



University of Fort Hare

Together in Excellence

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**Interpreting Structural Polarization in Zimbabwean Electoral Politics Since
1980**



By

KENNETH TAKUDZWA MUNHUWEYI.

University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

202001829

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SUPERVISOR: DR. BOOKER MAGURE

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Abstract

The study presents the structural polarization that characterized Zimbabwe's post-independence electoral politics from 1980. Existing literature on the same phenomenon of polarization is both fragmented and inconsistent. Nevertheless, this study traced the history of Zimbabwean polarization to the pre-colonial and colonial periods to ascertain the reality of post-independence polarization. The post-independence of Zimbabwe under the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations, the ZANU-PF ruling party, was marked by political repression and restriction in electoral politics -a stealth authoritarian practice. In line with earlier studies, this research suggested that Zimbabwe is far from being an institutionalized democracy, given the dearth of electoral democratic qualities, the rule of law- and constitutional subversion. Zimbabwe has had a series of elections under monitoring and evaluation by local and international observers. The electoral observers' reports and verdicts remain crucial in any given election and require scrutiny to determine their credibility and legitimacy. In 2018, Mnangagwa opened a doorway for international electoral monitoring/observation, previously closed by Mugabe in 2002. While recognizing Mnangagwa's democratic aspirations, the 2017 post-coup was laced with political repression and 2018 post-election judicial verdict bias. There have been democratic transitioning impediments due to the ZANU-PF party's centralized state institutions and militarized state capture –typical of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime. With the ZANU-PF party's competitive authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, the thesis presented the prospects of the Citizens Coalition for Change opposition political parties' -office seeking coalition building -aiming at maximizing electoral outcomes towards power changing and electoral reforms.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank the Lord Jesus Christ for Grace that worked in me and for me until I accomplished my research despite the challenges I encountered. The scripture says, “Count it all joy, brethren, when you fall into diverse temptations.” Similarly, another scripture says, “For the light afflictions are, but for a moment, they cannot be compared to the eternal weight of Glory.” These, among other scriptures, inspired me to fight a good fight of faith each day until I reached this level.

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keep on fighting a good fight of faith until the end without being contaminated by worldly doctrine.

Lastly, I would like to thank the Protector and Defender of mankind, my pillar of support in this academic journey. They are people I cannot mention who stood by me throughout my research. It was such a moment of good pleasure with your support.



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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my love, life pillar and family, who wished me all the best during the course of my studies, and I want to wish them to live long enough to see my further accomplishments. The secret behind the academic achievement is that it will never be inherited by the generations to come. It is something you should work for through studying. I would not have come up with this solid piece if it were an inheritance.



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Declaration

I, the undersigned, Kenneth Takudzwa Munhuweyi, student number 202001829, hereby declare that this study is my original work, and all sources from which information was obtained have been acknowledged by referencing accordingly. The research study has not been submitted and will not be presented at any other University for a similar or any other degree award.



Signature:

Date: 02/11/2022



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
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Acronyms

AIPPA Access to Information Private Protection Act

ANC African National Congress

AU African Union

BCA Broadcasting Corporation Act

BSAC British South African Company

BVR Biometric Voter Registration

CAZ Conservative Alliance in Zimbabwe

CCC Citizens Coalition for Change

CSO Civil Society Organizations

CCJP Catholic Commission of Justice and Peace

CIO Central Intelligence Organization

CZC Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition

ERC Election Resource Centre

EUEOM European Union Electoral Observer Mission

FPTP First Past the Post

FTLRP Fast Track Land Reform Programme

G-40 Generation-40

HZT Heal Zimbabwe Trust



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IEEP Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act

IR/NDI International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute

LEP Look East Policy

LOMA Law and Order Maintenance Act

LRF Legal Resource Foundation

MDC- Movement for Democratic Change

MDC-T Movement for Democratic Change Tsvangirai

MDC-A Movement for Democratic Change Alliance

MMZ Media Monitoring Zimbabwe

NCA National Constitutional Assembly

NDP National Democratic Party

OAU Organization for African Union

POSA Public Opinion and Security Act

PPTMA Presidential Powers Temporary Measures Act

SRANC Southern Rhodesian African National Congress

UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UANC United African National Congress

UPC Union of the Peoples of Cameroon

ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army



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ZANU- Zimbabwe African National Union

ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

ZAPU- Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZARU Zimbabwe African Regional-Union

ZATU Zimbabwe African Tribal Union


ZBC Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation

ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union

ZEC Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

ZESN Zimbabwe Election Network System

ZLC Zimbabwe Liberation Committee



ZIMASSET Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation

ZIMSTART Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency

ZIPRA Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

ZNLWVA Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

ZNP Zimbabwe National Party

ZUM Zimbabwe Unity Movement

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY



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"The drift into authoritarianism does not always set off alarm bells.

Citizens are often slow to realize that their democracy is being dismantled even as it happens before eyes."

(Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 9)

1.0 Context of studying polarization and electoral politics in Zimbabwe

Historical evidence in the academic literature shows that there were/are multiple intra-state conflicts/polarization in the Zimbabwean 1980 post-independence. The conflicts range from political parties' factional battles, civil war, electoral competition, and by extension, the ZANU-PF ruling party's authoritarian politics (elite-engineered) of repression and restriction in decimating opposing forces. Thus, literature has classified the drivers of the Zimbabwean intra-state conflicts into economic, societal, ethnical, ideological, and political perspectives¹. Pre-dominated by two ethnic military revolutionary fronts of ZIPRA and ZANLA forces, Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 after a protracted liberation struggle against the white settler colonialists². Ndebele ethnic group under the ZAPU party dominated the ZIPRA military wing, while the Shona ethnic groups dominated the ZANLA military wing under the ZANU party. In this regard, ethnic factors influenced post-independence polarization in the first decade between the two main revolutionary military fronts (LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Scholars aptly argued that the 1960s formation of the revolutionary front's factional battles intensified ethnic conflicts between the 1962 ZAPU party under Nkomo and the 1963 ZANU party under Sithole (Sithole, 1979; Mazarire, 2011). At the same time, others traced the origin of ethnic conflicts from the 1830s pre-colonial Ndebele-Shona society relations (Alexander *et al.*, 2000; Ranger, 2004; Msindo, 2012). The ethnic and linguistic factors between the Ndebele and Shona societies in the 1830s resulted in the 1960s revolutionary parties' factional battles and civil war in

¹ See, for example, McCandles, 2011; Mungwari, 2017; LeBas and Munemo, 2019.

² (See, for example, Alexander *et al.*, 1999; Msindo, 2012)

the 1980s (Mpofu, 2020). From 1977 and post-independence, ZANU³ was under the leadership of Mugabe, and ZAPU was under the leadership of Nkomo (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). The dynamic nature of an ethnic militarized authoritarian regime in post-independence Zimbabwe inspired the researcher to investigate the polarization phenomenon from a fresh perspective of structural polarization -electoral politics nexus. On the other hand, existing literature examined polarization in Zimbabwe from the perspective of societal, political, ideological, and ethnic (LeBas, 2006; McCandles, 2011; Mungwari, 2017; LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Drawing from the interpretive paradigm, this study equally seeks to unravel the realities of post-independence Zimbabwean polarization by tracing its roots, trajectories, drivers, consequences, and attendant remedial action.

Literature exists that speaks to the multiple clashes between ZAPU and ZANU military revolutionary fronts,⁴ culminating in a civil war from 1982 to 1987 that claimed an estimated 20 000 Ndebele speaking people (CCJPZ and LRFZ, 1997; Phimister, 2008; Meredith, 2009; Miles-Tendi, 2020). The conflicts are argued to have been firmly embedded in the 1980 and 1985 militarized no-zone area elections campaign between the Shona and Ndebele societies (ibid). Hence, Robert Mugabe won both elections. The protracted civil war in the 1980s abated following the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU, which saw the formation of a seemingly *de facto* one-party state under the leadership of Mugabe (Moyo, 1992;

³ ZANU was formed as a splinter group of ZAPU in 1963 under the leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole. In 1977 ZANU loyalists to Mugabe staged a palace coup disposing of Sithole, which found Mugabe ascending as the party president until 2017.

⁴ In February 1981, there was an ethnic military coercion, in which an integrated battalion (ZANLA forces) sanctioned at Ntabazintuna spread to Ethumbane and other military bases, causing gunfire exchanges between the two military camps. With this post-independence ethnic militants' extremely polarized environment, a civil war was inevitable in the 1980s (see Meredith, 2009).

Moore, 2006: 23; Ndlovu, 2016; 157). Hence, the 1980s electoral militarized environment is still an inherent feature of Zimbabwean electoral politics. However, the 21st-century ethnic conflicts in Zimbabwe are structured within inter-and intra-party lines, resulting in factionalism battles, succession disputes, and power struggles in ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). This has also found extreme divisions among the Zimbabwean societal groups advancing along ethnic and geographical boundaries. As a result, the intragroup political members have developed a mindset of animosity or hatred for outgroup political members, also known as effective polarization⁵.

The genesis of polarization in Zimbabwe's electoral politics arguably emanates from the ZANU-PF party's authoritarianism and resistance to democracy (see, for example, Masunungure, 2009; 2011). Other factors that gave rise to Zimbabwean post-independence polarization include African traditionalism, settler-colonial government structure, and liberation culture (Moyo, 1993: 1-13). The ZANU-PF party under Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations inherited a typical white settler's South Rhodesian authoritarian governance system (Southall, 2015; 2018). The police, military, and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) securocrats were actively involved in electoral manipulation and political repression (Mahomwa and Zinyama, 2021). It is argued that the Zimbabwean post-independence elections were illegitimate following the involvement of securocrats and further promulgation of restrictive laws (Southall, 2015; 2018). For example, Magure (2014) examined that elections in post-independence Zimbabwe were won either violently or by manipulation, favoring the ZANU-PF party. Other scholars maintained that elections in post-independence Zimbabwe had been characterized by voter intimidation,

⁵ DiMaggio *et al.*, 1996.

electoral manipulation, and violence (Masunungure, 2011; Southall, 2015, Moyo, 2019). Therefore, the elite-partisan electoral conflicts in post-independence Zimbabwe led to elite state-engineered repression and restrictions against opposition political parties, the mass, and CSO (Slater, 2013; Slater and Arugay, 2018). Hence, state institutions have been utilized by the ruling ZANU-PF party's hegemonic project, thereby leading to societal polarization. Zimbabwe is a deeply polarized country due to the 'us versus them'⁶ party affiliation mindset that is generally propagated by those that are in power (see, for example, LeBas and Munemo, 2019).

The intra-state party and institutional polarization have been examined across the authoritarian and democratic literature based on elite-partisan conflicts (see Slater, 2013; Slater and Arugay, 2018; Tanneburg, 2020). In authoritarian regimes, the elite's allies eliminate rival factions and decimate opposition competition (mass uprisings, electoral competition, and CSO advocacy), dealing with the authoritarian problems of power-sharing and power-control⁷ (Wintrobe, 1998; Slovik, 2012; Tanneburg, 2020). On the other hand, the democratic intra-state conflicts follow constitutional proceedings of opposition parties and the mass demanding popular accountability regarding decisions and actions by the elite's allies (ibid). The elites in democratic states are further constrained from usurping power through constitutions that provide a system of power checks and balances⁸. Based on intra-state conflicts,

⁶ McCoy, J. L. and Somer, M. (2021). Political Parties', Elections, and Pernicious Polarization in the Rise of Illiberalism: (Ed) by Andras Sajó, Renata Uitz, and Stephen Holmes. Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism.

⁷ Slovik (2012) examined the problem of power-sharing as the conflicts among the elites in power and problem of power-control as threats from the one's excluded in power.

⁸ The phenomenon of government's power checks and balances was analyzed in the doctrine of separation of powers within the executive, judiciary, and legislative. However, in the modern-day political system, we have found the fusion of arms of government. The doctrine of separation of

the Zimbabwean post-independence political environment was mainly characterized by elite-driven state-engineered repression and restriction against the masses, CSO, and opposition political parties. Therefore, the research is inspired by conflict theory examining the Zimbabwean polarization phenomenon.

It is against this background that this study applied Slovik's (2012) twin authoritarian problems of power-sharing (threats among the elites in power) and power-control (threats emanating from the ones excluded in power) in relation to the ZANU-PF ruling party under Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations. The idea is to bring to the fore how both administrations managed to control and silence critics be they elite opposition figures or the Zimbabwean masses⁹. Mugabe consolidated his power from 1980 through the systematic decimation of opposition political parties and CSO through repression, restrictions, and silencing of opposition voices (Magure, 2009; Msipa, 2015; Cameron, 2018: 155). The opposition political parties include the Zimbabwe Unit Movement (ZUM) of 1988 under Edgar Tekere and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formed in 1999 under Morgan Tsvangirai (Sachikonye, 2005; Raftopoulos, 2014; Rwodzi, 2018: 88). The CSO include the National Constitution Assembly (NCA) of 1997 and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) (Magure, 2009; McCandles, 2011; Maringira, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). With increased electoral competition and civil rights movement groups, the ruling party ZANU-PF promulgated stringent laws, including the AIPPA and POSA Acts, against opposition political parties, the mass, and CSO (ibid). Hence, the post-independence polarization involved elite-partisan opinion and affective polarization

powers has remained a utopian state system of government; although there are mature, democratic states (see Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison in Adam and Dyson, 2007).

⁹ On authoritarian repression see, for example, Wintrobe 1998; Slovik, 2012; Tanneburg, 2020

emanating from ideological and policy differences. In this regard, the ZANU-PF party utilized repression and restrictions on civil and political liberties. Similarly, this correlates with stealth authoritarian practices, whereby the laws and democratic institutions are utilized to galvanize the authoritarian elites in power against opposition resistance (Varol, 2015).

Polarization entails intra-state elite and mass divisions along ideological, ethnic, societal, religious, economic, and political boundaries, which can either be moderate or extreme. Intra-state polarization results in ingroup members' hatred of outgroup members, influenced mainly by ideological differences and conflicts are intensified in policy formulation (see, for example, Iyengar *et al.*, 2012; Gidron *et al.*, 2020). The divided groups are further polarized in their opinions, known as opinion polarization¹⁰ (DiMaggio *et al.*, 1996). Opinion polarization occurs whenever societal groups in a country are sharply divided in terms of their opinions on matters that affect them for the good or bad, especially on the root causes and how to find long-lasting solutions to challenges at hand⁸. The drivers of intra-state polarization in Zimbabwe have been mainly marked by ethnic, ideological, religious, and economic factors. Thus, Zimbabwean post-independence has been characterized by affective polarization among religious, ethnic, civic, and political groups. LeBas and Mumemo (2019) interpreted 2000 to 2009 as a societal polarization, which was pernicious following the state divide of 'us versus them'. From 1980 to 1987, ethnic militarized conflicts indicated a clear state divide between Shona ethnic society groups versus the Ndebele ethnic society group¹¹. Similarly, the existing literature noted this as

¹⁰ (See, for example, Iyengar *et al.*, 2012).

¹¹ LeBas and Munemo (2019) did not point out the divides in the 1980s between the Ndebele and Shona ethnic societies in terms of elite-partisan ethnic driven affective polarization. The divides of group versus another group are supported in the literature (see, for example, Iyengar *et al.*, 2012; Gidron *et al.*, 2020)

affective polarization, in which ingroup members develop animosity and hatred for outgroup members. However, existing literature on polarization in Zimbabwe did not examine the political party structures and institutional state structures and how they have intensified intra-state divisions. Hence, polarization can be interpreted either in a similar or different manner in the scholarly literature on the same phenomenon (see, for example, Firiona *et al.*, 2005; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). This study seeks to interpret structural polarization in the Zimbabwean electoral body politic.

For Sewell (1992), a structure is complex and defined as a systematic pattern that embodies the state's societal, political, institutional, cultural, and economic aspects. The term structure is used from the sociological and anthropological perspective to unravel cultural intra-state aspects. From an anthropological point of view, a structure is used to examine the very minute social structures of the state, including the kingship, secret societies, and ethnic groups (Kurtz, 2001: 2). In this context of the study, the term structure is used to define the political parties and state institutions in Zimbabwean electoral politics. I defined structure as the arrangement or grouping of state institutions and political parties distinguished by constitutions, rules, and regulations in their systematic way of operation. The above definition fits into Sewell's (1992) observation of a structure as a pattern. Aside from Sewell's analysis, Kurtz (2001: 9) examined social-political structures, 'such as lineages and age-grades, or political systems, such as chiefdoms and the state.' Hence, state institutions and political parties are structured in regard to the ideologies, constitutions, norms, and values. In this regard, the political anthropologist examined different state structures from the maximalist and minimalist perspectives. From the minimalist perspective, structures involve state organizations and institutions, while the maximalist perspective examines minute societal structures such as kingship and

secret societies (ibid). I do not intend to dwell much on defining the term structure (see, for example, Sewell, 1992).

The ZANU-PF party has been characterized by intra-party factionalism battles since the formation of the party in 1963 by Ndabaningi Sithole (Moyo, 2004; Msindo, 2012). Several explanations of the ZANU-PF internal party's conflicts to date include internal party succession disputes, power struggles, and politics of regionalism. For four decades, from 1977 to 2017, former ZANU-PF leader Mugabe was reluctant to relinquish power, despite his old age. This was due to the fear of internal party elite conflicts intensification between the G-40 faction under Grace Mugabe and the Lacoste faction under Emmerson Mnangagwa (Southall, 2018; Rodgers, 2019). The fourth-decade Zimbabwean post-independence, ZANU-PF factional battles accentuated between the two factions evidenced in the social media and rallies. After that, Mnangagwa (known as the crocodile) was expelled from the ZANU-PF party culminating in what was known as Operation Restore Legacy (Southall, 2018; Mungwari, 2021). Operation Restore Legacy involved the Mnangagwa faction or military wing aided by Army General Chiwenga with the support of the Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (former freedom/liberation fighters). This process led to the deposition of Mugabe through a successful bloodless military palace coup (Mungwari, 2018). Southall (2018), in his article 'Croc in Bob out,' critically examined the continuity of Zimbabwe's authoritarian electoral politics. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020) examined the 2017 coup period in the analogue of "In the Jaws of the Crocodile," referring to Mnangagwa (nicknamed the crocodile), immense

patience, and a canny ability to know when to seize the moment securing the party presidential seat¹².

Moyo (2018) claimed that former Army General Chiwenga missed a historic call to end the tyrannical rule when he created a safe passage to the presidential seat and brought in Mnangagwa instead of initiating a generational renewal or transition in Zimbabwe's body politic in general and ZANU-PF in particular. Such a development might probably –have made Chiwenga a kingmaker in Zimbabwe's democratic transition for posterity's sake¹³ (ibid). There are scholarly arguments about whether the 2017 removal of Mugabe from power was a coup or not, following the military involvement and, subsequently, the legal proceedings in his removal from power¹⁴ (see Moyo, 2018). On the other hand, Moyo termed the 2017 post-coup another Machiavellian moment involving executive abuse of power and human rights violations. Hence, Zimbabwe missed a 40-year historical call for democratic transition despite democratic pressure from the opposition movement, the masses, and CSO (Moyo, 2019). However, the intra-party elite cohesion in ZANU-PF post-coup period is suspected of intensifying between the Chiwenga and Mnangagwa Lacoste factions¹⁵. The intra-party structural conflicts in the ZANU-PF party structure are due to factional Shona ethnic structures within the party. Over the years, the

¹² Rodgers, D. (2019). Two Weeks in November: The astonishing untold story of the operation that toppled Mugabe: Short Books Ltd. African Politics.

¹³ See also Rodgers, 2019; Matthew, 2021:637.

¹⁴ Asueline, L, E. (2018) A coup or not a coup: That is the question in Zimbabwe. Journal of African Foreign Affairs. Pp 5-24

¹⁵ Zamuchiya Philian, seminar presentation, SAPES Trust on the 09th of September 2021 available on SAPES Trust Facebook page and YouTube channel.

ZANU-PF internal party conflicts have resulted in rival factional groups' and individual's elimination and suspension¹⁶ (see, for example, Mauswa, 2018).

There have been contentions in the academic literature surrounding the legitimacy of courts and judges in authoritarian regimes.^{[17][18]} The same goes with the democratic legal system, which has found elements of illiberal practices. A clear line that distinguishes authoritarian constitutions and liberal constitutions is based on election quality and separation of powers – in which the elites in democratic states are held accountable for any decision and action¹⁹. In authoritarian regimes, the elites often breach the rule of law and constitutional proceedings. Thus, in examining the illiberalism in both democratic and hybrid regimes²⁰, scholars looked at the judiciary, electoral, and executive politics²¹. Ozan (2015) is of the view that democratic and competitive authoritarian states have been characterized by stealth authoritarian²² practices encapsulating or insulating the elite rule against suspected successful opposition electoral competition. The Zimbabwean 2017 post-coup involved the judiciary legitimization of Mnangagwa's rule as the designated president on 24 November 2017, which is still a contested constitutional matter²³. This further goes down to the legitimization of the 2018 elections with clear evidence of inflated electoral figures. The 2017 post-coup in Zimbabwe marked an institutional state capture

¹⁶ See, for example, Rodgers 2019.

¹⁷ Solomon, P, H. (2007) Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes: World Politics.

¹⁸ Barnett, R, E. (2003). Constitutional Legitimacy: Columbia Law Review. Columbia Law Review Association. Vol. 103, No. 1. Pp. 111-148.

¹⁹ Landau, D. (2021) The Myth of the Illiberal Democratic Constitution: (Edt) by Andras Sajó, Renata Uitz, and Stephen Holmes. Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism.

²⁰ Hybrid regimes are characterized by democratic institutions, which do not materialize the democratic qualities.

²¹ Holmes, S. (2021) The Anti-liberal Idea. (Ed) by Andras Sajó, Renata Uitz, and Stephen Holmes. Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism

²² Intra-state democratic institutions and constitutions are influenced by stealth authoritarian practices, meant for autocratic survival. In this regard, the elites are above the law, subverting the rule of law, yet opposition political parties must strictly adhere to constitutional law proceedings.

²³ See, for example, Southall, 2017.

continuation by ZANU-PF, which found Mnangagwa ascending as the legitimate winner after the contested 2018 electoral outcome.²⁴ It is, therefore, safe to conclude that Zimbabwe is a hybrid regime with simultaneous democratic and autocratic features marked by regular elections and systematic political repression and restriction against opposition competition.


Thus, some scholars termed Mnangagwa's regime 'Mugabeism without Mugabe'²⁵, following executive abuse of power involving fraudulent elections, human rights violations, and further decimation of opposition political parties, mass movements, and CSO (Melber, 2017; Maromo, 2017). The 2017 post-coup political climate clearly indicates a typical authoritarian, bureaucratic system of governance (Chirimambowa and Chimedza, 2014; Melber, 2017; Southall, 2018). Bureaucratic authoritarianism involves political repression and restriction, centralized state institutions, and militarized state capture (O'Donnell, 1973). On the other hand, internal party conflicts within the ruling party ZANU-PF, led by Mnangagwa, find their concrete expression in factionalism, power struggles, and potential future succession disputes. This research aims to interpret the reality of polarization in post-independence Zimbabwe. The scholarly literature examined Zimbabwe's polarization from the perspective of societal, ethnic, political, and ideological (McCandles 2011; Mungwari 2017; LeBass and Munemo 2019). Hence, the research will be exploring structural polarization, which characterizes political parties and state institutions, and their attendant impact on electoral politics in Zimbabwe

1.1 The rationale of the study

²⁴ See, for example, Mungwari 2018.

²⁵ See, for example, Southall's 2018 article.

Studies have been conducted on Zimbabwe's polarization climate or culture from post-independence 1980, mainly focusing on the political, ethnic, societal, and ideological perspectives (see McCandles 2011; Mungwari 2017; LeBas and Munemo 2019). McCandles (2011) examined polarization among social movement groups by looking at the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) of 1997 and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) from 1997 to 2010 (see also Deonandan *et al.*, 2007). Furthermore, she examined the role of both social movement groups in both 2000 constitutional reform and land reform (see also Magure 2009). Moreover, Mungwari's (2017) research focused on the media polarization between the MDC opposition party and ZANU-PF ruling party, looking at the Herald, Sunday Mail, The Standard, and Daily News from 1999 to 2016 press censorship. In this regard, he looked at the politicization of the press involving the ZANU-PF's promulgation of restrictive laws against the MDC opposition political party. Thus, the elite-partisan conflicts in Zimbabwe have resulted in a sharp division in the media opinions between ZANU-PF and opposition political parties.



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In addition, LeBas and Munemo's (2019) literature stands out as one of the few recent scholarly works on polarization in Zimbabwe. The two scholars examined two main polarity phases between 1980 to 1987 and thereafter from the year 2000 to 2008 from ethnic and societal polarization perspectives. What is evident is that both phases involved militarized violence and intimidation and further restrictions on political rights and civil liberties. The similarities drawn from the two distinct polarization phases are that both culminated in-unit settlements of the 1987 Unit Accord and the 2009 Government of National Unity (Magure, 2014; LeBas and Munemo, 2019). The two phases differ in their founding myths and the nature of polarization. The former was an ethnic-linguistic polarization, and the latter involved

deep societal cleavages dividing state-society relations into 'us versus them' (see also McCoy and Somer, 2019). Therefore, this study drew from the existing polarization literature on ethnic, societal, ideological, and political polarization. The post-independence Zimbabwe's electoral body politic was generally characterized by the ZANU-PF party's state-engineered repression and restriction, decimating civil rights and political liberties. Hence, this research interpreted the polarization that characterized state institutions and political parties in the Zimbabwean electoral body politic.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Polarization in authoritarian states is marked by executive abuse of power by the elite allies decimating civil rights and political liberties²⁶. In a democratic state, it follows the constitutional procedures in which the elite, masses, and opposition political parties are held accountable for any decision, action, and even inaction²⁷. It is often argued that polarization in both authoritarian and democratic states can either give rise to democratic deepening or decay (McCoy and Somer, 2018). For four decades in post-independence Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF has been in power either through coercion or consent²⁸, leading to fraudulent elections, abuse of human rights, and promulgation of restrictive laws (Makumbe, 2009; Masunungure, 2008; Chilunjika and Chigora, 2012; Southall, 2013; 2015). Therefore, opposition political parties and CSO have limited space for political competition, campaigns, and advocacy (Moyo, 2014; Southall, 2015). The ZANU-PF party secured the liberation gains against democratic pressure from the opposition political parties and CSO

²⁶ See, for example, Slater and Arugay, 2018

²⁷ (ibid)

²⁸ See, for example, Magure 2014 in his article narratives that made a difference in the 2013 harmonized elections in Zimbabwe

(Chikorowore, 2002). In this regard, Zimbabwe faces immense challenges ranging from a corrupt patronage system of government and abuse of state institutions for partisan ends leading to inconsistent policy formulation, judicial bias, electoral irregularities, corruption, and by extension leading to the undermining of the rule of law. Hence, both Mugabe and Mnangagwa defied the wind of democratic change, breeding authoritarian politics of repression and restrictions, in which elections have been a democratic disguise or window dressing (Masunugure, 2009; Chirimambowa and Chimedza, 2014; Brooker, 2014)

Elections in Zimbabwe have been characterized by violence and intimidation (Bratton and Masunugure, 2011; Bratton and Penar, 2019). For instance, Mwonzora and Mwandikwaza (2019) state that the 2008 voting process in Mwenezi East and Bikita West, among other rural constituencies in Zimbabwe, was nothing short of voting for peace, given the orgies of intimidation and violence that characterized the overall 2008 electoral environment. There have been systematic abductions of ardent government critics cum activists, including but not limited to Itai Dzamara Glen View 3 Harare²⁹, Jestina Mukoko, National Director of Zimbabwe Peace Project³⁰, and Makopa in Chipinge³¹ by ZANU-PF's securocrats (Magure, 2016; BBC News, 2018). The 2018 post-election environment involved the military shooting at unarmed civilians, killing six and injuring an estimated thirty-five


²⁹ Itai Dzamara was abducted by five men on the 9th of March 2015 while he was at his barbershop in Harare's Glen View suburb

³⁰ On the 8th of December 2008, Jestina Mukoko was abducted at her residence area in Harare by a group of 6 unidentified armed men. She was released after months of severe torture and cross-examinations (see the book published by Jestina Mukoko, (2016). The abduction and trial of Jestina Mukoko: The fight for human rights in Zimbabwe, published by African Politics).

³¹ The ancestry of Makopa in Chipinge Manicaland province is a political, anthropological study of cultural-spiritism on how Makopa, a spirit medium mysterious, escaped and disappeared from the truck of the abductors in post-2008 Zimbabwean harmonized elections (see Magure 2016).

(Mungwari, 2018; Moore, 2018). Similarly, from 1980 to 1987 and 2000 to 2009, periods involved militarized electoral violence and intimidation. Tekere (2007) expressed that democracy in Zimbabwe was in intensive care, involving state repression and restrictions against the mass and opposition political parties. Similarly, Moore (2014) concurs that democracy in post-independence Zimbabwe is either dead or simply slow to be born. The scholarly observations are relevant when looking at Zimbabwe's electoral politics during the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations.

Few studies have spoken toward structural polarization in Zimbabwe, examining state institutions and political parties and their attendant impact on electoral politics and voting behavior. Thus, an ethnographic study was conducted to fill the identified academic lacunae to interpret the structural polarization phenomenon in Zimbabwean electoral politics.




1.3 Research questions University of Fort Hare *Together in Excellence*

- What is the role played by bureaucratic authoritarianism in structurizing polarization in Zimbabwe's body politic?
- How has the incumbent ZANU PF-led government been abusing state institutions in a manner that polarized state-society relations in Zimbabwe?
- What has been the impact of structural polarization on voting behavior and electoral reforms in Zimbabwe?
- What are the contestations surrounding International election observer's missions and civil society organizations' involvement in Zimbabwe's electoral politics?

- Is coalition politics a panacea to regime change/ political change in Zimbabwe?

1.4 Objectives of the study

- To understand the relevance, myths, and realities surrounding bureaucratic authoritarianism-driven polarization in Zimbabwe.
- To identify ways in which the ruling party ZANU-PF utilized state institutions leading to polarized state-society relations in Zimbabwe.
- To analyze the impact of structural polarization on voting behavior and electoral reforms in Zimbabwe.
- To examine the contestations surrounding international election observer missions and civil society organizations' influence on Zimbabwe's electoral politics.
- To critically analyze the extent to which opposition political parties' coalitions can contribute to political change in Zimbabwe.



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1.5 Central postulates

- ❖ The first postulate of the study is that polarization in Zimbabwe's post-independence could have been a result of the ZANU-PF ruling party's centralization of state institutions and executive abuse of power.
- ❖ The second postulate is that the International Electoral Observer Mission and Civil Society Organizations' involvement in monitoring and observing electoral processes in Zimbabwe can potentially ensure credible, free, and fair elections.

- ❖ The third postulate is that CCC opposition political parties' coalition building has considerable chances of winning an election, ensuring power change and electoral reforms.

1.6 Significance of the study/ Contribution of the study to academic inquiry

As noted earlier, most studies conducted on polarization in Zimbabwe offered different explanations for different research phenomena. For instance, McCandles (2011) examined the dilemmas and changes in social movement groups of NCA and ZNLWVA from 1997 to 2010. Mungwari (2017) studied the press polarization between MDC under Tsvangirai and ZANU-PF under Mugabe from 1999 to 2016. The literature by LeBas and Munemo (2019) examined ethnic and societal polarization by looking at 1980 to 1987 and 2000 to 2008, respectively. Although polarization literature exists detailed from 1980 Zimbabwean post-independence, there is an academic lacuna on the roots of polarization to ascertain the realities of polarization. At the same time, there is slow growth in the body of literature examination of polarization in Zimbabwean electoral politics.

Hence, this research study examined polarization from a dimension that has not been exhaustively explored in the existing literature on structural polarization electoral politics nexus in post-independence Zimbabwe. Since this phenomenon is new in the academic literature on polarization in Zimbabwe, lessons were drawn from established literature, including America and Asian nations (Slater, 2013; Slater and Arugay, 2018; Carothers and O' Donohue, 2019; 2020). For example, Slater and Arugay (2018) looked at the phenomenon of institutionalized polarization by applying the Madisonian republican and Machiavellian authoritarian theories addressing both

democratic and authoritarian regimes' conflicts. Fiorina *et al.* (2005) traced the historical origin of polarization in America from the 1950s between the democrats and republicans to assert the 21st-century polarization myths and realities. Accordingly, this research built on the strength of these earlier works by examining the phenomenon of polarization in Zimbabwe's electoral politics. Thus, the research intended to fill the academic literature gap on polarization in Zimbabwe from a dimension that has not been extensively explored in the literature tracing polarization roots to ascertain the post-independence polarization realities.

1.6.1 The politics of elite and mass polarization

The research contributed to the body of literature on polarization, particularly in Zimbabwe's electoral politics. There was literature inconsistency and silence in examining the elite and mass movement dynamics in necessitating polarization (LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Thus, this research study interpreted structural polarization electoral politics nexus to complement the existing literature on polarization in Zimbabwe. Existing literature has mainly focused on the ethnic, ideological, political, societal, and economic polarization in post-independence Zimbabwe. Firiona *et al.* (2005) stated that there are myths and realities of American polarization between the Democrats and Republican parties. Hence, this research examines the structural polarization that characterized electoral politics in post-independence Zimbabwe from an interpretive paradigm.

1.6.2 The role of state institutions in polarizing state relations

The study critically examined the executive abuse of power in influencing and intensifying polarization among the elites and the mass. The structural polarization by means of utilizing state institutions for political repression and restriction in

Zimbabwe has not yet been extensively investigated. Henceforth, this study contributed to the polarization body of literature, in which the executive has become the source behind intra-state conflicts in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF authoritarian repression, restrictions, and legitimation have been utilized to dampen opposition political parties, mass movements, and CSO.

1.6.3 The politics of election monitoring and observation in Zimbabwe

The research study examined a contentious phenomenon in electoral politics: the role of international election observer missions and CSO in electoral monitoring and evaluation. There is a need to ascertain the credibility and legitimacy of the internal and external observer's reports and verdicts. In which a comparison of the external and internal observer's reports and verdicts gives room for clarity. Electoral monitoring and observation are crucial in promoting credible, free, and fair elections.



1.6.4 The pre-electoral opposition political parties' coalition

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Finally, the study detailed the pre-electoral coalition prospects in opposition political parties in Zimbabwe. The study mainly focused on the Chamisa-led MDC-Alliance and the new party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) coalition building. A contestation surrounding office seeking coalition strengths involves ethnicity, political campaigning, and voting behavior relations toward maximizing electoral votes for power changing and electoral reforms. Nevertheless, every coalition is characterized by challenges, opportunities, and prospects. The following section will detail how the researcher managed to conduct the research.

1.7 Research methods and techniques

The study was primarily inspired by the phenomenology and ethnography approaches utilized in the social science research phenomenon or studies. Edmund Husserl (1859-38) was the founder of the phenomenology approach, which involves "a systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in the act of consciousness" (see also Moustakas, 1994). It does not study consciousness from the perspective of clinical psychology. It, however, speaks to the consciousness of human nature through life experiences. Phenomenology has several assumptions, including understanding nature through analyzing human behavior (ibid). People understand social world dynamics differently, which needs to be explored. It gathers conscious experience rather than traditional data. It is oriented towards discovery using less restrictive methods in collecting data. Hence, phenomenology was crucial in gathering data through first-hand information from 'life experiences,' making it easy to interpret the research phenomenon (Creswell, 2007). Data was gathered through dialect consciousness, as Hegel proposed (Adam and Dyson, 2007). Hence, phenomenology "grasps the very nature of a thing," which makes it relevant to this study (VanManen, 1990)

There is a positive relationship between the phenomenological and ethnography approaches in collecting data in this research study, as both were used to collect, analyze and interpret data. Ethnography denotes the life experiences in which data was gathered through observation and conducting face-to-face and online interviews (Klente, 2008). The co-relationship between the two approaches involves gathering data based on human life experiences to interpret a given phenomenon. This is supported by Elizabeth Metz (2007), who noted that ethnography involves systematic observation and interviews over a long period to gather the exact details of a particular research study.

The ethnography further gathers data from multi-media platforms, including YouTube videos, Facebook, and Twitter. The information was compared with the observations and interview responses to acquire realistic testable data. Ethnography takes a broad spectrum in gathering data. Furthermore, the secondary data were analyzed in relation to the primary gathered data to assert its relevance, significance, and meaning. Political anthropology was utilized to explore state socio-economic and political structures of different ethnic groups, intra- and interparty structures, state institutions, and religious groups (Sewell, 1992). This approach is related to the ethnography approach in understanding the political dynamics and trajectories in the minimalist and maximalist perspectives (see, for example, Kurtz, 2001). Although the approach was not entirely utilized as a part of the research study, it helped in examining other entities besides political organizations, which are within the political organization and societal oriented. In this regard, the research approaches helped collect valid data from participants through human life experiences, online sources, and interviews with further documentary reviews to assert areas of convergence and divergence in the research study.

1.7.1 Research methodology

This research utilized the qualitative research techniques of the secondary and primary data to collect, analyze, and present data (Wyse, 2011; Neuman, 2011). The qualitative involves a "rigorous collection of data for systematic interpretations of particular events and occurrences of phenomena from participants' experiences in the research study" (Chivanga, 2016: 1-4; Chivanga and Monyai, 2021: 5). However, qualitative data is not only limited to participants interviews and observations. The qualitative research further stretches to documentary reviews and online multi-media

sources. In this case, data was gathered from different sources to interpret the research phenomenon under investigation. Hence, qualitative research acknowledges multiple interpretations in which reality is complex and multifaceted (Kumar 2010). In this regard, the world exists independently of the observers, while the world depends on individualistic observation, a qualitative research methodology (Creswell, 2008; 2009). In interpreting this research phenomenon, qualitative methods were utilized to understand and gain insights through observation, documentary review, multi-media sources, and interviews enriching this study (Tuckman, 1994; Leedy, 1997). Virtual ethnography was extensively utilized in this research as the internet impacted global world communication (debates, conferences, news, and seminars) due to the Covid-19 pandemic restrictions (see, for example, Stenmetz, 2012). Hence, information was accessed on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook; and data were compared with the interviews, observations, and academic literature to get areas of literature convergence and divergence. The qualitative research managed to enrich this study through a systematic and rigorous interpretation of facts from history, observations, and interviews.

1.7.2 Sampling and sample size

Sampling involves the selection of a given population of interest to answer the pre-determined research questions and accomplish the objectives of the research phenomenon. The results of a selected population were fairly generalized back to the population from which they were drawn (Babbie, 1990; Marshal, 1996; Small, 2009). The research targeted 36 participants, and the interviewer managed to interview 29 participants. This research utilized the non-probability sampling techniques of the purposive and snowball sampling techniques (see, for example,

Jewel, 2000; Denscombe, 2003; Goodman, 1961). Snowball sampling was used to recruit participants through a social network system to identify other experts in this research study (Van Wyk, 2016). The snowball sampling proved sufficient in identifying participants who could not be easily found. The researcher identified the participants who are Zimbabwean nationalities living in Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans in Diaspora, specifically in South Africa. In which the researcher was helped to identify other participants by political party activists and elected members at local or ward and constituency levels in both the ruling and opposition political parties. The participants were actively involved in the Zimbabwean elections and the current upcoming elections. At the same time, the researcher utilized purposive sampling to hand-pick expert participants in Zimbabwe's electoral politics and other related areas under investigation (Klente, 2016; 9). The purposive sampling technique helped to identify various respondents to answer various questions of this study. Therefore, this allowed interviews to be conducted with selected individuals who have experienced, participated in, and are experts in the electoral politics of Zimbabwe. Hence, the snowball and purposive sampling helped identify selected participants who enriched this study with their varied interpretations of personal experiences (see, for example, Alston and Bowles, 2003).

1.7.3 Data collection and processing

The researcher acquired a research ethics certificate to gather data through interviews with various participants. Before collecting data, I made appointments with multiple respondents, mostly MDC-A (now Citizens Coalition for Change), ZANU-PF party members, and former political party members. The former party members include the factional party members of MDC-T and ZANU-PF G-40. I had to arrange

for both online interviews via Microsoft teams or Zoom meetings and face-to-face interviews. The online interviews were because of the third wave of Covid-19 pandemic restrictions and respondents' fears of contracting the virus. I found it difficult to travel across the border to Zimbabwe and other provinces in South Africa because of the strict regulations that were put in place. In this regard, I utilized online meetings to gather data. I engaged with political party activists, advocates, and experts in the academic field on this research phenomenon. I conducted face-to-face interviews with Zimbabwean university students in South Africa at Fort Hare Alice and King Williams Town. Furthermore, I conducted interviews with Zimbabweans in South Africa via online platforms. The interview information was kept through audio recordings and notes taken during interview sessions, in which recordings were stored in an external hard drive.



Furthermore, to get relevant information on complex and controversial topics, I engaged in expert interviews with political scientists and lawyers or advocates who understood electoral politics from a legal perspective. For example, the 2018 Constitutional Court ruling and V11 form contestations. In addition, most of the respondents failed to give sufficient information about the involvement of the international election observer mission in elections and the opposition coalition in Zimbabwe. Hence, the expert's interviews helped to detail both relevances of electoral observers and opposition coalitions in electoral politics in Zimbabwe. I conducted interviews with people who represented different political parties (polling agents) in the 2018 elections and signed the V11 polling station forms. The polling station agents gave relevant information on how electoral outcomes were reached in the 2018 harmonized elections.

In addition to the above, semi-structured questionnaires were used as part of this research to make respondents feel comfortable answering various questions. In this regard, I used a set of interview guide questions for general interviews and expert interviews (Paley, 2016). Different groups of respondents were interviewed to have an in-depth understanding of this study. Hence, people's experiences, views, and opinions on Zimbabwe's electoral politics enriched this research. Interviews participation only took a period of 30 to 45 minutes, depending on the responses from the participants. However, in-depth interviews exceeded 45 minutes, mainly conducted with experts in the field of electoral politics. In-depth interviews are often utilized to interpret a given phenomenon to get the sense and meanings of that particular study (see Creswell, 2007; Saldana, 2015).

