to ensure

that human life, dignity, and security, in general, are provided for ordinary people in Zimbabwe;

4. Appeal to members of the security forces and the police to ignore orders that may lead to the torture, murder and other crimes against humanity and against their brothers and sisters;
5. Request that HE President Thabo Mbeki gives a public commitment to impartiality in his facilitative role in Zimbabwe, or that he be replaced by an individual whose credibility is not open to question.
6. Lastly, call upon all Zimbabweans at home and abroad to remain resolute in defence of our freedom, and to identify perpetrators of atrocities.

Signed on this 16th day of April 2008 at Tshwane, South Africa

- Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, Gabriel Shumba, Executive Director
- Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum
- Zimbabwe Political Victims Association
- Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement
- Zimbabwe Refugee Association
- Zimbabwe Peace and Democracy Project
- Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
- Solidarity Peace Trust
- Southern African Institute for Migration Affairs
- Concerned Zimbabweans Abroad
- Friends of Zimbabwe Coalition
- Amnesty International (South Africa), Executive Director



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Initially, the petition was the brainchild of ZEF though they managed to get signatures from other movements. A ZEF respondent said:

“We have signed a number of petitions as a way of raising awareness on what was happening in Zimbabwe, you can search online for detailed petitions because some of the petitions are documented”.

Petitions are an effective way to get the government to listen to citizens' grievances. Even though petitions are submitted, they do not guarantee change. They help legitimise CSOs. A CiZC respondent mentioned that:

“One of our objectives is influence relevant authorities by bringing to light the plights and woes of citizens, so we have also been submitting petitions for reforms in Zimbabwe with the aim of influencing the position of SADC and AU among others in ensuring the rebuilding and consolidation of democracy”.

In 2006, CiZC circulated their petition to other movements for signatures which was to be handed over to the United Nations (UN). Their aim was first to inform the world at large of the irresponsible actions of Mugabe and his government; secondly, they wanted the UN to apply pressure on Zimbabwe's government to do right by its people. CiZC said, as recorded by ZimOnline (2006):

“It has become apparent that despite the UN having sent two envoys to Zimbabwe on a fact-finding mission, the government of Zimbabwe has not only ignored the reports and recommendations but has intensified its fight against the poor”.

In 2013, CiZC submitted yet another petition among other petitions submitted in previous years. This time the petition was against NIKUV International projects, an Israeli company that was involved in the manipulation of the voters roll and the outcome of the elections. After having conducted their research, they substantiated the allegations and realised that there were over a million people who appeared on the

voters roll and those people were said to be either amongst the deceased or some had migrated to other parts of the world. This led CiZC to hand over a petition to the Israeli Embassy in South Africa. CiZC as documented by the Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum (2014:74) maintained in their report that:

“We, Zimbabwean residents in South Africa, Zimbabwe civil society organisations, concerned Zimbabwe political parties and South African civil society organisations, organised in solidarity with Zimbabweans, are gravely concerned about reports by political parties in Zimbabwe in the regional and international media that NIKUV International Projects, an Israeli Registered Company, is involved in attempts to manipulate the outcome of the forthcoming harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. These allegations of voter’s roll manipulation in Zimbabwe pose a serious threat to the democratic right of the people of Zimbabwe to express their political views. The role NIKUV, and by implication the tacit support they receive from the State of Israel, derail attempts by Zimbabweans to foster an electoral climate in which people have trust and confidence in the systems that have been established”.

Such interference by NIKUV led to the outright victory of ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections. There were no issues of violence or the intimidation of opposition members like what had become the norm in previous elections. The elections of 2013 were massively rigged and saw Mugabe and his party leading with a wide margin. In other areas, especially the rural areas, the number of votes recorded exceeded the number of eligible voters who lived in those areas. Whilst some voters were excluded, others had their names removed or had their names placed under certain constituencies where they were not residents leading to a massive exclusion (Masunungure, 2014:107). Nehanda News (2013) stated that “huge numbers were turned away from the voter

registration process, with hundreds of thousands of potential voters also turned away on the day of voting after failing to find their names on the voters roll or having learnt of displacement of their entries to other constituencies, including as far as hundreds of kilometres away. Details of long-deceased people were retrieved and used to create fake IDs for ZANU-PF Youth, who in some cases were still below 18 years of age”. NIKUV had been accused before in countries like Swaziland, Zambia, Botswana, and Lesotho for manipulating their electoral system and/or processing of identity documents under debatable conditions. Thus CiZC’s submission of the petition can be justified because NIKUV played a key role in denying Zimbabweans a right to vote for a government of their choice. This further hindered them from exercising their rights, stalling the process of restoring democracy in the country.



ZRYM also submits petitions as a way of drawing attention to specific issues. A ZRYM respondent said:

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“We have submitted petitions even on behalf of Zimbabwean based CSOs. It was very difficult for the Civil Society Organisations in Zimbabwe by that time to come up with demonstrations, marches and handover petitions so the CSOS in Zimbabwe thereby see us as a platform to say guys this is the petition which we need to handover to the SADC but we can’t do it in Zimbabwe or this is the petition we need to send out to the chairperson of SADC and president of South Africa. So we have been submitting petitions in solidarity with CSOs in Zimbabwe”.

Petitions pave the way for a protest cycle as this is normally the first step of a protest. Petitions generate publicity, raise awareness and above all, have mustered a quality of authority that allows them to cause notable changes in a peaceful way (Mohamad,

2012). ZRYM also submitted quite a number of petitions raising different issues. One of their notable petitions was the one submitted at the Chinese Embassy in South Africa and they had an additional signature of ZEF. They were calling the People's Republic of China to stop aiding Mugabe's regime in its fight against its people during the most violent election era of 2008. They brought to light some of the incidences that had happened like hundreds of homes being burnt down, over 3000 families being displaced and remaining destitute, opposition members and activists being detained without charges. ZRYM's part of the demands that were in the petition which was documented by Kubatana (2008) read as follows:

On behalf of the people of Zimbabwe we demand:

- 
1. That China recalls the cargo of arms aboard the vessel "An Yue Jiang"
 2. That this shipment of arms is not sent to Zimbabwe on another vessel or by air;
 3. That China stops all supplies of arms to the Zimbabwean regime;
 4. That China recalls all societies stationed in Zimbabwe for the purpose of suppressing the will of the people and ensuring the regime retains power;
 5. That China stops the supply of surveillance equipment to Zimbabwe for illegal internet censorship and surveillance;
 6. That China stops providing huge loans to prop up the bankrupt Mugabe regime;
 7. That China respects the human rights of all Zimbabweans.

Petitions are often used to exert a degree of public pressure on the recipient. CSOs and politicians alike have used petitions to impact the government one way or another. Generally, petitions are the most widely used institutional strategy of communication between citizens and government apart from elections (Saalfeld et al., 2013:61). Thus, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM adopted the strategy of petitions because they saw that it helps

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bring their issues and concerns on the political agenda and puts pressure on concerned institutions to address them. As mentioned previously, submission of petitions does not guarantee change or action, at times movements go for months without receiving any response be it good or bad. At the very worst they do not receive any feedback at all.

5.3.1.2 Advocacy and lobbying

Advocacy is the practical use of knowledge for purposes of social change. These changes can be directed to government policies, laws or procedures. Advocacy is, therefore, an act of supporting an issue and persuading the decision makers on how to act in order to support that issue. Advocacy is an effective process aimed at achieving some specific results (Apgar, 2018:116). Lobbying is defined by Zetter (2014: no page) as “the process of seeking to shape the public policy agenda in order to influence government and its institutions. It is also, of course, the art of political persuasion”. Advocacy and lobbying are inevitable strategies used by CSOs at large. CSOs’ boundaries with the state are often blurred because they are constantly interacting and negotiating around public issues. CSOs are a notable force because of the push and watch role they play in Zimbabwe.

ZEF is one of the diaspora movement that has been at the forefront of campaigns when it comes to advocacy and lobbying. They have lobbied and advocated in countries where the domestic legislation permits the trial of serious offences outside their jurisdiction irrespective of where the crime was carried out. Back in 2011, Advocate Gabriel Shumba, director of ZEF in Kavanagh (2011), was quoted as saying “we are

here to persuade the Canadian government to speak up about human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. To use its influence with the Security Council with frontline countries by way of Commonwealth, with the International Criminal Court; even with China that is a big trading partner of both Canada and Zimbabwe. We want Canada to invoke its domestic laws on crimes against humanity to bring Zimbabwean perpetrators to justice. We must work now to restore democracy in our homeland". ZEF is forced to seek for help abroad because Zimbabwe's judiciary is compromised by threats and by purging of judges, as highlighted previously in Chapter Four.

Again in 2014, ZEF challenged a court appeal that had been granted to the South African Police Service (SAPS). The Court of Appeal had previously granted ZEF's wish that SAPS investigate alleged crimes against humanity in Zimbabwe. ZEF advocated that since South Africa was a signatory to the Rome Statute used in the International Criminal Court (ICC), they should investigate crimes committed in Zimbabwe by the Mugabe regime. The case they were still advocating for in 2014 is a case that dates back to 2008 when ZEF and Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) submitted a docket to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) detailing acts of torture that had been carried out when the ZRP had raided MDC-T headquarters in Harare and repressive force used on citizens.


ZEF was quoted in the Zimbabwe Independent (2014) saying:

We remain hopeful that the highest court in the land will agree with our position as the appellants have in my opinion of their arguments largely relied on political expediency rather than confronting the legal imperatives of making sure that those

who commit crimes against humanity finds no sanctuary in any jurisdiction. Justice and the rule of law should prevail in this case where justice delayed is justice denied.

Despite their effort of trying to get perpetrators brought to book, the NPA and SAPS said it was impossible for them to investigate the allegations because it was outside their jurisdiction and in the case of ICC, Zimbabwe is not a member which in a way is a justified excuse.

Advocacy and lobbying do help in mobilising support from different institutions and organisations. For example, the advocacy and lobbying by ZEF on 2008 violence that happened in Zimbabwe managed to draw the world's attention. The Human Rights Institute of Southern Africa insisted that the AU should follow up on reports alleging gross human rights abuse in Zimbabwe. They also urged that Mugabe should fast-track democratic reforms; this call from the institute was welcomed by ZEF (Voice of Africa, 2011).



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CiZC also mentioned using advocacy and lobbying as one of their strategies in their quest to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe. Now that the country is preparing for 2018 elections, CiZC is advocating and lobbying the ZRP to respect and uphold the Constitution. The ZRP is known for its partisan conduct towards the ZANU-PF and using excessive force on anyone who opposes the ruling party. CiZC pleaded with the police to stop their partisan behaviour and let all Zimbabweans exercise their rights unhindered. Zvorufura (2018) said, "CiZC is also concerned by the tendency by law enforcement agents to label civil society organisations as agents of regime change".

This has often led to the harassment, torture, and intimidation of movements by security agents in previous years. Thus, if such behaviour is allowed to continue unabated it will derail the CiZC's wish of consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe.

ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM are important actors because they represent the interests, concerns and needs of the ordinary citizens. Apart from representing the masses, they also empower them in the fight against social issues like poverty but again promote human rights and strive for democracy among other core values. The intention of these diaspora movements' lobbying and advocacy is to add value to people's lives. ZRYM's advocacy and lobbying is normally carried out in the form of submission of petitions. A ZRYM respondent said:

“Check out our Blog we have documented some of the ways in which we have lobbied and advocated various issues”.



Sometime in 2009, ZRYM advocated that President Kgalema Motlanthe, as the then Chairman of the SADC, should take measures to ensure that Mugabe, his ministers and security agents stop the wave of arrests and unlawful detention of CSO leaders, activists and members of opposition parties. ZRYM was lobbying for the immediate release of all those who were incarcerated in 2008. They lobbied for the release of, among others, Jestina Mukoko of Zimbabwe Peace Project who was abducted in December 2008 by state security agents, Fidelis Charamba aged 72 who was the chairperson of MDC branch in Zvimba and Andriison Manyere, a photojournalist who was taken away from hospital in February 2009 (Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement, 2009).

Lobbying and advocacy is all about acting as watchdogs and that is exactly what ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have been doing. It is one powerful strategy when used correctly because it can bring about the desired change or at least have their concerns and grievances known. Lobbying and advocacy as a strategy is not a 'one size fits all'; instead, diaspora movements should know when to change and try other avenues or strategies. The downfall of lobbying and advocacy is when they fail to mobilise people to support their cause because generally there is power in numbers. The bigger the number of people rallying behind a cause, the bigger the voice which thus helps validate the cause.

5.3.1.3 *Demonstrations*

Last but not least, demonstrating is another repertoire of contention used by diaspora movements. A demonstration is a march which people take part in to show their opposition to something or their support for something (Collins Dictionary, 2015:339). It is a mass expression of the public's thoughts; it could be a popular celebration or anger or presentation of political demands. People embark on demonstrations because it is a way of venting their anger and frustrations of not having their voices heard by relevant authorities. Public demonstrations are mainly due to political, social and economic issues that have not been addressed. Economically, it could be because of economic inequalities or lack of economic opportunities. Socially, it could be lack of access to the most basic service delivery like access to good health institutions or education. Politically, a demonstration might be trying to change an existing political system that has failed to uphold people's rights and meeting their needs (CIVICUS, 2016:5).

Movements usually resort to demonstrations if they have exhausted other ways or feel their first strategies are insufficient or simply ineffective like submission of petitions with no positive action or feedback given. A demonstration is never a first option for movements but once they opt for a demonstration to be held it is because they are frustrated with their government. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have all at some point demonstrated as a way of trying to get their voices heard. They have visibly occupied central public spaces in big cities as a strategy to promote their cause and mobilise more support. In this case, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have all made use of their host province, Gauteng, in South Africa and demonstrated in Johannesburg and Pretoria because these cities house different Embassies.

ZRYM demonstrated at the Zimbabwe Embassy in Pretoria, demanding that all Zimbabweans in the diaspora be allowed to vote in the 2008 elections. Simon Khaya Moyo who was the Zimbabwean Ambassador to South Africa had previously refused to accept their petition calling for the diaspora vote. ZRYM then threatened to occupy the Zimbabwe Embassy and have it shut down if he did not comply and accept the petition. The ambassador then agreed to receive the petition but not at the embassy premises and rather opted they do so at the Pretoria Police Station. However, the ambassador did not honour his words and sent a representative. This move infuriated the ZRYM and SAPS helped subdue the noise because they sent a word to the embassy that if the ambassador did not accept the petition the police too would not provide any security when ZRYM occupied the embassy. Thus, the ambassador finally received the petition and was informed to submit it to the government and was given a deadline to meet

(Karimakwenda, 2008). Despite their demonstration being a success, they did not, however, yield the intended results as no diasporas were allowed to vote in the 2008 elections. This did not deter their cause because they continued staging more demonstrations.

In April 2008, ZRYM demonstrated peacefully in Pretoria at the Union Buildings, with about 200 people gathered to hand over a petition regarding Zimbabwe's situation to the then President Thabo Mbeki. They wanted Mbeki to convince Mugabe to accept his defeat and step down as President. Despite their peaceful demonstration, the SAPS threatened to arrest them. This was a threat they were willing to risk because they had to make sure their petition was received. ZRYM's president was quoted in News 24 (2008) as saying "We are not leaving this place until we hand over our petition. They say they are going to arrest us. No problem, we are not leaving, we will be sleeping here". However, Mbeki did not succeed in convincing Mugabe to step down but he had a hand in the forming of the Government of National Unity (GNU) which was an amalgamation of ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and MDC-M. There was a delay in the naming of cabinet posts and again ZRYM demonstrated at the Union Buildings and wanted the process to fast-track as well as highlight the need for a new democratic constitution.

