



University of Fort Hare
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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**Understanding the Role of the Media in Zimbabwe African National Union -
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) Factional Fights and the Representations of the
Lacoste Faction in Zimbabwean Public Discourses.**

BY

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201614134

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN POLITICAL STUDIES**

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2018

ABSTRACT

This thesis sought to critically examine the origins, nature and impact of ZANU PF factionalist tendencies and how a particular faction headed by former Vice President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa was represented in Zimbabwean public discourses. Drawing from comparative politics, history, media studies and Zimbabwean current affairs, this interdisciplinary narrative detailed how the new media played a central role in precipitating factional implosion in the liberation war based political party (ZANU PF). Clearly, ZANU PF internecine conflicts in and outside the state controlled and new media had far-reaching socio-economic and political ramifications as rival ZANU PF factions resorted to dirty strategies and tactics to try and weaken and outwit each other. These political machinations took the form of slandering, use of hate speech, dissemination of fake news, assassinations and poisoning among others. As the battle for factional supremacy raged on, the Zimbabwean economy continued on a downward spiral due to *inter alia* policy contradictions and uncertainty but at the end, November 2017 saw Mugabe being unexpectedly deposed in a coup after 37 years in power. This study went on to identify a number of factors that were working against Mugabe's patient and heir apparent – Mnangagwa, as he sought to take over the reins of power. These included *inter alia* the presence and close proximity of the G40 faction linked to the first family but opposing the former vice president, his tainted political record as a result of his involvement in the Matabeleland massacre of the Ndebele ethnic group in the 1980s, allegedly masterminding and engineering electoral fraud in 2008 and having been Mugabe's right hand man for almost four decades. On the other hand, findings from this study suggest that Mnangagwa's liberation war credentials and his close association with the military and the war veterans played a pivotal role in assisting him to land the presidency following Mugabe's forced resignation or what was defined by many as a coup. While the Lacoste faction eventually prevailed over their G40 rivals, the study concluded that ZANU PF factionalism negatively impacted on governmental decisions, policies and systems and the aftermath of the military coup continues to pose serious challenges to Zimbabwe's political future however defined.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Almighty God for his grace in permitting me to accomplish this study in spite of the rigorous engagement and commitment demanded by this project.

I sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr Booker Magure who stood by me through all the academic challenges I faced. He helped me see it through and he went an extra mile, providing anything I could have expected from a supervisor. I am proud to call him my supervisor.

I am also grateful for the financial support from my supervisor, Dr Booker Magure and the Govan Mbeki Research and Development Centre (GMRDC). The supervisor-linked bursary awarded to me was the first financial aid I have ever received, and it was a blessing as it assisted me in meeting all the academic needs which any student could wish for. The Fee waiver from the University of Fort Hare and GMRDC really made research a way to go and rendered it quite enjoyable.

To the Mauswa family, I thank you for your unwavering support. This was not easy but you kept on encouraging me not to give up. May the Almighty keep on blessing you all.

Lastly but not least, I would like to thank my friends who were always there to provide moral support and push each other in this academic journey.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to all Zimbabweans who have remained resilient despite the socio and economic hardships faced by that country.

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, Desmond T.T Mauswa, student number 201614134, hereby declare that this study is my own original work and that all sources from which information was obtained have been acknowledged by means of complete referencing. The research study has not been submitted, and will not be presented at any other University for a similar or any other degree award.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

I, Desmond T.T Mauswa (201614134), hereby declare that I am fully aware of the University of Fort Hare's Plagiarism Policy and I have taken all precautions to comply with the regulations.

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ETHICAL CLEARANCE DECLARATION

I, Desmond T.T Mauswa (201614134), hereby declare that I am fully aware of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Policy and I have taken all precautions to comply with the rules. I have obtained an ethical clearance certificate from the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) and my certificate number is MAG011SMAU01

Signature: _____ Date: _____

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List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
CIO	Central Intelligent Organisation
EU	European Union
G40	Generation 40
GNU	Government of National Unity
JOC	Joint Operations Command
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NPF	National Patriotic Front
PF	Patriotic Front
RBC	Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RF	Rhodesian Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZIMPAPERS	Zimbabwe Newspapers
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean People's Revolutionary Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

ZPF	Zimbabwe People First
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Context of studying factionalism in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 from British colonial rule after a protracted and bloody armed struggle organized by different political groupings¹ under the leadership of, among others, Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo who led the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Prior to 1980, however, ZANU was formed as a faction which split away from Nkomo's ZAPU in 1963 (Msindo, 2012:192). The causes of the split are disputed; several competing explanations have been advanced to explain it. Some scholars suggest the ethnic factor (Sithole, 1980) while others advance the class factor (Schutz, 1978; Tshabangu, 1979; Sithole, 1984). Generally, the ethnic and class factors have been advanced to explain factionalism in ZAPU, a development that led to a split in the liberation movement along linguistic lines. Nkomo's ZAPU became a predominantly Ndebele party whilst Mugabe's ZANU became Shona led (Msindo, 2012:220).

Nonetheless, in 1976 the warring factions formed a tactical alliance, the Patriotic Front (PF), which Msindo (2012:208) referred to as a "marriage of convenience" marred by suspicion and antagonistic attitudes as events later showed. It is thus justifiable to a certain extent to conclude that the ZAPU-ZANU split gave birth to the propensity of factionalism in present day Zimbabwean politics. For this reason, it is worth noting that present day factionalism is an inherent feature of Zimbabwean politics. Therefore, this research shall be drawing its essence from the theories of factionalism and representation that will be explored throughout the thesis.

Following the formation of the Patriotic Front, negotiations were held in a bid to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. It was after a number of unsuccessful interventions between the warring factions and the British government that in 1979 the Lancaster House

¹ The political groupings (ZANU and ZAPU) had their respective military wings: Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (Alao, 2012:20).

Conference was convened resulting in all parties conceding to a ceasefire. This paved the way for the country's landmark first democratic elections (Mlambo, 2014:190-193). Robert Mugabe, who had been in control of ZANU since 1977, won the 1980 elections. Mugabe, who was leading the now Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), has been at the helm of power from that time till 2017. Essentially, as the Prime Minister from 1980 until 1987 when the post of the prime minister was abolished and thereafter as the executive president² of the country (Zenenga, 2010:18).

Since the 1980s, former President Mugabe successfully clung to power, crushing any dissent and opposition to his leadership of the country and the party. An example of such power-clinging heavy-handedness lies in the manner in which uprisings in Matabeleland Province were handled; thousands of Ndebele civilians subscribed to Nkomo's ZAPU were alleged to have been killed (shall be discussed later) (CCJP, 1997). As a result, in 1987 a unity accord was reached between Nkomo's PF (ZAPU) and Mugabe's PF (ZANU) leading to the formation of a unified ZANU PF party (CCJP, 1997).

It is against this background that the late leading academic, Masipula Sithole used to describe former President Mugabe as 'the prince' who consolidated his power through suppressing opposition and uprisings (Magure, 2009). To assert his control, Mugabe was strongly oppressive towards his enemies, staying true to Machiavelli's advice on 'the Prince' that, "men should either be caressed or crushed" (Machiavelli, 1988:9). Before being toppled in 2017, Mugabe had been able to maintain, strengthen and extend his hold on power as the leader of ZANU PF and the president of the country, using both carrot and stick measures.

Over time ZANU PF started to experience serious internal problems mainly due to frustration over Mugabe's overstay in power, his fragile health and fatigue tied to old

² Executive Presidency gave Mugabe sweeping powers that enabled him to pursue patron-client politics and destroy any political alternative including civil society (Magure, 2009).

age. Thus, Mugabe's longevity in power, from 1980 to 2017, when he was eventually deposed at the age of 93, coupled with poor health, created perfect conditions for the need of a successor. This state of affairs led to bitter disagreements about who in the political party would succeed Mugabe. For some time ZANU PF vehemently denied the existence of factions, calling it fabrication by the media, until Didymus Mutasa (former National Secretary for Administration) publicly acknowledged the prevalence of factionalism within the party (The Zimbabwean, 29 April 2013). At that time, however, factional rifts existed between Mugabe's then two deputies - Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa. Mujuru was eventually kicked out from both the party and government but once again factionalism reared its ugly head when another faction called Generation 40 (G40) faction emerged.

Thus two major factions took root within ZANU PF after Mujuru's ouster - one was led by former Vice President Emmerson "Ngwenya" Mnangagwa (Ngwenya meaning 'crocodile' in Shona Language). It is known as 'Team Lacoste' faction and has the war veterans as its allies; while the other rivalry group was allegedly led by Grace Mugabe (Mugabe's wife) and was known as the 'Generation 40' (G40). As factionalism within ZANU PF reached a fever pitch, Cephass Msipa (former ZAPU national executive committee) predicted that ZANU PF infighting will possibly lead other people to form a breakaway party (The Herald, 16 October 2014).

Msipa's 'political prophesy' came to pass since Mujuru went on to form her own party, Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) after her ousting from the party and government, and members of the G40 faction recently formed the National Patriotic Front (NPF) after Mugabe's deposition. All these developments are an indication of the extent to which Msipa's views were correct. It is against this background that this study seeks to examine the role of the media in ZANU PF factionalism and how the Lacoste faction was portrayed in the Zimbabwean public discourses before they managed to wrestle power from Mugabe in 2017 via a coup.

1.2 Rationale of the Study

There has been a proliferation of factional wars in Zimbabwean politics since the 1960s to the present (Sithole, 1984; Tendi, 2016). Most studies that have been conducted concerning factionalism in Zimbabwe focused mainly on the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. To mention a few, Sithole (1980) examined the role of ethnicity as an explanation for the proliferation of factionalism in the national movement. Sithole (1984) also reviewed the class factor argument in explaining the causes of factionalism during the Zimbabwe nationalist politics. A study by Tendi (2016) stands out as one of the few recent scholarly works that examined factionalism in Zimbabwe. Tendi examined the role of state intelligence in supporting Mnangagwa's presidential succession bid that led to the ouster of Mujuru and members of her faction.

In addition, Sabao and Visser (2016) detailed on representations of ZANU PF factionalism in the Zimbabwean newspapers using a case study of Mujuru's expulsion. There has been a dearth of scholarly literature that focuses on the representation of the Lacoste faction in the Zimbabwean public discourse. Hence, despite a regular reference to factionalism in ZANU PF, a systematic academic analysis of this contemporary³ phenomenon in Zimbabwean politics is yet to emerge from scholars besides Tendi's work as already mentioned. Therefore this study is motivated by the need to examine the role of the media in ZANU PF factionalism and the representation of the Lacoste faction in the Zimbabwean public discourses. The idea is to complement the slowly growing body of scholarly literature on factionalism in post-independence Zimbabwe especially in light of the dramatic nature of the Mugabe's ouster that was driven by factionalism in ZANU PF.

³ Masipula's articles in the 1990s were the last ones to delve on the issue of factionalism hence the notion of waxing and waning in terms of literature that speaks to this important subject.

1.3 Statement of the problem

Factionalism is an innate characteristic of Zimbabwean politics (Sithole, 1984; Tendi, 2016). Factionalism in Zimbabwe is deep-rooted in the political system such that one observer remarked that "if you were to put two Zimbabweans on the moon and visited them the next day, you would find that they have formed three parties" (Sithole, 1993:35). Previous studies on Zimbabwean politics have agreed that there has been a long history of factional wars in Zimbabwe since the 1960s and it has significantly increased to this date (Sabao & Visser, 2016). Factional activities have been rampant in the Mugabe era leading to dysfunctional effects on the governance of the country. Thus Zimbabwe is facing extreme challenges varying from policy inconsistency, political uncertainty, poor economic performance that has been generally attributed to factionalism. Factionalism has pervaded both the ruling and opposition parties as well as the civil society in Zimbabwe (News Day, 5 March 2015).

Jing Huang (2000:2) argues that factionalism has drawn much attention and yet still remains a puzzle in the sense that it affects leadership relations and leadership decision making. Through factionalism ZANU PF elite members have diverted their attention from important national issues; instead of concentrating on the country's development, they have been concerned with the scramble for power and self-preservation. It is against this background that this study seeks to examine the role of the media in ZANU PF internecine conflicts and how the faction led by former Vice President Mnangagwa has been portrayed in Zimbabwean public discourses.

1.4 Research Questions

Having provided the context, rationale and the research problem, the study is aimed at addressing the following central question: What has been the role of the media in ZANU

PF internecine struggles and how has been the faction led by former Vice President Mnangagwa portrayed in Zimbabwean public discourse since 2014? Other questions to be addressed are:

- What are the socio-political and economic effects of continuous factionalism in Zimbabwe?
- What has been the role of media in ZANU PF factional fights?
- What factors are likely to promote or stand in the way of Mnangagwa and his faction as the former sought to succeed former President Robert Mugabe?

1.5 Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of the study are:

- To identify the socio-political and economic effects of continuous factionalism in Zimbabwe as well as examining how the faction led by former Vice President Mnangagwa is portrayed in Zimbabwean public discourses.
- To examine the role of media in ZANU PF factional wars.
- To interrogate the factors that promote or stand on the way for former Vice President Mnangagwa and his faction in their presidential succession bid.

1.6 Central Postulates

- ❖ The thesis's first central postulate is that the continuous bickering within ZANU PF retards Zimbabwe's social economic and political progress.
- ❖ The second postulate of this study is that the new media will significantly play both destructive and constructive roles in ZANU PF factional wars.

- ❖ The third postulate is that former Vice President Mnangagwa's tainted political record as a result of his involvement in the Matabeleland massacre could have potentially stood in his way to be Mugabe's heir apparent.

1.7 Significance of the Study/ Contributions of the study to academic Inquiry

As noted earlier, most studies that have been done in the field of factionalism offered different explanations. For instance, Schutz (1978) examined the role of socializing institutions, particularly education, in contributing to the cleavages within the Zimbabwe liberation movement. Sithole (1980) examined the role of ethnicity as an explanation for the proliferation of factionalism in the national movement. Sithole (1984) also reviewed the class factor argument in explaining the possible causes of factionalism during the Zimbabwe nationalist politics. The recent works of Tendi (2016) highlighted the role of state intelligence in supporting Mnangagwa in the presidium succession wars that led to the ousting of Joice Mujuru. Sabao and Viser (2016) also contributed on the representation of ZANU PF factionalism in the Zimbabwean newspapers using the case study of Mujuru's expulsion.

It is worth noting that presently factionalism in Zimbabwe has been mostly written about in journalistic circles (newspapers i.e. Herald, Daily News etc) than in a scholarly fashion (books, journals etc). It should be noted that the role of the media in ZANU PF internecine struggles and how the faction led by former Vice President Mnangagwa was portrayed in the Zimbabwean public discourse has received scant attention in the scholarly literature. Thus this study is in response to the scant attention that has been given to this area of study. This study seeks to complement the slowly growing scholarly literature on factionalism in post independent Zimbabwe body politic.

In addition, the research focuses on public discourses, which allows for language to play a pivotal role in social life as an important means of communication. This research is significant because it studies social constructs in a bid to better understand the role of the media in ZANU PF factionalism and how former Vice President Mnangagwa and his allies are perceived in the Zimbabwean public discourse. It is important to note that by focusing on the public discourse, the study goes a long way in studying social attitudes and perceptions towards the current politics of factionalism in Zimbabwe, thus making it of great scholarly significance. In summation the contributions of this study to existing body of literature on factionalism, the role of media in politics Zimbabwean troubled transition to democracy are as follows:

1.7.1 The politics of elite intra-party conflict

The study makes a modest contribution to the growing body of research on factionalism in Africa, particularly in post independent Zimbabwe. The study is in light of the scant attention given by scholars to this important area of study after Sithole's pioneering work in the late 1970s and 1980s. Thus this study is a timely scholarly intervention on the topic given the extent to which factional implosion within ZANU PF significantly played a significant role in shaping the liberation war based party's internal dynamics and by extension Zimbabwe's political trajectories.

1.7.2 The role of media in sustaining and escalating factionalism

The study critically examines the complex and various roles played by the media in influencing political conflicts. Literature on whether the new and the state controlled media played a destructive or constructive role in the ZANU PF factional fights has not been adequately investigated. Therefore this study makes a contribution to this area of study, particularly on how the new media is fast becoming one of the most important

players in framing political events and developments particularly in polarized political environments.

1.7.3 The politics of leadership succession

Finally, the study offers a fresh insight on the complexities of leadership succession in liberation war based political parties based on the developments that took place in Zimbabwe's ZANU PF presidency, formerly occupied by the then President Robert Mugabe. Having detailed the contributions of this study to existing body of knowledge the next section seeks to alert the reader on how this research was conducted.

1.8 Research methods and techniques

The research methods for this study were broadly inspired by Glaser and Strauss's Grounded theory approach and both classic and virtual ethnography approach in particular. From the onset, it is worth noting that most studies on sociological research have been finding it difficult to accurately obtain facts and to test a theory rigorously (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:1). It is on this basis that the ideas of Glaser and Strauss and other scholars who advocate for grounded theory were employed in this study. It is imperative to note that grounded theory is a method that is based on competing interpretations hence it is said to be a contested 'method' (Babchuk, 2010). Grounded theory has become the most popular research design in social sciences that seeks to discover how a theory can be generated from the data systematically attained from social research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:2). This is made possible by a process in which the collection of data and the analysis of data happen concurrently, allowing the researcher to become theoretically sensitive (ability to produce themes from data and relating it to normal models of theory) (Strauss & Corbin, 1990:42). Hence, this makes grounded theory an essential research technique for gathering and analyzing data; it

looks into the actualities in the real world and analyses the data with no preconceived ideas (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory seeks to minimize the researcher's influence on data analysis by allowing data to 'speak for itself'.