The study further relied on documentary review in comparing and contrasting the relevance of responses during interviews, online news articles, and YouTube videos. Documentary review, in this case, gave a basis for understanding the area under investigation and how scholars interpreted the study phenomenon, although under different research studies. Hence documentary review or analysis was through textbooks, journals, thesis, and reports. The reports include the electoral reports of 2018 by the European Observer Mission and the International Republic Institute/ National Democratic Institute to Zimbabwe. Specifically, the 2018 observers' reports documentation contained first-hand information, which was primarily used in this study as primary evidence.

In addition, virtual ethnography was used as part of the research in accessing videos via YouTube and other online platforms, for example, Facebook and Twitter (see Doyle, 2004). In this regard, I managed to secure seminar presentations held by

SAPES-Trust Non-Governmental organization, Zimbo Media, and Zim eye on topics related to Zimbabwean electoral politics. The debates helped to clearly understand Zimbabwean electoral politics involving presentations by Jonathan Moyo, Ibbo Mandaza, the late Dewa Mavhinga, Phillan Zamuchiya, and Fadzai Mahere. I attended other online seminar presentations hosted by different organizations on Zimbabwean electoral politics. Hence, multiple sources in the collection of data helped in enriching this research phenomenon. As I highlighted, the study also depended on virtual ethnography multi-media sources, including Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube (see, for example, Chibuwe, 2020, on how the multi-media platform impacted the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe).

1.7.4 Data analysis and interpretation

Data analysis and presentation were influenced by Glaser and Strauss's (1967: 37) grounded theory. The grounded theory is a mainstream qualitative data analysis spread across social science and humanities research (Strauss and Cobin, 1990; Tavory and Timmermans, 2010: 10). This involves the coding process of interview responses and observations, further categorized as the foundation of theory development (Jerolmack and Khan, 2018: 14-15). There is a co-relationship between the ethnographic approach and grounded theory, in which "grounded theory offers a social context of ethno narratives" (Haralambos and Holborn, 2008; Tavory and Timmermans, 2009: 244). This ensures thick descriptions in the research narratives "stratified into meaningful hierarchical structures," as Geertz (1973: 7) started. Hence, this research used the grounded theory in theory formulation and stratification of data in sections, subsections, and chapters (see De Vos and Van Zyl, 1998: 265-76; Desimone and LeFkock, 2004).

In addition to the above, the grounded coding denotes the emergency of notable themes and patens. Firstly I utilized the descriptive coding reading through qualitative data and coding passages according to a topic using multiple highlighters (Conrad *et al.*, 1993; Ryan and Bernard, 2003). This assisted in the easy identification of information against each theme and paragraph. Coding is a process of discovery conducted in cycles with various coding applied depending on the document (Saldana, 2015). The axial coding was further used in the selection of core themes which were categorized to discover common patens and their relations (Grbich, 2013). Finally, data were arranged and presented through selective coding, in which data was categorized under themes and sub-themes. Hence, the grounded theory helped to shape the research by coding and stratifying information under themes and sub-themes in the presentation and interpretation of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Silverman, 2015).



1.8 Ethical considerations

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There are ethical issues that should be followed when researching without infringing on the rights of human participants during the process of gathering data (Strydom, 2005; Bryman and Bell, 2007). This is mandatory for professional practices when conducting research that involves human subjects (Smith, 2000; Babbie, 2001; Pimple, 2017). Therefore, this research observed all ethics as it involved human participation through interviews. As noted earlier, ethical procedures were followed in this study.

Firstly, I applied for ethical clearance through the Higher Degrees Committee at the University of Fort Hare. The ethical application follows after the research proposal has passed at the Faculty level as detailed in the University policy. I had to wait for

the ethical clearance from April 2021 until it finally came out in January 2022. This delayed my collection and, subsequently, analysis of data. Nevertheless, I collected the relevant data through interviews, documentary review, and online sources after obtaining the ethical certificate. The current university ethical policy states that both secondary and primary data cannot be collected without ethical clearance. Hence, all due procedures were observed and followed before I collected data. The other ethical issues that were observed in this research are detailed below.

1.8.1 Informed consent

Before conducting interviews, the informed consent forms were sent to participants via emails and other social media platforms, including Whatsapp, Twitter, direct calls, messaging, and Facebook. I informed the participants about how the study would potentially affect them during and after their participation (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). This is because other participants actively participate on different social media, and I identified them on different social media platforms. Furthermore, participants were informed of their right to participate or declined to participate whenever they felt uncomfortable or chose not to answer other questions during their participation. This allowed most of the participants to feel free and comfortable during their participation.

1.8.2 Protection from harm

In any given research, the research should not cause harm to the participants or people being studied (Thackray, 2018). In which the information in any way should not endanger their personal lives. All the participants were fully aware of the potential risks in their participation, which I overcame by use of anonymity and confidentiality.

1.8.3 Anonymity and confidentiality

The research considered anonymity and confidentiality because of the nature of the research on electoral politics in Zimbabwe. The researcher informed the respondents of their right to use pseudonyms and anonymity in the study to protect them from any possible harm (see, for example, Babbie, 2010; 2013). Most of the respondents freely participated, giving accurate information without fear of future victimization. Hence, using pseudonyms and anonymity in any given research has been proven to get credible information from respondents. I further guaranteed the protection and security of all the responses by participants during interviews. Their responses were used in this research only, and for external use of their information, participants will be notified.



1.9 Limitations of the study

The research encountered challenges ranging from participants' fear of giving other relevant information on this study involving government employees and past victims of electoral violence. I conducted interviews with other people working in government institutions who decided not to answer other questions during interview participation for fear of losing their jobs (see the Official Secrets Act, Chapter 11:09). The act prohibits the publication and disclosure of government classified information commenced on the 27th of February 1970 (ibid). However, this was offset by expert interviews and documentary reviews. We are in the Covid-19 pandemic era; hence, face-to-face interviews and mobility crossing borders and provinces were limited. This was offset by conducting online platform interviews through Microsoft teams and Zoom meetings, allowing participants to participate freely without fear of contracting the virus.

1.10 Structure of dissertation

Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology.


The chapter outlined the context of the study, the rationale of the study, the research problem, the research questions and objectives, the justification of the study, and the contribution of the research to the academic inquiry. Furthermore, the chapter detailed the research methodology and techniques.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

It is a theory chapter that presents the theoretical framework and literature review of the study, that is, the founding knowledge of what is being studied.

Chapter 3: Roots and Typologies of Polarization in Zimbabwe

The chapter traces the Zimbabwean polarization from pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence.



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Chapter 4: Structural Polarization and Bureaucratic authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. The chapter offered a fresh perspective on understanding the relevance, myths, and realities surrounding polarization in Zimbabwe with regard to a bureaucratic authoritarian government structure.

Chapter 5: The Politics of Election Observing and Civil Society's Involvement in Zimbabwe's Elections. The chapter critically analyzed the contestations surrounding international election observer missions and civil society organizations' influence on Zimbabwe's electoral politics.

Chapter 6: Prospects of pre-electoral opposition political parties' coalition-building in Zimbabwe. The chapter provided an audit of the extent to which opposition political parties' coalitions have made and can potentially continue to make a meaningful contribution toward political change in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 7: Conclusion. This final or concluding chapter offers areas for future research on the same topic.



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CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW



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"Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide." (John Adams 1841)

2. 0. Introduction

The interpretive paradigm denotes that reality is multi-layered and complex, in which theory development avoids contamination with the old ones (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Frost, 1980). Yet, the old theories are a conduit and cornerstone in examining and shaping an emerging research phenomenon. In this regard, the traditional approach theoretical perspective cannot entirely be dismissed but should be nourished to reinforce and strengthen emerging theories³². The aim is to consider a more refined theoretical framework when examining a given phenomenon, avoiding trying to fit a theory in interpreting a given research phenomenon³³. It is governed by employing a critical examination of sense-making, meaning construction, and description of power and conflict, as supported in the critique theory (Cohen and Manion, 1994: 36). The multi-paradigm has its strength in other research studies. However, it often leads to a fractionalized and provincialized theoretical framework (Gioia and Pitre, 1990: 584-602). Hence, the multi-paradigm is not suitable for investigating this research phenomenon, which requires an interpretive paradigm based on meaning construction and sense-making (see Willis, 2007: 4). Following the studies of polarization, various theories have been applied based on different research studies. Therefore, theory development is required to examine Zimbabwe's electoral politics and structural polarization nexus from an interpretive paradigm. Wilson (1998: 56) argues, "Nothing in science, nothing in life, for that matter, makes sense without theory." Hence, world literature is a product of theories.

³² See, for example, Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2011)

³³ See, for example, Burrell and Morgan (1979)

Therefore, this study applied the conflict theory to analyze the Zimbabwean polarization multi-typologies. This is because polarization is understood in terms of intra- and inter-state conflicts among democratic and authoritarian regimes. For example, the Cold War marked an inter-state ideological conflict –a bi-polar war between the Russian socialist and American capitalist ideologies³⁴. In this chapter, I will examine the intra-state conflicts stretching from intra- and inter-political parties' institutional, policy formulation, and electoral conflicts. The intra-state conflicts are understood from the ethnical, ideological, religious, economic, societal, and political perspectives³⁵. This also goes further to peaceful resolutions to conflicts that were employed from one state to another.

Conflicts like polarization have roots, consequences, typologies, and attendant remedial action. Bartos and Wehr (2002) used the human conflict theory to assess family feuds, labour strikes, and international warfare. He examined how conflicts emerged and how intra-state conflicts were mitigated and managed. Conflicts follow a pattern and a process from their emanation, eruption, mediation, and resolution mechanism. Parties or groups involved will have to reach a consensus to settle or culminate the dispute(s), as there are costs incurred if conflicts are uncontained and unresolved (ibid). In this regard, the conflict theory is interrelated to the polarization phenomenon, as I have already pointed out, and the research will further unfold on their relation.

To clearly understand what conflicts constitute, it is important first to define what it is all about. Conflicts can either be direct or indirect, emanating from various societal groups. In this regard, conflicts can be analyzed on a macro or micro level. For

³⁴ Manorama, Savur, (1975) Sociology of Conflict Theory: Social Scientist. Vol. 3, No. 12. Pp 29-42

³⁵ (Ibid)

example, ethnical, political parties, and religious conflicts are classified at the macro-level. At the same time, conflicts, including family, kingship, and secret societies, are classified as micro-level conflicts (Kurtz, 2001). Hobbes's definition of human nature: "Is the war of all against all. Which life is solitarily poor, nasty, brutish, and often short" (Adam and Dyson, 2007). Hence, intra-state conflicts have been natural human socio-economic and political phenomena from ancient times. Other scholars defined conflicts in terms of the struggle for scarce resources and status (Bartos and Wehr, 2002: 12). Given the two definitions, we have a clear path of what conflicts constitute. However, a further understanding of the intra-state conflicts will be revealed in the research.

There is rising in the civil rights movement groups' globally emanating from social, economic, and political conflicts due to different suppressed intra-state groups, for example, the civil rights movement against racial inequalities, slavery, and human rights abuses in democratic and competitive authoritarian states³⁶. Racial inequalities have characterized countries like America and South Africa. However, both countries' laws were amended during the post-colonial and post-slavery periods. Nevertheless, the economic disparities between the black and white communities still exist in South Africa³⁷, which Southall (2019) prophesied to either lead to future democratic deepening or decay. Marxists and Engels have classified these state divides into socio-economic class struggles or conflicts³⁸. The class struggles to date have drawn much attention in the academic inquiry of both the authoritarian and democratic regimes.

³⁶ Dewey, M, C. (2018) Black Lives Matter and the Civil Rights Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Two Social Movements in the United States. *Journal of Black Studies*. Vol. 49(5) 448-480

³⁷ Wintrobe (1998) *Political Economy of Dictatorship*.

³⁸ Aspers, P. (2010), "Alfred Marshall and The Concept of Class", *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 69(1), 151-165.

On the other hand, there is a rise in the LGBTQIA+ movement (classified as secret society groups) globally supported by Civil Society Organizations³⁹. Still, the groups are facing stigmatization in states where they have been constitutionally accepted⁴⁰. In Zimbabwe, for example, the constitution has no provisions for lesbian and gay rights (Constitution of Zimbabwe Act No 20 of 2013). Other secret society groups besides LGBTQIA+ are fighting for their rights to be constitutionalized in different states. However, they have been condemned due to most ruling parties' religion, culture, and political ideologies. In this regard, Civil rights movement groups in both authoritarian and democratic states have raised costs toward either democratic deepening or democratic decay.

Conflicts in extremely polarized states usually lead to civil wars, uprisings, and social unrest. For example, the ethnic conflicts in Zimbabwe between the Shona and Ndebele⁴¹, and the Rwandan conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi, resulted in civil wars. Conflict resolution might take a steady approach to resolve the crescendo tension if the conflicts are rooted in ethnical or ideological⁴² polarization. Hence, intra-state conflicts related to ideology and ethnicity create a state divide between one group and another, typical of affective polarization.

Other intra-state conflicts are characterized by class struggles –social and economic struggles⁴³. Max Weber examined the capitalist ills and how this has led to intra-state

³⁹ Bartos, O. J. and Wehr, P (2002). Using Conflict Theory: Cambridge University Press. United States of America, New York.

⁴⁰ Wells, H. (2006). Anti-gay hate crimes in South Africa: prevalence, reporting practices, and experiences of police: doi: 10.1080/10130950.2006.9674694.

⁴¹ See, for example, Meredith 2009.

⁴² LeBas and Munemo (2019) examining the polarization in Zimbabwe.

⁴³ Marx, K. (1850), "The Class Struggle in France, 1848 to 1850", <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/>, (Erişim: 17.11.2009).

class struggles or conflicts ^[44] ^[45]. This has extended to wage-rate unionized strikes in countries including South Africa, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey. In competitive authoritarian regimes, conflicts have often been silenced through restrictive judicial proceedings and repressive measures (Wintrobe, 1998; Slovik, 2012). While in democratic states, conflicts are resolved through constitutional or liberal proceedings –through courts and parliamentary votes. Hence, the conflict theory will be utilized to examine political parties’ factional battles, electoral competition, and intra-state conflicts ranging from ethnical, ideological, and societal in both liberal and illiberal states. The terms conflict and polarization will be used interchangeably or simultaneously in this research. However, I will examine the phenomenon of polarization in relation to conflict theory as the guiding research theory.



Polarization is a feature of a state's politics, economics, and society involving both inter-and intra-party or ingroup and outgroup member conflicts (Fiorina *et al.*, 2005; LeBas, 2006; McCoy *et al.*, 2019; Slater and Arugay, 2019; LeBas and Munemo 2019; Southall, 2019). In this regard, the phenomenon of polarization has to be context-specific. However, there is a co-relationship of polarization multi-typologies in which the concepts of polarization are interrelated. Rogowski and Sutherland (2005) argued that intra-state polarization is characterized by both societal and ideological conflicts sparked through political blocks of political poles or mild cleavages. Therefore, the research drew from the conflict theory to develop a theoretical framework that shapes the polarization phenomenon.

⁴⁴ Hazelrigg, L. E. (1972), "Class, Property, and Authority: Dahrendorf's Critique of Max's Theory of Class", *Social Forces*, 50 (4), 473-487.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Max Weber writings from 1864 -1920 on society and economy literature. On the monopolization of the economy by the elite class forming a pyramid socioeconomic system

Various authors have agreed on the magnitude from zero, moderate, and extreme - three demarcated polarization or conflicts degree phases (Wintrobe, 1998). They have, however, analyzed different phenomena from institutional, ethnic, economic, political, societal, and ideological polarization⁴⁶ (Slater and Arugay, 2018; McCoy *et al.*, 2019; LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Wintrobe (1998) argued that extreme polarization would lead nations to break into authoritarianism of restriction and repression among the three-degree phases of polarization. He further noted that moderate polarization is a prerequisite for representation and action⁴⁷ (*ibid*). Wintrobe's assertion concurs with the literature that mature democratic states often are laced with moderate conflicts legally and guarantees political competition for sound democratic policy formulation and law-making.

Additionally, a moderate indication of polarization between Democrats and Republicans in the United States of America is based on policy and law-making (see Schumpeter, 1987: 269; Banisch and Olbrich, 2018: 76-103). There are schools of thought based on the Schumpeterian consensus theory and dissensus in analyzing polarization (*ibid*). Based on a left-right scale proposed by Anthony Downs of competing political parties in the electorate, whichever party wins a consensus-based law and policy will be adhered to and implemented. However, a failure (dissensus) will break into a civil war or social unrest (uprisings), which is a democratic crisis in both developing and consolidated democratic states (Downs, 1957; Somer and McCoy, 2018: 3-15).

⁴⁶ Various arguments in polarization literature are on the degree or magnitude, and roots and typologies. Yet other scholars agree that there is no polarization in some states (zero polarization). However, many scholars concur that polarization can be moderate or extreme examined on multi-typologies polarization research phenomenon.

⁴⁷ Wintrobe (1998) is of the view that zero polarization leads to no representation and action in a state.

Polarization is a characteristic feature of both liberal and hybrid regimes globally marked by electoral competition and ideological conflicts, in which political parties' conflicts usually intensify in policy formulation. Schumpeter (1987: 269) defined democracy from an elitist theoretical view: "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at a political decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide through a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Similarly, in the literature, partisan affective polarization is mainly reflected in the electorate, for example, the Democrats and Republicans of America, which involves ideological and policy-based conflicts⁴⁸ (Hetherington *et al.*, 2016; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017: 621-44; Lelkes, 2018). Hence, the elite's partisan polarization is associated with electoral competition and policy gridlock, often leading to a negative tone (opinion polarization) in news coverage about elite actions and decisions (Patterson, 1993; Jones, 2001; Binder, 2003; Robison and Mullinix, 2015). The affective polarization is rooted in inter-group conflict, which argues, "The value of one's group membership increases as intergroup conflicts become more salient" (Webster and Abramowitz, 2016: 693).

In contrast, other scholars argued that the more people identify themselves with a particular group, the more they develop hatred for the outgroup members (Gidron *et al.*, 2020). The research concluded that affective polarization is actively present in the American electorate, influenced by ideology, and propagated in policy formulation⁴⁹ (ibid). The sharp⁵⁰ ideological-oriented policy and law-making divisions

⁴⁸ The effective polarization is actively present among the Americans, which ingroup members display exceptional hostility and distrust toward political opponents (Gidron *et al.*, 2020: 1-3).

⁴⁹ Hartevelde *et al.*, (2021) analyzed affective polarization by looking at 102 elections in 28 European countries following the love and favoritism of the ingroup and animosity and hatred of the outgroup members.

between the Republicans and the Democrats were clearly seen in the 21st century. For example, the 2008 to 2016 Barack Obama administration, the 2016 to 2020 Donald Trump administration, and the 2020 Joe Biden administration (Frey, 2015; McCoy *et al.*, 2018). Brady and Harie (2006: 120) strongly supported that American polarization is from as early as the 20th century, following ideological accustomed policy-making processes marked by moderate polarization between the Republican and Democratic parties. However, the sharp divisions between the parties deepened in the 21st century in electoral politics and policy-making processes⁵¹ (see, for example, Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 13).

There is no widely accepted definition of polarization due to polarization multi-typologies. Societal polarization⁵² "Is a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in the society increasingly align(s) along a single dimension, cross-cutting differences become reinforcing, and people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of 'us versus them' (McCoy *et al.*, 2018: 16). This entails the intra-state economic, ethnic, and political strata societal structural group conflicts or divides where members of the ingroup hate and develop animosity for outgroup members, also known as affective polarization.

The above definition of polarization similarly applies to institutionalized polarization. Clearly indicated by a societal demarcation between the oligarchs (elites) and the ruled majority (mass), a typical socio-economic structured bureaucratic authoritarian


⁵⁰ Structures involves ideological oriented rules and policies on how a political party, society and a group of people are governed (see, for example, Sewell, 1992: 8),

⁵¹ Polarization between the Democrats and Republicans intensified in policy and ideology during the 21st century (Poole, 2008; Baldassari and Gelman, 2008).

⁵² Societal polarization alike affective polarization is pernicious in nature or extreme, which involves societal divides of us versus them (LeBas and Munemo, 2019).

governance system (Slovik, 2012). Other scholars critically examined polarization as "A state or condition and a process" and "A natural and regular phenomenon" (DiMaggio *et al.*, 1996: 690-755; Dixit and Weibull, 2007). Hence, polarization is a common feature of a state's politics, economy, and society, although conflicts are examined and interpreted based on different academic perspectives.

It is important to note that Slater and Arugay's (2018) idea of institutionalized polarization originated from the Machiavellian and Madisonian democratic and authoritarian conflicts. The scholars examined four Asian nations from, Indonesia, Taiwan, Turkey, and Thailand, in their polarization literature. They critically analyzed institutional polarization from a perspective of both horizontal accountability (i.e., constraints) and vertical accountability (i.e., inclusivity) on both grounds of democratic and authoritarian intra- state conflicts.



In the Machiavellian institutional state conflicts, the elite turn second-class citizens into one class. Hence, the elites create an archetype bureaucratic authoritarian structured government (Marxist archetype capitalist government system, which in this case benefits the few elites in power) -a socio-economic pyramid government system. In fear of uprisings, the elites (oligarchs) safeguard (utilizing coercion and consent) themselves by excluding the mass and opposition movement groups in real state economics and politics (see, for example, Shevtsova, 2004). However, the continuous existence of conflicts often leads to popular uprisings, mostly restrained through authoritarian state-engineered repression and restrictions, Machiavellian exclusive institutional conflicts⁵³ (Slovik, 2012).

⁵³ The 1790's revolutionary government in France during the Directory, 'whip of grape shot' followed the mob dispersal by the military under the command and directives of Napoleon Bonaparte (see, for

In contrast, the Madisonian institutional conflicts are moderate, following the constitutional adherence of opposition parties and the mass in confronting their leaders (elites) (Slater, 2013; pp. 729-763; Slater and Arugay, 2018). Considering this, the opposition political parties and the mass can demand popular accountability regarding elite actions, inaction, and decisions. Oftentimes this has resulted in the impeachment of elites through court proceedings. However, popular accountability demands can breed or result in either extreme intra-state or moderate institutional polarization⁵⁴.

Additionally, there have been cases in the United States of America impeachment trials over executive abuse of power by Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton of the Republican party (Hetherington, 2001; 2009; Niemi *et al.*, 2011). The opposition parties in this regard have the power to denounce and question various government actions, inactions, policies, and laws. However, it's not always the case that Madisonian conflicts will give rise to popular accountability of equality and fairness before the law based on inclusivity⁵⁵ (vertical accountability) and constraints (horizontal accountability)⁵⁶. Aside from America, Taiwan, and Indonesian leaders were removed from power through judicial proceedings bringing to reality the Madisonian constitutional democratic-driven conflicts⁵⁷.

example, Denis Richard 1789-1939). Zimbabwe's post-2018 harmonized election foresaw mob dispersal by the military (see, for example, Mungwari, 2019).

⁵⁴ This entails the one excluded from power, including the civil society, mass, and opposition political parties demanding the law enforcers and the courts to be impartial toward transparency and accountability.

⁵⁵ Issacharoff and Bradley (2021). The Plebiscite in Modern Democracy: In Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, (edt) by András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, and Stephen Holmes. Pp 505-516

⁵⁶ It is argued that states can only improve in either horizontal or vertical accountability, but not in both (Tanneburg, 2020).

⁵⁷ Madisonian conflicts are moderate rule-bound or constitutional bound conflicts.

Furthermore, this study is informed by Slovik's twin authoritarian problem of power-sharing and power-control. This is based on conflicts among the elites and further threats from opposition political parties and the mass excluded from power (Slovik 2012). Similarly, Tanneburg (2020) examined the twin authoritarian problems from a fresh perspective of horizontal and vertical accountability⁵⁸ involving popular accountability and systematic executive power checks and balances. In extremely polarized environments, the elites utilize repression and restrictions against the mass excluded from power, securing the continuity of their regime (Earl, 2011: 262). The theoretical basis examination of multiple authoritarian regimes emanated from Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Aristotle's writings (Geddes, 1999; Gandhi, 2008). However, Machiavelli's early writings contained in his book *The Prince* provided the basis or foundation of conflicts in authoritarian regimes. Coups are most likely to manifest in Machiavellian intra-state conflicts from either the mass⁵⁹ excluded from power or among elites' allies⁶⁰. As a result, intra-party factionalism battles and elite cohesion can trigger military coups or mass uprisings toward a coup (see Wintrobe, 1998; Slovik, 2012; Tanneburg, 2020)

Notably, the Machiavellian idea of polarization denotes a two-way criterion (i.e., vertical and horizontal conflicts) of the ones excluded from power and the executive or elite's allies in power (Somer and McCoy, 2018). Hence, the mass and opposition

⁵⁸ Tanneburg (2020) borrowed or drew his literature from Slovik's twin authoritarian problem of power-sharing and power-control.

⁵⁹ For example, the 2011 Egyptian coup that disposed of Ben Ali and the Libyan coup of 2011 that overthrow Muammar Gadhafi.

⁶⁰ The military coups that disposed Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966 and Milton Obote of Uganda (see Slovik, 2012). The coup that removed the most powerful Roman Empire leader Julius Ceaser (see Julius Ceasar by William Shakespeare 1599; Wintrobe, 1998).

parties can either democratically demand popular accountability in a republican government or undemocratically stage a coup through a popular uprising in an authoritarian regime. In this regard, the elites' allies shield and safeguard themselves from any form of state resistance through state-engineered repression and restriction. Nevertheless, in the republican discourse, Machiavelli examined that the mass will demand active involvement in law and policy formulation and enactment (McCormick, 2011).

Although most scholars picture 'The Prince' as the utmost literature of Machiavelli, they downplay his discourses as strongly supported by McCormick. However, we cannot cast a blind eye to his book 'The Prince', which critically analyzed the authoritarian institutional undertakings against the mass and opposition groups through repression and restrictions (Escriba-Folch, 2013: 544). On the other hand, the Republican discourse is of the view that those excluded from power fight for popular accountability in law and policy-making. In this regard, pressure from the opposition parties and the mass for their direct involvement in law and policy-making often leads to either moderate or extreme polarized state relations (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 178).

As opposed to Machiavelli's early writings of authoritarian governance structures in his book 'The Prince,' in which liberty, power, and authority are centred on the elites. The republican discourses present collective power structures involving a citizen-centred constitution to create a stable state (see, for example, Suchowlansky, 2015). In one of Machiavelli's republican texts, he noted, "Cities where the people hold power quickly make enormous conquest and much greater ones than cities which have always been under the rule of a prince" (Bhuiyan, 2009: 7-17). In this respect,

Machiavelli advocated for a people-centred institutional structured government involving law and policy-making instead of an absolute prince centred -elite-few bureaucratic structured authoritarian government system (Shumer, 1979: 8).

However, Machiavelli calls republican freedom a "disadvantaged necessity" in which the mass can strongly oppose the elites regarding their decisions and actions (Lasswell, 1936). His philosophy and ideas emanated from the Roman Republic tribunal's roles in democratic administration, upholding accountability and transparency measures (Vatter, 2013: 605). The Republican philosophy of Machiavelli further influenced the writings of Rousseau, Madison, Montesquieu, and Locke.



McCormick (2011: 37) describes Machiavelli as a democratic writer who influenced modern philosophy on democracy. Although he is notoriously only known about his book 'The Prince,' 'The Prince' was red more at the expense of the book 'The Discourses of Livy.' Machiavelli examined that the elites have to incorporate the general mass in the governance system for popular accountability (p. 6). Therefore, ordinary citizens enact accountability measures to surveil and control the socio-economic and political affairs of the state. McCormick preferred to call Machiavelli a democrat rather than a republicanist following his contribution to democratic literature (37-39). Popular governments are less vulnerable to antecedents of corruption, subversion, and usurpation of wealth by the elites in power (see Foucault, 1991: 95). This is the case with the constitution of America and its legal system, which stands for popular accountability. Although 'The Prince' proves famous based on how rulers should best deceive their subjects, his major unpopular discourses on

Titus Livy's First Ten Books speak to the citizen-driven power checks and balances (see also Bhuiyan, 2009: 7-17).

Therefore, Machiavellian Republican proponents involve a more participatory and inclusive democratic structured system of government, conceptualized and practiced in modern-day states. Conflicts in countries where citizens are more participatory in the law enactment and policy formulation are moderate. This further involves establishing tribunals or courts meant to maintain power checks and balances against elite/executive abuse of power. Hence, the elites are less likely to breach the constitution and, subsequently, the rule of law subversion, with the citizens given the power to preside over the judiciary and law-making process.

There are myths and realities of polarization from one state to another. Fiorina et al. (2005) examined America's polarization from the 20th century based on ideologically and sociological roots between the Republicans and Democrats. They asserted that the ideological foundation of polarization in America is exaggerated and is a myth⁶¹ (Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006). Apart from America, Slater and Arugay (2018) did not intend to dismiss the realities and myths of polarization in four Asian nations. They came to the conclusion that the conflicts are institutionally oriented rather than ideological and sociological rooted, as other academic research phenomena strongly argued. There is evidence in the Asian polarization literature that indicates that the divisions between the parties are ideologically and sociologically constructed (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007: 203-23). Polarization has found different interpretations of the same research phenomenon (Hetherington, 2001; 2009; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008;

⁶¹ Reality is complex and multi-layered, which forms multi-interpretations from various academic perceptions based on sense-making and meaning construction on a particular study or phenomenon.

Niemi *et al.*, 2011). Given the fragmentation in polarization literature, it is important to have an in-depth analysis and critical examination of what is termed intra-state polarization, in line with arguments put forth by various scholars (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Frizell, 2015; Fiorina *et al.*, 2008).

Carothers and O'Donohue (2020a; 2020b) examined five aspects of roots, trajectory, drivers, consequences, and attendant remedial action. The aforementioned aspects were drivers for analyzing polarization research in six electoral democratic states from South and South East Asian countries: India, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Thailand (*ibid*). Hence, "The deepening divisions, frequently fueled by majoritarian political agendas, influenced democratic regression in the key countries throughout South and Southeast Asia." Thus, opposition groups and authoritarian elites diversified conflicting initiatives can potentially give rise to either democratic breakdown or democratic deepening (*ibid*).

However, the South and South East Asian states differ in the quality of elections based on Dahl's electoral democracy perspective of vertical and horizontal accountability (Dahl, 1971; 2006). The study noted that polarization among these states is rooted in "Societal, religious, ethnic and ideological perspectives" (Carothers and O'Donohue, 2020a). It is also important to note that affective and opinion polarization can emanate from multi-ethnic societies, ideological party differences, policy and law-making, and denominational-religious divisions, among other factors depending on polarization typologies in one country to another.

In addition to the above, competitive authoritarian regimes have continuous and regular elections. Elections, in this case, are a panacea in authoritarian regimes

dampening the opposition resistance⁶². In this scenario, the opposition political parties are given room for electoral completion. However, the elites in power will ensure that the opposition political parties will not win the elections, although they are, in most cases, inevitably the loser. In this regard, there is a high probability of minimized intra-state conflicts in competitive authoritarian regimes through recurring elections. This is because of opposition political parties greater hopes of one day winning the elections. Nonetheless, the Zambian and Malawian elections remind the world that elections in hybrid regimes can potentially favor the opposition political parties. Hence, in support of the above assumptions of intra-state conflicts, I shall examine state institutions, electoral politics, authoritarian populism, and bureaucratic authoritarianism in authoritarian and democratic regimes.

On global record, extreme or pernicious polarization has resulted in the executive abuse of power following the meddling in election results, unfair court trials, abuse of human rights, and further politics of repression among other restrictions and under hand tactics. In this regard, Carothers and O'Donohue, (2019) examined that both old and new democratic states are experiencing democratic backsliding, recession, and decay following the ascension of global authoritarianism (see also V-Dem report, 2020; Nathan, 2020). Although, the third democratic wave might have impacted the globe from the 1970s with the socialist world-class tyrant's ideology wounded (Huntington, 1992; 1993; 1997). The recent studies concur with the prevalence of third-wave authoritarianism following the recorded half of the world population ruled under autocratic leadership (Fukuyama, 2015; Yua-hun *et al.*, 2020). Hence, there is pressure on democracy in both mature and young democratic states. As a result,

⁶² See, for example, Lucan and Way 2010.

democracy might soon find its way out, with authoritarian principles or structures of governance gaining global ground (Somer and McCoy, 2018; Nathan, 2020).

It is worth noting that structural polarization is at odds with academic literature, although noted with different aspects which I subscribed to the bureaucratic authoritarianism government structures⁶³ (Hyung Baeg Im, 1987: 231-257). For example, in Russia, under both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, the state's political and economic aspects were centralized on the elites' allies (oligarchs) secured under military guardianship (Shevtsova, 2004). The differences were noted in the manner of centralization of government institutions, in which the former leader Yeltsin decentralized security institutions in fear of a coup⁶⁴. However, Putin's administration allowed few institutions to stand between the ruling government and the masses (Busygina *et al.*, 2018; McFaul, 2011). Under Putin's presidency, the centrality of state institutions has secured his party's continued electoral predominance (Pieper, 2012). In this case, the country has offered room for political competition with limited civil and political liberties, which failed to materialize into real political parties' competition.

From the above, the patron-client relations characterize authoritarian regimes where the elite few are often kept through grants, promotions, and welfare, leading to their continued support and allegiance to a particular party or autocratic leader (see, for

⁶³ The phenomenon of Bureaucratic authoritarianism has been examined by Wintrobe 1988 South Africa Apartheid regime, Adolf Hitler of Germany and Caesar Julius of Rome, and others (see Wintrobe 1998)

⁶⁴ Famous quote by Boris Yeltsin, "You can build a throne with bayonets, but it's difficult to sit on it," Machiavellian elite-power-sharing and mass power-control conflicts in authoritarian regimes (see, for example, Tanneburg 2020). Yet, Yeltsin ruled under decentralized institutions and autocratic elections. However, Putin offered room for political competition under centralized electoral institutions.

example, Wintrobe, 1988; Slovik, 2012). Following the centralization of state institutions in authoritarian regimes, they are most likely tempted to promulgate laws and policies meant for regime security and survival. Tanneburg (2020) concurs that autocratic leaders often promulgate restrictive laws against the mass and opposition parties as repression backfires (Hess and Martin, 2006: 249-62). In this regard, repression breeds more dissidents or successive resistance towards a popular coup, whilst restrictions dampen opposition resistance (Tanneburg, 2020). Restrictions can give rise to opposition political parties and the masses' adherence to authoritarian constitutions. In this case, the opposition forces can only challenge the elites through constitutional proceedings (Wintrobe, 1998; 2007; Tanneburg, 2020).

At the same time, there is also a global rise in authoritarian populism in both liberal and competitive authoritarian regimes. For example, authoritarian populism was a defining feature of the American political system during the entire tenure of the Donald Trump administration (see Crewe and Sanders, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). The populist phenomenon is marked by undesired law-making and policy formulation meant to support an intended population or ingroup party members in power. In this regard, the American political system under the Trump administration crafted the anti-migration policy and construction of the US-Mexico border wall (ibid). More often than not, authoritarian populism begets hybrid political systems, and typical examples are Putin's administration in Russia and the ZANU-PF party with respect to Russia and Zimbabwe, respectively (see IDEA, 2009). The British policy of exiting BREXIT was characterized by authoritarian populist machinations crafted by the Conservative party under Prime Minister Boris Johnson (Gidron *et al.*, 2020: 2-3). At the same time, during the 2008 economic crisis and the unpopularity of Putin

in Russia's rule, he utilized repression and restriction to dampen the opposition movement (Shipman, 2016; Whitely *et al.*, 2018).

However, a unique case scenario found the Russian intelligence meddling in the 2016 American elections through media manipulations. Nevertheless, the 2020 elections in America were won by Joe Biden of the Democratic party, competing with Donald Trump of the Republican party (New York Times News, 2020). As a result, the 2020 electoral outcome received worldwide condemnation involving mass demonstrations and human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This increased hatred between the Democrats and Republicans.


The general perception of 2020 electoral rigging in America intensified the conflicts (elite-partisan opinion polarization) (see, for example, Gidron *et al.*, 2020). The American Republicans and Democrats are extremely opinion polarized, evidenced by multi-media views and opinions emanating from ideological and policy differences. Hence, the authoritarian populism rhetoric in both the democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes is a countdown time bomb (see, for example, Norris and Inglehart, 2019).

Tied to the above, populism and drift into authoritarianism are often undertaken as a long-term dream/process (Scoones *et al.*, 2022). Both democratic and authoritarian states have seen elements of authoritarian populism⁶⁵. In democratic states, liberal populism provides a stand for checks and balances for accountability's sake. However, looking at the Donald Trump case scenario, his allegations about electoral

⁶⁵ Scoones, I., Marc Edelman, Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Ruth Hall, Wendy Welford, and Ben White (2022) rural politics: confronting authoritarian populism. In *Authoritarianism Populism and the Rural World*: Routledge. London and New York.

rigging triggered riots in America⁶⁶. Authoritarian populism can even lead to state capture or a popular coup. Coincidentally, populism is advantageous for democratic strengthening, yet it can give rise to pernicious polarization/conflicts dividing the state between 'us versus them'⁶⁷.

A widespread belief that ZANU-PF rigged the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe, a development that led to a post-electoral mass demonstration. It would have become a popular coup if the military did not crush the mass uprising. The tension culminated in what was popularly known as the 45-degree shooting angle dispersing the mob⁶⁸. Only a rhetorical speech from a famous elite can turn the state into chaos, streams of blood, and bizarre. The drive from mature democracy into mild authoritarianism and vice versa is seemingly realistic in global electoral politics and constitutionalism politics.



Furthermore, authoritarian governments often resort to militarized state capture, whereupon the economy and politics of the country are centralized among a few elite allies breeding intra-state business cartels (Olver, 2020: 345-349). The ruling elites align public entities or enterprises with a few identified individuals in the private business sector, an indirect state capture (Tudoroiu, 2015). In return, the private business elites support the ruling elites at all costs (Sitorus, 2011). Illicit deals, in this case, are legalized in the state with the constitution amended to favor the elite's business operations (IDEA, 2009). Moldova state capture involved the elites controlling the state institutions and policy formulation promoting elite economic

⁶⁶ See, for example, Norris and Inglehart, 2019.

⁶⁷ McCoy, J. L. and Somer, M. (--) 'Political Parties', Elections, and Pernicious Polarization in the Rise of Illiberalism: (Ed) by Andras Sajó, Renata Uitz, and Stephen Holmes. Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism

⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch (2018) Zimbabwe: At Least 6 Dead in Post-Election Violence, Promptly, Impartially Investigate Security Forces' Use of Force. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/03/zimbabwe-least-6-dead-post-election-violence>

interest. The state capture goes further to the delegitimization of state institutions which is detrimental to democracy and economic growth. Therefore, the state capture phenomenon resonates with Russia, Moldova, and Zimbabwe, characterized by oligarchic elite business operations. This marked the creation of a socio-economic structural pyramid form of government in the aforementioned states (with few wealthy oligarchs and poor masses) (see Maverick-Citizen 2021; Mungwari, 2021). At most, the business cartels often indirectly fund government activities to influence; electoral outcomes, sponsor electoral violence, and electoral campaigns (Edwards, 2017). In the case of the Rwandan genocide, business elites were behind the funding of the military to carry out the mission, which claimed an estimated million Tutsi ethnic lives (Reyntjens, 2004).

Another assumption rising in the global phenomenon of authoritarian electoral politics is 'Black Knights,' who are known to bolster elections as means of authoritarian survival strategy beyond their state boundaries (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Tolstrup, 2009; 2016). Russia is said to have influenced the electoral outcomes of her neighboring authoritarian states by shielding the autocratic regime's electoral defeat and, by extension, an undesired regime change⁶⁹. According to Tolstrup (2016:4-15), there are five claims of Russia's involvement: "Signaling invincibility, deterring elite defection, undermining or weakening opposition activities, dealing with or dampening popular protest and countervailing pressure from foreign democracy promoters."

⁶⁹ Russia was involved in bolstering authoritarian elections of the following countries, "Ukraine in 2004, Belarus in 2006 and Moldova in 2005 and 2009" (see, for example, Tolstrup, 2016).

At the same time, Russia has been held accountable for influencing and providing a menu of electoral manipulation beyond authoritarian electoral politics (ibid). On record, Russian intelligence tampered with the 2016 American presidential election outcome favoring Donald Trump (McCoy *et al.*, 2018). As a result, Donald Trump was impeached in 2020 because the Democrats wanted to avoid the same scenario of 2016 electoral rigging. In this case, an inter-state electoral interaction influences the internal receiving state structures, structuring them based on authoritarian state structures.

Furthermore, the democratic state's internal involvement in pressuring authoritarian governments to adhere to democratic principles or standards can either lead to extreme intra-state or moderate polarization. Tansey (2016) noted that international involvement in the internal affairs of semi-authoritarian regimes raises the costs of authoritarianism. The foreign state's pressure on receiving states oftentimes leads to either democratic breakdown and authoritarian ascension or authoritarian breakdown and democracy ascension (ibid). Hence, the international community can sponsor authoritarian continuity or opposition uprisings, which the latter have higher chances of sparking intra-state conflicts toward a civil war (ibid).

It is often claimed in the literature that both authoritarian and democratic regimes often seek to influence authoritarian politics through financial aid (Carothers, 2006; Diamond, 2008: 337; 2010). However, the democratic states often play on both sides of neither supporting nor sanctioning authoritarian regimes (Schlumberger, 2006). The sanctioning of authoritarian states or individuals is meant to restrain and coerce them toward embracing democratic principles of governance (Donno, 2010).