CiZC also use demonstrations as a strategy to voice their grievances. After all, pleas to have NIKUV stopped from operating in Zimbabwe amid allegations that they had supported election rigging in other neighbouring countries and across the region, fell on deaf ears. There were fears that the 2013 elections were likely to produce illegitimate and unacceptable outcomes. Thus, CiZC with the help of the Zimbabwe Solidarity

Forum (ZSF) were to lead a protest to the Israeli Embassy in Pretoria under the theme Feya-Feya Campaign calling for peaceful free and fair elections. They had specific demands for the Israeli Embassy and according to Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum (2014:78) the demands read “NIKUV hands off the electoral commission; Israeli hold your companies accountable for their actions”. Even with such demands, NIKUV only left Zimbabwe after they had completed their task and knew ZANU-PF had achieved its landslide victory.

The diaspora movements are mostly opposed to the ZANU-PF's continued rule and have from their hostland articulated their grievances through peaceful demonstrations. Just like ZRYM and CiZC, ZEF has also made use of demonstrations as one of their strategies. ZEF has been mobilising Zimbabweans in South Africa to protest and demonstrate against abuses of power by the ZANU-PF government (Muzondidya et al., 2011:131). In 2008, one of the biggest demonstrations took place in Johannesburg during the SADC Summit which was held in Sandton, Johannesburg. The demonstration was held to oppose Mugabe and King Mswati's participation at the Summit. Movements from both Zimbabwe and Swaziland with the help of members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) demonstrated. The declaration that was made by diaspora movements from Zimbabwe and Swaziland read as follows:

We hold dear the firm view that Robert Mugabe and Mswati III are not legitimate leaders of their various countries. They cannot claim any amount of legitimacy to rule their countries, for they have not been democratically elected by the people of their countries. Therefore, as representatives of civil society, we condemn the

behaviour of these two leaders and take it upon ourselves to expose them and their unacceptable behaviour before the eyes of the world (Mail & Guardian, 2008).

It was a strategic plan of reminding other leaders that they need to deal with both leaders and hold them accountable for their actions especially crimes committed against humanity. Also, it was a cry for help directed to other SADC member states. Diaspora movements from Zimbabwe that took part included ZEF, ZRYM, CiZC, and ZSF. Whilst from Swaziland, Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, Swaziland United Democratic Front, Swaziland Federation of Labour, the Swaziland Youth Congress and the People's United Democratic Movement participated. Also, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the Anti-Privatisation from South Africa joined the demonstration in support of the call.



ZEF also demonstrated at the Zimbabwean Embassy in 2008 when there was a delay in the release of the presidential election results. ZEF said the protest was “over the delay of presidential results and the statement made by Thabo Mbeki that there is no crisis in Zimbabwe. We believed that Mbeki had compromised his facilitative role in the SADC. He must step down” (News 24, 2008). Therefore, ZEF demonstrated and submitted their memorandum and then went on to demonstrate at the Union Buildings to submit another memorandum. The demonstration included members from ZEF, Global Diaspora Forum and Southern African Women's Institute for Migration Affairs.

In January 2009, there was a meeting held at the Union Buildings between Robert Mugabe and Thabo Mbeki who continued mediating the crisis in Zimbabwe after his resignation from presidency. Zimbabwean diaspora movements and some opposition

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parties' leadership in South Africa demonstrated at the Union Buildings wanting to confront both Mbeki and Mugabe head-on. They were demanding that Mbeki should also be removed as the chief mediator because of his open bias towards Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The demonstration, however, quickly became violent because protestors were now trying to break into the Union Buildings' premises. SAPS then reacted and fired rubber bullets at about a 1000 protestors from ZRYM, CiZC, ZEF, other diaspora movements and members of MDC. Some people got arrested and amongst the arrested was the patron of ZRYM, acting coordinator for CiZC and MDC regional and leaders who comprised Thabitha Khumalo, Sibangeni Dube, spokesperson of MDC South Africa, organising secretary of MDC, Philimon Moyo, and his deputy, Rodgers Mudarikwa. Others were injured and hospitalised (The Zimbabwean, 2009). The fact that they went out in numbers showed that they knew they would draw the world's attention and have their voices heard. They knew such a move would put the crisis in Zimbabwe on the SADC's and AU's agenda.

Sometime in 2012, ZEF and other exiled Zimbabweans demonstrated outside the Pretoria High Court demanding justice for the hardships they faced back in Zimbabwe. They were demonstrating there because a landmark legal challenge was being heard and the case was advising South African authorities to investigate as well as prosecute Zimbabwe officials who are accused of crime against humanity. The case was filed by ZEF in partnership with the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) after the NPA and SAPS had reversed their decision to investigate the torture people were being subjected to in Zimbabwe in 2008. The ZEF director is also a torture survivor of the

Mugabe regime and so knows too well all the pains and effects of it. They argued that the investigations should be carried out. They demonstrated for three consecutive days outside the court (Southern Africa Litigation Centre, 2012).

They again demonstrated in 2016 when they shut down all border posts and the Musina-Beitbridge border was the most affected. The demonstration was simply to mount pressure on the Zimbabwe government to revoke a statutory instrument 64 of 2016 which restricted importation of certain goods they deemed to be readily available in Zimbabwe. This law mainly affected informal cross-border traders and local vendors who relied on stocking their goods from South Africa and other neighbouring countries for survival. It was reported that about 6000 people demonstrated in Musina though SAPS later dispersed the group. ZEF, Tajamuka, Africa Diaspora Workers Network, Zimbabwe Communist Group, and the International Cross Border Associations worked in solidarity and organised the demonstration (Zimbabwe Situation, 2016). The demonstration was a success because most people did heed the call and business was slow at the border post because few buses were ferrying people and no haulage trucks were being cleared from either side of the border. Prior to the demonstration, through a press statement, ZEF had called for a stay away just after the announcement of the statutory instrument 64 of 2016. Thus the demonstration was a subsequent call for action after the stay away call had failed to pressurise the government. However, it yielded results in the long run as the law was later repealed in 2017.

5.3.2 Partnerships and dialogues

Partnerships between local, national and international CSOs are an influential tool that can be used to achieve desired change. Diaspora movement's partnership covers the determinations of movements mostly in developing nations to organise themselves in national networks, coalitions and umbrella organisations. It also covers North-South and South-South partnerships in which diaspora movements from various countries work in partnership with each other in order to achieve their goals. Diaspora movements are progressively pooling their efforts, both nationally and internationally through partnerships (OECD, 2010:43). Partnerships help diaspora movements to empower citizens to perform their civic rights and to ensure representation of all. Partnerships create benefits on both sides if partners work equally, empowered towards mutually-agreed objectives. Diaspora movements have a better chance of achieving long-term effects with higher legitimacy if they engage in partnerships with local and national CSOs (CIVICUS, 2014:1). Diaspora movements differ in the way they work and in their skills, some may be good in areas of research whilst others are more activist-oriented and know how to organise people and put pressure on government. This at times is achieved through forging partnerships with other movements and complementing each other's work.

ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM have all at one point partnered with other movements or with each other in certain situations. Partnerships are forged when goals, values and their work are similar. Diaspora movements partnerships are essential for achieving significant impact and their survival. International institutions such as the World Bank,

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the UNDP, the African Union and the European Union have, since 2001, all enthusiastically promoted the issue of partnership as a tool promoting good governance in the developing world (Friedman et al., 2018:73). Contrariwise, CIVICUS (2017:17) argued that prior to building partnerships there are certain dynamics that have to be explored by both parties; they said “The receipt of resources should not compromise civil society autonomy. Civil society should be ambitious about partnerships, and ask whether partnerships offer real influence, reach the real decision makers in business, and lead to real change”.

ZEF has partnered with a number of diaspora movements to keep issues of human rights at the centre of the discourse. A ZEF respondent mentioned that:



“Zimbabwe Exiles Forum has for example partnered with the Zimbabwean Europe Network in Netherlands, the African NGO Forum in Africa and many others. This collaboration have enabled ZEF to raise the issues of Zimbabwe at the public sessions of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, with the result that special rapporteurs have been sent to investigate rights violation allegations in Zimbabwe, leading to resolutions and recommendations. Likewise, we have also partnered with the Foundation Open Society Institute in the United States, and the outcome was that ZEF Director Advocate Gabriel Shumba was called to address the United States Congress. Similarly, partnerships in Europe gave Advocate Shumba and ZEF the opportunity to keep Zimbabwe on the international radar when he addressed the House of Commons and Lords and in Canada when he was called to meet the Prime Minister and other government officials. It is this advocacy pressure through partnerships that has kept Zimbabwe on the banner of international concern and action”.

Just recently, ZEF partnered with a United States-based Zimbabwe Diaspora for Democracy Inc. in petitioning the government on its decision to bar emigrant Zimbabweans from voting from their hostland in the upcoming 2018 elections. As much as the government values them for their remittances they should also allow them to vote. According to Zimbabwe Situation (2018), ZEF and Zimbabwe Diaspora for Democracy Inc. said in a joint statement:

“It is incumbent upon the stakeholders who are going to receive the petition to take necessary political and legal steps to address this constitutional violation and ensure the outcome of the upcoming plebiscite will be judged free, fair, credible and inclusive”.

ZRYM also partnered with other diaspora movements, mostly with ZEF. A ZRYM respondent said:



“We get into partnerships or collaborate with other CSOs but mostly we have partnered with Zimbabwe Exile Forum led by Advocate Gabriel Shumba, together we have submitted petitions and conducted demonstrations at various places”.

They would submit petitions, at times drafted together by ZEF and CiZC, and hold demonstrations together. Improving the quality of such partnerships is primarily the obligation of diaspora movements themselves.

CiZC also believes in partnering with other movements that are aligned with the same values and objectives as theirs. Several times the CiZC partnered with the ZSF which is purely a South African CSO that formed and chose to look at issues affecting Zimbabwe with a goal to promote solidarity for more sustainable peace, democracy and above all

human rights for all in Zimbabwe. Together, they have managed to let their voices be heard in one way or another. They have submitted petitions, demonstrated, held dialogues, and monitored elections, among other activities. Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum (2014:83) mentioned in their review report that:

The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and the Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum, hosted by the ACTION Support Centre in South Africa, deployed a Regional Observer Mission composed of representatives of Civil Society Organisations, the Ecumenical Sector and Social Movements, to the 31st July 2013 harmonised election in Zimbabwe....observed the environment in the run-up to the elections, the voting process, closure of polling stations and in some instances counting.

Had CiZC not partnered with other movements chances are slim that they could have managed to execute such a huge task on their own, given the fact that after 2008 elections, Mugabe and his regime banned all local and international CSOs from operating in the country let alone operations that had to do with elections. Hence, through the partnership, they might have been able to come up with strategies that made it possible for them even to be allowed into the country.

Partnerships are seen as important for a variety of reasons. They provide a platform for accessing and sharing information and diverse resources for the purpose of realising shared objectives. Diaspora movements are less effective when they are isolated compared to when in partnership with other movements. A partnership improves the quality of decision making and improves relations that generate new ideas. Despite partnerships being a good idea they also have their shortfalls. Partnerships might crumble because of conflict of interests, dominance of one movement, hidden plans,

lack of clear goals, lack of communication etc. (Friedman et al, 2018:74). The worst is when diaspora movements are geographically separated because that could limit their potential of realising their goals.

Dialogues are another method diaspora movements use as a way of taking collective action. Movements working on similar issues should be able to consult and learn from each other through their partnerships, whether nationally or internationally (OECD, 2010:44). ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM would on different occasions attend seminars together with other diaspora movements from their hostland and exchange ideas as well as have presentations. The most notable dialogue held was the Musina Civil Society briefing meeting which was planned by CiZC and ZSF and which saw scores of people in attendance. They were calling for a referendum to be held so that the people would have a say about the Constitution as well as allowing the diasporas to vote (Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum, 2014:59). Apart from dialogues, diaspora movements through their partnerships with other movements would hold joint media briefings on Zimbabwe. For example, the CiZC together with the International Commission of Jurists and the Human Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA) organised a press briefing and even invited Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum to participate.

5.3.3 Social media

In the midst of the expansion of diaspora movements, the world has seen the rise and rapid expansion of the Information Age. The Information Age has led to the revolution of information technology which has decreased the costs of communication and brought

people closer together through the use of social media (Bailey, 2010:21). Social media consists of among others Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Text messaging, WhatsApp and Tumblr. Social media is not easily defined in a manner that is readily acceptable. Bardhan (2014:481) defined social media as “Internet-based applications that are built on the ideological and technological foundations. Social media enables the creation and exchange of user-generated content or all forms of media content that are publicly accessible and created by end users”. Massie et al. (2017:116) defined social media in the simplest way by combining the primary aspects of the term social with that of media. They defined social and media respectively as “any act, attribute, or object whose function is to build and or maintain relationships between parties. Media is any technology that allows for the transference of meanings”. Hence, their definition for social media is “those technologies that enable the building and maintenance of relationships”.



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The internet through social media is regarded as one of the most useful inventions in mass communication, as an agent of human and social development or as an important transmitter of globalisation (Kalyango et al., 2013:2). There has been constant growth in accessibility and application of social media in all aspects of life. Social media use in Africa is no different from other parts of the world as it has been used to shape lifestyle, expand business networks, represent culture, promote national identity and in some instances, to mobilise citizens in overthrowing governments like in the case of the Arab Spring, a wave that started on social media (Abdulsattar, 2015:34).

The most popular social media sites and messaging applications in Zimbabwe are Facebook, Twitter, and Whatsapp. These social media sites and messaging applications owe their popularity to the enthusiasm of Zimbabweans to obtain information other than that churned out by the national broadcasters and newspapers. This is the cheapest method of communication and even elderly people have learnt to use it in order to stay in touch with their family members and friends. To some extent, social media has contributed to political communication between the citizenry, thereby fulfilling a need which is currently not addressed by public television or radio (Chiumbu et al., 2009:9). Kalyango et al. (2013:2) argued that “some governments were uneasy about the potential of new media and its effectiveness in shaping the mindsets and attitudes of citizens concerning dictatorial regimes in Africa”. Social media is now being used as a force for social and political advocacy and above all ensures citizen participation.



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Social media provides new ways for diaspora movements to engage with their members and citizens on a larger scale. Hugo (2015: xlii) explained that “social media creates a capacity for free flowing ideas and connectivity on an equal level”. It allows diaspora movements to connect with people they may not otherwise have known or managed to reach. Social media provides opportunities to create public pressure for changes to be effected, educate citizens by widening the scope of knowledge sharing as well as generating more information (Hugo, 2015: xxxiv). It has been used in a multiplicity of ways, such as conveying messages, exposing corruption as well as mobilising people

for support. Social media and messaging applications are tools that can be effectively used to help consolidate democracy, thus they are not an end but a means to an end.

All diaspora movements selected for this study acknowledged capitalising social media and messaging applications by using them for their activities. ZEF has been using Facebook, Whatsapp, and Twitter to disseminate information to their members and the world at large. A respondent from ZEF said that:

“The utilisation of social media meant that all our press statements and activities are widely advertised and shared on WhatsApp and Facebook. Engagement with other people has been made easier especially with fellow Zimbabweans in other continents. This means we have been able to mobilise more support and having Zimbabweans as far as in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Netherlands, echoing their voices in unison to pertinent issues”.

ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have all recognised the potential that social media has in engaging with the masses. Through social media these diaspora movements have managed to air some of the citizen's grievances that are at times not reflected in mainstream political debates. Seibicke (2017:129) asserted that “social media can increase inclusion in political discourse, accessibility of information, and the ability to form and maintain relationships to strengthen advocacy efforts”. Through the use of social media, diaspora movements like ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have managed to attract media coverage through this strategy and by so doing they have managed to garner more support from the citizens. One respondent from ZEF pointed out that:

“This strategy has kept those in and outside the country in touch and to be able to synchronise activities and to articulate the human rights issues affecting the country from a common position. It is this method that has also assisted in bringing the Diaspora formations into Zimbabwe to assist with the removal of Robert Mugabe from power. CSOs, ZANU-PF, opposition parties and the masses at large for the first time in ages worked together. Such a move saw the Director of ZEF, Advocate Gabriel Shumba going to Zimbabwe for the first time in 15 years since he was forced into exile by the Mugabe regime. The utilisation of social media meant that all our press statements and activities are widely advertised and shared on Whatsapp and Facebook. This has also led to very huge success, especially in the number of Zimbabwean Diaspora supporting our activities e.g. in the United Kingdom, South Africa and Botswana. Engagement with other people has been made easier”.



Social media allows organisations that have limited resources at their disposal to multiply their members or audiences. All movements have to do is to carefully think of which type will best work for their organisations by reaching the exact targeted audience and in return achieve their goal (Counterpart International, 2014:11).

Another respondent from CiZC had this to say about social media:

“Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition is on Twitter we have thousands of followers, we are on Facebook and we have more than 120 000 followers and we also use Whatsapp. Now these have been really helpful in as far as spreading the word and getting the messages across where it is concerned. Word moves faster and mobilisation is also increased. Despite our use of social media, as CiZC we have remained conscious of the fact that social media can only conscientise people but what changes its action that people take. Very often for some of the activities that

we have ended up doing that required public participation we have used social media and its really been helpful”.

To CiZC, social media has increased to raise awareness on the behaviour of government office bearers. One CiZC respondent said:

“When you are a government official and do something wrong the likelihood of having someone record it is high and things always have a way of being exposed on social media whether intentionally or not and that official is forced to respond for their actions”.

For CiZC, social media has been used to spread information, garner more support and also to keep the system in check. Social media is now undoubtedly a part of politics because it has changed the ways people access information.

ZRYM have also been using Facebook and Whatsapp like CiZC and ZEF but in addition to that they have also made use of BlogSpot. A ZRYM respondent said:

“We were using about three Blogs check zimrevyouths.blogspot.com as well as Whatsapp and Facebook which was still active then because our activities are mostly determined by the political structures unfolding at that particular time. Mostly we would blog and our Whatsapp was very useful to people given that we were not in a position to get into physical contact with people back in Zimbabwe. So social media was playing a very important role in the sense that people would not be exposed to abuse by the police they would just receive the messages that we are signing a petition online. Hence it was quite useful and not risky. We could notify our members on activities to be carried out at a low cost”.

The rise of social media has brought about many changes for Zimbabweans at home and those in the diaspora. Diaspora movements must make sure they fully integrate

social media into their communication medium and not use it as an alternative. This is because a greater number of the population is the youth and this category of people move with time especially technology-related advancements (Tseisi, 2017). This means that once they do so they can mobilise more people, educate them and encourage them into participating to bring about positive change. Therefore, social media has been one of the strategies used by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM. They have helped to promote freedom of association and access to information for both Zimbabwean citizens in the diaspora and those in the motherland where there is censorship of local media.

5.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter looked at the strategies that were used by selected diaspora movements. A brief description was provided of the three selected diaspora movements and what their objectives are. They all have one thing in common which is the need to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe. The strategies used by diaspora movements were best explained by the political process theory which helped unpack how movements are formed and the reasons behind their formation. All the different strategies explored above which include petitions, demonstrating, advocacy and lobbying, having partnerships and making use of social media were some of the methods used by diaspora movements. Also, these strategies have their advantages and disadvantages and they either enable a movement to achieve their goals or to fail. In the case of the selected diaspora movements, the various strategies they have used yielded different results. In some instances they managed to achieve their intended results; in other

instances, they were forced to go back to the drawing board or to simply consider using other strategies. The next chapter identifies successes recorded by the diaspora movements thus far.



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CHAPTER SIX: SUCCESSES RECORDED BY DIASPORA MOVEMENTS IN THEIR QUEST FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN ZIMBABWE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

There are some African countries whose diaspora movements have managed to help their homelands consolidate democracy. Ghana is one of the few countries that made concerted efforts and succeeded to a certain extent in consolidating their democracy. Its existing political space which not only allowed people to express themselves but to also exert pressure on the government helped consolidate democracy. Arthur (2010: 211) mentioned that “CSOs have played crucial roles in deepening and sustaining the democratic process in Ghana by being the channels for promoting and protecting the values of various groups, shaping public opinion, influencing public policy and reporting on political activities”.

Gambia also has diaspora movements that have contributed greatly and succeeded in consolidating democracy. The Gambian diaspora movements have been constantly engaged with their homeland politics demanding respect for human rights, calling for a regime change and subsequently the restoration of democracy. Jaw (2017:82) alluded that “Diaspora activists have organised numerous protests and have been very significant in their work over the period in terms of the attention it generates”. The protests were deemed a success because of the media attention they drew. Not only

did they succeed in drawing attention but they also succeeded in educating the people through social media as well as mobilising them to ensure a regime change and consolidation of democracy (Jaw, 2017:115). This chapter focuses on successes that were recorded by the ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM. These successes are a result of their activities and the strategies used. Diaspora movements are quite aware that whatever they do they can either fail or succeed. Thus, based on the research conducted, this chapter highlights their achievements thus far and critical theory helps in analysing information obtained from the respondents.

6.2 SUCCESSES RECORDED BY ZEF, CIZC AND ZRYM

CSOs have contributed immensely to democratic consolidation and sustainable development in developed countries like the United States, Australia and Canada, among others. Omede et al. (2014:205) pointed out that “Civil society groups are agents of development in any nation and play an important role in social, political and economic development activities. The transformation of any society or system, particularly the developing societies depend on the effectiveness and efficiency of its civil society”. Movements can promote good governance, firstly, by policy analysis and advocacy, secondly, by regulating and monitoring of state performance and the conduct of public officials. Thirdly, they do so by allowing citizens to identify and express their values, beliefs, civic norms and democratic practices without encroachment from state agencies. Fourthly, they promote good governance by mobilising the citizenry, mainly the vulnerable and marginalised sections of communities, to participate more fully in

politics and public affairs, and lastly, they do so by improving the well-being of their own and other communities (Mkhize et al., 2018:209).

Zimbabwe was marked by years of escalating poverty coupled by oppressive ZANU-PF rule and mishandling of funds combined with severe economic crises. Consequently, most people were forced to migrate to other countries and new pro-democracy diaspora movements were formed by Zimbabweans beyond the borders of its own country. These diaspora movements have been expressing dissent, protesting against their own government from the diaspora, in particular, South Africa (Jambawo, 2017). Critical theorists have noted that civil society thrives in a coercion-free space where discussion and learning takes place, hence, they do succeed in some of their actions (Laine, 2014:65). Criticism directed towards the ZANU-PF government is mostly done by people in the diaspora and in return the government has excluded them from fully participating in the country's governance, deeming them to be outright puppets of the west. These actions in which the diaspora has protested against human rights abuses, partisan propaganda or general repression directed towards the state government are not new. Pro-democracy diaspora movements from many countries with repressive governments have thrived in their hostland.

Likewise, South Africa-based diaspora movements, namely ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM, have also thrived and recorded some notable successes which are elucidated below. However, when it comes to measuring movements success, it is not easy because what they can deem to be a success for them can be disputed by other people. Therefore, these movements achievements can be challenged. As a result, the successes below

are based on what the selected diaspora movements considered to be some of their achievements.

6.2.1 Use of social media for political education and dissemination of information

Educating the masses and dissemination of information is one of the successes that these diaspora movements have achieved. Increased internet access has improved access to information. Public access to social sites and other online news sources like zimbabwesituation.com and zimeye.net, among others, have been steadily undermining the monopoly position of Zimbabwe's state media. Political news posted on Facebook attracts significant public attention (Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, 2018: no page). For example, the International Cross Border Associations in solidarity with ZEF, Tajamuka, Africa Diaspora Workers Network and Zimbabwe Communist Group called for the shutdown of the Musina-Beitbridge border post (Newsday, 2016). One of the reasons why the call was a success is because the communiqué was widely shared on social media sites and messaging applications. Tendai Biti was quoted by Chatham House (2016:2) as saying "Facebook is becoming a major instrument in the fight against the government, as it was in places like Tahrir Square. Whatsapp is also becoming a major tool of opposition. The incumbent regime doesn't understand this new fight, because while it has always understood the physical struggle it doesn't understand the intellectual counterpart".

Social media has quickly changed the way information is disseminated. Kalyango et al. (2013:1) stated that “the role of social media continues to be useful in mobilising and drawing citizens to focus on issues that are perceived as important and in priming public opinion among Africans to get engaged in the political process of governance and democratisation”. Contemporary diasporas in contrast to their historic diasporas are fortunate enough to be transnational and transcultural and are able to maintain ties with their homeland through the use of social media. The growth in online and wireless digital media is taking over traditional media, namely radio, newspapers, television, and magazines. This has seen the rise of digital media such as cellular phones penetrating remote areas in many African states that are inaccessible to traditional media. Politics has been reshaped in the era of social media. Today, every tweet, blog post, Facebook update, YouTube video and instant message shapes people’s behaviour. Social media make it possible for any user to act as a columnist, editor, message creator and distributor. Social media have tested traditional media and its ethics. They have challenged notions of privacy, identity, credibility and obscured the distinctions between public and personal communications (Raman, 2014:472).

The diasporas use social media as a means of political education that does not restrict anyone despite political affiliation. It helps them to keep the Zimbabwean citizens aware of what is going on since back in Zimbabwe there is censorship on information that can be shared with the public. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have all helped mobilise the masses to continuously demand that the government be replaced. The amount of information

disseminated through social media and messaging applications, encouraging political participation has increased tremendously. One respondent from ZEF said:

“Because of the freedom of speech, assembly and access to information that exists in South Africa; we are now able to circulate unlimited and uncensored information to Zimbabweans through social media and messaging applications which is one of our successes”.

For example, ZEF through their Twitter handle have posted their thoughts, educated Zimbabweans, invited the media for press conference and even condemned the government. Some of their tweets that were condemning the government were posted by ZEF:

“ZANU has an insatiable penchant for stealing from the public. We have to stop them at all costs #zimexiles4change” 20th of October 2016

“We support the desire of the people of Zimbabwe for responsible leadership. We are together with the people #zimexiles4change”. 4th of September 2016

“The people are at war with their regime. Freedom is coming #zimexiles4change #Tajamuka we don't lose hope”. 28th of August 2016

“Promise Mkhwananzi must be free. We condemn his detention in the strongest terms Zimbabwe is for us Zimbabweans. We will not stop this fight for freedom #zimexiles4change”. 28th of August 2016

Another respondent from CiZC had this to say about the use of social media as a tool helping them reach out to the Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and those back home:

“Social media has really been helpful in as far as spreading the word and getting the message across where it’s concerned”.

They have successfully disseminated information by bringing the attention of Zimbabweans to some of the things happening. Through their Facebook page they have posted and even circulated several videos of different incidences that would have taken place in Zimbabwe. Recently, CiZC notified Zimbabweans on their Facebook page of the outcome of a case that involved an old woman who was a victim of police brutality sometime in 2016. The caption of the post read:

“Justice at last as Zim Court orders ZRP to pay \$13 500 to Gogo Chinyerere, a victim of police brutality”. 3rd of October 2018.

CiZC just like ZEF also have a Twitter handle and they use it as communication tool. Some of their tweets informed the people of what was happening or instructing the people what to do:



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“Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition condemns the killing of people in Harare’s CBD. We will be issuing a statement against the move by @zanu_pf to unleash the military against unarmed civilians”. 1st of August 2018

“Please visit the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition FB page and circulate as widely as possible a video on police brutality #notopolicebrutality”. 15th of July 2016.

This use of social media has greatly increased political participation as most people are now in touch with what is happening and have since been voicing out their views. Critical theory agrees that movements are a locus for restraining the powers of the state and by so doing advances the full participation by citizens ensuring that they move

towards a participatory democracy (Cunningham, 1992:12). Through diaspora movements there has been a rise in the number of people who are now using social sites like Facebook and Twitter. The use of the sites has led to a Cybercrime Bill being coined with the hope of curbing information shared. Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (2018: no page) reinforces the above statement, they said “Supa Mandiwanzira, who is also the Minister of Information Communications, announced yet another repressive cyber bill, which would punish anyone believed to be using social media to push regime change with up to five years in jail”. Jambawo (2017) clearly said, “It is these Diaspora groups and individuals that have prompted the government to extend the Computer Crime and Cybercrime Bill, which was introduced last year by government to curb cybercrime and has been criticised as an infringement on human rights and democracy”.



These diaspora movements have been able to link people together regardless of anyone's geographical location. Another respondent from CiZC said:

“We do not have to be in Zimbabwe for us to speak out and be heard on what really is happening in Zimbabwe. We have successfully as CiZC convened media briefings where we have congregated BBC, CNN etc. and local media houses in one room and give them information on the situation in Zimbabwe”.

It is in this activism role that diaspora movements mobilise the civic to channel their demands directly to the government. Civil society is able to gather and circulate information that helps empower the public in their collective pursuit of their shared interests. According to the Research and Advocacy Unit (2017:17), “Zimbabweans are

politically risk-averse and fearful. This makes it extremely difficult for civil society to encourage citizens to participate in activities that are regarded dangerous, this however opened an opportunity for the social media where one is engaging in the comfort of their homes or offices". Hence, these diaspora movements have capitalised on the use of social media and have successfully made citizens to re-engage in political participation.

Community participation in local affairs had declined over the years especially after the 2008 elections. The decline was a combination of economic and political problems and above all, the restriction of civil liberties through the use of repression by state security agents. This led to the detachment of the citizenry from civil participation which is not ideal if democratic consolidation is to be achieved. It is for this reason that diaspora movements like ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM operating from South Africa have filled this gap from their hostland and saw it fit to amplify the voices of the ordinary citizens and CSOs in Zimbabwe. They have successfully managed to at least encourage the people to express their views without fear of being persecuted by providing alternative methods such as the use of their Facebook and Twitter page so that disenfranchised citizens can have a voice and push for political reforms in Zimbabwe.

It is through this strategy that they have successfully managed to return to the public platform people that had ceased partaking in public affairs. They have also in the process of engaging citizens managed to even gather more useful information on what really is happening in Zimbabwe by engaging with those back home. Information and communication technologies have opened up spaces of power, influence, and association leading to the rise of online civil society action, allowing partnerships to be

built across geographical, social and physical divides. These partnerships allow people to collectively address societal challenges (World Economic Forum, 2013:6).

6.2.2 Raising awareness

Raising awareness and influencing national, regional and international bodies is also one of the recorded successes of these diaspora movements. They have in one way or the other managed to place issues on the agenda at national, regional or international levels, subsequently demanding action from relevant institutions. One respondent from ZRYM said:

“As the Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement, we managed to work in solidarity with the regional groups and even local South African CSOs. We have quite a number of events that we have carried and local CSOs and COSATU in particular though it is not a CSO have assisted us like when we marched against Mugabe and Mswati at Sandton when a SADC Summit was being held. Quite a number of CSOs came out to help us and our voices were heard. For us, that was a huge success”.