It is of crucial importance to note that grounded theory and the classic ethnography study are interrelated in some aspects. Hence, they both complement each other in the sense that data drives the theory (Klenke, 2008). It is for this modest reason that both approaches were employed in this study. However, in ethnographic study, researchers seek to investigate and examine cultures and societies that form part of the fundamental human experience (Murchison, 2010). It does so through a process of fieldwork method in which the researcher as an ethnographer, interact or participate in the lives of human subjects through observing and conducting interviews (Klenke, 2008). Hence, from this viewpoint, it must be noted that the ethnography approach involves a full immersion of the researcher in the day-to-day lives of those human subjects under study (Klenke, 2008). This makes the researcher to get an insider's view of reality, thereby acquiring realistic data and in a naturalistic setting in which participants acts naturally, focusing on both verbal and nonverbal behaviours.

1.8.1 Research methodology

The research was based on a qualitative technique. Qualitative research is research using methods such as participant observations or case studies which result in a narrative, descriptive account of a setting or practice (Parkinson & Drislane, 2011). Strauss and Cobin (1990) largely describe qualitative research as whichever kind of study that produces findings not arrived at by means of numerical procedures or other means of quantification. Qualitative research is research carried out by means of a variety of techniques which employ qualifying words and descriptions to record and examine aspects of social reality (Bless et al., 2006). Du Plooy (2002) argues that

qualitative research refers to interpretive and exploratory activities, rather than those which are plainly descriptive. The reason for utilizing a qualitative research technique was that it assisted the researcher in gaining a clearer understanding and knowledge regarding social issues under investigation.

1.8.2 Sampling and sample size

Sampling is the process of selecting a section of the population of interest so that by studying the sample, the researcher may fairly generalize results back to the population from which they were drawn (Babbie, 1990). According to Churchill (1996), sampling frame is the list of sampling units from which a sample will be drawn. The list could consist of geographical areas, institutions, individuals or other units. According to Marlhota and Peterson (2005), a good sampling design, if carefully executed, is a key to obtain high-quality data, this is often taken for granted and the results can be profound. Determining sample size is a very important issue because samples that are too large may waste time, resources and money, while samples that are too small may lead to inaccurate results. A sample of 34 participants was chosen from the following strata; Zimbabwean citizens and Zimbabweans who are based in the Diaspora - specifically those residing in South Africa. However, the sample which took part in the study was 27. The researcher faced challenges of participants who were skeptical in taking part in the study as they feared it could incriminate them. To determine the sample size for this study, the researcher utilized the sample size on empirical evidence from previous research (Magure, 2009). The researcher used a combination of both purposive and random sampling. Purposive sampling allowed the researcher to hand-pick participants who could contribute in-depth information on the issues of factionalism in ZANU PF and who could provide insights into the issue under study (Klenke, 2016:9). In addition, the study's reliance on random sampling also gave each individual a probability of being chosen at any stage of the sampling process (Kumar, 2008).

1.8.3 Data Collection and processing

In light of the fact that grounded theory is compatible with a broad range of data collection techniques, among others, interviews and observations. The data collection techniques used in this study was desktop reviews,⁴ and it concentrated on gathering data relating to the role of the media in ZANU PF factionalism and the representation of the Lacoste faction in the Zimbabwean public discourses. In addition, both classic (interviews) and virtual ethnography were also utilized (Charmaz, 2006). As was noted earlier, classic ethnography allows the researcher to interact with the research subjects that are part of the study thereby permitting the study to acquire firsthand information (Murchison, 2010:4). Hence, primary data was collected through classic ethnography (fieldwork); therefore semi-structured interviews were utilized. A semi-structured interview is a qualitative method of data collection which follows a flexible interview in which the interviewer does not follow a formalized list of questions (Doyle, 2004). Instead, the researcher will be having a list of general topics, called interview guides (ibid). The interview guides ensure same lines of inquiry to be followed by all the participants of this study. This will help the researcher reduce the probability of bias and culpable errors in the interview process (Babbie, 2001). The use of semi-structured interviews enabled the interviewees to provide insights by focusing on their perceptions on the phenomena being studied. Interviews were tape-recorded and this made it easy for the researcher to carefully listen to interview tapes and to write down notes which formed part of the interview transcript.

Furthermore, data was also be collected through the processes of virtual or cyber ethnography. Virtual ethnography is a relatively new development in the field of ethnography were the use of new multimedia technologies such as the Internet (YouTube, newspaper comments, recorded sound, Facebook, etc), makes it possible to

⁴ Desk research refers to secondary data or that which can be collected without fieldwork. Therefore, the research collected secondary data from books, journal articles and newspapers.

collect data (Klenke, 2008). Virtual ethnography allows the researcher, as the ethnographer, to immerse in the lives of the research informants through computer-mediated social interactions (Hua, 2016). This thesis made use of online social networks such as, *inter alia*; You-tube videos, newspaper comments and Facebook in order to enrich the study.

1.8.4 Data analysis and interpretation

Flowing from the above paragraphs, this study utilized the grounded theory approach to analyze the collected data. It should be noted from the onset that grounded theory as a practical tool for collecting and analyzing qualitative data, allows for a continuous interplay between analysis and data collection, hence the data collection and analysis process occurs concurrently (Charmaz, 2006). This enables the researcher to work back and forth allowing data analysis to guide future data collection and so on (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). However, in order to make meaning out of the data collected, the researcher followed the grounded theory's coding process. Data was analyzed using the three general phases of grounded theory, namely the open coding, axial coding and the selective coding (Charmaz, 2006). These phases occurred sequentially making the process to be iterative, and thus, allowing "data immersion" through a process of continuously reading the interview transcripts in order to be fully acquainted with the available data (ibid).

In order to analyze data, the study followed the first step of the coding process, which is the open coding. In open coding, data is fragmented, examined line by line, comparing incidents that emerged from the data, showing one or more concepts and then be categorized (Urquhart, 2013). Hence the aim of open coding phase was to develop categories. Line by line coding ensured intimacy between the researcher and the data; this allowed the researcher to be more theoretically sensitive. However, the researcher

made use of different highlighters of different colours (colour coding) as part of the coding process (Magure, 2009). The second phase of the analysis, that is, the axial coding was based on re-building data (fragmented through open coding) in a new way by creating connections between categories identified in open coding and their sub-categories (Punch, 2016). The last and final step of the analysis which is called the selective coding involved identifying of the central theme or category, systematically interrelating it to other sub-themes (ibid). Hence, it was through this process that all the interpretive work was integrated in this research study.

1.9 Ethical considerations

Ethical issues are important professional practices that a researcher is required to follow during the research process (Bless et al., 2006). It is important for the researcher to take into consideration some acceptable ethics when conducting a study. For this reason, since this researcher was interacting with human subjects, the following ethics were maintained throughout the research study:

1.9.1 Informed Consent

In any research, it is unacceptable to force human subjects to participate (Berg, 2001). It is ethical to inform participants first of the nature and reason of conducting the study as well as informing them on how the study will affect them, thus the benefits and risks encountered during their participation. However, participants must also be informed that they have the right to decline to participate at any stage, hence if they choose to do so (Bless et al., 2006).

1.9.2 Protection from harm

Social research should not cause any harm to the people being studied. The information revealed should not embarrass participants or endanger their lives, homes, jobs and social life. It is the responsibility of the researcher to make sure that the respondents participate in the study with full understanding of the possible risks involved (Babbie, 2001).

1.9.3 Anonymity and confidentiality

Anonymity and confidentiality are important ethical issues that were considered in this study because of the political nature of this study. Thus the researcher informed the respondents of the right to anonymity and this meant that only pseudonyms were used throughout this study. Anonymity also ensured that respondents gave authentic responses without any fear of possible victimisation in the future. Furthermore, participants were guaranteed that their information was to be kept confidential and not to be used for any other purposes except for this research (Berg, 2001).

1.10 Limitations of the study

The study encountered some challenges prominently among them being the lack of cooperation from the participants who feared reprisal from government spies. Thus due to the political nature of this study, some participants were afraid, assuming that the researcher was an agent of the Central Intelligent Organisation (CIO). However, these challenges were dealt with by assuring the participants of this study that their opinions were to remain confidential and anonymous and would only be used for academic purposes. Limited finance and time constraints made it impossible for the researcher to stay for a long time and be a participant observer in Zimbabwe. Therefore the use of virtual ethnography in this study, that is, the new media made it possible to offset this limitation.

1.11 Research outline

In order to answer the research question: What has been the role of the media in ZANU PF interneccine struggles and how has been the faction led by former Vice President Mnangagwa portrayed in the Zimbabwean public discourse since 2014? This thesis is organized into six chapters:

Chapter 1 outlines the research context, rationale of the study, statement of the problem, research aim and objectives, central postulates and the significance or contributions of the study to academic inquiry. Thereafter the chapter details the research methodology and techniques.

Chapter 2 is a theory chapter and it presents the theoretical framework of the study, that is, the founding knowledge of what is being studied. This chapter critically examines previous theories and scholarly ideas regarding factionalism.

Chapter 3 examines the costs and benefits of ZANU PF internal struggles on Zimbabwe.

Chapter 4 critically analyzes the role of both state controlled and new media in fueling, abating and portraying ZANU PF internal struggles. Particular attention is paid to the Lacoste faction and how it was represented in the Zimbabwean public discourses.

Chapter 5 examines the factors that potentially promote or stand in the way for former Vice President Mnangagwa and his faction in their presidential succession bid, within the broad context of the calculated measures that rival factions were taking to weaken each other.

Chapter 6 provides the conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Factionalism is a key feature of many political parties and it should be noted that the theories of factionalism have been used differently to understand the whole gamut of intraparty behaviour. It is against this background that the definition and understanding of factionalist tendencies in political parties have to be context specific. For Boucek (2012:36) factionalism is a process whereby a political party is partitioned into sub-units that engage in collective action in order to achieve their collective goals. From a political anthropology point of view, factionalism is defined as groups of people created to rally behind a leader who rejects the status quo and subsequently work against established authority in a society which may include institutions such as political parties, state institutions and even economic interests (Forte, 2013). Similarly, Beller and Belloni (1978:419) define a faction as "any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part."

It is important to note that factions emerge and exist in political parties prompting Harmel, et al., (1995:7) to forcefully argue that "factionalism is a fact of life within most political parties." Factionalism can represent a coming together of associates of different movements, different political formations and different ideological groups to maximize political influence and power during the early phases of party formation (Webb & Lewis, 2003:65). Webb argues that factionalism can be a party aspect whereby members without similar preferences from those of the superior group choose to form separate groups to gain bargaining power (ibid). Intra-party factional groupings stem from political issues ranging from conservative to liberal groups but mostly it revolves around personalities (Hoover, 2011:254).

Boucek (2009) argues that party unity is difficult to preserve in the long run as domination bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Political parties are not huge structures but collective units in which competition, different opinions and disagreements create internal pressures and fissures. In turn, these forces often generate the formation of factions that give the unitary actor assumption highly questionable (Boucek, 2009). Dominant political parties become more and more polarized and divided as they attract careerist politicians who are focused on increasing their share of private incentives even at the expense of party reputation (Boucek, 2012:1 805). Pye (1980) also opined that the main root for factions amongst cadres is the search for career security and the safeguarding of power. He argued that the strength of factional groups is based on the personal relationships of individuals who, operating in a hierarchical context, create linkage networks that extend upward in support of particular leaders who are, in turn, looking for followers to ensure their power (Ibid).

For Sartori (1976:10) factionalism has been uniformly condemned under entirely different assumptions. He stated that the French revolutionaries declared themselves as patriots and to them, parties and factions were the same as a conspiracy to the nation. In South Africa, former African National Congress (ANC) secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, described factionalism as a political problem found in every political system. He was quoted saying, "Factionalism will be raised all the time; it is the challenge facing all political parties. We are trying to reverse it because it is a cancer and it can weaken or even kill an organization" (The Sunday Independent, 11 October 2015). It can be concluded that, more often than not, factionalism has been depicted as detrimental to the integrity of political parties and systems.

It has been argued that factions can undermine party cohesion, effectiveness and management, and that they can cause personnel decisions to be based on factional affiliation rather than on merit (Kollner, 2004). As cited in Sartori (1976:10), Robespierre stated that what brings about plurality of parties is only the "personal interest"; and that

"wherever I perceive ambition, intrigue, cunningness and Machiavellianism, there I recognize a faction; and it is in the nature of all factions to sacrifice the general interest". Saint-Just further stated that "Every party is criminal...Every faction is thus criminal...All factions attempt at undermining the sovereignty of the people" (cited in Sartori, 1976:10).

At the same time, political factions do not have permanent friendships or relationships. They unite to fight the major power then split in the long run and fight against each other. Hence, factional groupings seldom remain united. Today's opponent may potentially be tomorrow's ally. Wiarda (2005) states that factional groups tend to obstruct the surfacing of strong leaders. The strong leader represents a threat to other factions' opportunities for power, and they gang together long enough to topple that strong leader from power (Wiarda, 2005:143). Andrew Nathan in his factionalism model stated that, factionalism undermines the political stability; he said that, "no faction will be able to achieve overwhelmingly superior power and one faction may for the moment enjoy somewhat greater power than rival factions, but this power will not be so great that the victorious faction is capable of expunging its rival and assuring permanent dominance" (Huang, 2000:16).

For some scholars, however, factionalism within political parties serves to represent and articulate varied interests or preferences of portions of a certain party and/or their followers (Beller & Belloni, 1978). Huang (2000:4) views factionalism as a dependent variable that results from policy disputes, conflicts of institutional interests and power struggles. Hence he argues that factionalism does not just emerge in political parties but they come into surface due to disputes over policies, institutional interests and succession struggles. From this standpoint, it is clear that factionalism is characterized by conflicts as factions battle to further their agendas within an institution such as a political party. Thus in its nature, factionalism represents antagonism between opposing groups within a larger group.

On the other hand, there is a broad consensus among scholars that factionalism can also have positive consequences for political parties and systems (Boucek 2009; Carty 2004; Verge & Gomez 2012). For Harmel and Tan (2003), the activities of intra-party factions can influence changes in the identity, organization and internal decision-making processes of parties and party systems. Factionalism can potentially strengthen internal party processes, enabling the party to appeal to a broader constituency, contributing to better decision-making, integrating diversity into manifestos, moderating party leaders' responses to issues and facilitating coordination within parties (Saraskinsky, 2015).

Secondly, this study is also inspired by Hall's representation theory that says representation is the production of meaning of the concepts in human minds through language Hall (1997:17). It is important to note that language plays a vital role in social life as an essential means of communication. But in addition to the use of language, it should be pointed out that representation also involves the use of signs and images which stand for or represent things (Hall, 1997:15). A case in point is the use of the crocodile and the Lacoste fashion logo when referring to the Mnangagwa faction.

Hall (1997) argues that representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. In short, representation is an attempt to interpret reality in order to make sense and meaning. Therefore, it is not necessarily a reflection of reality (Hall, 1997). According to Preziosi (1998:357):

It is through representations that we know the world. At the same time we cannot say, in a simple sense, that a representation or an image 'reflects' a reality, 'distorts' a reality, 'stands in place' of an absent reality, or bears no relation to any reality 'whatsoever.'... Reality is a matter of representation ... and representation is, in turn, a matter of discourse.

As a matter of fact, one of the primary and highly influential components through which meanings are produced and represented is the mass media (Mahadeo and McKinney

(2007:15). Similarly, Parichi (2016) posits that, while all human communication can be considered as various examples of representation, a prominent tool and purveyor of representation in modern society is the media, such that much academic discussion of representation revolves around media representation. In most cases, representation is concerned with the way subjects, such as societies, races and ethnic groups, social groups, and individuals, are portrayed in the media. This is so because, the concept of representation relates to the idea that the media construct meaning about the world (Hoijer, 2011).

Thus by representing the world, the media help readers and viewers make sense of it. In addition, the media also have the power to represent again and again some identities and some imaginings, while excluding others and making them seem unfamiliar or threatening (Hall, 1997; Mahadeo & McKinney, 2007). It is therefore important to note that, representation theory is inevitably concerned with how media representation works. This is so because the media plays a critical role in public opinion formation and representation. Thus, more often than not, the media form, influence and direct public opinion. Having consolidated the theoretical framework, the next section reviews the existing literature on factionalism as it relates to ZANU PF and attendant internecine conflicts.

2.2 Understanding the genealogy and nature of ZANU PF factionalism

It is worth noting that before being toppled by the army in November 2017, Robert Mugabe has led the ruling ZANU PF party and Zimbabwe since 1977⁵ and 1980⁶, respectively. Whether by hook or crook the nonagenarian Mugabe was the country's number one since Zimbabwe attained independence from the British colonisers. Mugabe's longevity in power and his old age coupled with growing speculation over his

⁵ Robert Mugabe assumed control of ZANU in 1977.