In addition to the above, regular elections in authoritarian regimes are a mechanism used to sustain the longevity of elites in power by curtailing the rights and activities of opposition movements (Geddes, 2005; Morse, 2012; Howard and Roessler, 2006; Moller and Skanning, 2013). Other scholars have analyzed that "Elections in autocratic regimes are a risky business that often leads to regime breakdown rather than reinforcement of autocratic power and its survival" (Lindberg, 2006; Ghandi and Przeworski, 2007). At the same time, elections in authoritarian regimes save as mere window dressing or a ritual (Schendler, 2002; 2006). In this case, elections in competitive authoritarian regimes do not constitute Dahl's vertical and horizontal electoral accountability quality principles⁷⁰ (Dahl, 2006). Schedler (2002) termed elections in authoritarian regimes a menu of manipulation, especially in African countries such as the case of Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Kenya, where electoral institutions are politically structured to favor the ruling government's electoral outcomes.



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It goes without saying that most authoritarian regimes adopted democratic institutions that dismally failed to meet the minimum standards of democratic policy and law-making in general and elections in particular (Magalonioza, 2006; Tanneburg, 2020). Wintrobe (1998) examined the Chinese communist party's longevity in power by systematically employing restrictive, authoritarian measures decimating opposition movements (Slovik, 2012). As already stated, state institutions' are manipulated to favor and secure the autocratic elite and their allies by way of excluding the mass opposition political parties and CSO in law-making and enforcement. For instance, the late Gaddafi of Libya ruled with a green book with

⁷⁰ Dahl's (1967) plural democratic principles involves: i) free, fair, and competitive elections, ii) universal adult suffrage, iii) protection of civil and political liberties for free and fair elections, and iv) the absence of unelected tutelary institutions.

stringent laws that decimated opposition voices or popular opinion (Jouve, 2004). Similarly, the ZANU-PF party 1997 Zvobgo's constitutional amendment bestowed unlimited and/or unfettered executive powers that stalled the democratic transition in Zimbabwe⁷¹ (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997). The masking of anti-democratic practices through the adoption of democratic institutions is typical of Ozan's (2015) stealth authoritarian practices⁷².

There are elements of constitutional breaching in both authoritarian and democratic states⁷³. Scholars contend that illiberal practices in democratic states are not drifting to authoritarianism but a mild despotism involving abuse of the rule of law and constitutional subverting⁷⁴. Democracy, accordingly, will emerge into a totalitarian majority rule, in which the ruling party adopts policies and promulgates regulations favorable to them. The minority groups are segregated in policy formulation and law-making⁴⁴. Nevertheless, independent institutions are put in place for the purpose of power checks and balances to avoid the continued drift of democratic states into illiberal democracies⁴⁴.



As I noted earlier, authoritarian constitutions give the executive unlimited powers without power checks and balances. The authoritarian constitutions, in this case, perpetuate autocratic rule. The elites are above the law and can amend the constitution for elite security and party patron privileges⁷⁵. At some point, the authoritarian constitution can provide grounds for states to step toward democratic accentuation. It is in case the judiciary and the opposition parties will pressure the

⁷¹ Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 7) Act, 1987.

⁷² Ozan, O. V. (2015) Stealth Authoritarianism: IOWA Law Review. Vol. 100: 1673

⁷³ Sajo, A. (2003) Out of and Into Authoritarian Law: Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, New York.

⁷⁴ Moustafa, T. (2007) The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt: Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁵ Solomon, P. H. (2007). Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes: Review Article. `

elites in power through constitutional proceedings. The Malawian 2020 election marked the constitutional proceedings which rendered the election invalid. As a result, a re-run election was set in place. In contrast, the Zimbabwean 2018 electoral judicial verdict legitimized the electoral outcome with inflated statistical electoral data. This gives credence to the view that some constitutions and courts are put in place by incumbent regimes just to theoretically appease the international democratic community while, in practice, the actual intension is to buttress the political status quo.

With rising global authoritarianism marked by unfair and, by extension, disputed electoral outcomes, some scholars have proposed/suggested opposition electoral coalitions with a view to winning elections and thereafter democratically restructuring the electoral state institutions (see McCoy and Somer, 2018). In this regard, opposition political parties' coalitions are created for the dual purpose of office-seeking and eventual democratic policy formulation once they are in power (see, for example, Ricker's, 1962). In order to maximize electoral outcomes, opposition parties should unite to confront the elites in power. However, authoritarian regimes are infamous for systematically outmaneuvering and decimating opposition coalitions by fomenting opposition political parties' fragmentation and divisions, as well as limiting civil and political liberties (Barbera, 2013: 4). Zimbabwe has more than 50 registered political parties, while Russia has weak opposition political parties; either way is a means to decimate successful opposition electoral competition and ensure elite continuity in power (EUEOM, 2018; NDI/IRI, 2018). In fear of strong opposition, the elites in power provide limited space and liberties for political competition (Magaloni, 2010; Levitsky and Way, 2010).

It is noteworthy that Ozan (2015) critically analyzed the stealth authoritarian practices that are a dominant characteristic feature of both authoritarian and democratic regimes. As I have pointed out, the hybrid regimes adopted authoritarian institutions as a means to galvanize their autocratic power against perceived radical change. The same applies to democratic states, where the executive often abuses authority, thereby subverting the rule of law and constitutionalism. Stealth authoritarian practice, therefore, is a means to silence intra-state conflicts through authoritarian judicial court verdict bias, abuse of constitutions, and militarized electoral institutions for the elite benefit at the expense of the democratic agenda.

Tied to the above, stealth authoritarian practices have shaped the politics of both authoritarian and democratic regimes in the digital age. With the advent of global technological advancement, governments have promulgated restrictive measures to surveil, control, and repress citizens from their social media freedoms of expression⁷⁶ (Scott, 2006: 281-303). Digital technology has promoted information dissemination through social media platforms, including but not limited to Facebook, Twitter, and Whatsapp (Bosch et al., 2020). In fear of being exposed in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, political restriction has played a significant role in social media control (Altheide, 2013).

On the other hand, in democratic regimes, for example, Julius Assange was arrested as a threat to America's national security (Koenig, 2019). This was after he published several highly classified and confidential government articles through his organization, WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks played a significant role in exposing corruption and abuse of power by elites, promoting transparency globally. Assange was

⁷⁶ The intra-state critics follow three manifold stages, according to Toepfl (2020) communication theory: uncritical, policy critical, and leadership critical. Authoritarian regimes, in this case, differ in their state critics across the globe.

arrested as a threat to American state security and on account of rape and sexual assault. However, world-online journalism has remained the ideal platform for whistleblowers (Wasserman, 2019). Looking at the Zimbabwean political system, the ZANU-PF party, fearing government critics and strong opposition, resorted to promulgating restrictive laws of the AIPPA and POSA Acts of 2002 (Masunungure, 2011). Hence, if executive abuse of power through actions and decisions by the elites in power are kept confidential from the masses in both democratic and authoritarian states -stealth authoritarian practices are the order of state politics in the digital age.

This section gives an overview of the polarization phenomenon, looking at polarization roots, typologies, consequences, trajectories, and attendant remedial action. In understanding and shaping the phenomenon of polarization, the chapter used conflict theory. This is because of the existing co-relationship identified between the conflict theory and the polarization phenomenon under investigation. I looked at the different case studies in the academic literature on polarization, including the United States of America and Asian Nations.

2.1 Conclusion

The conflict theory was applied to analyze the polarization that characterized both authoritarian and democratic states. The intra-state conflicts range from ideological, political, societal, economic, and ethnic. Conflicts, similar to polarization, are marked by a degree variance from zero, moderate, and extreme divisions. This chapter used the terms polarization and conflicts interchangeably and simultaneously. Accordingly, intra-state conflicts were examined at a micro and macro level. Conflicts like polarization have roots, trajectories, typologies, drivers, and attendant remedial

action. Hence, the conflict theory clearly defines the intra-state divisions involving but not limited to, wars, political parties factions, uprisings, and coups in both democratic and authoritarian regimes.



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CHAPTER THREE

Roots and typologies of polarization in Zimbabwe



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“Unless if one lives and loves in the
trenches, it is difficult to remember that the
war against dehumanization is ceaseless”

(Audre Lorde: Goodreads quotes).

3.0 Introduction

In understanding the polarization phenomenon, there is a need to trace its roots and trajectories. This chapter intends to trace the history of Zimbabwean polarization to the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence periods. Conflicts in the Zimbabwean literature have been analyzed from the phenomenon of ethnical, racial, ideological, political, and societal divisions⁷⁷. The pre-colonial and colonial periods were characterized by Ndebele-Shona ethnical conflicts, white settlers' authoritarianism and black resistance, and the revolutionary parties' factional battles. The ethnical conflicts from the pre-colonial and colonial periods led to a 1980 post-independence Ndebele-Shona civil war. According to Henriques (1977), “the revolutionary parties expend more energy on fighting each other more than their intended enemy.” There is a great debate in the literature regarding the ethnic and class factor of revolutionary parties' 1960s internecine conflicts (see, for example, Sithole, 1993). At the same time, the ZANU-PF ruling party's internal factional battles have been the party's pristine state since 1963. Despite the ZANU-PF's internal party conflicts, the party has been in power since independence through systematic decimation of the opposition movement, the masses, and the CSO. Therefore, this chapter will bring to the fore the roots and trajectories of Zimbabwean polarization from the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence periods.

3.1 Tracing the polarization roots going into the future

It is worth noting that the genealogy of polarization in Zimbabwe originated from the 1830s Ndebele invasion of Zimbabwe following the geographical or map-line demarcation (geopolitics) of Ndebele-Shona societies (Alexander, 1998; Pulossof,

⁷⁷ See, for example, McCandles, 2011; Mungwari, 2017; LeBas and Munemo, 2019.

2014: 340). However, literature focused entirely on the post-independence ethnic, political, ideological, and societal polarization (LeBas, 2006; McCandles, 2011; Mungwari, 2017; LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Polarization roots can be traced from the pre-colonial and colonial periods, involving the Ndebele-Shona society relations and the revolution political parties' formation. LeBas and Munemo (2019) focused on tracing the Ndebele-Shona ethnic conflicts from the colonial period in analyzing the post-independence 1983-87 ZAPU and ZANU civil war.

Tied to the above, the ZANU party of 1963 had a majority of Shona-speaking people, whilst the 1962 ZAPU party had a minority of Ndebele-speaking people (Phimister, 2008). The battle of supremacy between the two factional parties in post-independence 1980 claimed an estimated 20 000 Ndebele-speaking people (Nkomo, 1984; CCJPZ 1997; Muzondidya, 2009). Hence, the intensification of the colonial ethnic polarization in Zimbabwe is from the 1960s intra- and inter-party tribal conflicts. There is a pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial polarization multi-paradigm typology phenomenon in the history of Zimbabwean ethnic conflicts (see the struggle within struggle by Masipula Sithole, 1979; Alexander *et al.*, 2000; McCandles, 2011; Mungwari, 2017; LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Thus, ethnic conflicts have been an inherent feature of Zimbabwean politics since the colonial period's revolutionary parties' formation.

On the other hand, the origin of ethnic rivals/conflicts between Shona and Ndebele-speaking people is as old as Zimbabwe's pre-colonial history (see Bhebhe, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). In this regard, the historical Ndebele and Shona relations before the white settlers' occupation of Zimbabwe shaped the colonial and post-colonial societal polarity state relations (Alexander, 1998). The Ndebele, when upon

entering the Zimbabwean plateau, raided and ravaged the Shona societies. Queen Nyamazana's military was responsible for skinning to death King Chirisamhuru of the Rozvi Empire (Beach, 1990: 45-79).


The existing literature strongly supported that the Ndebele were bloodthirsty warlike savages, while the Shona people were peaceful and loving (Needham *et al.*, 1984). The characterization of the Ndebele and the Shona behaviors and conflicts has been attributed to a myth and exaggerated (Alexander *et al.*, 2000). Nevertheless, there were other intra-state conflicts before the 1830 Ndebele invasion of Zimbabwe, including civil wars and succession disputes among the Shona societal groups (Moyana and Sibanda, 1984). On the other hand, the Ndebele people created enmity with the Shona people through conquest, incorporation, and assimilation, and most Shona chiefs were obligated to pay tribute to the Ndebele king.

At the same time, it is important to note that the British South African Company (BSAC) occupation of Zimbabwe in 1890 intensified conflicts between the Ndebele and Shona people (Anderson 1983: 102). Solomon Mombeshora (1990) captured the overall contribution of colonialism when he stated that; "The seeds of ethnic factor were derived from the pre-colonial past, but the colonial era provided extreme ethnic rivals, in which the ideology of tribalism germinated, blossomed and was further propagated." The Southern Rhodesia white settler's colonial regime influenced polarization in many ways, including class, ethnic, and power struggles during the colonial and post-independence periods (Masunungure, 2009; Raftopoulos, 2009).

Firstly, I shall examine the tribal conflicts during the 1960s formation of revolutionary parties. Apart from tribal conflicts, the first colonial period conflicts were between the

Ndebele and the white settlers over the Shona people, who used to be Ndebele raiding grounds and source of tribute (Needham *et al.*, 1984; Beach, 1994a). On record, both Shona and Ndebele's uprisings against the white settlers in the 1890s were separately undertaken⁷⁸ (see Moyana and Sibanda, 1984; Ranger, 1967; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017).

It is argued in the literature that multi-tribalism and regionalism contributed to intra- and inter-revolutionary party polarization/conflicts in Zimbabwe in the 1960s (see Tekere, 2007). As a result, there was the emergence of multi-tribal political parties in the 1960s. The regionalized political parties during the 1960s include the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC), National Democratic Party (NDP), Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), and others (Sithole, 1970; Muwati, 2009: 59). Bishop Abel Muzorewa examined that;



"In 1963, at the time of the split, a demon invaded Zimbabwe (...) The demon ravaged the entire country, petrol-bombing to death and maiming innocent children, men, and women (...) To have a different political opinion⁷⁹ was tantamount to witchcraft, and as a result, some of us lost confidence in ourselves and sacrificed self-rule" (Muzorewa, 1975).

Similarly, various scholars examined the conflicting geographical boundaries and party formation in the 1960s. The SRANC political party of 1959, the first black party in Southern Rhodesia, was characterized by a nationality and unity movement which consolidated multi-ethnic groups in Zimbabwe (Sithole, 1959; Msindo, 1960). The

⁷⁸ The Ndebele uprising was in 1896, while the Shona uprising was in 1987.

⁷⁹ The revolutionary political movement in the 1960s and 70s were influenced by ethnic-based opinion polarization, in which members were coerced into unity.

intensification of the colonial settler's oppressive and restrictive measures led to the death of SRANC and the birth of NDP in 1960, led by Nkomo (Sylvester, 1990; Sadomba, 2008).

From the above, it is clearly stated that the NDP party was tribalized by the Kalanga people, who occupied most of the popular positions in the party (Sithole, 1978). Hence, this resulted in the formation of the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) as a splinter group by the Kalanga (Msindo, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). Joshua Nkomo outmaneuvered the ZNP political party after opening higher posts in NDP to other Shona tribes (ibid). The intra-party structural conflicts intensified by regional-ethnic divisions transcended intra-party factionalism battles in the NDP, leading to the formation of the ZNP by the Kalanga. Masipula Sithole analyzed the Zimbabwe liberation movement splits and divisions, as he noted;

"If you were to put two Zimbabweans on the moon and visit them the next day, you would find that they have formed three parties" (Sithole, 1993: 35)

Consequently, both tribal conflicts and pressure from the white settlers' Smith regime on revolutionary parties resulted in either the 1960s death or the birth of regionalized ethnic political parties (Sithole, 1979). The NDP party member's radical and unconstitutional approach to confronting the Rhodesian government led to the banning of the party in September 1962. However, the party was replaced by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) political party after six days (Marongwe, 2012: 89). Yet, ZAPU revolutionary party suffered from ethnic battles between the Ndau and the Ndebele-speaking people, resulting in the formation of the 1963 ZANU party, a splinter group led by Nabandingi Sithole (Sithole, 1970). From 1963, factional battles were mainly between the two main revolutionary political parties,

ZANU and ZAPU revolutionary fronts. However, ZANU had intra-party tribal conflicts/factional battles that claimed Shona-speaking people's lives.

Tied to the above, ZANU became the main revolutionary political party consolidating the Manyika, Karanga, Zezuru and Ndau, and other Shona tribes (Moyo, 2004). With such originality, there were power struggles within ZANU, as the party was the leading South Rhodesian national-revolutionary movement party. Fear, mistrust, and conflicts among party members led to successful assassination plots, which are still an inherent feature of ZANU-PF to date (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020). Sithole analyzed the conflicts within the ZANU revolutionary party, as he noted that;

"When we formed ZANU in 1963, it was called the Zimbabwe African National Union, but by 1974 and at the beginning of 1975, it had become in practice 'Zimbabwe African Tribal Union' masquerading under the respectable garbs of the ZANU of 1963. Therefore, the tribalized or regional Dare (War Council known as Dare reChimurenga) had ceased to represent ZANU as we know it. It has come to represent in effect ZATU (Zimbabwe African Tribal Union) or ZARU (Zimbabwe African Regional-Union)" (Sithole, 1978).

It became clear that the ZANU party was a terrain of tribalism and regionalism politics among the Shona-speaking people (Sithole, 1979). The assassination of Hebert Chitepo in 1975, who was the first black Rhodesian lawyer, raised suspicions within the ZANU party ranks against the Kalanga tribe as members were paving their way to succeed and control the party (Godwin and Hancock, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Furthermore, Josiah Tongogara ZANLA army commander's assassination was due to power struggles within the ZANU party ranks (Kriger, 1998).

The tribalism and ethnic conflicts were due to the fact that "African nationalism was a terrain for the retribalization of politics and identity" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). The turning point within the ZANU party was the 1977 palace coup against Nabandingi Sithole, which found the ascension of Robert Mugabe as the party leader. The ZANU party was camouflaged with regionalized Shona ethnic group structures within the ZANU party structure. As a result, this led to unhappy marriages -a unification of Shona ethnical parties characterized by hidden conflicts thwarted by employing elimination and assassinations of rival factions' party members.

In line with the above, ZANU party members were detained in the mid-1960, including Nabandingi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, and Albert Muzorewa (Alexander 1998; Beach 1984; 1994b). It is detailed that most ZANU members were no longer satisfied with Sithole's leading role in the party. This includes forming his high command known as Zimbabwe Liberation Committee (ZLC), which was tribal in nature, failed to cater for his fellow comrades in prison, and finally, the "Magagao Declaration by Zimbabwe Freedom Fighters" (Sithole, 1979; Kriger, 1992; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011).

The Magagao declaration by the ZANLA forces shifted the armed struggle by strengthening the military structure in 1975⁸⁰. In the same year, ZANU, as a party, held a congress which brought in talented and ambitious young leaders to the party, including Emmerson Mnangagwa, after his release from prison. The declaration by the comrades was an expression of gratitude to the Organization of African Union Liberation Committee, the Tanzanian government, and the Frelimo of Mozambique.

⁸⁰ Magagao was a communiqué written by young military officers at the main ZANLA training camp in Tanzania at the height of the liberation struggle in November 1975.

The same Magagao Document spelt out that the armed struggle was the only way to liberate Zimbabwe from the colonial master, the British government.

From the above, the document highlighted that the ANC and ZAPU political parties proved worthless in the struggle to lead the revolution. It further listed specific complaints against Muzorewa, Nkomo, Chikerema, and Sithole (Fay-Chung, 2006). The complaints directed to the ZANU leader Sithole include failing to cater for the detainees and his failure to get money to their families to help feed them, moderate negotiations with the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organizations, his callous behavior towards people killed at Mboroma, and lenient approach to Ian Smith. At the same time, the ZANLA distanced itself from the Zambian government over an incident at Mboroma that found 11 ZANLA guerillas killed and 13 wounded, including women.

During the Mapima meeting in September 1977, the ZANLA army had four commanders, and Mugabe was the second man in the party hierarchy as the Secretary-General who assumed the party leadership position⁸¹. Mugabe was unintentionally supported by his elite allies, including Morris Nyagumbo and Edgar Tekere, to succeed Sithole through a palace coup (Godwin, 2011). Hence, the declaration spelt out that Mugabe was an outstanding member of the party. The document was signed by dozen of the ZANLA officers, which saw the revolution back on track. Therefore, the Zezuru tribe took over the ZANU party from the Ndaube tribe in 1977, resulting in Sithole forming his political party ZANU Ndonga. Consequently, ethnic structural intra-party-based conflicts led to splits of political parties in the 1960s revolutionary movement phase.

⁸¹ The Sunday News (2021) Magagao Declaration changed the dynamics of the armed struggle. Interviewee Rtd Brigadier-General Edgar Dube.

In agreement with the above, Masipula Sithole (1984: 117-25) believes that ethnicity⁸², rather than societal classes, dominated the factional battles in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement groups. Although with such a compelling argument, he focused on the class factor in analyzing the intra-state conflicts in the Zimbabwean liberation movement (p. 117). The Zimbabwean liberation parties were themselves characterized by the class struggles of peasants and the working class. As noted by the Marxist in his 'petty bourgeoisie concept,' the few merchants or intellectuals dominate and influence the majority of peasants. The Zimbabwean liberation movement was marked by elite intellectuals' ideological divisions (p. 120); for example, Hebert Chitepo quarreled with other ZANU cadres over the cease-fire terms during the second liberation struggle, resulting in his assassination⁸³. The revolution in Zimbabwe was consuming its children, similar to France's National Convention revolutionary government⁸⁴. The class factor within the revolutionary movement has not been extensively explored in analyzing the factional battles that characterized the movement leading to the elimination and expulsion of elite members in ZANU and ZAPU revolutionary parties (ibid).

Furthermore, there was inter-party polarization between ZANU and ZAPU's revolutionary patriotic front. Both political parties' military fronts were separately trained, with the ZIPRA militants trained in Zambia and ZANLA militants in Mozambique (Meredith, 2009). Initiatives to unite ZANU and ZAPU by the Organization for African Union (OAU), Zambian, and Mozambique's leaders only found a temporary union of both fronts in the mid-1970s (Masunungure, 2009). It became clear that ZAPU and ZANU members were at rival terms or loggerheads

⁸² See, for example, Masipula Sithole 1993 article.

⁸³ See also Cliff (1980: 14).

⁸⁴ See for example, Sithole (1993).

following the disunity of members during the second liberation struggle (Scarnecchia, 2008).

It is believed that the split between ZAPU and ZANU was conceived in ideological foundations rather than ethnic conflicts, although not in a similar way; both influenced the polarity between the revolutionary fronts (Henriques, 1997: 496; Sithole, 1993). In 1963, Nkomo supported the new proposed constitution, although, at a later stage, Nkomo and Sithole contrasted the proposals, as they provided no prospects for black majority Rhodesians. Another case that emerged was the arms tactics, in which Nkomo believed in conventional mechanisms, while the ZANU believed in guerilla warfare. The guerilla warfare during the liberation struggle gave the ZANU party recognition and popularity across the country, although pushed with non-constitutional tactics (Henriques, 1977: 495). The inter-group ideological conflicts led to competition among the revolution parties despite the outspoken ethnic disparities among the revolutionary parties. It is not to contest the existence of ethnic conflicts between the revolutionary fronts that aided in extreme divisions in the post-independence 1983-87 civil war. As I noted earlier, we cannot simply ignore the individual interest in intensifying the conflicts between ZAPU under Nkomo and ZANU under Mugabe revolutionary fronts (see, for example, Scarnecchia, 2021).

Tied to the above, the affective polarization⁸⁵ among the revolution fronts found the ethnic grouping camps of the ZIPRA forces under ZAPU and ZANLA under ZANU forces developing hatred and animosity for outgroup members. Meredith (2009) analyzed that Nkomo wanted to be the leader of Zimbabwe despite ZANU's popularity, yet, the election of 1980 proved him otherwise as the outcome favored ZANU under Mugabe. The conflicts marked a phase of extreme ethnic militarization

⁸⁵ See, for example Gindron *et al.*, (2020) on roots of affective polarization.

and affective polarization -intense ingroup favoritism and outgroup animosity and hatred (1983-1987 civil war) that claimed 20 000 people, including men, women, and children (Scarnecchia, 2021).

Nevertheless, a critical analysis of the conflicts between Nkomo and Mugabe from colonial history are more detailed on ethnic factors rather than their competition for power and control of the revolutionary movement (Scarnecchia, 2021: 10). Thus, the Nkomo-Mugabe rival conundrum goes beyond the Ndebele-Shona ethnic conflicts, which was driven by elite selfish ambition with enthusiasm to one day rule the country, after disposition of the white settlers colonial rule. Similarly, the 1983-87 civil war between the Ndebele-Shona military fronts has mainly been attributed and biased to Mugabe and Nkomo's inter-party ethnic rivals (ibid). The conflicts in the Zimbabwean literature need to be clearly examined based on class, race, ethnic political, ideological, and societal perspectives. This is not to dispute the reality of the ethnic conflicts in the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence periods. It is simply not to ignore other intra-state conflicts that characterized Zimbabwean politics, as Scarnecchia (2021) pointed out.

Hence, post-independence Zimbabwe's polarization should be critically analyzed and justified from polarity roots. Literature has tended to focus on the post-independence period, with the historical perspective of polarization left unjustified in the literature. However, I did not dispute other scholars' contributions to myths and realities of polarization in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, it has been proven sufficient to explain the reality aspect of a given phenomenon by tracing its roots or history. The following section will examine polarization from the 1960s South Rhodesian government under the white settler UDI Smith's administration.

3. 2 White settler regime's contribution to polarized state-society relations?

The Southern Rhodesian government under the Ian Smith colonial regime, similar to the Apartheid government of South Africa, ruled with repressive measures under a typical bureaucratic militarized authoritarian structured government system (Palley, 1960; Wintrobe, 1998). Thus, the white settler government in the 1960s decimated opposition political parties' members' and supporters' movements by detaining active party members and limiting political competition through promulgating restrictive laws (Palmer, 1977). The colonial settlers' regime systematically promulgated restrictive laws, including the Law and Order Maintenance Act and the Emergency Powers Act of 1960, to silence any opposition resistance or state dissidents (Palley, 1970; Muzondidya, 2005). In 1965 the Smith regime further Unilaterally Declared Independence (UDI) from the British government (Bhebhe, 2004; Pilosof, 2014: 341).




From the above, the state's declaration of independence called for economic sanctions of Southern Rhodesia under Smith's administration by the British government⁸⁶ (Mosley, 1983; Moyo, 1998; Moore, 2005). On the other hand, the intra-state relations between the blacks and white Southern Rhodesians in the 1960s were laced with extreme polarization with the revolutionary political parties' formation. Amongst other issues, this involved regional parties' death and birth and

⁸⁶ The white settler South Rhodesian government under Ian Smith shifted its trade market and traded through South Africa, which the sanction less impacted the regime.

white-black elite-mass (white and blacks) socio-economic and political disparities⁸⁷ (see, for example, Bishi, 2018).

The dominant group in South Rhodesia encompassed a quarter million white settlers who ruled over close to six million blacks (ibid). The dominant white group controlled the economic resources and means of production, including three-quarters of the Zimbabwean fertile lands and the mining and production industry. As a result of the socioeconomic disparities, the white settlers promulgated restrictive laws to castrate the opposition groups and any form of intra-state political competition. Nevertheless, the subordinate groups –the black majority outmaneuvered the white settlers' authoritarian machination by unconstitutionally and ruthlessly challenging their repressive measures⁸⁸ (Msipa, 2015). This led to the detention of the revolutionary-leaders, supporters, and guerillas during the second liberation struggle. It became a polarity between the white settlers' minority dominant group versus the black majority subordinate group (see, for example, Henriques, 1977).



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The radical racial laws by the Southern Rhodesian government in the 1960s demarcated the state between black people and white settlers⁸⁹ (Alexander, 1998; Bhebhe, 1999; Magure, 2009). Similarly, this resonates with the elite-partisan affective polarization, marked by intra-state group divides (Gidron *et al.*, 2020). At the same time, Marxist class structures classified the Zimbabwean colonial societies. This includes limited black people's socioeconomic and political liberties, following

⁸⁷ The outgroup hatred by ingroup members in a socio-economic white settler South Rhodesian government system was a divide between the black and white communities (us versus them), which can be understood and equated to affective polarization group identity theory (Gidron *et al.*, 2020).

⁸⁸ The restrictive laws included: "Law and Order Maintenance Act, Emergency Powers Act, and Vagrant Act" (Henriques, 1977).

⁸⁹ The colonial racial inequalities between the whites and the blacks led to a socioeconomic extreme polarization.

segregation in employment and education, and a limited number of black people in election participation (ibid).

For example, the Tredgold Commission promulgated "the Electoral Act of 1957, which instituted some complex changes in the franchise" (Shopo, 1985; Mpofu, 2014). It, therefore, increased the number of African voters by 20% in the Southern Rhodesian electorate, and only special voters were allowed to vote, deemed to be humans and responsible (ibid). Resistance from the black people was due to several reasons ranging from the exclusion of the majority of Africans in the electorate and the education system, which illiteracy negatively influenced voting behavior in electoral decision-making (Dube, 2015). Similarly, scholars note that;

"The large section of the population was backward and illiterate, and the adult suffrage would be to place political control in the hands of people sadly equipped to exercise it. An uneducated peasant from a remote area might form some sort of judgment upon a candidate's personal qualities. A voter must be able to form an opinion as to the true merits of the policy for which the candidate stands; this he certainly could not do" (Morgan and Langford, 1982: 124).

On the other hand, African decolonization was mostly influenced by the African continent's racial legacies and the Cold War ideological war between the communist and the front-line capitalist states⁹⁰ (Scarnecchia, 2021: 1). The decolonization of Zimbabwe delay has been tied to the white settler's Unilateral declaration of Independence to create a state called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (p. 5). Such developments found the revolutionary parties resistant to the dictates of the white colonial settlers. Nevertheless, the Cold War impacted the revolutionary parties to

⁹⁰ The capitalist states were dominated by United States of America and Britain, while the communists states was dominated by USSR now Russia and China.

resist imperialism as they developed animosity and hatred of the colonial legacies of authoritarian repression and restriction. This further involved China and Russian communist states supporting the Zimbabwean revolutionary parties ZANU and ZAPU, respectively, with ammunition and military training.

There are similarities in the colonial periods drawn between the Southern Rhodesian government and the Apartheid regime of South Africa in terms of authoritarian repressive and restrictive measures (Bhebhe and Ranger, 2000; Southall, 2019). On the other hand, the societal disparities between the white settlers and most black people created and sparked extremely polarized state relations leading to liberation struggles in the African continent (ibid). Hence, colonial-era polarization was characterized by structured black-and-white⁹¹ socio-economic and political disparities.



The liberation struggle in the African continent was more of what Karl Marx pointed out as a class struggle between the white settlers and the native black groups (Sithole, 1993). For example, there was a colonial class struggle in urban areas in Zimbabwe regarding wage rates and working conditions⁹². The conflicts were viciously manifested in Salisbury (now Harare) and Bulawayo, influenced by the working-class trade unions –*trade unionist-led strikes* (Scannercchia, 2021). The Marxist class struggle and capitalist ills could have been the major contributors to the liberation struggle in Africa during the Cold War era. The African colonial era was marked by white settler imperialism at the expense of the black majority. The rise in discontentment by black Africans against white settler imperialism marked the

⁹¹ The classification of the white settlers and the black people is characterized as black and white to classify the socio-economic and political disparities in the colonial era.

⁹² Kriger, N. (2002). *Striking Back: The labour movement and the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe 1980-2000*. (Edt) by Brian Raftopoulos and Lloyd Sachikonye. Harare: Weaver Press.

unconstitutional revolutions across the continent dominantly influenced by communist ideologies (ibid).

However, the difference between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa is that the Zimbabwean liberation military fronts' resistance liberated the country (Lodge, 1983; Harowitz, 1991; Msipa, 2015; Mlambo, 2020). In this regard, the Apartheid Regime was one of the strongest oppressive white settler colonial governments in the African continent, which required more than just black resistance for a successful liberation struggle (Wintrobe, 1998). The involvement of the international community in South African politics, sanctioning the Apartheid colonial settler regime following human rights violations, marked independence and democratic elections in 1994 (Wintrobe, 1998; Southall, 2019).



Zimbabwe's liberation struggle from 1964 to 1979 culminated during the 1979 Lancaster House Conference and agreement held in London (Bhebhe, 1984; Moyo, 1992; Bhebhe and Ranger, 1996; Chongo, 2015). However, an election was held in absentia of the main revolutionary parties, ZANU and ZAPU, in 1979, in which Albert Muzorewa won and was appointed as the first Southern Rhodesia black Prime Minister (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997). Meredith (2009) analyzed the politics of deception and manipulation by the white settlers in the regional revolutionary political parties, which intensified conflicts among the tribal groups of Zimbabwe (see also Muzorewa, 1978). Seemingly, the white settlers in Zimbabwe perceived the ethnical divisions amongst the Zimbabwe revolutionary movement groups and wanted to use a divide-and-conquer strategy, which availed not.

Nevertheless, the election of April 1979 was disputed by the main revolutionary fronts, ZAPU and ZANU party members, which led to the first democratic election of

Zimbabwe in February 1980 (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997). The election outcome favored ZANU under Mugabe, appointed as the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe until the 1987 Zvobgo constitutional amendment (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no. 7 Act, 1987). In 1987 Mugabe became the Zimbabwean president for 37 years until the 2017 coup that disposed him of from power. The next section shall give a detailed examination of the Mugabe and Mnangagwa electoral authoritarian regimes.

3. 3 Party survival strategies under Mugabe and Mnangagwa regimes

In analyzing the new ZANU-PF administration under Emmerson Mnangagwa, scholars have argued that it was an authoritarian continuation of typical “Mugabeism without Mugabe” (Maromo, 2017; Melber, 2017). Similarly, Russia experienced authoritarian continuation from Yeltsin to Putin’s administration. Mugabe secured his regime under a militarized electoral authoritarian regime for 37 years of his leadership. Due to intra-party factionalism battles, he was finally toppled through a military coup d’état in November 2017 (see the article 'The Croc in Bob out' by Southall, 2018; Dube, 2021: 1-13). This was because of factional battles within the ZANU-PF party laced with strata ethnic party structures, including but not limited to the two factional camps of the young generation (G-40) factional party competing for power with the Lacoste faction aided by old elites or comrades.

From the above, the 2017 Chiwenga coup was a repeated history of the 1977 Mugabe's elite allies palace coup (Tekere, 2007). However, the 2017 military coup intended to restore the lost legacy of ZANU-PF's former elite allies against the G-40 factional party under Grace Mugabe (see Southall, 2018). A successful militarized state capture and a coup by Chiwenga toppling the presiding incumbent Mugabe and

replacing him with Mnangagwa has consequently led to continued human rights abuses, electoral fraud, and illicit deals (forex, fuel, and food) under military guard (see, for example, Mungwari, 2021).

Looking at Mugabe's regime, soon after independence in 1980, the revolutionary party ZANU-PF inherited the white settler authoritarian system of governance, involving repression and restriction of opposition parties, CSO, and the masses (Alexander 1995; Masunungure, 2009). The restrictive colonial laws involved the Law and Order Maintenance Act, Emergency Powers Act, and Vagrant Act (for example, Magure, 2010; Hamadziripi, 2018). In post-independence, Mugabe was willing to cling to power through coercion and consent, decimating state dissidents and opposition voices by creating a seeming defacto socialist one-party state (Moss and Patrick, 2006; Magure, 2014). However, Mugabe's one-party state did not materialize, which found periodic elections in post-independence Zimbabwe. In one of his popularly known statements in Mozambique in 1976 before independence, Mugabe said that;

"Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have has been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer—its guarantor. The people's votes and the people's guns are always inseparable twins" (Meredith, 2009).

It became clear that the liberation struggle failed to yield its intentions of creating a Zimbabwean democratic society with civil and political liberties. The gun became the source behind electoral outcomes, in which elections were illegitimate based on unfair electoral practices in post-independence Zimbabwe (Masunungure, 2011). For example, the ZANU-PF party reverted to the Chimurenga night vigils in the 2008 re-

run elections, reminding people that war was inevitable with the opposition party MDC-T in power (Krigler, 2003; Chung, 2006; Alexander, 2011). Hence, the periodic elections under the Mugabe administration failed to adhere to the minimum standards of electoral democratic principles. Similarly, Magure examined that "Whether by hook or crook," ZANU-PF has been winning elections resoundingly (Magure, 2014). Furthermore, Southall (2015) noted a shift from a dominant party to a competitive authoritarian state, following that elections are a mere ritual or a window dressing in Zimbabwe.

Moreover, Mnangagwa secured the ZANU-PF ruling party from 1980, appointed by Mugabe as Minister of Security and Defense in post-independence (Southall, 2018). Mnangagwa's political history is from his membership in the 'crocodile gang,' a radical military group that attacked the white settler regime during the liberation struggle (Mazarire, 2021). In this regard, he was apprehended by the white settler's South Rhodesian security and survived the death sentence because of his age (he was a minor under the age of 21) (Hodgkinson, 2019; Rodgers, 2019: 58). During the 1983 to 1987 Matabeleland undertakings against the ZAPU revolutionary front, Mnangagwa likened the Ndebele dissidents to "Cockroaches and bugs that had reached such an epidemic proportion that the government had to bring in DDTs to get rid of them" (see Mail and Guardian, November 2017; Newsday, March 2016). Mnangagwa added, "Blessed are they who will follow the path of government laws for their days on earth shall be increased. Woe unto those who choose a path of collaboration with dissidents, for we will certainly shorten their stay on earth" (Zhou, 2016)

However, Mnangagwa disputed his involvement in the Matabeleland atrocities that claimed an estimated 20 000 Ndebele-speaking people (Maedza, 2018). Nevertheless, much is accredited to him and other ZANU-PF army generals, including Shiri and Mujuru. ZANU-PF's party security mechanism in the 1980s was through elimination, assassinations, and incorporation. Mnangagwa was one of the trusted master architects and strategists under the Mugabe administration (BBC news, June 2018). Similarly, Ugandan President Milton Obote entrusted his military general Idi Amin, who succeeded him through a successful military coup (see, for example, Slovik 2012). Mnangagwa's way to the presidential seat involved his demotion after the Tsholotsho declaration attempted coup of 2004. Finally, he was expelled from the ZANU-PF party in 2017 due to the intensification of factionalism battles⁹³ fueled by power struggles and succession disputes.

The ZANU-PF party's crescendo of tension marked the November 2017 Chiwengalied 'Operation Restore Legacy' military coup disposing of Mugabe and the G-40 ZANU-PF faction members. The Chiwenga military-staged coup paved the way for Mnangagwa to become the designated ZANU-PF party and national president until the 2018 post-coup harmonized elections, legitimizing his rule (see Southall, 2018). One author commented, speaking of Mnangagwa, "He was very, very strict. He does not say much... I think that is what frightens people" (BBC News, June 2018).

Furthermore, the Lacoste ZANU-PF factional party has maintained the status quo legal and security systems against the intended post-2017 coup electoral reforms. The 2017 post-coup is arguably an arrested democratic transition, and post-

⁹³ The factional battle was between the two factions of G-40 under Grace Mugabe and the Lacoste faction under Mnangagwa (see Southall, 2018).

independence is a transition of 50 years of tyranny (Coltart, 2016; Moyo, 2018). Other scholars argued that it was an authoritarian continuation from Mugabe to Mnangagwa's administration (Southall, 2018; Mungwari, 2019). The disputed 2018 elections and the military involvement in silencing mass uprisings clearly indicate a typical militarized electoral authoritarian regime (Beardsworthy *et al.*, 2017).

As detailed in one of the discussions held by SAPES-Trust (May 2021), is history about to repeat itself in the upcoming 2023 harmonized elections? Furthermore, will Mnangagwa amend the constitution to further his term of office after the 2023 harmonized elections? On record, Mnangagwa's administration amended the constitution to allow ZEC to conduct census and delimitation of constituencies towards the 2023 harmonized elections and extension of the Chief Judge's term of office (SASPES-Trust, October 2021). Mnangagwa, similar to Putin, might be tempted to extend the presidential term of office with unlimited executive powers bestowed on the president. Hence, autocratic leaders have the potential to unconstitutionally amend laws safeguarding their authority and power against perceived successful opposition resistance and political competition (Slovik, 2012).

3. 4 Conclusion and opposition political parties' dilemmas?

It is worth noting that Zimbabwe experienced multi-polarization typologies from ethnic, racial, political, ideological, and societal, as detailed in the academic literature. The founding myths and realities of polarization have been unjustified since pre-independence. In this regard, polarization roots and typologies involved; i) The 1830 Ndebele-Shona ethnic-society relations, ii) White settlers' colonial structured governance system, and iii) 1960s ethnic and class-based party factional battles. Post-independence period ZANU-PF party security mechanism under both

Mnangagwa and Mugabe administrations has resulted in continued repression and restriction against opposition political parties and the mass. The party ZANU-PF adopted an authoritarian constitution that rested unlimited powers (Zvobgo Constitutional Amendment no. 7, Act, 1987) on the executive president in 1987. That constitution has been contrasted by Civil Society Organizations and opposition political parties, which the allied force (National Constitutional Assembly) managed to limit the presidential term of office in 2013. The unlimited presidential executive powers (section 110-111 of the Zimbabwean Constitution Amendment No. 20, Act, 2013) have been abused to decimate the opposition political parties, mass movements, and CSO. The epilogue shall discuss the dilemmas in opposition political parties in the Zimbabwean electorate.



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CHAPTER FOUR

Structural Polarization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe



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*"The ZANU axe must continue to fall
upon the necks of the rebels when
we find it no longer possible to
persuade them into the harmony that
binds us all." (Mair and Sithole 2002:*

22)

4.0 Introduction

For the previous four decades after independence in 1980, Zimbabwe failed to translate into intended electoral democratic principles, with ZANU-PF in power.