Another respondent from ZRYM said:

“Some of our actions have been a success, for instance during the GNU talks we were very instrumental and played a pivotal role airing out the grievances of the people and their demands through CSOs in Zimbabwe. They will engage us and we will take their concerns straight to Mbeki, Zuma, and SADC because the laws of this country gives us that platform to submit petitions, demonstrate and all unlike in Zimbabwe whereby you are beaten before they even hear you out”.

In countries where institutions are weakening like in Zimbabwe, activism in various forms like protesting is one of the accessible and most effective methods that can hold the government to account. CSOs in their endeavours through the use of these strategies have successfully garnered more support from the world at large.

The advocacy and lobbying done by these selected diaspora movements managed to get a number of issues on national, regional and international agendas. They have thus managed to put Zimbabwean issues on the national, regional and international radar as individuals or through partnerships with other foreign or local movements. Wodrig (2017:43) said ‘Within the ANC rank and file, Zimbabwe likewise emerged as a subject of debate. Especially vocal was the ANC Youth League and its former secretary general, Julius Malema. In parliament, the major opposition party Democratic Alliance kept Zimbabwe on the national agenda’. This shows that the combined efforts of these diaspora movements really made an impact and that in itself is a success. If different parties were able to put it on their agenda and not discuss their national issues that says a lot. The South African government has been more than willing to consider the views of Zimbabwean diaspora movements based in South Africa. One respondent from ZEF said:

“The demonstrations we have carried out at Zimbabwe’s embassies and consulates have enabled the world to follow the human rights and democracy developments in Zimbabwe, with the result that support from other countries made the difference”.

These diaspora movements have been playing very critical roles which include being a watchdog through holding the government accountable and promoting transparency. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have been advocating the situation and raising awareness of the plight of most Zimbabweans. They have been contributing more knowledge through the research they conduct, especially ZEF and CiZC. Not only have they represented the marginalised masses and highlighted issues of importance, they have successfully championed citizen participation especially in public affairs. All these actions have been carried out whether in collaboration with other movements or stakeholders.

The above response shows that South-African based diaspora movements have been working hard trying to help restore democracy in Zimbabwe. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have a responsibility to protect citizens against the excesses by the state by creating a buffer against possible state predatory behaviour, human rights and corruption, among other duties. They have been calling for the fixing of the economy, restoring rule of law, reviving of the basic pillars of a society, like the health system, that have failed the majority of Zimbabweans. The demand for human rights is a demand for survival (Nzimande, 2018).

These diaspora movements have been openly challenging the abuses of Mugabe's government and fostering a culture of tolerance as well as civic engagement. All this was done by diaspora movements because Zimbabweans abroad and those back home were largely withdrawing from any political-related issues and the number of people who had participated in politics dwindled due to Mugabe's repressive government. This has been on-going for a while now, even Makumbe (1998:307) once mentioned it back

then by stating “many, seeing their role in political life reduced to a farce, incapable of bringing any change of government or improvement in their standards of living, resorted to the exit option”. However, the diaspora movements have been successful in encouraging people to partake once more in issues that affect their day-to-day lives. They have peacefully protested and by so doing they have drawn attention to Zimbabwe’s struggles faced by the ordinary citizens on a day-to-day basis and above all exposing the repression of ZANU-PF’s regime.

Tocqueville believes that civil society is an “autonomous area of liberty incorporating an organisational culture that builds both political and economic democracy” (Walton, 2015). This makes diaspora movements to be regarded as counterweights of a hegemonic state like Zimbabwe and separated from the state power, making them to be automatic agents of change. Tocqueville in Zihnioglu (2013: 94) said “a pluralist and self-organising civil society independent of the state is an indispensable condition of democracy”. Diaspora movements educate citizens and scrutinise state actions, they provide opportunities for direct involvement in public affairs so as to achieve the desired democracy. Diaspora movements do so as a check against the tendency exhibited by the ZANU-PF government of centralising power and educating citizens would help safeguard against dictatorship. Diaspora movements like ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have served as a barrier to some extent by enabling an environment that has allowed Zimbabwean citizens to be aware of their rights and even made it possible for them to be acquainted with others. This is an environment that the ZANU-PF led government have restricted the ordinary citizens from. Zimbabwean citizens can participate if they

are allowed to have that associational life in an environment which permits them and thus, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have in one way or the other made it fairly possible for the citizens to be aware of what really is happening in Zimbabwe, especially for Zimbabweans in the diasporas and those at home who receive biased information due to censorship.

6.2.3 Building of alliances

Building of partnerships among movements within and across borders is important and helps increase the chances of their success rate. USAID (2017:4) asserted that “Alliances increase the pool of resources available to groups. Alliances can often better articulate a clear and common message to multiple audiences. Redundancies can be avoided and time and resources better managed when groups with similar demands are able to coordinate. Groups working in alliances may be more likely to experience and learn principles of democratic governance”. Local and transnational partnerships can help enhance the effectiveness of diaspora movements. One of their successes has been the ability to establish good working relations with local movements considering that they are operating from a hostland. One respondent from CiZC said:

“We as the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition have a cordial working relationship with local CSOs. We have worked well with for example Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum. This has helped us to even open more doors of opportunity because of their guidance as people who know how the system of their country operates”.


Another respondent from ZEF said:

“These collaborations have enabled the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum to put our crisis on the political radar and raise the issues of Zimbabwe at the public sessions of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, with the result that special rapporteurs have been sent to investigate rights violations allegations in Zimbabwe leading to resolutions and recommendations being given”.

According to Habermas (1996:367), the core of civil society includes a "network of associations that institutionalises problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organised public spheres". As mentioned earlier in chapter two that theorists like Friedman and Fraser that are influence by Habermas are interested a civil society that takes part in discussions about public affairs which take place in the public sphere, a space open to all citizens (Pedraza-Farina, 2013:630). It is through having alliances or partnerships that diaspora movements are more effective and utilise the public sphere in a meaningful manner to further discuss and pursue common interests like how to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe. There is collective power in building partnerships, it is through them that diaspora movements influence their members with participatory norms and instil a sense of effectiveness in their social and political life. By building partnerships, diaspora movements can nurture a culture that supports democracy.

Though alliances alone do not warrant a popular reaction, retribution, or deterrence, they can motivate civil society to take further action. Not only are their efforts recognised in their hostland only, they are also recognised beyond the borders of South Africa. In Chapter Five, it was mentioned that ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have collaborations with other movements locally and abroad, and it is those partnerships that made it possible

for them to have good relations with local movements like ZSF and other organisations like COSATU. This to a certain extent can be considered as a success because it is not easy for foreigners to have organisations and forge relations with hostland organisations. In the case of Zimbabwe's diaspora movements based in South Africa, alliances with local movements have been built. For example, CiZC has on numerous occasions worked hand in hand with ZSF, a South African organisation in support of democratic development in Zimbabwe. Also, in line with building alliances, ZEF and ZRYM have at some point worked with COSATU by holding demonstrations against the Zimbabwe government and even holding anti-xenophobic events. One ZRYM respondent said:



"We actually managed to receive solidarity support from South African CSOs and unions like COSATU that has been quite helpful. We have quite a number of events being assisted by COSATU like the demonstration we had at one point when there was a SADC Summit held in Sandton, Johannesburg in 2008".

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6.2.4 Contributions in the Constitution of 2013

Diaspora movements were involved during the drafting of the Constitution 2013, mostly at the consultation stages. A number of civic groups and coalitions were involved in the constitution-making process which culminated in the adoption of the 2013 Constitution. Chigwata (2016:86) reinforced the above statement and said "Some civic groups and political parties have also been visible in constitutional litigation, especially around the enforcement of fundamental human rights and freedoms". Diaspora movements played

a pivotal role in the implementation of the Constitution. One respondent from CiZC said:

“So there are things that we will claim and there things that are difficult to claim. It is easy to claim victory through the fact that the country has a new Constitution because the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has been part of the bigger voice that has been calling for the Constitutional reform. Crisis is part of the broad civic movement that has been calling for the reform of the Constitution because the belief is that a well-crafted functional Constitution can consolidate democracy, so the fact that we have a new Constitution speaks to a degree of success. However, having a Constitution in itself is not sufficient it is dependent on political will; how willing are the ruling elites to implement the Constitution. It is good that the Constitution itself has given life to independent institutions that we did not have in the past e.g. Gender Commission, Anti-corruption Commission and Human Rights Commission etc.”.



Another respondent, from ZRYM, said:

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“As we measure our progress during the time of GNU we can actually agree that we achieved one or two things. During the Constitution making processes we have some other acts which we demanded in partnership with quite a number of organisations like ZEF and Zimbabwe Global Forum which were considered in the Constitution”.

Despite having fundamental rights like freedom of association being guaranteed in Zimbabwe’s Constitution, these rights are also regulated by the government. Elone (2010:3) argued that these rights are “obstructed by prohibitions against unregistered groups, complex registration procedures, and vague grounds for denial, re-registration requirements, and barriers for international organisations”. Such hostility has seen

diaspora movements thriving from their hostland because the environment there does not thwart civic space in any way. Zimbabwe's political landscape is characterised by polarisation, distrust of citizens towards their government, corruption, iron-fist type of rule, all of which have greatly triggered an antagonistic relationship between civil society and the government (Chikoto-Schultz et al., 2016:146).

6.2.5 Watchdog role

A diaspora movement has the power to mobilise its members to resist a tyrannical regime (Bodewes, 2013:25). Civil society advocates like Diamond (1999:233) believe that civil society organisations have the potential to advance democracy in two ways “by helping generate a transition away from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy and by deepening and consolidating democracy once it is established”. The consolidation process must also strengthen the right to absolute human rights, constitutionalism and institutional structures such as political parties, the legislature and the judicial system in order to ensure political rights, civil liberties and mechanism of accountability (Beetham, 1999:92). Critical theory does acknowledge the importance of civil society because naturally they execute a watchdog function by holding the government to public scrutiny and uncovering the abuses of state power (Diamond, 1999:240).

Walton (2016:11) articulated that “The rise of transnational civil society organisations means that local civil society now includes international organisations that challenge the territorial power of nation-states”. In the same vein as Walton are Ferguson et al. (2002: 981) who also noted that “local grassroots organisations can now bypass political

society and appeal directly to the transnational organisations for resources and solidarity”. This has been the case with most of these selected diaspora movements who have at one point successfully provided either resources, acted in solidarity or simply been a mouthpiece of movements back in Zimbabwe. For instance, one respondent from ZRYM said:

“It was very difficult for the civil society organisations in Zimbabwe to have demonstrations, marches and hand over petitions. Therefore the CSOs in Zimbabwe thereby deem us as a platform they could go through and so they tell us that this is the petition we need to send out to the chairperson of SADC for instance. In solidarity with them we then submit it on their behalf. This was actually a success we managed to bring Zimbabwe’s crisis at the forefront of most agendas especially at regional level”.



Enlightened thinkers believe that civil society and the pressure of public opinion will determine how a free, efficient and honest market and a vibrant democracy will emerge. Tocqueville argued that volunteerism, a sense of community spirit and independent associational life help to protect people against the state’s dominance of society and help to act as a counterweight to keep the state functioning and responsible for its actions (Awiti, 2016). To Tocqueville, civil society is an associational activity which occurs in a political space that is detached from the state. This is what ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have done by operating from South Africa because the political space there allows them to carry out their activities, unlike in Zimbabwe where ZANU-PF’s government closed that much needed political space for movements to fully operate. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM are all calling for more accountable leadership and a transparent

government. The role of these diaspora movements is to influence the desired change and make sure that the end result is a more democratic Zimbabwe. An active diaspora movement is essential for any democracy to thrive.

Gramsci (1999:373) argued that “hegemony is always contested due to divisions between ruling and subject classes, and that compromise in the form of alliances between groups is needed to ensure hegemonic rule is curbed”. Therefore, he was implying that civil society comprises different organisations and ideologies which seek to challenge and maintain the existing order (Lewis, 2002:571). Civil society is often regarded as an alternative to, and check on state authority, hence an essential peg in the democratisation process (Hammett, 2014). According to Chikoto-Shultz et al. (2016:139), civil society is a “critic or watchdog of the state and never its appendage or supporter”. To Gramsci, the role of civil society is to support or challenge state power. Thus, among other actions taken, diaspora movements like ZEF, CiZC, and ZRYM challenge the state power, call for Mugabe’s government to make reforms, and in some instances, ask Mugabe to relinquish power.

Whilst Gramsci sees civil society and the state as inherently independent, Hegel sees them as intertwined because to him the civil society is a sphere or relations between the family and the state where mutual needs are met and contractual terms are defined (LeVan, 2011). Hegel’s view was more market-oriented where he emphasised the role of civil society as one in which some kind of balance is created in relation to the state and the market. Tocqueville, however, adopted a voluntarist view of civil society where individuals are at liberty to choose goals and how to achieve them within the limits of

certain societal restrictions. Civil society should be able to protect as well as promote the interests of individuals (Zhou, 2014:44). ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM should tirelessly voice the concerns and everyday issues affecting the lives of Zimbabweans.

Although democracy is threatened when it is taken for granted, it is even worse when office bearers who are entrusted with the powers to preserve it take it for granted too. These leaders are able to increase their political authority by manipulating electoral norms, curbing dissent and limiting freedom of speech, and amending the constitution to prolong their terms in office. All this is done within the legal frame of a democratic system (Burcher, 2017:70). This has been the case in Zimbabwe, a country that has had one party dominating since its independence in 1980 coupled with an economic crisis, high unemployment rates and decay in public service delivery over the years. This is why ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have been very vocal from their hostland, mobilising citizens in the diasporas and those back home, calling for the ZANU-PF regime to respect citizens' human rights and restore the rule of law. Diaspora movements have over the years become a resilient voice for Zimbabweans abroad and those back home by demanding restoration of democracy and its consolidation.

One of the major issues that saw diaspora movements protesting in their hostland was related to, for example, Mugabe's political governance. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM were demanding that Mugabe, who had ruled for decades without any economic and political progress to show for it as witnessed in the previous years especially from 2000 onwards, should relinquish his power. The country's grave economic problems were attributed to mismanaged governance and corruption, whilst authoritarianism was

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viewed as the source of state repression that was used on anyone who thought of opposing Mugabe (Sachikonye, 2017:131). Diaspora movements have been raising awareness on the incompetence of the government. Sachikonye (2017: 132) articulated that “The crisis in Zimbabwe has deepened to reach a tipping point, where citizens are beginning to overcome fear and reverence of authorities, along with their legendary docility, to reclaim their public spaces in order to assert their rights and air their grievances”. Hence, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have performed their watchdog role and managed to persuade their members to demand transformation in the government.