⁶ Robert Mugabe won the 1980 elections and assumed the Prime Minister position until 1987 when the prime minister position was abolished. He thereafter became the executive president of the country (Zenenga, 2010:18)

health created perfect conditions for the need of a successor. As a result rifts/factions emerged in ZANU PF vis-à-vis who in the political party was to succeed the then President Mugabe.

It is noteworthy that factionalism in Zimbabwe's political parties is not a new phenomenon. Incessant intra-party conflicts which come in varying magnitudes and intensities have been a hallmark of Zimbabwe's politics since the 1960s - during the times of the liberation struggle (the second Chimurenga). In contextualizing the current debate, it would, therefore, be imperative to recap the history and nature of ZANU PF factionalism. Factionalism in ZANU PF has its roots in 1963 when Ndabaningi Sithole and other nationalist leaders, including Robert Mugabe, broke away from Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU to form a splinter party, ZANU (Msindo, 2012).

Although the cause for the bloody ZAPU-ZANU split is disputed, several competing explanations have been provided to explain what caused the split. To that extent, various scholars of the nationalist movement suggest that the intra-nationalist rivalry manifested itself in the form of ethnic differences (Sithole, 1980; Ali & Mathews, 1999; Mutambara, 2014), while others premised it on the class factor (Schutz, 1978; Tshabangu, 1979; Sithole, 1984). But generally, the ethnic factor coupled with disagreements over how the struggle against the British rule could be waged is the most plausible factor that explains factionalism in ZAPU. In a way, to prove that there was an ethnic dimension to the split, Nkomo's ZAPU became a predominantly Ndebele party, whereas Mugabe's ZANU became Shona led (Msindo, 2012). Thus, in essence, the infighting within ZAPU resulted in a two way split of the liberation movement along linguistic or geopolitical lines.

What should be pointed out from the onset is that the factional antagonism and animosity which characterized the nationalist movement culminated in bloody township rivalries as both ZANU and ZAPU fiercely attacked each other by words and through physical violence (Day, 1975). This scenario weakened the nationalist movement as they diverted their energies from fighting a common colonial enemy (ibid). In sum, it can

be argued that as the liberation struggle raged on, both parties were not only fighting their common enemy but were also fighting each other and this became linked to a phenomenon termed as the “struggles within the struggle” (Sithole, 1999). The warring factions - ZANU and ZAPU established their respective military wings - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (Howe, 1994). On that account, the ethnic dimension to the 1963 split became more apparent when the two military wings mainly recruited their cadres based on ethnic grounds - ZIPRA from Ndebeles and ZANLA from Shonas (ibid). As a result, both the warring factions with their respective armies remained acrimonious rivals and distinct bodies throughout the war. Hence they operated from different bases and from different regions.

Notwithstanding the fact that the nationalist movement had split into ZAPU and ZANU, it is noteworthy that both parties experienced internal squabbles of their own. For instance, there were fissures that emerged in ZANU's military wing - ZANLA and this was the so-called Nhari rebellion of 1974 (see Chung, 2006). The Nhari mutiny was essentially a confrontation between a group of young and educated guerrillas within ZANLA against the political leadership of the then Defence Chief, Josiah Tongogara and the ZANU High Command (ibid). The guerrillas, who were led by Thomas Nhari, accused the ZANU High Command of corruption, tribalism and for failing to meet the army's basic needs, among other vices (ibid). In short, the guerrillas wanted Tongogara's leadership to be replaced by a new military leadership. However, it is critical to note that because the grievances were levelled against the ZANLA leadership, the High Command conveniently interpreted the very act of questioning its actions as insubordination (Mazarire, 2011). Eventually, Nhari was arrested and executed together with other ZANLA fighters who had supported him. But this did not solve divisions within ZANLA as it was speculated that the Nhari rebellion later culminated in the assassination of the High Command chairperson, Herbert Chitepo (Magure, 2009).

A commission of inquiry into Chitepos’ death concluded that he was murdered by his fellow Karanga tribesmen in ZANU, and another nationalist Chikerema also blamed the

internecine conflicts among members of ZANU (ibid). In sum, it should be pointed out that during the liberation struggle power-based internecine rivalry was the norm (ibid). Power struggles amongst the Shona sub-ethnic groups led to assassinations, massacres and imprisonment of ZANU party members (ibid).

Given the intra and inter nationalist rivalries and assassinations that characterized the Zimbabwean liberation movement, Sithole (1999) was correct when he asserted that the nationalist liberation struggle was a revolution that ate its own children. However, despite being allied as the Patriotic Front during the Lancaster House negotiations, the warring factions that had started in the early sixties contested the 1980 elections on separate tickets, remaining themselves as PF ZAPU and PF ZANU respectively. What should be pointed out is that the factional tendencies that characterized the nationalist movement were carried over into the newly independent Zimbabwe.

With the advent of independence in Zimbabwe, huge factional cracks within ZANU PF deepened in 1988, barely a year after signing the Unity Accord with Nkomo's PF ZAPU, culminating in the expulsion of Edgar Tekere, the party's secretary-general who was against former President Mugabe and his ZANU PF's one-party state ambition (Sachikonye, 1990; Sithole, 1993). Following the expulsion, Tekere went on to form his own political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). The formation of the splinter party ZUM was specifically to forestall ZANU PF's apparent drive towards a one-party state (Sithole, 1993). This was a direct challenge to Mugabe who, since the signing of the unity accord, had uncontested power.

Consequently, the campaign period that preceded the 1990 parliamentary and presidential elections was viciously contested, thus assuring Mugabe's overwhelming victory (Sachikonye, 1990). The fortunes of ZUM, however, dwindled after the 1990 elections when the party failed to consolidate its election gains. Despite the decimation of ZUM, post-2004 saw an intensification of internecine tensions within ZANU PF pitting Mugabe's former two deputies. As a result, Mnangagwa and Mujuru went on to form their respective factions to deal with the matter of leadership renewal (see Tendi, 2016).

Both Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions jostled to succeed Robert Mugabe culminating in what became known as the Tsholotsho Declaration of 2004.

Flowing from the above, in order to fully comprehend the factional rifts that existed between the then Mnangagwa and the Mujuru factions, this study chronicles the events that led to the disputed Tsholotsho Declaration. Professor Jonathan Moyo (former ZANU PF politburo member) described it as a “ghost still haunting ZANU PF succession politics” (Moyo, 2004). The Tsholotsho Declaration which was allegedly masterminded by Moyo had the following four key principles that defined its political thrust:

(1) that all the country's four main ethnic groups, Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru and Ndebele must be represented in the Presidium. (2) that the position of the president must not be monopolized by one ethnic group but must rotate among the four main ethnic groupings. (3) that the filling of Presidium posts must not be by imposition by the party hierarchy but through democratic elections done by secret balloting. (4) such positions must be filled in accordance with the Constitution of the party (Moyo, 2004).

According to Moyo (2004), the Tsholotsho Declaration was a culmination of political debates and processes that sought to internally reform ZANU PF, particularly in the context of filling the vice president post that fell vacant following the death of Simon Muzenda in 2003. The untimely death of Muzenda triggered a scramble for political power in ZANU PF. It was clear that whoever was appointed to replace Muzenda would be the then President Mugabe's successor (Moyo, 2004). Mnangagwa (a Karanga⁷) appeared to have garnered support from most provinces (except Mashonaland Central, Harare and Mashonaland East) that had voted in favour of the principles of the Tsholotsho Declaration (Moyo, 2004). The momentum that Mnangagwa gathered ahead of the ZANU PF annual people's conference of December 2003 increased the chances of him being appointed for the vice presidency post. However, Mugabe was reluctant to appoint a replacement and was content to await the party Congress of December 2004, thus denying Mnangagwa a sure win opportunity (Matyszak, 2014:26).

⁷ Karanga is one of the sub-groupings of the Shona ethnic groups. The Shona ethnic group also consists of other tribal sub-groupings such as Manyika, Zezuru, Karanga, Korekore and Ndaou.

On the other hand, the principles of the Tsholotsho Declaration stood in the way for Mujuru's (a Zezuru) aspirations to the vice presidency post because Mugabe (also a Zezuru) was already representing the Zezuru ethnic group in the presidium (Matyszak, 2014:27). Therefore the Mujuru faction, aware of the growing sentiment of the party's need for ethnic balance in the top leadership positions, regrouped with the three provinces that were against the declaration and they conspired to smuggle in the centrality of gender in the presidium (Moyo, 2004). This move was to scuttle the imminent inevitable election of Mnangagwa and thus, circumventing the application of the principles of the Tsholotsho Declaration.

Notwithstanding Mnangagwa's chances, the strategy of electing a woman was pursued at the ZANU PF Women's League in November 2004 where both Mugabe and the former First Lady Grace Mugabe, played a crucial role in endorsing Mujuru's candidacy (Moyo, 2004; Matyszak, 2014:27). Mugabe, however, was convinced that electing Joice Mujuru would secure his consolidation of power and would maintain the Zezuru ethnic domination and hegemony in Zimbabwean politics (Moyo, 2004). As a result, the ZANU PF constitution was hastily and unlawfully amended to the effect that the vice presidency post be filled by a woman (Moyo, 2004; Matyszak, 2015). It became clear that the Mnangagwa faction and the principles of the Tsholotsho Declaration had been overlooked and thus, in December 2004, the Congress "elected" Joice Mujuru as the vice president (Matyszak, 2015).

Mugabe reacted angrily to the principles of the Tsholotsho Declaration alleging that its architects accused him of tribalism (Moyo, 2004). As a result, several senior party members aligned to the then Mnangagwa faction and who sought to advance the principles of the Declaration were either suspended or expelled from both the party and government. Among the casualties were Jonathan Moyo, Jabulani Sibanda (former chairman of the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association) and many others. While his allies were suspended and expelled, Mnangagwa was only demoted from the party hierarchy

because he allegedly distanced himself at the last minute from the Tsholotsho plotters (Financial Gazette, 18 August 2016; Daily News, 31 July 2016).

Clearly, Mnangagwa disowned his allies who were campaigning for his ascendancy to the presidium in the wake of the purges that followed the Tsholotsho incident. For instance, when Jonathan Moyo was fired, he had to fight for his political life while Mnangagwa never came to his defence. Basically, it was partly for this reason that Jonathan Moyo became one of Mnangagwa's foremost critics and opponents within the ZANU PF party. Thus this was a clear indication of the common political adage that politicians are only loyal to their interests, hence, they have no permanent friends or enemies - today's friend may become a foe the next day and vice-versa.

However, it should be noted that the purging of the then Mnangagwa loyalists following the ill-fated Tsholotsho incident did not solve or end cleavages within ZANU PF. This is so because, the entrance of the former First Lady - Grace Mugabe into the political arena in 2014 (as ZANU PF secretary for Women's League), resuscitated the factional rifts between Mujuru and her 'traditional' rival Mnangagwa (The Standard, 12 October 2014; Tendi, 2016). At that stage, the latter formed an amorphous alliance with Grace Mugabe in order to derail Mujuru's presidential aspirations which had become powerful and unprecedented threat to Mugabe's presidency (Tendi, 2016). As a result, scathing factional attacks coupled with numerous accusations on Mujuru and her allies eventually led to their expulsion from both the government and ZANU PF.

While the ZANU PF party spiritedly denied the existence of factions within its ranks (The Herald, 23 December 2012); it soon became apparent that two major factions emerged in the party (News Day, 18 May 2016) following the expulsion of Mujuru. The first one was led by the former First Lady Grace Mugabe alongside Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao, known in ZANU PF lingo as the 'Generation 40' (G40)

faction (ibid) while the other rivalry group was rallying behind Mugabe's former Deputy President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, also known in factionalist lexicon as the 'Team Lacoste' faction. The next section will give a detailed background about Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa's political journey from the colonial and post-colonial epochs. This is important in light of the fact that this study is based on how the former vice president and his faction were represented in the public discourses.

2.3 Who is Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa?

Mnangagwa, who joined the military at a very young age, was recruited into ZAPU in 1962. But, following the nationalist split into ZAPU and ZANU, he subsequently joined the latter soon after it was founded, in 1963 (Bhebhe, 1999). That same year he was among the first group of ZANLA fighters who were sent to China for military training (Cilliers, 1985). On his return to the then Rhodesia, he became part of a group of fighters known as the 'Crocodile Group' which participated in the first armed guerrilla incursion against the Smith regime (The Herald, 29 August 2015). According to Mnangagwa, it was basically within the context of this Crocodile group and its sabotaging activities which included the killing of whites and destroying of properties that earned him the nom de guerre 'Ngwena' (Crocodile) (ibid). However, it is worth noting that several interpretations have been provided with regards to his nickname. For instance, it is interesting to point out that his wife, Auxilia Mnangagwa asserts that he was given the nickname 'Ngwena' during his time as Minister for State Security in the 1980s (The Sunday Mail, 14 December 2014).

It is worth pointing out that Mnangagwa was in charge of sabotaging a locomotive in Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) and this led to his arrest but was spared from the mandatory death penalty on account of his young age (Fletcher, 2016). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail what happened while he was imprisoned but it should, however, be noted that upon his release, Mnangagwa later joined with Mugabe, whom he had met in jail and was appointed as Mugabe's personal aide in 1977 (see The Herald, 29 August 2015). It is worth pointing out that since that time the two developed

a close relationship which blossomed beyond that of master and servant but to father and son, with Mnangagwa looking up to Mugabe as his father (News Day, 10 November 2017). In a way, this served as their reference point of being close political allies as Mnangagwa turned out to be Mugabe's right-hand man, thus becoming an important figure in the ZANU PF party.

2.4 Mnangagwa's political journey 1980 - 2017

Allied to the above, it is imperative to note that at the appointment of the first cabinet in independent Zimbabwe, the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe assigned critical security and defence ministries to his confidantes and trusted lieutenants in order to consolidate his power base (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2 April 2016). It is possibly for that reason that Mnangagwa was appointed as the first State Security Minister from 1980-1988. What needs to be pointed out is that, it is during Mnangagwa's tenure as the state security minister that the infamous Matabeleland disturbances occurred. It is, therefore, the aim of this account to demonstrate the relevance of the 1980s Matabeleland uprising with respect to how Emmerson 'Ngwenya' Mnangagwa is portrayed in the Zimbabwean public discourses.

As pointed out earlier that despite being allied as the Patriotic Front during the Lancaster House negotiations, PF ZAPU and ZANU PF contested the 1980 elections on separate tickets (Magure, 2009). Following the overwhelming victory of ZANU PF, the then Prime Minister Mugabe went on to form a government of national unity which saw some of the senior PF ZAPU officials, including Joshua Nkomo being appointed to government posts. However, this inclusive government did not last following suspicions by ZANU PF that PF ZAPU was sponsoring and fanning a dissident problem and anti-ZANU PF activities in Matabeleland culminating in very serious security issues (CCJP, 2007; Magure, 2009). According to Mugabe, "Dr Nkomo was trying to overthrow my government. ZAPU and its leader, Dr Joshua Nkomo was like a cobra in a house. The only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head" (quoted in Magure, 2009:118). Thus, the fact that Dr Nkomo and ZAPU were metaphorically seen

as snakes in the eyes of Mugabe, by and large, explains the tragedy that befell Matabeleland from 1982-1987 (ibid).

The Matabeleland disturbances, commonly known by the Shona code-name 'Gukurahundi' - meaning an unusual tsunami-like storm that "destroys everything, weeds, crops, the good and the bad" (Sithole, 1993:37) - was essentially an operation by Mugabe's government to combat a dissident problem in Matabeleland (see CCJP, 1997; CCJP, 2007). It was evident from the parliamentary response given by Mnangagwa - the then State Security Minister - to a motion raised with regards to the country's security situation in 1982 that the ZANU PF government was convinced that Nkomo was behind the making of banditry and dissidents (Magure, 2009).

According to Mnangagwa, the campaign against dissidents could only succeed if the infrastructure which nurtured them was destroyed (The Herald, 22 March 2016). For him, opposing Mugabe was tantamount to death. In this same vein, the state controlled Chronicle newspaper reported Mnangagwa at the time likening dissidents to "cockroaches and bugs" that had reached such an epidemic proportion that the government had to bring in "DDT" to get rid of them (see News Day, 19 July 2011; The Chronicles, 23 March 2016). Therefore the deployment of the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade by the ZANU PF government was ostensibly to deal with dissidents. So in a sense, Mnangagwa described dissidents as "cockroaches" and the Fifth Brigade as "DDT", a deadly pesticide used to exterminate vermin. As such, the Fifth Brigade's military operation became a bizarre combination of random killing, raping of women and girls, abduction and torture of PF ZAPU supporters and Ndebele speaking civilians (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2008).

In addition, the Fifth Brigade conducted cultural imperialism in an attempt to force Ndebele speakers to speak Shona and indoctrination which was aimed at forcing people to support ZANU PF (ibid). Consequently, thousands of Ndebele civilians were

allegedly killed during the Gukurahundi massacres (CCJP, 1997), suggesting that the operation was not just a political manoeuvre but apparently tribal and ethnic in nature. Although the Gukurahundi massacres officially ended in 1987, after the signing of the Unity Accord between Nkomo (PF ZAPU) and Mugabe (ZANU PF) - it remains a politically and ethnically emotive issue. Thus it has cemented an ethnic and tribal animosity that is still potent in contemporary Zimbabwe.