⁹⁴Several explanations about ZANU-PF's authoritarianism are detailed from Mugabe's 1980s failed one-party socialist state agenda. Hence, "All legitimate organizations were challenged to join the ruling party ZANU-PF proving their revolutionary and patriotic commitment" (Moyo, 1992; 1993). It involves incorporating the regional factional political parties and Civil Society Organizations that evolved during the second liberation struggle. One author noted that a "... coalition of political and military elites stands ready and willing to employ violence to execute the Machiavellian vision of President Robert Mugabe and perpetuate his control of the state⁹⁵." In this regard, Mugabe's administration centralized state institutions, including the media, legal, security, and electoral institutions (Masunungure, 2009).

However, the 2017 post-coup administration under Mnangagwa gave room for political debate and freedom of speech with remaining centralized state institutions (see, for example, Southall, 2018). Mugabe's last days in the Presidential office either eliminated or suspended ZANU-PF party members, thereby escalating elite power-sharing⁹⁶⁹⁷ conflicts (Beardsworthy *et al.*, 2019). The fourth decade found two

⁹⁴ See, for example, Makumbe and Compagnon, (2000) and Moyo, (2018).

⁹⁵ See, for example, Masunungure's (2011: 47) examination of militarized electoral institutions in Zimbabwe

⁹⁶The power sharing conflicts in Zimbabwe were marked by the ZANU-PF two factional camps, the Lacoste party under Mnangagwa and G-40 party under Grace Mugabe jostling to succeed Mugabe.

⁹⁷ The elite power-sharing conflicts resulted in the 2017 military coup that disposed of Mugabe. Other scholars and SADC members argued that it was not a coup, but a constitutional bound process resignation of Mugabe from power, which found Mnangagwa ascending to power.

competing ZANU-PF factions of G-40 under Grace Mugabe and Lacoste under Mnangagwa, leading to the 2017 expulsion of Mnangagwa from the ZANU-PF party, prompting him to flee from the country for security reasons. Thus, this resulted in Jo'burg's orchestration of Operation Restore Legacy under the command and directives of Chiwenga, disposing of nonagenarian Mugabe through a palace coup, which found Mnangagwa ascending as designated President (Southall, 2018; Nyarota, 2018; Rodgers, 2019). Moyo termed this period of 2017 post-coup as an arrested democratic transition and another Machiavellian moment with Mnangagwa in power (Moyo, 2018; SAPES-Trust, May 2021). Clearly, Mnangagwa is drinking from the Machiavellian authoritarian chalice of his predecessor, involving state-engineered restrictions and repression continuity against the mass and opposition political parties (ibid).



Therefore, this chapter examines the realities surrounding polarization in post-independence Zimbabwe. Literature in Zimbabwe analyzed polarization to have been engineered and influenced by the elite, mass, media, and social movement groups (McCandles, 2011; Mungwari, 2017; LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Hence, Zimbabwean polarization was driven by ethnic, ideological, societal, and political conflicts (ibid). In appreciation of the myths and realities of polarization, this chapter examined both the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations based on a fresh perspective of structural polarization and bureaucratic authoritarianism post-independence Zimbabwe. Polarization is a multifaceted phenomenon that found different interpretations by academic researchers in demystifying one country's myths and realities. Although there is literature inconsistency on polarization in Zimbabwe, the research did not dismiss other scholarly interpretations.

There are polarization myths to examine and offer an interpretation of the reality of state polarization. The phenomenon of Zimbabwean post-independence polarization is clearly understood by examining the roots of the conflicts asserting the reality of polarization. Hence, the research chapter focused on interpreting the reality of Zimbabwean polarization based on bureaucratic authoritarianism –institutional and party-structured polarization.

4.1 Myths and realities of polarization in Zimbabwe's post-independence

As highlighted in the preceding chapter and introduction, there are myths and realities of polarization, which literature can give different interpretations of the same phenomenon. Fiorina *et al.* (2005) offered a detailed study of American polarization by tracing the 19th-century emanation of the Republican and Democratic parties' conflicts from the perspective of ideological and sociological roots (see also Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). The notion of ideological and sociological conflicts in America have been indicated in policy and law-making (see Schumpeter, 1967: 629). However, Fiorina *et al.* (2005) disputed the degree of political polarization on ideological grounds as a myth. Besides America, Slater and Arugay (2018) argued that the four Asian nation's⁹⁸ polarization is detailed in institutional Machiavellian and Madisonian conflicts.

Nevertheless, there are polarity myths and realities from ideological and societal perspectives. This chapter, therefore, will not dismiss the realities and myths of polarization in Zimbabwe by other scholars, although I intend to interpret this phenomenon from a fresh perspective of structural polarization (see, for example, LeBas, 2006; McCandles, 2011, Mungwari 2017; LeBas and Munemo 2019).

⁹⁸ The Asian nations include Indonesia, Taiwan, Turkey, and Thailand.

Phenomenology's social aspect entails that reality is built from a comparative analysis of facts from history and observations (Walsh, 1997).

It is important to note that the ruling party ZANU-PF's centrality of state institutions necessitated bureaucratic authoritarianism, leading to fraudulent elections, corruption, human rights abuses, and promulgation of restrictive laws (interviews notes January 2022). Given this observation, the 1980 post-independence Zimbabwean socio-economic and political context involved a centralized socialist ideological oriented party structure system of governance under both Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations (Southall, 2015; 2018). Consequently, this led to limited space for contributions by opposition political parties and Civil Society Organizations in both policy and law-making, which historically have been ZANU-PF's survival strategic tools for decades (Magure 2014; Moyo 2014).

Therefore, the exemption of key informants in the policy formulation process resulted in inconsistent policy formulation, including the 2013 ZIMASSET, which was termed the worst blueprint/policy ever (see Saul and Saunders, 2005; Besada and Moyo, 2008; Magure, 2009; Muchadenyika, 2017). Hence, the Zimbabwean political context aligns with Groucho Max's definition of politics: "The art of looking for trouble, finding whether it exists or not, diagnosing incorrectly and applying wrong remedies" (Spring, 1944: 31).

The phenomenon of authoritarian governance origins in the post-independence Zimbabwean political context is arguably rooted in the white settler's governance structure, liberation culture, and African nationalism ideology (see Masunungure, 2009; 2011; Mamvura, 2020). The three factors mentioned earlier have shaped and influenced the politics of Zimbabwe over the years, following the centralization of

state institutions, the promulgation of stringent laws, and undesired policy formulation (Interview notes January 2022). It is justified in authoritarian literature that the global authoritarian regime's longevity in power hinges on repression and restrictions against opposition political parties and the mass (Wintrobe, 1998; Slovik, 2012; Tanneburg, 2020). Magure maintained that similar to the 1960 Rhodesian government's Law and Order Maintenance Act, ZANU-PF promulgated the 1982 Emergency Powers Act, typical of the colonial settler's authoritarian legal instruments. The 1982 Act provided a legal basis for the 5th Brigade and other security forces deployment in Matabeleland 1980s civil war (see Magure 2009: 120-21).

It is important to clearly understand the term bureaucratic authoritarianism, as used in this study. Bureaucratic authoritarianism politics is characterized by the elite centralization of the government powers maintaining the status quo, technocratic decision-making, rejection of political plurality, repression of political dissidents, and unlimited executive authority (Heiss, 2017: 1-3). Guillermo O'Donnell examined Brazil's rapid industrialization and civil-military dictatorship in coming up with the bureaucratic authoritarianism concept⁹⁹. For example, in Brazil's 1964 post-coup period, the country advanced to a militarized state capture in electoral and judicial politics and economic development. Political and civil liberties were constrained through political repression and restriction. Further, the labor unions were decimated to represent the working class -a typical oligarchic state.

Accordingly, industrial modernization marked a shift in authoritarian political studies, in which scholars, in an attempt to offer explanations, used the political-economic

⁹⁹ O'Donnell, G. (1973). *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.

model¹⁰⁰. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF party's role in centralizing state institutions, military state capture, subverting the rule of law and constitutionalism, and unlimited executive authority is typical of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. There is still complexity in the Zimbabwean militarized state capture¹⁰¹. Nonetheless, the military advancement in Zimbabwean electoral politics and economic development is seemingly the post-independence pristine state, with increasing elite security and stability while decimating the political and civil liberties (see, for example, Masunungure, 2011).

The states, including Spain and Portugal, have seen varied military advancements in state politics leading to democratic breakdown (Collier, 1979). A different case altogether, most African countries inherited the colonial archetype authoritarian system of government, which they further intensified during the creation of revolutionary parties' ideological institutionalized bureaucracies. According to the modernization theory, socioeconomic development increases the chances of political democracy –bureaucratic authoritarian breakdown¹⁰². However, social modernization might destabilize institutional stability and have a higher chance of threatening democracy (Heiss, 2017). Hence, these features of rapid industrialization probably led to bureaucratic authoritarianism in Brazil, Argentina, Chile¹⁰³, and Uruguay. Similarly, South Africa, under the Apartheid regime, developed a capitalist economic system with authoritarian elements of repression and restrictions (Wintrobe, 1998). Thus, bureaucratic authoritarianism is marked by capitalist economic structure,

¹⁰⁰ Collier, D. (1979). Overview of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model: In the new authoritarianism in Latin America, edited by David Collier, 19-32. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Mungwari (2021), on the phenomenon of Zimbabwean state capture,

¹⁰² (ibid)

¹⁰³ Shu-Yun Ma, (1999). The Rise and Fall of Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism in Chile: Studies in Comparative International Development. Pp. 51-65

centralization of state institutions, political repression and restriction, and the rule of law and constitutionalism subversion (Collier, 1979).

Furthermore, I will analyze the relationship between structural polarization and bureaucratic authoritarianism to unveil the reality of Zimbabwean polarization and electoral politics' nexus. The term structural polarization is related to Slater and Arugay's (2018) concept of Machiavellian and Madisonian intra-state conflicts in both authoritarian and democratic states¹⁰⁴. In this regard, the late academic scholar Sithole Masipula termed Mugabe a Machiavellian prince following his cunningness, boldness, and politics of authoritarian repression (see, for example, Magure 2009). The 2017 post-coup in Zimbabwe electoral politics was analyzed by a renowned scholar as an arrested or blocked democratic transition with Mnangagwa in power (Moyo, 2018).



In support of the above, the scholarly views concur in the academic literature regarding authoritarian continuity from Mugabe to Mnangagwa administration that "It is Mugabeism without Mugabe"¹⁰⁵ and another 'Machiavellian moment' (Melber 2017; Maromo 2017). A clear indication is that ZANU-PF's coalesced elite allies and the military are standing ready to defend and protect the authoritarian regime against democratic pressure from opposition political parties, CSO, and mass movements or uprisings.

¹⁰⁴ The Madisonian conflicts are constitutionally oriented and moderate, following the executive power checks and balances for accountability and transparency purposes. The notion goes into the doctrine of separation of powers which has not materialized in modern state politics. The Machiavellian conflicts opposed to Madisonian conflicts are pernicious; following executive abuse of power mostly in authoritarian regimes (see also Slater, 2013).

¹⁰⁵ See for example, Southall, 2018.

Given the assumptions of bureaucratic authoritarianism and structural polarization, the Zimbabwean socio-economic and political system is characterized by executive abuse of power, following human rights abuses, corruption, and electoral manipulation (see, for example, Masunungure, 2011). The Zimbabwean post-independence intra-state conflicts were extreme or pernicious among political parties', leading to elite-engineered political repression and restrictions typical of an authoritarian governance system¹⁰⁶ (ibid).

Therefore, the first and the third decades after independence were laced with extreme polarization, following elite-engineered driven violence enforced by the securocrats of the military, police, and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) (Sachikonye, 2009; 2017; HStvLive, July 2021). The same Modulus Operandi, which operated in the 1980s, is still administering violence in the electorate, decimating the mass and opposition political parties' uprisings/demonstrations (interview notes January 2022). Hence, the sharp group divides among political parties' and societies in post-independence of Zimbabwe facilitated an elite-engineered illiberal or stealth authoritarian practice¹⁰⁷, thereby decimating opposition forces and subverting the rule of law and constitutionalism.

It is crucial to note that the mass and elite conflicts within the Zimbabwean political context have a historic origin dated from the pre-colonial period, which I intend to focus on in the post-independence era in this chapter. However, the pre-colonial and colonial events will be mentioned in passing, assessing their relations to the post-colonial period polarization. In this regard, the post-colonial period academic literature examined and characterized the first decade of independence as an ethnic

¹⁰⁶ The authoritarian politics is characterized by repression and restrictions dealing with intra-state authoritarian power control conflicts (see, for example, Wintrobe 1998; Slovik 2012).

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, Ozan 2015.

polarization between the Ndebele and Shona-speaking people (Siziba and Hill, 2018; LeBas and Munemo, 2019).

Scholars implied that typologically adjudication of polarization requires an in-depth examination of the polarity root cause (Fiorina *et al.*, 2005). In this case, Carothers and O'Donohue (2020) traced the roots, trajectories, consequences, typologies, and attendant remedial action in five Asian nations to justify the myths and realities of polarization. Thus, although interpreted differently, this particular aspect of polarization requires a historical origin of the phenomenon on the myths and reality justification. As previously indicated, I intend to offer an interpretive view from a fresh perspective of both institutional and party-structured polarization in Zimbabwe.

From the above, the American ideological conflict between the Democrats and Republicans was traced from the 19th century justifying evidence of myths and realities of polarization. Fiorina *et al.* (2005) argument is based on the American polarization ideological and sociological perspective. Hence, there is a need to weigh historical facts and observations to reach a consensus on the roots and typologies of the polarization phenomenon. In this regard, LeBas and Munemo (2019) contributed to polarization literature in Zimbabwe from a perspective of ethnic and societal polarization typologies, two main polarity phases.

However, there is still an academic lacuna evolving from the roots emanation of polarization, which was unjustified in their research (ibid). The case may be that the conflicts within the first decade are probably rooted in ethnic and societal group structures. The observation concurs with the historic ethnic conflicts origins in pre-colonial Ndebele-Shona relations and 1960s revolutionary parties' factional battles (Msindo, 2012; Moore, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020). Given the

background from existing literature, the 1980s period may be attributed to an elite state-engineered polarization fueled and influenced by ethnic group rivals between Shona and Ndebele military fronts of ZIPRA and ZANLA forces (Moyo, 1992; Southall, 2016). Commenting on the Zimbabwean militarized elite-led polarization, academic literature revealed that;

Mugabe and his army generals (including Shiri, Mnangagwa, and Sekeramai) were responsible for the bloodshed and intensification of the enmity between the Shona and Ndebele-speaking people¹⁰⁸. The mission (Gukurahundi massacre or rain that clears the chaff) involved inhuman activities of torture, rape, and murder of innocent people, including children and pregnant women^{[109] [110]} (in which pregnant women's stomachs were ripped open¹¹¹). ZANU-PF is a bloodthirsty party in which, in every decade as Zimbabweans, we have seen and experienced militarized bloodshed under Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations during elections and mass uprisings/demonstrations. We thought that the only enemy of ZANU-PF was ZAPU, but it seems the tribal Shona conflicts of the odds are still an inherent feature of the

Politics in post-independence Zimbabwe is in line with Mao Zedong's definition of politics of war without bloodshed, and war is politics with bloodshed (Carl von Clausewitz 1949: 121; PFLP, 1968; Adie, 1972). The inevitability of a civil war in the 1980s was due to revolutionary fronts ZANLA and ZIPRA military capabilities and

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, Makumbe and Masipula's 1997 article.

¹⁰⁹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, (CCJPZ)., and Legal Resources Foundation Zimbabwe (LRFZ), (1997). Breaking the silence, building true peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980 to 1988. Harare, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe.

¹¹⁰ See Magure's 2009 thesis on Civil society's quest for democracy in Zimbabwe: Origins, barriers and prospects, 1900-2008

¹¹¹ See, for example, Meredith 2009.

ethnic-based conflicts (Ranger, 2004; Sithole, 1979). Furthermore, it involved the arms cache in one of the ZAPU's farms which Nkomo and his accomplices intended to overthrow the ruling government ZANU under Mugabe. As Meredith (2009) stated, Nkomo was disappointed with the 1980 election outcome in favor of ZANU resolved under a post-election parliamentary coalition including political parties of CAZ, ZAPU, ZANU, and UANC¹¹² (see, for example, Moyo, 1992). Mugabe likened Nkomo's role in the Cabinet to "A cobra in the house" and went on, "The only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head" (Sithole and Makumbe 1997).

Similar to one of the greatest hits, Chimurenga songs by Thomas Mapfumo in 1984, which goes, in Shona, "Mwana venyoka inyoka, votorova musoro. In English, "The child of a serpent is a serpent; the only way to deal with it is to strike its head. Never play with the enemy" (Mapfumo 1984). Immensely and vigorously supported by his close friends and allies Mnangagwa, Nkala, and Tekere;

"Who were spoiling for a fight and, with utter recklessness, openly talked of the need to crush ZAPU?" Nkala, himself a Ndebele, claimed that the deserters were "Ndebele's who were calling for a second war of liberation" and said they should be "shot down." He called Nkomo a "self-appointed Ndebele king" who needed to be "crushed." Tekere went further: "Nkomo and his guerrillas are germs in the country's wounds and will have to be cleaned with iodine. The patient will have to scream a bit." Mugabe did not attempt to distance himself from these remarks. To ZANU and

¹¹² Conservative Alliance in Zimbabwe (CAZ) was a white settlers party that had 20 reserved parliamentary seats, ZAPU won 20 seats, UANC won 3 seats, and ZANU had a majority of 57 seats (see Sithole and Makumbe 1997)

ZIPRA alike, it appeared that Mugabe was bent on provoking a showdown (Meredith, 2009: 77)

Tied to the above, in 1981, Mugabe embarked on training an authoritarian typical special militia known as the 5th brigade, in which he hired 106¹¹³ North Korean trainers (Masunungure, 2009; 2011; LeBas and Munemo, 2019). Mugabe's history proved he had a strong religious background, and he quoted scriptures to give a true reflection of circumstances. In responding to Nkomo's conspiracies, Mugabe said in a 1982 parliamentary speech, "Some measures we shall take... will be extra-legal. An eye for an eye and an ear for an ear may not be adequate in our circumstances. We might very well demand two ears for one ear and two eyes for one eye" (Meredith, 2009). Although he may have quoted Isaiah 2 verse 4b in 1980 speaking of peace, multiple clashes between the revolutionary military fronts and Nkomo's underworking were unforgivable and inevitable for a civil war (see Gusha, 2019). One interviewee noted that war was unavoidable, and peace was anathema in the 1980s. Similarly, scholars are of the view that;

After the liberation struggle in 1980, the ZIPRA forces continued with their sneaking games attacking ZANLA forces. On one occasion, certain white tourists were murdered in Matabeleland by the ZIPRA forces¹¹⁴. Hence, the 5th brigade's involvement in Matabeleland was justifiable considering the dangers posed by the Matabeleland revolutionary front dissidents¹¹⁵. We can all agree that it went to the extremes because that happens when there is war. The Matabeleland resisted

¹¹³ See, for example, Meredith 2009.

¹¹⁴ See literature by Kenneth Good; Meredith 2009

¹¹⁵ Ndlovu-Gatsheni (--) The post-colonial state and Matabeleland: Regional perceptions of civil-military relations, 1980-2002.

obliging with the terms of the liberation arms surrendering policy. It was a war after a protracted war, and we cannot deny that fact. Nkomo was deeply involved in the marionette role between the white settlers and the ruling party leading to failed assassination attempts on Mugabe during the first years of his Prime Ministerial post¹¹⁶

Gusha (2019) used the Cue Dependency theory to examine how Mugabe distanced himself from the peaceful analogue of 1980, following the scripture he quoted from the book of Isaiah 2 verse 4b¹¹⁷. Machiavelli's literature of 'The Prince,' similar to Sophist's literature, noted that leaders should embrace a deceiving and cunning character (Bondanella and Musa, 1979; Kerferd, 1981). Hence, Mugabe quoted the scripture as a pretense of peace. Typical of the Rwandan genocide, the 1980 ethnic conflict claimed an estimated 20 000 Ndebele ethnic people, including men, women, and children (CCJPZ and LRF, 1997). In this regard, most respondents termed the Gukurahundi (the rain that clears the chaff) a necessary evil that went to the extremes and outlived its purpose, similar yet not identical to the Reign of Terror in France under the command of Maximilian Robespierre¹¹⁸.

From the above, Mugabe termed it "A moment of madness," however; he successfully dealt with the authoritarian problem of elite power-sharing¹¹⁹ intra-party (post-1980 coalition government) structural conflicts (Maedza, 2019). To date, there are elements of affective polarization (love and favoritism for ingroup members while

¹¹⁶ See, for example, Meredith 2009.

¹¹⁷ "... and they will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not lift up a sword against nation, and never again will they learn war" (Isaiah 2 verse 4B adapted from Amplified Version Bible: King James Version Bible)

¹¹⁸ Maximilian Robespierre was the leader of the National Conventional government during the 1790s course of the French revolution

¹¹⁹ See Slovik (2012), on the authoritarian problems of power-sharing and power-control

portraying hatred or animosity for outgroup members¹²⁰) among the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups regarding the wounds inflicted during the 1980s Gukurahundi mission in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands. These conflicts were characterized by linguistic and ethnical societal identity –geo-politics between the Ndebele and the Shona-speaking people.


Wintrobe (1988) examined that dictators will always imitate other dictators by looking at the history of the global authoritarian structural governance system, for example, Rome under Julius Cesar, France under Napoleon Bonaparte, Germany under Adolf Hitler, and Italy under Benito Mussolini. Mugabe, in 2003, said, 'I will be Hitler tenfold,' however, the black Hitler was given birth in the 1980s Matabeleland wars (Meredith, 2009). Hence, authoritarian longevity is based on autocratic management of threats from either the mass or among the elite allies (Slovik, 2012; Tanneburg, 2020). The Zimbabwean 1980s parliamentary coalition posed power-sharing threats against Mugabe's regime in the first seven years of his leadership (Masunungure, 2020).

However, after a protracted post-colonial civil war in 1987, all the parliamentary seats, including the white settler's 20 seats, were dissolved in the unit government (Unit Accord) of ZAPU and ZANU. This resulted in the formation of a seeming *de facto one-party* state under the leadership of Mugabe (Mpofu, 2021). The 1987 unit government marked a ZANU-PF party structural crisis union of distinct ethnic structural parties of ZANU under Mugabe and ZAPU under Nkomo. To avoid future intra- and inter- ZANU-PF party crises in the post-1987 Unit Accord, the party

¹²⁰ Gidron et al. (2020) examined affective polarization and elements of opinion polarization in multi-media platforms.

influenced the state institutions structures with a composite structure party ideology of liberation culture, African nationalism, and white settler bureaucratic governance structure.

In line with the above, Satori (1976) analyzed the four-phase typologies of dominant parties in the order of "dominant-authoritarianism, pulverized, non-dominant, and dominant." I intend to examine Satori's system of government in regard to the post-independence Zimbabwean government structure. Similarly, Southall (2015) analyzed a shift from dominant parties to competitive authoritarian regimes by looking at Zimbabwe and South Africa¹²¹. In 1987 Zimbabwe adopted a typical authoritarian party constitution, which rested unlimited executive powers on the President and dissolved the parliamentary seats, thereby creating a dominant-authoritarian party structure (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997; Compagnon and Makumbe, 2000).



A call for government structural reforms was mainly from student movement groups and the Zimbabwe Unity Movement opposition party (ZUM) under Edgar Tekere (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010). Tekere was a former ZANU-PF secretary who formed the first opposition party in 1988, 6 months after the 1987 Unit government. However, ZUM political party members, including Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, former detained ZAPU loyal members, faced more than detention, including threats on their lives (see, for example, Moyo, 1992). Makumbe and Sithole (1997) termed the 1990s period as the worst decade following the shooting of Patrick Kombayi, who challenged Muzenda in the electorate Gweru constituency. In

¹²¹ See, for example, Ferim's (2013) examination of South Africa and Cameroon's competitive authoritarianism

addition, the ZANU-PF party intimidated ZUM leaders and supporters through radio and TV campaigns. In their campaign message, they were noted saying;

"People must not listen to petty little ants which we can crush. In which white settlers were warned for their campaigning to vote for ZUM. ZANU PF insisted that if whites in Zimbabwe wanted to rear their ugly terrorism and racist head by collaborating with ZUM, they were going to chop their head off. Television and radio broadcasting advertising campaigns were marred with intimidation and horrendous scenes. One of the adverts pictured the crushing of glass and metal in a car accident, followed by a voice warning coldly. This is one way to die. Another is to vote for ZUM. Do not commit suicide. Vote ZANU PF and live. The other advertisement showed that death was the final penalty for voting in favor of ZUM. Voting for ZANU PF was the only ultimate way to live; the video further showed a coffin being lowered into the grave with a warning, AIDS's kill. So does ZUM, Vote ZANU PF". (Magure, 2010: 129;

Moyo, 1992: 75; Meredith 2009, 81)

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Supporting the above statement, one author noted, "If we vote for ZUM, there will be war... Even though we are poor and the Government is corrupt, it is better to be oppressed than to have another war" (Laakso, 2003: 125). Similarly, the ZANU-PF party promised people bullets in the 2008 harmonized elections, which they were noted saying that we have enough 'bullets' for each of you (Dorman, 2005: 6; Makumbe, 2009; Masunungure, 2014). Although scholars contend that election is a risky business in authoritarian regimes, it is a different case with Zimbabwean electoral politics, which found ZANU-PF electoral dominance despite multiple elections (Lucan and Way, 2010). From post-independence 1980, Mugabe secured

the Machiavellian manuscripts never to slip through his hands, as he strongly depended or relied on his book *The Prince*, employing either carrots or sticks.

It proved beyond reasonable doubt that Zimbabwe's electoral politics from 1980 have been "The product of the gun, in which the gun and the ballot remained inseparable twins, following that the former became the security guarantor of the latter," detailed in one of Mugabe's speeches (Magure, 2010; Meredith 2009). In 2002, Mugabe further said, "The country won by a barrel of a gun cannot be simply taken by a paper and pen, via the ballot" (Wilems, 2012). The militarized electoral violence root in Zimbabwe's electoral politics is a historical feature and reality of the first decade of independence from 1980 to 1987. However, elections from 2000 to 2008 were characterized by both restrictions and violence (Gwekwerere, 2018). Professor Jonathan Moyo was among the ZANU-PF's party master strategists involved in promulgating the 2002 AIPPA, POSA, and the 2003 Political Parties Financial Act, decimating the opposition political parties and Civil Society Organizations movement (Sachikonye, 2004; Miles-Tendi, 2010). In commenting on the 2008 harmonized elections, one interviewee noted that;

Is the deployment of soldiers even necessary during elections? It is like ZANU-PF is ready for war in the advent of an election. We all need peace, not war. Most people, especially in our rural communities, ended up voting for ZANU-PF, where we do not have options regarding elections¹²². Sometimes, we are reminded of the 2008 post-elections when people were tortured and murdered¹²³. We are not cowards. We are


¹²² See the article by Laakso 2003

¹²³ See also Masunungure 2011 on militarized electoral institutions in Zimbabwe

doing this (voting for ZANU-PF) for the greater good of our families and community at large to live in peace (Interview with Mr. Mao Desmond T., January 2022).

Similarly, one of the respondents who happened to be among the unfortunate post-2008 harmonized elections electoral violence stated that;

As constituted in the constitution, the party ZANU-PF trod upon the right to vote freely. If I was asked whom I voted for after casting a vote, then my vote was not confidential. I could not deny that I voted for MDC-T with a cocked gun pointing between my eyes (on my forehead). They had a list of MDC-T names and conducted door-to-door night abductions¹²⁴. People were tortured during ZANU-PF's youth night vigils as if that was enough. They were ruthless, as some people lost their lives, mostly aftermath of the torture¹²⁵. Before the post-2008 electoral violence, the ZANU-PF meetings attendance register was used to identify opposition supporters in which families turned against family and relatives against relatives (Interview with Mr. Peter Daya January 2022)



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In this regard, the 2008 post-electoral period involved militarized abductions and violence against the MDC-T party supporters and activists (Masunungure, 2009). These abductions mainly happened in rural areas, encompassing three-quarters of the Zimbabwean population and most registered voters. Sachikonye (2017) examined that the securocrats from the military, police, and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) were deployed all over the country with the aid of youth gangs mainly meant to conduct night abductions (see, for example, Hodzi, 2014).

¹²⁴ (ibid)

¹²⁵ (ibid)

Comprehensive interview notes noted that the 2008 post-elections were similar to the second Chimurenga period, resulting in the establishment of secret military bases. It was another turning point in electoral politics, following War Veterans and ZANU-PF ministers, including Didymus Mutasa of Manicaland, on the frontline of securing Mugabe's Presidency¹²⁶ (Interview notes January 2022). This was due to the stalemate in the 2008 elections, which found no winner, although MDC had the majority electoral votes (Makumbe, 2009; Moore, 2014; Southall, 2015). In this regard, the Electoral Act had quibble issues, including the First Past the Post (FPTP) and the winner must take all, which could not provide the basis for MDC-T to ascent into the Presidential office (Electoral Act of Zimbabwe, 2: 13; Lenington, 2013).


With this in place, a 2008 re-run election was set to run between the two main political parties MDC-T with 47,9% and ZANU-PF with 43,2%, in which both parties had majority votes (McCandles, 2011: 192; Southall and Slabert, 2013). The humiliation defeat of ZANU-PF alarmed the elite allies to remind people that voting in favor of Tsvangirai's MDC party was an act of war¹²⁷; through a post-election state modus operandi 'operation, how did you vote' in Shona' Makavhotera Papi' (see, for example, Mandaza, 2015). ZANU-PF elites, including the War Veterans and military, were ready for another liberation struggle, with the war songs and military trucks patrolling all over the country and secret military bases establishment (Interview notes January 2022). Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the re-run elections, which

¹²⁶ It is believed that Mnangagwa was part of the 2008 securocrats electoral violence and rigging, who orchestrated the ZANU-PF Road map electoral strategy. He even went on further to force Mugabe not to resign after the President considered electoral defeat (see, for example, SAPES Trust presentation by Ibbo Mandaza 2021)

¹²⁷ The habitus theory succinctly points out that there are certain habits that cannot easily forget or maybe can be resurfaced due to prevailing conditions (see, for example, Swartz, 1997). The 2008 elections were a humiliation to ZANU-PF members, defeated by the ballot, which they used ZANU-PF militarized guns culture to remain in power.

Mugabe won with 85, 5%, following electoral violence and intimidation, which found an estimated 100 people dead and over 100 000 displaced (see Sachikonye, 2009).

Tied to the above, the 21st-century electoral politics marked deep societal divides of us versus them -elite-led partisan polarization, favoring members of the ingroup ruling party ZANU-PF, portraying animosity attitudes towards the outgroup members of MDC-T¹²⁸. Similarly, the social identity theory denotes that people identify with a particular group based on ideology, policy, and ethnic-societal background. In the post-2008 elections, intra-state conflicts were characterized by the mindset of party membership and identity, leading to hatred and animosity against outgroup members¹²⁹.



A unique case scenario in Zimbabwean electoral politics emerged in 2005, urbanized Operation Murambatsvina or Slum Clearance. Bratton and Masunungure (2007) argued that the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (Move the rubbish) or Slum Clearance was meant to stifle economic and political activities in urban areas through a state-sponsored campaign. The primary victims were young unemployed families who were pressured to migrate to rural areas following illegal urban structure demolition (interview notes January 2022). Since urban areas proved to be MDC's strongholds for political campaigns and electoral outcomes, ZANU-PF temporarily destabilized urban activities. As a result, hundreds of thousands of urban shanty dwellers' were forced to evict and migrate to rural areas.

¹²⁸ ZANU-PF ruling party utilized the securocrats for violence and intimidation against the opposition political parties' leaders and supporters (affective polarization animosity behavior towards outgroup members).

¹²⁹ LeBas and Munemo, (2019) asserted the 2000 to 2009 polarization to a societal polarization characterized by extreme divisions of us versus them mentality.

Nevertheless, Mugabe's state modulus Operandi urban repression failed as MDC continuously dominated the metropolitan area's electoral outcomes (The New Humanitarian, 2014). Similarly, during Mnangagwa's administration in 2021, there was an operation demolition of illegal properties. The urban housing demolished 190 households in Budiro 5, Chitungwiza estimated 11, 000, and other Harare suburbs, enforced under National Housing Minister Garwe (All Africa News, January 2021). The 2021 operation culminated after the international community and CSO pressure on the Mnangagwa regime's human rights abuses (Aljazeera, January 2021).

There is a significant role played by Russian Black Knights in authoritarian regimes' electoral politics, involving bolstering electoral outcomes in succoring presiding incumbents (Graeme, 2016). Similarly, the Zimbabwean 2013 harmonized elections were meddled with by a ZANU-PF-hired Israeli company, Nikuv (see Magure, 2014; Masunungure, 2014). Magure maintains that elections in Zimbabwe are either by hook or crook, which concurs with the literature that they are either by coercion or consent (see also Moore, 2014). In this regard, elections in Zimbabwe are either stolen or a menu of manipulation that guarantees ZANU-PF's electoral victory (Schedler, 2002; Dorman, 2005; Makumbe, 2009; Raftopoulos, 2013; Moyo, 2019). On the other hand, the ZANU-PF party agents' influence on electoral state institutions necessitated a safe passage for electoral rigging in Zimbabwe besides the involvement of the Black nights.

From the above, ZANU-PF's blended elements of democratic and non-democratic political practices,' involving authoritarianism and populism rhetoric, have stabilized the regime (see Robinson and Mine 2017: 413-422; Magure, 2014). In this regard, the ZANU-PF party used popular nationalism and liberation culture of socialist

ideology in their electoral campaign through speeches and songs for the party's image-building and popularity across the country (Meredith, 2009; Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010; Munhuweyi, 2022).

However, ZANU-PF's unpopularity in the 21st century necessitated executive abuse of power (interview notes January 2022). This involves electoral violence, intimidation, and further promulgating restrictive laws (Magure, 2010). The same goes for crafting policies, including the IEEP, LEP, and ZIMASSET. ZANU-PF utilized the IEEP to manipulate the majority of youths to garner their support in the 2013 elections, besides Nikuv's (Israeli company) maneuvers (Magure, 2012; 2014; Hodzi, 2014). Mnangagwa, in 2017 post-coup, made similar strides to that of Mugabe when he promulgated a democratic policy, 'Zimbabwe is Open for Business,' and further invited the international electoral observers to oversee the 2018 harmonized elections. However, the 2018 electoral irregularities, and the reluctance of global investors, are arguably due to ZANU-PF's authoritarian continuity (see, for example, Mungwari, 2021).

4. 2 The economy under ZANU-PF party's authoritarianism

Authoritarian regimes do not operate in a vacuum; they entirely depend on economic resources to finance their leadership for elite security and stability (Wintrobe, 1998). In this regard, authoritarian regimes globally are seemingly drifting into a state capture phenomenon, with centralized state institutions and an elite few controlling the socio-economic and political aspects of the state. The above notion resonates with the bureaucratic authoritarian proponents (see, for example, O'Donnell, 1973). In this regard, the authoritarian regimes' private business people are further incorporated into the first-class citizens' elite allies (Slovik. 2012). The economics of

the authoritarian regimes is henceforth characterized by patronage and nepotism for regime securing and stability, with a typical command economy market structure. As a result, the public sector accountability and constitutional transparency initiatives are subverted, promoting corruption and illicit business operation.

From the above, Wintrobe (1988) made a substantive contribution to authoritarian literature, differentiating tinpots, timocracy, totalitarianism, and tyranny¹³⁰. In this regard, Wintrobe brought in the economic aspect of authoritarian regimes, which I intend to examine in particular reference to Zimbabwe's political economy. Wintrobe's opinion is that a dictatorial system of governance tends to be more corrupt than in democratic states¹³¹ (ibid). This scenario is similar to the economies under bureaucratic authoritarian regimes.



From post-independence, the Zimbabwean political economy was marked by public elite officials' led corruption following the ZISCO steel, ZESA bill, ZBC, and PSMAS scandals (Bond and Manyanya, 2002; Meredith, 2005; Hammer, 2008). Thomas Mapfumo, one of the famous Zimbabwean musical figures, responded to post-independence public corruption in a song entitled 'corruption in our society of 1990. Part of the lyric texts goes 'something for something, nothing for nothing, corruption in our society' (Mapfumo, 1990). In support of the above, Desmond Tutu examined that "The country that used to be the breadbasket of Africa has become the basket case itself" (available on YouTube CNN, September 2009). Besides the Fast Track Land Reform Program, corruption and inconsistent policy formulation contributed to

¹³⁰ Wintrobe analyzed the authoritarian problems in terms of authoritarian dilemmas are best understood in the use of repression, which varies from one authoritarian regime to another (Wintrobe, 1990; 1998).

¹³¹(ibid)

an economic crisis in Zimbabwe (see, for example, Hanke, 2009; York, 2009; Godwin, 2011).

Furthermore, Gramsci's theory supports that civil society acts as a barricade against hegemonic authority as he argued, "Between the economic structure and state with its legislation and coercion stand civil society" (Gramsci, 1971; 263). As detailed in one of the Catholic Bishop's letters of 2007 quoting scripture from Isaiah 21: 11, "Watchman, how long the night," was strongly speaking of the gross unconventional prevailing socio-economic and political Zimbabwean environment (Meredith, 2009). In this regard, the period from 2000 to 2009 involved a high rate of unemployment, hyperinflation, human rights abuses, illegitimate elections, and poverty (see, for example, Harold-Barry, 2004; Bourne, 2011).



From the above, the CCJPZ in the 1980s made similar strides in confronting the government over prolonged human rights abuses, including wanton killings, torture, and rape from 1983 to 1987 during the Matabeleland massacre (Holmes and Orner, 2011). In August 2020, the Catholic Bishop's letter to Mnangagwa on the letterhead was detailed, "Is this the Zimbabwe we want," rallying behind the harsh tag, 'Zimbabwe lives matter.' The 2017 post-coup period involved a high unemployment rate, inflation, corruption, and human rights abuses (Aljazeera News, July 2020). Mapfumo and Mtukudzi responded to the 2000 era of hyperinflation and unemployment in their 2000 music albums.

Mapfumo's song goes

In Shona, "Ndiyo nyika yamaichemra zvino yaita mamvemve, Chipa bereka mwana tiende."


In English, "The country we used to cry for is now in tatters Chipo, carry the baby on your back and let us get out here" (Thomas Mapfumo in the song Mamvemve, 2000)

Similar to Mtukudzi's song, which goes;

In Shona, "Bvuma Kuchembera... kuchembera mucherekedzo wenguva yakareba... hauchagoni vachemera"

In English, "You are over the peak; you cannot do what you used to do; you are old"

(Oliver Mtukudzi in the song Wasakara, 2000)



In this regard, music is either used as "A form of protest or praise" to the political parties, which can shift regarding time and the prevailing socio-economic and political environment (see Onyebadi, 2018; Mthathiwa, 2020). Their music is similar to "Fela Anikulapo-Kuti from Nigeria, Alpha Blondy (Seydou Koné) from Ivory Coast, Lapiro de Mbanga from Cameroon, Lucius Banda Malawi and Lucky Dube from South Africa" (see Sibanda, 2004; Nyamnjoh and Fokwang, 2006). However, ZANU-PF put the Broadcasting Corporation Act (BCA) into effect, restricting the broadcasting of both songs. Hence, both songs were a form of protest against the government following the 21st-century economic crisis as a result of Mugabe's old age and incapability to run the economy effectively.

On the other hand, the 21st century, to some extent, was marked by a degree of elite-partisan affective and opinion polarization of ingroup party members developing hatred and animosity toward outgroup party members. A clear indication is the

economic and ideological induced affective polarization in electoral politics in Zimbabwe, which manifests in speech and songs (opinion polarization) smear campaigning either the ruling or the opposition political parties (see, for example, Munhuweyi, 2022: 1-12)

4. 3 The ZANU-PF party's authoritarian dilemma.

Slovik's (2012) founding principle of the global authoritarian problem of power-sharing and power-control was utilized to examine post-independence Zimbabwean politics. This phenomenon denotes that the elites in power face both 'problems among the elites' and 'problems arising from the mass' (Slovik, 2012; Tanneburg, 2020). The power control problem denotes elite-mass conflicts mostly restrained through restrictions and repressions. Both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's administrations confronted the 21st-century urban uprisings through repressive and restrictive measures (Muchemwa *et al.*, 2013; Mungwari, 2018). Scholars argued that mass uprisings pose less probable threats to overthrow the ruling incumbents (see Slovik, 2012; 2013; Tanneburg, 2020).

However, there are cases where popular uprisings were successful in staging coup d'états, including but not limited to the 2011 coup that disposed and further street executed Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and the 2011 coup which toppled and exiled Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia¹³² (ibid). Thus, in fear of popular uprisings involving coalesced masses and the military, the elite allies often offer grants,

¹³² Opposed to the idea of revolutions from within, Tullock analyzed that revolutions are from above, which concurs with the proletariat-led revolutions by Marxists, Engels, and Lenin socialist thinkers. However, we have had revolutions and protests into coups from the mass exempted from power, yet we can't downplay the role of the middle class in influencing the mass uprisings (Slovik, 2012).

allowances, and higher posts to military generals securing the regime against potential elite threats or successful coalesced resistance (Tanneburg, 2020).

From the above, the ill-planned 31st July 2020 demonstration led by Ngarivhume and Chin'ono, following a Twitter message citing section 59 of the 'constitution' as a guarantee for demonstration, concurrently inculcated by economic and social upheavals. However, the ZANU-PF party outmaneuvered the plans of the protest (Ndebele, 2020). This further involved an arrest of Ngarivhume and Chin'ono for contravening the Covid-19 regulations and the military and police patrols ahead of the 31st of July mass protest. On national television broadcasting, ZBC TV Mnangagwa said;

"I want to commend the party and citizens in general for shunning the machinations of violence and the divisions through the planned, ill-fitted, July 31st insurrection.

Following their crushing failure, our detractors are evidently in disarray and desperate, grasping its throws to destroy confidence in our democratically elected government. They are equally on overdrive to discredit our people-centred programs" (Mnangagwa, 2020).