6.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In a nutshell, selected diaspora movements have been expressing dissatisfaction about things that have been happening back in Zimbabwe, especially how the ZANU-PF government has been running the state. These diaspora movements, namely ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM, have succeeded in some of their endeavours. They have successfully used social media to educate the masses as well as disseminate information. They have successfully raised awareness of what is taking place back in their homeland of Zimbabwe. They have managed to build alliances with other movements in South Africa or transnationally. Further, they contributed in the drafting of the Constitution of 2013 and performed their watchdog role. Above all, this chapter infused views of civil society from a critical theory perspective. The next chapter subsequently looks at the challenges encountered by these diaspora movements.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY DIASPORA MOVEMENTS IN THEIR QUEST FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN ZIMBABWE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Diaspora movements play a crucial role in promoting fundamental human rights and contribute to the functioning of democracies by giving voice to ordinary citizens as well as monitoring a government's activities. Despite diaspora movements being the voice of the people they are faced with challenges that vary in terms of their nature and degree. These challenges may include, among others, a repressive environment, accessing financial resources, in-fighting within movements and ensuring their sustainability. Some of these challenges are common to all selected diaspora movements and others are peculiar only to some. For example, Diaspora Somali movement based in Finland like the Somalia League has been faced with clan representation challenges and political divisions within the movement. This challenge stems from the fact that even back in Somalia, the country is so divided into clans which affects how they either trust or relate to each other. This situation has replicated itself even within Diaspora movements like Somalia League based in Finland (Tiilikainen et al., 2013:44).

Somali League was formed in 1996 and its aim was to represent the Somali community in Finland and above all to promote the integration of the Somalis. The Somali League

council after its formation was made up of a council body comprising 60 people who were selected based on clan size including those from the independent Somaliland residing in Finland. Tiilikainen et al. (2013:45) mentioned that “since a couple of years the Somalis and associations in Finland who identify themselves as Somalilanders have withdrawn from the Somali League. The reason is that the Somali League has a nationalistic agenda and supports the unification of all Somalis under one flag. This is unacceptable for those Somalilanders who support independent Somaliland, as they feel that Somali League cannot represent them”. These internal struggles for power and representation make it difficult for the diaspora movement to achieve its aim. Therefore, based on the research conducted, the essence of this chapter is comprises some of the challenges that ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have faced in their quest of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe.




7.2 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY ZEF, CIZC AND ZRYM

Civil society organisations globally are under significant pressure and are faced with many challenges ranging from difficulties in registration, restricted foreign funding, and closed space for operations to internal squabbles in Zimbabwe. It became risky to challenge those in authority as it was always followed by reprisals. They had some of their human rights repressed like freedom of assembly, association and that of expression. However, the challenges of diaspora-based movements are different because the above-mentioned human rights that are repressed in Zimbabwe are promoted and protected especially in Western democracies. Luckily the South Africa-

based diaspora movements are not bound by Zimbabwe's jurisdiction and hence the draconian laws like POSA and AIPPA for instance do not affect them. The role of these diaspora movements is to influence the course of change and guarantee that the end result is a more democratic Zimbabwe. The central challenge for the South Africa-based diaspora movements today is to influence the progression of democratisation and keep the cause on track. Therefore, the success of their central challenge is further hindered by a different set of internal and external challenges that have held them from consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe. Below are some of the noted challenges they have faced.

7.2.1 Inadequate resources and donor fatigue



Inadequate resources especially accessing donor funding have been a challenge for most diaspora movements, particularly African diaspora movements, including these selected diaspora movements. Diaspora movements struggle with sourcing funds which hinders their sustainability in the process and greatly affects meeting their intended goals. This is because Africa's diaspora movements rely heavily on external financial support from willing donors. Their reliance on external funding also has a bearing on their autonomy as an organisation. Zalanga (2017:55) stressed that "Given that overseas donors have their own agenda, such civil society groups lose any autonomy that they have by becoming implementers of foreign donor programs and projects". Since they depend on external funding, more of which comes from overseas donors, they are at times required to align their objectives with those of their funders so that they can be considered for funding.

To affirm the above statement one respondent from CiZC said:

“So we are a Civil Society Organisation and we are purely donor funded. So being a Zimbabwean organisation and also based in a developing country it is difficult to have any other funding model other than sourcing donors. So we source funds from donor organisations and these organisations are those that are primarily interested in the work that we do. Reliability of donor funding is not guaranteed because their interest in issues at given intervals may change. So when donors feel that their interests and ours are not aligning or in sync anymore they can withdraw with immediate effect from funding you. Despite this challenge, we have received significant donor funding that has helped us carry out some of our activities”.

The aligning of interests at times might slightly derail the major objectives of the concerned diaspora movement because they will be quite aware that for them to carry any of their activities successfully, funding is required.

Another respondent from ZRYM echoed different sentiments regarding donor funding:

“Our organisation has never had a source of funding; we operate mainly from contributions made by our members. At times we get generous people like businessman or individuals who would have at that point sympathised with us and/or are interested or believe in our goal and therefore they end up donating funds to us. Otherwise, we have no specific donors locally or internationally”.

Those that depend heavily on international funding or government funding for them to carry out their philanthropic duties are now faced with a serious funding crisis. This is because funding from the developed world in general plunged especially after the global and Eurozone financial crisis of 2007/2008. This global crisis forced traditional donors to

reduce or withdraw funding totally. Such a move significantly impacted diaspora movements more. Gumede (2018) reported that “Given the decline in international development funding, SA will have to secure funding for civil society organisations from within the country”. Though what Gumede said is a reasonable solution for the sustenance of movements in South Africa, it does not guarantee that all movements will receive funding. It is even worse for diaspora movements based in South Africa to have hopes of getting funding from the South African government because logically any country will cater for their own people first. To show how difficult it already is for the Zimbabwean diaspora movement in South Africa one respondent from ZEF said:


“There are obvious challenges such as lack of or inadequate resources. These have been the bane of our struggle to emancipate Zimbabwe fully. To traditional funders, Zimbabwe Exiles Forum is a South African organisation when they are supporting activities in Zimbabwe; and Zimbabwe Exiles Forum is a Zimbabwean organisation when they are supporting activities in South Africa. We are thus unable to become the catchment area for most funding because while we are registered in South Africa, we are mainly dealing with Zimbabwean issues. We are therefore more or less seen as a schizophrenic organisation, something that has worked to our detriment”.

Sriskandarajah (2015), the secretary general of CIVICUS, conducted research and identified five reasons why donors are unable or at times unwilling to fund the global south. The reasons include the following:

- Lots of southern and smaller CSOs do not have the capacity to fill in all forms, let alone spend money effectively.

- Donors do not have the administrative capacity to give smaller amounts of money.
- Donors need to channel money through a few trusted partners so that they can manage risk and comply with their own rules.
- Donors have strict anti-terror and anti-money laundering rules that make giving directly difficult.
- Donors are under domestic political pressure to fund through CSOs in their home country.

With such considerations from the donors, it makes it even more difficult to even think of outsourcing funding and worse if the movement is considered to be small. These reasons leave a bitter taste in the mouth of most movements in the south. Donors should reconsider availing funding to smaller movements in the south considering that is where most of African CSOs are. If movements are to rely on local funding only, they may not be able to reach the desired changes.



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An additional issue that could be the reason why these selected diaspora movements face challenges when it comes to funding is that of donor fatigue. Donor fatigue according to Smith et al. (2006:71), is the “reluctance of a donor to give money to a charity because excessive financial demands on the donor by that cause, and possibly others, have generated a loss of interest in making donations”. Zimbabwean issues have been on the frontline for long and many donors showed so much interest in trying to help solve the crisis in the country by generously donating funds to movements who have worked on Zimbabwe’s crisis. However, little to no progress at all on the part of the movements has been evident. Therefore, donors become discouraged from continually

funding for something with no positive results to it. O'Driscoll (2018:7) affirmed that "agencies aim to fund organisations who they think can aid democracy". However, the issue of democracy in Zimbabwe has been a daunting task to achieve. Opposition parties, movements locally and in the diaspora have all tried and continue to do so in the hope of restoring and consolidating democracy. It is these unending efforts that lead to donor fatigue because no tangible results are seen and so they might decrease funding or withdraw it altogether.

7.2.2 Xenophobia

Another challenge has been xenophobia. The South African society has been marred with problems of xenophobia since 1994. Xenophobia is a profound loathing of immigrants by nationals of the host country (Akinola, 2018:1). There has been increased xenophobic antagonism directed at Africans from all over the continent because of their foreign status. South African citizens normally refer to foreign Africans as *amakwerekwere*. Makwerekwere is a derogatory term which is a classification of someone who is a foreigner and is unable to speak the local language, it is associated with being uncultured and uncivilised (Crymble, 2015:127). This hostility is shocking given the fact that during their fight against apartheid, they received overwhelming support from African countries. Foreign Africans have been accused of being responsible for so many things that have gone wrong in South Africa. The South Africans citizens feel that the rise in unemployment in South Africa is because foreigners are taking their jobs; they also blame foreigners for crime and for spreading of diseases especially HIV. All social ills emanating or on the rise in South Africa are

blamed on foreign Africans (Neocosmos, 2010:2). Hence they have become the easy targets of abuse from the citizens, police and even the Department of Home Affairs and are blamed for the country's problems which has resulted in much prejudice.

The perception that has been entrenched within South African citizens is that wherever there are foreigners, there are immoral activities taking place. Mpe (2011: no page) claimed that "This group of African immigrants and refugees are charged with promiscuity, drug dealing, and violence". Consequently, xenophobic violence has become part of South Africa's story and if it is not curtailed at its earliest stages it can degenerate into civil war in the near future. Akinola (2018:2) gave a clear example "the intolerance that triggered genocide in Rwanda in the 1990s looms, not only in South Africa but in several other parts of Africa. What often begins as mild expressions of dislike can easily develop into institutionalised discrimination, psychological trauma, physical abuse, hate crimes and brutal killings". The violent expression of xenophobia in South Africa is directed mostly against black African immigrants.

In practice, South African citizens have been most hostile to Somali nationals, Nigerians, and Zimbabweans, among other nationalities. Xenophobia in the country has impacted greatly on how diaspora movements run by foreigners function because of the prejudice, discrimination and violence directed towards their members. A respondent from ZEF said:

"It is so difficult for us to assemble our fellow countryman in one place because local people will always do something to make sure we dismiss. We can only hold meetings without disturbances because there will be indoors, but at times we need

to take physical action and make our voices heard which means we have to be on the streets and demonstrate. The moment we tell people of our plans to march they shy away on the basis that they fear being attacked by locals. Let me be clear on something, it is not always that when we march on the street we get attacked. There are times where it can be a success and there are days where locals can really be hostile calling us out with all sorts of names though the commonly used term is amakwerekwere”

This makes it difficult for diaspora movements to freely meet and express themselves especially when they are thinking of marching. Some members who have been victims of xenophobia before might be reluctant to go out and march in numbers with fellow foreigners because they do not know how the citizens might react to their activities. Apart from being scared of openly going out as foreigners, the fact that some of their members get displaced also affects the activities of diaspora movements in general. Displaced people may consider relocating to a different location where they can start a new life and this indirectly leads to a drop in membership numbers. Another respondent from ZEF said:

“We also struggle with xenophobic attitudes in South Africa in particular when we carry out our work. This has largely been a hindrance to free activities when we want our people to gather”.

One respondent from ZRYM said:

“We get hostile reactions from locals at times when we are carrying out demonstrations. They will be shouting at us telling us to go back in Zimbabwe and demonstrate from there and leave them in peace”.

Such reactions from the locals make it hard for future activities to be carried out as it may affect the attendance of the people due to a hostile attitude and hate speech which are continuously aimed at them. The biggest problem is that it has become a norm for both citizens and influential people to blame their country's woes on foreigners and this leads to anxiety. Pugh (2014:243) argued that "the works of both state and civil society actors alike are impacted by the negative social constructions of migrant, refugee and asylum seeker populations, which position migrants as both a burden and unwanted competition to the rights and well-being of South African citizens". It makes it difficult for these selected diaspora movements to function effectively because of the limited space that is created by an environment which is anti-foreigners. These attacks happen when people are least expecting them (Crush et al., 2017:69).



7.2.3 Undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants

Undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants is one of the stumbling blocks that diaspora movements are faced with. The Zimbabwean crisis forced a lot of people to migrate to other parts of the world in search of greener pastures. The greater number of people migrated to South Africa and it is estimated that about three million Zimbabweans live in the country as of 2009 (Alfaro-Velcamp et al., 2016:989). Some of the Zimbabwean immigrants, because of their illegal status due to being undocumented, will display an unwillingness to participate in any activities that can expose them. This affects diaspora movements negatively because for them to realise their goals they need Zimbabwean immigrants to partake in their activities. One respondent from ZEF said:

“The other issue is that a significant number of Zimbabweans in exile do not have proper documentation in host countries. This has thus negatively impacted on their willingness or ability to participate in activities associated with the democratisation of Zimbabwe for fear of exposure, arrest and possible deportation”.

Another respondent from ZRYM said:

“Some of our members do not have the necessary documents that will legalise their stay in South Africa, so it becomes difficult whenever we want to meet or have a demonstration that requires us to come out in numbers. These people with no necessary documents will shy away from attending some activities because they fear being arrested and consequently get deported. This is a challenge for us because we then fail to draw in the masses to help us get whatever message we want to convey and at times just to be taken serious”.

Those who get arrested for not having documents are taken to the famous Lindela Repatriation Centre situated outside Johannesburg which was built in 1996 specifically for foreign nationals who enter and reside in South Africa without legal documentation. The place is reportedly overcrowded and cases of corruption and relentless abuse have been reported (Patel et al., 2015). Zimbabwe Exiles Forum has in so many cases received reports of people who have been arrested and are awaiting deportation. Advocate Shumba of ZEF was quoted by Ncube (2017) as saying “We have visited Lindela and noted with serious concern that those arrested for deportation include those either attempting to apply for or renewing asylum and refugee status”. Those who get deported often return to South Africa and once they return they prefer not to apply for asylum again. Thus, they end up falling under the undocumented category and are constantly on the run because they have to dodge the police or volunteers from the

Department of Home Affairs who roam in the streets of Johannesburg targeting undocumented immigrants.

Undocumented immigrants live in fear and often are in hiding. This was exacerbated by what the Minister of Home Affairs, Malusi Gigaba, said “Any other undocumented Zimbabwean in South Africa will continue to be treated as an undocumented foreign national and will be subject to the provisions of the Immigration Act which demands that if the parties ever come into contact with such a person they’re going to be immediately deported” (Immigration South Africa, 2018). This makes it difficult for these Zimbabweans to participate fully when their presence is required for a good cause by these diaspora movements. It becomes a challenge for these diaspora movements when they need to congregate Zimbabwean immigrants because those who are undocumented fear being caught and thus might choose to refrain from attending any event organised by these diaspora movements.



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7.2.4 Polarisation of the state and diaspora movements

Polarisation is another obstacle that one of the diaspora movement mentioned. Zimbabwe has been polarised between party lines and this has also spilled over into the civil society. The crisis of polarisation has even affected diaspora movements and those back in Zimbabwe. Polarisation in Zimbabwean society, especially between state and the civil society, worsened in the late 1990s. This led the government to adopt an authoritarian rule which saw the rise of repression and use of state agents. Civil society cannot afford to be disconnected from issues of democracy and reform; hence, they

participate and even form movements. Polarisation has led diaspora movements to face dilemmas that have hindered their efforts in contributing to transformative change (Connolly, 2013). One respondent from ZEF said:

“The democratisation project has also been compromised by the polarisation that we find in Zimbabwe after Mugabe’s autocratic divide and rule approach to governance. Invariably, any attempt to articulate from a human rights perspective is seen as pro-opposition and anti-ZANU PF. This approach to discourse shaping the nation is very helpful and democracy practitioners find it difficult to be brutally frank when necessary; fearing the labelling which may even come from the opposition itself”.