Fast forward in 2008, Mnangagwa played an instrumental role in securing Mugabe's stay in power following ZANU PF's electoral defeat by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the disputed 2008 harmonized elections (Masunungure, 2010). In fact, the MDC had won in the first round but withdrew in the second round due to ZANU PF's intimidation and violence that preceded the presidential runoff, thus making a free and fair election impossible (Staff reporter, 2008; Masunungure, 2010). According to Alexander and Tendi (2008), Mnangagwa sought to guarantee Mugabe's survival, secure his favour and therefore reinvigorate his claim to succession. To that end, he reportedly assumed the leadership of a shadowy Joint Operations Command (JOC), which comprised of security heads from the army, air force, prison service, police and intelligence agency (ibid). Unconfirmed reports suggest that Mugabe was ready to concede defeat after the March elections but was advised not to do so by Mnangagwa and his other JOC members (The Zimbabwean, 29 April 2008). Thus this leaves little doubt that the violence that was perpetrated against the MDC supporters in the aftermath of the March polls was orchestrated by the JOC.

What needs to be pointed out from the onset is that, the ZANU PF's electoral defeat in March 2008 was partly believed to have been as a result of a clandestine anti-Mugabe campaign under the code name 'Bhora Musango' (kick the ball off the playing field) which was instituted by Mujuru, who then was the Vice President (see Magure, 2014; Nyambi, 2016; Sabao & Visser, 2016). As part of the Bhora Musango campaign, some ZANU PF candidates from the Mujuru faction allegedly urged party supporters to vote ZANU PF for parliament and the opposition MDC for the post of president. The idea was

to punish Mugabe for, among other reasons, refusing to relinquish power and choose a younger presidential candidate (ibid).

In the run to June 2008 runoff elections, violence was perpetrated by ZANU PF's pillars of coercion including war veterans, along with the military to the electorate, under Operation Makavhoterapapi (whom did you vote for) (Magure, 2009). This operation was carried out as a punishment for not voting for Mugabe in March harmonised elections and as a warning against the repeat of such a vote in June 2008 runoff (ibid). It is therefore imperative to note that the June 2008 presidential runoff election period serves a very important purpose in this study given that Mnangagwa is alleged to have supervised a heavily militarized election campaign that resulted in the death and displacement of a number of the opposition MDC supporters (see Alexander &Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2010). As Masunungure (2010:81) would want to say it, "the April to June 2008 election interregnum was a militarized moment". In his chapter entitled "A militarized Election: The 27 June Presidential election" Masunungure concluded that "the political processes was overthrown and in its place came a militarized process in which the military elite came to the aid of their political counterparts in a toxic combination of ZANU (PF) and the military/security complex" (Masunungure, 2010:97). Thus in this political-military alliance, the military, just like in the early 1980s Gukurahundi episodes, was the dominant player and this robbed the electoral process of its political character.

2.5 Conclusion and Aftermath of Mnangagwa's endgame

It is worth noting that the controversial 2008 elections culminated in a Southern African Development Community (SADC) facilitated Government of National Unity (GNU) between ZANU PF and MDC (Magure, 2014) whereupon Mnangagwa was assigned the powerful Defence portfolio (The Herald, 11 December 2014). It can be inferred that Mugabe appointed Mnangagwa to head the Defence ministry as he had tirelessly

worked alongside the military to reverse the MDC victory by unleashing a brutal wave of violence against the opposition and its supporters. The appointment of Mnangagwa as the Defence Minister can also be interpreted as a calculated strategy by Mugabe to maintain the party's authoritarian machinery well lubricated ahead of the 2013 presidential elections which were subsequently 'won' resoundingly by ZANU PF (Magure, 2014). Over time the strategy proved to be a blessing in disguise for Mnangagwa and a poisoned chalice for Mugabe since the army eventually toppled and replaced him with Mnangagwa as detailed in the Epilogue section.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IMPACT OF ZANU PF INTERNECINE CONFLICTS

3.1 Introduction

Over the years Zimbabwe and ZANU PF's intra politics increasingly took a very interesting and controversial angle following Mugabe's reluctance to relinquish power. The frustration over Mugabe's longevity in power coupled with his poor health and advanced age created perfect conditions for the need for leadership renewal. Thus different competing factions within ZANU PF that jostled to succeed Mugabe both in the party and government emerged in that particular context. The party's factional battles led to seismic changes and challenges well beyond the party machinery. Hence one observer said, "When ZANU PF sneezes the whole country catches a political cold". The implication was that there were negative spillover effects on Zimbabwe's body politic that came to the fore as competing faction leaders within ZANU PF sought to strategically reposition themselves to succeed Mugabe. The goal of this chapter is to detail the costs and benefits associated with ZANU PF factional battles in light of the profound claim made by the observer that the country's socio-economic and political terrain stands to be affected directly and indirectly by developments within the party.

3.2 Costs and benefits of ZANU PF factionalism on Zimbabwe

As already indicated in the preceding chapter, there is a long history of factional rifts in ZANU PF since the 1960s. What is increasingly becoming evident is that over the years, factionalist tendencies in ZANU PF have been on an upward trend. It is being argued here that ZANU PF factionalism has both costs and benefits on the country's socio-economic and political landscape. This is so primarily because political processes in the Zimbabwean community cannot be defined and understood independent of the polity and a ZANU PF government once led by Robert Mugabe (Sabao & Visser, 2016).

It should, therefore, be noted from the onset that there is a relationship between ZANU PF's party politics and the socio-economic and political development of the country (interview notes, November 2016). The reality is that ZANU PF's predominance and its longevity in power enabled the party to permeate and influence almost every aspect of Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political life. Thus the dynamics in ZANU PF influenced national policy, governmental decisions, actions and systems. To a certain extent, it can be argued that any disruptions within and/or to ZANU PF as a party necessarily negatively impacts on the socio-economic as well as the political processes of the country.

Flowing from the above, (Köllner & Basedau, 2005:6) succinctly asserts that, "factions can affect the stability of parties and party systems...they influence how parties perform their societal and state-oriented tasks...thus they can impinge upon the legitimacy and efficiency of political systems." Findings of this study suggest that factionalism within ZANU PF was retrogressive as it negatively affected national development. This was so primarily because government officials who are supposed to champion the country's economic development agenda were preoccupied with securing their own political future (interview notes, January 2017). In actual fact, members of different factions were more concerned with the survival of their factions rather than collectively driving government programmes meant to deliver on the party's past electoral promises.

Consequently, Zimbabwe is facing extreme challenges ranging from policy inconsistency, political uncertainty and poor economic performance that were in part attributed to ZANU PF internecine conflicts. There is strong evidence detailed in this chapter suggesting that the intensification of factionalism within ZANU PF represents the biggest obstacle to the resuscitation of the country's economy. The country's economic problems were exacerbated by the implosion in ZANU PF due to factionalism (interview notes, January 2017). As a result, citizens became victims of harsh economic

and political realities that characterize Zimbabwe. If one looks at the survival of the people in Zimbabwe, one would be left wondering if another beginning is ever possible.

Developments in ZANU PF are in line with Kollner & Basedau's (2005) observations that factions can affect the stability of parties and party systems .i.e. they influence how parties perform their societal and state-oriented tasks. It should be noted that factionalism brought political instability within the ZANU PF party, a development that negatively affected the country's economy and the society at large. Perennial cash shortages, unprecedented levels of unemployment and glaring levels of abject poverty became the order of the day while the ruling party's attention was diverted to fighting factional battles (interview notes, December 2016). So pervasive and intense was the succession wars in ZANU PF that the government started failing to provide for economic security for the population. Commenting on the effects of factionalism that was bedeviling the country, one interviewee posited that:

ZANU PF is the government and so, it is responsible for all social and economic issues relating to Zimbabwe but unfortunately, in-house squabbles have made its officials to concentrate only on securing their governmental or factional positions. As a result, the economic and social problems are left unattended. 'We' citizens are at the receiving end; we are suffering because those in authority are spending most of their time and energies dealing with succession wars - our needs and our voices are continuing to be ignored. There is no competition for developing the country but rather government officials are competing for political power. The economic and social ills we are facing right now are a result of factionalism within the ruling ZANU PF government. (Interview with Mr Alphonse Mapipi, December 2016).

In an editorial, an independent paper, *The Zimbabwe Independent*, had this to say about ZANU PF internecine struggles:

The ongoing ZANU PF internal party squabbles translate to a huge cost to the country with the struggling Treasury being forced to meet the high costs of by-elections at the expense of crucial development and social services. The large-scale purges in the ruling ZANU PF party - spawned by the serious infighting precipitated by the bitter succession to replace President Mugabe when he eventually goes - are a serious liability to the fiscus at a time the country faces a protracted economic crisis. (The Zimbabwe Independent, 29 May 2015).

What is telling about the above remarks is that the internal factional fights within ZANU PF were characterized by a tendency of sacking senior key officials from both the party and the government. The incessant purging of most senior key officials within ZANU PF on allegations ranging from fanning factionalism and sowing seeds of disunity among others was generally accompanied by a series of cabinet reshuffles as the ZANU PF led government sought to fill the positions left by expelled candidates (see, for example, Daily News, 13 December 2014). It should be noted that the expelled officials would take away with them expensive vehicles and other perks as golden handshakes while their successors had to receive new packages from the government (interview notes, November 2016). Clearly, this had far-reaching effects on the country's comatose economy as it further strained the national fiscus.

This instability and uncertainty disrupted government and cabinet business through stalling projects that were meant for national development. Commenting on the incessant cabinet reshuffles, one political analyst was quoted as having said: "the appointments of the cabinet were more of political patronage extending its boundaries where comrades were being invited to the feeding trough" (The Financial Gazette, 17 September 2015). Given the incessant cabinet reshuffles, controversial portfolios such as the Ministry of National Scholarships and Ministry of State for Liaising on Psychomotor Activities in Education and Vocational Training were created as a way of appeasing factional interests (Daily News, 23 October 2017).

Flowing from the above statement, it can be inferred that most cabinet appointments were based on patronage rather than merit. As a result, most cabinet ministers were incapable and inefficient in implementing strategies or policies that would drive socio-economic development. This is in line with Magure (2012) who contends that in the long run patronage politics is economically and financially unsustainable as they run against the very basic notions of wealth creation meant to alleviate poverty and redistribute wealth.

In addition, it is instructive to note that in some instances, replacing the expelled candidates required conducting parliamentary by-elections that demanded campaign funds. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the country's election management body - the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) - spent up to US\$4 million in 2015 for parliamentary by-elections (The Standard, 7 June 2015). These figures are shocking, especially if one considers the harsh economic realities affecting the country. More so, the increased frequency of elections kept the country in an election mode, thus creating a cycle of anxiety, political uncertainty and raising the risk of political violence across the country (interview notes, December 2016). Almost similar to the aforementioned observations, Masunungure, a leading scholar, posited that Zimbabwe was in perpetual election mode and political violence was being exacerbated by intraparty factionalism linked to ZANU PF succession wars (The Standard, 15 November 2015).

Another major issue of concern revolved around the endless policy contestations, contradictory government statements and conflicting government programmes that emerged as ZANU PF internal squabbles intensified. The country witnessed the worst policy inconsistencies in living memory as cabinet ministers from rival factions publicly attacked and repeatedly contradicted each other over policy positions thereby leading to policy paralysis. For instance, with respect to the government's Command Agriculture programme which was championed by former Vice President Mnangagwa, the G40 faction expressed diametrically opposed views with its key members such as Jonathan Moyo attacking it on social media platform, Twitter - deriding it as "Command Ugly-Culture" (The Herald, 21 June 2017). The Command Agriculture programme which

became embroiled in the ZANU PF internal wrangles was implemented by the government in 2016/2017 in a bid to boost the country's food security. However, despite its vigorous support from former Vice President Mnangagwa, the programme had not been fully implemented as Moyo accused Mnangagwa of hijacking a government programme for selfish factional ends (News Day, 8 July 2017). As a result of these policy contestations, an interviewee lamented that:

People are just tired of ZANU PF cadres who are fighting against each other whilst there are not formulating and implementing policies that can solve the country's problems. For Zimbabwe's economy to recover; those in authority must support each other, support the same ideas, same policies and must collectively implement such policies. But unfortunately, those tasked with solving the country's problems are doing nothing about the country's challenges. (Interview with Mrs Stiffler Manyore, January 2017).

The contradictory nature of Zimbabwe's policy landscape reflected divergent views on various issues such as indigenization laws, foreign direct investment - a development widely seen as hindering the country's social and economic progress (see Magure 2012). According to Pye (1980:15) "leaders can bitterly contend over policies not because of intellectual disagreements, but because they foresee that the effects of the policy will alter their respective power positions." In light of the aforementioned statement, another example of the negative impact of ZANU PF factionalism that deserves attention in relation to policy discord lies in the feud that emerged between the then Minister of Indigenization, Patrick Zhuwao (a G40 faction ally) and the Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa (a Lacoste faction ally). The policy contestation came to surface when Zhuwao and Chinamasa fundamentally differed in the interpretation of the country's indigenization laws. Chinamasa was of the view that foreign-owned banks operating in the country were in compliant with the indigenization laws⁸, while Zhuwao publicly criticized this policy pronouncement (see, The Standard, 3 April 2016).

⁸ For a detailed account on the indigenization policy, see Matyszak, D. (2014). *Madness and Indigenisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Lawlessness*. Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit.

Tied to the above, the pattern of policy inconsistency associated with leadership dissonance in ZANU PF needs to be understood not only in relation to government officials' failure to speak with one voice but also as sending highly misleading and mixed signals to existing and potential investors. In short, internecine struggles within the ZANU PF government scared current and potential investors at a time when both are needed most. As one interviewee observed, "If we look at the concept of investors - no private or foreign investor wants to invest in a country where there are policy inconsistencies and contradictions" (interview with Mr Guchu Mubururu, January 2017).

Similarly, Magure (2012) noted that the former Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Governor, Gideon Gono, was on record as having warned the political leadership to guard against implementing policies in a manner that would hurt the economy and threaten investors. Thus given the policy inconsistencies and contradictions especially over the indigenization laws, the government's commitment to develop a market economy became doubtful. In actual fact, policy discord adversely affected foreign direct investment – investors developed a wait and see attitude as they waited for the political dust to settle.

However, contrary to the negative effects of factionalism vis-a-vis policy contestations, Boucek (2009) asserts that competition within factions improves the party's performance, policy-making and intra-party democracy. This is so because, by articulating different policy positions, factions can indicate to party leaders which policies are acceptable or which are not (Bowler et al., 1999). In the same vein, Park (2001) argues that the existence of factions permits a substantial degree of pluralism - as some would say "competitive dynamism." Therefore, the fact that the ZANU PF government is made up of people with varying policy preferences and opinions may mean that there are different alternatives for dealing with the country's ills.

In line with Mnangagwa's assertions factionalism was making the ZANU PF government stronger and more sharpened to deal with issues pertaining the governance of the country (News Day, 18 April 2017). The former vice president argued that the internal contradictions were healthy and strengthened ZANU PF (ibid). Similarly, one

interviewee observed that "contradictions over policies may mean that different mechanisms were being put forward so as to come up with coherent, sustainable and sound policy packages" (interview notes, December 2016). In fact, it should be noted that competition is the cornerstone of sound policies since it breeds excellence and robust policy debate. Therefore policy contestations within factions in the ZANU PF party facilitated debate thus providing alternatives as "divergent opinions served as a mechanism for the party's making choices among policies" (Beller & Belloni, 1978:441). In a way, this created a "forum in which...strategies could be discussed, winnowed, and refined" (ibid). For instance, with regard to the confusion over the interpretation of the indigenization policy, former President Mugabe was forced to provide clarity on the policy after admitting that discord was undermining investor confidence (The Herald, 13 April 2016).

Still on the positive impact of ZANU PF factional rivalry on the country, Mr Raphael Muza submitted to this writer that:

Factionalism within ZANU PF is a blessing in disguise to Zimbabweans. I say so because if you look at how members of these factions are exposing each other of their various acts of misconduct such as corruption. Indeed factionalism is doing the country good given that it is bringing about transparency within government structures. Just imagine if there was no factionalism in ZANU PF, how we were going to know "who" is doing "what" and with "whom?" Now there is no secrecy, all criminal activities are coming out. This is good for the country as some officials are now performing their duties ethically, fearing to be implicated and getting arrested at the instigation of the other faction. (Interview with Mr Raphael Muza, December 2016).

Competing factions within the ruling party assumed the watchdogs. For instance, it is argued here that the Lacoste faction spearheaded an investigation into alleged acts of corruption among key officials of the G40 faction, including Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere (see Nehanda Radio, 13 November 2016). Although such issues remained unresolved, factionalism has in part helped in monitoring and reducing the abuse of offices by government officials.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a critical analysis of the costs and benefits of ZANU PF factionalism on the country. Based on the findings presented in this chapter, factionalism within the ZANU PF government negatively affected nearly all spheres of life in the country. The chapter argues that ZANU PF factional battles became increasingly costly to an already impoverished country and a dysfunctional economy struggling to boost investor confidence. In a nutshell, the chapter argues that, while factionalism in ZANU PF remains a thorny issue, the costs of ZANU PF factionalism outweigh the benefits.