Nevertheless, the 2019 demonstrations involved a complete network shutdown in Zimbabwe, in which few people could access Facebook and Whatsapp through Virtual Private Network (VPN) application software (Burke, 2019). In this regard, both the 2019 and 2020 demonstrations involved violence, intimidation, and demonstrators' detention. Following the 2020 human rights violations by security forces, people posted messages with the hashtag "Zimbabwe lives matter" on Facebook, Twitter, and Whatsapp. Similarly, in August 2020, the Catholic Bishops wrote a letter to Mnangagwa rallying behind 'Zimbabwe lives matter' with a letterhead

detailing, "Is this the Zimbabwe we want." One commentator noted that it became azure as a summer sky that Covid-19 was used to stifle dissidents (Aljazeera News, July 2020).

The 21st-century Zimbabwean political environment became a conflict between the ZANU-PF ruling party members against the mass, Civil Society Organizations, and opposition political parties. However, there is much needed in the academic literature examining the political parties and civil society's pernicious polarization along political party ideological boundaries. The main political parties, ZANU-PF and MDC-A, now CCC, are the major players in influencing polarity demarcation among religious groups, ethnic societies, and other political parties. Although scholars are skeptical about the reality of polarization in Zimbabwe, there is a consensus that the elite and the mass are polarized along political parties' boundaries, which concurs with the elite partisan affective polarization sentiments.

Adding to the above, the mass and opposition political parties exempted from power do not pose real threats in authoritarian regimes speaking of global statistics coup d'états (see Slovik, 2012). The problem of power-sharing¹³³ poses absolute authoritarian elite threats (Wintrobe, 1998). Yeltsin, President of Russia, decentralized security institutions in fear of a military coup. Putin, however, is an institutional centralizer directly opposite of his predecessor (Tompson, 2000: 14). For

¹³³ The government power-sharing theory has been analyzed to ensure autocratic survival, according to Magaloni (2008). He then looked at both the strength and weaknesses of power-sharing following threats that might arise from a government coalition for a coup. Yet, there are benefits, including decimating rival factions and threats from the opposition movement.

example, Putin eliminated the regional laws, thereby consolidating his power with reduced horizontal and vertical power checks by regional governments¹³⁴.

Nevertheless, Mugabe appointed Mnangagwa as the 1980 minister of Defense and Security forces, whose maneuvers to succeed him were noted from the ill-planned 2004 Tsholotsho declaration until he finally succeeded Mugabe in 2017 through a military bloodless palace coup (Southall, 2018). Similarly, Milton Obote of Uganda and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia were toppled through military coups, which found Idi Amin and Ben Ali in power¹³⁵ (Slovik, 2012). Hence, the overall analysis of elite mass polarization, based on Slovik's perspective, is that the authoritarian twin problems and successful coups were undertaken uniquely considering different global authoritarian regimes.



Exiled G-40 ZANU-PF faction Moyo Jonathan examined the post-coup Zimbabwean environment in the manner that;

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It is always a norm that a post-coup environment is always conducive to another coup, and Mnangagwa uses the military to secure his regime in fear of another coup.

In which the army and other related institutions sanitized the post-2017 coup. The

2018 election was a moment of winning the election as a cure to the coup

legitimizing Mnangagwa's rule. ZANU-PF was fighting to win that election by any means, and the same scenario will happen in the 2023 election because we are still

in the post-coup era (Jonathan Moyo, SAPES-Trust Presentation, May 2021).

¹³⁴ Ozan, O. V. (2015) Stealth Authoritarianism: IOWA Law Review. Vol. 100

¹³⁵ Tullock analyzed the authoritarian problems and how autocrats can secure their regimes, including i) rotation of high officials, avoiding a loyal following to their jobs, ii) making sure the army is under the autocrat leadership, there should be no fixed commander but rather officials with titles such as minister of war or chief of staff iii) a lot of pompous ceremony surrounding the dictator is good idea iv) "cutting off the tallest flowers" (disposing of people with influence and rising to power) (Tullock, 2005: 304-305; Wintrobe, 2012: 118)

In support of the above claim, countries that experienced coups found the same leaders disposed of by another coup. Good examples include Ben Ali of Tunisia, Julius Caesar of Rome, Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (Harvey, 1994; Slovik, 2012; Tanneburg, 2020). With a global history of coups, Mnangagwa is putting drastic measures upon his elite allies by opening the higher posts to the most influential people in the military, including Chiwenga, whom he appointed as Deputy President and Health Minister (News 24, 2020). It is a mechanism to derail them from the most threatening positions, in which Chiwenga is one of the influential Generals and currently a retired army general occupied with newer posts. Mnangagwa might survive from threats of another coup which grants, promotions, and favors have been a blessing in disguise to his authoritarian elite allies¹³⁶.



At this point, I will reveal the events from the 2017 pre- and post-coup period and the parties involved in the ZANU-PF internal party conflicts or factionalism battles -an elite power-sharing problem¹³⁷. At the same time, lessons learned by Mnangagwa from Mugabe's power-sharing elite coercion. Firstly, in adjudicating the constitutionalism of the 2017 Zimbabwean coup, there is a need to look at the 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe Act No. 20 of 2013 (Moyo, 2019). From another academic view, the 2017 coup was constitutional following Mugabe's inability to perform his duties as the President prior to section 101 of the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution. However, the legality of the deployment of troops is questionable, bringing to reality executive constitutional breaching. The President had the sore powers to authorize the deployment of 'troops' (see section 213 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Act no.

¹³⁶ According to Tullock, the issue of rent-seeking concurs with the state capture illicit deals where public and private enterprises co-join in making profits without contributing to society (Tullock, 2004).

¹³⁷ See Slovik 2012.

20, 2013). Hence, if Mugabe was not involved in deploying the military, the 2017 coup would have been unconstitutionally undertaken.

On the other hand, Grace Mugabe's ZANU-PF G-40 faction political influence and contribution towards the demise of Robert Mugabe cannot be lightly undertaken. The key characters in the succession disputes drama were between the two faction camps of G-40 under Grace Mugabe and Lacoste under Mnangagwa (Biz News, 2016; Rodgers, 2019: 13; Hot263, 2021). In rallies, Grace Mugabe claimed to be the so heir of Mugabe while insulting her nemesis Mnangagwa, Kaukonde, and Kazembekazembe, among other Lacoste elite faction group members (New York Times, November 2017). With the expulsion of Mnangagwa and other elite allies from the party, ZANU-PF conflicts flamed for a coup. In a call for 10 minutes between Mugabe and Mnangagwa, Father Mukonori of the Catholic Church noted that Mnangagwa fled from the country in fear for his life (BBC Newsnight, November 2017).



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After divorcing the powerful elite allies and ZNLWVA (old comrades), a military coup was inevitable, which toppled Mugabe from power (see successful coups in Slovik, 2012). Stuart Lowman (2016) stated that the wheels of change are slow to get into motion, but just like bankruptcy, once they get rolling, it is hard to stop them. The dynamics of factionalism in ZANU-PF in the 21st century, including the Mujuru, Mnangagwa, and Grace Mugabe¹³⁸, eventually marked the November 2017 Lacoste faction military-engineered coup, which disposed of Mugabe.

¹³⁸ The Zimbabwean (2015) ZANU PF implosion was dangerous, says Zhuwawo. Patrick Zhuwawo.

In one of the ZANU-PF Gala before the 2017 coup, Grace Mugabe accused Mnangagwa of appointing himself as the heir of President Mugabe. While dancing to the song by Jah Prayzer, "Mudhara Achauya," in English, "the Father is coming, "Mnangagwa is claimed to have been pointing to himself¹³⁹. The song goes iyi isungano, chibvumirano, Mudhara vacho ishumba inoruma, in English, this is the covenant, this is an agreement, and the Father is a lion that bites¹⁴⁰.

Without any doubt, Mnangagwa was the potential heir to succeed Mugabe having powerful elite friends and undercover support from George Charamba¹⁴¹, also known as "Jamwanda¹⁴²." In one of her public speeches, Grace Mugabe reprimanded Charamba for writing good stories favoring the Lacoste Mnangagwa faction. While on the other hand, Jonathan Moyo, known in the media as Nathaniel Manheru, was against the Mnangagwa faction in support of the G-40 Grace Mugabe faction¹⁴³ (see, for example, Rodgers, 2019). The tag of war between the two factional camps created a perfect arena or environment for a coup, which found the Mnangagwa Lacoste faction in power. Most G-40 members are currently in exile, exposing their former kith and kin ZANU-PF Lacoste faction members' maneuvers in the electorate. Hence, there has been a record of opinion polarization among the ZANU-PF factional party members in the 21st century.

¹³⁹ Hot263. (2021). 5 Grace Mugabe Crazy Moment/ Blasting ZANU-PF Member: available on YouTube.

¹⁴⁰ ZBCtv (2017) Grace Mugabe humiliates VP Mnangagwa. On the 09th of September 2017, available on YouTube

¹⁴¹ George Charamba was secretary of Information and President Robert Mugabe's Spokesman and is currently Mnangagwa's spokesperson.

¹⁴² (ibid)

¹⁴³ Jonathan Moyo was Minister of Information and Publicity under President Robert Mugabe's administration.

Sybeth Musengezi claimed that the ascension of Mnangagwa was unconstitutional outside the provisions of the ZANU-PF party constitution under section 48, article 9. Mnangagwa and his alleged allies, including Patrick Chamisa, held a kangaroo meeting on the 19th of November, 2017¹⁴⁴. In this regard, the first secretary of admission and the President of the party is the one who should convene the meeting. Comrade Chinamasa, the legal affairs secretary, had no powers to convene the central meeting. Obert Mpofu had no legality to chair the ZANU-PF central party meeting, which the first secretary should only conduct¹⁴⁵. Following the President's incapacitation, the only vice secretary who could chair the central committee meeting was then Pekezela Mpoko. Mnangagwa was fired from the ZANU-PF party, and it was illegal for him to preside over the meeting, which subsequently led to the appointment of Mnangagwa as the ZANU-PF's first secretary and President.

Flowing from the above, Sybeth Musengezi filed an application or petition to the Bulawayo High Court to declare null and void the 19th of November 2017 ZANU-PF central committee meeting¹⁴⁶. In this regard, there is a need to regularize the party's presidential position and first secretary. The proposed central committee is to legitimize the illegitimate first secretary and presidential position, which most of the ZANU-PF members currently support the proposals. Mugabe was ready to preside over the central committee meeting¹⁴⁷, in which Mnangagwa and his accomplices

¹⁴⁴ SABC NEWS., (2021). Bid to unseat Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa: Sybeth Musengezi: The 22nd of October 2021. accessed on YouTube @The Globe SABC News

¹⁴⁵ Sybeth Musengezi corresponding with SABC News 2021

¹⁴⁶ My Zimbabwe News., (2021). Latest on the plot to remove President Mnangagwa from office: New details emerge (see post-coup minutes). By Muza Mpofu on the 01st of November 2021.

¹⁴⁷ ITV News (2018). Robert Mugabe tells ITV News Zimbabwe 'must undo disgrace' of 'military takeover.' The 16th of March 2018: Available on ITV News YouTube Channels.

outmaneuvered and staged a coup¹⁴⁸. Hence, the different party structures within the ZANU-PF party structure, including the conservative, neutral party members¹⁴⁹, Lacoste faction party, Mujuru faction party, and the G-40 faction party, influenced ZANU-PF intra-party polarization in the 21st century.

In analyzing ZANU PF's current (the 2017 post-coup) political dynamics, the balance of forces, and possible scenarios going into the future, Zamuchiya made profound arguments similar to Slovik's power-sharing authoritarian problem analysis¹⁵⁰. He noted that ZANU-PF faces serious intra-party elite division from the presidium to the cell (the shell is about to explode and disintegrate) at this interregnum, but cohesive state machinery keeps it breathing. Zamuchiya termed ZANU-PF an empty shell¹⁵¹. There have been power struggles between Mnangagwa and Chiwenga since the 2017 military coup. In this case, Mnangagwa has been sidelining Chiwenga from critical levers of the state and party power. Following the intra-party elite cohesion, the ZANU-PF political party has been characterized by strata-militant ethnic groups affiliated with their regional ethnic elite's factional groups within the party.

Clearly, this involved reassigning Chiwenga's military elites, who engineered the 2017 coup, to civilian positions for coup-proof (see also Mandaza, 2021). This further involves the replacement of General Sanyatwe, commander of the President Guard Brigade, by General Mhonda and the reassignment of Air vice Marshall

¹⁴⁸ NTV 2017 Robert Mugabe remains Zimbabwe's president-full speech on the 19th of November 2017 accessed on YouTube.


¹⁴⁹ People or elites without party affiliation in ZANU-PF who were fighting for the maintenance of the status quo ZANU-PF political party structure, including the War Veterans

¹⁵⁰ Zamuchiya Philian, seminar presentation, SAPES Trust on the 09th of September 2021 available on SAPES Trust Facebook page and YouTube channel.

¹⁵¹ (ibid)

Shumbayawonda. Major General Chendo and the late Major General Nyikayaramba were reassigned to the ministry of foreign affairs¹⁵².

Last but not least, in August 2019, the artillery brigade in Domboshava General Mangena was moved to command agriculture and replaced by Mnangagwa's close ally, Brigadier General Singizi. However, Chiwenga is no lite weight and is fighting or punching back. Therefore, the ZANU-PF's internal power struggles to succeed in Mnangagwa are predictably going to intensify after the 2023 elections¹⁵³. There were allegations of ZANU-PF members working with the opposition political parties to topple Mnangagwa. Hence, this led to party members being expelled and others suspended for serious treason allegations¹⁵⁴.



The intense ZANU-PF party divisions and polarity are between the two dominant giant members, retired General Vice President Chiwenga and Lacoste Faction under President Mnangagwa. However, by eliminating rival factions, appointing Karanga tribal-linked military posts, and rewards to elite allies, Mnangagwa might potentially secure his leadership. Hence, post-independence Zimbabwean polarization is an inherent feature of geo-politics ethnic boundaries. This marked ZANU-PF intra-party elite-partisan affective polarization -hatred of outgroup ethnic members by ingroup ethnic members within the party. The ZANU-PF party is being ethnically structured by the Kalanga Shona tribe towards securing the Mnangagwa regime against other Shona tribes, an ethnic elite power-sharing conflicts scenario.

In contrast, Runyararo Mahomwa dismisses ZANU-PF as an empty shell classification. According to him, the empty shell analogue best explains MDC-A party

¹⁵² (ibid)

¹⁵³ (ibid)

¹⁵⁴ (ibid)

factionalism and internal power struggles¹⁵⁵. The internal ZANU-PF factionalism and internal power struggle dynamics have been the history of ZANU-PF since 1963. He disapproved of the Mnangagwa and Chiwenga's alleged faction wars as mere anger rumored perspective that does not express the internal reality of power dynamics in ZANU-PF. However, they have been an implosion in ZANU-PF following the ZNLVWA demanding pension increment in 2021 (The Zimbabwe News, 2021). Thus, ZANU-PF has an internal crisis (internal power struggles and factionalism battles) in which Mnangagwa is trying to avoid another coup in ZANU-PF following the appointment of the Kalanga tribe militants in the most influential military post (Zamuchiya, September 2021, SAPES Trust Organization Presentation).

Slovik (2012) made an authoritarian power threat critique that aligns with Zamuchiya's observation, which involves the fear of autocratic leaders of the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. A clear indication is Mnangagwa's involvement in reassigning army generals. He has become the new Machiavellian revisionist of Mugabe's leadership. Similarly, Hafez Al Assad of Syria coalesced the business elites, army general, and former Bath party members for his son to inherit a stable throne at the end of his tenure (ibid). However, threats in autocratic regimes cannot be entirely silenced. In this regard, authoritarian problems should be constantly managed, which in most cases, are unforeseen. In this regard, the Mnangagwa ZANU-PF party's internal power struggle dynamics might lead to another successful coup in the post-2023 elections following the history of party succession disputes.

¹⁵⁵ Mahomwa Runyararo, seminar presentation, SAPES Trust on the 09th of September 2021 available on SAPES Trust Facebook page and YouTube channel.

With the internal party crisis in ZANU-PF 2017 post-coup and lessons learned from the pre-coup factionalism battles, Mnangagwa has been utilizing soft power and political repression to retain power through the electorate and silencing of rival elite factions. At the same time, the systematic decimation of active opposing voices has been the end game of ZANU-PF. This also brings us to the nature of electoral politics under the Mnangagwa administration (see, for example, Moyo, 2019).

Moving on, the 2017 post-coup electoral politics in Zimbabwe were characterized by electoral manipulation and political repression under the dispensation of the Mnangagwa (the Crocodile) administration. Hence, electoral politics in authoritarian regimes involves the absence of democratic qualities. Schedler (2002) terms elections in authoritarian regimes as a menu of manipulation. The Russian elections under Putin and the Yeltsin administrations have been a product of coercion and consent with centralized state institutions and patronage systems (Rivera and Rivera, 2009). Like the Russian administration, Zimbabwe's electoral system under Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations was marked by the securocrats' state capture and patronage systems (Masunungure, 2009).

For example, the deployment of CIO to ZEC Mavis Matsanga, ZEC acting Chief Executive Officer Utoile Silaigwana, ZEC Chairperson Priscilla Chigumba, and Luke Malaba as presiding Chief Judge, according to Moyo (2019), ensured a safe passage for 2018 electoral rigging. One of the respondents had this to say concerning the centralization of state institutions.

We cannot separate ZANU-PF from the military, legislature, judiciary, and electoral institutions¹⁵⁶. All these institutions have been influential and have a role in ensuring ZANU-PF's continuity in power¹⁵⁷. Either they use violence or restrictions to rig the elections by militating the electoral institutions or amending the laws¹⁵⁸. Whichever they see fit in ensuring they are protected from threats from opposition parties and the masses. Zimbabwe will never experience credible and legitimate elections, with further law and policymaking with ZANU-PF in power, come what may. Mnangagwa and Mugabe have the same authoritarian DNA, which as well flows through every member of the ruling party ZANU-PF (Interviews with Dr. Hilary Ingwe January 2022)

The military of Zimbabwe has remained highly contested with the conflicts emanating from the 1975 Magagao Declaration. In this case, the military was strengthened, yet there was a politically polarized notion of the military during the revolution and after the independence of Zimbabwe (Alexander, 2000). The fact that the military continued to use guerilla tactics in post-independence of Zimbabwe to instill fear and intimidation against the opposition parties and supporters can be attributed to political polarization. Yet, the ZANU-PF party remained fragmented, influenced by power struggles and regional politics. Thus, the ZANU-PF party had intra- and inter-party conflicts fueled by the military regionalism division and which can be attributed to political polarization

¹⁵⁶ Ndlulo, M. (2010). Zimbabwe's Unfulfilled Struggle for a Legitimate Constitutional Order: Framing the State in Times of Transition. Chapter 7, 176-203

¹⁵⁷ This is a feature of the bureaucratic authoritarian government system, characterized by stealth authoritarian practices (Ozan, 2015).

¹⁵⁸ See, for example, Magure's 2014 article in which he commented on whether, by coercion or consent, ZANU-PF has been winning elections since independence in 1980.

There was a highly contested political environment before the 2018 elections between the new interim Presidents of the ZANU-PF ruling party under Mnangagwa and the MDC-A main opposition party under Chamisa, the first election without Mugabe (IRI/NDI, 2018). Nevertheless, the 2018 harmonized elections followed the electoral rigging pattern of yesteryears of violence and intimidation (Moyo, 2019; Mare, 2018). The 2018 post-elections involved urban demonstrations over delayed election results announcements silenced by the military. General Sanyatwe fired and dispersed¹⁵⁹ the unarmed mob, similar to the French's 1975 Napoleon Bonaparte's 'whiff of grapeshot' (Mungwari, 2018; Moore, 2018).

Therefore, the 'Constitutional Court' presided over the disputed electoral outcomes, which Chief Justice Luke Malaba ruled in favor of the ZANU-PF party under Mnangagwa. It proved beyond that Zimbabwe is manacled under another typical Machiavellian moment of a militarized and populist electoral authoritarian regime. In this case, the judiciary system in Zimbabwe has been systematically used to bolster stealth authoritarian practices¹⁶⁰ by ZANU-PF. For example, the 2018 electoral adjudication, the 2000 land reform verdict, and the appointment of Mnangagwa as the designated president in November 2017. The next section shall examine the judicial politics in Zimbabwe.

4. 4 The rule of law and judicial politics in Zimbabwe

From the preceding section, the 1987 Zvobgo constitutional amendment rested unlimited powers on the executive ascended to be President Mugabe in 1987 under

¹⁵⁹ The matter was heard in an inquiry known as the Montlante Commission of Inquiry (see Mungwari 2018)

¹⁶⁰ Stealth authoritarianism has characterized both democratic and authoritarian states which involves elites' practices inconsistency with the legal instruments (see for example Ozan, 2015:1688)

the Unit Accord -ZANU-PF socialist one-party state¹⁶¹ (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997). Several contestations surrounding the 1987 constitution amendment were mainly from the NCA of 1997 and the MDC opposition party of 1999, which managed to limit the presidential term of office in the 2013 Constitutional Act Amendment No. 20 (see McCandles, 2011; GoZ, 2013).

In this case, the Zimbabwean constitution has created room for executive abuse of power under the Mugabe and Mnangagwa regimes, evidenced by a series of unconstitutional amendments of acts of parliaments and the appointment of state officials (Moyo, 2019). Similarly, most scholars, if not all, agreed that "Authoritarian constitutions might make democratic like institutions of political parties, legislatures and elections which are all linked to the survival of autocratic regimes" (Schedler, 2002; Boix, 2003; Geddes 2003; Boix and Slovik 2008; Magaloni, 2008). In line with the above statement, Sachikonye, in commenting on the Zimbabwean authoritarian institutional patron networking system, yields to that;

"Under a neo-patrimonial system, the president and his inner circle undermine the effectiveness of a nominally modern state administration by using it for systematic patronage and clientelism practices to maintain political order and perpetuate their hold on power." He further noted, "These institutions militate against democratization because they undermine transparency and accountability, in which authoritarianism tends to be the hallmarks of a neo-patrimonial system." (Sachikonye, 2003. 99)

¹⁶¹ "In 1980 elections, CAZ had 20 reserved seats, ZANU 57 seats, ZAPU 20 seats and finally UANC 3 seats". In the 1985 election, however, ZANU PF had 60 seats, ZAPU had 17seats, UANC had 3 seats, and CAZ had reserved 20 seats. The 1987 Unit Accord found all the seats absorbed by ZANU-PF, creating a Marxist socialist state which some termed a fascist party state.

The President appoints the Chief Judge following the act and the constitution of Zimbabwe to guarantee transparency and accountability (GoZ, 2013). Mnangagwa has unconstitutionally extended a 5-year term of office for Luke Malaba as presiding Chief Justice of the country following Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 2 (promulgated on the 07th of May 2021). The constitution of Zimbabwe of 2013 article 186 (1) provision set out that the 'Chief Judge' should retire at the age of 70 (Carmel Richard, 2021). Several contestations surround the Judicial Service Commissioner's roles in facilitating the extension of the tenure of office of Zimbabwe's retired Chief Justice (see SABC-News correspondent report by Ephert, Musekiwa, May 2021).

In this regard, the contested matter was overturned and ruled invalid based on the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe Act No 20. The inconsistency of the executive action in relation to the constitutional provisions is a tactic or strategy used by the incumbents to return power or safeguard power against opposition resistance¹⁶². "See comments online case file by the minister of justice re: high court decision in the matter of 1. Musa Kika vs minister of justice and 18 others HC 2125/21; and 2. Young lawyers association of Zimbabwe vs judicial service commission and 2 others HC2166/21¹⁶³." Most respondents noted that Mnangagwa abused his executive powers by overriding the judicial system and its laws¹⁶⁴, especially the constitution and acts of parliament, which clearly state judges' resignation and appointment

¹⁶² See, for example, William Partlett, Putin's Artful Jurisprudence, NAT'L INT., Jan./Feb. 2013, at 35, 37.

¹⁶³ See, for example, Joshua John Chirambwe v (1) The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe (2) Judicial Service Commission (3) Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, Luke Malaba N.o. (4) Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (5) Kumbirai Hodzi. Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe; Garwe JCC, Makarau JCC, Gowora JCC, Hlatshwayo JCC, Patel JCC, Mavangira JCC, Bhunu JCC, Makoni JCC & Mathonsi JCC, Harare: the 09th of October 2019 & July 2021 Judgement No. CCZ 4/21. Court Application No. CCZ 4/19.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, Krygier, M. (2021) Illiberalism and The Rule of Law: In *Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism*, edited by András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, and Stephen Holmes. 533-553

(Interview notes January 2022). Commenting on the re-appointment of Justice Luke Malaba, one interviewee said that;

The executive should be independent of the judiciary and the legislature¹⁶⁵.

Mnangagwa amended the law and then re-appointed judge Malaba based on a baseless constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, the new law was supposed to be applied to a newly appointed judge in the office. Malaba was appointed as a judge based on the 2013 Constitution Act amendment no 20. The same constitution states that a judge should resign at 65, which Malaba reached, and no longer be Chief Judge as per the rule of law (section 3b of the Zimbabwean 2013 Constitution). We cannot live above the law; we should correctly define and interpret the law. However,

Mnangagwa breached the constitution and should have been impeached for contravening the rule of law, which never was the case¹⁶⁶ (Interview with advocate Emmaculate Jani, January 2022).

In agreement to the above, the judiciary in Zimbabwe is a conduit of the patronage system, thereby absorbing legitimacy and credibility in adjudicating over elections and public affairs and, by extension, undermining of the rule of law (see McGregor, 2013: 783-805). Similarly, Compagnon and Makumbe (2000) argued that "Legal institutions and 'rule of law' in Zimbabwe have been systematically weakened, to allow the leader to rule the country through arbitrary decisions influenced by patronage systems" (see also Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe by Alexander and McGregor, 2013). Hence, giving rise to why duly extension of Luke

¹⁶⁵ Montesquieu and Madison's doctrine of separation of powers in Adam and Dyson's 2007 book, Fifty Major Political Thinkers

¹⁶⁶ The Judicial Service Commission is mandated to submit a list of nominees to the President (see, for example, Section 110 of the Zimbabwean Constitution Act No 20 of 2013), which is then submitted to the President for due nomination.

Malaba's Judicial term of office? The fear of ZANU-PF towards the upcoming 2023 elections has marked a series of constitution amendments by the President. In this regard, Malaba's 'Judicial five-year extension,' from 2021, was meant to secure ZANU-PF's 2023 upcoming harmonized election outcome in favor of Mnangagwa (Interview notes January 2022).

Similarly, judges are mere pawns in the ZANU-PF elites' allies who are meant to rule following the ruling party's demands (Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008). Anthony Gubbay, then presiding judge in 2000, made claims that the Fast Track Land Reform Program¹⁶⁷ (FTLRP) was unconstitutional, as there was no legal basis (Madhuku, 2004; Scarnecchia, 2006: 221-37). Uncivil society war veterans' (ZNLWVA) demonstrated against Gubbay's ruling, which Chidyausiku's ruling ascended to effect following the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Lee, 2003, Ncube, 2013).

However, the MDC party leaders and white settlers said, "There can be no judicial independence without judicial impartiality, and as such the Supreme Court has lost its independence, it is because and only because the court has failed to be impartial" (Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008: 249). Similar to the 2000 Supreme Court verdict, Malaba's 2018 electoral verdict favored the ruling party ZANU-PF with clearly identified electoral irregularities. However, contestations surrounding Zimbabwe's Judiciary system transparency and accountability dilemmas involve patronage and

¹⁶⁷ The post-liberation struggle found the colonial settlers reaching an agreement with the revolutionary governments in the 1979 Lancaster House Conference, of a 10-year willing buyer willing seller first phase of the land reform programme, followed by donor funding, and finally the 2000 FTLRP. The main agenda of the liberation struggles from the 1890s was land. In 1976 Mugabe said, "In Zimbabwe, none of the white exploiters will be allowed to keep a single acre of their land" (Caute 1983: 78). However, in 1980, Mugabe gave a contradictory statement which he was noted saying, "the wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten (De Waal, 1990). With the growth of unpopularity of ZANU-PF toward the 21st century, Mugabe engaged in the FTLRP (Meredith, 2009).

partiality undermining or subverting the rule of law to perpetuate the ZANU-PF party's rule.

Furthermore, Greg Lenington analyzed the 2013 amendment of the electoral act¹⁶⁸ and the election date controversy following the executive utilization of the Presidential Powers Temporary Measures Act (PPTMA) (see Oberst *et al.*, 2016). The PPTMA did not provide a basis for the 'executive president' to amend the electoral laws. A further examination is that 'if amendment of the laws was unlawful, then elections of 2013 must also have been unlawful' (ibid). In this case, the amendment and enactment of laws should go through the parliament, according to the Act of Parliament. Hence, Mugabe abused executive powers in the act amendment and election date announcement.

Similarly, McCoy and Somer (2018) noted that the American political system under the Donald Trump Republican administration had abused power in influencing the judges over electoral verdicts and the Russian intelligence involvement in the meddling of the 2016 elections. This brings us to the academic attention that authoritarian practices have characterized both democratic and authoritarian states to insulate the elites in power- a stealth authoritarian practice.

Mnangagwa learned lessons from his predecessor, in which he amended the constitution to allow the Zimbabwe Electoral Commissioner to conduct a census and delimitation of constituencies towards the 2023 elections. The ZEC's involvement in the population census has been analyzed as means to guarantee ZANU-PF's electoral victory in the upcoming 2023 harmonized elections (SAPES-Trust 2021). Although not similar to the above, the regime under Mugabe adopted the white

¹⁶⁸ See also Chigora and Chilunjika (2016) on electoral fraud examination of the 2012 Electoral Act amendment.


settler's legal system initiated in the form of the AIPPA and POSA Acts with further the BCA (Magure, 2013). The Acts were meant to destabilize and restrain opposition parties from political gatherings and the publication of information masterminded by Professor Jonathan Moyo, currently exiled member of the G-40 ZANU-PF faction (Masunungure, 2009). Hence, promulgating restrictive laws in authoritarian regimes is meant for opposition political parties to adhere to legal proceedings, securing the continuity of autocratic leadership (Tanneburg, 2020).

It is hence, the true attune of dictatorial governments to decimate the freedom of opposition parties and the mass through restriction and repression. Although repression is the ultimate security guarantor of authoritarian leaders, repression is not often utilized, as it breeds more opposition resistance or dissidents (Tanneburg, 2020). ZANU-PF ruling party's longevity in power involved the utilization of both repression and restriction. Hence, the opposition political parties have been systematically weakened and unable to gain ground in challenging the regime in power (Reuter and Robertson, 2013). Therefore, the legal and security entities have been used for restriction and repression under the ZANU-PF ruling party's Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations. Borrowing from Kenneth Good assertion, Zimbabwe, similar to Botswana, is "Caught between an autocratic and increasingly powerful presidency and a visionless, stultified ruling party, on the other hand, disorganized people and fragmented opposition political parties" (Good, 2008: 142). In this case, the ZANU-PF party has utilized repression and restrictions to insulate the regime against successful opposition resistance¹⁶⁹.

4. 5 Conclusion

¹⁶⁹ This is analysed in form of stealth authoritarianism practice, whereby the elites decimate opposition resistance using democratic constitutions.

The phenomenon of polarization is complex and multi-faceted from one state to another. In this chapter, the study offered an interpretation of structural polarization and bureaucratic authoritarianism in post-independence Zimbabwe. The existing polarization literature in post-independence Zimbabwe is both fragmented and inconsistent. However, to ascertain the reality of Zimbabwean post-independence polarization, the research drew from the existing literature from ethnical, societal, ideological, and political perspectives. In this regard, the interpretation of a given research phenomenon on polarization varies from one academic literature to another. Thus, the research looked at polarizations to examine the reality of post-independence Zimbabwean polarization. This further follows the chapter examination of affective polarization (elite-partisan polarization), ZANU-PF factionalism battles, opinion polarization, and inter-party conflicts, among other post-independence polarization typologies. Thus, the chapter argues that the Zimbabwean post-independence under Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations involved the centralization of state institutions and militarized state capture, leading to ZANU-PF party's elite-engineered polarization, a typical bureaucratic authoritarian regime. As a result, Mugabe and Mnangagwa abused their executive powers following the unconstitutional amendment of laws, unlawful appointment of state officials, human rights abuses, corruption, and legitimized fraudulent elections.



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CHAPTER FIVE

The Politics of Election Observing and Civil Society's Involvement in Zimbabwe's Elections



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*"To vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of
the will of the electors" (ICCPR
Article 25 B)*

5.0 Introduction

Over the years, it has been argued whether the presence and influence of the international election observer mission guarantee the prevalence of credible and legitimate elections¹⁷⁰. Nevertheless, in competitive authoritarian states elections are often conducted without the external electoral observer mission's monitoring/observation, thereby legitimizing fraudulent elections (Carothers, 1997; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Sadurski, 2019: 245). For international electoral recognition, states have to comply with the International electoral ethical standards and further involvement of observer mission in monitoring and evaluating electoral conduct and process (Carothers, 1997; Anglin, 1998). This phenomenon of election observation evolved from as early as 1857 in Moldavia and Wallachia, which gained global attention either in the post-World War II or in the post-Cold war era with the ascension of third-wave democracy (Huntington, 1993; Fukuyama, 2015; Enebong, 2017: 110). The states, including Germany, Korea, and France, have historically involved the international electoral observer mission in analyzing pre-election, election, and post-election periods from as early as the 1960s. Hence, the relevance of the election observer mission has become a norm in both young and established democratic states (Hyde, 2011; Kelley, 2012). In this regard, the election observer mission gained relevance in African electoral politics in Zimbabwe in 1980, Zambia in 1991, South Africa in 1994, and Namibia in 1989 (Geisler, 1994; Chan, 2019).

However, the integrity of the observer mission is questionable due to multi-complex factors: "Political partisanship, inaccurate and inconsistent final reports, and inability to detect frauds and electoral irregularities" (Obi, 2008; Enebong, 2017: 111). Matlosa (2021) observed that the observer mission lowered the democratic

¹⁷⁰ See, for example, Geisler, (1993: 616), and Dodsworth, (2018: 382)

standards from democratic promotion to a 'peaceocracy mission' in most African states. Hence, there are no set international electoral monitoring/observation standards, as electoral observation and monitoring differ from one country to another. This is because of the observer mission's interest in evaluating the quality and integrity of an election (ibid).

Hence, this chapter will assess the roles and significance of the involvement of CSO and the International Electoral Observer Missions in resolving disputed electoral outcomes, looking at Zimbabwe's post-independence elections. There is a need to analyze external and internal electoral reports and verdicts, looking at the electoral environment from the "pre-election, election, and post-election" period (Booyesen 2002: 27-51). This involves a continuous examination of the media, legal system, electoral management board, constituencies' delimitation and the number of polling stations, voter registration, voting day, vote tabulation and counting, and results announcements. Therefore, the internal and external observer mission reports and verdicts remain crucial for overall electoral adjudication in a particular country (Carothers, 1997; Norris, 2010). On the other hand, they are contestations surrounding the legitimacy and credibility of the internal and external observers' reports and verdicts. Clearly, the reports and verdicts, in some instances, are biased. However, electoral monitoring/observation¹⁷¹ remain the linchpin or hallmark for states to adhere to the international electoral standards for quality (credible, free, and fair) elections.

¹⁷¹ Election observation and monitoring have been used interchangeably in the literature, which are different terms albeit intertwined concepts. Election observation involves "the purposive gathering of information through electoral processes and making an informed judgment on processes involved in information gathered", encompassing rules, regulations, procedures and processes in elections (IDEA 2004, Dundas 2011). Monitoring involves the internal and external observer mission scrutinizing the polls and providing their reports and verdicts encompassing watching, seeing, noting, reporting, supervising, and intervening (Baker 2002; Dundas 2011)

5.1 Scope and relevance of Election Observer Mission

On the eve of independence in 1978, Josiah Tongogara' ZANLA army commander' made a profound statement: "Our demand is just and legitimate. We demand a free and fair election where international observers will oversee!" (Tongogara, 1978 cited in Rupiya, 2011). Hence, the February 1980 election is detailed as one of the multi-party democratic elections to have ever been held in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, there were military fronts of ZIPRA and ZANLA forces' involvement in the electorate (Raftopolous, 1992; Sithole and Makumbe, 1997; Maringa, 2021: 177-86). The Zimbabwean history of the 1980 democratic elections failed to repeat itself during Mugabe's administration. In 2002 Mugabe disputed the international observer's reports that identified electoral irregularities and fraudulent processes (Booyesen, 2002). In a 2002 statement, Mugabe firmly said, "Shut your dirty mouths, we do not want to hear that elections are free and fair from you. You are not our judges, you are not our keepers, leave us alone". (Herald, February 2002). Compounded by the 2000 FTLRP human rights cases of abuse, Zimbabwe was sanctioned and isolated from the Western country's socio-economic and political relations. Elections in post-independence Zimbabwe have arguably been illegitimate, involving voter intimidation, violence, and fraudulent processes (Magure, 2014; Southall, 2018). In this regard, elections provide the basis for determining a country's stability and democratic level (mature or young democracies). Thus, the authors argued that;

"When the electorate believes that elections have been free and fair, they can be a powerful catalyst for better governance, greater security, and human development. However, in the absence of credible elections, citizens have no recourse to peaceful political change. The risk of conflict increases while corruption, intimidation, and

fraud go unchecked, rotting the entire political system slowly from within" (Annan *et al.*, 2012: 3)

Therefore, ZANU-PF's hegemonic tendencies in post-independence resulted in a series of fraudulent elections, human rights abuses, and corruption (Southall and Slabert, 2013; Southall, 2013; 2015). In fear of international electoral observers' detection of electoral irregularities in the post-2002 election, Mugabe exempted external observers from monitoring and evaluating elections. The 2000 and 2002 elections were characterized by political violence, intimidation, and restriction against opposition political parties, which electoral observers illegitimized (Compagnon, 2000: 449-553; Laakso, 2002). Hence, international electoral observers monitor/observe electoral conduct and processes, further detecting fraud, and offering reports, verdicts, and recommendations to countries. In this case, electoral monitoring and observation ensure quality future elections compared to previously conducted elections (Norris, 2017; Borger, 2020: 12-16).



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Tied on the above, Zimbabwe was sanctioned by the international community due to human rights abuses against white settlers following the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) of 2000 (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; McCandles, 2011). Mugabe made one of the most powerful speeches still celebrated by Pan-Africanists, in which he said, "We do not mind having and bearing sanctions banning us from Europe. We are not Europeans. We have not asked for any inch of Europe or any square inch of that territory. So, Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe," both to laughter and applause (Mail and Guardian, February 2002). In this regard, ZANU-PF elites, without hesitation, maintained frost relations with the western countries, securing the party at the expense of the economy. Thus, the country experienced

massive unemployment, workers retrenchment, hyperinflation, abject poverty, and further fraudulent elections (Mawowa, 2007; Zamuchiya, 2013). In addition, the ZANU-PF party managed to distance itself from democratic pressure and promotion from western countries through electoral monitoring and observation. Therefore, post-independence elections in Zimbabwe have provided procedural uncertainties and outcome certainties in favor of the ZANU-PF led-government under Mugabe and, subsequently, his successor Mnangagwa.

Consequently, the economic crisis and sanctions from the West for nearly two decades affected the country. However, Mugabe resorted to engaging with Eastern countries by initiating the Look East Policy (LEP) of 2003 (Alao, 2014: 6; Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018: 26-29). In that same decade, ZANU-PF promulgated the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP) of 2007 to empower indigenous black people (Melber, 2021: 235). However, the IEEP scared foreign direct investment following its demands of 51% internal ownership shares and 49% external ownership shares (see the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007, Chapter 14:33). Arguably, the 2007 indigenization policy was costly to the Zimbabwean economy, while the policy secured ZANU-PF following the party's 2013 electoral campaign and outcome (see Magure, 2012; 2014; Hodzi, 2014). The IEEP and the LEP policies had benefits and costs on the socio-economic and political aspects of the country (see Zvoushe *et al.*, 2017). Hence, ZANU-PF utilized authoritarian populist rhetoric policy formulation in the 21st century to garner support from the electorate.

With Zimbabwe's engagement with the Eastern countries, political scientists were not surprised by where the ZANU-PF-led government was heading. The history of

Zimbabwe's liberation struggle details China and Russia's involvement in sponsoring the ZAPU and ZANU military wings of ZIPRA and ZANLA forces, respectively (Fay-Chung, 2006). The socialist dominant party ideology of ZANU-PF, besides the influence of African Nationalism, was arguably adopted from Eastern countries, including Russia and China (see Bader, 2015: 23-33). In this regard, autocratic nations have been known for avoiding the involvement of democratic states in observing and monitoring their elections. Mugabe, post-2002, in fear of democratic pressure and a successful opposition electoral resistance, closed doors for international electoral monitoring/observation. Hence, the post-2002 elections in Zimbabwe under the Mugabe administration have been legitimized, with clearly identified electoral irregularities and human rights abuses (Interview notes January 2022).



Moreover, it is argued that the international observer mission in competitive authoritarian regimes has been used as a scapegoat or cover-up to seek international assistance (Bell *et al.*, 1995; Hyde, 2011: 336; Miller, 2015). In the 2017 post-coup Mnangagwa administration revised the Mugabe policies to re-engage with the western market through the 'The Zimbabwe is open for Business Mantra of 2018' toward attracting global investors (Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Mnangagwa, 2017: 8-9; 2018a: 5; 2018b). To clear the belief and impression of dictatorial post-coup tendencies, Mnangagwa further re-opened a doorway for an international observer mission in the 2018 harmonized elections (Ndakaripa, 2020: 19). Almost similar but not identical to the 1980 elections, the prevalence of peace marked the 2018 elections during the pre-electoral and electoral environment (IRI/NDI 2018; EUEOM, 2018). However, post-2018 elections involved military-induced violence silencing MDC-A demonstrators in Zimbabwe's main city Harare (Aljazeera, 2018; Mungwari,

2018). It proved beyond that Zimbabwe's democratic transition was held and manacled in the crocodile's jaws¹⁷²-having authoritarian electoral practice continuities, disguised under the impression of international and local electoral monitoring and observation.