In Zimbabwe the nature and role of movements is questioned by the government because to them, movements are viewed as organisations that have self-serving plans and are always appendages of either their international donors or the opposition party. There is continuous suspicion of movements regardless of location and this makes it difficult for local and diaspora movements to be able to reach their desired goal which is a democratic Zimbabwe. The government believes movements are there only to undermine them. According to Mavhinga (2014), “They point to western funding of civil society as evidence that civil society is the West’s Trojan horse used to undermine Zimbabwe’s sovereignty”. Hence, movements are deemed as a threat to national interests. There is no sustainable democracy that can be developed and consolidated without an energetic civil society. The Zimbabwe government has made it difficult for movements to operate effectively unless they are pro-ZANU-PF and become part of a partisan society. Therefore, any attempts by movements to raise issues like violation of

human rights are perceived as supporting one party which is mostly the opposition whilst condemning the other, in this case ZANU-PF. Thus, this has stalled diaspora movements' endeavours of a democratic Zimbabwe.

7.2.5 Lack of regional and international support

Lack of regional and international support is another hurdle that diaspora movements battle with. Movements are acknowledged as key actors on the regional political playing ground. The efficiency of movements is shaped by spaces that are opened up to civil society. Lack of regional support for movements is worsened by the fact that many African leaders are reluctant to challenge fellow leaders who for instance violate basic human rights. Their regional goals of restoring democracy have remained paper objectives. Hanson (2016:58) mentioned that “many protocols have been signed but remain unimplemented, due to the absence of effective sanctions against defaulting member states and weak enforcement and implementation capacity”. Lack of political will from African leaders has let down diaspora movements. Landberg (2017:45) noted that the 1992 Windhoek Treaty gave a special status to the roles of CSOs:

SADC shall seek to involve fully the peoples of the region and non-governmental organisations in the process of regional integration...SADC shall co-operate with, and support the initiatives of the people of the region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations, and people of the region.

Despite the status given to movements, the SADC has been slow to act when their help is needed the most in supporting the initiatives of movements, especially in areas where restoration and consolidation of democracy are required. This has been one of the challenges that diaspora movements are faced with. Diaspora movements have slammed the SADC and AU for their failure to ensure democracy prevails in its member states like Zimbabwe where Mugabe and his government have been using an authoritarian system in which state repression is used on anyone who opposes the government. The CiZC in Bulawayo News 24 (2016) made the following plea to both the SADC and AU:

CiZC urges the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) to heed the early warnings from Zimbabwe as public unrest escalates in the country...We also ask that SADC and the AU take note of the current unrest in the country, included the clamping down on peaceful protest and closure of civic space. These institutions cannot sit by and watch the country continue to fall apart without making any meaning intervention. The people of Zimbabwe have suffered long enough and it is time for a lasting solution to be found.

One respondent from ZEF said:

“Ineffective regional and international institutions are also to blame for delaying the democratisation project in Zimbabwe. Many of these institutions are very good on paper, but there is a huge difference between aspiration and reality. It is usually very easy for these and country partners to ratify treaties and draft resolutions than to do anything tangible when there is frustration on the ground”.

The SADC and AU have failed Zimbabweans on numerous occasions because they are so determined to protect their ‘boys club’ regardless of how the ZANU-PF government

continues to mistreat the people. They have to show that they have the necessary powers to implement resolutions not just resolve on paper. Even international bodies like the UN have not been of any help in finding solutions for the crisis in Zimbabwe. The UN has failed Zimbabweans regarding the protection of human rights and the fact that decisions are mostly made by the five permanent security council members makes it worse. They have all kept their resolutions on paper and failed to practically implement them. The SADC, AU, and UN have not been supporting diaspora movements' efforts of bringing about democracy in Zimbabwe.

7.2.6 Infiltration and monitoring by state agents

Infiltration and monitoring by state security agents is one of the problems that diaspora movements have to guard against. Infiltration, as defined by the Oxford dictionary (2012:372), is the action of entering or gaining access to an organisation or place in order to acquire secret information or cause damage. Infiltration has been mostly carried out by the CIOs who are submissively a ZANU-PF ally. They operate as a secret police, are not easily identified and above all, their work is highly classified. They are well known for instilling a culture of deep fear when they are dealing with citizens. CANVAS (2017:41) alluded that “within this culture, negative emotions connected to past experiences make people believe that the same horrors can happen at any moment and they run a constant risk”. This culture of fear has an influence on Zimbabwe's society, regardless of geographic location, in the way they engage when it comes to political issues.

Intelligence officers from Zimbabwe were deployed and strategically placed at Zimbabwean Consulate offices so that they can easily infiltrate and disorganise diaspora movements. This weakened or destroyed some diaspora movements because it did instil fear and mistrust within and among the diaspora population. This in turn has prevented members from engaging in political discussions freely lest they are discussing with an undercover intelligence officer (Miriyyoga, 2017:178). Back in Zimbabwe, there is public display of violence and repression unleashed on anyone who is anti-ZANU-PF, the worst of which has been the disappearance of activists like Itai Dzamara. Hence, people in the diaspora are on their guard of such incidences. The CIO are famous for monitoring opposition parties as well as diaspora movements and then they alert ZANU-PF of their strategies; they do this successfully through infiltrating organisations. Since they work undercover, they can be active members of an organisation which they are targeting without disclosing who they really are. Thus they can destroy or derail diaspora movements/activities from within. One respondent from ZEF said:

“The Zimbabwean government has tried to thwart our organisation and our activities by sending secret agents to pose as clients or members”.

Another respondent from ZRYM said:

“Mugabe’s regime tried to infiltrate our organisation through planting their state security agents to derail our activities and also having CIOs spying and following us”.

Additionally, another respondent from ZRYM said:

“The Zimbabwe military was so swift and ever willing to trace us even if we were here in South Africa. I would go into hiding at times, for instance, I was followed in Swaziland when I had gone for a presentation representing CSOs in Zimbabwe. I was arrested and banned for five years from travelling to Swaziland. So those are some of the things that CIOs and military are capable of doing. They were very serious at that time, they could easily track you or inform you of your exact whereabouts at that specific time. These are some of the issues that could hinder the smooth implementation of some activities, by the end of the day you discover that you have been infiltrated. So infiltration was one of the biggest elements which was being used by ZANU-PF and they at times used money as a gate pass. They would inject funds and pretend to be interested in our cause once they are a part of us they would derail our activities. Despite that we managed to soldier on”.

The CIO is one of the state agents that is highly politicised and acts on behalf of the ZANU-PF nationwide and even beyond its borders as long its beneficial to the ZANU-PF government. The ZANU-PF uses its long-standing leverage in government to punish any form of opposition they consider as dissenting behaviour. ZANU-PF considers the demanding of compliance with human rights requested by diaspora movements or supporting the opposition as dissenting behaviour. Therefore, they are prepared to thwart any diaspora movement by sending CIO personnel to pose as members and disrupt their activities. Thus, diaspora movements need to be vigilant of some of their members.

7.2.7 Internal leadership

Last but not least, leadership is one of the challenges that diaspora movements often battle with. Leadership, in general, is the act of leading a group of people or an

organisation. Koehn (2017: no page) said leadership is “actually a result of individual people committing to work from their stronger selves, discovering a mighty purpose, and motivating others to join their cause”. Organisations with good leaders are more resilient. However, this has not been the case in some of the diaspora movements. The CiZC is one of the organisations that was once affected by leadership battles. There were many power struggles that at one point tarnished the organisation. It was mentioned in Chapter Five that CiZC has members back in Zimbabwe which means that the organisation’s leadership structure is a combination of members in Zimbabwe and those in South Africa.

There were allegations of members wanting to depose some board members. It emerged during interviews that the chairperson of the organisation at that point, Dewa Mavhinga based in South Africa, had the support of seven board members not to renew the then director, MacDonald Lewanika’s contract once it expired on 31 December 2014. The power struggles got so ugly that they made it to the tabloids. Zimbabwe Online News (2014) reported that:

Lewanika’s allies meanwhile, issued a statement late Wednesday calling for a no-confidence vote against Mavhinga, accusing him of, among other things, undermining the organisation by trying to run it by remote control from his South Africa base. Dewa Mavhinga is ordinarily resident in South Africa and as such he is running the Chair’s office by remote control, a situation which means that he cannot provide the necessary timely leadership when he is called upon to do that. He is a non-resident Chair only interested in being flown around to attend even ordinary meetings.

The leadership battles in the Zimbabwe government also began to reflect in the diaspora movements that were supposed to be exemplary when it came to leadership. CiZC also suffered from succession scandals. Consequently, the chairman, Dewa Mavhinga, resigned. As that was not enough, in 2015 an open letter was written directed to Lewanika asking him to step down because he had been in the leadership of the organisation in various positions for about a decade which the writer compared with Mugabe's stay in power. Though Lewanika's was "approximately a third to Mugabe's rule", (Mkono, 2015).

In support of leadership battles, one respondent from ZRYM said:

"We had a problem with leadership because when our organisation was infiltrated it was dismantled to a certain extent such that some of our leaders ran away to neighbouring countries like Namibia and Botswana fearing for their life. Also, there was betrayal from leaders and members alike, though we managed to survive the tide and soldiered on".

Diaspora movements once marred with internal leadership challenges can be undermined in terms of their ability to carry out their organisation's mission. Most successful diaspora movements are led and founded by people who are either visionaries or entrepreneurs in the first world countries and manage to draw in qualified personnel to help them achieve their mission. This is hardly the situation when it comes to African movements in general as some of them are founded by inexperienced people who lack the required skills to run an organisation which may result in failure to achieve the intended goal. Brown et al. (1999:3) claimed that "many of them are much less

experienced in organising and managing civil society organisations”. This is evident in the case of the respondent whose leadership deserted the organisation once they were faced with challenges. Good leaders stand with their organisations no matter the trials and tribulations because after all, a movement always stands firm for what they believe is right.

7.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the previous chapter outlined some of the diaspora movements' successes but they have also faced different challenges – as explained in this chapter. These challenges range from inadequate resources and donor fatigue, xenophobia, undocumented migrants, polarisation, and lack of regional and international support to infiltration from Zimbabwe state security and leadership, among others. These challenges have been obstacles in one way or another for the diaspora movements to fully be able to achieve their goal. These challenges have also destabilised their activities in various ways. Despite facing the above challenges, they have managed to move on and continue working towards consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study examined South Africa-based diaspora movements and their pursuit of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe. The researcher had three objectives to examine which were to explore strategies employed by selected South-Africa based diaspora movements, to discuss successes recorded, and to discuss challenges encountered. Completing these set objectives led to the findings explained below.

Chapter Five of this study discussed the various strategies used by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM vis-à-vis the political process theory. PPT made it clear that movements are formed because there are opportunities that would have emanated and steered the need for action to take place. In this regard, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM formed because of political opportunities that spurred them to take collective action. Once reasons to take action had been identified, different tactics had to be used to ensure the desired outcome which in this case was to consolidate democracy. Therefore, the common strategy used by all selected diaspora movements was protesting which comprises different methods referred to as repertoires of contention in PTT.

A petition is one of the methods used by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM. Over the years they have submitted petitions to bring to light the plight of citizens and calls for reforms have been made with the hope it will be a step in consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe.

However, despite the submission of petitions in partnership or independently, these petitions in most cases have not produced the anticipated outcome. Some petitions were handed over but no positive changes were made.

Lobbying and advocacy have also been used which has only resulted in ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM gaining attention but with no tangible or practical changes. Little has been achieved from this strategy and thus far it has not helped them in any way. Therefore, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM need to consider other strategies that they can use juxtaposed with lobbying and advocacy because this strategy on its own has proved to be insufficient. Demonstrations unlike other repertoires of contention have to a certain degree produced something fruitful. Demonstrations in a few other cases made remarkable changes, for example the demonstration against the Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016 which controlled imports into Zimbabwe that was held in 2016. Border posts were shutdown with the Musina/Beitbridge being affected the most. These demonstrations pushed the government to repeal the law. On the other hand, demonstrations failed dismally as their efforts fell on deaf ears. For instance, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM demonstrated at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, calling for Mbeki who was mediating the crisis in Zimbabwe after the disputed 2008 elections to step down.

Partnerships and dialogues have only helped at keeping Zimbabwean issues like gross violation of human rights on the table. They have not helped much in paving the much needed path to consolidate democracy. Despite diaspora movements like ZEF being awarded the opportunity to address, for instance, the United States Congress, no notable change have been gained from it. Dialogues have been used as a way of

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sharing information and discussing pressing issues. It ended there because no selected diaspora movement has ever mentioned doing any follow up on issues discussed. The use of social media by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM has been one strategy that has helped them a lot. Facebook, Whatsapp, Twitter and Blogging have been some of the avenues used by these diaspora movements. It made it easy for them to engage and share information with Zimbabweans in the diaspora and those back in Zimbabwe. This strategy has been useful in that mobilisation has been easier and at the same time these selected diaspora movements have been able to gather citizens' grievances that do not make it in political debates back in Zimbabwe. They have then used these grievances in strengthening their activities like advocacy. Overall, these strategies have not really had much impact in terms of consolidating democracy. This could be because ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM are operating from South Africa which is their hostland; had they tried these strategies from their homeland, Zimbabwe, they could have made notable strides. Unless they consider other strategies, consolidating democracy will remain an elusive task for them.

Chapter Six discussed challenges encountered by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM in their quest of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe. Critical theory has helped to elucidate what is generally expected of a movement and to strengthen their successes thus far. These selected diaspora movements have a couple of successes to their names. For instance, they have all made use of the social media for political education and as a way of disseminating information. The success recorded in using social media has also enabled the ordinary Zimbabwean immigrants and those back in Zimbabwe to have

their voices heard; thus political participation in a public space or forum has greatly increased. CiZC for instance claimed to have over 120 000 followers on their Facebook page which is a fairly large following. Critical theory points out that movements advance the full participation of citizens to ensure a participatory democracy. For that reason, ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have all managed to use social media and helped Zimbabwean citizens within and outside Zimbabwe to actively contribute to discussions held on various social media sites like Facebook, Whatsapp and Twitter. In return, these diaspora movements have also benefited because they have managed to gather more information on what is really happening in Zimbabwe from their social media followers based in Zimbabwe.



Another recorded success by these diaspora movements is the ability to raise awareness on issues that are affecting Zimbabwe. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have all acted as a buffer against, for example, abuse of human rights by the ZANU-PF government. They have let the world at large know about what Zimbabweans are going through in their home country. It is this success that makes critical theory regard movements as agents of change that are necessary for democracy to prevail and be consolidated. Building of alliances is another success which all three selected diaspora movements have managed to do. Alliances have been built within these and other movements making them to be effective in their activities and have good relations with local movements and organisations like COSATU. These Alliances with organisations like COSATU or ANC Youth League only helped these diaspora movements to get attention from the South African government but not the much needed support for them to realise

their aim. ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM should consider building Alliances more with movements back in Zimbabwe so that they can be a united force and fight to consolidate democracy.

ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM further contributed in the drafting of Zimbabwe's Constitution of 2013 during the consultation stage. Despite their contributions, the Constitution has basic human rights and liberties included but this still has not helped much because ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM among other diaspora movements still operate from their hostland. If the ZANU-PF government followed what is enshrined in the Constitution of 2013 then these selected diaspora movements would have been operating from Zimbabwe by now but alas that is not the case. Last but not least, playing a watchdog role is another success recorded by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM. They have proved to be a resilient voice with one quest of consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe. Their resilience is a trait that critical theory encourages movements to have if they want to successfully challenge state power in order to consolidate democracy.

Chapter Seven discussed the challenges encountered by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM in their quest of democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe. The challenges they face overshadow the successes recorded. Inadequate resources as well as donor fatigue is one of the challenges encountered by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM. Having access to resources which includes financial aid or donors is an integral part for movements to realise their objectives. There have been obstacles in some instances when they have tried accessing resources or attracting donors. ZEF, for example, mentioned that some donors supporting activities in Zimbabwe regard ZEF as a South African organisation

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and the inverse of that when it comes to activities in South Africa. This makes it difficult to receive funding. In some cases there can be complications when a donor's objectives and those of the particular movement are not aligning, which means the donor can choose not to fund the movement's activities. At times, procedures to be followed in order to access the funds can be too demanding or if the donor's interests change funding may be terminated. The worst part is when donors have been generous enough to extend a helping hand and no positive change takes place. The donors then reach at a point where they become fatigued by funding and cease the funds.

Xenophobia is one of the setbacks that ZEF and ZRYM pointed out. They operate from a country where there is a generally entrenched hatred towards African immigrants among the South African citizens. This makes it hard for the immigrants to fully carry out their activities without fearing being victimised. That hostility portrayed by locals makes immigrants keep away from any activities that might expose their identity, like demonstrating. Also, undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants are unwilling to participate in activities organised by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM because this category of people is usually targeted by Home Affairs officials and even the police. They know their fate is that once they get caught they can be deported. This reduces the number of people who can participate which is unfortunate because more can be achieved when the number of participants is high.

Polarisation of the state and diaspora movements has made it extremely difficult for any endeavours made by ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM to be a success. This is because to the ZANU-PF led government, movements in general whether operating within Zimbabwe

or from the diasporas are regarded as appendages of the West. Therefore, they do not consider them as organisations that can bring transformation in terms of consolidating democracy. This makes it hard for ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM to achieve anything in a set-up where their efforts are discredited as long as they are not in support of ZANU-PF. Lack of support from relevant regional and international bodies hampers ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM from consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe. Efforts made by these diaspora movements whenever they get the attention from bodies like SADC or AU remain on paper with no implementation.

Infiltration and monitoring from state agents like CIO has affected the functioning of ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM. Infiltration and monitoring of these selected diaspora movements' activities or what they intend to do is known before they even execute their plans. Once a diaspora movement is infiltrated, these agents act as spies and their mission is to get as much information as they can and also to disrupt the functioning of the movement. Last but by no means least, internal leadership problems have been another obstruction to diaspora movements like CiZC and ZRYM. Power struggles emerged in CiZC with members trying to unseat each other whilst in ZRYM the case was different, The ZRYM leaders left the organisation when they got infiltrated as they feared for their lives. Such a move makes its members lose faith in the diaspora movement and the end result may be the collapse of the organisation.

8.2 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This study makes a substantial contribution of knowledge deduced from the findings. The researcher highlighted in Chapter One of this thesis how other scholars acknowledge the importance of people in the diaspora from an economic perspective and less is said about their political contribution. Focus has been on remittances and thus, the researcher identified a gap concerning their political contribution. It is from this observation that the researcher undertook this study. Chapter Two helped position the researcher's study and the chapter explored the advent of CSOs in Zimbabwe which shows that they have been in existence from way back. Therefore, having diaspora movements is not something new as well.

The issue of democracy in Africa is something that has been a struggle on the continent in general. As a result, diaspora movements have made it their onus to try and consolidate democracy. In their endeavours to consolidate democracy they have used strategies that are common to almost all diaspora movements. This study established that these strategies do not yield universal outcomes. Strategies that worked for Egypt during the Arab Spring revolution like the way social media played an important role does not guarantee the same outcome when used by other movements. The gap in previous literature is that it does not fully point out that though these identified strategies are there for any movement to use, they are not a one-size-fits-all. This means that what works for one diaspora movement may not work for the other and therefore in the case of ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM, strategies they explored produced different results.

Diaspora movements will need to consider using more than one strategy concurrently.

Diaspora-based movements all make use of social media which is reiterated in existing literature by different scholars. However, it is how these diaspora movements use social media that matters the most. In a country like Zimbabwe where censorship of information coupled with legislations that further stifle access to information, social media becomes a tool that people can rely on for information. Thus, diaspora movements can be helpful in this regard where they get to disseminate information without censorship and they also educate people. This can only be achieved from an environment where basic democratic principles are followed, like in this study South Africa offered the best example of a country from which to operate. Also, the building of alliances especially with local movements or other organisations is something the study encourages. Selected diaspora movements have managed to table some of their grievances to the leadership of their hostland because of the support they received from local movements and organisations like COSATU. This also helps sustain diaspora movements.



Another major contribution this study makes is the challenges encountered by diaspora-based movements. The fact that they are foreign immigrants operating from a hostland brings with it a couple of challenges. In Chapter Two, access to funding was identified and when the researcher conducted interviews the respondents mentioned inadequate resources and donor fatigue. However, in the literature, reasons for lack of funding were generalised to all movements. This study managed through the interviews conducted to gather some of the specific reasons that hinder in particular diaspora movements. One respondent made it clear that a diaspora movement can be registered in its hostland but

when it comes to accessing funding they may not be considered because their movement will be tackling homeland issues from a hostland whilst funding available is for movements tackling domestic issues of that hostland. This is one aspect that existing literature has not covered. Also, there is a difference between how diaspora movements access funding and how they get donors on the basis of their location. Diaspora movements mentioned in most existing literature are based in the West which is an area of affluence and an environment where the system understands the importance of movements. However, the researcher chose to focus on diaspora movements within Africa and their challenges to accessing resources like funding are different. Those in Africa are mostly faced with stringent conditions that they have to meet prior to receiving funding. So, it is even more challenging for diaspora movements operating within the periphery of Africa.



The study further contributes another aspect, namely xenophobia, which is not common or experienced by other diaspora-based movements. Xenophobia is one challenge which is so entrenched in South Africa that apart from the selected diaspora movements used for this study, other diaspora movements operating from South Africa would if interviewed also mention it. In the existing literature nothing has been said about diaspora movements facing any hostility from the citizens of their hostland. Another contribution is thus the aspect of polarisation between the state and diaspora movements. If polarisation affects movements operating within the home country then that means even those based in the diaspora are affected too. In a country like Zimbabwe where the ZANU-PF regime regards movements as accessories of the West,

the belief ZANU-PF has is that movements are anti-ZANU-PF. This is not always the case because if a movement's quest is to consolidate democracy then their aim is to find a common ground where they can work together with the government to achieve the aim. Infiltration and monitoring from state security agents is another contribution the study makes. By what was deduced from the findings, selected diaspora movements have experienced being infiltrated and monitored by Zimbabwe's security agents who posed as members. This is one challenge that can affect any movement regardless of their location especially if the government is repressive.

8.3 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, focusing on the findings, the researcher has outlined the strategies that ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM have used in their quest of consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe. These strategies have not been highly effective because some of the challenges faced by these diaspora movements have had an impact on the strategies used. Even though these strategies have not been as effective as ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM would have envisaged them to be, they have still managed to successfully make a change in some aspects. For instance, educating and disseminating information to Zimbabweans in the diaspora and those back in Zimbabwe. This is a positive success from their part because they have managed to at least rekindle citizen participation in issues that matter. This has been a positive step towards consolidating democracy where a participatory citizenry is a prerequisite from a critical theory point of view. However, the researcher has managed to unearth more challenges faced by these

selected diaspora movements which surpassed successes recorded. If these challenges are not addressed, then ZEF, CiZC and ZRYM will not be able to realise their quest of consolidating democracy in Zimbabwe.

Some African countries can draw lessons from this study. If the state is repressive, actions by diaspora movements will generally have no meaningful effect. Thus, bodies like AU and SADC should be firm when dealing with countries where human rights abuses and political repression are rife. Diaspora movements thrive in an environment where democratic principles like rule of law, individual rights and liberties are respected and promoted. Generally, a good number of African countries with repressive governments are cautious when it comes to accommodating diaspora movements. Such government stifle the activities of diaspora movements in order to maintain the status quo. For that reason, diaspora movements need to take rigorous measures when dealing with such governments. They need to unite in their actions and resist any endeavours by their repressive governments to foil their efforts of entrenching democracy. Signing and submission of petitions is not enough and drastic actions like revolutions need to take place. The Arab spring was a bold move that people in North Africa took and noticeable change was witnessed. Such an example is worth emulating in the quest to entrench and consolidate democracy across the African continent.

8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy Recommendation

- Partnerships between the Zimbabwean government and Diaspora movements need to be introduced and sustained in a way that catalyses a relationship where discussions can take place for democracy to be consolidated in Zimbabwe without any form of hostility from the government.
- The role of diaspora movements is important and therefore the ZANU-PF government should consider diaspora movements as key players and not view them as antagonists whenever they try to engage them.
- Diaspora movements need to work on their relationship with donors to ensure they receive funding and use it in such a way that donors in return do not grow weary of funding them.
- Donors in return should provide funding without stringent conditions. This will help enhance diaspora movements performance to attain and consolidate democracy. Moreover, western donors should not compel movements to have objectives that align with theirs because their state of affairs differ. They should give them the autonomy to operate in the best way that serves their interests.
- Diaspora movements need to work on their internal leadership battles if they seriously need to achieve their goals. There is no way an organisation can succeed if it is marred with internal leadership problems.

- The South African government must show a political willpower in dealing with Xenophobia in a sustainable way. All the talks of doing away with Xenophobia must be implemented.
- Diaspora movements must also encourage Zimbabwean immigrants to have proper documents that will legalise their stay in the hostland as undocumented immigrants are unable to help the diaspora movements when they need the immigrants' support.
- Diaspora movements should consider having alliances at all levels, that is with domestic, regional and international movements that operate from countries where democracy is practiced. This will help in empowering diaspora movements through sharing of ideas for instance various strategies on how to achieve and consolidate democracy.
- Diaspora movements need to have structures in place that do background checks on suspicious individuals to avoid infiltration and monitoring from undesirable people.
- Regional bodies like SADC have a duty to guard against abuse of human rights and the stifling of civil rights and liberties, therefore, they need to act promptly whenever diaspora movements call out for their support. They must refrain from protecting repressive governments which is an obstacle for democracy to prevail.



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
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APPENDIX ONE: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE



University of Fort Hare
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ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE REC-270710-028-RA Level 01

Certificate Reference Number: FER031SNDL01

Project title: **South Africa-based Diaspora movements and the Pursuit for Democratic Consolidation in Zimbabwe.**

Nature of Project PhD in Political Science

Principal Researcher: Sitembiso Irene Ndlovu

Supervisor: Dr V Ferim

Co-supervisor: N/A

On behalf of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) I hereby give ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project and research instrument(s). Should any other instruments be used, these require separate authorization. The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this certificate, using the reference number indicated above.

Please note that the UREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the document
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

Special conditions: Research that includes children as per the official regulations of the act must take the following into account:

Note: The UREC is aware of the provisions of s71 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 and that matters pertaining to obtaining the Minister's consent are under discussion and remain unresolved. Nonetheless, as was decided at a meeting between the National Health Research Ethics Committee and stakeholders on 6 June 2013, university ethics committees may continue to grant ethical clearance for research involving children without the Minister's consent, provided that the prescripts of the previous rules have been met. This certificate is granted in terms of this agreement.

The UREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Ethical Clearance Certificate if
 - Any unethical principal or practices are revealed or suspected
 - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
 - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
 - The conditions contained in the Certificate have not been adhered to
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project.
- In addition to the need to comply with the highest level of ethical conduct principle investigators must report back annually as an evaluation and monitoring mechanism on the progress being made by the research. Such a report must be sent to the Dean of Research's office

The Ethics Committee wished you well in your research.

Yours sincerely



Professor Lindelwa Majova-Songca
Acting Dean of Research

10 November 2017

APPENDIX TWO: INFORMED CONSENT FORM



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

Department of Political Science and International Relations.

Dear participant

I, Sitembiso Irene Ndlovu, a PhD student in the department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Fort Hare. In fulfilling my study, I am conducting a research on **“South Africa-based Diaspora movements and the Pursuit of Democratic Consolidation in Zimbabwe”** and your participation is being requested for the purpose of this study. Participation on the research is limited to a face-to-face interview that will take between 30 to 45 minutes. Participating in the research is voluntary and there are no direct benefits that can be expected in participating in the interview. There is no foreseen discomfort and stress anticipated in participating in the interview, however, you have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time or refuse to answer any question which you feel makes you uncomfortable.

Your participation will be kept confidential while it is necessary to record the proceedings of the interview for analysing purposes, information that identifies your name will be omitted or changed from the transcript. The interview tapes will be destroyed once they have been transcribed. The transcripts will be kept in a secure file that will be stored within the Political Science and International Relations department at the university. The data will be open to the research supervisors and other three people who are nominated by the university will examine the completed dissertation. The research findings can be made available to you however, this requires that you notify

the researcher of your wish to have a copy of the findings as well as furnish the researcher with your postal details.

Should you have any further queries please contact the researcher on +27783319658 or via email at 201407671@ufh.ac.za or nsithembiso@yahoo.com and the researcher will answer any questions that you may have during or after the project.

INFORMED CONSENT

I hereby agree to participate in this research. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop this interview at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively.



Signature of participant.....

University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

Date...../...../.....

Yours sincerely,

Sitembiso Irene Ndlovu

APPENDIX THREE: INTERVIEW GUIDE



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

1. What is the name of your organisation and when was it formed?
2. What are the objectives of your organisation?
3. Who are your targeted population and why that specific group?
4. How is your organisation funded and how reliable is the source of funding?
5. What strategies has your movement used in trying to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe?
 - Are there other strategies you have tried apart from those mentioned?
6. In what ways have these strategies helped promote the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe?
7. How has the Social media helped your organisation?
 - Which platform do you use;
 - Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, YouTube and why?
8. How have people responded to your organisation?
9. Is your organisation aligned to any political party?
10. If yes, in what ways does the party coordinate your activities?
11. What are the constraints and opportunities of operating from South Africa?
12. Has the Zimbabwean government enacted legislation that has helped either facilitate or hinder your participation in consolidating democracy?
13. Has the Zimbabwean government attempted to forge any partnership with your organisation to help consolidate democracy?
14. Has the Zimbabwean government attempted to thwart the activities of your organisation in any way?

APPENDIX FOUR: SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

1. What is the name of your organisation and when was it formed?

Response: Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and it was formed in 2001/2002 back in Zimbabwe and this regional office was set up in 2004 and became functional in 2005.

2. What are the objectives of your organisation?

Response: So as Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, I will speak more about the regional office. It was set up to do primarily three things. The first one was to be a one stop shop for information on Zimbabwe, information to be used by Zimbabweans in the Diaspora, by policy makers and the media. The second one was to be an institution or to be an office that connects Zimbabweans in the Diaspora to issues back home as in doing advocacy on Zimbabwean issues together with Zimbabweans in the Diaspora to try and influence the region and the international community on Zimbabwe. then the third one was to be the link point between Zimbabwean civics and the diplomatic community and the media in many ways including advocacy and lobbying and many other activities.

3. Who are your targeted population and why that specific group?

Response: Our targeted population is the ordinary Zimbabweans back home and those in the Diaspora especially here in South Africa considering the estimated number of Zimbabweans in South Africa.

4. How is your organisation funded and how reliable is the source of funding?

Response: So we are a civil society organisation and we are purely donor funded. We have a membership which is institutional but we do not have a mechanism that says institutional members must pay membership fees for instance. So being a Zimbabwe organisation and also being based in a developing country, it is difficult to have any other funding model other than the funding model that says you source your funds from donor organisation and donor organisations are primarily those that are interested in the work that we do that is foundations, embassies and other philanthropic institutions. Reliability you know, reliability of donor institutions is a function of many things. Number one it is a function of the interest in the issue at given intervals, so when donors feel that their interests and ours are not aligning in the sense that probably they feel that it's no longer a priority or also for one reason on the other they just probably feel that no you know they probably have supported enough or there is a change at the back end in terms of whosoever is giving them money. There often is a point where there is a break that is a point where you can talk about non-reliability but overall for many years ours donors have been interested in Zimbabwean case for so many reasons and for that reason they have been really reliable, but reliability as I said is a function of donor interest in the matter and its also a function of you know how well aligned as a civil society organisation and them are in many ways.

5. What strategies has your movement used in trying to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe?

Response: You know democratic consolidation is a term that means many things to different people and so it depends on what context the question is coming, but listen if you, if democratic consolidation to you means for instance that at the advent of democracy in Zimbabwe some argue that Zimbabwe has never been democratic isn't it, but let's assume that there is a point were Zimbabwe got democratic which is around 1980 as the point of independence. If we use 1980 as a baseline and we say that's when we got independence and therefore that's our standard measure of democracy and that's the democracy we want to consolidate. Look at it this way,

Crisis regional office has been functional since 2005, so democratic consolidation in our view targets a number of things. The first thing is that democracy is institutionalised for it is a function of institutions, strong institutions that serve the purpose of promoting democracy and democratic ethos. Now from where we are sitting as Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition sitting right here in South Africa our responsibility is to apply international standards to Zimbabwean institutions for democracy to be upheld and if we want for the term that you are using for democracy to be consolidated, and institutions here we are talking of institutions that deliver justice. We are talking of institutions that deliver peace, we are talking of institutions that protect human rights and the rule of law, we are talking of judicial institutions so0 here we are thinking of the judiciary as an institution, we are thinking of if you look at our current set up, chapter 12 independent institutions that are there to promote democracy, you know independent institutions isn't it and I am sure I do not have to elaborate that point because you know them. We are also talking of institutions of governance and institutions of executive authority, the legislative is one of them and institutions of executive authority which are institutions found within the executive itself. Now in terms of consolidating democracy out strong belief is that whatever we do must aim at holding institutions to account. Look at democracy from this way, there are institutions that are charged with ensuring that they uphold democracy. There are individuals who are right claimers; individuals can claim rights for as long as institutions provide for these rights. So that's strategy number one, it's a strategy that focuses on institutions. Strategy number two is a focus that focuses on the right holders. So for institutions to be functional and responsive they must be responding to something and that something must be a voice, civic agency. It must be a voice that is coming from the people, so for us out strategy as Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition is to build civic agency for civics to be able to claim their rights as part of consolidating democracy. How do civics claim their rights, so when you deal with civics for instance or when you capacitate civics you obviously are speaking to issues around their rights in the constitution, it's a rights based discourse isn't. How do you claim your social economic rights, how do you claim

your political rights? So this is about us dealing with issues around participation, encouraging civics, encouraging citizens to actively participate in issues that concern them on the government front. So for instance you know, let's just take this recent example there has been a process around voter registration, biometric voter registration. What biometric voter registration simply means is that everyone is deregistered and they are registering anew. Our responsibility as a civic organisation is to articulate those issues, facilitate and encourage people to register because registering is the first step to participating in an electoral process. You cannot influence things if you do not participate isn't, so our approach really is about connecting civics, connecting you know individuals to governance matters, whenever governance matters are expressed be it through institutions or through processes. So if you get my flow of thought in terms of how I am presenting this to you around democratic consolidation we have a strategy that focuses on institutions. How do you make sure that institutions that are set up by instrument such as a constitution serve the purposes for which they are set up which is around delivering justice, delivering human rights, safeguarding human rights, rule of law etc. Then institutions are empty without individuals, individuals sitting in institutions are individuals that have authority so the second layer of dealing with you know how you consolidate democracy is about creating civic agency, how do you actually ensure that the voice in people comes out for them to be able as right holders to claim rights. So this is a two tier kind of strategy if you look at it from that way. I hope it's making sense.

➤ Are there other strategies you have tried apart from those mentioned?

Response: We have only used those we mentioned.

6. In what ways have these strategies helped promote the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe?

Response: It has helped to promote consolidation of democracy in a number of ways but here is a more sober response to this question. Now consolidation of democracy is also a function of the state allowing consolidation to happen. The state is a

regulator so civics or civil society organisations operate and function inside a country because of the latitude that the state gives them for them to operate, now to the extent that the state gives civil society organisations the latitude to operate in that kind of continuum. In that kind of relationship is where you find the answer around how effective the strategies have been. Now cannot respond to this question without tracing state-society relations overtime in Zimbabwe. The state in Zimbabwe has been quite authoritarian; we all know that they are restrictive legislations Access to information protection to privacy, Public Order and Security Act, Broadcasting services act etc. so the response to this question sits at the centre of state-society relations and my response to your question is that the strategies have been successful to the extent the state has allowed the strategies to be successful in the sense that we have had to find survival mechanisms because of the restrictive measures of our environment back home in Zimbabwe. I don't know if it's making sense, if you want a straight answer there has been a balance in terms of whether or not these strategies have been successful. So there are things that we will claim and there are things that are difficult to claim. It's easy to claim victory through the fact that that the country has a new Constitution because the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has been part of the bigger voice that has been calling for the Constitutional reform. Since the days of the, this debate was started by the NCA in 1997 and the Crisis joined this bandwagon in 2001/2002 and Crisis is part of the broad civic movement that has been calling for the reform of the Constitution because the belief is that a well-crafted functional Constitution can consolidate democracy, so the fact that we have a new Constitution speaks to a degree of success. However, having a Constitution in itself is not sufficient its dependent on political will, how willing are the ruling elites to implement the Constitution to the extent that the Constitution is implemented. We could talk of consolidation of democracy but it is good that the Constitution itself is you know has given life to independent institutions we didn't have in the past like National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights Commission, Gender Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission etc. The pressure that has come from CSOs like Crisis but

also working with the generality of Zimbabweans and political players is quite significant in terms of consolidating democracy by setting up institutions. The pressure must continue from institutions to be functional, for individuals that control these institutions to realise the need for these institutions to function for democracy to be consolidated and then of course the last point really is related to what I said about an enabling environment. It will be important for civics like Crisis to keep pushing authorities to open up the operating environment for democracy to be consolidated. The search for democratic consolidation itself you know functions in such a way that it is always in contestation especially in an authoritative state. It is always in contestation with the push for authoritarian rule. So you cannot consolidate democracy that easily in an authoritarian state. Number one it's a militarised state, number two it's a police state, number three it's a dictatorship. It has been a dictatorship for so long so consolidating democracy under such circumstances no matter who you are is never going to happen.

7. How has the Social media helped your organisation?

Response: Social media itself does not consolidate democracy; it is a tool that can be used to attain that end. So it's a means to an end unto itself. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition is on Twitter we have thousands of followers, we are on Facebook we have more than 120 000 followers and likes; we use Whatsapp and many other channels. Now these have been really helpful in as far as spreading the word and getting the message across were its concerned. Word moves faster, mobilisation happens a little bit faster, so social media has really been helpful but we have remained conscious of the fact that social media itself can only make people conscious but what changes it's the action that people take. So very often for some of the activities that we have ended up doing that required public participation we have used social media and its really been helpful but I will keep on hammering the point that it is a tool that helps to consolidate democracy but it is not an end in itself. It really has been quite helpful in that regard but what we have relied on more is how you know people have responded to what we put out on the social media. One of the

advantages of social media is that it is increasing the cost of error and behaviour as in especially on the part of duty bearers. That you are a government you do something, someone is going to capture it and is going to find its way on social media and before you know it you are forced to respond. We have used that tactic quite a lot and I have seen it working in a big way. So the use of social media in my view in this respect, then it comes through to sort like reduce the risk of error and behaviour on the part of the state which can be a key enabler or a key restrictor if there is such a word to consolidation of democracy. So social media, number one is used to target people and it is also used to keep the system in check.

8. How have people responded to your organisation?

Response: They have responded positively to Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition because Zimbabweans in the Diaspora are yearning for space to express themselves and space to get institutions that can connect their struggles here with struggles back home. If you put together a sizeable number of Zimbabweans from across interests the chances are that at least one or a few would know about Crisis because it's also out there in the media, it is also out there in the society and communities, so it's a fairly well known CSO that people rely on for information, mobilisation and connection.

9. Is your organisation aligned to any political party?

Response: As Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, one of our principles and values is that we are apolitical as in we are non-partisan. We are a political organisation in the sense that we deal with political matters but we are non-partisan. Although, because of the nature of the issues that we deal with, very often they have been biases that seem to suggest that we are inclined towards working more with opposition. I guess its because our interests have often been aligned here and there but we are clearly non-partisan.

10. If yes, in what ways does the party coordinate your activities?

Response: N/A

11. What are the constraints and opportunities of operating from South Africa?

Response: The constraints of cause are less for us because unlike many of the organisations you are going to speak to our Constituency and base are in Zimbabwe and our head office is in South Africa. Our membership are in Zimbabwe, here we do not have and do not want to have a membership as in we are a service office. So if you go to Zimbabwe and you asked who are the members of Crisis you will find ZCTU, Woman Coalition, you will find a whole number more than 100 organisation. So that makes us a little different from a good number of institutions. So the constraint bit of it is neither here nor there but then the opportunity that is there because of operating here, obviously number one it is estimated that there are more than 2 million Zimbabweans living in South Africa alone, it's a huge base that needs our service, they don't have to be our members for us to provide services to them. The second one is that you would agree with me that for a very long time the space in Zimbabwe was closed for civic organisations to operate, so when space is closed for Crisis and other constituency members we amplified the voice in South Africa. We do not have to be in Zimbabwe for us to speak out so we speak from here. Then there is a time if you remember or recall when media, foreign media houses were banned from Zimbabwe, so one of the things that we have done overtime as Crisis is to convene media briefings so we could easily get your BBC's, CNN etc to congregate in one room and give them a media briefing about the situation in Zimbabwe. So there is a geographical opportunity that exists because of being based here in South Africa.

12. Has the Zimbabwean government enacted legislation that has helped either facilitate or hinder your participation in consolidating democracy?

Response: We spoke about POSA, AIPPA but then you see you can't talk about POSA and AIPPA in here in South Africa and we did speak about the NGO Bill of 2004/2005 which was eventually shelved. So those are the pieces of legislation that

I would speak about but then you see there is need for that question to be responded to carefully because I am responding to you sitting in South Africa which means the jurisdiction in terms of our operations are guided by South African laws rather than by Zimbabwean laws.

13. Has the Zimbabwean government attempted to forge any partnership with your organisation to help consolidate democracy?

Response: Not exactly because Zimbabwean government is not receptive to Civil Society Organisations of our nature because relationship between Crisis and the Zimbabwean government back home seems to suggest that Crisis is not a friend of the government. So there have been attempts to forge any partnerships at that level even here the Zimbabwean government is represented by the Embassy. We have only worked together loosely when we were dealing with issues around permits for instance influencing the South African government to issue special permits to Zimbabwean, renew them at intervals and stuff like that but we do not have a formal relationship and we prefer it be like that because it allows us to be autonomous. It allows us to be independent, allows us to speak truth to power without fear of co-optation.

14. Has the Zimbabwean government attempted to thwart the activities of your organisation in any way?

Response: Yes especially back home. During the life of the Crisis Coalition, the Coalition has been raided countless times, raided even computers taken, attempts by government officials to delegitimise the institution by speaking out publicly against the Coalition. So many of formal government officials and ZANU-PF functionaries speaking out against Crisis, accusing Crisis of being an appendage of the West and accusing Crisis of being a stooge of the British and many of these things. So they have been attempts definitely directly and indirectly through direct attacks , indirect attacks, media attacks and many other attempts but here we are we have continued to survive.

APPENDIX FIVE: SAMPLE OF PETITION SUBMITTED

Petition submitted to the Zimbabwean Embassy in South Africa

Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (ZEF)

April 16, 2008

The Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community, Botswana: Mr Tomaz Augusto Salomão;

The Chair, African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: HE Jakaya Kikwete;

The Chair, United Nations Security Council: Republic of South Africa;

The August House of Parliament, South Africa;

The Pan African Parliament; Honorable Gertrude Mongela

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights; Honourable Sanji Mmasenono Monageng

The African National Congress President, Mr Jacob Zuma;

Opposition Parties, South Africa;

Faith-based Organisations, Labour and Civil Society Colleagues:

We, the people of Zimbabwe, driven into exile in South Africa are:

Concerned that Zimbabwe faces a deficit of democracy and governance.

Alarmed that the crisis in Zimbabwe is of such magnitude that the country is on the brink of an explosion, which may have drastic consequences for the entire region;

Noting that our compatriots trapped in the country are under a siege of a military nature when ironically we should be celebrating together our independence from colonialism 28 years ago on the 18th of April;

Observing that since the 29th of March when we went to the polls, Presidential election results have not been released;

Cognisant of the fact that since HE President Thabo Mbeki's pronouncement that there is no crisis in our country, many Zimbabweans have lost faith in his ability to remain impartial towards a resolution that buttresses the will of the people of Zimbabwe and is thus compromised;

Acknowledging that the Southern African Development Community with all good wishes intends to assist Zimbabwe out of its man-made catastrophe;

Further acknowledging international support to this end, and the non-partisan support towards a democratic Zimbabwe by among others Amnesty International, International Bar Association and Human

Rights Watch:

Hereby:

1. Call upon the present, illegal structure running the country unconstitutionally through the Joint Operations Command to step down;
2. Implore the SADC, AU, UN Security Council and the above institutions to expeditiously come out in defense of the ordinary people of Zimbabwe; and to demand that the results of the Presidential election be released immediately and in the event of a run-off, to demand international supervision of the whole process;
3. Further implore the above-mentioned institutions and organizations to take all practical measures necessary, including those that may be difficult ones, to ensure that human life, dignity and security in general is provided for ordinary people in Zimbabwe;
4. Appeal to members of the security forces and the police to ignore orders that may lead to the torture, murder and other crimes against humanity against their brothers and sisters;
5. Request that HE President Thabo Mbeki gives a public commitment to impartiality in his facilitative role in Zimbabwe, or that he be replaced by an individual whose credibility is not open to question.
6. Lastly, call upon all Zimbabweans at home and abroad to remain resolute in defense of our freedom, and to identify perpetrators of atrocities.

Signed on this 16th day of April 2008 at Tshwane, South Africa.

- Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, Gabriel Shumba, Executive Director, T. +27 72 6393 795
- Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum,
- Zimbabwe Political Victims Association
- Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement
- Zimbabwe Refugee Association
- Zimbabwe Action Movement
- [Zimbabwe Peace and Democracy Project](#)

- [Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition](#)
- [Solidarity Peace Trust,](#)
- Southern African Institute for Migration Affairs
- Concerned Zimbabweans Abroad
- Friends of Zimbabwe Coalition
- Amnesty International (South Africa), Executive Director, +27 12 320 8155.

http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/migr/080416zef.asp?sector=REFUG&year=2008&range_start=31



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