CHAPTER FOUR

TRADITIONAL AND NEW MEDIA'S ROLE IN ZANU PF FACTIONAL DIVISIONS

4.1 Introduction

Post-independence politics in Africa saw some countries experiencing an increase in media pluralism, an establishment of multi-channel broadcasting systems, independent media and even experimentation with community media. Nevertheless, there are many exceptions to this development and Zimbabwe is one of those unfortunate cases where there has been a dramatic regression from the democratization process (Ndlela, 2010:87). The operation of the media in Zimbabwe has been a contested terrain since the development of the media industry during the then colonial Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Despite claims to neutrality by both pre- and post-independence governments, the country's ruling elite has, over the years, used the media as a tool for political control and manipulation (Muchena, 2013).

It is worth pointing out that the media has become an important aspect in today's politics. Santos & Ndlovu (2016) states that the media is often a major player in uncertain political processes and is capable of changing a country's political, economic and social trajectories for the better or worse. Mungwari & Vhutuza (2016) also states that political dynamics determine to a large extent political communication and the discourse employed. There is a growing consensus among politicians, academics and media specialists that the information revolution and the growth of the media have had a profound impact on politics and society in both developed and developing countries (Krauss, 1996). This chapter seeks to interrogate the positive and negative roles of both state controlled and new media in ZANU PF succession battles specifically in relation to how the Lacoste faction was represented in the Zimbabwean public discourses.

4.2 Conflict, fake news and click-bait journalism in the age of social media

Many scholars generally agree that the media plays a key role in conflicts and this has become an issue all over the world (Puddephatt, 2006; Apkan et al., 2013). Its influence has increased tremendously and researchers are yet to agree on the degree and magnitude of the media influence on conflicts (Chebii, 2014). Newbold (1995) points out that the majority of scholars have concentrated on the role of media in economic, social and political issues affecting states with little attention being given to conflicts. Therefore, in order to objectively understand the role of media in ZANU PF factional conflicts, this study seeks to ventilate the various ways and perspectives through which media fuel political conflicts. For Wolfsfeld (1997:4) political conflicts are characterized by moves and counter-moves as each antagonist tries to initiate and control political events to dominate political discourse about the conflict, and to mobilize as many supporters as possible to their side.

Ordinarily, the media has a considerable influence over political conflicts given that it is the most important source of information on various issues. Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that the role of media in conflicts varies along with factors such as the political context of the conflict, the resources, skills and political power of the players involved; the relationship between the press and each antagonist, the state of public opinion and the ability of journalists to gain access to the conflict events. It should, however, be noted that in most conflict-ridden countries, the media often play both constructive (resolving) and destructive (escalating and sustaining conflicts) roles (Amisi, 1997:4). As put forward by Puddephatt (2006), the media either takes an active part in the conflict or stays independent and out of the conflict, thereby contributing to the resolution of conflict. This is in light of the role played by the media in the agenda-setting process and framing of news items.

Flowing from above statement, it is crucial to note that the agenda-setting function explains how audiences can perceive a given news item depending on the significance

that the media give to the news story in terms of coverage and position (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002). This implies that the mass media pre-determine what issues are considered as important at a given time in a given society. On the other hand, Entman (1993:52) argues that media framing involves selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation. Framing influences the choice of which events appear in the news and how they are subsequently reported. In this regard, the agenda-setting and framing role of the mass media entail bringing (or not bringing) certain issues into the public domain. Nwosu (1987) is a firm believer in the notion that media coverage contributes significantly to starting, continuing and terminating a conflict. In the same vein, Vladislavljević (2015:2) posits that the media can strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of conflicts by reporting on some conflicts but not on others, and by representing conflicts they report on, in particular ways.

The media's agenda-setting and framing roles probably explain why opposing actors in most conflicts often try to influence the mass media to provide different kinds of coverage, depending on their relative power. Vladislavljević (2015:2) observes that in most cases, conflicting parties aim to manipulate the media to advance their interests or goals by adapting their activities to the logic of media operation. In line with Vladislavljević's observations, this study takes into account the 1994 Rwanda genocide as an example of how the Rwandan government exploited the public media as agenda setting and framing tools to incite ethnic conflict.

Although it is beyond the scope of this study to detail all the events surrounding the Rwandan genocide it must be noted that the dearth of alternative sources of information in Rwanda made the citizens be increasingly dependent on the government controlled media - especially radio, for political information (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). This made it possible for the Hutu led government media to carry out a full-fledged propaganda campaign against the Tutsi minority (ibid). Therefore throughout its relentless broadcast, the media encouraged Hutus to exterminate the Tutsis labelling them “cockroaches”

that needed to be eliminated, thereby resulting in conflict (see Kellow & Steeves, 1998). Clearly, the Rwandan genocide account gives evidence of how the mass media's agenda-setting and framing roles were used to set the stage for the perpetuation of ethnic conflict and genocide.

It should be noted that the emergence of the new media⁹ made it possible for the agenda-setting and framing function of the traditional media to be altered either by diminishing its ability to set the political agenda or by reversing the flow of information (Sawers, 1996). In this way, new information and communication technologies have allowed ordinary people to take part in any of the stages of the communication process. Thus they can create the content of a news item from a broad range of sources, disseminate it while circumventing the traditional one-way imposture (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013) often associated with traditional media. In essence, the new media has given rise to new forms of journalism defined as the citizen, alternative or participatory journalism (see Domingo, 2008; Kelly et al., 2009). On the flipside this new media has also provided a fertile ground for the spread of misinformation and disinformation (Kamilindi, 2007; Paterson et al., 2012), a theme discussed in the next section.

There is a growing heated debate among scholars, politicians and journalists with regard to the role of the social media in conflict-ridden societies (Dimitrakopoulou et al., 2014). Social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube which facilitate and support user-generated content, have taken up a leading role as communication and mobilization tools in the development and coordination of a series of social movements such as, the protests in the Philippines in 2001 as well as the outbreak of revolution in the Arab world, the so-called Arab Spring (ibid). Just like the state media, social media can be a double-edged sword - their use by political activists or by state actors can lead to totally opposite outcomes. While the state controlled media rely extensively on elite groups, alternative media has offered a voice to the ones marginalized by the state media (Atton, 2002; Atton & Wickenden, 2005). Thus it can be argued that social media

⁹ New media is a catch-all term used for various kinds of electronic communications (e.g online or social media) that are conceivable due to innovation in computer technology (Mitra, 2011)

expands awareness of certain conflicts that mass media may not deem imperative to share with their audiences.

The advent of the new media has allowed individuals to access and disseminate information, but the bone of contention is the accuracy of information churned out through the different social media outlets. In a broad sense, assessing the credibility of information on social media is increasingly challenging due to the proliferation of information sources, aggravated by the unreliable social cues that accompany this information (Baum et al., 2017). It is necessary to point out that the upsurge in social media and the internet, has in recent years, witnessed a rise in the circulation of fake news stories, ranging from misinformation, eye-catching or click-bait headlines intended to attract individuals' attention thereby influencing the public opinion (ibid). The term "fake news" refers to content containing deliberately misleading information and is often devoted to political satire (Holbert, 2005a).

The spread of "fake news" sources on social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, combined with increased distrust of traditional media sources is of growing concern in today's politics. Several studies have demonstrated that exposure to fake news can shape the public's opinions thereby affecting political attitudes (Young, 2004; 2006). The argument being put forward is that, while some of the stories about ZANU PF internecine conflicts were based on reliable sources and events, some were based on assumptions and fake news stories circulated on the various social media platforms. Before delving deeper into that theme it is imperative to give an overview of the media in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe given the centrality of the negative media related legacies bequeathed by the former on the latter.

4.3 Media in Colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe – a panoramic overview

It is noteworthy that the development of the media in post-colonial Zimbabwe is intimately tied to settler colonialism, settler interests and black people's resistance to the status quo. The settler government was determined to gain control of the media in order

to silence any opposition to its white supremacist policies even if meant unilaterally declaring independence from Britain (Windrich, 2001). As Windrich (1981) and Frederiskse (1982) argue, these circumstances drove the Smith regime to use the state controlled media to legitimize Rhodesian Front's (RF) assumption and retention of power.

For instance, the Broadcasting Act 1957 was used by Smith to obtain state monopoly over all broadcasting in Rhodesia, to ensure that the natives only received broadcasts from the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC), the mouthpiece of the government (Ndlovu, 2015). In a broad sense, the RBC was part of Smith's propaganda machinery which determined what blacks had to know, how they had to know it, and what they did not have to know (ibid). On the other hand, white Rhodesians read in their local newspaper only what the press was allowed to reveal, and they saw and heard on state-controlled broadcast media news items "slanted in the interests of Rhodesia" (Windrich, 1979:523).

With the advent of independence in 1980, it was widely expected that the new ZANU PF government would seek to correct the injustices of the colonial era. However, that did not happen because the new government inherited a whole gamut of colonial repressive machinery including a biased media (Magure, 2009:113). As Ronning (2003) aptly observes that the media system inherited by Zimbabwe at independence had hitherto tailored to serve sectional interests of the white minority community and its successive government. So in a sense, Zimbabwe inherited a monopolistic media system that gave the ruling ZANU PF control of not only the sole broadcasting station but also the biggest newspaper publishing company, Zimbabwe Newspapers (Zimpapers).

Over time, ZANU PF fine-tuned and turned the government controlled media into a political tool meant to maintain its tight grip on the levers of political power. This action by ZANU-PF was better explained by Windrich (2010) who argued that the legacy of the Smith regime's censorship and propaganda had come to define broadcasting control

and uses under Mugabe's ZANU PF government. On the other hand, the government controlled media sought to denigrate the opposition and the private media as Western lackeys. This development led to a deeply polarized and toxic media environment with the state owned media being sympathetic to ZANU PF while the privately owned media became the mouthpieces of opposition parties (Sabao & Visser, 2016). However, the modus operandi of the state media significantly changed following the intensification of factional battles linked to Mugabe's succession politics, a theme addressed in the next section.

4.4 State media and ZANU PF factionalism

It must be pointed out from the outset that in a functioning democratic society, the media, as a platform of political communication, should communicate political views from all groups in a state (Lilleker, 2006). In other words, the media should enable political ideas to clash with the dominant ideas carrying the day (Gripsrud, 2002). Thus, the media should be balanced and neutral in its coverage. The media should inform and educate the citizenry on political contestants and their offerings to allow the public to reflect on all processes thereby enabling them to make informed decisions (Moyse, 2009). The media should also be the watchdog that holds the government officials accountable for their actions (Lilleker, 2006; Moyse, 2009). However, in reality, Coronel (2003) argues that the media in new and restored democracy do not always live up to the ideal, thus they are hobbled by monopolistic ownership as was the case in Zimbabwe under Mugabe.

As Mugabe's age advanced, a number of factions emerged in ZANU PF circles and their disagreements spilt into the media. There is an ongoing debate on how the controversial role played by the state controlled media in framing factionalism related news in the ZANU PF. It is necessary to note that despite the fact that the state owned media has been over the years controlled by the ZANU PF party, things significantly changed within the state controlled print and electronic media when the party was having internal cleavages. It is against this background that a number of interviewees

alluded to the fact that the state controlled media has never been impartial in its coverage on the ZANU PF factional fights. According to Mr Jena Agere, there was a tendency between opposed factional groupings in ZANU PF to manipulate the mass media's agenda setting and framing of the news content so that it reports negatively about each other. Thus he argues that,

The state media has never been objective at all. As for me, I have come to realize that factional groups within ZANU PF have recognized that if one faction controls information, that faction can also control the narrative and it can be able to control or influence public opinion. So as a result, factions have manipulated the state media so that they use it to further their political agendas. This is simply what's happening; most reports on ZANU PF factional wars are just to promote one faction at the expense of the other. (Interview with Mr Jena Agere, November 2016).

Another respondent argued that historically, the government controlled media has been infamous for being used as a weapon to vilifying and demonizing both intraparty rivals and opposition elements (interview notes, November 2016). Clearly, this development is contrary to idealistic claims that the mass media should be a public platform and a watchdog of those in power (Lilleker, 2006). In addition, Mrs Rumbidzai Rasi asserts that:

The state media is playing a part in these factional wars. Its coverage and editorial slant depend on which faction is controlling the ministry of information. This has been evident even long back during the time of the then rival faction between Mnangagwa and the Mujuru faction. At that time we could see Jonathan Moyo who was the then Minister of Information and (at that time) an ally to the Mnangagwa faction using the state media to castigate Mujuru and he even used it to discredit her liberation war history during Grace Mugabe's nationwide rallies dubbed "Meet the People." (Interview with Mrs Rumbidzai Rasi, November 2016).

Similarly, Mr Alvin Anesu observes that:

Apparently, the ministry of information seems to be linked with the Team Lacoste faction, so the guns are pointed at the G40 faction (including Jonathan Moyo who is now the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education). The Lacoste faction is using the state media to sway public opinion against the G40 faction whilst propping up their faction so that it becomes likeable to the people. So generally, the state media has never been impartial in its coverage on factionalism in ZANU PF. (Interview with Mr Alvin Anesu, November 2016).

The above views are consistent with the observation by Iyengar (1999:2) who notes that the use or even manipulation of the mass media to promote political objectives is now not only a standard practice, but in fact essential to success. Thus the argument being put forward here is that politicians are adept at manipulating the mass media's agenda setting and framing functions in order to control the political discourses thereby shaping public opinion. Therefore from the excerpts of the interviews, it is evident that the Lacoste faction was controlling the government owned media. This ostensibly afforded them a considerable advantage and leverage in factional wars in the sense that it used its influence on the media to undermine the G40 faction.

The above was confirmed by Temba Mliswa's (former ZANU PF official) statement when he said, "There are factions in the party. I am sure the Minister of Information belongs to another faction, so he will also attack another faction" (The Chronicle, 2 April 2014). In light of this aforementioned statement, it goes without saying that the ministry of information entangled the state media into ZANU PF's factional battles. Given that the government controlled media was embroiled in ZANU PF internecine conflicts, it leaves no doubt that the news coverage and content has been sympathetic to the agendas of the faction in control of the state media apparatus. One interviewee observes that:

If we look at the coverage of these conflicts in the state media, they turn to be very negative when it comes to the other faction. The reports are always one-sided and in favour of the faction controlling the state media apparatus. It is very confusing to us and there is no neutrality. Today you read of how corrupt Kasukuwere or Moyo is, in the Herald or Sunday Mail and the next day they deny it on social or private media and thus, accuse the state media editors of carrying out a vilification campaign against them at the behest of Mnangagwa and his allies. This also happened some time ago, when Jonathan Moyo was accused of influencing the state media to report negatively against Didymus Mutasa and Joice Mujuru to the extent that Mutasa complained on the private media that he could not believe the Herald was reporting negatively against them and yet they were party members. (Interview with Mr Khule Chesa, December 2016).

In addition, Mrs Tafadzwa Sadavanhu bluntly stated that:

The state media has never been fair in its reports on ZANU PF succession disputes. I no longer trust all the state newspapers and ZBC news anymore. The government is always using the state media to lie to us. ZANU PF used to lie about the non-existence of factionalism within it, so what makes me think that this time around they are telling the truth? I don't believe anyone in ZANU PF. (Interview with Mrs Tafadzwa Sadavanhu, January 2017).

From the above accounts, it can be argued that the government controlled media has been biased in its coverage on ZANU PF internecine conflicts. Hence the state controlled media has been a blatantly partisan in favours of the Lacoste faction while on one hand it denigrated and provided limited or no space on the opposing factions, the G40 in particular (interview notes, January 2017). In a similar vein, one interviewee aptly summed up that "The Mnangagwa faction controls the state newspapers, the Herald and Sunday Mail and electronic media, hence there is no way the state media could report negatively about them, so in this case the G40 faction members were victims of negative publicity in the state media" (interview notes, January 2017).

Similarly, Chitagu (2018) argues that the state media was giving positive coverage to the Lacoste faction and attacking the G40 faction. By way of hindsight, the role of the state media was to weaken and undermine the G40 faction and slandering its key leaders including Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere, thus fuelling hostilities in the ruling ZANU PF government.

It is noteworthy that this study supports Terzis & Melone's (2002) observations that the public media can create divisions by not reflecting pluralism in the social and political structures. Thus distortion of news coverage for particular interests exacerbates the tension between opposed factions thereby triggering political conflict (ibid). Therefore it can be reasonably argued that whereas the public media systematically gave negative and biased coverage of factional events, the role of new media has been critical in giving those who were marginalized, ostracized and demonized a platform to debate, defend and counterattack what was being said in the state media: a subject to be discussed under factionalism in the digital age in the next section. So in a sense, both factions engaged in a war of words using the state controlled and social media to expose their different factional vendettas. In an interview account with Mr Raphael Muza, he indicated that:

The state media has exposed many skeletons in ZANU PF but at the end of the day, you wonder if they were exposing the ugly side of both factions. So the overarching point is that the state media has actually worsened the cracks within the party itself. Whatever reporting done, there is bias towards one faction thus worsening the situation. (Interview with Mr Raphael Muza, December 2016).

The point is that three key developments took place as the battle to succeed Mugabe intensified: one the party initially denied the existence of factions within its own ranks and secondly they eventually accepted that there were camps within the party and finally the different factions then started to accuse and expose each other of unethical conducts. Factionalism greatly improved the coverage of ZANU PF internal affairs and

politics - a development that was welcomed by many respondents and the generality of Zimbabweans. As the battle for political supremacy raged on, factions that have been on the receiving end of internal party driven propaganda resorted to using the new media to deal with this state of affairs as demonstrated in the next section.

4.5 ZANU PF factionalism in the digital age

It is worth noting that the influence of media on political processes is much more pervasive now than it was some decades ago. The media's often controversial role in influencing political events and developments is a topical issue especially with the advent of the new media. The use of the new media has become increasingly relevant for the twenty-first century politics, not only as a means of political communication but also as a crucial platform where anyone and everyone can interact in an unstructured and informal manner. As already stated, the media landscape in Zimbabwe has been polarized along political and party lines. Thus the proliferation of the new media¹⁰ in the recent years offered alternative digital platforms, where citizens could discuss issues they would not otherwise discuss either in state owned or privately owned media.

In light of the succession battles in ZANU PF, it soon became apparent that the new media was playing a key role in keeping the momentum going and bringing the voices of disgruntled faction members to the attention of the public. The new media, in this case, assumed the role of an alternative media especially to those ZANU PF members that have been denied space in the state owned media. Ndlela (2010) is of the view that any environment where there is little or no access to the state controlled media, citizens turn to alternative communicative spaces independent of government control. Moyo (2007) also posits that historically, societies living under repressive regimes have always come up with alternative forms of communication as tools of subversion. In this

¹⁰ In the third quarter of 2016, the mobile penetration rate in Zimbabwe reached 97% while internet penetration stood at 50% (see Kalamera., et.al, 2016).

case, the term "alternative press" has been denoted by Moyo (2007) as those media that function in counter-position to government controlled media systems by offering the means for democratic communication to groups and individuals who are otherwise excluded from the government owned media production processes.

Consequently, a myriad of respondents singled out mobile phones, Youtube, Facebook and Twitter as being instrumental in providing alternative communicative spaces in light of ZANU PF factionalism. In an interview account, Miss Yvonne Chayi argued that:

Social media is largely playing a key role in providing communication platforms to party members who probably have been denied an opportunity for their voices to be heard in the state media. For instance, some G40 members such as Jonathan Moyo are using Twitter to air out their views and opinions about succession disputes and the government. Of late, we have also noticed Patrick Zhuwao from the G40 faction attacking Vice President Mnangagwa calling him "unelectable" on these social media platforms. In response to this, Mutodi a follower of Mnangagwa, flatly went out on Facebook threatening Zhuwao to withdraw his statement with immediate effect. Judging from all these, I can say the new media is playing a crucial role in providing a level battleground for these factional wars. (Interview with Miss Yvonne Chayi, December 2016)

Similarly, Mr Donald Mutema had this to say:

The new media has become a battleground for ZANU PF factional fights. We have seen people from within ZANU PF denigrating and ridiculing each other on these social media platforms. I have seen some members who are alleged to be from the G40 faction, to be quite specific, Jonathan Moyo, using Twitter and Facebook to discredit other members from the Lacoste faction. (Interview with Mr Donald Mutema, December 2016)

From the above standpoint, it can be observed that social media has been used as a platform where party members attacked and discredited each other. What is imperative to understand is that following a cabinet reshuffle, Professor Jonathan Moyo lost control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (see News Day, 12 September 2015) to Christopher Mushohwe (ally to Lacoste faction). Following this development Moyo and the other members of the G40 faction resorted to the use of social media, particularly Twitter in order to fight back or attack their rival faction.

For example, in a Twitter message, Moyo accused the former war veteran Minister, Chris Mutsvangwa (ally to Lacoste faction) of "being famed for stealing and selling female underwear" during the Zimbabwe's struggle for independence (Daily News, 4 February 2016). This came after Mutsvangwa had accused Moyo of having run away from the liberation struggle and thus in a way, he labeled Moyo an anti-ZANU PF as well as anti-government (Bulawayo 24 News, 4 February 2016). What is interesting is that despite losing the information portfolio to a rival faction, Moyo did not lose his voice, instead, he resorted to using the new media especially Twitter to air his views. Thus it is necessary to indicate that Moyo justified the use of social media saying "if provoked, he would retaliate" (The Standard, 28 June 2015). Similar views were expressed by Mr Alphonse Mapipi who lamented that:

Social media has played a very important role in ZANU PF internecine conflicts. I say so because; it has provided different platforms for political communication to those people like Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere. Since the Lacoste faction is believed to be in charge of the state media, G40 members no longer have space in the state media and hence they have resorted to social media. Moyo, in particular, has used social media because he had been shut out of the state media. So for him, social media is useful in defending himself in the face of sustained attacks from state-owned media. This has also worked to our advantage because we are now able to hear both sides of the story about factions and succession disputes in ZANU PF. (Interview with Mr Alphonse Mapipi, December 2016)

On another note, Mr Thomas Marange mentioned that:

With regard to ZANU PF factional fights, I have noted that if someone has been attacked in the state media, that person can now go on any social media platform to set the record straight. In a way, the new media has given an opportunity to people who have been denied or not given space in the government controlled media. So for me, social media is a welcome development because it deepened Zimbabwe's democratic project. (Interview with Mr Thomas Marange, January 2017)

In addition, the new media also played a key role in bringing ZANU PF conflicts to the attention of citizens for public debates and opinions. According to Mpofu (2013), the new media offered avenues to discuss "taboo" subjects without fear or being reprimanded by the secretive and despotic Zimbabwean government. In this case, Mpofu (2013) notes that "taboo" subjects are those issues that the government have silenced or criminalised and therefore cannot be discussed in public or outside ZANU PF circles. Such issues included former President Mugabe's health, ZANU PF factionalism and succession debate among others. On the contrary, the social media have opened avenues for such discussions. According to Mr Innocent Joram:

Social media is not controlled by anyone, thus they do not play to the wings of anyone or any faction. They are not monitored, and thus they convey messages as they are and people analyse such news for themselves. As a result, the new media provided the public with much information regarding ZANU PF infighting and such issues have raised debates on different social media platforms. (Interview with Mr Innocent Joram, January 2017).

In a similar vein, Moses Chihwa asserts that:

Let us give credit to Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and many other social media platforms, they are playing a “no secret” role in exposing ZANU PF's shenanigans. If we look at how succession disputes started, ZANU PF has been denying the existence of factions, calling it fabrication by the private media whom they perceived as “enemies of the state”. They wanted to keep their brawls a secret, “vaisada kufugura hapwa” (they did not want to wash their “dirty linen” in public). This did not go well as the internet played its role of exposing and spreading the truth about ZANU PF all over the world. (Interview with Mr Moses Chihwa, January 2017).

These responses are indicative of how social media has been celebrated as an effective tool that gathers and disseminates information about ZANU PF factional wars around the globe. It is clear that the party had no intention of publicizing or publishing succession issues and factional struggles. This is primarily so because, over the years ZANU PF had been constantly denying that factions existed within the party (The Financial Gazette, 17 April 2014), thus there was always an effort to present a narrative of a unified front to the public. Nonetheless, the shadowy Facebook character Baba Jukwa is a case in point of how social media played a leading role in exposing secrets within ZANU PF. Baba Jukwa's mysterious Facebook page became popular among millions of Zimbabweans ahead of the 2013 general elections as it leaked detailed and sensitive information about ZANU PF in relation to electoral irregularities, classified information about politburo meetings, internal brawls as well as assassination plots against factional and dissenting party members (Mungwari & Vhutuza, 2016). It is imperative to note that most of the leaked information was proved to be true by subsequent events although some leaks turned out to be patently false or fake news. In another account, Mrs Tapiwa Gavaza observes that:

Information about what's happening in the ruling party government is travelling so fast and beyond borders, thanks to the internet and all social media platforms. Even if ZANU PF wanted to be secretive about their infighting, they failed because social media closed that gap. We cannot compare the role of social media with their ZBC and Herald

newspapers, the new media has been right on point in terms of informing us the general populace about the evils and cracks inside ZANU PF. As for me, I really wish if such technologies were there in the 1990s, maybe Zimbabwe wouldn't have suffered up to this end. We are suffering now because we did not know what was happening in the party all along, these guys (ZANU PF) just brainwashed us with their state media, so I am glad that we now have social media which exposes all the lies and dirty happening in the ruling party government. I am sure if we did not have such communication platforms, believe me, we wouldn't know about all these G40s and Team Lacoste', they would have made us think that there is unity in the ruling party. (Interview with Mrs Tapiwa Gavaza, January 2017).

In addition, these views seem to confirm assertions made by most Zimbabweans living in the Diaspora, specifically those residing in South Africa. Most of them argued that:

The new media has been very effective in informing people especially those living in the Diaspora like me; we are now aware of all the squabbles happening in ZANU PF between the G40 and the Lacoste faction. Hence it is through these social media networks that we now know how the future of ZANU PF and Zimbabwe looks like. The internet has allowed us to use our mobile phones and computers to download videos, pictures and uncensored information about ZANU PF, which since historically the government kept tight control of in their state media. (Interview with Mrs Tapiwa Gwena, November 2016).

Furthermore, another respondent had this to say:

The new media has played a crucial role in ZANU PF factional fights. Lately, we have seen social media being a battleground for the ZANU PF members. Members of both factions have been involved in the exchange of words, verbally attacking each other on Twitter, Facebook and this enlightened us of what's happening at home. I would say

social media exacerbated factionalism in ZANU PF, but to a larger extent, it really provided me with juicy news regarding in-house fights in ZANU PF. (Interview with Mr Denzel Gumani, December 2016)

Generally, this was the most common opinion from most participants:

If it was not for the internet, we could have been in the dark with regard to what is happening within ZANU PF. These social media networks came to act as the watchdogs and as alternative press to the disgruntled members within ZANU PF as well as to the public at large. We now have diverse sources of information unlike back then when we only relied on the state controlled media which only favoured the ruling party and its government. (Interview with Mr Joseph Makarau, January 2017).

From the foregoing interviews, it is clear that the new or social media has been celebrated for being very informative and as a catalyst that gathered and disseminated information about ZANU PF factionalism around the globe. It provided alternative sources of information which are independent of government control and censorship, thus enabling the public to engage in the wider debate on the internal brawls gripping the ZANU PF government. Accordingly, Ndlela (2010) is of the view that, in situations where society's communication structures are heavily tilted towards mainstream discourses, oppositional forces and reformists often resort to alternative media, hence creating an alternative public sphere. He further indicates that since alternative media is not controlled by the government, it arguably revitalize the political public sphere by giving access to opposition and social movements that cannot easily access the formal public sphere (ibid). Apart from providing alternative sources of information, the new media also challenged and enabled citizens to resist state propaganda churned out through the government controlled media.

However, it is worth pointing out that whereas social media has been celebrated for being an alternative source of information, its role has not been entirely embraced without criticism. Some few respondents mentioned that social media has just been a tool of destroying the country. They suggested that the declining trust in the traditional media could be both a cause and a consequence of fake news gaining more traction (interview notes, January 2017). Hence, the argument being put forward was that since social media are not controllable, it made them to be well-suited for disseminating fake news or misinformation about ZANU PF's factional fights in particular. Thus as one interviewee observed:

Social media has some negative aspects in the sense that it allows anyone to become a consumer and producer of information. The credibility of news stories from these social media platforms is highly questionable. Since it is not controlled, it allows some people to create satirical accounts as a form of parody to the actual political party or factional groupings. For instance, there is a Twitter account, @Zanu pf which faced criticism people saying it was a fake account as it posted fake news stories about ZANU PF. The same also goes with ZANU PF factionalism; there are fake Facebook or Twitter accounts which are disseminating distorted information just to tarnish certain individuals. The trending of negative articles has led to loss of faith from supporters who rely heavily on the new media platforms as sources information. (Interview with Mr Selby Butawo, January 2017).

According to Mr Geoffrey Tawanda:

Of course, the new media has informed us about what's happening in the ruling party but at some point, it has exaggerated some of the facts. We have seen fake and edited images that have gone viral, stories being circulated by those who want to destroy the revolutionary party. Yes, there are factions within the ruling party, but the fact that the new media is not controlled by anyone has made it possible for people with selfish interests to abuse it. Sometimes you hear that Mnangagwa or Grace said this...or the

President attacked this... on social media but in reality, nothing would have happened, they would be just lies. So people must stop abusing these social media networks by spreading false news regarding what's taking place in ZANU PF. (Interview with Mr Geoffrey Tawanda, November 2016).

Mr Alex Takawira also shared a similar view that,

People should not just believe all the news circulated on these social media platforms. Yes, social media platforms are very quick at disseminating news about what is happening within the ruling party government, but if you go on these different social media platforms, each will be having its own version of the story about these succession disputes. So my point is, some individuals are taking advantage of the social media to create blogs that peddle falsehoods about ZANU PF succession politics. Some will be doing it on behalf of certain individuals or their preferred factions while portraying the other faction as bad or evil. This aptly demonstrates that some people are abusing these new communication platforms to spread fake or distorted news. Clearly, these new media technologies have become bad and unreliable sources of political information. (Interview with Mr Alex Takawira, December 2016).

Moreover, commenting on the abuse of the new media, participants of this study also indicated that ZANU PF senior officials were misusing the social media platforms. On that note, Mrs Sarah Samukanga stated that:

Honestly, to me, social media has contributed in de-stabilizing the party and the country. It has brought chaos in the ruling party. It does not make sense to see people belonging to the same party engaging in verbal wars on Twitter or Facebook. They are better platforms for them to discuss their differences not to use social media. I think they are abusing these social media platforms; this should stop because it is fueling more hostilities in ZANU PF. (Interview with Mrs Sarah Samukanga, January 2017).

In another interview, Mr Dennis Muvoti explained that:

Social media has brought us more problems than solutions in ZANU PF. I surely believe that it is unprofessional for party officials to engage public spats on social media. If we did not have these social media platforms, I am sure ZANU PF would have utilized other proper channels to engage or settle their disputes. Right now those in authority are becoming addicts of social media platforms such that they are spending more of their time 'tweeting' and on Facebook humiliating each other instead of prioritizing service delivery. (Interview with Mr Dennis Muvoti, January 2017).

It can be observed that the new media has been criticized for fueling and bringing political disorder in the ZANU PF government. Some respondents suggest that it was not proper for party members to attack each other in the open and they regarded this as the abuse of the media. In fact, ZANU PF convened a politburo meeting to deliberate on use of social media by party officials. The ZANU PF party spokesperson Simon Khaya Moyo was quoted as having said, "The President has, on several occasions, emphasized that party members should not take to social media to discuss internal matters or to denigrate each other. We are a party with structures and where we have situations of transgressions they should be brought to the relevant structures" (The Herald, 2 February 2016). It is necessary to point out that other senior party officials like Saviour Kasukuwere and Jonathan Moyo were against the idea of placing the issue of social media as an agenda of the party's politburo meetings arguing that it was rather imperative to discuss issues with regard to the coverage from government controlled media which they termed a "successionist disgrace" (ibid). In short, the new media platforms were instrumental in informing the world about factionalism within ZANU PF despite the concerted effort by the state media to censor such new items.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to examine the positive and negative roles played by both traditional and new media in ZANU PF succession battles specifically in relation to how the Lacoste faction was represented in the Zimbabwean public discourses. In the case of Zimbabwe's high polarized media landscape, the new media proved to be a boon for silenced and muzzled voices and a bane to the state controlled media that could no longer censor information with impunity. Thus ZANU PF factional and succession battles were fought in both the traditional and new media - the state controlled media positively reported on the Lacoste faction while reporting negatively on the rival G40 faction. The development prompted the G40 faction to resort to using the new media to fight or hit back at their rivals who were in control of the state media. Clearly, the new media played a crucial role in ZANU PF factional fights through the provision of a neutral ground as both factions battled out to succeed Mugabe.

CHAPTER FIVE

MNANGAGWA'S TROUBLED ROAD TO THE 'STATE HOUSE'

5.1 Introduction

Leadership succession in its broadest sense has been defined as the ways in which power passes, or is transferred, from one individual or group, government or regime to another (Brier, 1987). In its narrower sense, it refers to orderly arrangements for the transfer of tenure of important offices within a state, in a manner that gives room for continuity and eventual change (ibid). Political parties just like any other organization or entity always require leadership renewal and viable effective succession structures - besides ideological and policy renewal (Chikerema, 2014). Scholars have pointed out that the orderly transfer of political power from one individual to another is generally regarded as a major test of the stability and legitimacy of a political system and its successful handling can be viewed as evidence of maturity on the part of a particular political community (Hughes & May, 1988; Igbuzor, 2010). In fact, under normal circumstances, there should be conditions and rules that guide political succession in every country or within political parties (ibid). When these conditions are met and the rules are followed, it allows for a smooth transition, political stability and legitimacy. Thus it has been suggested that institutionalized succession rules can reduce costly and potentially destabilizing infighting by offering guidelines over who will fill the power vacuum upon a leader's departure (Frantz & Stein, 2017).

But it should be noted that in some countries, especially in Africa, the lack or gradual erosion of the constitutive and regulative rules and mechanism for political succession has resulted in political instability, illegitimate governments and conflicts (Igbuzor, 2010). In other words, the process of changing from one political leader to another, that is, political succession can be a source of potential conflict and instability in a state or within a political party. Hoffman (2007) argues that succession in the highest political office usually marks a moment of crisis in most political systems. This is usually so because, during leadership transitions, elites scramble to determine who will replace the departing leader which can provoke elite conflicts, deepen existing factions and ultimately, create an environment of political instability (Helms, 2012). The goal of this chapter is to critically examine some factors advanced by various respondents as

potentially promoting or standing in the way of former Vice President Mnangagwa and his allies before they prevailed over the G40 faction in the battle to succeed Robert Mugabe.

5.2 Mnangagwa and the politics of succeeding Robert Mugabe

Former President Robert Mugabe's reluctance to map out a clear succession plan culminated into the protracted succession battles within ZANU PF. This development led to a low-intensity political succession warfare in ZANU PF that elicited unprecedented debates, speculation and interpretations from both within and outside the country (Mail & Guardian, 10 July 2015). Political debates over "who" will succeed Mugabe brought to the fore the complexities of succession politics in ZANU PF and the "populist discourse surrounding it" (Magure, 2014:18). Indeed, the succession issue can primarily be understood within the broad context of Mugabe's longevity in power and the need for leadership renewal within the party.

As previously stated two major factions emerged within ZANU PF following the ouster of former deputy president Joice Mujuru from the party. The first one was led by former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and was backed by the country's securocrats – the country's military and the former liberation war fighters (News Day, 18 May 2016). The rival group was allegedly led by Grace Mugabe alongside Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao and was known as the 'G40' faction (ibid). It is worth noting that the two rival factions in ZANU PF employed various strategies to weaken and outwit each other. This became more dramatic after the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU PF as it became evident that Mnangagwa's chances of automatically succeeding Mugabe were not guaranteed (interview notes, November 2016).

Before the intense jockeying for the number one position in ZANU PF, the late musical icon Simon 'Chopper' Chimbetu was prophetic when he sang 'Hoko' (Peg) in 2002 and 'Ku State House Kure' (State House is far) in 2003 (Nungu, 2012). The song 'Hoko' with the following lyrics: "*Hoko mucherechedzo; hokoyechirangano; isiyeiripo; hokoineropa*"

[The peg is a sign; the peg is sacred; leave it there; it is the peg of blood]. The song insinuated that the war of liberation, its symbols, surviving war veterans and Mugabe's presidency were sacred and that no one should tamper around with any of these. Whereas lyrics in the song 'Ku State House Kure' which contain lines such as: "*KuState House kure; Chokwadi kure; Kurefu*" [State House is far, truly it is a long route], implied that it is a long and arduous journey for one to reach or reside at the State House - the Presidential official place of residence. In this sense, both songs carried political connotations ostensibly directed at the political opposition and those who wanted to succeed Mugabe within ZANU PF - that one cannot take over the reins of power on a silver platter.

It should be pointed out from the onset that the debate over who was to succeed Mugabe within ZANU PF circles has been a thorny issue since 1987 (Mandaza, 2007) when Mugabe became the executive president with sweeping powers. The development enabled Mugabe to pursue patron-client politics, destroying political alternative and voices of dissent with impunity (Magure, 2009). This probably explains why it was a taboo to table or even discuss about presidential succession in each and every ZANU PF elective Congress since 1987. Former cabinet minister, the late Edison Zvobgo, likened Robert Mugabe's refusal to hand over power as "the mentality of a madman who, when given a baton in a race, flees with it into the mountains instead of passing it on" (Mandaza, 2007:41).

It is instructive to point out that veteran nationalists such as the late Edison Zvobgo, Sidney Sekeramayi, Emmerson Mnangagwa, Joice Mujuru and John Nkomo among others, were at some point mentioned as possible contenders to succeed Mugabe in the event of his retirement from active politics (Mandaza, 2007), but that was not to be. Attempts by some possible contenders like Mujuru and Mnangagwa left both of them politically scathed with Mujuru being expelled from both the party and government till this day, while the same fate befell Mnangagwa and it only took the intervention of the army for him to make a comeback as Mugabe's successor. It should be pointed out that Mugabe's leadership has been chiefly sustained by an incessant tendency to generate

and manipulate factions so as to weaken internal dissent in ZANU PF and government (Msindo, 2016). Therefore it can be argued that Mugabe used the Machiavellian tactic of divide-and-rule (Machiavelli, 1965:697) to play rival factions against each other in order to extend his longevity in power while at the same time temporarily avoiding a costly implosion in the party. However, following the Mujuru ouster, new factional rivalries within ZANU PF emerged between the G40 faction and Lacoste faction, wrangling over succeeding Mugabe.

Allied to the above, it should be noted that in Zimbabwean politics, leadership succession and renewal has been a contentious issue within its two major political parties, the ruling ZANU PF party and the opposition party, the MDC (see Chikerema, 2014; Mpondi, 2015). In case of the ruling ZANU PF government, the theme of succession, both of the State Presidency and the leadership of the party led to political instability in Zimbabwe (Matyszak, 2012). The question of who was to succeed Mugabe brought to the fore the complexities of succession politics in Zimbabwe, with the main focus being on the internecine struggles between the two rival factions in ZANU PF, the G40 and Lacoste faction.

The emergence of the G40 faction that was also vying for the top position in ZANU PF after Joice Mujuru's ouster was telling. The G40 faction, which coalesced around former First Lady Grace Mugabe held several rallies dubbed Presidential Youth Interface rallies to launch scathing attacks on former Vice President Mnangagwa and allies, portraying him as unfit to succeed Mugabe (see, example The Standard, 6 August 2017; Bulawayo 24 News, 11 November 2017). In addition, the G40 faction allegedly instigated the dismissal or suspensions of Mnangagwa's allies from key political positions within both the party and the government over various allegations, including indiscipline and plotting against former President Mugabe (Bulawayo 24 News, 19 March 2016). Political purges were done with the ultimate goal of removing key Mnangagwa allies from the strategic positions of power within the party and government - thus weakening Mnangagwa's position and his support base from the party. According to Pigou (2016), the overall

trends showed that the Lacoste faction was losing ground in both the party and the state to the G40 and Mugabe acolyte interests.

It should, however, be pointed out that, akin to what happened during the ill-fated Tsholotsho Declaration of 2004, Mnangagwa's allies were purged whilst he remained quiet or flatly denied having any association with his allies or faction (Daily News, 31 July 2016; Financial Gazette, 18 August 2016). In short, Mnangagwa disowned or failed to protect his allies when they were being purged for supporting him to ascend to the presidium. Among the casualties of those who were purged was the ZANU PF youth league members from across the country, women's league executives and war veterans' leaders, one of whom was Christopher Mutsvangwa, chairman of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) (see The Zimbabwe Independent, 4 March 2016).

The scramble for political power became messier as rival factions within ZANU PF turned to political assassinations to weaken each other (interview notes, January 2017). In fact, "over the years, ZANU PF has been using different techniques of political assassinations as a method to internally and externally purge its political opponents, especially during the times when the party was having in-house conflicts" (interview notes, January 2017). For example, the mysterious and controversial deaths of generals, cabinet ministers and other senior politicians such as Moven Mahachi, Elliot Manyika, Edward Chindori-Chininga, Solomon Mujuru has been generally attributed to as a ZANU PF unorthodox practice of silencing opponents (Mail & Guardian, 27 June 2013). So in this case, respondents frequently pointed out the mysterious motor vehicle accidents as a strategy employed by rival factions within ZANU PF to eliminate or weaken each other.

It is therefore not surprising that a high number of ZANU PF stalwarts linked to both G40 and the Lacoste faction perished in suspicious car accidents (interview notes, January 2017). For instance, the horrific accident that claimed the life of Espinah Nhari (alleged Mnangagwa ally), who was the women's league secretary for administration was suspected to have been engineered by members of the G40 faction who were offended by Nhari's anti-G40 faction chant during a campaign rally in Masvingo (News Day, 18 May 2016). According to Mrs Tafadzwa Sadavanhu, "It is suspected that some politicians were deliberately killed in stage-managed car crashes engineered by rival factions" (interview with Mrs Tafadzwa Sadavanhu, December 2016).

Tied to the above, it is instructive to point out that the alleged poisoning of former Vice President Mnangagwa at a ZANU PF rally in Gwanda (see The Zimbabwe Independent, 18 August 2017) can be best explained as another calculated measure taken by his opponents to eliminate him as a potential successor of former President Mugabe. It is speculated that during a Presidential youth interface rally in Gwanda, Mnangagwa ate a poisoned ice-cream that was made at Gushungo Dairy - owned by the Mugabes (The Chronicles, 2 September 2017). Different theories were advanced in relation to Mnangagwa's poisoning incident but the broader implication was that the First family and its G40 allies were behind the plot to kill the former vice president. The G40 faction distanced itself from the poisoning of Mnangagwa and spiritedly denied any involvement of the first family's Gushungo Dairy in the whole affair.

Mnangagwa loyalists chanted slogans challenging Grace Mugabe and the G40 members whom they accused of the poisoning plot (The Standard, 3 September 2017). On the other hand, Grace Mugabe intensified her vitriolic and personalized political attacks that were directed to Mnangagwa. This was followed by a campaign by the G40 faction, calling for Mnangagwa's ouster as they accused him of being disloyal, deceitful and fanning factionalism in ZANU PF (News Day, 8 November 2017). However, former Vice President Mnangagwa as a cunning and astute politician remained calm in face of

these serious allegations and frontal attacks by his G40 opponents. According to Mr George Gundu:

Vice President Mnangagwa has been under the mentorship of Mugabe and ZANU PF for quite a long time. By virtue of that, he has acquired much knowledge and experience about how ZANU PF party politics operates and this will contribute towards his presidential succession endeavour. He knows the party from right, left and centre - in fact, he is an experienced politician - he has been working for Mugabe as his 'task man', so he probably knows Mugabe's way of doing things and as such he is prepared to take action when the time is right. This also probably explains why he does not attack back his rivals in public and he keeps denying having ambitions to succeed Mugabe, thus distancing himself from his allies and the Lacoste faction. As a calm and experienced politician, he is just being strategic and tactical; thus he will unpredictably outmanoeuvre the G40 members when the time comes. (Interview with Mr George Gundu, December 2016).

Similarly, in an editorial, Bulawayo 24 News, it described Mnangagwa as a shrewd politician, who utilized the game of chess as a platform to formulate his strategies to defend and attack his political opponents. It noted that:

In chess, the king in the form of Mnangagwa is the most important piece and every other piece can be sacrificed in defence of the king, hence staunch allies like war veterans leader Christopher Mutsvangwa have been expelled from ZANU PF for defending him. And as G40 members like Grace, Professor Jonathan Moyo and Mandi Chimene have attacked him, Mnangagwa has defended himself via his 'pawns' in the form of war veterans like Christopher Mutsvangwa, Douglas Mahiya and Victor Matemadanda. This strategy of defence is the basis of the Chess game where the King is protected by pawns when he is attacked by opponents. And when the King is on the offensive, he also leverages on the 'pawns' to attack on his behalf hence you hear allies like Godfrey Tsenengamu and Energy Mutodi attacking G40 and even launching direct verbal salvos

on President Mugabe himself....as a shrewd politician he has always denied that his Lacoste allies speak on his behalf, leaving his opponents like G40 and Grace with no legs to stand on (Bulawayo 24 News, 28 February 2017).

In addition to being a shrewd politician, Mnangagwa's liberation war credentials and his support from the ruling party's most influential people - the war veterans, is another salient factor that contributed towards his success to succeed former President Mugabe. Mnangagwa's close association with senior figures of the military and intelligence services - some of which are also veterans of the war of liberation played a significant role in enabling Mnangagwa to ascend to Presidency. There were concerns amongst the war veterans that the scale on who was to succeed Mugabe was tilted in favour of the G40 faction that was led by people with no liberation credentials.

It is imperative to note that, by virtue of having liberated the country from the colonial rule, the ZANU PF master narrative has always been that of preserving the gains of the liberation struggle and as such, its declaration has been that someone without the liberation war credentials was not fit to govern the country (The Standard, 14 November 2017). Given that most of the G40 members do not have war credentials, the war veterans accused the G40 faction of destabilising the revolutionary party and reversing the gains of the liberation struggle (Mail & Guardian, 14 December 2017). So in a sense, the fact that Mnangagwa has the requisite war credentials, it potentially afforded him support from war veterans as well as the security sector - thus having an upper hand in the presidential succession bid (interview notes, January 2017).

What should be pointed out is that, the declaration that someone without the liberation war credentials cannot rule Zimbabwe was made a fact especially during the 2002 presidential elections and the run-up to 2008 harmonized presidential and parliamentary elections when the chief of the armed forces and other heads of various security

services announced that they would not support or salute political leaders with no liberation war credentials (Rupiya, 2004; Tendi, 2010; Mpondi, 2015). Although this message was specifically directed to the opposition political parties, the MDC in particular, it however, implies that the military - which comprises of the Mnangagwa loyalists - could not accept members from the G40 faction to take over from Robert Mugabe as they lacked the requisite liberation war credentials.

Notwithstanding the above, it has been argued that a Mnangagwa presidency is likely to be a dictatorship based on his close association and reliance with the military and him being an ardent student of Mugabe's rule which has been enmeshed in brutality and strong-arm tactics (Bulawayo 24 News, 28 February 2017). According to Mr Dennis Muvoti, "Most of us Zimbabweans are tired of cruel leaders" (interview notes, January 2017). Many respondents described Mnangagwa as a ruthless hardliner who has been Mugabe's henchman and enforcer of brutal and coercive tactics for decades. The same sentiments were also expressed by another interviewee who asserted that:

We can't be having another Mugabe in the form of a Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa does not deserve to be the President...if he does, then we will be simply letting him 'get away with murder'. He is one of the surviving perpetrators of human rights violation and must be indicted for his crimes against humanity and for the mass killings of the innocent people of Zimbabwe; hence he should never go off scot-free". (Interview with Mr Justice Ndlovu, January 2017).

It can be argued that, for several years, Mugabe heavily dependent on brute force and intimidation as the major instruments to cow citizens into submission (News 24, 18 November 2017). So as Mugabe's henchman, it is believed that Mnangagwa was the enforcer of state-sponsored-killings, human rights violations and military repression that sought to eliminate the political opposition while securing Mugabe's stranglehold to power. For instance, narrative accounts by locals suggest that they are fearful of

Mnangagwa's presidency since he has a tainted political record. His involvement in the 1980s Matabeleland genocidal attacks, where thousands of Ndebele civilians who supported Nkomo's ZAPU were alleged to have been killed (CCJP, 1997).

Although this study is alive to the fact that Mnangagwa denies the accusations citing that he was not in capacity to authorise the operation, his later roles in influencing over electoral outcomes and crushing political opposition made him unpopular amongst Zimbabweans. In an interview with the New Statesman journalist, Mnangagwa retorted: "How do I become the enforcer during Gukurahundi?...we had the President, the Minister of Defence, the Commander of the Army and I was none of that. My own enemies attack me left and right and that is what you are buying" (Fletcher, 2016). In a sense, Mnangagwa's response was in a manner that sought to place blame Mugabe who was the Prime Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi (then Minister of Defence) and army commanders while probably sanitizing his image ahead of a tilt at the presidency.

Mnangagwa is also infamous for using hate speech especially his anti-unity slogan "Pasi ne Mhanduuu!!!" slogan (Down with enemies). During the Matabeleland disturbances, he labelled the so-called dissidents as "cockroaches" that had reached such an epidemic proportion that the government had to bring in the Fifth Brigade to get rid of them (News Day, 19 July 2011; The Chronicles, 23 March 2016). It is therefore imperative to note that the Gukurahundi genocide remains a biggest scar in contemporary Zimbabwe as its memories are extremely painful to those who survived it, or those who were born afterwards and told of its horrors by relatives or friends who had lived through it. Clearly, the ghost of the Gukurahundi will forever haunt Mnangagwa's presidency.

However, respondents who appeared to be supporters of former Vice President Mnangagwa have posited that he is a reformer who is keen to move away from a

Mugabe's dogmatic anti-colonial rhetoric which did nothing to build the country and improve relations with the needed economic partners in Europe (interview notes, January 2017). According to Chan & Gallagher (2017), the anti-colonial rhetoric has been part of Mugabe's repertoire since the late 1990s when he engaged in a standoff with the British government and then parts of the Commonwealth, the European Union (EU) and other Western donors.

However, in contrast to Mugabe's *modus operandi*, ever since he toppled Mugabe with the assistance of the army, Mnangagwa has presented himself as a pragmatic and flexible leader who can do business with East and West. He also made concerted efforts to re-engage with the international community and promised to implement economic and political reforms (interview notes, January 2017). For instance, Mnangagwa was quoted as having said that the government needed to swallow its pride and review some controversial economic policies to attract foreign investment and thus he argued that the government had to “bite the bullet” for the country to catch up with its African peers (Bulawayo 24 News, 28 February 2017).

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter singled out factors that were advanced by various respondents as potentially promoting or standing in the way of former Vice President Mnangagwa and his allies before they prevailed over the G40 faction in the battle to succeed Robert Mugabe. Reference was made to the various strategies that rival factions employed to weaken each other and these took the form of slandering, hate speech, political assassinations and poisoning among others. The major political impediment that Mnangagwa's faction faced was the existence of a rival faction called G40 linked to the First Family. Mnangagwa's presidency and political record are tainted as a result of his involvement in Matabeleland massacres and alleged engineering ZANU PF rigging of

elections against the political opposition. On the brighter side, Mnangagwa's liberation war credentials and his close association with the country's security services, including the military and the war veterans eventually assisted him to land the presidency following a bloodless coup engineered in his favour by the army.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

The overarching goal of this thesis was to critically examine the role of the media in ZANU PF internecine conflicts and how a faction led by former Vice President Mnangagwa has been portrayed in the Zimbabwean public discourses. Given that factionalism in ZANU PF is not a new phenomenon, this study chronicles its origins, its effects and how it significantly escalated during Mugabe's 37 year rule. Overall, the study made a modest contribution to the burgeoning literature on factionalism in political parties, political leadership succession and on the role of the media in influencing political events and developments.

In line with Harmel et al.'s (1995) the study maintains that factionalism is a fact of life within most political parties i.e. factions emerge and exist in almost all political systems. Thus findings from this study suggest that Zimbabwean political parties are not an exception with respect to factionalism. In short, factionalism has been an inherent feature of Zimbabwean politics as evidenced by the proliferation of factional wars in the country's intraparty politics since the 1960s to the present. Chapter Two of the study detailed how factionalism originated and how it significantly escalated in present day Zimbabwe. The roots of factionalism in Zimbabwe have been traced back to the liberation struggle (the Second Chimurenga) when ZANU was formed from a faction that broke away from Nkomo's ZAPU in 1963.

With the advent of independence, internecine conflicts which were chiefly characterized by leadership succession emerged within ZANU PF as the Mnangagwa and Mujuru factions battled to succeed former President Robert Mugabe, culminating in what was known as the Tsholotsho Declaration of 2004. It is being argued here that there was a concerted effort by the different factions in ZANU PF to maintain an ethnic balance. This was in line with what was witnessed during the war of liberation (see for example Sithole, 1980). Similarly, if one looks at the Tsholotsho Declaration there was an attempt towards ethnic balancing as well. However, following the deposition of the Mujuru faction in 2014, new factional fights over who was to succeed former President

Mugabe became intense following the emergence of another faction called G40 linked to the First Family.

Chapter Three of this study illustrates that the intense jockeying for the number one position within ZANU PF was both a boon and bane to Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political landscape. The longevity of ZANU PF reign since 1980 to the present made it possible for the party to permeate every aspect of Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political terrain. At the same time, there was a sense in which there was a conflation between the party and the government, a development that exacerbated the factional wars. Consequently the factional implosion within the ZANU PF party over who was to succeed Robert Mugabe negatively impacted on governmental decisions, actions, policies and systems thereby posing a serious challenge to national development. Thus, the fact that those in authority were fighting over power, time and effort were devoted to fighting factional battles and self-preservation at the expense of national development.

Findings from this study suggest that the incessant factional fights within ZANU PF as a party became increasingly costly to the country as they undermined investor confidence, led to policy inconsistencies, political uncertainty thereby worsening the country's comatose economy. On the other hand, the study has also identified some perceived benefits of factionalism. For instance, the fact that factions within ZANU PF were contesting over policies and procedures, robust debates ensued forcing Mugabe to make policy pronouncements. Thus policy contradictions, especially over the controversial indigenization policy, eventually facilitated policy clarity after Mugabe's intervention.

It is being argued here that ZANU PF factionalism also benefitted the country in the sense that it helped reduce the abuse of public offices by government officials. This is so because, in seeking to outwit each other in the scramble to succeed former President Mugabe, the competing factions within ZANU PF started exposing each other of unethical conducts. There is a sense in which both factions assumed watchdogs' roles, a development that kept the rival faction under check through exposés of

unethical conduct by members of a competing faction within the party. These benefits notwithstanding, findings from this study suggest that the costs of ZANU PF factionalism outweighed the benefits.

It is worth noting that this thesis supports the proposition that the media can influence political events in conflict-ridden societies as demonstrated in Chapter Four of this study. The chapter interrogated the various roles played by the triad - state owned media, privately owned media including the new media in exposing, fueling and abating ZANU PF internecine conflicts. Alternative sources of information about Zimbabwe exposed the government controlled media as a platform and purveyor of 'fake' news that was pro-ZANU PF and anti-opposition both in content and coverage. The battle for supremacy amongst rival factions in ZANU PF was taken to the state controlled newsrooms where news coverage and editorials' slants took a factional outlook. It soon became evident that the Lacoste faction, which was in control of the information ministry, was manipulating the state controlled media in their favour as it determined news content and coverage. The idea was to spruce up the image of the Lacoste faction at the expense of the G40 faction that was on the receiving end of biased reporting.

The new media (such as Twitter and Facebook) made it relatively easy for "silenced" voices to access and disseminate alternative information to counteract the biased news that was being churned out by the state controlled media. This was evidenced by how political players, especially from the G40 faction resorted to using the new media - to defend and counteract negative news items covered about them in the state controlled media. In fact, the new media provided a neutral ground for factions within ZANU PF to fight their factional battles. In addition, the new media provided a relatively balanced coverage of ZANU PF intraparty politics through gathering and disseminating both censored and uncensored information. These alternative media sources disseminated information about rival ZANU PF factional politics into the public domain regardless of concerted efforts by the state controlled media to censor such news items.

Chapter Five of this study critically examined some factors advanced by various respondents as potentially promoting or standing in the way of former Vice President Mnangagwa and his allies before they prevailed over the G40 faction in the battle to succeed Robert Mugabe. As the intense jockeying for the number one position intensified, it soon became evident that the G40 faction was the major stumbling block that stood in the way for Mnangagwa and his faction to succeed former President Mugabe. It is against this background the study brought to the fore the various overt and covert strategies that rival factions employed to weaken and outwit each other. For example, the G40 faction rallied behind the former first lady Grace Mugabe as she launched scathing attacks on Mnangagwa and his faction. It is argued here that the G40 faction allegedly instigated the suspension and/or subsequent expulsion of Mnangagwa loyalists from key political positions within the party and government. This strategy was meant to weaken the Lacoste faction strongholds, thereby scuttling Mnangagwa's presidential succession plan.

In addition to the above, it is widely believed that the rival factions sought to decimate key rival factional leaders through political assassinations. The horrific accident that claimed the life of Espinah Nhari (a Mnangagwa ally) and the alleged poisoning of Mnangagwa at a ZANU PF rally in Gwanda is indicative of these underhand strategies and tactics that characterised ZANU PF factional politics. In short, the mysterious and controversial deaths of ZANU PF senior officials from either the G40 or Lacoste faction, especially through mysterious car accidents were allegedly linked to the ruling party's internecine conflicts. Notwithstanding the fact that Mnangagwa and his faction prevailed over the G40 faction with respect to succeeding Robert Mugabe, a number of respondents had painted a very gloomy picture about the former Vice President ability to appeal to the electorate. A number of respondents made reference to Mnangagwa's involvement in the Matabeleland and 2008 atrocities and some described him as a

dictator and a ruthless hardliner who over the years relied on military repression to cow citizens into submission.¹¹

It is worth noting that there was also debate before Mnangagwa became president in relation to factors that were in his favour as he sought to succeed former President Mugabe. In other words, there was a relatively balanced and robust debate about Mnangagwa's suitability as a presidential candidate to succeed Robert Mugabe. For example, it was suggested that Mnangagwa, unlike his G40 faction opponents, is a cunning and astute politician, who for decades was under the mentorship of an equally Machiavellian former President Mugabe. It is probably because of his astute political manoeuvring and cunningness that worked in his favour as he sought to outwit and outclass his arch-rivals in the presidential succession bid. Before assuming the presidency, Mnangagwa presented himself as a pragmatic and flexible leader keen to re-engage with the international community as well as to implement both economic and political reforms in Zimbabwe.

In addition, Mnangagwa's liberation war credentials and his support from the war veterans and the security sector, particularly the army, were touted as key factors favourable to him as he sought to succeed former President Mugabe. Indeed former President Mugabe was toppled by military officers who then handpicked Mnangagwa as their preferred Commander in Chief and State President. This was hardly surprising primarily because the army has been dabbling in politics upon Mugabe's alleged invitation. The idea was to keep the opposition at bay and hence the army once declared that anyone without the liberation war credentials was not fit to rule the country.

¹¹ These were the popular views raised by respondents before Mnangagwa became president as standing in his way to succeeding former President Mugabe. It is beyond the scope of this study to debate whether Mnangagwa's ascendancy to the presidency was either a coup or not a coup

6.2 Areas for further research

The study focused on the analysis of the role of the media in ZANU PF internecine conflicts and how a faction led by former Vice President Mnangagwa has been portrayed in the Zimbabwean public discourses. In the course of the research and its analyses, issues that require further exploration were identified. For instance, it is important to conduct further research on the relationship between Mnangagwa and the military - to what extent can Mnangagwa continue relying on the country's security sector and implication thereof? In addition, there is a need for further research on factionalism within other major political parties in Zimbabwe, particularly the MDC especially in the post-Morgan Tsvangirai era. Finally, there is also a need for further research on factionalism in other liberation war based political parties in the region.

Epilogue

Late 2017 saw ZANU PF internecine conflicts reaching a crescendo culminating in the humiliation and subsequent firing of Mnangagwa by former President Mugabe. The expulsion of Mnangagwa from both the government and the party triggered a military intervention in the ZANU PF succession disputes, culminating in the eventual resignation of President Mugabe and the appointment of former Vice President Mnangagwa as Mugabe's successor.

For some observers, there were signs that former President Mugabe was paving way for Grace Mugabe's possible ascendancy to the vice presidency, thus being in a pole position to succeed Mugabe as president (Southall, 2018). Following his expulsion, Mnangagwa fled to South Africa amid reports of death threats but he vowed through a letter to come back to challenge Mugabe's leadership (E.D. Mnangagwa, press statement, November 8, 2017). Predictably, his dismissal provoked a sharp response from his allies, the war veterans and the country's security forces, the military in particular. Thus it prompted the then Zimbabwe's army chief, General Constantino Chiwenga (now Mnangagwa's Vice President) to issue a press statement ostensibly calling for an end to the intra-party purges that were mainly targeting ZANU PF members with the liberation war background (Nehanda Radio, 16 November 2017).

Consequently, a dramatic military operation code-named 'Operation Restore Legacy' was launched. The operation saw the deployment of soldiers across the country's capital Harare and the seizure of the state's television broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). The army insisted that their action was not a military takeover of the government (The Herald, 16 November 2017) but it was an operation that was targeting dominant figures in the G40 faction. They were referred to as "counter-revolutionaries" and "criminals around President Mugabe" who had infiltrated

ZANU PF, committing crimes that were causing social and economic suffering in the country (Southall, 2018). As a result, the G40 kingpins such as Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere¹² went into exile while others like Ignatius Chombo and Kudzanai Chipanga were arrested¹³. In addition, the ZANU PF party sacked all the alleged chief architects of the G40 faction, including Robert Mugabe as their party leader, paving way for Mnangagwa's ascendancy to power. It is noteworthy that the military intervention was welcomed with wild enthusiasm within and outside the country as thousands of Zimbabweans marched into the streets celebrating Mugabe's toppling. After an interregnum that lasted a few days, Mugabe eventually resigned paving way for Mnangagwa.

Following Mugabe's resignation, the ZANU PF party elected Mnangagwa as the new party leader and interim president of the country ahead of the 2018 general elections. In his inauguration, President Mnangagwa delivered a positive maiden speech which raised hopes for significant change from the Mugabe era for most Zimbabweans. Thus he pledged to, among other things, rebuild the country, stamp out corruption, re-engage with the international partners, attract foreign investment, ensure a new and unfolding democracy as well as a peaceful and harmonized election as scheduled in 2018 (The Chronicle, 25 November 2017). However, hopes of significant change were dashed when President Mnangagwa appointed an interim cabinet that mainly comprised of dead wood ministers from the Mugabe era and members of the armed forces (News 24, 1 December 2017). As such, his cabinet appointment was indicative of a greater continuity than change vis-à-vis the Mugabe era, while on the other hand re-asserting the ruling party's alliance with the military. From a radical perspective, President Mnangagwa's administration is nothing but old wine in new bottles.

¹² Kasukuwere later came back to Zimbabwe from the self-imposed exile in May 2018.

¹³They were later released on bail while awaiting trial over different allegations including corruption and wearing of the ruling party's regalia without ZANU PF's authority.

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University of Fort Hare
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University of Fort Hare- Department of Political Science and International Relations.

Dear participant

I Desmond T.T Mauswa a Masters student in the department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Fort Hare. In fulfilling my study I am conducting a research on **“Understanding the Role of the Media in ZANU PF Factional Fights and the Representation of the Lacoste Faction in the Zimbabwean Public Discourses”** and your participation is being invited for the purpose of this study. Participation on the research is limited to a face to face interview which will take between 30 to 45 minutes. Participating in the research is entirely voluntary and there are no direct benefits which can be expected in participating in the interview. There are no foreseen discomfort and stress anticipated in participating in the interview however you have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time or refuse to answer any question which you feel it makes you uncomfortable.

Your participation will be kept confidential while it is necessary to record the proceedings of the interview for analysing purposes, information which identifies your name will be omitted or changed from the transcript. The interview tapes will be destroyed once they have been transcribed. The transcripts will be kept in a secure file which will be stored within the Political Science and International Relations department at the university. The data will be open to the research supervisors and also the completed dissertation will be examined by other two persons who are nominated by the university. The research findings can be made available to you however this requires that you notify the researcher of your wish to have a copy of the findings as well as furnish the researcher with your postal details.

Should you have any further queries please contact the researcher on +2774 270 2025 or via email at dtmauswa@gmail.com and the researcher will answer any questions that you may have during or after the project.

INFORMED CONSENT

I hereby agree to participate in this research. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop this interview at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively.

Signature of participant.....

Date...../...../.....

Yours sincerely,

Desmond T.T Mauswa

Interview Questions

1. What do you know about factionalism in ZANU PF?
2. Can something good come from ZANU PF party factionalism?
 - How has factionalism in ZANU PF affected the country;
 - politically;
 - economically;
 - and socially?
3. What has been the impact of factionalism on ZANU PF as a party?
4. Given the damaging effects of factionalism, how has ZANU PF managed to survive amid these factional wars over the years?
5. Could succession disputes/ factionalism have been avoided, and if so how?
6. Is succeeding Mugabe the sole objective of these factions?
 - If not, what are the other secondary objectives of these factions?
7. In your opinion, has the State controlled media been impartial or objective in its reports on the ZANU PF factional fights?
 - What role has the State controlled media played in the ZANU PF succession disputes?
 - What role has the new media (facebook, whatsapp, twitter etc) played in the ZANU PF succession disputes?
8. What factors are likely to contribute towards the success of VP Mnangagwa and his faction in achieving their presidential succession bid?
 - What factors are likely to stand in the way for VP Mnangagwa and his faction in achieving their objectives of having the latter as the president of Zimbabwe?
9. Does VP Mnangagwa have Mugabe's endorsement or support in this quest?
 - If not, why do you think Mugabe seem not to prefer VP Mnangagwa as the heir apparent?
10. In your opinion, what strategies have these factions employed to weaken each other?



University of Fort Hare
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ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE
REC-270710-028-RA Level 01

Certificate Reference Number: MAG011SMAU01

Project title: **Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) internecine conflict and the representations of the Mnangagwa faction in Zimbabwean Public Discourses.**

Nature of Project: Masters

Principal Researcher: Desmond Tagara Tavengwa Mauswa

Supervisor: Dr B Magure

Co-supervisor: N/A

On behalf of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) I hereby give ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project and research instrument(s). Should any other instruments be used, these require separate authorization. The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this certificate, using the reference number indicated above.

Please note that the UREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the document
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

Special conditions: Research that includes children as per the official regulations of the act must take the following into account:

Note: The UREC is aware of the provisions of s71 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 and that matters pertaining to obtaining the Minister's consent are under discussion and remain unresolved. Nonetheless, as was decided at a meeting between the National Health Research Ethics Committee and stakeholders on 6 June 2013, university ethics committees may continue to grant ethical clearance for research involving children without the Minister's consent, provided that the prescripts of the previous rules have been met. This certificate is granted in terms of this agreement.

The UREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Ethical Clearance Certificate if
 - Any unethical principal or practices are revealed or suspected
 - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
 - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
 - The conditions contained in the Certificate have not been adhered to
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project.
- In addition to the need to comply with the highest level of ethical conduct principle investigators must report back annually as an evaluation and monitoring mechanism on the progress being made by the research. Such a report must be sent to the Dean of Research's office

The Ethics Committee wished you well in your research.

Yours sincerely



Professor Wilson Akpan
Acting Dean of Research

12 October 2016