Melber and Southall (2021) argued that Mnangagwa's foreign policy was characterized by re-engagement with the West, contradictory to Mugabe's anti-western imperialist policy. Simultaneously, the 2017 post-coup violence and intimidation in general, and specifically the 2018 electoral violence, reinforced western reluctance to uplift the sanctions. Hence, this prompted the Zimbabwe government to use its SADC neighbors to plea for the anti-sanction movement, which amounted to nothing. SADC reached a consensus following the 25th of October 2019 declaration of "SADC Day of Solidarity with the Republic of Zimbabwe." This further involved an anti-sanctions march, which the FreeZim Congress leader termed; "Meaningless and SADC initiatives as solidarity by a group of clueless people" (Mhetu, 2019, cited in Melber and Southall, 2021: 5). The failed sanctions removal has been blamed on MDC-A under Chamisa, who, including Moyo and Biti, appealed for stiffer sanctions against ZANU-PF's authoritarianism towards democratic reforms (News 24, November 2017)

Seemingly left with no option, ZANU-PF's only hopes, and faith were in the Look East Policy, which found Mnangagwa travelling to Russia and China to strengthen diplomatic relations. However, China and Russia's involvement in the African continent has caused ripple effects on the continent's socio-economic and political stability (see Gravitas on reports of China exploiting Zimbabwe, June 2021). Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah examined the African continent's neo-colonialism as the

¹⁷² See, for example, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020.

highest stage of imperialism (see Melber and Southall, 2021). If the case could have been that the 2018 elections were credible, western countries would have uplifted the Zimbabwean sanctions (interview notes January 2022). In this regard, both Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations have blamed the western sanctions to have contributed to the 21st-century economic instabilities of the country (Chikohomero, 2019a; 2019b; Southall, 2019).

On the other hand, political scientists blamed the ruling government for mismanagement of funds, policy inconsistency, and corruption, not sanctions (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018: 37). Similarly, Malanie Robinson examined that it is not sanctions holding Zimbabwe's economy back, but its corruption and illicit financial flows that robbed Zimbabweans of their resources (@HMAMelanieR Twitter account 2021). Having been distanced from western diplomatic ties in the 21st century, Zimbabwe experienced hyperinflation, human rights abuses, and electoral irregularities. Hence, Zimbabwe is a typical pseudo-democratic state with periodic election characterized by violence and intimidation disguised under internal and external monitoring and observation. Based on this background, the next section will detail the credibility and legitimacy of internal and external observer's reports and verdicts in Zimbabwe.

5.2 Internal and external electoral reports and verdicts credibility

The contestations surrounding the internal and external electoral observer mission's reports and verdicts involve an interest over credibility and legitimacy when observing and monitoring elections (Geisler, 1993; Kelly, 2008: 771; Gadjanova, 2018: 2). The internal and external reports and verdicts must be consistent with the electoral environment during the pre-election, election, and post-election periods. For


electoral observers to reach sound judgments, there should be a continuous six-phase electoral assessment to adjudicate if elections are credible, free, and fair (Booyesen, 2002a; 2002b). In most cases, the electoral observer mission's reports cannot detail the period beyond Election Day. However, the observer mission remains crucial in ensuring the quality of an election in any given country (Carothers, 1997). Proving that elections are way beyond Election Day, a Zimbabwean street pastor said that;

We Zimbabweans do not have a suitable or conducive environment to conduct an election right now (speaking of the upcoming 2023 harmonized elections). It is a waste of resources to conduct an election if nothing changes in government structure and operation. The 2023 election has already been engineered in other places favoring the ruling party ZANU-PF. I want to advise opposition parties that if the state institutions are running the way they are, having an election is a waste of time. Instead, the resources that are meant to conduct elections should be used for the country's development. In which elections in Zimbabwe are a cosmetic way of authenticating a militarized rule (prophecy towards 2023 harmonized elections by Apostle Chiwenga T. F. the 13th of May 2021, available on YouTube. zimbomedia)

From the above, an election is not an event but is process-driven. Booyesen examined a six-phase electoral process to detail the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe. Hence, elections should be examined from early pre-election, pre-election, voting days, counting days, early post-election, and post-election periods (Booyesen, 2002). The elections observer mission adjudicated that the 2018 election in Zimbabwe did not meet the required international electoral standards. This was due to violence and fraudulent processes that characterized the election (EUEOM 2018; IRI/NDI 2018).

Similarly, Jonathan Moyo argued that the 2018 electoral rigging is documented but not yet proven (seminar presentation SAPES-Trust May 2021). Examination of the quality of elections goes beyond Election Day to give credible information on whether elections were free and fair or not. One interviewee commenting on the 2018 elections noted that;

Similar to the 2013 elections, the 2018 elections were rigged, but there was no sufficient evidence of how they were rigged¹⁷³. The only proof that MDC-A had in the 2018 elections was the missing V11 forms and inconsistent electoral outcome statistics¹⁷⁴. This called for a demonstration in the capital city of Harare following the delayed announcement of election results influenced by the gossip of the MDC-A electoral victory. This was due to the belief that ZEC was tampering with the results in favor of ZANU-PF¹⁷⁵. I was among the people who demonstrated a yearning for change, change shielded by the military, which fired into unarmed civilians (Interview with Mr. Zhuu Kelvin, January 2022).



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In line with the above, the EUEOM 2018 and IRI/NDI 2018 documented the highly inflated figures in the 2018 harmonized elections with further military involvement in silencing the mob, which killed six and injured an estimated thirty-five civilian demonstrators (see also Mungwari, 2018). However, the international observers did not manage to monitor the early pre-election and post-election periods following their observer's deployment (EUEOM, 2018; IRI/NDI, 2018). Nonetheless, their electoral

¹⁷³ Jonathan Moyo destroys Mnangagwa and tears ZANU-PF apart. Professor Jonathan Moyo discusses ZANU PF rigging and how ZANU PF cheats opposition parties during elections. This was a Zoom meeting hosted by SAPES Trust on the 15th of May 2021. "The stampede towards 2023 elections: Is history about to repeat itself again in Zimbabwe?"

¹⁷⁴ See the reports by EUEOM 2018 and NDI/IRI 2018

¹⁷⁵ Jonathan Moyo's 2019 Excelgate book unveiled how the 2018 elections were rigged in favor of ZANU-PF

reports remain crucial and valid, despite the external observers' deployment. This brings us to the attention why Mugabe, in post-2002, conducted elections without inviting international observers, but only his regional peers. His regional peers legitimized the 2005, 2008, and 2013 elections to be credible, free, and fair (see an article by Masunungure, 2014). Be that as it may, in the 2018 elections, the International Observers could not make any difference in challenging the electoral process's credibility. Although, their reports discredited the 2018 presidential electoral outcome's legitimacy. In addition, the electoral observer's recommendations have not yet materialized towards proposed and intended electoral reforms in Zimbabwe. In commending the 2018 electoral observation, one interviewee noted that;

Under the disguise and impression that the presence of an international observer mission is certainly a pathway for credible democratic elections, ZANU-PF under the Mnangagwa administration stole the 2018 election. The opposition political parties shifted their attention to secure the electorate and challenge the legality of the electoral outcomes, believing that elections would be credible, free, and fair with the international observers' overseeing the process and conduct of an election. The belief created a perfect and conducive platform for ZANU-PF to rig the election by crockery in respect of the international observers. However, the post-election counting, and result announcement period involved militarized electoral violence against demonstrators. Still, the election results were already engineered in favor of

ZANU-PF (Interview with Mrs. Muchipo R, M January 2022)

Flowing from the above, Lynch *et al.* (2019) succinctly asserted that an electoral observer mission in any country ensures that incumbents implement electoral

manipulations that do not involve violence from ballot stuffing, gerrymandering, and vote-buying (see also Schedler, 2002; Chigudu, 2015: 274). Similarly, both the 2013 and 2018 elections in Zimbabwe were rigged by technicality or a stolen election. However, the 2013 elections were conducted, observed, and monitored by only an internal observer mission. Hence, Mnangagwa displeased his European guest, who believed that Zimbabwe was transitioning toward democracy while regressing to authoritarianism (Hofisi, 2018: 27-44). In line with the above observations, one of the interviewees commented that;

ZANU-PF was not ashamed to rig elections in the face of an international observer mission. For all these years, the regional peers applauded following ZANU-PF's electoral militarized authoritarian tendencies involving violence, intimidation, and fraudulent electoral processes (interview notes, January 2022). Which is something that the SADC region should have condemned following the conduct and processes of elections in Zimbabwe? However, because of the one-party dominance across Africa, the local observers condoned violence, intimidation, and fraudulent electoral processes. That is why Mugabe was not hesitant to call his regional peers in the advent of an election. Who legitimized the elections to be credible, free, and fair (interview with Dr. Ngwarai, S, N. January 2022)

In support of the above claim, one of the 2000 Organization for African Union election observers to Zimbabwe from Namibia, Tuliamen Kalomoh, noted that;

"I have not seen any objective individual who was ever to say with a straight face that; I have observed irregularities. I have observed rigging of the election. I have

observed the intimidation of the voters that they have been prevented from casting their votes. I have not seen that"¹⁷⁶ (BBC News, March 2002).

From the above, observers sometimes come across as being on holiday instead of fulfilling their mandatory and designated duties. Good examples are the 2000 and 2002 elections in Zimbabwe, in which the regional peers from SADC declared the elections to be credible, free, and fair. However, the elections were marred with violence and intimidation (see, for example, Baker, 2002: 1145-58). For example, in the 2002 pre-election, the urban people were required to register to vote using their proof of residents. In this case, many urban residences did not have their monthly utility bills- a common proof of residence- because of disconnected water and electricity at their homestead. It proves that electoral rigging can be undertaken by enforcing the legal laws-a typical stealth authoritarian practice.

Similarly, either the 2008 and 2013 harmonized elections were by hook or crook, Mugabe received warm regards and congratulations from his regional peers and the Eastern countries, including China and Russia (Masunungure, 2014; Southall, 2015). Hence, electoral monitoring and observations are tainted with interest over legitimacy and credibility. Nevertheless, the 2002 elections were illegitimized by the European Union Observer Mission and South African Observer Mission (ibid). This brings us to the dilemmas in electoral observer mission reports and verdicts, which often contradict.

¹⁷⁶ BBC News 2002 Head-to-head: Zimbabwe election observers. Thursday, the 14th of March 2002, 19:48 GMT, newsimg.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1873438.stm.

Moreover, the 2018 harmonized elections provided internal and external liberties for electoral observation and monitoring processes (MMZ, 2018; IRI/NDI, 2018; EUEOM, 2018). It is clearly stated and detailed in the observer's reports that the 2018 elections did not give all political parties equal opportunities in media campaigning and access to state resources. This further involved the restrictive measures, including the IAPPA and POSA acts of 2002, which provides limited civil and political liberties to opposition political parties. The IRI/NDI (2018) and EUEOM (2018) further detailed that the electoral legal instruments in Zimbabwe are inconsistent, looking at the Electoral Act and the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution Act No 20 (see recommendation 1: EUEOM, 2018). In addition, the post-elections involved the militarized violence and partiality of the judiciary in electoral adjudication (interview notes January 2022). Therefore, the observer mission's reports and verdicts illegitimized the 2018 harmonized elections, contradictory to the judiciary electoral verdict.



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In addition to the above, the Civil Society Organizations were actively involved in the 2018 harmonized elections in voter education, voter registration, media examination, election monitoring and observation, and conflict mediation. The CSO may include the Election Resource Centre (ERC), Zimbabwe Election Systems Network (ZESN), Media Monitoring Zimbabwe (MMZ), Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZZT), Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CZC), Habbakuk Trust, and Veritas (EUEOM, 2018; IRI/NDI, 2018; Kubatana 2018; 2021). Ibbo Mandaza SAPES Trust (2021) noted that we have a brave but also amorphous civil society in Zimbabwe. It is detailed that more than 78 local Civil Society Organizations were involved in the 2018 harmonized elections (ibid). CSO identified electoral irregularities in the rural communities,

involving Chiefs and rural Headmen, instilling fear in rural voters¹⁷⁷ to vote in favor of ZANU-PF (see Dorman 2005; Makumbe, 2009; New York Times, August 2018; EUEOM, 2018). They claimed that the new biometric system would monitor everyone when casting their votes (interview notes, 2022). The complementation of reports from internal and external observers ensured the credibility of their reports, verdicts, and recommendations in the 2018 harmonized elections in Zimbabwe (see EUEOM, 2018; IRI/NDI, 2018). For all that, the post-independence elections in Zimbabwe were characterized by electoral irregularities and fraudulent processes.

Moreover, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Nigeria are volatile electoral countries where election observers shifted their focus from democratic promotion to a 'peaceocracy' mission (see Smith, 2017; Lynch *et al.*, 2019). Hence, this necessitated observers to be unable to detect electoral fraud in most African countries (Matlosa, 2021). Their shift of focus breeds a newer autocratic electoral rigging technicality that does not constitute violence. Based on scholarly observation, international observers have been accredited to a two-edged sword having double standards in the form of "Progress bias, a tendency to tolerate flawed elections that improve on those held previously and path dependency" (Geisler, 1993; Dodsworth, 2018a: 382; 2018b). Thus, the African elections suffered from double deceit "Created by their ruling incumbents who prevent power changing and the international observer failing to condemn seriously flawed elections" (Geisler, 1993). In light of the Zimbabwean 2018 election, the ZANU-PF-led government utilized soft mechanisms or

¹⁷⁷ See also Chamisa Citizen Coalition for Change commending on the by-election rigging processes influenced by rural leaders (chiefs, headmen, and instilling fear in eligible opposition party voters - HSTV, 2022 available on YouTube.

manipulation in rigging the elections following the V- five forms of electoral outcomes inconsistency and judiciary electoral verdict bias.

Therefore, there are growing heated debates over the credibility and legitimacy of the election observer mission's reports and verdicts. There is evidence of inconsistency between the international verdicts and the judiciary adjudication when looking at the electoral phase from the pre-election, election, and post-election period (Kelly, 2008: 771). The international observer mission legitimized the Malawian 2019 elections to have been credible, free, and fair. However, the judiciary disputed the observer's electoral verdict credibility following identified electoral irregularities and fraudulent processes (Matonga, 2020; Chitete, 2020; Matlosa, 2021). Similarly, the Commonwealth Observer Group legitimized the 1992 elections in Kenya, although they were deeply flawed (Matlosa, 2021: 7). In contrast, Nigeria's 2003 and 2007 elections were reported to have been deeply flawed, involving militarized violence and intimidation. Thus, the international observers illegitimized the election, which was consistent with the electoral environment and other Civil Society Organization's, reports (Human Rights Watch, 2003; 2007a; 2007b; Matlosa, 2021). Therefore, there are dilemmas in election monitoring and observation, in which electoral verdicts and reports are subject to criticism and must be rigorously examined for their credibility.

With the Covid-19 pandemic in 2019, Matlosa (2021) examined that the international observers adopted new mechanisms to monitor/observe electoral conduct and process. In this regard, the observer mission has found monitoring and observing elections challenging due to low technology methodologies and failing to adapt to the new Covid-19 global electoral politics, among other factors. However, the

Zimbabwean 2023 elections will be conducted in the post-Covid-19 political environment. The ZANU-PF ruling party has utilized the Covid-19 protocols to decimate opposition political parties and mass movements (Gavin, 2020). This involves banning political parties campaigning and gatherings, as detailed in the Covid-19 restrictions (Rivers and Ndlovu, 2020). Hence, revolutionary ruling governments across Africa have used Covid-19 to stifle opposition campaigning and mass uprisings/ demonstrations (BBC News, August 2020). In which ZANU-PF has been campaigning under the auspices or disguise of government project implementations.

Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean government adopted the biometric electoral registration process and voting procedure in 2017 towards the 2018 elections. Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) allows people to be registered in the voter's roll through fingerprint scanning and demographic data capturing. In this regard, the BVR has greater chances of preventing electoral fraud associated with duplication in electoral registration and voting. At the same time, digital technologies minimize the chances of electoral rigging, ensuring credible or legitimate electoral outcomes. However, the African BVR system has been characterized by inflation of electoral voters in the system due to duplication of voters in the registry. Mude (2022) is of the view that the BVR did not minimize the voter fraud that has been characterizing the African and, specifically, the Zimbabwean electoral system.

On the other hand, the BVR, in relation to the Zimbabwean 2013 Constitution Act No 20, does not provide the basis for ZEC's independence in the registration of voters. Despite the above, digital technologies in voter registration have allowed the safe passage of providing a menu of electoral manipulation. Since the electoral observers are biased toward electoral violence and intimidation in Africa, the ruling incumbents

have resorted to electoral manipulation that does not involve violence. Similarly, Matlosa (2021) noted that the election observers had been biased toward a 'peaceocracy' mission in African elections. Hence, the electoral observers have, in most instances unable to detect smart electoral manipulation involving gerrymandering, inflation of electoral voters, duplication of voters in the registry, and altering of electoral results.


Ibbo Mandaza, director of SAPES Trust, examined the upcoming Zimbabwean 2023 harmonized elections based on the International Electoral Observers and Regional observers relations¹⁷⁸. He noted that Zimbabwe had a series of failed elections since 1980. He specifically looked at elections from 2000 under Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations. He further pointed out that the crisis in Zimbabwe is due to the securocrats machinery operation. Similar to the 1979 Lancaster House Conference, the current crisis in Zimbabwe needs to be resolved through a consensus of regional and international organizations. However, with the history of failed elections, there might be a repeated electoral scenario in the 2023 elections, following the legacy of the big man and one-party state that inherited power at independence with the ethnic elite's coalition government¹⁷⁹. Furthermore, it consists of the ZANU-PF party's antipathy to democracy and separation of powers.

Adding to the above, the electoral verdict bias by the regional blocks involved their failure to recognize the 2008 electoral irregularities legitimizing Mugabe's rule. The opposition party MDC-T, under Morgan Tsvangirai, won the 2008 election with a landslide victory over ZANU-PF under Mugabe. On a 2008 Saturday evening,

¹⁷⁸Ibbo Mandaza seminar presentation SAPES Trust on the 23rd of September 2021. How can the regional and international community prevent another failed election in Zimbabwe in 2023? Available on SAPES Trust Facebook page and YouTube channel.

¹⁷⁹ (ibid)

Mugabe is alleged to have telephoned Mbeki and Obasanjo to concede defeat. Mugabe held his ground for more than 24 hours, refusing to stay put and agreeing to leave¹⁸⁰. Mnangagwa, Mutasa, and Chiwenga, the big men, reset the history of the military by securing the presidential polls through a series of violence and intimidation. Therefore, this marked or has seen the military advancement in the Zimbabwean electoral institutions following the 2013 and 2018 harmonized elections. With the SADC failing to condemn seriously flawed elections, the AU and International Observer Mission cannot impact the Zimbabwean elections. Similar to the observations made by Jonathan Moyo in the Excelgate book, Mandaza concurred that Mnangagwa lost with a landslide of 33%, while Chamisa won with 66%¹⁸¹. However, ZANU-PF held most of the parliamentary seats in the parliamentary elections. For example, Matabeleland North Mnangagwa had 5%, yet an estimated 7-10 MPs won the seats. Thus MDC-A had poor structures at the local and constituency level, which found most ZANU-PF MPs winning with a landslide, opposite of the Presidential outcome.



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Whether elections in Zimbabwe will be free and fair, Zamchiya noted, "If people are not prepared to die, to go to prison ... you are not going to take away power from this regime" (Moore, 2018). The ZANU-PF's security is entirely on the military, just like any other authoritarian regime, in which the army remains the backbone of autocratic leadership (see Slovik 2012; Tanneburg, 2020). In the Government of National Unity of 2009, the military declared never to recognize and salute Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T opposition leader being the appointed Prime Minister of Zimbabwe in 2009) because he had absolutely no military credentials (Magure, 2014). Similarly, in the

¹⁸⁰ (ibid)

¹⁸¹ See Moyo (2019) Excelgate electoral rigging apocalypse.

2018 elections, the military involvement legitimizing flawed elections was seemingly obvious. Whether elections will be credible, free, and fair, ZANU-PF will never concede defeat and surrender power to the winning opposition party (interview notes, February 2022).


In the documentary titled "A new film about Zimbabwean elections is worth watching but flawed," David Moore observed the military involvement in the post-voting period. It was a clear theatrical show of the military shooting into the unarmed mob, wherein in one of the pictures, a soldier was clapping the back of another soldier shooting at the dispersing crowd. The post-electoral demonstrators were angry at the deliberately slow counting of the votes. Six of the demonstrators died on the spot, and many were injured. Attempts were made by the opposition MDC-A to challenge the vote counting, which amounted to nothing. Watching electoral commission bosses and judges trying not to squirm was pleasurable. However, "The democratic hero Douglas Mwonozora now the splinter group leader of MDC, made the film so interesting that he is allegedly working with ZANU-PF wondering how long this movie brewed" (Moore, 2018). In a theatre, the curtains drop, and people return to their personal lives, a clear indication of the 2018 harmonized elections, military involvement, and the constitutional court electoral verdict. When commenting on the military involvement and electoral adjudication, one respondent noted that;

After the demonstrator's dispersal by the military in the post-2018 elections, the Constitutional Court presided over the electoral irregularity-filed petition by the MDC-A. We had high hopes that the V11 forms and the mathematical and statistical errors identified would amount to election invalidation¹⁸². However, the court contradicted the MDC-A findings as hogwash without proof to substantiate the facts of identified

¹⁸² See electoral observers' reports 2018 by EUEOM and NDI/IRI.

electoral irregularities. Still, the reality will always be that there was an irregularity in the 2018 electoral outcome, and the judiciary ignored the MDC-A's claims (Interview with Rachael Sengurai, R January 2022)

Hence, the 2018 harmonized elections have been documented in the literature looking at the six-phase proposed by Booysen from early pre-election, pre-election, voting, counting, early post-election, and post-election electoral environment (Booyesen, 2002). There is consistency in multiple 2018 Zimbabwean internal and external electoral reports and verdicts (EUEOM, 2018; IRI/NDI, 2018). Thus, the electoral fraud of the 2018 election, like any other election in Zimbabwe, is well documented. Still, the fraudulent part is not yet proven, which Moyo examined from a fresh perspective of an Excelgate-stolen election (see, for example, Moyo, 2019). The next section shall detail the contestations surrounding the V11 forms in the 2018 Zimbabwean harmonized elections.



5.3 V11 forms contestations and Con-Court adjudication


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From the above, the Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance party filed an application applying to Zimbabwe's Constitutional Court, prior to section 93(1) and r23 (2) of the constitution, contesting the 3rd of August 2018 electoral outcome, which ZANU-PF won with 50, 8% whilst Chamisa had 44, 3%. Thabani Mpofu filed the petition due to the failure of ZEC to follow due process relating to the collation and announcement of results and gross mathematical errors in the election results (Daily Maverick 2018). However, their claim was contradicted by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), which used the Sample Based Observation (SBO) method and resolved that the results tallied with Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) (ZESN, 2018). Mpofu alleged that,

"We had managed to place before the court unpopulated signed V11 forms and V11 forms that show an attempt to erase the figures that had been entered. We have managed to place before the court all the mathematical and statistical irregularities" (ibid).

As opposed to the MDC-A's claims, the ZANU-PF's secretary Paul Mangwana, noted that;

"It is based on some theoretical calculations by some statistician whose qualification we highly doubt. The elections are not won in court but in the field. Nevertheless, if they want to meet us in court, we have sufficient legal minds to meet them squarely in court. The electoral material is there for everyone to see. Nelson Chamisa was beaten thoroughly and effectively, so there is no basis or ground for challenging President Mnangagwa's victory. Broadly, that is the thrust we are taking in opposing the application" (Times Live, 2018; Daily Malverick, 2018)



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Similarly, the announcement of the election results by ZEC was consistent with the SBO estimates ranges, in which both estimated Mnangagwa was leading with 50.7%, whilst Chamisa had 45.8%. On his Twitter account, Mnangagwa said that as we wait for further official results, I urge us all to remember the teaching from Ephesians, "Be completely humble and gentle; be patient, bearing with one another in love" (@mnangagwa Twitter account 2018). ZANU-PF members were confident that the election results court adjudication would be in favor of them despite the V11 forms mathematical and statistical errors MDC-A's court contestation claims. In this case, however, the electoral irregularities were characterized by deflation and inflation of electoral results.

In this regard, the V11 forms and V23 forms are essential in the election of Zimbabwe for the announcement of results. The V11 carries results from polling stations and is signed by members of all contesting parties (Interview notes, January 2022). The information in the V11 forms is then recorded on the V23 form, a collation of polling station results within a ward or local level (By Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban reporting to Africa news, 2018). The recorded electoral results for the Presidential, National Assembly, and Councilor are sent to the National Command Centre for official announcements of the results. David Coltart mentioned that the ZESN produced a report which states 21% of polling stations posted V11 results without presidential results in violation of the law, which he cited;

Section 64 (1) subsection (e) of the Electoral Act requires presiding officers to, without delay and in the presence of candidates and election agents present, "affix a copy of the polling station return on the outside of the polling station so that it is visible to the public and ensure that it is there so that all members of the public who wish to do so may inspect and record its contents" (ZIM FACT, 2018)

In support, Chamisa made it clear in one of the interviews with Mhlanga that they had sufficient evidence of the V11s forms, which the court did not intend to listen to - from their side of the story¹⁸³. The MDC-A party wanted to provide a subpoena based on the fact that they won the 2018 elections. The problem was the court's view and the interpretation of their filed petition and evidence. Chamisa noted that their legal team made a fantastic effort, although the court was against their esteemed findings. In the upcoming 2023 elections, he noted that we are confident

¹⁸³ HStv Live Zim. (2021). The Nelson Chamisa Interview| #HStvZim: available on YouTube

that we are going to win the elections. Dictatorship has fallen closer home in Malawi and Zambia, and ZANU-PF has already felt the impact of the seismic quakes¹⁸⁴.

In contrast, Mnangagwa disputed that the Zambia scenario would never happen in the Zimbabwean electorate. Chamisa maintained that Douglas Smith said, 'Not in a thousand years'¹⁸⁵, and the same demon is haunting Mnangagwa. The President is hallucinating; MDC-A is ready for the 2023 elections.

Coltart's and Chamisa's observations contradict Jonathan Moyo's views regarding the 2018 electoral rigging. He made precise observations of the 2018 elections following the five V forms majoring in specific three forms of the V11, V23A, and V23B forms (SAPES Trust seminar Presentation, 2021). Moyo made it explicitly and succinctly clear that the V11 forms were baseless regarding the Constitutional Court hearing, in which the V11 could not form the basis of the Presidential outcome. He further noted that the 210 V23 forms are for National Assembly electoral outcomes and subsequently account for the Presidential outcome as V23B forms. If the V11 does not constitute the Presidential electoral outcome, MDC-A representatives were chasing after the wind. However, based on the MDC-A petition, ZANU-PF party members were confident of the 2018 Constitutional adjudication. They never hesitated to pursue the Constitutional Court matter held on the 22nd of August 2018 because of MDC-A's baseless arguments.

¹⁸⁴ see also SAPES Trust dialogue on 2021 Zambian elections

¹⁸⁵ Smith said, let me say it again. "I don't believe in black majority rule ever in Rhodesia, not in a thousand years. I repeat that I believe in blacks and whites working together. If one day, it is white and the next day it is black. I believe we have failed, and it will be a disaster for Rhodesia" (Ian Douglas Smith).

ZEC's opposing affidavit 59. Para 6.6.2.2 Veritas Trust (2018) denied that 21% of V11 forms were not posted, as claimed by MDC-A. The applicant did not place evidence for averment before the court, and polling stations alleged to have returns posted (p. 67). Hence, the averments were not bald and were not with respect ground for relief sought. Accordingly, their petitions on the compact discs were denied as not in the complaint's briefing based on CCZ42/18 (p. 6).

Furthermore, the collation of results in the polling station had errors. However, according to ZEC, it did not affect the Presidential outcome. Chigumba announced the results in favor of Emmerson Mnangagwa, ZANU-PF ruling party, according to section 110 subsection 3 of the Zimbabwean Constitution (pp. 1-78). The nullification of electoral results favored ZANU-PF because MDC-A under Chamisa could not provide substantive evidence based on the filed complaint before the Constitutional Court. Hence, the irregularity of the 2018 election is documented but not yet justified.

In contrast, the European Union Observer Mission (2018: 8-9) noted that the ZEC results on a CD-ROM with polling station figures in excel format were inconsistent with the actual presentation of figures on the V11 forms for each polling station. Hence, the errors and inaccuracies raised a lot of suspicion about the accuracy and reliability of the electoral figures presented by ZEC. They made similar strides with Jonathan Moyo on the counting and collation procedures following the V11 ward level, and constituency collation, which forms V23 A and V23 B return forms (EUEOM, 2018; Moyo, 2019). The guidelines for the 2018 elections are in the Electoral Act and Electoral Officers Guidebook (Electoral Act 2:13). Some party agents and CSO claimed that other V11 forms were altered, and figures changed at ward and constituent collation centres (EUEOM 2018: 41; IRI/NDI, 2018: 45). This


further involved military harassment of MDC-A party members who, in fear, refused to sign replacement V11 forms in Gokwe South. The observer's recommendation 18 specified that "the results management process must be coherent and better explained to all stakeholders to enhance the election's transparency, verifiability, and integrity. This could include publishing the original V11 and V23 a/b returns" (ibid). One interviewee, commenting on the V11 forms, stated that;

ZANU-PF knew that if they did not create a loophole on the V11 forms, MDC-A would have filled the case based on other hidden electoral irregularities. They made it so clear that the V11 forms would form the basis of contestations of the electoral results. Nevertheless, the V11 did not form the basis of the presidential outcomes but the local elections at the ward level¹⁸⁶. Although they had good stories and impressions when presenting their facts before the jury, the jury demanded evidence, which they could not provide. Hence, you cannot file your emotions or arguments based on facts without evidence in court. This is what the MDC-A lawyers simply did (Interview with Mr. Alexander Tawandudzwa, February 2022)

In line with the above observation, Moyo (2019) claimed that the 2018 election was an Excelgate stolen. The missing V11 forms did not account for the Presidential outcome, which MDC-A members pursued through courts. In support of the international observer's observations, Moyo noted inconsistent data from the Excel and the CD-ROM. Hence, the MDC-A petition was baseless regarding Moyo's observations. According to Moyo, the 2018 harmonized elections were an Excelgate stolen, and the V11 form narrative is a case of its own.

¹⁸⁶ Moyo Jonathan Excelgate textbook of 2019 unveiled the disputed electoral outcomes of the 2018, ZANU-PFs maneuvers.

In one of the interviews with Anotida Chikumbu, Jonathan Moyo revealed the contents of his book *Excelgate* and how the Zimbabwean 2018 elections have been rigged¹⁸⁷. The military in the post-2017 coup was shocked by the 2018 presidential election results and needed to coup-proof through electoral rigging. Firstly, the V11 out of 10 985 polling stations based on each voter's role had 800 to 1200 registered voters making vote counting easy. The polling station electoral counting was completed at 2 a.m. on the 31st of July 2018. There is a distribution structure for the V11s, in which the original V11s were sent to the ward centre. The process involves the manual and electronic capturing of the votes from the constituency's district, province, and head office. With the V11s results, ZANU-PF members found out that the results were overwhelming against Mnangagwa, and they had to maneuver the process to avoid fulfilling the actual electoral outcomes. Chamisa won with 66% against Mnangagwa with 33%¹⁸⁸.



Tied on the above, Moyo examined that an election is a rule-bound process. ZANU-PF's- ZEC patron architecture manipulated and distorted the rule-bound process, stating that vote counting starts at the polling station. The due election collation procedure started at the ward centre, in which the V11 became the V23As (for 1958 ward councilors or local authorities). The V23As are then sent to the constituency centre, which translates into the V23B for the Member of Parliament MP (for 210 constituencies). The constituencies' V23Bs are added within a province to get 10 V23Cs sent to National Command Center. The 10 V23Cs are added together and translated into V23Ds for the preliminary results of the President. Section 110

¹⁸⁷Book TV (2021). *Excelgate-How Zimbabwe's 2018 Presidential Election was Stole*, (Book by Professor Jonathan Moyo): Anotida Chikumbu interviewing Jonathan Moyo.

¹⁸⁸ See, for example, Moyo Jonathan 2019 *Excelgate* 2018 electoral rigging

subsection 3 requires the 210 constituency officers to certify the constituency return sent by messenger to the Command Centre to get the final result of the President, which is a V23E return.

However, ZEC came up with a different route in collating the 2018 Presidential electoral results by diverting from A, B, C, D, and E five V's electoral returns¹⁸⁹. They focused on the V11 collation on an excel spreadsheet done at the National Command Centre, diverting from the rule-bound electoral results collation process (Interview with Chikumbu Book Series, 2021). Hence, the 2018 elections were rigged in broad daylight by ZANU-PF. In this regard, ZEC breached the constitution and electoral act in the procedure of collating the 2018 presidential electoral results (see Constitution of Zimbabwe Act no 20 of 2013; Electoral Act 13:12)

In addition to the above, Moyo termed Priscilla Chigumba, ZEC chairperson, the mother of electoral rigging, Justice Luke Malaba, the father of electoral rigging, Mavis Matsanga, and retired Major Chivasa, electoral rigging sisters¹⁹⁰. Instead of following the same route of the parliamentary election results, ZEC diverted the route and presented the results from an excel spreadsheet with electoral anomalies involving mathematical and statistical errors. In this regard, mandatory to section 323 of the Zimbabwean constitution, ZEC is supposed to present how they collated the electoral results. They confirmed bypassing the other collation phases against the rule-bound procedure as clearly stated in the Electoral Act 2:13 section 37, 64, 65a, 65b, and section 110 subsection 3¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁹ (ibid)

¹⁹⁰ (ibid)

¹⁹¹ (ibid)

Furthermore, ZEC misled people that they did not use an electronic server but manualized the process. As detailed in the Excelgate book, Africom ran the computers during the elections, while the CIO and the army did the electoral registration and accreditation (Moyo, 2019). Moyo Jonathan further analyzed that the sister of 2018 electoral rigging, Matsanga, was awarded a golden trophy mansion in Borrowdale, and recently she has been blessed with higher posts as director in the CIO. Hence, the elections were never run by ZEC in the 2018 elections but by the securocrats (police, military, and CIO), discrediting the legitimacy of the 2018 presidential outcome. A characteristic feature of bureaucratic authoritarianism with centralized state institutions, state capture, and militarized state institutions.

Similarly, in an interview, Ibbo Mandaza responded that they faced criticism from the ZANU-PF and ZEC chairperson Priscilla Chigumba because of the Excelgate book that vindicates the 2018 election rigging (SABC News, 2021). Priscilla declared that those who say elections were rigged must provide proof (eNCA News 2018). The book Excelgate is evidence-based research literature in which the editor and the author faced criticism. ZANU-PF party further launched a ghost online-published Excelgate book ahead of the actual book. Moyo Jonathan, although in exile, has made strides and an impact in Zimbabwean electoral politics, academic literature, and online debates. Moyo Jonathan revealed in his book how the Zimbabwean elections were rigged in favor of ZANU-PF under Mugabe and, specifically, the 2018 elections under the Mnangagwa administration (see, for example, Moyo, 2019). Furthermore, this involved the seven months military coup, in which the military was actively engaged in the electoral process safeguarding the 2017 post-coup or coup-proofing the Mnangagwa regime.

Regarding the constitution of Zimbabwe, it provides a seven-day limit after announcements of the presidential elections for a complaint to submit a petition or application challenging the validity of an election (Electoral Act of Zimbabwe 2: 13). The application is followed by 14 days for the court to render due judgment. Thus, a winner may be declared or invalidated. The invalidation of an election is followed by another election held within 60 days. Chamisa claimed that he was the duly winner, in which the polls had mathematical and statistical errors, consequently affecting the validity of the outcome (Mavedzenge, 2020). Furthermore, MDC-A claimed that the ZEC board was involved in the Constitutional and electoral law violations that undermined impartial conduct during the election. In this regard, the Constitutional Court was scheduled on the 22nd of August 2018, broadcast live on ZBC TV, to show transparency of the proceedings. However, two days later, Chief Justice Luke Malaba rejected Chamisa's petition claiming that the applicant failed to state "Clear, sufficient, direct and credible evidence" (IRI/NDI, 2018: 50; see also section 93 (4) (a) of the Zimbabwean Constitution). It was, in this regard, a battle of facts and evidence. However, MDC-A court representatives (lawyers) failed to prove and state beyond facts the fraudulent part of the 2018 Presidential electoral outcome.

As part of the defense team, MDC-A roped two legal minds from South Africa, advocate Dali Mpfu and Tembeka Ngcukaitobi. In this regard, lawyers should be argumentative, combative, and abrasive. However, given the findings by MDC-A, their legal challenge was baseless, as they could not provide sufficient evidence, although with facts of electoral rigging (interview notes February 2022). This is why Moyo argued that the rigging part of the 2018 elections is well documented but not yet proven (SAPES-Trust seminar presentation May 2021). There are arguments that the 'Judiciary' undermined impartiality in adjudicating the 2018 elections. This

follows the MDC-A petition challenging the legality of the presidential electoral outcome with identified anomalies in the statistical and mathematical data (IRI/NDI, 2018). Hence, the judiciary muzzled justice by not blindfolding in weighing of facts and case adjudication, which ZANU-PF further prejudiced the legal process.

The legitimization of illegitimate electoral outcomes is typical of semi-authoritarian regimes. The patron party relations in the authoritarian judicial system influence decisions in the adjudication of court cases favoring ruling incumbents or elites, thereby undermining the rule of law (Ginsburg and Mustafa; Tafirenyika, 2017). According to News 24 (June 2018), the corresponding analyst predicted the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court would rule against the opposition MDC-A's party petition. Despite the MDC-A's efforts, Malaba dismissed the application with costs after strongly criticizing the legal challenge - a stealth authoritarian practice, in which Mnangagwa was duly declared the winner of the presidential elections held on the 30th of July 2018. Utoile Silaigwana, the ZEC official, says the electoral body has been vindicated, in which "ZEC has conducted this election professionally and transparently" (News 24, 2018).

Nevertheless, the ZEC failed to be accountable and transparent in any given election in post-independence Zimbabwe under Mugabe and Mnangagwa's ZANU-PF-led government. In this case, ZEC did not account for the 2018 electoral figures laced with inflation and deflection of electoral figures. Therefore, elections should be documented beyond Election Day from the pre-election, election, and post-election environment, which should be a rule-bound driven process providing procedural certainty and outcome uncertainties for electoral credibility and legitimacy.

5.4 Conclusion

The involvement of an international electoral observer mission and CSO in any given election promotes a peaceful electoral process and conduct. Zimbabwe's 2018 observer mission reports detailed the pre-election, election, and post-election periods. Both 2018 internal and external observers' electoral reports and verdicts were consistent, validating the credibility and legitimacy of their information. However, international electoral observer mission verdicts often contradict the internal observer's verdicts in some instances. In which observers have often prioritized interest over the credibility and legitimacy of their reports and verdicts. The final section looked at the 2018 electoral V11 forms contestations and the Constitutional Court adjudication contradictory to the external electoral observers' verdicts. The internal and external observers identified electoral irregularities that are well documented but not yet proven. Hence, the international electoral observer mission and Civil Society Organization remain crucial in promoting democracy through electoral monitoring and observation. They provide reports, verdicts, and recommendations to improve future elections compared to previously conducted elections. With or without the electoral observer mission internal and external observation in Zimbabwe, elections have provided procedural uncertainty and outcome certainties in favor of the ruling party ZANU-PF. The internal and external observers are expected to promote credible, free, and fair future Zimbabwean elections compared to previously conducted elections

Chapter SIX

Prospects of pre-electoral opposition political parties' coalition-building in Zimbabwe



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*"Governments lose elections; the
opposition do not win them" (Tucker,
2007: 535-551)*

6.0 Introduction

Coalition theories are summed in the broadest sense of pre-electoral and post-electoral coalitions (Franklin and Mackie, 1983; 1984; Laver, 1986; Budge and Laver, 1986: 485-05). This phenomenon speaks of the office and policy-seeking political parties' coalitions in a narrower sense. The mid-1970s' third wave democratization' marked an increased number of representative parliamentary democracies (parliamentary coalition government) and pre-electoral coalitions globally (Laver *et al.*, 1986; Sweden by Bergman, 1995; Lanny and Randolph, 2001: 33-50). Hence, this chapter will focus mainly on the office-seeking (pre-electoral) coalition theories but not entirely dismiss the policy-seeking coalition phenomenon, which can be jointly examined, albeit interrelated concepts (Budge and Laver, 1986; Storm, 1990: 567; Warwick, 2006). Accordingly, Kapa and Shale (2014) support that coalitions are not exclusively for office-seeking but to influence state policies. In this regard, coalitions/alliances are a feature or characterization of plural democratic states. However, there is evidence of coalitions/alliances formation in competitive authoritarian regimes (Kapa, 2008: 339)

Tied to the above, scholars argued that the pre-electoral opposition political parties' coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes suffice for power-changing and electoral reforms (Robertson, 1976; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Steinberg, 2014; Chari, 2017). It is evident in the literature that the African continent's 1990s and 2010 third-wave democratization marked a shift in electoral politics with an increased number of political parties' coalitions (Kadima 2006; 2014). One author noted that "The opposition coalition gained traction and interest across African electoral politics" (Beardsworth, 2017). Whether the pre-electoral coalition will be successful or die

prematurely, many scholars maintain that it is necessary for extremely elite-partisan polarized states (Ordeshook, 1986; Kadima, 2014). But some conditions ensure a successful and stable pre-electoral coalition, including political parties' founding ideology, ethnic roots, and maturity of political parties. However, there are coalition intra- and inter-party challenges involving factionalism, fragmentation, power struggles, lack of political experience, and lack of financial resources, which lead to opposition political parties' premature death or unstable coalitions (Best, 2013: 314-42; Ostwald *et al.*, 2018: 31).

It is worth noting that opposition political parties' coalition has become important in recent literature on electoral politics (Wahman, 2006; 2013). Scholars generally agree that a stable office-seeking opposition political parties' coalition has a high margin of winning an election (Kadima, 2006; 2014). Based on the opposition political parties' ethnic coalition, campaigning, and voting behavior relations, the chapter will use psychological, sociological, and rational choice theories. Different voting behaviors are categorized into "Two kinds of swing voters and two kinds of base voters," equating to four types of behavioral voters (Weber 1978: 3; Strohmeier, 2002: 52-58). Hence, this chapter aims to detail the office-seeking opposition political parties' coalition-building in Zimbabwe, with special focus on the MDC-A opposition party previously under the leadership of Chamisa and the formation of the new political party Citizens Coalition for Change under Nelson Chamisa. Based on what might potentially stand against the Citizen Coalition for Change opposition coalition. On the other hand, this chapter will analyze the strength, weakness, and opportunities in the opposition coalition building towards the 2023 harmonized elections. In this regard, the opposition political parties' coalitions are towards power

changing (by maximizing electoral votes) and electoral reforms (law and policy reforms) (Diverge, 1954; Epstein, 1967; Wilson, 1973: 107).

There is a need to examine MDC from 1999 under Morgan Tsvangirai until the new 2022 party under Chamisa as Citizens Coalition for Change, based on the opposition political parties' coalition building. The cycle analysis is based on the 1999 formation of the MDC party, the 2005 MDC factionalism battles, and the 2008 MDC party name change. The chapter will further examine the post-Tsvangirai 2018 MDC-T succession disputes (involving factionalism battles and party name change) and the 2022 Citizens Coalition for Change formation. The new political party, CCC, formed by Nelson Chamisa and his close allies, aims to secure the 2023 electoral outcome. Will the coalition Citizens Coalition for Change succeed in winning the 2023 harmonized elections? There is a history of disputed elections and an unfavorable electoral environment for the upcoming 2023 elections. Hence, elections in Zimbabwe go beyond a coalition of opposition political parties, which entirely depends on coalition strengths and electoral strategies to secure the ballot and electoral outcome for power change. Thus, this chapter examines the 'dynamic nature, consequences, and prospects in opposition political parties' coalition toward the upcoming 2023 harmonized elections.

6.1 Office-seeking opposition coalition in Zimbabwe's electoral politics.

A coalition is the union of two or more political parties toward office or policy seeking, aiming at either maximizing electoral votes or crafting new policies (Downs 1957: 30-1; De Swan 1973: 88; Lanny and Randolph, 2001). Several theories in the study of political parties' coalition are from the ideological, ethnic, voting behavior, and historical origin and structure of political parties (Leiserson, 1966; Axelrod; 1970). A

coalition "Should seek to win, having minimal parties, able to cover median policy space, ideologically connected and closed, and able to pay off partners by the proportional rule" (Crook, 2002; Pedersen, 2012: 896-97). Hence, a minimum-sized coalition has a greater degree and advantage for the longevity and sustainability of the coalition (Dodd, 1976). Howard and Roessler (2006) maintain that a minimum coalition of opposition political parties in an office-seeking alliance has more certainty in the likelihood of government transition. For Riker (1962: 34-46), a coalition is based on rationality and winning choices –by maximizing gains or profits in -a zero-sum game initiative. In this regard, to ensure the effectiveness of a coalition after winning an election, there should be "A proportional distribution of government offices among coalition partners, examined in two competing models" (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 2-25). Hence, political elites use an office-seeking alliance to either retain or access power¹⁹².



Similar to the above, Riker's coalition theoretical phenomenon encompasses a multi-analytical framework from minimum to maximum office-seeking coalitions (Riker 1962: 373-82; Luebbert, 1983: 235). In this regard, he analyzed the phenomenon of the office-seeking coalition from a perspective of the minimum winning coalition, minimum-sized coalition, oversized coalition, and grand coalition (see also Bergman, 1995). He further noted that an office-seeking coalition aims to win an election despite political parties' ideological basis or foundation. However, pre-electoral coalitions can be compromised due to political parties' weaknesses and ideological differences (Franklin and Thomas, 1984). This particular notion by Riker concurs with the old saying "The enemy of my enemy is my friend," used as an opponent's coalesced strategy to win a war against the main enemy in the ancient era around

¹⁹² See, for example, Kapa and Shale 2014.

4BC (Saperstein, 2004; Borgeson and Valeri, 2007). Similarly, this statement speaks to the coalition of opposition political parties, despite their ideological differences, to successfully challenge the ruling incumbents in the electorate by maximizing electoral votes (Wahman 2011; 2013; Gandhi and Reuter 2013).

Andrew Wyatt (1999) examined the former as an alliance and the latter as a coalition in differentiating the pre-electoral and post-electoral coalitions. Building on Wyatt's proponents, Kadima examined the African countries' coalition formation from South Africa, Malawi, Kenya, and Senegal (Kadima, 2006; 2014). Coalitions involve both ex-ante (before) and post-ante (after) following the conduct of an election (Bandyopadhyay *et al.*, 2009). In this regard, alliances aim at maximizing electoral votes, whilst a coalition is an agreement to work together in a government or parliament on the basis of electoral outcome (ibid). However, the terms coalition and alliance are used interchangeably in the academic literature, referring to the pre-electoral and post-electoral examination of electoral politics. There is a three-phase manifestation of coalitions from pre-electoral unions that will eventually end in post-electoral cabinet sharing (power-sharing agreements), unit governments towards ending political crisis, and parliamentary coalitions (Resnick, 2014: 43)

Tied on the above, Zimbabwean electoral politics experienced the first opposition political parties' office-seeking alliance in the 1990s, with ZUM as the main opposition political party (Nkiwane, 1998; ZDI, 2016). However, the 1990s coalition between ZUM and other opposition political parties' breakout due to ideological differences and the weakness of opposition political parties (Sithole, 1993). Despite having coalition ideological difference challenges, opposition political parties' fragmentation and factionalism often cost them in the electorate (see Sartori, 1973;

Palfrey and Poole 1987). Hence, this has been the case with Zimbabwean opposition political parties and the overall examination of African opposition electoral politics (Mungwari and Vhutuza, 2017; Sachikonye, 2017). Nevertheless, we have had successful opposition coalitions in Africa, including Malawi, Kenya, and Senegal. Zimbabwe had its unique case of a successful opposition movement coalition in 1999 (McCandles, 2011). Thus, we have seen varied political parties and civil society groups fusion and fission in the African continent's electoral body politic.

For instance, the 2000 referendum election found a union of MDC and NCA (coalesced civil societies and opposition political parties) campaigning for a no-vote against ZANU-PF (Magure, 2009). A successful coalition between Civil Society Organizations and a newly formed trade unionist opposition political party¹⁹³ marked the defeat of ZANU-PF in the electorate for the first time in two decades of post-independence (McCandles, 2011). However, ZANU-PF was electorally shocked and humiliated, prompting the party to promulgate restrictive laws decimating opposition political parties and CSO activities. The ZANU-PF party promulgated the 2002 AIPPA and POSA acts and the 2003 Political Parties Finance Act (ibid). Nevertheless, the union of MDC and NCA was not based on office-seeking but on pre-electoral constitutional reform. It, however, marked a shift in the opposition political parties' movement, in which the opposition coalition is a pre-requirement to face the ZANU-PF party in the electorate. With a record of factionalism and

¹⁹³ MDC was formed from a trade union, ZCTU, in 1999. In 2005 there was a splinter party MDC under Nkala, which Mutambara later ruled in 2008 as MDC-M. The 1999 MDC under Tsvangirai ran the 2008 elections as MDC-T until the 2013 election. In 2018 MDC-T was under the leadership of Chamisa, which contested the election as MDC-A. Recently we have had two MDCs, MDC-A under Chamisa and MDC-T under the leadership of Mwonozora.

fragmentation, opposition political parties have been unable to challenge ZANU-PF in the electorate.

To avoid splitting electoral votes, scholars aptly agreed on the coalition of opposition political parties (Kadima, 2006; 2014). ZANU-PF party, over the years, has either or both used coercion and consent, directly or indirectly influencing opposition factionalism and fragmentation (see, for example, Beardsworth, 2016). The 2018 elections had 23 political parties that contested for the Presidential post and over 50 registered political parties (IRI/NDI 2018; EUOEM 2018). Hence, Riker's examination of grand or oversized coalitions¹⁹⁴ toward winning an election regardless of the ideological foundation is inappropriate, particularly looking at Zimbabwe's opposition political parties' fragmentation (Riker, 1962: 38). Reiterating the above point, Riker pointed out that, "In a zero-sum game with side-payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger." However, the opposition political parties' coalitions across Africa have been impacted by inter- and intra-party challenges involving fragmentation, factionalism, and power struggles (Beardsworth, 2017).

Adding on to the above, this has been the case with the main opposition political party MDC-T internecine conflicts and power struggles as members jostled to succeed former and late President Morgan Tsvangirai (Corcoran Bill, the Irish Times news reporter, 2018). Evidently involved Chamisa, Khupe, and Mudzuri tussling to find their way to the Presidential seat, replacing Tsvangirai, whose days by then 2017 were seemingly numbered having colony cancer at its late stage

¹⁹⁴ Riker's notion of an oversized coalition is basically based on the uncertainty of the minimum winning sized coalition. In this regard, the partners will open up for more coalition partners to have high probabilities or chances of winning and not losing an election (see, for example page 48 of his book on theory of political coalition).

(Nyakanyanga Sally, Daily Maverick News Reporter, February 2018). Although trying to be doused, the factional rifts in the MDC-T party were flaming in rallies, subsequently leading to elite conflicting messages, smear campaigning, and counterclaims among party members (Cockburn Harry, Independent news reporter, 2018).

The crescendo tension among the MDC-T party members grew worse when the late Morgan Tsvangirai appointed Nelson Chamisa as the acting party President in 2018. In this regard, the MDC-T senior party members disputed the February appointment of Chamisa by Tsvangirai as acting party president as unconstitutional and an ultra vires action (see the case file online Judgement No. SC 56/2020, Civil Appeal No. SC 289/2019). Similarly, article 9. 21. 1 of the MDC-T party constitution supports holding an 'Extra-Ordinary Congress' in the advent of the President's death or resignation within a year (Mwonzora and Hodzi, 2021). The intra-party structural conflicts within the MDC-T involved different internal party structures within the MDC-T party structure, including the Chamisa faction, Thokozani faction, and the Mwonzora faction. Thokozani Khupe as being the senior Vice President appointed in the 2014 party congress, said that;

"Chamisa has an unquenchable thirst for power. He is prepared to use violence to grab power, as he is doing now. Which she further accused him of shamelessly staging a coup" (Chronicle, January 2020).

From the above, the death of Morgan Tsvangirai, opposition leader of MDC-T, resulted in sixes and sevens among the top leadership of vice presidents and their supporters, an elite-partisan intra-party conflict (Joseph Winter reporter BBC News 2018). Tsvangirai was actively involved in allying with the opposition political parties

to challenge ZANU-PF in the 2018 elections. The opposition alliance had five political parties that rallied behind the 2016 MDC-T under Tsvangirai (Mungwari and Vhutuza, 2017; Sachikonye, 2017). Nelson Chamisa as being the newly appointed party president before the 2018 elections, was noted saying;

"There is a lot of noise in the cockpit; these are just turbulences. It is a difficult transition. We had a giant who was our head, our leader, and suddenly that giant is no longer there." He further said, "Obviously, the small giants would want to fit in the shoes. Nevertheless, you can be assured it will be resolved," he added. "Do not listen to too much noise. Listen to the music coming from the cockpit, and the music is that we are going to win the election." (Chamisa, 2018)

However, the above statement by Chamisa was contrasted by one of the interviewees, similarly to the Afrobarometer¹⁹⁵ electoral survey prediction. Commenting on the upcoming 2023 harmonized elections, one respondent noted that;

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The current situation in the main opposition, then MDC-A, now Citizens Coalition for Change, has little or no hope in the upcoming 2023 elections¹⁹⁶. Chamisa's presidency has made an insignificant contribution to the opposition political parties' movement. I think he (Chamisa) let bygones be bygones (real fight between ZANU-PF and MDC-T) by not adopting his predecessor's legacy. The historical endeavors of the MDC party are fading away, and the party is collapsing from within. We need someone with the character of the late Morgan Tsvangirai to challenge the ruling

¹⁹⁵ Afrobarometer (2017) noted that ZANU-PF was going to win the 2018 elections

¹⁹⁶ The history of election rigging or disputed electoral outcomes is about to repeat itself in the 2023 election, in which Professor Moyo Jonathan noted there are no development to ensure free, fair and credible elections. SAPES Trust 2021

party ZANU-PF. Otherwise, it will be a long-term dream for the Citizens Coalition for Change to be in power (Interview with Mrs. Emily T J, February 2022).

In this regard, Chamisa has failed to fit in the shoes of his predecessor, yet, there is much contention on this particular aspect (Munhende Leopold, reporter of New Zimbabwe, 2021). However, most respondents agreed that Chamisa learned much from his predecessor's fate against Mugabe's administration. Following that, opposition political parties' supporters and leaders were tortured and murdered (Allison Simon, Mail and Guardian news reporter, 2016). Hence, Chamisa's silence is a well-calculated intellectual move because ZANU-PF under Mnangagwa (the Crocodile) wants to incriminate and put him behind bars for disrupting the opposition parties' campaigning toward the 2023 elections (interview notes, February 2022). Chamisa has proven an electoral threat to the ruling party ZANU-PF evidenced in the 2018 harmonized elections, in which he managed to secure 44. 3%, whilst Mnangagwa won with 50. 8% (Mungwari, 2018; EUEOM, 2018: 35). Arguably, the electoral processes were deeply flawed (see reports by EUEOM 2018, NDI/IRI 2018; EISA, 2018).

There was an attack on the MDC-A Chamisa's convoy by allegedly ZANU-PF supporters who threw stones¹⁹⁷ and chanted ZANU-PF slogans. The incident happened on their way to meet the community in Charumbira Masvingo Province (Fadzai Mahere reporting to eNCA News on October 2021). The ZANU-PF party disputed the allegation of blockading Nelson Chamisa's motorcade. Besides physical violence, the ZANU-PF party has decimated the opposition party MDC-A, including

¹⁹⁷ eNCA News (2021) Watch/ Discussion MDC alliance convoy attacked October 2021 available on youtube eNCA channel.

the withdrawal of financial resources, which have been transferred to MDC-T under Mwonozora as a recognized party under the Political Parties Finance Act.

Furthermore, there is polarization within the opposition political parties across Africa, involving fragmentation and factionalism battles which have ensured continuous ruling parties' electoral dominance (Southall, 1998: 443-69). Similarly applies to ZANU-PF, UCP, and ANC revolutionary ruling parties in Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and South Africa, respectively (Ferim, 2014; Southall, 2015). In this regard, the main opposition MDC-T party members were involved in power struggles challenging the legal basis of the 2018 party name change from MDC-T to MDC-A and the constitutionality appointment of Chamisa as the party President (News 24, 2018). There was a hotly contested MDC-T case in the Supreme Court, in which Mwonozora stated that;



"I note that following the Supreme Court judgment in MDC and Others v Elias Mashavira and Others (SC56/2020) of the 31st of March 2020, which ruled that you were no longer the President of the Movement for Democratic Change formerly led by the late Dr. Morgan Tsvangirai, you have continued to defy the court order. He further noted that in terms of clause 5.10 (a) of the MDC-T constitution Mr. Chamisa automatically terminated his membership to the party by joining or forming another party" (Chronicle, January 2020).

Tied on the above, the Supreme Court ruling over MDC-T party members adjudicated for the party to revert to the 2014 party structures, in which the party leadership prior to the party constitution was going to be contested by senior party members, including Mwonozora and Khupe (Tapfumaneyi Robert, Newsday reporter, 2020). In this regard, the 2020 party election was won by Mwonozora, which Khupe

deeply contested as a fraudulent election who, together with Mudzuri, were both appointed as vice presidents (Chifamba Mitchel, The Africa Report, 2020). Hence, the Zimbabwean electorate had two MDCs in the post-2017 coup, similar to the two 2005 MDCs. The Africa report (2021) detailed that following the Political Parties Finance Act, the funds embarked for MDC-A were handed to MDC-T, led in 2020 by Khupe, before the party election. The late Alex Magaisa further noted that multi-party democracy is under threat because of ZANU-PF's authoritarianism involving their hopes to crush and fragment opposition political parties toward a one-party regime (ibid).

Similarly, the 2008 opposition political parties' fragmentation costs them their electoral advantage, having majority votes but being legally unable to ascend to the Presidential seat (Mungwari and Vhutuza, 2017). However, there is a record of Zimbabwe's ruling party's factionalism battles, which could have worked to the advantage of the opposition political parties' 2018 coalition. Nevertheless, with a current record of power struggles, factionalism, and fragmentation of opposition parties, ZANU-PF will continue dominating the electorate (Interview notes January 2022). This brings us to the 2020 elections in Malawi. The opposition political parties constitutionally challenged the identified electoral irregularities in the court. A re-run election was adjudicated and set to run between two main political parties (Jegwa, Peter reporter BBC News, February 2020). Finally, the election managed to dispose of the presiding incumbent, Mtharikwa, through the ballot following a successful opposition political parties' coalition.

In addition to the above, the dilemmas in opposition political parties in Zimbabwe are beyond factionalism and fragmentation, which involved an increase in defectors from

the main opposition MDC-A to ZANU-PF and MDC-T opposition faction under Mwonozora aligned to ZANU-PF (Mangwanya Miriam News Day reporter August 2021). The MDC-A defectors were enrolled at ZANU-PF's Chitepo School of Ideology for orientation and training in order to be officially welcomed as ZANU-PF party members (Herald, 2021). Hence, the instability in opposition political parties will probably disrupt the 2023 intended power-changing and electoral reforms (interview notes, January 2022). Following Mwonozora's overwhelming enthusiasm supporting the ruling party, ZANU-PF's policies, Mbofana made a profound argument that;

"In our own Zimbabwe, this has manifested itself from political entities that portray themselves as genuinely and uncompromisingly against each other. A very common denominator of most of these 'dirt games' in most countries is their 'fight' for political power and the other lucrative trappings associated with such offices. But, most recently, we have witnessed another equally shameful opportunistic sham of the so-called cooperation between the opposition and the ruling party. Now that is us a world first! Since when have opposition parties 'cooperated' with ruling parties? He said it is problematic when the country's citizenry finds out that the opposition is cooperating with the ruling party. How can Dynamos cooperate with Highlanders? Or Chelsea with Manchester United?" (Mbofana, 2021)

Hence, it became clear that MDC-T under Mwonozora cannot be accounted for opposition coalition-building towards the 2023 harmonized elections¹⁹⁸. However, MDC-A had further internal disruptions (Mangwaya, 2021). On record involving the 2021 MDC-A fallout of party members who joined ZANU-PF ranks, including Lillian Temveous, the former treasury of the party; Blessing Chebundo, a senior party

¹⁹⁸ Riker examined that the coalition partners should have a strong foundation in order to maximize the chances of winning an election.

official, and former Senator James Makore (ibid). The internal MDC-A disruptions further involved 450 youths in Harare and 200 in Kwekwe who joined ZANU-PF ranks (Muponde, 2021). The printing of MDC-A regalia and party membership cards ahead of the 2023 elections was denounced by MDC-A spokesperson Fadzai Mahere. She was noted saying that;

“The so-called defections are a charade by the ruling party to portray an image of an opposition party facing implosion. The purported defectors were hired ZANU-PF activists dressed in newly printed MDC Alliance regalia and flaunting neatly-minted membership cards. MDC will not be swayed by cheap ZANU-PF propaganda. Those fake cards do not belong to MDC-A. (...) ZANU-PF is faking defections from MDC-A. It is an act of desperation to paint a false theatrical picture that they are recruiting our members when the reality is that our base is growing exponentially. She further said they banned elections because they feared our popular support. People are tired of bad governance; they want a change and not suffering” (Harare Metro News, October 2021)

However, contrary to what then MDC-A spokesperson Mahere noted regarding ZANU-PF's manoeuvres to decimate opposition political parties, ZANU-PF spokesperson Simon Khaya Moyo was noted describing her allegation as;

"Hogwash. He further said, we are not a consultancy for disintegrating political parties. Those running short of oxygen cannot blame ZANU-PF; they are also welcomed to join the people's party (...)" (Moyo, 2021).

In this regard, estimated three-quarters of MDC-A party members were estimated to fallout and join the ZANU-PF party before the 2023 elections (Muponde, 2021). However, Matemadanda, former ZANU-PF commissar, was demoted and appointed

as an ambassador because his striking statements revealed ZANU-PF's maneuvers and well-oiled authoritarian strategy against opposition political parties. Rusero made a similar observation when he said;

"Those defectors to ZANU-PF are better than those who are defecting and remaining in the MDC-A. You cannot downplay the defections; I think that is where MDC-A is losing the plot. The issue of parading defectors is what ZANU-PF is good at. You should understand how ZANU-PF does its things. We have returned to the time of pungwe (overnight political vigils) at the height of the liberation struggle. For one to survive, you have to show allegiance to ZANU-PF by attending these pungwe's (night vigils)" (News Day, October 2021)

Tied on the above, Greene Robert, in his book '48 principles of power', examined that, "Say less than necessary and appear more greater and powerful than you are." Similarly, Cardinal de Retz (1613-1679) noted that "It is even more damaging for a minister to say foolish things than to do them." Concurrently "Undutiful words of a subject do often take deeper root than the memory of ill deeds ..." (Sir Walter Raleigh, 1554-1618; see also Robert Greene, 1998: 47). In this regard, words by Matemadanda were costly to his party position in which he was, however, a whistleblower to the opposition political parties.

In an interview with Andy Hodges, Komichi Morgan, MDC-T chairperson, responded to elections in Zimbabwe from 1980. He noted that we need comprehensive electoral reforms in Zimbabwe—similarly supported by MDC-A vice-chairperson Job Sikhala¹⁹⁹. They, however, disagreed on the 2023 harmonized election suspension

¹⁹⁹ ZTN. (2021). Election 2023: Should Zim form Inclusive Government Instead? Andy Hodges interviewed Job Sikhala, Komichi and Paul Mangwana, available at <https://www.ztn.youtube> channel.

and working as an inclusive government with ZANU-PF, similar to the 2009 Global Political Agreement and the formation of the 2009 GNU²⁰⁰. Sikhala believed that the suspension of the 2023 election was an illegitimate call in which the citizens had the right to vote for their representatives.

Contrary to Sikhala's observations, Paul Mangwana, secretary of legal affairs ZANU-PF party, supported the inclusive government with distinct opinions. In support of Mangwana, Komichi maintained that the people had lost their confidence in the elections in Zimbabwe since 1980. In this regard, he noted that 66% of the people support the 2023 GNU, and 51% have seen no value in elections in Zimbabwe²⁰¹. From another angle supporting the noted above, Mangwana stated that everything about elections has to be a rule-bound process, and the government has to adhere to the dictates of the masses.



Tied on to the above, Sikhala contested the views of both ZANU-PF and MDC-T. He noted that elections should not be a ritual but withheld fundamentally with certain barometers to meet the free and fair electoral process and outcome threshold. An inclusive government is a way of illegally dishing offices by political members against the people's will²⁰². The MDC-T and ZANU-PF parties are afraid of the election; that is why they are calling for the suspension of the 2023 elections. The 2022 by-election results in favor of CCC resonate well with Job Sikhala's observations of the fear of MDC-T and ZANU-PF towards the 2023 general elections.

²⁰⁰ See also Chigora and Guzura (2011) examination of the Government of National Union which found the settlement agreement of ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and MDC-M in 2009, mediated Thabo Mbeki SADC representative.

²⁰¹ (ibid)

²⁰² (ibid)

Furthermore, the rationale behind the opposition political parties' coalition is to win an election which has been the case with the 2020 Malawian opposition political parties (Africa news, 2020; BBC news, August 2020). Historically the 2000 elections in Senegal found a joined opposition force as the Sopi (or Change) alliance defeating the ruling incumbent, ending 40 years of one-party dominance (Kelly, 2018). Similarly, the Kenyan opposition political party coalition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) swept to power in the 2002 elections disposing of the government that had ruled since 1963 (Tsuda, 2010). However, Lesotho has had failed coalitions following the 2012, 2015, 2017 and 2020 coalition formation due to intra- and inter-party conflicts²⁰³ (Kapa and Shale, 2014). Other factors include ideological differences, internal power struggles, and financial instabilities.

Similarly, the Zimbabwean 2018 opposition alliance faced internal and external challenges giving rise to the ZANU-PF party's electoral dominance²⁰⁴ (see why opposition coalition succeeds or fails by Beardsworth, 2017). Thus, we have stable and unstable electoral alliances, which determine the union's strength, longevity, and sustainability. In commenting on the opposition political parties' coalition, one interviewee noted that;

With the history of ZANU-PF electoral dominance through authoritarianism of coercion and consent decimating the opposition political parties, my prediction for

²⁰³ Nyane, H., and Kapa, M, A. (eds). Coalition Politics in Lesotho. A Multi-disciplinary Study of Coalitions and their implications for Governance: Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.

²⁰⁴ The alliance involved the Movement for Democratic Change Tsvangirai (MDC-T) under Morgan Tsvangirai, National People's Party (NPP) under Mujuru, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under Welshman Ncube, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under Dumiso Dabengwa, Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD) under Simba Makoni, People's Democratic Party (PDP) under Tendai Biti, and Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ) under Elton Mangoma.

the 2023 elections favors ZANU-PF²⁰⁵. This is because of opposition political parties' ill-preparedness to challenge ZANU-PF in the upcoming 2023 and 2028 elections. Chamisa being the leader of then MDC-A, now CCC, should have done so much, in which too little has been done considering opposition political parties' coalition building. Zimbabwe has more than 20 political parties competing with ZANU-PF for the Presidential post (interview with Mrs. Muchina R, M., January 2022).

Tied on the above, Dzikamai Bere clarified that the Zimbabwean electoral environment is not conducive to holding an election in 2023²⁰⁶. He noted that the upcoming 2023 elections had already been engineered in favor of ZANU-PF. Following the business elite cartels (cartel power dynamics), the post-coup environment, judiciary capture, decimation of opposition parties, the ZEC population census and delimitation of constituencies, opposition political parties capture, and youth involvement in electoral politics as an architecture of violence and intimidation²⁰⁷. Hence, with the pre-electoral environment in Zimbabwe, it is inevitable for ZANU-PF to win the 2023 election, as prophesied by Dzikamai Bere.

In a seminar discussion and presentation entitled, "What needs to be in place for elections in 2023 to pass the audit of acceptability?" Daniel Calingaert noted that election rigging is common in undemocratic countries, but can happen anywhere, in which elections can be rigged in every electoral process²⁰⁸. In this regard, they

²⁰⁵ See, for example, the article by Masunungure (2011) on militarized electoral institutions in Zimbabwe

²⁰⁶ Dzikamai Bere seminar presentation SAPES Trust the 10th of June 2021 ("Are the Necessary conditions in place for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe in 2023?" available on SAPES Trust Facebook page and YouTube channel

²⁰⁷ (ibid)

²⁰⁸ SAPES Trust 2021 What needs to be in place for elections in 2023 to pass the audit of acceptability? On the 23rd of November 2021, SOLAR Music Rights Management, Latin Author - Sonya TV, Sony ATV Publishing, UNIAO BRASILEIRA DE EDITORAS DE MUSICA - UBEM, Latin Author Perf, and 5 Music Rights Societies.


should be put in place ways to detect and deter sophisticated electoral methods of fraud and manipulation. Elections, in this case, are a political competition to decide who should govern and confer domestic legitimacy and international recognition to rulers. In most cases, it's riskier to rely on the international community because they genuinely call it as they see it and make some political calculations giving one side or the other more leeway than is merited. Hence, the probability of a minimum winning office-seeking opposition coalition entirely depends on coalition stability and electoral strategy to counter the authoritarian electoral rigging strategies

On the other hand, in analyzing the Zambian electoral process, Susan Mwape noted that the elections begin with the delimitation of constituencies, which attracts gerrymandering tilting the electoral ground in favor of the ruling parties²⁰⁹. However, the Zambian 2020 election foresaw an electoral turnaround and opposition parties won the election. At the same time, Ellen Dingani, the program coordinator for the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, noted that in 2018 an observer mission's report compilation and comparison to Zimbabwe was conducted to give recommendations. They collated 223 recommendations from among the observers from the EU, COMESA, SADC, AU, ZCC, and CCJP. The audit came with 15 clusters and themes under in total of 115 recommendations. This has led to reforms in the electoral laws in Zimbabwe, including the youth quarter, an extension of the women's quarter, and the introduction of the women's quarter (constitution amendment number 2) in the local authority²¹⁰. However, the much-anticipated power change in Zimbabwe through the opposition coalition in the 2023 harmonized elections with or without electoral reforms or electoral audit is unrealistic, as the history of electoral rigging is about to repeat itself.

²⁰⁹ (ibid)

²¹⁰ (ibid)

Similarly, Jonathan Moyo made a profound observation following five aspects of why ZANU-PF will win the 2023 harmonized elections (SAPES-Trust, seminar presentation May 2021). This involves the legitimacy crisis in the three arms of government, which controls three economic aspects of fuel, forex, and food (three f's), the 31st of March 2020 Supreme Court judgment on MDC-T, the presumption of previous disputed elections, and consequences of the post-coup²¹¹. According to Moyo's observation, the 2023 election will be a certainty rather than a prediction of history about to repeat itself (see also the presentation by Aurther Mutambara and Fadzai Mahere, SAPES-Trust May 2021). Hence, the reality aspect of the pre-electoral opposition coalition in Zimbabwe is conspicuously low toward the intended electoral victory.



In the quest to quench the confusion and dilemmas among the supporters, having MDC-T under Mwonozora claiming the MDC-A party name under Chamisa, Chamisa registered a new party as Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), launched on the 24th of January 2022²¹². Chamisa said that "We are number one in the country. Champions are fought by mediocrity. You cannot stop us. We are number one" (The Zimbabwean Mail, 2022; Times Live, 2022). In the article praising the Croc despising Nero (...), the author unveiled the number one chant by Roki and Kofi Olomido as a

²¹¹ Jonathan Moyo seminar presentation SAPES Trust the 13th of May 2021 "The Stampede towards 2023 elections: Is History about to repeat itself again in Zimbabwe?" available on SAPES Trust Facebook page and YouTube channel.

²¹² There have been factionalism wars in the MDC-T under Mwonozora since he resorted to the old MDC-A party name, Thokozani Khupe, claiming from the odds that Mwonozora is no longer the MDC-T party president. The history of the MDC-T party is repeating itself, having Chamisa expelled from the party headquarters and provincial offices; the same is following Mwonozora. The understanding of MDC is to trace it in the phases of -from Morgan Tsvangirai as MDC, the 2008 elections when it became the MDC-T, the 2018 MDC-T as MDC-A under Chamisa, and finally Citizens Coalition for Change, a new political party separate from the MDC party structures and name. The factionalism wars or intra-polarity in the party has claimed MDC from having a solid challenge against ZANU-PF for decades.

campaign message for Mnangagwa (see, for example, Munhuweyi, 2022). It seems Chamisa is following in the same footsteps of the 2013 election campaign message by MDC-T under Morgan Tsvangirai. The one-finger campaign reflecting the CCC as number one proves that Roki and Kofi Olomido (New Zim TV, YouTube video, 2022) swayed Chamisa into yielding to the same campaign chant message for Mnangagwa. MDC-T had no campaign message in the 2013 elections leading to a landslide electoral victory favoring ZANU-PF.

Will history repeat itself in the upcoming harmonized elections? Although Chamisa disputed this in an interview, the probability is undoubtedly high. He noted that "Now we are stronger than we were in the 2018 harmonized elections. The 2023 elections will be a whitewash in favor of the Citizens Coalition for Change" (SABC News, the 27th of January 2022²¹³). Nevertheless, the prospects of the 2023 electoral outcome are, to some extent, in favor of the ZANU-PF. On the other hand, the CCC party won the 2022 by-elections resoundingly and is promising to make a turnaround in the 2023 electorate. Although having won the 2022 by-election, it is not a guarantee that the CCC opposition coalition will win the 2023 harmonized election.

Similarly, the 2000 referendum election marked resounding hopes for the opposition party MDC and CSO (NCA) coalition after they won the election with a no vote. However, the ZANU-PF party has been systematically maneuvering the electorate to ensure that the opposition political parties will not win the presidential election²¹⁴. Hence, this is safe to conclude that elections in Zimbabwe on record are a zero-sum

²¹³ SABC News (2022) Zimbabwe's opposition leader Nelson Chamisa confident of performing well in upcoming by-elections www.sabcnews.com

²¹⁴ See, for example, Southall 2015 article when he analyzed from dominant parties to competitive authoritarianism looking at Zimbabwe and South Africa.

game in favor of the ZANU-PF ruling incumbents. The next section shall detail how political campaigning and ethnic relations influence Zimbabwe's voting behavior and, subsequently, voting decisions.

6. 2 Ethnicity, electoral campaigning, and voting behavior relations

From the above section, pre-electoral coalitions aim at winning an election involving ideological, ethnical, campaigning, and voting behavior considerations. It is detailed that the union of ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 necessitated ZANU-PF to win majority votes in both Ndebele and Shona- ethnic speaking constituencies during the 1990s decade, although the 1987 unity government is argued as not a coalition (see Mandaza and Sachikonye, 1991; Sithole and Makumbe, 1997). Therefore, the opposition political parties in multi-ethnic states must consider ethnical factors in forming a coalition (Egobueze and Ojirika, 2017). Zimbabwe has diversified ethnic structured societies from the Ndebele and Shona-speaking people, in which the Shona societies encompass mainly the Kalanga, Ndaou, Manyika, and Zezuru (Alexander, 1998; Moyo, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020: 34). Similar to Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Kenya, and Senegal consolidate multi-racial societies. The countries have a detailed history of multi-coalition formation along ethnic lines or boundaries (Kadima and Kasenally Chapter 3; 72-109; Kelly, 2018:209-229; Fjelde and Hoglund, 2018).

There is a close relationship between multi-ethnic societies in Zimbabwe and voting behavior from post-independence in 1980 (Alexander, 2000: 385; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Rukuni, 2020). Given the findings, the rural areas in Zimbabwe consolidate both the majority population and registered voters. ZANU-PF managed to champion electoral victories for years through coercion and consent involving intensive


campaigning, vote-buying, voter intimidation, and violence (see Masunungure, 2009; 2011). In this case, the opposition political parties should pay particular attention to intensively campaigning in the multi-ethnic rural areas, where a majority of Zimbabweans reside (Interview notes February 2022). Hence, it is important to understand the population distribution in a multi-ethnic state or provincialized state for coalition formation and campaigning.

Furthermore, the behavioral voting analysis has two types of swing voters and two types of base voters influenced by class, gender, age, ethnicity, and race (Brooks et al., 2006; Schofield and Reeves, 2014). There is an argument that "There is no such thing as the voter. There are different voters, characterized by different voting behavior, resulting in different voting decisions" (Strohmeier 2013; 52). These include the traditional base voter, value rational base voter, instrumental rational swing voter, and effectual swing voter (Weber, 1978; Dalton, 1984). The "Traditional base voters have ingrained habituation," while the "Value rational base voter has a high tendency party affiliation and rationality." The instrumental rational swing voters have a low degree of party affiliation and a higher degree of rationality.

In contrast, "The effectual swing voters have an extremely low degree of party affiliation and rationality" (ibid). In this regard, the psychological and sociological aspects play an essential role in influencing voting behavior. This is the case with American electoral politics involving the Republicans and the Democrats, polarized groups mostly influenced by traditional base voters (see also Howard on "A Sketch of Political Psychology"). Zimbabwe, however, has a higher degree of value rational base voters, as has been noted in the history of the 21st century multiple electoral

outcomes between MDC and ZANU-PF (Makumbe, 2009; Southall, 2013; Hodzi, 2014; IRI/NDI, 2018).

Moreover, looking at the voting pattern in Zimbabwe, Obert Hodzi (2014) analyzed the youth factor in the 2013 elections, that the youths are polarized and driven by individual interests rather than for group benefits. Similarly, the ZimStats, (2012) observed that the youths comprise a majority of the voting population in Zimbabwe. The above observation is supported by Magure (2014) that youth comprise two-thirds of the voting population. However, Hodzi (2014) made it clear that the youth in Zimbabwe are driven by selfish ambitions comprising swing voters. Similarly, Hodgkinson (2003) defined the youth as "a complex social construct difficult to define, susceptible to manipulations by politicians." ZANU-PF incorporated a youth empowerment policy and the 2013 youth campaign movement, including the young generation G-40, which garnered the party's majority of youth support in the 2013 harmonized elections (Hodzi, 2014).



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Drawing from the above, the opposition political parties' coalition should prioritize electorally educating the youths and further involving them in active party politics. The MDC's Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) in universities of Zimbabwe has contributed to youth electoral campaign participation at local or micro level campus elections against the ZANU-PF's youth movement group Zimbabwe Congress of Student Union (ZICOSU) (interview notes, February 2022). Similarly, Ohrvall and Oskarsson (2019: 1-17) examined how mock elections influence voter turnout in real elections, looking at the Swedish 2010 parliamentary elections and 2009 European parliamentary elections.

Adding on to the above, Chipo Dendere made a profound presentation on how ZANU-PF has strategically used financial resources for electoral campaigning²¹⁵ (SAPES-Trust seminar presentation September 2021). ZANU-PF has renewed itself to convince younger voters through financial aid support from age 22 to 35. ZANU-PF strategically found youth in general, specifically youth celebrities, on media platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, and Whatsapp. With the lack of energy in the youth league, the former ZANU-PF member Kudzai Chipanga G-40 faction has been re-admitted into the ZANU-PF Mnangagwa Lacoste faction. Chipanga is campaigning for ZANU-PF toward the 2023 elections²¹⁶ due to ZANU-PF's fear of losing potential youth voters. The same scenario transpired closer home in the Zambian electorate, where first-time youth voters made a turnaround in the electorate by voting for opposition leader Hichilima (BBC News, August 2021).

However, Zimbabwe has never had a revolutionary opposition transition, which Zambia had in 1991. In this regard, the Zambians voted out their equivalent to the ZANU-PF party in Zimbabwe twice. The ZANU-PF party has been campaigning and registering youth who are easily manipulated to vote in their favor. At the same time, the opposition MDC-A (now CCC) had insufficient resources to conduct youth party registration and active campaigning²¹⁷. With this scenario of no record of political transition and opposition active youth campaigning, the youth evaluation of politics in Zimbabwe plays a vital role in their participation. In the 2000 decade, Zimbabwe had

²¹⁵ Chipo Dendere seminar presentation SAPES Trust the 09th of September 2021, Book launch Re/membering Robert Mugabe: Politics, Legacy, Philosophy, Life and Death available on Facebook and YouTube.

²¹⁶ (ibid)

²¹⁷ (ibid)

a different political landscape in which the youth strongly supported MDC. However, the youths in the 2017 post-coup period were captured by the ruling party ZANU-PF.

In contrast to Chipso Dendere's observations, MDC-A under Chamisa has been involved in youth registration and voter education in rural and urban areas (ZimEye, August 2021). In this regard, MDC-A has actively targeted ZANU-PF's strongholds, including Uzumba, Maramba, and Pfungwe, which the constituencies have been allegedly utilized for ghost voting. Zamuchiya, on SAPES Trust Policy Dialogue, stated that "election rigging has a ceiling" (Mandaza, 2021). Although Zimbabwean elections take a unique form and shape, CCC might impact the 2023 elections. Predictably the 2021 elections in Zambia favored the ruling party. However, Hichilima influenced the electorate by intensively registering the youth, involving voter education, and campaigning. #CitizensCovergeForChange is CCC's engineering message to ensure transparency and accountability of ZEC electoral figures in the 2023 elections.



Tied on to the above, Mandaza critically examined that Zambia and Zimbabwe are too close to call, especially on the electoral front in recent years (ibid). Hence, there is still a contestation surrounding the prediction of the upcoming Zimbabwean elections towards the 2023 elections. The MDC-A has made an impact by registering voters in ZANU-PF's strongholds. In this regard, the hashtag #ZambiaDecides2021 influences opposition political parties in Africa and Zimbabwe, in particular, to take a stance despite revolutionary parties' militarized electoral dominance.

From the above, both the sociological and psychological influence personal interest in rational choice voting decisions (see Lasswell, 1930). The social psychology approach succinctly supports that party identification is from "Childhood to

adolescence socialization" (Almond and Verba, 1971; Nie *et al.*, 1976). The psychosocial analysis is best defined in the cognitive consistency theory, reference group theory, and rational choice theory (see Downs, 1957; Festinger, 1957; Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Hence, these theories give an overall assessment of what influences different voting behaviors. However, the Zimbabwean electorate goes beyond self-gratified voter decisions, influenced by the psychological effects of coercion and consent, in which voters have been voting in favor of the ruling party ZANU-PF in post-independence (interview notes January 2022). One interviewee was of the view that;

In rural constituencies such as Uzumba, Maramba, and Pfungwe, ZANU-PF has inflated numbers in the electorate. How can such places have large population distribution than Manicaland constituencies? I assume this is where ZANU-PF intensively utilizes ghost voting and vote-buying and further violence and intimidation. People will vote in the name of peace, not by choice but coercively, for ZANU-PF. The coalition of opposition political parties matters if they are willing to coalesce along ethnic lines in Zimbabwe (Interview with Mrs. Pfungwa, J. January 2022).

Similarly, ZANU-PF has been coercing teachers in Mutoko district to register as party members, which a teacher's union in Zimbabwe observed,

"Over the weekend, members of ZANU-PF terrorized some teachers at Kagande in Mutoko district, forcing them to register as a part of the five million voters for ZANU-PF. In some cases, ZANU-PF had all the details of the teachers; they just visited to confirm" (ARTUZ, 2021).

Flowing from the above, the electoral politics in multi-ethnic societies are arguably prone to rigging through ballot stuffing, gerrymandering, political violence and intimidation, and ghost voting (Chandra 2011: 155; Stokke, 2020). This brings us to ZEC being legalized to conduct population census and delimitation of constituencies towards the 2023 harmonized elections (Murwira Zvamaida reporting to Herald, 2021, EISA, 2021). ZIMSTART has previously conducted population censuses prior to the 19th constitution amendment, including the 2002 and 2012 population censuses (Central Statistical Office, 2002; ZIMSTAT and UNFPA, 2015). Jonathan Moyo examined that the ZEC board has been a conduit of the patronage system following its membership appointment, which is definitely towards securing ZANU-PF's electoral outcomes. This is due to its involvement in the population census and delimitation of constituencies (Moyo 2019; 2021). In this regard, the delimitation of constituencies necessitated gerrymandering (mixing of rural and urban constituencies) in the electorate ever since the population census was conducted in Zimbabwe (see, for example, Moyo, 2019).



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Moreover, there is a growing heated debate over campaigning through rallies and multi-media platforms on how both can influence voting behavior and, subsequently, the voting decision (see, for example, Mare 2016). However, not every voter can be easily swayed through campaigning (Strohmeier, 2013). The 2013 ZANU-PF electoral party campaign message was an analogue of a football match with an overall theme campaign, "Ball in the gate," in Shona, "Bhora Muggedhi" (Ncube, 2014; Magure, 2014). This is similar to the Mbare Chimurenga choir song, which goes, in Shona, team ndikusetere team, pekutanga tarira pana VaMugabe, pechitwo pana VaMujuru, pechithree pana VaNkomo. Tambai makadaro. In English, "It is time to

structure the team with Mugabe in the first position, Mujuru at the second and third, there is Nkomo, play the game and rule in your positions."

Nevertheless, the main opposition MDC-T campaign message was on the 'Ball off the pitch' in Shona 'Bhora Musango' (Roftopolous, 2014). It, however, became clear that the MDC-T was not ready for the 2013 election following their ill-prepared campaigning message. Mugabe won resoundingly in the 2013 elections with two-thirds, which was his final blow against MDC-T before the 2017 coup, which disposed him from power.

In support of the above, the 2013 elections have been analyzed by David Moore (2014) to have been a "Combination of trickery, coercion, populism, the convenience of regional peers, and opposition flat-footedness," which amounted to ZANU-PF'S electoral victory. The 2013 election followed after a five-year Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 2009, which found the union or coalition of MDC-T under Tsvangirai, MDC-M under Mutambara, and ZANU-PF under Mugabe²¹⁸. The 2009 coalition formation was because of a political crisis²¹⁹ involving post-2008 electoral violence and intimidation. Masunungure (2014) termed the 2013 election a technical knockout, in which an alleged Israel-hired company maneuvered the electoral outcome. Hence, the elections in Zimbabwe are either by coercion or consent²²⁰. Specifically, the 2013 and 2018 elections were a menu of manipulation or stolen elections (Schelder, 2002; Magure, 2014; Masunungure, 2014).

²¹⁸ Coalitions in some instances are formed in regard to the political crisis within the state, which in most cases is meant to ensure state stability. The 2008 post-election was characterized by a systematic militarized violence, and intimidation, which was culminated through a post-election coalition government known as the Government of National Unity (GNU).

²¹⁹ See, for example, Kapa and Shale, 2014.

²²⁰ See, for example, Magure 2014.

Moreover, electoral campaigning impacts voting behavior and, subsequently, voting decisions. The electoral campaign in America between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon marked that campaigning is a powerful tool in influencing electoral voting decisions (see Strohmeier, 2013). The election is argued to have been won by the television campaign favoring Kennedy (Neuman and Gregorowicz, 2010; Nielsen, 2010). In this regard, the swayed voters are at most swayed by policies, political ideologies, campaign messages, and the background of candidates contesting for the Presidential posts. Barack Obama won the 2008 elections through internet campaigning, among other American Presidents. Hence, electoral campaigning has become a powerful tool in influencing voting behavior.

In addition to the above, campaigning further involves smear campaigning in which ZANU-PF termed MDC party members as sellouts and "Running dogs of the western imperialist," while the main opposition MDC termed the ZANU-PF party as a 'rotten party, corrupt and abusing power' (Ncube, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Rukuni, 2020; 35). Campaigning is therefore a medium pulling factor swaying voters towards voting for a particular political party.

Adding on to the above, Marxists noted, "Religion is the opiate of the society or masses" (Papke, 2015). However, I did not intend to look at the delusionary party of the Marxist perspective of religion, which plays a vital role in the uneducated religious sects, especially the white garment sect (Vapostori) in Zimbabwe (see Teo, 2014). As asserted by Machiavelli, religion can be used for political support yet not actively incorporated into real state politics (Preus, 1979: 171-90). Zimbabwe is a multi-religious society encompassing mainline churches, the Pentecostal movement

churches, and white-garment churches (Musoni, 2019: 2-7). Thus, this marked a shift in the political parties campaigning in 21st-century electoral politics.

From the above, ZANU-PF under both Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations, although believed to be members of mainline churches Roman Catholic and Methodist, respectively. Both ZANU-PF leaders have been actively involved in the white garment sects of Mwazha and Marange gatherings shrines wearing their white garments regalia and campaigning (see Dube and Nkoane, 2018: 229-31). Mnangagwa has been ordained in the Marange sect and prophesied to win the 2023 harmonized elections, with further the church attendants promising to vote in favor of ZANU-PF (interview notes 2022). The prophecy is probably true considering Dzikamai Bere's observation regarding the electoral environment and ZANU-PF's 2023 electoral victory prediction, although not based on ZANU-PF's campaigning (SAPES-Trust Seminar Presentation, June 2021).

Following the presentation held by SAPES Trust on #ZAMBIADecides2021, Zamuchiya noted six lessons for the African continent. Firstly, elections must not be a political theatre legitimizing incumbents²²¹. That is characterized by unprocedural certainty and outcome certainty. For example, Chad's late President won the sixth term with 79% of the vote, and DRC, the incumbent, won the 5th term with 88.4%²²². Zambia reminds the African continent that elections should have procedural certainty and outcome uncertainty. The electoral game's rules must be free and fair, allowing any contestant to win and enable state power transfer. Democracy needs

²²¹ Zamuchiya Philian seminar presentation Sapes Trust on the 17th of August 2021 (Zambian Decides 2021: Pertinent Observation on the National Situation and Lessons for SADC Region and Beyond)

²²² (ibid)

strong institutions, not strong men, to ensure a smooth transfer of power, which necessitated and ensured Zambia's peaceful electoral power transition. However, the opposition parties' coalition CCC is already defeated in the electorate following a militarized or captured electoral state institution by the ruling party ZANU-PF.

In this regard, Zimbabwe has a symbiotic relationship with the military. Chinamasa reinstated that the ruling party has an inseparable relationship with the military. There is a need to invest in demilitarizing African state politics, and the same goes for states that progressed to military coups²²³. For example, there is a need to cure the coup for electoral democracy to work in Zimbabwe and Mali. In this regard, the strong man and one-party state have failed to reform electoral politics. Hence, democracy needs strong institutions, not strong men who back the military. Zambia's swift electoral transitioning is similar to the United States of America's following independence and robust electoral institutions. The robust parallel vote tabulation system reduces rigging related to deflation and inflation of electoral outcomes²²⁴. Furthermore, the African opposition political parties need transformative policies incorporating the working class and ordinary citizens. Hence, institutional independence and opposition cooperation should exist for electoral reforms across Africa.

Finally, the 2023 electoral campaigning for MDC-Alliance, now CCC is Ngezi Hwende Mukomana in English is 'Let in the Boy' #6millionvotes4change (Chalton Hwende Twitter account @hwendec, 2021). For their nemesis, the ZANU-PF party,

²²³ (ibid)

²²⁴ (ibid) supported by Ibbo Mandaza as the convener of the seminar presentation.

the campaigning message for 2023 is "#2023 Five Million Votes ED Pfee (ED In Office)" (Zimeye, August 2021). However, the ZANU-PF campaigning message is similar to the 2018 electoral campaign message. Hence, the party ZANU-PF did not develop a sound campaign message for the 2023 elections. The song 'ED Pfee this Year 2018, everyone ED Pfee' by Chief Shuma became popular after Mnangagwa won the 2018 harmonized elections. In the 21st century, during Mugabe's administration, Jonathan Moyo allegedly has been the master architect in the ZANU-PF's successful electoral campaign messages. Ngaapinde Hake Mukomana's campaign message for MDC-A, now CCC under Chamisa, promises to impact the 2023 elections favoring Nelson Chamisa (interview notes January 2022). Hence, election campaigning has been proven vital in any given election, although elections in Zimbabwe go beyond electoral campaigning.

Therefore, the opposition political parties coalition should ameliorate factors of electoral campaigning and ethnic coalition, influencing voting behavior and subsequent voting decision. Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean electoral system takes a deeper root than electoral campaigning and coalition of opposition political parties towards winning an election (Southall and Slabet, 2013). From 1980 elections, electoral politics have been a product of electoral rigging and fraudulent processes. Ibbo Mandaza firmly said Zimbabwean incumbents are inevitably the loser, even if they refuse to accept it. Hence, the opposition political parties in Zimbabwe should coalesce to challenge the ruling party ZANU-PF in the electorate, drawing lessons from the Malawian 2019 electoral adjudication and 2020 re-run elections.

A different case altogether, the electoral campaign remains a powerful tool in the history of elections influencing voting behavior and, subsequently, a voting decision

affecting electoral outcomes. Therefore, the opposition coalition MDC-A now CCC, should have a flexible campaigning message speaking to multi-ethnic societies, influencing voting decisions in the electorate. Nevertheless, there is a need to secure and defend the vote from manipulations by the ZANU-PF ruling incumbents. Will Citizens Coalition for Change as a new political party be able to secure the 2023 electoral outcomes, having the electoral state institutions captured by ZANU-PF, a history of disputed electoral outcomes, and militarized state institutions, among other factors? Citizens Coalition for Change political party has found itself between a rock and a hard place, that is, battling to overcome the ZANU-PF's electoral authoritarian dominance, at the same time, opposition fragmentation and factionalism battles.

6. 3 Conclusion



This chapter pointed out factors standing against the opposition political party MDC-A coalition, now Citizens Coalition for Change, towards the upcoming 2023 harmonized elections. The chapter examined inter and intra-party polarization in opposition electoral politics of power struggles, factionalism, and fragmentation. The major impediment that impacted the opposition political parties was the migration or defections of MDC-A party members to ZANU-PF. Yet, under Nelson Chamisa, Citizens Coalition for Change, there are prospects in the opposition political parties, including coalition building along ethnic boundaries, campaigning in rural and urban areas, and incorporating youths in active party politics. The coalition of opposition political parties along ethnic boundaries and intensive urban and rural campaigning in Zimbabwe influences voting behavior and, subsequently, voting decisions. Given the lessons from the Malawian 2019 electoral adjudication and 2020 re-run elections, the Zimbabwean opposition coalition can successfully resist ZANU-PF's hegemonic

tendencies in the electorate. The Malawian and Zambian elections brought a turnaround in African history electoral politics, particularly in the SADC region, which found opposition leaders in power. Such is expected of Zimbabwe and the rest of the African continent, still dominated by revolutionary ruling parties. The Citizens Coalitions for Change is expected to deal with structural driven electoral fraud to ensure future electoral reforms.



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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION



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“Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy” (Justice Louis Brandeis, 1856-1941).

7. 0 Introduction

This research interpreted structural polarization that characterized Zimbabwean electoral politics from the 1980 post-independence under the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations ZANU-PF ruling party. In this regard, the phenomenon of polarization in Zimbabwean electoral politics was traced from the 1930's Ndebele incursion and white settler colonial (BSAC) period. The thesis examined the pre-colonial Ndebele-Shona relations, the white colonial system of governance, and the 1960s ethnic revolutionary parties towards interpreting the reality of post-independence polarization. Thus, the study contributed to post-independence Zimbabwe's burgeoning literature on polarization and electoral politics. Therefore, the study of polarization is not new in the academic literature on Zimbabwe, although interpreted differently by various academic scholars. Furthermore, in electoral politics, the research examined the involvement of observer missions' and Civil Society Organizations in monitoring and observing elections. Finally, the thesis examined the office-seeking coalition of opposition political parties towards Zimbabwe's democratic transition.

To begin with, in line with Fiorina *et al.* (2005), there are myths and realities of polarization, which require fact-finding through observations and documentary review. This is to assert the reality of a given research phenomenon. Chapter Three examined the three phases of Zimbabwe's polarization from the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence periods. In this regard, the roots of polarization in Zimbabwe have been traced from the 1930s ethnic Ndebele-Shona society relations pre-colonial period and the white settlers' Rhodesian government -colonial period, marked by the revolutionary front's ethnic factionalism battles –geopolitics and white settler's authoritarian politics of repression and restriction. Hence, the conflict theory

was utilized to examine the polarization that characterized Zimbabwean pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence intra-state politics.

Tied on the above, the intra-party ethnical conflicts or factionalism battles involved mainly the ZAPU under Nkomo of 1962 and ZANU under Sithole of 1963. However, other ethnical conflicts characterized the Zimbabwean revolutionary parties' movement among the Shona groups in the ZANU party, including but not limited to the Zezuru, Kalanga, Manyika, and Ndaue ethnic groups. The research strongly argued that the ethnic factor contributed to both revolutionary parties' splinter groups during the 1960s revolutionary parties' formation and the post-independence 1982-1987 civil war between the Ndebele and Shona-speaking people.

With the colonial settler's authoritarianism characterized by the centrality of state institutions, political repression and restrictions, the revolutionary governments evolved in the 1960s resisting the oppressive rule (Sithole, 1979). The SRANC of 1959 under Nkomo was the first revolutionary party in the Southern Rhodesian government. In this regard, the exclusion of the black majority in education, employment, and elections and the further promulgation of restrictive laws have been argued to have led to the revolutionary parties' formation. The conflicts were intensified during the post-1965 UDI Ian Smith administration leading to the birth and death of ethnic revolutionary parties.

The research supports Masunungure's (2011) observation that the white settler's system of governance influenced post-independence authoritarian electoral politics involving repression and restriction. The white settlers decimated the 1960s opposition forces through repression and restrictions. Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations adopted the same white settler legal system in post-independence

1980. Aside from the white settlers' oppressive rule, the 1960s revolutionary parties' polarization was characterized by intra- and inter-party conflicts influenced by regionalism politics.

Chapter Four of the study pointed out the important phenomenon of structural polarization -bureaucratic authoritarianism nexus in Zimbabwean electoral politics. In this regard, the post-independence polarization has been marked by the 1980s ethnic war, the 2017 coup d'état, and the post-coup environment, mass demonstrations, electoral violence, intimidation, and undermining of the rule of law and constitutionalism subversion. The research findings further pointed out that the post-independence of Zimbabwe foresaw executive abuse of power in decimating opposition political parties and CSOs, including ZUM of 1998, MDC of 1999, CCJP, and NCA of 1997.



In defining the bureaucratic authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, the research looked at the ZANU-PF party's centralization of state institutions, military state capture, the decimation of opposition political parties, and the rule of law and constitutionalism subversion. This is a characteristic feature of what O'Donnell (1973) ascribed to as bureaucratic authoritarianism when he critically analyzed states, for example, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. There is a chance that bureaucratic authoritarianism will break into democratic deepening or strengthen the authoritarian regime. At the same time, the authoritarian elites control the state's economies by establishing a command economy typical market structure –a bureaucratic authoritarian economic system.

In line with the above, the chapter examined the economic aspect of authoritarian regimes by looking at Wintrobe's (1998) assertion, in which he analyzed four authoritarian typologies: tinpots, timocracy, tyranny, and totalitarianism. The findings

succinctly pointed out that corruption, policy inconsistency, and poor governance led to Zimbabwe's 21st-century economic instability. Thus, the chapter looked at the structural polarization and bureaucratic authoritarianism impact on the socio-economic and political aspects of the country. In which the findings supported that the challenges faced by Zimbabwe to date are a result of a bureaucratic authoritarian government structure and executive abuse of power

Slovik's (2012) founding principle of the authoritarian twin problem of power-sharing and power-control helped to examine the Zimbabwean post-independence authoritarian politics. The principle involves problems arising from both the elite allies and the masses exempted from power. The findings concluded that the power-sharing conflicts during Mugabe's era involved, but were not limited to, factionalism battles between the G-40 under Grace Mugabe and Lacoste under Mnangagwa. The intra-party conflicts in ZANU-PF culminated after the 2017 Operation Restore Legacy military coup d'état, disposing of Mugabe. Accordingly, the global statistics of coups are mainly from power-sharing conflicts (ibid).

Tied on the above, the chapter looked at another authoritarian problem of power-control involving political parties' competition and mass demonstrations or uprisings. The mass uprisings in Zimbabwe were silenced through repression and restrictions under the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations. At the same time, the opposition competition, political activist, and CSO advocacy were decimated following a systematic implementation of political repression and restrictions. Therefore, the chapter concluded that the authoritarian problems differ from one authoritarian regime to another by comparing autocratic leadership across Africa and beyond. The post-independence intra-state conflicts in Zimbabwe were influenced by

the ZANU-PF party's centrality of state institutions leading to a typical bureaucratic authoritarian governance structure.

Authoritarian regimes tend to establish democratic institutions and recurring elections for regime security and stability. Ozan (2015) examined the stealth authoritarian practice in both authoritarian and democratic states – involving subversion of the rule of law and constitutionalism. This further involves the judiciary and legal systems used as a means to galvanize the authoritarian regime for their security and stability. The chapter findings support the judiciary stealth authoritarian practice in Zimbabwe. This follows, among other issues, the 2017 post-coup legitimization of Mnangagwa as the designated president, the 2018 electoral verdict credibility, and, subsequently, the 2018 appointment of Mnangagwa as the President-elect.



There are elements of polarization multi-typologies in Zimbabwean post-independence. In this regard, the research examined the opinion and affective polarizations among other polarizations, characterized by ingroup favoritism and outgroup hatred and animosity. The inter-group polarization is evident in Zimbabwe's religious groups, ethnic, societal groups, and political groups. On the other hand, the research drew from existing literature on polarization in Zimbabwe from economic, political, societal, ethnic and ideological perspectives. Hence, polarization takes different forms and typologies. Although conflicts might emanate from the same root, they can result in many forms of disputes or intra-state conflicts. Nevertheless, the chapter concluded that the reality of polarization in Zimbabwe is institutional, and party structured with bureaucratic authoritarian elements.

In authoritarian regimes, elections have been conducted with the involvement of the international election observer mission and Civil Society Organization's observation and monitoring. Chapter Four examined the most controversial and complex topic of electoral observer missions and CSO in promoting democratic electoral practices in Zimbabwe. As clearly indicated in the literature, the 1980 election in Zimbabwe involved international electoral observation and monitoring. In post-2002, Mugabe exempted international electoral monitoring and observation. However, in the 2018 harmonized election, his successor Mnangagwa had something to prove to the world. He invited international observers to oversee electoral conduct and process. In line with the chapter findings, the 2018 observer mission's electoral verdicts and reports were consistent, legitimizing their credibility.

The research findings further made a comparison by looking at other case studies where electoral monitoring and observation have been conducted to assert the credibility of the observer mission's reports and verdicts. Be that as it may, Matlosa (2021) observed that the international observer mission has shifted its agendas of monitoring and observing the electoral conduct and processes to a 'peaceocracy' mission in African states. Hence, the chapter argued that there are complexities surrounding the credibility and legitimacy of the observer mission's reports and verdicts. The reports and verdicts are often biased and influenced by the observer's interest in one country to another.

The findings further examined the Zimbabwean elections from 1980 to 2018 under the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations. In this regard, the 2018 elections were similar, yet not identical, to the 1980 elections, in which both elections involved both external and internal observers monitoring and observation. The reports in the 2018 elections detailed the pre-election, election, and post-election period. Booyen's

(2002) six-phase electoral monitoring and observation process helped to analyze if the observer mission reports managed to look beyond Election Day.

However, as Booysen proposed, international observers cannot be present in any election looking at the early pre-election and post-election periods. Hence, the external observer's reports offset this by complementing CSO and other internal observers' reports with their observations. Accordingly, the Zimbabwe 2018 electoral reports and verdicts were legitimate. Thus, the findings concurred with the observation by Moyo (2019) that electoral irregularities of the 2018 elections are well documented but not yet proven.

There have been arguments surrounding the complexity of the 2018 electoral V11 forms and the Con-Court electoral adjudication. The findings detailed that the V11 forms do not form or constitute the Presidential outcome but the local or ward-level results. In this regard, the collation of the V11 ward forms accounts for the 210 V23A constituency forms, which form the V23B presidential outcome forms. Although there were identified electoral irregularities in the 2018 elections, V11 forms were baseless in the 2018 presidential electoral outcome. However, the question remained on the inflated electoral figures, which Chief Justice Luke Malaba invalidated and appointed Mnangagwa as the 2018 President-elect.

Whether elections will be free and fair, ZANU-PF will hold on to power, as Magure (2014) supported that elections in Zimbabwe are either by hook or crook. The findings concurred with the above claim that Zimbabwean post-independence elections have been characterized by violence, intimidation, and restrictive laws. However, local observers have often legitimized the elections to be credible, free,

and fair. As opposed to the 2000 and 2002 local observations, the international observers illegitimized the post-independence Zimbabwean elections.

There is a debate as to why internal and external observer mission reports often contradict. This is due to the observer mission's interest in invalidating or validating the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process and conduct. Hence, the reports and verdicts by observers need to be scrutinized as they are subject to objection. The Zimbabwean 2018 electoral reports concluded that the elections in Zimbabwe did not comply with the international and regional electoral standards, consistent with the thesis research findings.

The coalition of opposition political parties across the African continent gained relevance in the 1990s and 2010 third wave of democratization (Kadima, 2014). Chapter Five examined the prevalence of office-seeking opposition coalitions in the Zimbabwean electorate to maximize electoral outcomes towards intended power-changing and electoral reforms. The chapter detailed that both internal and external party challenges have characterized the 2018 MDC-A party, now the CCC opposition coalition under Chamisa. The challenges range from factionalism, opposition fragmentation, succession disputes, and defectors, which claimed them the electoral advantage in 2018 and might costs them the 2023 electoral victory.

The research drew from various scholars who examined the phenomenon of the office-seeking coalition. In this regard, the coalition of political parties has drawn attention to the academic inquiry of democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes. The coalition of political parties was critically examined in terms of office and policy-seeking coalitions. Zimbabwe saw the emergence of the first office-seeking opposition coalition in the early 1990s, which, however, died prematurely.

Kapa (2014) is of the view that opposition political parties in the African continent often die prematurely due to ideological, financial, and structural problems –intra- and inter-party challenges.

At the same time, there is a record of successful opposition political parties' coalitions in the African continent (see, for example, Kadima, 2014). The research argued that office-seeking opposition coalition varies from one country to another. Zimbabwe is a multi-ethnic country which strongly depends on the coalition of political parties along ethnic boundaries to maximize electoral votes. The coalition of opposition political parties should, therefore, encompass, but not be limited to, ideologically linked parties, financial resources, multi-ethnic coalition, campaigning, coalition number, and coalition strategy and purpose for its stability and success. Hence, the research supports the argument that they are many factors that must be considered when forming an office-seeking opposition political party's coalition




The chapter further examined the ethnic and voting behavior relations across Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF ruling party accordingly has been utilizing electoral rigging involving violence, intimidation, and gerrymandering in Zimbabwe's multi-ethnic societies. The findings asserted that the opposition political parties' coalition should be, in this case, formed along ethnic lines to safeguard against electoral rigging associated with the inflation and deflation of electoral results.

In addition to the above, the youth in Zimbabwe encompasses 60% of the voting population and the majority of registered voters (Magure, 2014). Hodzi (2014) examined that the youth in Zimbabwe are controlled by their selfish interest over group interests, which political leaders can easily manipulate. Hence, the chapter findings argued that the opposition political parties should be actively involved in the

incorporation of the youths in active electoral party politics. Thus, the opposition political parties' coalition incorporation of youths in active party politics is towards maximizing electoral votes guaranteeing power changing and electoral reforms. Accordingly, the CCC political party, in line with the chapter findings, should further pay particular attention to campaigning in rural areas that consolidate a majority of the Zimbabwean voting population.

According to Weber (1978) and Dalton (1984), there are four types of voting behavior: traditional base voter, value rational base voter, instrumental rational swing voter, and effectual swing voter. The findings detailed that the Zimbabwean electorate is mainly influenced by the majority of youth effectual swing voters, as noted in the 21st-century electoral outcomes between ZANU-PF and MDC. Hence, the opposition political parties' coalition should actively involve the youth in party politics to maximize electoral votes.



New developments saw MDC-A under Chamisa giving birth to a new citizen-centred political party, Citizens Coalition for Change. Most of the Zimbabwean youth population actively participated in the 2022 by-election in favor of the CCC political party. In this regard, the findings supported that majority swing voters influence the Zimbabwean electorate. Swing voters, in this case, are swayed by the economic policies and electoral campaigns, which CCC swept a majority of the seats in the 2022 by-elections.

Scholars believe in strength in numbers in an office seeking coalition formation (Riker, 1962; Kadima, 2014). I borrowed from Riker's four-coalition formation from minimum size coalition, minimum winning coalition, oversize coalition, and grand coalition. However, there is no limit to what constitutes a winning office-seeking

coalition. The chapter argued that the CCC should strategize in coalescing with other political parties towards the 2023 harmonized elections, involving ethnicity boundaries, connected ideological parties', financial resources, and stability of political parties.

From the above, the 2023 election in Zimbabwe has been predicted to be a history about to repeat itself (Jonathan Moyo SAPES-Trust Seminar Presentation, May 2021). This concurs with the findings of this research regarding the electoral environment towards the 2023 harmonized elections. This follows the ZANU-PF party's judiciary capture, the militarized electoral institutions, youth capture, and ZEC involvement in the population census and delimitation of constituencies. Hence, the opposition coalition has been predictable to be unable to secure the predetermined electoral victory considering the prevailing electoral environment.

To cap it all off, the research is timely, examining polarization and electoral politics in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the research examined both Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations ZANU-PF ruling party from 1980 to 2018 electoral politics. The study further drew from existing academic literature on polarization typologies from social, ethnic, political, ideological, and economic perspectives. This was to assert the reality of Zimbabwe's post-independence polarization electoral politics nexus. The reality of Zimbabwean post-independence polarization, according to the research findings, is institutional and party structured with bureaucratic authoritarian elements. Hence, the study examined electoral politics, election observation, myths and realities of polarization, and the coalition of opposition political parties in Zimbabwe.

7. 2 Areas for further research

This research focused on interpreting structural polarization and electoral politics nexus in Zimbabwe. Firstly, the study looked at structural polarization and bureaucratic authoritarianism. The study further investigated the involvement of CSO and International observers in electoral monitoring and observation. Finally, the research analyzed the coalition of opposition political parties in Zimbabwe. In an examination of this study, areas for future studies were identified. For instance, there is a need to examine the phenomenon of state capture in Zimbabwe and its attendant impact on electoral politics. There has been growing literature on factionalism dynamics in ZANU-PF since 1963. However, there is a need to examine factionalism in the post-2017 coup between Mnangagwa and Chiwenga. In addition, there should be a detailed study looking at factionalism dynamics in opposition political parties. On the other hand, studies should pay particular attention to examining the multi-media platforms (opinion polarization) opinion driven elite-partisan polarization in Zimbabwe.

Moreover, there should be a detailed study of the religious sects' elite-partisan affective polarization. Conclusively, comprehensive research should examine the micro-level electoral politics in Zimbabwean universities on how they influence youth participation in real or national macro-level elections. On the other hand, the ideological driven affective and opinion polarization on-campus or university political groups. Most areas identified were not intensively and extensively explored in this research phenomenon.

Epilogue

The post-independence of Zimbabwe in 1988 marked the birth of the first opposition political party, ZUM, led by the former ZANU-PF secretary Edgar Tekere. The continued state-engineered repression and restriction by the ruling party ZANU-PF against opposition leaders and supporters silenced active opposition political voices (involving outgroup hatred or dislike, a characteristic of both opinion and affective polarization) and political competition. Thus, ZANU-PF won the 1990, 1995, and 1996 elections without a substantial electoral challenge. The 1995 opposition coalition died pre-maturely because of the opposition political parties' weakness involving ideological differences and financial instabilities. Hence, ZUM opposition political party faced internal and external challenges, which they withdrew from one of the 1990s elections (Makumbe and Sithole, 1997). For some observers, ZANU-PF was on a two-decade electoral honeymoon in post-independence (Meredith, 2009). ZUM was booted out of the electoral political game after the 1996 elections, arguably due to a seemingly ZANU-PF's socialist one-party dominance and authoritarianism.

A trade unionist organization, ZCTU, formed the 1999 MDC opposition political party under the leadership of the late Morgan Tsvangirai. Following a coalition of Civil Society Organizations (NCA) of 1997 and the MDC opposition toward the 2000 referendum election, ZANU-PF was defeated in the first elections in two decades of the party's leadership in post-independence Zimbabwe (McCandles, 2011). Arguably this led to the promulgation of 2002 AIPPA and POSA acts and further violence and intimidation by the securocrats decimating opposition politics. Hence, during the 21st-century elections, ZANU-PF either used coercion or consent to win the elections. Nevertheless, the 2008 harmonized elections marked a near-miss electoral outcome in favor of MDC-T under Morgan Tsvangirai. Arguably opposition

fragmentation and factionalism battles claimed the opposition's strong challenge towards perceived electoral victories against ZANU-PF. Tsvangirai retired in 2018 due to debilitating health issues that led to his death. Due to opposition political parties' unpreparedness, Tsvangirai was humiliated in the 2013 election, which Mugabe won with two-thirds.

Before Tsvangirai's appointment of Chamisa as the MDC-T's acting party President in 2018, he was involved in the opposition political parties' coalition formation. The death of Morgan Tsvangirai resulted in MDC-T's succession disputes and factionalism battles intra-party structural conflicts²²⁵. This was followed by an intra-party legal challenge of the party's name change from MDC-T to MDC-A by Nelson Chamisa and the constitutionality of his appointment as party President. The Supreme Court adjudicated that the party was supposed to revert to the 2014 party structures. Hence, the Zimbabwe electorate had two MDCs under Chamisa and Khupe, similar to the 2005 MDC factionalism.

In addition to the above, there has been a record of MDC-A party members and supporters migrating or defecting to the ZANU-PF ruling party. Furthermore, the MDC-T faction led by Mwonozora has been reported to have strongly supported ZANU-PF policies -an opposition party's structural complexity. The dilemmas in opposition political parties stretch from factionalism, defections, and fragmentation, which costed them their electoral advantage over ZANU-PF. Despite the opposition political parties' factionalism battles, ZANU-PF has continued dominating the electorate by hook or crook (Magure, 2014). Thus, the MDC-A (now CCC) in the

²²⁵ Lack of party succession plan by Morgan Tsvangirai led to the post-2018 intra-part conflicts among the elite party members (see article by Mwonozora (2018) entitled. The lack of a succession plan has left Morgan Tsvangirai's party in disarray. Available on: <https://theconversation.com/the-lack-of-a-succession-plan-has-left-morgan-tsvangirais-party-in-disarray-91714>).

upcoming 2023 elections might find it challenging to build a strong pre-electoral coalition against ZANU-PF.

Nelson Chamisa has been the main opposition MDC-A leader since February 2018 until the February 2022 formation of the new political party CCC. Party members in the MDC-A party have been blaming him for aligning with ZANU-PF faction G-40 members, including Jonathan Moyo, Grace Mugabe, and Patrick Zhuwao (News Day, 2018). Dzambara claimed that Chamisa opened the MDC party to be captured by ZANU-PF (New Zimbabwe, 2020). For example, the contention over the MDC-A party funding by G-40 members, in which Zhuwao and Moyo claimed on a Twitter account to have funded USD 6 000 towards the 2018 harmonized elections. Furthermore, Jonathan Moyo has posted on a Twitter account akin to his support to train 44 000 polling station agents of MDC-A for 11 000 polling stations in Tsholotsho towards 2023 harmonized elections (The Zimbabwe Mail, May 2021).

However, the offer by Moyo has raised questions and suspicions, as Moyo is an untrustworthy person being part of the opposition movement. Chamisa disputed all the G-40 2018 party funding claims, which among other factors, allegedly have contributed to internal party conflicts, leading to the splinter group MDC-T under Mwonzora and MDC-A defectors to ZANU-PF. Other scholars argue that the succession disputes have led to factionalism in MDC-T.

Thus, the opposition political parties' dilemmas are noted from factionalism, power struggles, and fragmentation- internal and external party challenges. As a result, Nelson Chamisa has resorted to a new political party, Citizens Coalition for Change, due to the MDC-T and MDC-A party name (s) dilemma, similar to the 2008 MDC-T

and MDC-M. The landslide victory in the 2022 by-elections by CCC under Chamisa has left many hopes for the party to win the upcoming 2023 harmonized elections.



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
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
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
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INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION SHEET AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM²²⁶

(AGES 18 YEARS AND ABOVE)

Please note:

This form is to be completed by the researcher(s) as well as by the interviewee before the commencement of the research. Copies of the signed form must be filed and kept on record

(To be adapted for individual circumstances/needs)



Dear participant,

I, Munhuweyi Kenneth Takudzwa, a Masters's student in the department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Fort Hare. In fulfilling my study, I am conducting research on **"Interpreting Structural Polarization in Zimbabwean Electoral Politics"**. Participants' participation in this research is important to enriching the thesis research findings. You are at liberty to give your views and opinions based on this particular study.

(Purpose of Study)

The study seeks to examine the pre-election, elections, and post-election periods in post-independence Zimbabwe. The interview questions will focus on the 1980 to 2018 period. Participants should give their personal experiences and views on how elections were conducted in Zimbabwe. This is to fill the academic literature gap on how state institutions have been utilized by the ZANU-PF-led government to influence voting behavior and general electoral politics in Zimbabwe. In this regard, interview responses will be compared with existing literature to depict areas of convergence and divergence in the academic inquiry.

²²⁶ Approved by UREC (13 November 2019)

(Study Procedure (Explain all procedures using layperson's terms)). Participation in the research is limited to a face-to-face interview which will take between 30 to 45 minutes. Participating in the research is entirely voluntary, and there are no direct benefits which can be expected from participating in the interview. There are no foreseen discomfort and stress anticipated in participating in the interview; however, you have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time or refuse to answer any question which you feel makes you uncomfortable.

Your participation will be kept confidential while it is necessary to record the proceedings of the interview for analyzing purposes, information which identifies your name will be omitted or changed from the transcript. The interview tapes will be destroyed once they have been transcribed. The transcripts will be kept in a secure file which will be stored in the Political Science and International Relations department at the university. The data will be open to the research supervisors, and also the completed dissertation will be examined by two other persons who are nominated by the university. The research findings can be made available to you. However, this requires that you notify the researcher of your wish to have a copy of the findings as well as furnish the researcher with your postal details.

Some questions may be of a personal and/or sensitive nature. I will be asking some questions that you may not have thought about before. We know that you cannot be absolutely certain about the answers to these questions, but we ask that you try to think about these questions. When it comes to answering questions, there are no right and wrong answers.

Please understand that **your participation is voluntary**, and you are not being forced to take part in this study. The choice of whether to participate or not is yours. However, we would really appreciate it if you do share your thoughts with us. If you choose not to take part, you will not be affected in any way whatsoever. If you agree to participate, you may stop me at any time and tell me that you don't want to go on with the interview. If you do this, there will also be no penalties, and you will NOT be prejudiced in ANY way.

The information will remain confidential. This means that your name and address will not be linked in any way to the answers you give. We study and report on the answers given by all the people we interview and not on an individual basis. The research data will be anonymous – with all personal respondent information removed and will be archived at the University.

At the present time, we do not see any risks in your participation. The risks associated with participation in this study are no greater than those encountered in daily life.

There are no immediate benefits to you from participating in this study. However, this study will be helpful in finding out the systems used by universities in supporting first-year Faculty of Education students.

Risk-Benefit Ratio (*benefits hoped for from this study and the risks involved for the participant*): Not Applicable

Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns

This research has been approved by the Inter-Faculties Research Ethics Committee (IFREC) as per delegated authority of the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC). If you have any complaints about the ethical aspects of the research or feel that you have been harmed in any way by participating in this study, please call the IFREC Administrator, [insert name, contact number and email here]

Reporting and Complaints

If you have questions at any time about this study or if you have concerns/questions, you may contact the researcher/project leader whose contact information is provided on the first page. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, or if problems arise that you do not feel you can discuss with the researcher/project leader, please contact the IFREC Chairperson, Prof. Pumla Gqola, on [insert contact number and email address] or the UREC Chairperson, Prof. Renuka Vithal on [insert contact number and email address].

If you have concerns or questions about this study, please feel free to contact the project coordinators: **Researcher/Project Leader:**

Name: Munhuweyi Kenneth Takudzwa

Department: Political Science and International Relations

Address: 7 Recreational Road Alice

Phone: +27 629639219; **Email:** 202001829@ufh.ac.za

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

(Edit as Required)

I (name of participant)
have been informed about the study by (provide the name of researcher/ project leader/
fieldworker)

I understand the purpose, procedures, and risk-benefit ratio of the study.


I have been given an opportunity to ask questions about the study and have had answers to
my satisfaction.

I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at
any time without affecting any procedurals that I would usually be entitled to.

I have been informed about any available compensation or medical treatment if injury occurs
to me as a result of study-related procedures

I understand that I will be given a copy of this informed consent.

I understand that if I have any questions or complaints about my rights as a study
participant, or if I may have concerns about any aspect of the study or the researcher/s, then
I may contact the Chairperson of the Inter-Faculty Research Ethics Committee, Prof. Pumla
Gqola or Chairperson of University Research Ethics Committee, Prof Renuka Vithal (details
available from the Researcher or by contacting the University of Fort Hare or Website
www.ufh.ac.za)


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Participant signature:

Consenting for Audio Recording– when necessary

YES / OR

Participant signature:

Witness signature:

(To be altered according to the study)

Translator signature:

(To be altered according to the study)

Data curation – I understand that the information that I provide will be stored electronically and will be used for research purposes now or at a later stage (to be altered according to the study)

Participant signature:

Date:



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Interview Guide Questions

1. What is your overview of how elections have been conducted in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 under the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations?
 - In your answer, can you explain the electoral environment
 - i) before elections
 - ii) during elections, and
 - iii) after elections
2. In what ways did ZANU-PF utilize state institutions as a means of party survival strategies under the Mugabe and Mnangagwa administrations?
 - In your answer, can you specify which institutions?
 - How and when exactly were state institutions utilized?
3. What are/were the impacts of abuse of executive power during Mugabe and Mnangagwa administration on:
 - i). Constitutionalism
 - ii) Electoral reforms
 - iii) Election participation
4. In what ways did civil society organizations in Zimbabwe resist ZANU-PF's hegemonic tendencies since independence under both Mnangagwa and Mugabe administrations?
 - Identify civil society organizations that were/are involved in Zimbabwe's electoral processes—specifying their respective roles.
5. In what ways did state institutions become a stumbling block to opposition political parties' liberties in Zimbabwe? Including;
 - Campaigning
 - Censorship
6. With multiple elections conducted in Zimbabwe since 1980, in your view, is the country going to experience legitimate and credible future elections?
7. Is there a distinction between the quality of elections under Mugabe and the current Mnangagwa administration? May you support your claim(s)?
8. In your view, does state institutions' independence provide the basis for quality elections in Zimbabwe, and why?



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9. From your point of view, will the international election observer missions help resolve disputed electoral outcomes in Zimbabwe?
- Specifying roles played by the international observer mission in Zimbabwe's elections.
10. Can a coalition of opposition political parties ensure power change considering Zimbabwe's electoral politics?
- Do you think opposition parties will win the presidential elections?
 - If they win the 2023 elections, in your view, will opposition parties champion democratic transitioning?
11. Are you at liberty to participate in political parties' electoral campaigns during elections and post-election? Give reasons.
12. In your view, based on your earlier responses, what needs to be done to ensure quality elections in Zimbabwe?



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ETHICS CLEARANCE
REC-270710-028-RA Level
01

Project Number: BOO011STAK01

Project title: **Interpreting structural polarization in Zimbabwean electoral politics.**

Qualification: Masters of Social Science (Political Science)

Student name: Munhuweyi Kenneth Takudzwa

Registration number: 202001829

Supervisor: Dr Magure Booker

Department: Political Science

Co-supervisor: N/A

On behalf of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) I hereby grant ethics approval for BOO011STAK01. This approval is valid for 12 months from the date of approval. Renewal of approval must be applied for BEFORE termination of this approval period. Renewal is subject to receipt of a satisfactory progress report. The approval covers the undertakings contained in the above- mentioned project and research instrument(s). The research may commence as from the 13/01/22, using the reference number indicated above.


Note that should any other instruments be required, or amendments become necessary, these require separate authorization.

- Please note that UREC must be informed immediately of Any material changes in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the document;
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research.

The student must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

UREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this approval if
 - Any unethical principal or practices are revealed or suspected;
 - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented;
 - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require;
 - The conditions contained in the Certificate have not been adhered to.
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project.



Your compliance with Department of Health 2015 guidelines and any other applicable regulatory instruments and with UREC ethics requirements as contained in UREC policies and standard operating procedures is implied.

UREC wishes you well in your research.

Yours sincerely

Dr N Taole-Mjimba

Chairperson: University Research Ethics Committee

13 January 2022

The end



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence