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**The Role of South Africa as a 'Hegemonic' Power in the Maintenance of Peace and
Stability in the SADC Region**

By

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DECLARATION

I, *Nkosiyapha Sibanda* the undersigned candidate, declare that the content of this dissertation is my own original work and has not previously been submitted to any other University for the award of a degree, either in part or in its entirety.

Signature..... Date.....

DEDICATION

To my loving parents, Mr and Mrs A Sibanda who saw the value of education and have continuously supported me unconditionally, I love you so much.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABC	All Basotho Congress
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BNP	Basotho National Party
CAR	Central African Republic
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
DIAC	Department of International Affairs and Cooperation
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EU	European Union
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIGA	German Institute of Global and Area Studies
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
IDC	Industrial Development Cooperation
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission

LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LDF	Lesotho Defense Force
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PALAMA	Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SA	South Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SANDF	South African National Defense Force
SAPS	South African Police Service
UCT	University of Cape Town
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

ABSTRACT

This study investigates South Africa's role as a hegemonic power in maintaining peace and stability in the SADC region. Using qualitative and secondary data supplemented with primary data, the study examines not only South Africa's hegemonic role in the SADC region but also the challenges and critiques of South Africa's hegemonic role in the region. The study implores the hegemonic stability theory and explores the features that qualify South Africa to be a regional hegemonic power. These include South Africa's economic power, military power and strategic location. This study reveals that South Africa's role in maintaining peace and stability in the region is informed by its foreign policy and its pursuit of national interest and protection of its borders. The study also found out that the motive behind South Africa being active in peacekeeping missions is that it avoids being surrounded by failed states which might have spillover effects into its territorial boundaries. The study notes that there are numerous shortcomings which taint South Africa's hegemonic status. They include violent protests, xenophobia, racism, crime and corruption. The study recommends that South Africa needs to be proactive in solving the challenges within its domestic terrain as these shortcomings taint its hegemonic status .

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Wars, armed violence and insecurity continue to affect Africa, contributing to human suffering and hindering poverty alleviation across much of the continent. Instability such as terrorism, religious wars, coups, armed robbery and so on, have led to millions of deaths in the continent and further leading to millions of refugees and displaced people all over the continent. It is unfortunate that a continent lacking developmental capital, susceptible to drought and diseases, and is unable to feed its entire population, is confronted with such violent conflicts and instability (Afisi, 2009). As a result of these violent conflicts in Africa, preventing and reducing conflict has become significant not only for African governments but also for Europeans and the rest of the world. The need to find permanent solution to the long-lasting problems of instability in Africa has led to testing with various forms of approaches after attaining political independence by African states. This is because of the Western countries' increasing lack of interest and growing reluctance to intervene in political and civil conflicts particularly in Africa leading to increased pressure on regional powers.

This implies that regional powers have emerged to take the principal role to address conflicts, political instabilities and economic deprivation in their region (Prys, 2010:2). Hence, expectations are embedded upon African regional powers to deal with the political conflicts, instability and economic challenges encountered in their backyards. Furthermore, "regional powers are assumed to strongly influence the interactions taking place at the regional level, thereby contributing in a significant way to shaping the regional

order, or, in other terms, the degree of cooperation or conflict or the level of institutionalization in their regions” (Dallaji, 2012: 12). The international community would like these stronger states to form the backbone of conflict management efforts in the region and send their troops as part of an African security infrastructure. In return, these emerging sub regional hegemons gain international legitimacy and respect as well as foreign economic and military assistance, along with pay and training for their armed forces. Furthermore, these benefits actually serve to reinforce and enhance the material standing and hegemonic status of these pivotal states (Habib 2013). According to Francis (1996), the international community has asked a small number of African sub-regional hegemonic states to put into place regional and sub-regional security infrastructures.

However, these African security organizations are not being pulled together in response either to interstate conflict or an external threat, both of which are frequently the primary motivations for forming regional security complexes. Instead, some African states are trying to counteract externalities from domestic threats emanating from civil wars and state crises in neighboring countries, primarily in their sub regions (Kingombe, 2013). The SADC region remains Africa’s the most peaceful region. Although there have been inclusive agreements and protocols, the region is still confronted with challenges characterized by resource deficits, tensions between member states, social discontent, citizens’ exclusion and limited external and internal coordination. The region is characterized by security challenges and various conflict and its capacity to sustain and foster security and peace has been tested in recent years by prolonged economic and political crises in Madagascar and Zimbabwe. Some countries are facing high levels of

protests, caused by socio-economic aspects like poverty, unemployment, inequalities and political exclusion. In 2011, Swaziland and Malawi experienced unrest and riots exacerbated by growing socio-economic pressure on their citizenry. These indicators are likely to fuel socio-economic discontent, leading to more internal upheaval and potential conflicts. Beyond efforts to respond to these challenges, policy implementation capacity and information and response mechanisms are urgently required. However SADC's intervention in Madagascar and Zimbabwe has exposed the region's limited capacity to enforce agreements it has brokered. "SADC's mediation efforts reveal the complexities and challenges of dealing with unconstitutional changes in government, contested elections and violations of the region's electoral code" (Weishenk, 2010:23). Realist theories argued that any collective security efforts need a single dominant power, a so called hegemon to lead a joint cooperation effort.

In light of the above, multiple researchers have labeled South Africa as a hegemon power in southern Africa. Wallenstein (2002) defined a hegemon state as one that is able to impose a set of rules that shape interactions between states in a way that creates a new political system. A hegemon state can hence gain a political advantage in the projects and investments it owns and supports (Wallenstein, 2002). This can also refer to the deployment of power and persuasion by a dominant state to defend its region, avoid warfare and to promote economic stability, commerce and peace.

1.2 Problem statement

Southern Africa has an abundance of natural resources (for example diamonds in Botswana and Zimbabwe and oil in Angola), but this wealth has not transformed the livelihood of its inhabitants because of the prevalence of insecurity and instability. For example “Angola’s resources have in the past enabled the prolonging of its civil war. What’s more, resources have contributed towards poor governance in the country, as the government has been able to raise money from them. On the other hand, after full independence from British rule in 1980, Zimbabwe was the breadbasket of Africa. However, the country has since the 1990’s been experiencing a multitude of crises’, from economic to social and political” (Nganje, 2014:6). Internal instability within SADC countries poses a threat to both regional security and regional development due to the spillover effects of domestic turmoil (Afisi, 2009).

One of the most critical challenges facing effective regional security systems is that of leadership. Initiating and implementing peacemaking intervention is extremely difficult unless one state is willing and ready to take the initiative to commit the necessary resources (Nganje, 2014). However this can be through accepting the inevitable costs, and putting together a coalition with other states in the region that are prepared to commit some of their own resources towards the operation (Tjonneland, 2013). Southern Africa as a region requires a rallying point from where they can integrate and mobilize their resources in order to create a security community, which acts both as a deterrent to the outbreak of conflict and regional block to which will act as a catalyst of conflict management and peacebuilding. South Africa’s economic and military might in the region

provides that perfect point of departure needed for the building of a security community. However in spite of these features, some scholars have contested the role of South Africa as the SADC regional hegemon citing that South Africa is not living up to its hegemonic traits to maintain regional peace and stability. Van Nieuwkerk (2014:7), notes “that it is doubtful whether South Africa’s increasing economic and military superiority has in any way translated to specific political advantage”. On the other hand, Alden and le Pere (2009) states that the “degree to which South Africa’s hegemonic position can effectively be translated into a leadership role in Southern Africa depends upon its willingness and urgency in resolving conflict and crisis in the SADC region”. Though South Africa is the military and economic powerhouse of SADC, its capacity to convert these power indices into real political benefits and outcomes, the actual regional hegemonic influence is still very much lacking. Thus there is still a great reluctance on the part of political leadership of South Africa to be proactive in the deterrence of regional conflict and instability.

1.3 Research questions

Against the background of the problem, the study attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What makes South Africa a hegemonic power in the SADC region?
2. What role does South Africa as a hegemonic power play in enhancing peace and stability in the SADC region?
3. What challenges does South Africa as a hegemonic power face in fostering peace and stability in the SADC region?

4. How can South Africa get over these challenges effectively to play its role in fostering peace and stability in the region?

1.4 Research aim and objectives

The primary aim of this study is to examine South Africa's hegemonic role in the maintenance of peace and stability in the SADC region.

Aligned to this aim, the specific objectives of this study are to:

1. To identify the features which make South Africa a hegemonic power in the SADC region.
2. To explore South Africa's role as a hegemonic power in promoting peace and stability in the SADC region.
3. To identify the challenges faced by South Africa as a hegemonic power in fostering peace and stability in the SADC region.
4. To recommend ways forward for South Africa in solving these challenges in order to effectively play its role in the region.

1.5 Scope of the study

The study analyses the role of South Africa as a hegemonic power in the SADC region period between the year 2002 to 2016. This period of study was selected on the basis that it allowed the study to capture the most recent developments in the region for academic analyses. As such, delineating the content of the study enabled the research to be less sporadic and more manageable. It was of paramount importance to delineate the study so as to complete it within the two year designated time for the Masters

dissertation. The year 2002 was chosen as the point of departure because it is the year when the African Union (AU) was established. Since 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) placed restrictions on how member states involved or intervened in domestic state affairs, until in 2002 when the AU new deal opened a new chapter to allow intervention and interference in situations of crisis government. Nwosu (2005:231) suggests that the AU “provisions for intervention in internal affairs of member states” were set to ensure adequate security and sustainable peace in Africa.

1.6 Rationale of the study

South Africa was selected for the study because of its evident potential as SADC’s regional power. This entails its military and economic strength as well as its political influence in the region. South Africa has been anticipated to be a leader in the promotion of not only SADC but African peace agenda and to deal with intractable and prolonged conflicts in the continent. Therefore South Africa is expected to have remedial foreign policies which ensure peace and stability in the region. However South Africa faces obstacles that impact its capability, capacity and willingness, to act as hegemonic leader in the region. Schoeman (2007:21) claims that “the essential features of regional powers are the assumption of a stabilizing and leading role in the region and the acceptance of this role by neighboring states”. These issues are related to taking responsibility for those in need of assistance’ and being ‘an example to other countries in a number of ways. Therefore the widely held assumptions of South Africa’s hegemony in the SADC needs to be examined and analyzed by exploring not just its leadership potential or role but also, the obstacles faced by this regional power in enhancing peace and security in the region.

However, in order for South Africa to play a role in the region, the country is expected to go beyond the will and start addressing its capacity to exercise such a role (Tjonneland, 2013).

1.7 Significance of the study

The relevance of this study is to assist in the analysis of South Africa's hegemonic role in maintaining peace and stability in the SADC region. The study will contribute to the literature and knowledge particularly on the role played by South Africa in fostering peace and security in SADC. This will benefit researchers, students of Political Science and international relations and other related fields of study on the subject matter. This will be particularly on the factors and challenges that are faced by the state under study in its role to foster peace and security in the region. This will in turn provide areas for further research on how such obstacles can be mitigated.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research methodology applied in this study is a qualitative design. Qualitative research is used by researchers if they are looking for depth and meaning. The strengths of qualitative research are that they enable the researcher to gain more in-depth knowledge that may be difficult to quantitatively convey. They are also used to better understand any phenomenon with which very little is known yet. Lastly, qualitative research is pertinent in gaining new perspectives on phenomenon where much is already known (Cressell, 2003). The study employed the case study research design. The selected case in this study is South Africa. According to De Vos (2005), "a case study is a systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events aiming to describing and explaining the

phenomenon of interest”. The unit of analysis varies from an individual to a corporation. In this particular study the unit of analysis is South Africa and the level of analyses is the SADC region.

1.8.1 Methods of data collection

The bulk of the study was based on desktop research and secondary sources which involved analyzing the foreign policies of South Africa. The study further focused on the annual reports and White Papers of the department of International Relations and Cooperation (where available). Data was further collected from government records and official government reports on peace keeping missions in the SADC region, databases for trade and foreign direct investment, and databases of peacekeeping by SADC, African Union and the United Nations. This study also focused on foreign policies of other SADC countries in relation to South Africa as well as speeches and responses of SADC leaders specifically on the South Africa’s hegemonic role. Such information provided the perception and the level of acceptance of South Africa’s hegemonic role by other SADC countries.

The research was also supplemented by relevant library data gathered from published books and journal articles (South African Journal of International Affairs, Institute for global dialogue, Institute for Security Studies) on hegemony and South Africa’s hegemonic role in the SADC region, archival materials and local dailies on South African foreign policy and foreign policies of other SADC countries, relevant research and seminar papers related to this study, annual reports on South African and other SADC

countries, magazines and newspapers articles on South Africa's hegemonic ambitious in the SADC region as well as responses of other SADC countries on South Africa's hegemonic role. Secondary data provides researchers with quality and inexpensive information. Furthermore, existing sources of information also permits a longer period of study of a particular topic. These sources of information were essential because they provided the ability to complement and strengthen the quality of the primary data gathered.

1.8.2 Method of Data analysis

Data collected was subjected to extensive and substantive qualitative analysis through the instrumentality of document and content analysis. These included: historical, economic, political science, and social science-based analyses of accounts of South Africa inter-state relations in the SADC region. According to Bless et al (2006) "content analysis involves gathering and analyzing of the context of the text; language, words, phrases, themes and symbols". Nachmias and Nachmias (1996:34) defines it as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages". Furthermore, "It involves the examining of the presence of words or phrases in a text in order to identify the specified characteristics of messages and to make meaning of them" (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996:34). Document analysis is a qualitative social research method and is an important research tool which involves reading lots of written material. Analyzing documents will incorporate coding content into different themes. Data analysis was also performed within the specific contexts of the research objectives and questions of the study. The method of analyses in this study is

explanatory, as well as analytical, so as not to only offer a way of understanding hegemony as a condition for peace and stability, but also to present it within an analytical framework that explains and analyzes data. The framework used in this study was based on the hegemonic stability theory. Data was also analyzed according to the criteria for the role of hegemony as propounded by the theorists of the hegemonic stability theory, so as to examine the role and obstacles of the country understudy. This involved the reading, critiquing and drawing of inferences from the analysis of all the relevant information obtained from the above mentioned categories of sources.

1.8.3 Ethical Considerations

For the data to be collected the researcher referred to the University of Fort Hare Manual on ethical practices. Most researchers want to obtain recognition for their contributions and desire not to have their ideas stolen or disclosed prematurely (Bless et al, 2013). Therefore, the researcher acknowledged the sources of data to be used in the study. The study ensured objectivity through the application and explanation of theoretical perspectives and their contextual significance, so as to provide an unbiased argument. Lastly, because of its qualitative nature, caution was ensured when conducting the research in terms of the reliability of the sources used as well as their applicability.

1.9 Definition of Concepts

1.9.1 Hegemony

The word hegemony was derived from the Greek word “*hegemonia*”, which itself originates from hegemon meaning ‘ruler, leader, often in the sense of a state other than

his own' (Williams, 1977: 144). The word literally articulates the dominant status of one element over others in the system. In the 19th Century hegemony was used to show "political predominance, usually of one state over another" (Williams, 1977:144). Antonio Gramsci contributed extensively to the articulation of this term as he suggested that power is not reliant on force only but on 'consent' too. Gramsci believed that in the international system hegemony symbolizes the status of the most powerful state or the position of a dominant country in a particular region. Therefore according to Gramsci, "hegemony involves 'cooperation safeguarded by force', combining political and social supervision, consent and force" (Barrett, 1997: 239). Hegemonic countries are those considered to have a major large advantage over all other countries in the custody of such resources (McKeown, 1983). Such an advantage is presumed to translate into great influence over the actions of other countries in the region (McKeown, 1983).

1.9.2 Power

The term power can be understood to equal national capabilities. Power is a political resource, which encompass the sum of the various elements that allow a state to have its interests prevail over the interests of another country (Morgenthau, 1964). Power is multifaceted. There this concept has received extensive international relations scholarly about its form, nature and role in international relations although without any agreement. According to Weber (1947:152), power is "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rest". On the other hand Holsti (1983: 114) perceives it as: "the capacity of a state to control the bahaviour of others". Power includes tangible

elements such population and geography. It also includes intangible elements like leadership and type of government.

1.9.3 Peace

Generally, peace is when states are able to resolve their conflict without violence and can work together to improve the quality of citizens' lives. Hamburg and Holl (2000) argue that security is traditionally a formal public good amongst nation states. They assert that peace or 'just peace' is a sustentative criterion for public good and is its penultimate form. Peace is seen as the result of preventing deadly violence which is argued to have universal externalities because it acts on potential sources of violence, and therefore potentially protects anyone from violence and death (Hamburg et al.; 2000:365). The "roots of conflict are found at three levels: the psychological level, the level of a society or political system and the level of the international system". Hamburg and Holl "portray peace as the result of comprehensive and ongoing efforts to build social systems where differences can be settled peacefully" (Hamburg et al.; 2002:365)

1.9.4 Foreign Policy

The concept of 'foreign policy' is complex to clarify (Du Plessis, 2002:111). Since there are different and numerous arguments, statements and interpretations on foreign policy, Russet and Starr (1996:62) "contend that this culminates into nothing but lack of consensus on the definition of foreign policy". According to Ojo, et al (1985:43), "foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and means used by it for

the achievement and defusing of these purposes and interests”. There are limitations to this definition. In view of the above, foreign policy is defined as being representative of state interests only, ignoring the interests of non-state actors. However in a more comprehensive, though not all-inclusive terms, Du Plessis (2002:112) describe foreign policy as “those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated directives, and performed by government representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities are manifestly directed towards objectives, conditions and actors both governmental and non-governmental which lie beyond their sphere of territorial legitimacy”.

1.10 Structure of the Dissertation

The study is organised as follows:

Chapter 1 provides the background of the study. Identifying the problem and articulating the research aim, objectives and the research questions of the study. It will also state the methodology to be employed in the study, the ethical considerations as well as the limitations and/or the delimitations of the study.

Chapter 2 situates the study within contemporary literature. This chapter further incorporated and discussed the theoretical framework on which the study is premised.

Chapter 3 focusses on the characteristics that made South Africa a hegemonic power in SADC and provided an account of the role of South Africa as a hegemonic power in enhancing peace and security in the SADC region centred on the foreign policies of South Africa.

Chapter 4 identified, discussed and analysed the challenges faced by South Africa in its role to foster peace and security in the SADC region. Both domestic and regional factors that may be obstacles to South Africa's hegemonic role were scrutinized.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERAURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first part reviews relevant literature and contributions from scholars directly related to the study. It aims to summarize key points and to identify the existing gaps which this study intends to fill. The second part explores the theoretical framework underpinning this study, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) and articulates the rationale for the choice of the theory as a framework for the analysis of this study.

2.2 What makes a regional power?

Regional powers have been studied as both obstacles and facilitators to regional institutionalisation under unipolarity; and their role as middle powers or emerging powers in international institutions and global governance has been discussed. The focus on regional power has motivated debates on the classification and quality for the description of states as regional powers. Intellectuals have “therefore attempted to make a distinction between regional powers and other classifications of international power status such as global powers, super powers, middle powers, pivotal powers, pivotal-regional powers” etc. (Prys, 2008:13). There are also various academic debates as to the context in which the concept of regional hegemons or regional powers is used (Prys 2008; 2010; Destradi 2010).

Osterud was one of the scholars to define regional powers and stated to the notion of 'regional *great power*' defined as a state which according to him is i) geographically part of a delineated region ; ii) able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region; iii) is highly influential in regional affairs and iv) contrary to a middle power, might also be a great power on the world scale in addition to its regional standing (GIGA, 2010:1). On the other hand, Neumann (1992) defined regional power as a state which is geographically part of the delineated region; a state which is able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region; a state which is highly influential in regional affairs; and a state, which is contrary to a "middle power", might also be a great power on a world scale in addition to its regional standing. Lemke (2002:49) in applying the power transition theory at the regional level of analysis equally conceptualizes regional powers as "local dominant states supervising local relations by establishing and striving to preserve a local status quo".

Schoeman (2003:352-353) in contextualising regional powers to the South African case notes that "regional powers can be identified by the assumption of a stabilizing and leading and the acceptance of this role by neighboring states". Regional powers can also be considered "as role models and leaders within a particular region by carrying out leading activities which are generally accepted by neighbouring states" (Schirm 2005:110-112). Nolte (2006) regards regional powers or what he termed 'regional *leading powers*' as states that are powerful and influential enough in certain sub-regions or geographic regions (especially in Latin America, Asia, Middle East and Africa.

For Dahl (1957:202-3) “A has power over B to the extent that we can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. Goldhamer and Shils (1939:103) contend that “[a] person may be said to have power to the extent that he influences the behaviour of others in accordance with his own intentions”. Power is thus the major ingredient of political relationships defined in terms of *who* gets *what*, *when*, *where*, and *how* on the stage of world politics. To further have a broad understanding of what makes a regional power, it is imperative for identify and discuss different scholarly perspectives of the basic elements of national power. National power is relative, not absolute. This means that a nation does not have abstract power in and of itself, but only power in relation to another actor or actors in the international arena. To say that the United States is the most powerful nation on earth is to compare American power with that of all nations as they currently exist . Nevertheless, leaders of a nation at the peak of its power can come to believe that such power has an absolute quality that can be lost only through stupidity or neglect. In reality the superior power of a nation is derived not only from its own qualities, but from that of other actors compared with its own (Kagwanja, 2006).

2.3 The Elements of National Power

2.3.1 Economic Power

Economic capacity and development are key links to both natural and social determinants of power. In terms of natural resources, a nation may be well-endowed but lack the ability to convert those resources into military hardware, high-technology exports, and other manifestations of power (Harrison, 2008) . Ultimately, however, economic development in a nation flows from the social determinants of power, whether they be

political modernization and widespread formal education, or geographic and social mobility and the ready acceptance of innovation. All this, of course, is worked out against the backdrop of balanced military investment (Hartman, 1978). An excess of military spending can erode the underlying basis for a nation's power if it occurs at the expense of a larger economy and reduces the national ability to invest in future economic growth. For developing countries already short of economic investment capital, military spending represents a serious allocation of resources (Harrison, 2008).

Strong domestic economies also produce nonmilitary national power in the international arena. Leading industrial nations have available all the techniques for exercising power, including rewards or punishment by means of foreign trade, foreign aid, and investment and loans, as well as the mere consequences their domestic policies can have on the global economy Motsamai (2015) . This type of power can be weakened, however, if a nation suffers from high inflation, a large foreign debt, or chronic balance of payment deficits. In short, the strength of a nation's economy has a direct effect on the variety, resiliency, and credibility of its international economic options. Gross Domestic product (GDP) is also another important element linked to economic power (Mastapeter, 2008).

GDP is the total value of goods and services produced by a state. This is then divided by the total population of the country. A high GDP means a country is doing well in its economic production. A state's economy is vital to its ability to wield influence in world politics. In addition, the value of a country's currency determines the strength of that country. The relationship of currencies (exchange rates) is an important influence on the flow of international trade (Mastapeter, 2008).

2.3.2 Military power

Military strength is historically the gauge for national power. Defeat in war has normally signaled the decline if not the end of a nation's power, while military victory has usually heralded the ascent of a new power (Oloruntoba, 2013). As such, military capability is a crucial element of state power. Most analysts of international security regard this element as the most important. It includes the number of armies and training, nuclear weapons and sophistication of weapons technology. Military power is also linked to military expenditure (Mastapeter, 2008). The amount of money a country budgets and spends for its military determines the military capability of a state. Since the end of the Cold war, United States has budgeted more than seven highest nation's budget. The quality of arms technology also has become a vital military factor for all nations in a period marked by rapid and important scientific breakthroughs (Oloruntoba, 2013).

In addition, new technologies in the hands of rogue states or non-state actors such as terrorist groups will continue to be an important consideration for nations in the exercise of military power. Weapons of mass destruction are and will probably continue to be of primary concern in this regard. But even relatively cheap, recently developed conventional weapons in the appropriate situation can be decisive. Lastly, "technological advances are a useful reminder once again that military power, like all elements of national power, is contextual" (Harrison, 2008). Technology is not an automatic panacea for producing quick victories and low casualties, particularly absent clear political direction and coherent strategy. There comes a time, as Britain's thin red line "discovered under the weight of the Zulu offensive at Isandhewana, when quantity has a quality all on its own" (Harrison, 2008).

2.3.3 Type of government

The quality of a country's government is another element associated with national power. The issue is not what form of government, such as democracy or an authoritarian system a country has (Harrison, 2008). Instead the issue is administrative competence that is whether a state has a well-organized and effective administrative structure to utilize its power potentially fully. Leadership skill also adds to a government's strength. The quality of a country's leadership also determines the power of a state. Leadership involves the skill with which a state's chief officials manipulate other elements of power in their ongoing attempts to influence other states (Mastapeter, 2008). These are issues of diplomatic and negotiation skills.

2.3.4 Population

One of the most important elements of state power is the country's human characteristics. These include demographics in the form of size, trends, and structure. A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an automatic guarantee of strength (Treverton et al, 2005) . A large population becomes important as an element of power when combined with industrialization. A large population would be an asset if it has educated, skilled and healthy men and women to promote economic activities. In an attempt to distinguish regional powers from other states, Nolte defines regional power as a "state generally displaying large population in the regional context" (Nolte, 2010: 123). For example China is regarded as a powerful state because of its population and industrialization "because a large population supplies military personnel and industrial workers, sheer numbers of people are a positive power factor" (Treverton et al, 2005).

However a large population may be disadvantageous if it is not in balance with resources. For example, “India which has a population of 919 million, the world’s second largest population, yet because of the country’s poverty (\$320 per capita GNP), It must spend much of its energy and resources merely feeding its people” (Treverton et al, 2005:7).

Population structure and balance are also significant for developed nations. Important here is the percentage of the population in the most productive cohort, generally considered to be somewhere between the ages of 18 and 45, that can best meet the needs of the nation’s military and industry as well as create the following generation (Goldstone, 2012). This means that how a country’s population is distributed among various age groups can be a source of strength or weakness. Worldwide 31% of the earth’s population is less than 15 years old, 6,5% is over 65 years or over, 62% of the world population is in the normal productive years (Goldstone, 2012). For comparisons, the extremes of each category are the Ivory Coast with the greatest percentage of its population under age 15, South Korea with the largest percentage of ages 15-65 and Norway with the largest percentage of age 66 and above. Many analysts would contend that South Korea is relatively advantaged by its large working-age population, while the Ivory Coast and Norway are relatively disadvantaged by their numerous children and senior citizens. A supplementary note is that the country with the least youngsters is Italy at 15,1%. Countries with such a low birth-rate “are in a zero or even a negative population growth pattern may also experience economic difficulty because of future labor shortages” (Goldstone, 2012).

2.3.5 Geography

Geographical factors, whether they are location and climate or size and topography, influence a nation's outlook and capacity. Location, in particular, is closely tied to the foreign policy of a state Destradi (2010). Vulnerable nations, like Poland caught geographically between Russia and Germany, have even had to deal with the loss of national existence. Conversely, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan have been protected by large bodies of water throughout their histories. Each, in turn, "used the combination of a large navy and overseas trade to become a great power" (Geldenhuys, 2010:3). The link between location and foreign policy is vital in that it led to an increase in the 20th century to the field of study of geopolitics.

At its most extreme, geopolitics can succumb to Morgenthau's "Fallacy of the Single Factor" or be distorted as it was at the hands of Karl Haushofer and his disciples into a kind of political metaphysics with a call for adequate national living space that was put into ideological service for Nazi Germany. At its best, geopolitics has many insights to offer. Consider, for instance, "the connection between the British and American development of democracy and civil rights and the relatively secure strategic locations of both countries, as opposed to the authoritarian regimes of Germany and Russia, direct neighbors for much of history, lying exposed on the North European plain" (Mastapeter, 2008:12). Location is also closely tied to climate, which in turn has a significant effect on national power. The weakest and poorest states "in modern times have all been located outside the temperate climate zones in either the tropics or in the frigid zone" (Mastapeter, 2008:13).

2.3.6 Natural Resources

Abundant natural resources are a factor of power. Not only do abundant natural resources give a state the ability to develop and gain wealth from others, through trade, they may also provide a state with a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency (Draper and Schilvin, 2012). Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern nation to wage war, to operate an industrial base, and to reward other international actors through trade and aid, either in modern industrial products or in the raw materials themselves . But these resources, “whether they are arable land and water or coal and oil, are unevenly distributed around the world and are becoming increasingly scarce” (Mastapeter, 2008:13-14). Moreover, as in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical possession of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation can also develop those resources and maintain political control over their disposition. In their raw state, for example, “minerals and energy sources are generally useless” (Draper and Schilvin, 2012).

To summarize the above discussion of the elements of power, it can be said that national power is historically linked with military capacity, a natural relationship since war in the international arena is the *ultima ratio* of power. Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot determine national power. For instance, there is the huge size of Brazil, the large population of Pakistan, the industrial makeup of Belgium, and the first-class army of Switzerland. Yet none of these states is a first-rank power (Geldenhuis, 2010). This means that national power is necessary for a state to be a regional power or a regional leader.

Destradi (2010:929) conceptualises regional powers by stating that regional powers are states which “belongs to a region, disposes of superior power capabilities, and exercises an influence on regional neighbours”. Furthermore, he notes that a regional power is a “regionally predominant state exercising an influence on the region to which it belongs by pursuing, in relation to its neighbours, strategies which can be imperial, hegemonic, or leading”. Kappel (2011:275) describes a regional power as a country that has unrivalled economic strength ‘in a given region’ and has influence extending from regional to global proportions. Such a country must similarly have “a relatively large population, covering a relatively large area (and) achieves high economic growth, above the regional average, over a longer period of time and thus provides a growing market for the region. It plays an important role in trade within the region” (Kappel 2011:275).

In Southern Africa, South Africa has over the years established itself as a regional hegemon in order to maintain security and peace. South Africa’s economic and military might in the sub-region is necessary in its role to maintain regional peace and security. It is now a respected member of the international community and has enjoyed successes in furthering its own interests, as well as those of the SADC region. South Africa enjoys an edge over other countries in the region because of its resource endowment, location and physical geography which provides support for transport by rail and road. Furthermore, Draper and Scholvin (2012) argue that proper infrastructure is one essential development requirement that most countries in SADC still lack. It has for the most time been and most likely will continue to be in the near and mid-term future the pole of economic activity in Southern Africa. Its economic preponderance in terms of GDP,

industrial output and competitiveness is almost indisputable and as a result, such factors qualify South Africa as a regional hegemon.

2.4 Debates on the role of hegemonic powers

Rationalist theorists are of the view that material power resources are paramount for the predominance of a state over its counterparts (Destradi, 2010: 916). As such, economic leadership is the first pillar of the traditional concept of hegemony. While analysing the expansion and growth of states, Gilpin upholds that the main goal for a country to achieve leadership is to dominate the international economic scene, subordinating the economic activities of other countries to the dominant state's preferences (Gilpin, 1983: 106). To exert power in the international system, preeminent economic competences are required collectively with sufficient military power to secure obedience of subordinate countries. Economic power, "including raw materials and access to markets and capitals, will be used to enforce order in the international system" (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 49-51). Thus a hegemon exerting economic leadership will assume international economic liberalization by imposing an open system which will raise the absolute level of welfare of all participants (Webb and Krasner, 1989: 184).

Moreover, McKeown (1983: 77-78) "describes the power of the hegemonic state as essentially economic in an oligopolistic setting. He also emphasizes economic predominance as a weapon available to the dominant state able to threaten to cut off the access of non-complying nations to its rich home market or raise tariffs". Keohane (1984: 39-40) relates economic dominance with the military capacity of the hegemon and this

has to be powerful enough to protect the international political economy from incursions by hostile adversaries that could deny access to major areas of its economic activity . Therefore “the emergence of an international market also requires an international political structure that involves a certain degree of consent from subordinate states” (Gilpin 1987: 143; Joseph, 2008: 113). This brings us to the second pillar of traditional hegemony based on coercion. Structural realists consider that a hegemonic power will seek an aggressive unilateralist strategy through coercive domination using its material power resources to guarantee international security in what is considered an anarchical environment (Waltz, 2000:28; Destradi, 2010:904-909). In contrast and through the world-system theory, Wallerstein asserts that “hegemony is a normative system based on domination, coercion, exploitation and inequality” (cited in Rapkin, 1990: 3).

On the other hand, Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:56) precisely capture a realist view of hegemonic order through defining a “coercion model based on the use of sanctions and inducements by the most powerful state to change the practices of its subordinates”. Through offering rewards for cooperation, “both the costs of non-compliance and the benefits of compliance increase, making it more rational for secondary states to follow the hegemon even though their normative orientations remain unaltered”. Concurring with such coercive features, Kindleberger (1981:243) states that: “leadership has strong elements of both arm-twisting and bribery. One reason why the hegemon opts for bilateral instead of multilateral negotiations is to reduce the possibility of secondary states to co-operate against it while taking advantage of playing off weaker states against one another (McKeown, 1983:78). Furthermore, Gilpin affirms that the hegemonic power will coerce

other states with taxes imposing itself as a centralised authority, able with its power to force subordinate states to make contributions (cited in Snidal, 1985: 588-589). According to McKeown (1983:73-75), the hegemonic state must be able to offer bribes and threats, using its economic power as a primary tool and military force as a secondary way to secure compliance. From his neoliberal institutionalist standpoint, Keohane (1984:32-46) acknowledges this differentiation and although he defines hegemony as a preponderance of material resources he acknowledges that material dominance is not enough and cooperation through institutions is also required. Alden & Le Pere (2009:3) recognizes the necessity of the presence of a hegemon as an important feature of international systems. The role of hegemony in international politics is to create and sustain order and openness within the international political economy (Ikenberry, 1989). In sustaining order and openness in the international political economy a hegemon uses its political influence. Political influence is strategically used to “preach the universal virtues of freedom of the seas, free trade, open door policies, comparative advantage, and a specialized division of labour” (McCormick, 1990:127).

This is done to secure the interest of the hegemon because all states prioritize their self-interest above those of other states first. A hegemon preaches because it has the most to gain from a free world, and has the most to lose especially if the free movement of capital, currencies and goods are limited in any way. Keohane's (1984: 45) analysis of coercion delves beyond “military force, claiming that hegemonic leadership is too expensive and self-defeating to dominate solely by force, therefore, recalling Wallerstein concept, the hegemon is characterised by supervising politically independent societies

through a combination of hierarchies and control of the operation of markets". According to Joseph (2002) there is more to hegemony than meets the eye. He describes the hegemon as a state that "has an objective basis in material conditions" (Joseph, 2002: 20). This points to the fact that a hegemon's interest is not only vested in ruling groups of states, but also in the accumulation of material which can be translated into capital the driving force of modern society. There is interplay between military power and economic power because it is the strength of a state that will provide the productive base for increasing military power. Military power coupled with economic power commands both the attention and respect of other states (McCormick, 1990). In the past, hegemons for example have used their economic power to create institutions and rules that fostered the internationalization of capital (McCormick, 1990). During the colonial era, the British enforced their dominance on their colonies with the help of gold and guns (Persaud, 2001) while Americans in the neo-colonial era of today have used complex and diffuse strategies to increase and maintain their country's role as a global hegemon (Persaud, 2001).

Gilpin justifies coercion for its potential to avoid the break out of wars caused by the rise and fall of hegemonic states. Applying this assertion to the concepts of order and disorder Snidal (1985), claims that a coercive dominant state can guarantee stability, although the centrality of a leading state can break down to a sub-regional basis. In the case of South America, US impositions are often regarded as the main reason that drove Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Paraguay to having military regimes . This claim however misses, "the internal political and economic dynamics that led national elites to support these

regimes from the socialist and communist threat” (Burges, 2008: 68). In addition “the coercive part of hegemony is subtler than domination and originates from the need of national elites to support whatever the global predominant ideology is, to gain access to transnational networks and thus to maintain its privileges” (Burges, 2008: 68). In the case of regional powers, “coercive measures are adopted to make other states comply with their will allowing the imposition of their own rules” (Destradi, 2010: 911). This brings us to the third pillar of the traditional concept of hegemony: the establishment of an order imposed by the hegemonic power. Both structural realist and liberal internationalist approaches consider that hegemonic leadership refers to a predominant state that is trying to define a certain kind of self-interested international order (Rapkin, 1990:3). Realists consider that hegemonic states provide material incentives to secondary states to impose their power. This preponderance will give the hegemon enough capacity to define and enforce order in the international system (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 50). Other scholars like Gilpin “acknowledge the importance of normative factors, like prestige, in hegemonies ability to impose a set of rules in order to advance their interests” (cited in Destradi, 2010: 916).

Hegemonies resemble empires in as much as they seek to unify and govern the international system in order to guarantee their dominance. With the modern nation-state, a hegemonic power will try to convince subordinate states of its strong central authority . Hence, “secondary elites will keep the monopoly of the legitimate use of force safeguarded by a bureaucracy and a single set of laws inspired by the beliefs and the institutions of the hegemon” (Gilpin, 1987: 111-123). The hegemonic state will try to order

world politics, without imposing awkward political superstructures like empires did . Cooperation will, therefore, be sought through institutions. As rules cannot successfully be directly enforced hegemonic leadership will depend on asymmetrical cooperation, with the hegemon playing a paramount role in providing leadership in return for deference (Keohane, 1985: 46). Keohane concludes that “the exercise of hegemonic leadership and the order it produces should not be considered negatively by secondary states” (Rapkin, 1990:4). Although the dominant state will always act focused on its self-interest, “the existence of a hegemonic power helps preserve peace and stability within the international system” (Snidal, 1985: 587). A hegemony can also be coercive and benevolent but still beneficial, although this can simply be exploitative (Snidal, 1985:579-584). In order to gain recognition as a hegemonic power, another requirement that a state has to meet is that it has to possess the ability to exercise dominance in both “institutions” and “ideology”. Hegemons achieve “dominance in the establishment of both ideology and institutions that spread and popularize the life-standard and cultural values of the hegemon” (Uzgel, 2003:31). According to Kindleberger (1973) achieving and maintaining stability in the international arena has a lot to do with whether or not the state offers public goods. This means that a state that does not provide or offer public goods cannot in any way claim hegemonic status .

Prys (2008:8-11) proposes the following three dimensions that ought to be considered when attempting to establish or comprehend a political hegemonic system:

Perceptions: This dimension entails both the “self-perception” by the hegemonic power itself and the perceptions by subordinate fellow members within the system. “Hegemons

are perceived to possess a sense of political willingness to take on the burdens of hegemony". This is because a lack of political willingness may culminate in "disappointment" or "bewilderment" especially where there is a widening gap between expectations and concrete or abstract achievements. Most theories generally accept that there cannot be hegemony outside of the "followership of secondary states". Probably, *"not all secondary actors will acknowledge the leadership of a hegemon; some are likely to express defiance and condemnation"*. Thus, establishing a hegemon may, to some extent, depend on reciprocal consensus from every single unit within the system."

Projection: A hegemon must project its values and interests rather than imposing them on its allies. As power actors, hegemons ought to be conscious of the manner in which they carry out their activities and pursue their vision and values. For instance, *"such obligatory activities include conflict resolution, setting up of institutions, and acquainting themselves with resources such as finance"*. For a hegemonic power to be affective in values projection, "it ought at least to institutionalize the same political system" in the intra-state spheres of "troubled", subordinate state(s)" (Prys 2008:11).

Provision: As pointed out earlier, a hegemon in whichever sphere is characterized by unilateral, generous provision of public goods. Economic services that are often provided include free trade and markets, and just about any type of services such as infrastructure, security, and others . However, "not all observers acknowledge security services as public good(s)" (Lentner, 2005:736). Unlike the "perceptions" and "projection" dimensions where there is almost always political will by a hegemon, "provision" of public goods *"takes place regardless of the preponderant actor's willingness to become involved or not"*

especially in cases of (natural) disaster. Material possession is not solely responsible for determining hegemony. Ideological affiliation also plays a significant part. A hegemon, in principle, follows what it ideologically stands for". The "ideal image of what a hegemon stands for can be identified as the way in which it views and interprets the world and its contents, perhaps partly influenced by its national interests" (Schoeman, 2007). By way of illustration, South Africa serves as the embodiment of a regional hegemonic actor in the Southern African region.

2.5 Theoretical framework (Hegemonic Stability Theory)

This study is based on hegemonic stability theory as propounded by Kindleberger (1973) and other scholars like Keohane (1984; 1989), Modelski (1987), Krasner (1989) Gilpin (1987), Gadzey (1994). The word "hegemony" literally means „leadership". "The original concept comes from Ancient Greece, emerging from the political domination exerted by powerful city-states over their neighbours" (Gilpin, 1983: 144). Antonio Gramsci contributed extensively to the articulation of this term as he suggested that power is not reliant on force only but on 'consent' too. Gramsci believed that "in the international system hegemony symbolizes the status of the most powerful state or the position of a dominant country in a particular region". Therefore according to Gramsci, "hegemony involves 'cooperation safeguarded by force', combining political and social supervision, consent and force" (Barrett, 1997: 239). The modern concept of this term, "however, remains vague due to lexicographical imprecision and different scholarly conceptualizations" (Burgess, 2008: 67). The current academic debate surrounding hegemony first emerged in the second half of the 20th century, with neorealist and

neoliberal institutionalist interpretations of Kindleberger's analysis of the Great Depression. Kindleberger argues that "in order for the world economy to be stable, one country ought to assume world domination and act as a stabilizer" (Kindleberger, 1981: 247). Asserting that "lack of leadership caused the unstable economic situation that led to the Great Depression" (cited in Rapkin, 1990: 1), he concluded that "declining US influence in world affairs meant a danger of too little concentrated power and thus the situation of a world full of free riders expecting a global leader to emerge" (Kindleberger, 1981: 253).

McKeown (1983: 73-74) concurs by stating that "the power of a hegemonic state is necessary for the emergence of an open international economic system". These formulations led to the origination of the theory of hegemonic stability. Despite its economic nature, "this theory also implies that a stable environment is needed in politics and that international law is necessary for the proper functioning of an international system" (Destradi, 2010: 914). Kindleberger's ideal conception of a stable world system is based on the benevolent creation of a stable environment by a hegemonic power. Exerting power in a "monopolistic way to guarantee its predominance, the hegemon will provide public goods to other states that, without sharing costs, will act as free riders benefiting from the stability created" (Kindleberger, 1973: 307-308). Labelling it the "collective goods argument", Webb and Krasner (1989: 184) argued that "small and medium-sized countries are unlikely to contribute to the production of public goods, leaving the hegemon as the only actor able to absorb the costs incurred". Snidal (1985: 581-583) reinforces the benevolent nature of hegemonic stability in contrast to sustained

domination, claiming that “even though the dominant leader benefits from a stable international regime, smaller states gain even more. This is the case because the country that has the incentive to provide for the collective good will therefore have to carry the burden itself” (Gowa, 1989: 310). Opposed to the benevolent concept of hegemony, Gilpin introduced a “negative interpretation of hegemonic leadership: a neo-realist approach that is purely focused on national interest”. His view is that the hegemonic state “provides public goods, such as stability and peace, in exchange for a tax in the form of subordinate states being forced to contribute to the costs of provision as they are too weak to oppose the most powerful state” (Gilpin, 1983: 144-146). In addition to this, Gilpin and Krasner assert that with “a hegemonic distribution of power, the dominant state can promote liberalisation without jeopardising security objectives by using its superior economic and military capabilities to oblige other states to accept an open trading structure” (cited in Webb and Krasner, 1989: 184).

The basic theory of hegemonic stability has been modified since the writings of these scholars; the refined version however does not assert an automatic link between power and leadership. Hegemony is now defined as a situation in which “one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstates relations and willing to do so” (Keohane, 1996: 287). This modification of the theory declares that states with preponderant resources will be hegemonic except when they decide not to commit the necessary effort to the task of leadership, yet it does not tell us what will determine the latter decision. For the purposes of this thesis only the mainstream version of the theory of hegemonic stability will be considered because the refined version lacks a predictive

power. Lake (1993) argues that the hegemonic stability theory is more or less a combination of two analytically distinct theories; leadership and hegemony theories. His argument is that the theory of leadership emphasizes the provision of public good and international economic infrastructure in an atmosphere of international stability while hegemonic theory on the other hand argues that “the politics of international economic relations arise from the different structurally derived preferences over trade policy possessed by competing state and the assumption that states possess the objective of political power or security” (Lake 1993:469). To this end, scholars have made such categorization of varieties of hegemonic presence to include benevolent, selfish, pariah, liberal hegemon, co-operative, structural hegemon, pivotal hegemon etc. Adebajo et al (2003:174) summarizes this viewpoint advancing that a “hegemon needs to have effective tool at its disposal, such as the ability to dispense foreign assistance, forge alliances, and use various sticks and carrots to achieve its policy objective”. This implies that, it must be able to communicate clearly to the “hegemonized”, its capacity to not only reward obedience and conformity with hegemonic norms and ideas but also to punish deviance or unacceptable behavior from belligerent states.

The neo-liberal view of hegemonic stability theory suggests that “an open and liberal world economy requires the necessary and compulsory existence of a hegemonic and dominant power” (Gilpin,1997:72). Hegemonic stability theory is especially relevant in the analysis of the traditional conceptions of hegemony. It is so because the objectives of economic leadership, coercive domination and establishing a self-interested international world order emerge from this theory. South Africa in recent times has been grossly

referred to and celebrated as Africa's hegemon particularly since the erosion of the decades of apartheid rule. Therefore, within the framework of the theory of hegemonic stability, the study will address the question of identifying the link between the role of South Africa and its hegemonic ambitions to regional stability, in the SADC region. The study will assess the implication of the theory of hegemonic stability to understand the power dynamics.

2.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted various intellectual debates in which the concept of regional powers or regional hegemons is used as well as debates on the role of regional powers which revealed that regional security, peace, cooperation and stability are therefore possible through the leadership initiatives of regional powers. Furthermore literature also revealed that regional powers can be catalysts for regional political-economic integration within a region. This chapter also explored the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis; Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) which revealed the underlining characteristics that a hegemonic state should have. The next chapter will discuss South Africa's hegemonic role in the SADC region.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A HEGEMONIC POWER IN FOSTERING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE SADC REGION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims at discussing what makes South Africa a hegemonic power in the SADC region. The chapter also provides a broad analysis of South Africa's foreign policy and its role in maintaining peace and stability in the SADC region. This analysis focuses on discussing and analysing South Africa's quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe, conflict management in DRC, its role in resolving conflict in Lesotho and strengthening of SADC's stability.

3.2 What makes South Africa a Hegemonic power in the SADC region?

The end of cold war transformed the bipolar system that had prevailed and as a result of the Soviet Union's demise, the US rose as the sole superpower. For the African continent, the conclusion of the cold war meant the beginning of super powers vying for alliances in the continent (Tjonneland, 2013). In the SADC region, the significant factor was the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. The infrastructural, military and economically superior state needed to be absorbed in to the SADC community. "The apartheid's relations with its SADC and African neighbors were perceived to be of an aggressive nature' due to 'a process of destabilization and military interactions in neighbouring countries", corresponding; limited economic interactions were noted and where they did take place, they obviously favored South Africa (Kromberg, 1996:5). This was a defining change for South African foreign policy in general and especially its policy towards the

African continent. Pretoria had to locate herself within the international community and in Africa (Pfister; 2000:1). As Nelson Mandela stated: “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny and is an inextricably part of southern Africa and its destiny is linked to that of a region, which is much more than a mere geographical concept” (Pfister; 2000:6).

South Africa’s colonial past has ensured a cloud has been lingering over its ability to be a true regional leader. During the apartheid the Group Areas Act of 1950 “outlawed interracial communities and created racially defined residential areas” that still remain even today (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:243). Habib (2010) contends that “South Africa’s hegemonic ambitions may not be actively pursued but they are naturally an outcome of its possession of political, military, economic and cultural attributes of hard power unparalleled in Africa”. South Africa’s ability to acquire legitimate hegemony is apparent in its advocacy of democratic values and good governance and the endorsement of the ideas by African leaders as signatories of Constructive Act of the African Union.

3.2.1 Economic dominance

South Africa has become an important role player in peace keeping and peace building on the African continent, has contributed to the growth of the African Union (AU) and APSA, is the biggest investor in the SADC countries and is also the biggest financial contributor to the region (Kok, 2015). South Africa’s dominance in southern Africa, most notably in the economic sphere, is undisputed (Nathan, 2013). South Africa’s economy makes up 70 % of Southern Africa’s overall economy, and it makes up 40 % of the whole economy of the sub-Saharan Africa (Monyae, 2014). South Africa accounts for 60% of SADC’s total trade and about 70% of the region’s GDP. Moreover, 82% of the net GDP

of SADC comes from South Africa (Hassan, 2015). It is also the country in the region with the most diversified economy and therefore critical to SADC's drive towards developmental regionalism (Nganje 2014). South Africa is recognized as the hegemonic power in the region due to the fact that it is the largest contributor and investor in SADC member states. South Africa is also privileged to have the most business linkages with industrialized states across the globe (Draper et al., 2007). South Africa's major trading partners are those in Europe, North America and Japan (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obe, 1998). On the economic front, South Africa's economy is undoubtedly the strongest in the region. Given this economic strength, South Africa has provided financial assistance to a number of SADC member states at different moments. Some of the beneficiaries include Swaziland and Zimbabwe although these are not the only ones (Ogunnubi, 2013). Regional powers tend to combine power and leadership over resources. They "have to bear a special responsibility for regional security and for the maintenance of regional order" (Tjonneland, 2013:24).

This economic dominance and power enables South Africa as a regional power to perform the hegemonic role of provision of goods. Another important aspect of South Africa's hegemonic presence is the power and influence of the South African Rand. The South African Rand co-circulates with other currencies in a number of Southern African countries. A formal currency union, the Common Monetary Area or (CMA) has been in existence for many years and provides the framework for such co-circulation in three of South Africa's neighbours. The rand also circulates informally in a number of other countries.

3.2.2 Military Strength and capability

South Africa has a multi-faceted approach to securing peace outside its borders. This is informed by a 'human security' approach to peacebuilding, which incorporates recognition of the need to guarantee human rights and basic needs as important elements of security. The "human security paradigm, which is elucidated in South Africa's foreign policy white paper, indicates that the country adopts an expanded understanding of security threats and, therefore, also warrants an expanded repertoire of responses that includes political and military solutions" (DIRCO, 2011). Owing to the successes of its own democratic transition, South Africa has consistently expressed a preference for a negotiated settlement of disputes.

South Africa is the first and most dominant military power in SADC. It is considered as a regional military power because its military capability is impressive (Neethling 2003). According to the 2013 Global Firepower (GFP) 'Power Index' ranking of military powers, South Africa is ranked 34th in the world (GFP 2013). Its military budget was R40.2 billion in 2013/14, and R42.8 billion was budgeted for the 2014/15 financial year. According to the GFP data, the country has an active frontline personnel totaling 88,565 people, with 17,100 in reserve. This is out of approximately 14 million individuals who are fit for service. Looking at military strength by vehicles, it has the following stats: It is largely made up by 2,265 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), 196 tanks, and 50 multiple-launch rocket systems. In terms of aircraft, South Africa has 17 interceptors and 12 attack helicopters. As for the naval strength, South Africa has 4 frigates, 3 submarines and 9 defense craft (GFP 2013).

South Africa is powerful not only in the SADC region but in the African continent in terms of military status. Angola is the only other countries in the region that come close to matching the Defense architecture of South Africa. Even though the South African troops have been facing challenges, they have been evidently present in states confronted with conflict and insecurity like DRC. Although such military interventions have had varied and sometimes embarrassing outcomes as demonstrated in the case of CAR, they however reveal the military presence of South Africa's in warring states (Odigbo et al, 2014).

Traditionally, South Africa has remained the military powerhouse of the SADC region with an unequalled level of military investment, budget and unparalleled capacity which supersedes any other country within the continent. This is "despite the fact that its military expenditure has reduced significantly since the post-apartheid and post-Cold War eras respectively". Nevertheless, South Africa has always presented an image of a formidable military powerhouse in Africa especially (Ogunnubi, 2013). In relation to foreign policy, "the leadership of the country itself acknowledges the imperative of the military as a significant instrument in its attempts to bring to reality the country's post-1994 foreign policy ambitions of reform, stability and development in SADC" (Mandrup 2008:5). As a consequence, the achievement of South Africa diplomatic goals of creating peace, stability and development in SADC would almost be impossible without the willingness to exert its coercive instrument in furtherance of these goals. It is in doing this that the SANDF becomes critical to the foreign policy trajectories of South Africa. It can "therefore

be in a position to effectively use its military superiority complex to achieve its political agenda at the international stage. Its armed forces can therefore play a pivotal role in promoting peace and stability as fundamental conditions for development within Africa” (Mandrup 2008:14).

3.2.3 Strategic Location

South Africa is located at the southern edge of the African continent. This means that it does not lie between other African states and extra-regional trading partners from Europe, the Far East and North America which would boost its role as a gateway but rather outside of these main currents. Even as a hub for intra-SADC trade, South Africa’s location is unfavorable: it lacks centrality (Cohen, 1991). Yet it “is also the only SADC country that possesses shores on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans”. It can easily be reached by “cargo ships coming from the cores of the world economy, including the emerging cores of Brazil (South America), China and India (Asia). Looking at its relative location vis-à-vis other SADC states, one sees that South Africa borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

Swaziland and Lesotho are essentially islands within South Africa’s territory. Five members of the SADC do not share borders with South Africa. Among all regional states, “only tiny Lesotho, Swaziland and landlocked Botswana appear to be tied to South Africa for locational reasons” (Draper and Scholvin, 2012). This is because their connection to the oceans, and thence to world markets, is via South African territory, albeit Swaziland also has access to the sea via Mozambique. Zimbabwe, another landlocked country, can

also access the sea via Mozambique. Transport from “South Africa to Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia is not only rendered complicated by distance but also by the fact that there is always at least one other country in between” (Draper and Scholvin, 2012).

3.2.4 Leadership's Moral Authority

In the dawn of the 21st Century, the young democratic South African government was reluctant to undertake leadership or hegemonic role both in the SADC and the continent. However its supremacy in economic and military terms as well as moral authority of its leaders (Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki) and of the state itself, created an opening for South Africa to bear the burden to addressing political and socio-economic challenges in the SADC region. The first president of the democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela was a “global icon of freedom, of liberation, of justice and the hero of the world and approached others not as members of a certain race or a group but as human beings and where previously there had been division and hate, he forged interaction” (Battle, 2007).

On the other hand, Thabo Mbeki popularized the term African Renaissance during his 1998 speech to the Constitutional assembly of South Africa. The term African renaissance is a new form of Africanism that seeks to promote a new political culture that offers new opportunities for African states to improve their social conditions (Bongmba, 2004). In South Africa, it was Mbeki's African renaissance that popularized terms such as Ubuntu. The term Ubuntu, a concept that has been around and gained popularity. Ubuntu is a Nguni Bantu term roughly translating to "human kindness". It is an idea from the Southern

African region which means literally "humanness", and is often translated as "humanity towards others", but is often used in a more philosophical sense to mean the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity (Battle, 2007). As Adebajo and Landsberg (2003: 178) stated, The former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki is deemed an ideas, values and norms man, he stressed values and norms such as democratization, negotiations and peaceful resolutions to disputes. As Zuma (2011) stated, South African has undertaken a lot of conflict resolution responsibilities, the state and its leaders have continued to be involved in negotiating peace agreements in the SADC region (for example DRC Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Malawi). South Africa relations with SADC states are based on cooperation and positive rewards in contrast to control and negative sanctions.

Among other African leaders, Thabo Mbeki was instrumental to the change in the continental organisation's nomenclature from Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU). Together with the former president of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo and the former president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, he was also active in the establishment of the NEPAD. One of the core objectives of this pact is "the promotion of continental integration and the re-enactment of African renaissance" (Olukoshi, 2007, Akinboye and Oloruntoba, 2011). Such political commitments suggest that Mbeki was and is genuinely interested in promoting integration of African continent. Furthermore South Africa has also managed to push through Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's successful nomination to be the incumbent chairperson of the AU. This gives South Africa more voice and influence not only in the SADC region but on the continent as well. Lastly,

South Africa and its three presidents, Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma should be commended for their efforts in helping to resolve African conflicts. Fortunately for Africa, South Africa has both the financial and the military means to do so. But what is more important has been the political will (Solomon, 2010). South Africa has nevertheless followed a particular pattern in their attempts to resolve African conflicts. It has always called for an all-inclusive negotiation process. South Africa has constantly called for the formation of a government of national unity and reconciliation. This in some instances allowed warlords and those who have committed crimes against humanity to be accommodated in government and to gain legitimacy. The choices enacted “often reflects the notion that peace is better than justice” (Solomon, 2010:13).

3.2.5 The hub for Multi-national Cooperations

Multinationals seem to be satisfied to invest where there is political stability even if that stability is associated with limited political activity and freedom of expression. Johannesburg and to a lesser extent, Cape Town is the key location for overseas companies that set up regional headquarters for their business in SADC, with South Africa “doing relatively well in terms of logistics and its investment dominates throughout Southern Africa, most likely channeling overseas capital to the region”. South Africa also serves as a hinge joint for commodity chains and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is a conduit for financial flows from the rest of the world to the entire SADC region. South African businesses enjoy unparalleled access to and dominance in regional markets. In varying degrees, “the economies of other SADC member states also benefit from employment opportunities, skills transfer, tax revenues and global linkages as a result of

the business activities of South African firms” (Nathan, 2013). This suggests “a measure of interdependence between South Africa and the region, and prospects for mutual benefits from a successful integration scheme”. Arguably, this incentive motivated South Africa’s initial engagement with SADC. It is worth underlining that Pretoria’s unwillingness or inability to lead SADC does not in any way detract from South Africa’s economic hegemony in the region. South African companies continue to “penetrate and dominate southern African markets, and in some instances their operations have worked to undermine the developmental objectives of SADC’s integration agenda” (Nganje 2014).

South Africa also has investment in other countries outside the region. For instance, the mobile telecommunication company, MTN is the leading communication company in Swazilanda, Botswana and Zambia. In recent times, retail outlets such as Shoprite are also making inroads to other parts of SADC like Malawi, Swazilanda and Lesotho.

Draper and Scholvin (2012) argue that, “the likelihood of a successful integration in Africa is when integration is around geographical core states such as South Africa”. It is contented that such states have better global connectedness because they are gateways. They argue that, private and public sector policies are important for the role of South Africa as a gateway to Africa. MNC’s that do business in Southern African countries have tended to set up their headquarters in South Africa (Draper & Schlovin, 2012). The most prevalent of these incentives is the Motor Industry Development Program (MIDP) applicable in the motor vehicle manufacturing sector. The program was designed to help “the industry adjust and increase its global competitiveness in the post-apartheid trade policy environment” (Oloruntoba, 2013). The savings derived from the program also help

offset the costs associated with South Africa's geographic location which is often far from the export markets. In addition to the MIDP, South Africa is also made attractive by the fact that it is a beneficiary of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) introduced by the USA government in 2000. AGOA makes provision for trade preferences and duty free entry to the USA of certain goods from Sub-Saharan Africa. A number of manufacturers are taking advantage of this incentive and use South Africa as an export base to the US. For example, "BMW South Africa only sells 30% of their vehicles to the local market and the rest are exported with the US being the biggest export destination" (Hart and Padayachee, 2010).

3.2.6 Regional integration and development

South Africa has used its position to bolster higher level of integration and development of inter-country institutional networks in terms of infrastructures such as roads, ports etc. SADC states depend upon South African transport infrastructure, ranging from railway lines and roads to airports and harbors, in order to connect to world markets. Regarding air transport, including almost the entire continent is tied to South Africa's major airport, OR Tambo in Johannesburg. This indicates that the range of the South African gateway depends upon its specific functions (Draper and Scholvin, 2012). Development Corridors have been established through which economic performances of the various countries are boosted (Alden and Soko, 2005). South Africa has emerged as the largest foreign investor in Southern Africa in recent years. "South African direct investment in the 13 SADC countries exceeded US\$5.4billion by 2000, while it amounted to R14.8 billion" (Alden and Soko, 2005:375). South Africa provides a SADC-wide vision for how such

transformation can take place by putting emphasis on the development of common trade and industrial policies, including strategies to create value chains and regional infrastructure initiatives across member states (Hengari and Lalbhadur 2014). The country has promoted regional cooperation through the formation of regional organizations such as South Africa Customs Union (SACU). This is a longstanding customs union made up of South Africa and the BINS states Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland-represents the most institutionalized expression of South African hegemony. South Africa contributes “98 per cent of SACU’s annual common revenue pool, which in 2009/10 represented US\$3bn” (Grobbelaar & Chen, 2014: 37). South Africa takes a mini-lateral economic perspective in the SACU with the push for the transformation of this institution. To this end, “it would like to see SACU becoming a vehicle for advancing and deepening developmental integration, particularly as an anchor in the SADC region” (Hengari 2014: 10).

Therefore South Africa has “acted both as a spiteful hegemonic power and as a kind hegemon in the SACU as it has led the process that led to the design of a custom union that allows mutual benefits for its members” (Alden and Soko, 2005). South Africa is also a member of BRICS, which make it a potential bridge builder between developing and developed nations. It is also among the biggest African contributors to multilateral peacekeeping operations through the African Union and the United Nations. Furthermore, it that has emerged as the well-developed country in comparison to the other countries. Internationally, it is also a member of the WTO, UN, GATT and holds membership in the G20.

3.3 South Africa's foreign policy and role in the SADC region

In the dawn of the 21st century, a number of massive changes in South Africa's domestic political dispensation and ultimately its relation with the rest of the world took place. This rapid political change led to the perception of South Africa as a leading political, economic and military influence in the SADC region, on the continent and around the world. Since South Africa is perceived to be a leader, it is also anticipated that it demonstrates its leadership capacity in the SADC region. Spence (2001:8) indicates that post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy is Africa-oriented predominantly devoted to the Southern African region. Furthermore, "it is committed to transformation in the SADC and further afield" (Johnston, 2001:11). Its content further addresses critical policy matters which include that of economic development, human rights, peace and security. The significant driver of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy is "the desire to contribute to SADC and Africa's recovery stabilization. In the process the country would gain access to trade and business opportunities and so demonstrating to its citizens the value of engaging the rest of Africa" (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012:31).

In its Strategic Plan for 2010-2013, South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), suggests that the SADC strategy rests on three pillars, namely restoring, strengthening, and maintaining the political unity and cohesion within SADC; deepening regional economic integration; and intensifying regional infrastructure development. South Africa's task is depicted as building conditions for a collective leadership. As a result it would focus merely on building political cohesion, promoting the

idea of deeper economic integration, encouraging intensive infrastructure development, and working with other states to ensure political stability in the region. South Africa sees its role as one of implementing a collective agenda and thus, acting on behalf of the region. From the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and decisions on the regional brigade, to the early warning system and mediation efforts in countries like Comoros, Zimbabwe, and more recently in Madagascar, it would see its role as strengthening the regional security agenda. Thus, South Africa would feel comfortable to use its power to implement a SADC mandate in Zimbabwe and Madagascar, but, on the contrary, would not initiate any campaigns in problematic areas such as Swaziland (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). For example not only does King Mswati III continue to rule with autocratic impunity, he is also honored and accepted as a national leader by South Africa and the region as a whole.

Despite the South African government's concern over the political environment in Swaziland, the two countries have co-operated on a number of binational projects. South Africa and Swaziland have formed partnerships for the construction of dams so that they can use shared water resources to greater mutual advantage. Examples of these are the Komati River Development Project, the Drieskoppies Dam and the Magugu Dam. South Africa does not condone the somewhat dictatorial regime in Swaziland, but it cannot escape participating in joint projects with that country because it is a close neighbour. Also Swaziland shares waterways with South Africa which are important to the government's development strategy (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). In the context of Swaziland, South Africa's hegemonic power is that of self interest and publicly condemning what is

happening in Swaziland might compromise its relations with the Swati Kingdom. This is enforced by Schoeman (2007), who argues that the “ideal image of what a hegemon stands for can be identified as the way in which it views and interprets the world and its contents, perhaps partly influenced by its national interests”. South Africa is “committed to pursuing a more focused and effective foreign policy. As a principal adviser on foreign policy issues, DIRCO coordinates the implementation of South Africa’s international relations” (DIRCO, 2011). To this end, the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) as an integral part of the Department will enhance South Africa’s international cooperation and implementation of development and humanitarian assistance programs. “Remaining loyal to the constitutional principles that have inspired South Africa since 1994, our foreign policy is currently based on the primacy of the African continent and the Southern African Development Community; commitment to South-South cooperation; the centrality of multilateralism; consolidating relations with the North; and the strengthening of bilateral social, political and economic relations” (DIRCO, 2011:5).

Furthermore, scholars such as Hamill (2001:47) and Matlosa (2007:111) proclaim that South Africa is “anticipated to undertake a supreme continental role in terms of security assurance, echoing that South Africa, due to its military (army, air-force and navy) power, resourcefulness and better organization, is expected to spearhead peacekeeping mediations and interventions, particularly in the Southern African region”. South Africa’s relationship with Africa evolved over time. This is because material conditions change, as do decision-makers (Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma illustrate that personalities

matter). Furthermore, where interests of domestic actors (government, political formations, business, civil society) overlap, it produces a convergence of views (the 'national interest') but cannot be assumed to be static, it dynamically changes over time. South Africa's stabilization agenda has three key pillars: mediation, post-conflict development and peacekeeping. The country has invested a lot of resources, energy and time in providing assistance to countries of the region in all three areas. South Africa recognizes itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa's stability, unity, and prosperity. South Africa strives to promote its national interest in a complex and fast-changing world. The impact of these complexities and changes must be factored in to the nation's work to achieve a better life for its people both at home and in a regional and continental context (Zondi 2012).

South Africa therefore accords central importance to the immediate African neighbourhood and continent; working with countries of the South to address shared challenges of underdevelopment; promoting global equity and social justice; working with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better world; and doing our part to strengthen the multilateral system, Foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic policies and as such South Africa ensures that these inform its foreign policy". From a geopolitical perspective, "Southern Africa has always been an important extension of South Africa's foreign policy. In more recent times strong ideological underpinnings have emerged to bolster the geopolitical advantage, thereby cementing the region's importance". The region's prominence in post-apartheid South

Africa's foreign policy orientation is partly explained by the strong 'African' focus introduced into government by the ruling ANC when it came into power in 1994 (Lalahadur, 2015). The SADC region "is singled out in South Africa's 2011 draft white paper on foreign policy, and the region's primacy is reiterated in the country's National Development Plan and New Growth Path, the last two are among South Africa's most important development implementation modalities" (DIRCO, 2011). This sense of "inexorability" about the fates of countries in Southern Africa is augmented by a protracted history of common culture, language and trade. However, despite this special, interwoven relationship, "South Africa cannot escape the inevitability of its own dominance in relation to its immediate region. Often, its actions are perceived as an attempt to dominate, that is, to be a 'big brother'" (Lalahadur, 2015: 5). The country's dominance finds political, economic and social expression, and is almost always manifest when it is seen to behave unilaterally. In some circumstances its dominance is benign; in others it is more selfish. Therefore, the manner in which South Africa's dominance is wielded, particularly in the face of its desire to create a more integrated region, becomes the key struggle of the post-apartheid dispensation.

3.3.1 South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe

The crisis in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the February 2000 constitutional referendum which sought among other things to: allow for land expropriation without compensation (unless paid for by Britain); increase the powers of the president and; extend Mugabe's tenure for another 12 years. From 2000 to 2008 "the Zimbabwe government took a number of decisions that resulted in hyper inflation, the near total

collapse of the economy, a massive humanitarian crisis with 7 million people on food aid and a third of the population migrating to other countries especially South Africa” (Makokera, 2015). Since 2001, Zimbabwe has regularly featured on SADC’s agenda.

The country has preoccupied leaders in the region for well over a decade now. South African presidents, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, have both had to deal with Zimbabwe as one of the more high-profile and complex foreign-policy challenges during their administrations. Their approach in Zimbabwe was labelled as 'quiet diplomacy'. This refers to a "combination of soft diplomatic approaches, aimed at achieving pacific settlements" (Mhango 2012: 16). Shillinger (2009) states that “instead of employing sanctions or other forms of aggressive behaviour to settle disputes, quiet diplomacy is based on the assumptions of gentle persuasion and negotiation”. More than that, South Africa also strengthened regional unity by spearheading boycotts on the SADC-EU’s Ministerial meeting in November 2002, where Zimbabwe was forbidden to attend. As a result, “the EU had to make special arrangements by moving the meeting from Copenhagen to Maputo so that the Zimbabwean representatives could attend” (Mhango 2012). South Africa has also positioned itself as a key player in the realm of conflict resolution.

Two of the African agenda goals speak to this: “promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts and encouraging post-conflict reconstruction and development; and successfully implementing ongoing peace processes”. Pretoria prefers the use of peaceful negotiation and mediation to resolve conflict, and has sought to make a name for itself as a renowned mediator or honest broker. In 2008 Mbeki famously used ‘quiet diplomacy’ to encourage

Mugabe towards negotiations during the Zimbabwe crisis. South Africa and Zimbabwe have a common and long history of regional affiliation and cultural ties. Zimbabwe is one of South Africa's main trade partners in Africa and several South African companies operate in Zimbabwe in sectors such as mining, tourism, agriculture, banking, manufacturing and retail (Makokea 2015). South Africa had achieved a positive outcome and enhanced its credibility as a capable regional leader when it played an important role in 2008 in encouraging the formation of the Government of National Unity a coalition between Zanu-PF and the two factions of the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

This new arrangement was seen to have broken the political deadlock in Zimbabwe and provided much-needed economic relief from the crippling effects of the country's hyperinflation and economic decline in the early 2000s. A road map was agreed upon that would see Zimbabwe take steps towards a new constitution and the restoration of democracy. The SADC endorsed this process and considerable South African resources were deployed to see it implemented. South Africa's intervention in Zimbabwe also made sense from a domestic point of view, given the pressure of migration from Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe's crucial location in the region in terms of trade and integration. If South Africa is to succeed in championing the development of the North–South Corridor infrastructure initiative, then a stable Zimbabwe is a prerequisite (Makokera 2015). With Zuma personally leading the process, the South African facilitation team set the groundwork in place for regional support for the elections that took place in July 2013. Interestingly, the initiative came from within the South African Presidency, and not the

Department of International Relations and Cooperation. “The president’s personal involvement reflects the importance South Africa placed on this matter. And it reinforced a sense in the international community that South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ on Zimbabwe an approach pursued by Mbeki was simply an excuse not to have to tackle President Robert Mugabe head-on. After the elections, Zuma was one of the first to express his satisfaction with the outcome” (South African government news agency, 2013). Initially, the South African President was banking on the belief that the opposition had a genuine chance of unseating ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections. But once it became increasingly likely that ZANU-PF would remain in power after August 2013, the South African president was forced to consider his position for the sake of his future relations with the leaders of Zimbabwe. This was particularly true in the run up to South Africa’s 2014 elections.

President Mugabe’s party has already shown itself capable of inflicting damage on Zuma’s bid for re-election, by providing ideological inspiration to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a new explicitly anti-Zuma party set up by former ANC Youth League president Julius Malema. A hegemon must project its values and interests rather than imposing them on its allies. As power actors, hegemons ought to be conscious of the manner in which they carry out their activities and pursue their vision and values. The forthcoming election forced Zuma to put his self-preservation above second-order interests such as the spreading of democracy and protection of human rights in other countries. Despite his genuine interest in pushing for reform in Zimbabwe, the South African president was arguably forced to abandon his tough stance when his personal

interests were threatened. Once it became clear who the likely electoral winner was going to be, Mugabe's power at the negotiating table rocketed and, arguably, Zuma had no choice but to back the winning horse. Most SADC member states were quick to join South Africa in declaring the elections free and peaceful (SADC 2014). The AU endorsed the results of the elections, which saw Mugabe return to office on the back of new-found levels of support for Zanu-PF. Both the AU and SADC went on to firmly welcome Mugabe back into the fold when in August 2013 he became chair of SADC and in January 2014 vice chair of the AU (AU Commission 2014). It "was as if South Africa and other nations in the region had breathed an audible sigh of relief and were finally able to take Zimbabwe off the official SADC agenda following the 2013 elections" (Makokera 2015:2). The regional road map may not have been followed to the letter but there was nevertheless a sense that SADC had done all that it could. Most countries in the region, with the notable exception of Botswana, were happy to accept the outcome.

3.3.2 South Africa's conflict management in DRC

There are various causes of the conflict in the DRC and the cast of actors are ever expanding. Exploitative "patterns of resource extraction, colonial and postcolonial authoritarian forms of governance, post-Cold War decline in the resources to sustain patronage politics, external pressure for good governance, and regional instability (Ugandan rebel movements and prowling genocide in Rwanda) all contributed to the many wars that have engulfed this country" (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013:2). Conflict and instability has been a part of post-independent DRC. President Joseph Mobutu ascended to the presidency through a coup in 1965. In 1997, Laurent Kabila was assisted by

Uganda and Rwanda in assuming into power through a bloody civil war. However, his rule was short-lived and the country was again engrossed in a civil war. After Kabila was assassinated in 2001 his son, Joseph Kabila, became president. In addition, the immense mining riches of the DRC, the size of its territory, and its geo-strategic position have made “it a most important objective for big multinational corporations and their host governments, a battle ground for regional states, and an arena for political contestation and economic predation by local actors” (Naidoo, 2003)

South Africa was, and remains, a key factor in conflict management in the DRC. It has played the roles of peacemaker, peacekeeper, peacebuilder and peace-enforcer. “South Africa has operated with the DRC in relation to post-conflict development and peacebuilding since 2002, when the Peace Accord was brokered” (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013:3). Subsequently, from 2002, South Africa chose quiet diplomacy to bring about peace and stability in the DRC. South Africa played “a role in bringing an end to the war by being directly involved in a number of mediation talks that resulted in the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement (a global and all-inclusive peace accord) on 17 December 2002” (Naidoo, 2003). This paved the way for the DRC’s first democratic elections in 2006. However, it should be noted that although South Africa’s approach of quiet diplomacy was successful in bringing the war to an end and in the formation of a government of national unity, which led to the first democratic elections, instability continued, and after a period of relative peace another war broke out. One can locate South Africa’s policy towards the DRC within South Africa’s SADC policy. According to Hendricks and Lucey (2013), “South Africa’s approach to post-conflict development and

peacebuilding is shaped by its foreign policy, and by its formative engagement in the UN, AU and SADC”. Sidiropoulos (2007:12-16) argues that South Africa’s engagement with Africa rests on three pillars: “(1) Strengthening Africa’s regional (the South African Customs Union, SACU and the SADC) and continental (the, AU) institutions by enhancing South Africa’s proactive participation in these bodies aimed at promoting integration and development. (2) Supporting the implementation of Africa’s socio-economic development programme, NEPAD, and of SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the regional expression of NEPAD. (3) Strengthening bilateral relations through effective structures for dialogue and cooperation”. This includes support for peace, security, stability and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives and South Africa’s participation in the implementation of Africa’s peace and security agenda and the management of peace missions. South Africa’s engagement in the DRC has its foundation in these three pillars.

According to Department of International Affairs and Cooperation (DIAC, 2007), “South Africa’s economic relations with the DRC should also be understood within the context of peace, stability and security and sustained renewal, growth and socio-economic development for the African continent”. Furthermore, South Africa is committed to efforts for post-conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC that are aligned with those of the African Union and NEPAD. Hence, its assistance to the DRC is broadly focused on three key areas, namely: “security sector reform (SSR), institutional capacity building and economic development” (DIAC, 2007). South African and DRC trade relations have increased considerably although bilateral trade is heavily tilted in South Africa’s favor due

to the limited capacity for production on the part of the DRC's economy. South Africa's business interests in the DRC range from mining, construction, energy, fisheries, communication and agriculture through to trade and information technology. The two countries signed approximately 32 memorandums of understanding (MoUs) between 2004 and 2005. According to Casoo (2012), "South Africa has broadly clustered its assistance to the DRC into three key areas, namely (i) SSR, (ii) institutional capacity building and (iii) economic development". Hendricks and Lucey (2013) "distinguish South Africa's economic activities in the DRC into seven categories namely: information sharing, human resource development, economic development, implementation support, infrastructure development, humanitarian assistance and governance.

The specific activities include, training of DRC diplomats which involve foreign language training and also training on mediation and conflict resolution, management and leadership & mission administration; training on anti-corruption Training of DRC magistrates Building capacity for infrastructure development (i.e. job inspection, licensing of civil construction agents, setting up of information systems, financing, infrastructure development) and lastly assistance with the development of a master plan for the reform of the armed forces". Hendricks and Lucey (2013:3) explain that such activities in the DRC have been "conducted by a wide range of South African government and non-government actors. These include the SA Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), SA National Defense Force (SANDF), SA Police Service (SAPS), Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Department of Home Affairs (DHA); companies such as Vodacom and Shoprite; and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as IDASA, ACCORD, SAWID”, etc. It is clear that the conflict in the DRC will not ‘go away’ in a hurry, and that South Africa, among others, will remain subject to multiple pressures to ‘do something’ to help put an end to the fighting. Sidiropoulos (2007) identified three factors that shaped South Africa’s foreign policy with regard to conflict resolution and peace missions. The third important factor noted by Sidiropoulos with reference to the White Paper of 1999, which is was specific to South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution, was the country’s own experience of peaceful transformation from apartheid to democracy. South Africa sought to resolve conflicts by referring to its own experience. However its leaders did not take into account the complexity of some African conflicts, in this case the DRC conflicts.

While one may agree with Sidiropoulos that South Africa’s conflict resolution model rests on three pillars, namely, preventative diplomacy, peace-building and peace-making, one can argue that South Africa’s conflict resolution model also needed to incorporate a peace enforcement aspect, as seen in the current peace enforcement in the DRC under MONUSCO. South Africa, along with SADC, pushed strongly for the establishment of the FIB within MONUSCO (Karlsrud, 2015). In its post-conflict strategy, South Africa has placed particular emphasis on the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, and the Comoros. South Africa’s strategy has advanced the proposition that “there can be no successful peace-building without socio-economic development and political and economic stability, and conversely there can be no sustainable development and political stability without a successful

comprehensive peace-building initiative” (Saloojee 2000). This currently applies to peace enforcement in the DRC. In addition, South Africa’s Department of Defense is playing a vital role in the upgrading of military training centers, the training of military personnel and the provision of medical assistance. The majority of the operations are being carried out in partnership with MONUSCO, the Netherlands, and the DRC Defense Force (Landsberg, 2009). Despite the fact that South Africa lost soldiers in Central Africa Republic (CAR) the SANDF has not been frightened off from its deployment to the DRC. South Africa’s stance regarding this deployment can be seen as ambiguous because there is no direct threat to South Africa’s national security. “South Africa and Tanzania are two countries’ that promise to send battalions to the DRC as part of the SADC-led international assistance force. This is in addition to the SANDF already present in the DRC as part of MONUSCO.

The SANDF has been operating alongside the UN in the DRC since 2000 when it led efforts to stabilize the country's internal politics, and helped with post-conflict reconstruction and the development of infrastructure. In addition, South Africa contributes 1,214 troops to MONUSCO” (Karlsrud, 2015). The SANDF’s presence in the DRC in support of MONUSCO consisted of three military observers, 25 staff officers and a contingent of 1 345 personnel, those in the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). According to SA Airforce (2013), combat support helicopters were deployed for the first time and played a pivotal role in the defeat of M23 rebel armed group in eastern DRC. On 24 February 2013, South Africa, along with ten other African countries as well as the UN, the AU, the ICGLR and SADC, signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for

the DRC and the region. “This is arguably the most important international effort to date to resolve the challenge of the recurring conflicts in eastern DRC” (Hofstatter, 2014). South Africa is still engaged in the DRC peace process and determined to help the DRC in its post-conflict reconstruction.

3.3.3 SA’s role in resolving the conflict in Lesotho

The current crisis in Lesotho is a history of periods of one-party dominance, military rule political partisanship and intractable post-election conflicts. This period has also resulted from months of political squabbling within Lesotho’s first three-way governing coalition which was established after the country’s general elections produced a hung parliament in 2012 Mostamai (2015). The Prime minister has since presided over a fragile coalition government comprising his party, the All Basotho Congress (ABC), Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing’s Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Basotho National Party (BNP) led by Minister Thesele Maseribane. Motsami (2015) further indicates that the fragility largely resulted from the fact that the coalition was a politically expedient one between parties that had fundamental ideological differences and conflicting ideas on governing the country.

The background to developments in Lesotho has its roots in an alleged coup-attempt to unseat the then Prime Minister Tom Thabane by the then-commander of the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF), Lieutenant General Kamoli, in August 2014. According to Mostamai (2015), this attempted coup occurred after Prime Minister Thabane had suspended parliament to avoid a vote of no confidence pushed by the opposition and further

reinforced by the support of his coalition partner, Mothejoa Metsing, who was the deputy Prime minister. Thabane accused his deputy of arranging this coup with army support, and immediately called for the deployment of peacekeepers into Lesotho to restore the status quo Vhumbunu (2015). The gravity of the security concerns in Lesotho was firstly flagged by South Africa by warning of the threat of a military coup in the country and cautioned against any unconstitutional change of government. This was accompanied by a series of working visits to Lesotho by President Jacob Zuma to encourage the coalition's adherence to inter-party talks and resolutions facilitated by Namibia. South Africa publicly expressed its concern about the political and security situation in the kingdom, singling out the unusual movements of the Lesotho Defense Force units in the capital, Maseru (Zondi, 2014).

Furthermore, through its Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa, condemned the coup and called for the restoration of democracy, with South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) calling for the urgent intervention of the SADC and AU. Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa, and is one of South Africa's key strategic trading partners within the SACU South Africa's geopolitical and strategic economic interests cannot be overlooked hence the country's sense of urgency to resolve the Lesotho conflict (Vhumbunu, 2015). In addition, Zondi (2014) suggests that it can be said that South Africa exaggerated the situation and caused unnecessary alarm on the flipside it sent a signal to the military that it was being watched, a pre-emptive move but however the motive remained unknown. The main role of South Africa in the Lesotho crisis was the role of Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa (A SADC appointed mediator)

who facilitated dialogue between the disputing political parties and stakeholders. In brief one can argue and say that South Africa facilitated negotiations between the leaders of Lesotho's governing coalition parties in an effort at finding a lasting political situation. The South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, articulated that In terms of Pretoria's commitment to regional stability a very important role in resolving the constitutional crisis in Lesotho was assumed through dialogue that was all-inclusive and where all parties concerned negotiated peacefully towards a political settlement (The New Age, 2015). The option for diplomatic negotiations led by South Africa rather than military intervention yielded positive results. According to Motsamai (2015), Thabane returned safely to Maseru on 3 September 2014 after SADC agreed on a low-key security mission to accompany him, with an assessment mission from South Africa having been dispatched to Lesotho ahead of him for investigation.

Furthermore, in the mediation process, an agreement was reached to dissolve Parliament and conduct sudden National Assembly elections on 28 February 2015, instead of waiting for 2017 as had initially been set by law in Lesotho. The major intention of having these snap elections was resolving a political and constitutional deadlock amid an uncertain security situation and to install a new five-year government after months of government paralysis (Dimpho, 2015). Critical for the holding of these early elections was the need to ensure that the people of the kingdom of Lesotho were able to exercise their democratic right to vote in a peaceful, stable and secure environment. This required that "the security situation be stabilized as part of creating a climate conducive for the holding of the February 2015 elections, in line with Lesotho's electoral laws and the SADC

guidelines for the holding of free and fair elections” (The New Age: 2015) .Part of the outcome of the mediation process was that an Observer Team on Politics, Defense and Security was put in place. (Vhumbunu, 2015). The SADC approved and endorsed the establishment of this observer team as an early warning mechanism in the event of signs of instability in Lesotho and to intervene as appropriate, in consultation with the SADC facilitator (SADC, 2015). As a result, the South Africa’s mediation process in conflict resolution in Lesotho should be commended for the following factors: facilitating the safe return of exiled ex-prime minister Thabane; the reopening of the Lesotho Parliament; agreement on the conduct of an early election; and the urgent deployment of an Observer Team on Politics, Defence and Security. Therefore South Africa’s intervention managed and mitigated the conflict in Lesotho.

3.3.4 Strengthening of SADC regional stability

There are notable leadership roles that South Africa has played not only in the region but in the continent as well. Through its role in SADC, South Africa also mediated in Madagascar after a 2009 coup, helping to secure an agreement to lead Madagascar out of crisis. This culminated in Madagascar holding a referendum in 2010 and elections in October 2013. General observation shows that South Africa has emerged as a major donor in the continent. Chidaushe asserts that many countries have been the recipients of aid from South Africa. A number of countries have received donations, even from and during the time South Africa was under the oppressive rule (Chidaushe, 2010). During the Post-Apartheid era there was a change, especially under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki, when the idea of an African Renaissance was pioneered. This was because the Mbeki Administration sought to bring renewed hope to the African continent.

Numerous African countries have been beneficiaries of aid from the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Chidaushe, 2010). Approximately 70% of South African aid is currently targeted for SADC member states and, across the continent; the aid targets "general improvements in governance and local priorities such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, resolution, mediation, post-conflict reconstruction, and research for development" (Chidaushe, 2010:28). It is a positive move to aspire and make efforts into having the biggest donor to Africa being from Africa because, "traditional Western aid has largely been criticized as being ineffective and undesirable, for being donor-driven, tied and linked to strategic political and economic interests of the donor countries rather than the needs of the poor. Despite decades of billions of aid, no positive and significant change or impact is visible on the ground" (Chidaushe, 2010: 27).

Pretoria became vital when peacekeeping deals had to be made towards peace among some rebel leaders and politicians in Africa (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014). Tjemolane et al. (2012) argue that South Africa has transitioned to being an Africa-centred and peace-oriented state and shows readiness to engage with the continent in co-operative relations. Areas in which South Africa has taken part include "involvement in peace-making, governance and post-conflict reconstruction processes in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe" (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014: 3). South Africa's interventions and mediation goals have been fuelled by the goal to facilitate sustainable development; political stability and

good governance within Africa so as to achieve eliminate poverty. Because of this, South Africa has profoundly invested in the Pan African Parliament (PAP) and the AU. This is also in support of the doctrine of 'African renaissance' that has become important in South Africa's foreign affairs (Soko, 2007). As mentioned earlier, the South African government peacekeeping and intervention record contains mixed results since not all its intervention missions have been successful (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014). There is the contention that international acceptability of South Africa in recent years noticeable with the mass influx of Africans into the country who perceive South Africa as a safe haven from the notoriety of devastating conflict within their own countries. In other words, South Africa's projected material, structural and ideational power in Africa is considered to be unparalleled and can be equated with the dominance of the United States in global politics.

3.4 Chapter Conclusion

The chapter gave an overview of the status of South Africa as the SADC hegemon. This further demonstrated not only South Africa's economic and military capability but the willpower to perform its hegemonic duties in the SADC region. The fundamental principle of the South African foreign policy reveal Pretoria's committed to pursuing a more focused and effective foreign policy. In the SADC region South Africa has played prominent role in the promotion of peace, stability. This is evident in the role that it played in Zimbabwe, DRC and Lesotho. The discussion of South Africa's role in maintaining peace and stability in the SADC region revealed that, South Africa favors quiet diplomacy to military intervention as mechanism of conflict resolution. This is evident in its role as

the mediator in dialogues in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and also partly in DRC. The next chapter will discuss challenges and critiques of South Africa's hegemonic role in the SADC region.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES FACED BY SOUTH AFRICA IN FOSTERING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE SADC REGION

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the role of South Africa in maintaining peace and stability in the SADC region. Regardless that South Africa is keen to exert influence in Africa it faces important risks, threats and challenges that constrain its ability to credibly make a leadership claim in terms of maintaining peace and stability in the region. South Africa's regional engagement and broader foreign policy has not been immune to the influence of this highly unequal and contested domestic terrain. The main security related "threats for SA itself include the identity challenge; high levels of corruption; poor service delivery associated with rising levels of poverty and insecurity engendered by the different forms of violence". Furthermore, South Africa's foreign policy towards SADC and its regional engagements have also come under scrutiny and criticism. Therefore the aim of this chapter is to identify the challenges and the major arguments and critiques of South Africa's hegemonic role of maintaining peace and stability in the SADC region.

4.2. Factors that hinder South Africa's hegemonic role in the SADC region

It is of paramount importance to note that the composition of South Africa's domestic affairs has an impact on South Africa's capacity, capability and its willingness to play a hegemonic role in the SADC region. In concurring with the above sentiments, Nieuwkerk (2012:102) states that, South Africa's internal base is hampered by constraints such as

“poverty and unemployment, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, a fragile racial reconciliation, and more recently the impact of the global financial crisis”, and a culture of violence. This is not to say there are no internal political dynamics in South Africa that enables a hegemonic claim. For instance, “in 1994, the unanticipated mode with which South Africa conquered decades of racial conflict was expected to be used as a conflict resolution template for many other African countries that are stricken by violence, divided by identity conflicts and other forms of social discord” (Sidiropoulos 2007:2).

4.2.1 Violent protests

Violence was a significant part of the freedom struggle in South Africa, though in the end freedom was not obtained through war, but through negotiations. As a result people in South Africa have become used to violence, and violence has become a technique of getting through to those in power. South Africa has seen continuous protests throughout the country, especially when it comes to service delivery. These protests often include the blocking of major roads, the throwing of rocks, etc. and deaths have resulted from fighting the riot police. "When people protest and burn tyres, and blood is shed, that is when you get a response. When you call a meeting and speak to them [local officials], it's like you're speaking another language. But when you burn tyres, that language is understood." (Serino 2014). This implies that violence is perceived as being the most effective way of being heard and this is not a good indication for a state that aims at maintaining regional peace through its hegemonic status. This high level of unrest is also linked to the upcoming municipal elections on 3 August 2016. Protest action has tainted voter registration periods for the upcoming municipal elections. No less than 51 cases of

political instability transpired over voter registration weekends in March and April 2016, consistent with a growing trend of demonstrations around electoral periods (Lancaster, 2016). The unrest at voter registration centers is tied to public dissatisfaction over service delivery and municipal boundaries (Eyewitness News, 9 March 2016; Times Live, 7 March 2016). This indicates an obstacle for South Africa as a hegemonic power to perform its duty of provision of goods and services in the SADC region. A hegemonic state is expected to play the role of provision of goods and services within its region (Prys, 2010). Therefore before South Africa can play the role of provision of goods and services in the SADC region, the state has to ensure that it adequately provide such goods and services to the general population of its inhabitants. It can be argued that failure to do so, may lead to the general population of South Africa being against the idea of South Africa playing the hegemonic role in the SADC region.

The lack of service delivery in South Africa has had spillover effects that have led to 2015-16 university protests in the country. The government's failure to provide free tertiary education has led to a series of university protests in the majority of South African universities. The most common series of protests was the 2015 '*Fees must fall*' campaign where students across all universities in South Africa shown their resistance to 2016 tuition fee increment. These protests were accompanied with violence and destruction of both university and national infrastructure. Despite the government's announcement to freeze university fees for 2016, protests have continued at universities across South Africa. Although university campuses have not witnessed disturbances on the scale of the mass demonstrations in October and November 2015, university campus protests

and riots continue to be a significant source of unrest, typically accounting for between 10% and 20% of monthly events. This is because in spite of the freeze, students still face significant barriers to their education. Tuition and registration fees remain in place and, when combined with living costs for a single year, still add up to more than the annual income of the average South African household (Mail & Guardian, 13 January 2016; The Guardian, 03 March 2016). Furthermore, the issue of outsourced labour continue to captivate both student and worker protests against university management. The *'Outsourcing Must Fall'* protests have pressured some universities Wits University, University of Cape Town and University of the Free State to review their outsourcing policies. The success of *'Outsourcing Must Fall'* at these universities, along with the success of last year's protests in stopping the increase in university fees and removing the status of Cecil Rhodes from UCT's campus, indicates that protest, both violent and non-violent, is an effective mechanism of negotiating with the government and university management. Therefore if students and university workers continue to make small incremental gains on their demands, it may be the case that universities remain center of protest in South Africa.

These protests are mainly as a consequence of government's failure to adequately render public goods and services to its inhabitants. Therefore before South Africa can play the hegemonic role of provision of goods and services in the SADC region, the state has to ensure that it adequately provide such goods and services to the general population of its inhabitants. Furthermore, the violent nature of the protests and the slow response by the government and security forces not only show the state's lack of urgency to solve internal problems but also security concerns within its borders. A hegemonic power is

expected to rapidly respond to instability within its region, hence South Africa's hegemonic role to maintain peace and stability in the SADC region is therefore compromised by its reluctance to swiftly solve its internal problems.

4.2.2 Xenophobia

South Africa is a rainbow nation composed of various racial groups from all facets of the earth. However, xenophobia has become a major issue of social debate in South Africa and a major concern for stability in the country. According to Shinsana (2008), the term 'xenophobia' is "usually used to describe the dislike or fear of foreigners or of people significantly different from oneself, usually in the context of visibly differentiated minorities". Khosa and Kalitani (2014:23) states that xenophobia is widespread in the South African townships where immigrants are referred to as "kwerekwere", a degrading word for African immigrant. As a result, certain stereotypes are used to characterize particular foreign nationals. For example, possessing stolen goods, falsification, working illegally, entering the country illegally and killings are among the severe criminal activities in South Africa that Zimbabweans are implicated in. Nigerians are stereotyped in drug dealers, support of marriage fraudsters, possessors of stolen goods, prostitute pimps and human traffickers. Marriage fraud is recognized in the country as a crime in the way that South African victims, in most cases, females did not even know these immigrant foreigners. South Africa has had a series of xenophobic attacks in 2008 and in 2015. The "2008 spate of xenophobic attacks on non-South African nationals could not have happened at the worst time and these barbaric and shameful events happened during the reign of Thabo Mbeki, an unabashed pan-Africanist and champion of South-South

relationships” (New African, 2013:18). Such attacks thus “dented South Africa’s role as a regional leader and demonstrated a stark contrast to Thabo Mbeki’s benevolent foreign policy”. Mosselson (2010:641) contends that “the dreadful way of treating foreign nationals has been established first and foremost by the state, through the entrenchment of extra-legal and, in some cases, visibly illegal ways of dealing with foreign nationals”. Clearly the violence on foreign nationals undermines South Africa’s stability in “social integration, which is an important factor in learning to operate globally” (Amoako 2005:2). In South Africa, illegal foreigners are treated with more contempt than local convicted criminals with the Immigration Act which affirms that illegal immigrants be held in different cells from other convicted individuals often disregarded.

Foreign nationals are usually held for more than the legal thirty days prescribed by the law (Mosselson 2010). Mosselson argues that the ‘state of exception’ which the ANC government has nurtured has presented foreign nationals as not belonging to the political community of the country. In this case, local South Africans, “seeking political recognition and better service delivery, have resorted to inflicting brutality on foreign nationals. Hence, xenophobic attack becomes another platform for local and disenchanted citizens to assert themselves as belonging to the new South Africa” (Mosselson 2010). If Mosselson’s argument is valid, then xenophobia will continue to emerge because the majority of South Africans still live in poverty. Perhaps what gives more credence to this argument was another wave of xenophobic attacks which broke out in early 2013. Once again, shops of foreign nationals were looted across the country with the government broaching a cover up story that these attacks were driven by criminality and not

xenophobia. However this can be argued by saying that it was not “mere coincidence that South African shops were not raided and that only shops belonging to foreign nationals were burgled” (Khosa and Kalitani, 2014:23). There was also a spate of xenophobic attacks in 2015. The attacks began in KwaZulu Natal province and spread to the other parts of the country where there was a series of violence on foreign nationals which was accompanied by looting of foreign owned shops. The 2015 xenophobic attacks against foreigners and government responses to the problem is a major cause of concern in South Africa. It took South African government two weeks to acknowledge and condemn the attacks on foreigners. When they finally did, South African elites’ calm response was one of denial rather than acknowledgement. According to South African elites, the problem lies in migration, and the “violence against foreigners is mere criminal activity rather than xenophobia”. As Gumede (2015) argues, “not honestly acknowledging and facing up to the underlying problems is a big contributing factor”.

It can be argued that xenophobia in South Africa is also sparked by the utterances and sentiments by the political leadership in the country. In 2014, President Jacob Zuma states “South African blacks should not behave as if they were typical blacks from Africa”. The ANC Secretary-General, Gwede Mantashe, blamed foreigners for stoking unrest in South Africa’s platinum belt. In January 2015, small business development minister Lindiwe Zulu, said “the businesses of foreign Africans based in township could not expect to coexist peacefully with local business owners unless they shared their trade secret” (Gumede 2015). In 2015, the xenophobic attacks were sparked by King Goodwill Zwelithini when he said “*African migrants should take their things and go*”. Whether

intentional or not, “such rhetoric and narratives constructed by South African elites and government officials can be a powerful diverging and provocative force to incite xenophobia from below” (Gumede 2015). This raises question regarding leadership at the local and national level in South Africa, and its role whether conscious or not in inciting violence against black Africans. Notably, government reluctance to strongly condemn the role of King Zwelithini in inciting the violence also leaves much to desire about South African leaders’ response to the crisis. In an environment of denial and anti-immigration sentiments, it becomes easy for dissatisfied South Africans to blame foreign nationals for all their problems and use violence as means to voice out their frustrations. Foreigners are used as the convenient scapegoats and mask for individual and government failures. As long as the South African government and those involved in the attacks do not take responsibility for their failures, this unfortunate situation is likely to be prolonged. South Africa capacity to play any meaningful hegemonic role must be tied to its ability to quickly address endemic social problems that it is confronted with.

4.2.3 Crime

The violent levels of crime in some areas leave many citizens feeling their government cannot protect them especially in areas with signs marked as non-stop zones. The government “does not know how to deal with crime partly because it is a problem that has spread throughout the country” (Mandrup, 2010: 12). So many people are now seeking alternative to private security services. As a result, “the figures are startling because in SA there are 375000 private security officers as oppose to 183.000 police officers” (Mandrup, 2010: 14). This says a lot about the levels and feelings of insecurity of private

citizens. It is pernicious and dangerous because the situation favors those who can afford security and leaves those who cannot vulnerable in a more dire state of insecurity. It would be hard for SA “to play its proper role as a regional leader if it cannot be seen to be dealing with its own numerous domestic challenges” (Habib, 2009: 150).

4.2.4 Racism

The dire conditions and poor service delivery “of those living in the townships and informal settlements is also a cause for concern” (Matshiqi, 2013: 428). These challenges including poverty and unemployment (at 25 percent in general and 70 percent for those under 25) have helped to aggravate the precarious levels of insecurity in the country (GSA, 2013: paragraphs 38-41; Forde, 2013: 18). Fighting poverty is such a crucial aspect that it is included as one of the main elements of the Government’s so-called diplomacy of *Ubuntu*. In terms of the risks and the threats the Government’s White paper on the diplomacy of “*Ubuntu* makes clear that poverty is a prevalent risk and challenge” (GSA, 2011: 12). Economic cleavages that were mainly on racial lines in the apartheid years have assumed a novel dimension with marked inequalities within racial groups. Verwey and Quayle note “that little has changed economically as whites still hold economic power for instance, black representation at top management level is only 22.2 per cent” (Verwey and Quayle, 2012: 568). The identity conundrum relates to the deep splits that exist in South Africa today on racial and economic lines. Racial tensions are often aggravated when issues related to land re-distribution are raised (De Wet, 2013). Extremist views backed by conservative Afrikaner groups on the one hand, and the stalwarts of the Economic Freedom Fighters (led by former ANC youth leader Julius

Malema), on the other pose dangers that could explode if uncontained. There are “serious concerns now as killings of whites in some farms are used by some white politicians to justify talk of genocide targeted at the Afrikaners” (Verwey and Quayle, 2012: 574). Corruption in the ranks of the ruling ANC has become a very serious problem with people like Desmond Tutu asserting that the leadership of the ANC does not really represent the interest of poor South Africans due to the chilling levels of graft and indifference of ANC leadership to those oppressed (Times Live, 2011). The nature of the problem is further elucidated by the fact that government officials and diplomats who are meant to check excesses have themselves been found guilty of corruption.

4.2.5 Corruption

Corruption has been described “as the abuse of public office for private gain.” This refers “to gain of any kind financial, in status and it could be gain by an individual or a group, or those linked with such an individual or group” (Drury et al, 2006). Other than bribery, it can include patronage, nepotism, embezzlement, influence peddling, use of one’s position for self-enrichment, bestowing of favors on relatives and friends, moonlighting, partiality, absenteeism, late coming to work, abuse of public property, leaking and/or abuse of government information and the like (Aderinwale, 1995). The source of corruption in South Africa is “rooted in the country’s bureaucratic traditions, political development, and social history”. Corruption has thrived, firstly, due to institutional weaknesses. ” Secondly, corruption arises out of social tensions. “The new social forces governing South Africa have historically been excluded from the economy, but now control state power, and are responsible for delivering services to previously excluded

and marginalised people.” It is clear that South Africans perceive corruption as a significant problem although actual experience of corruption is often lower than that perceived but measuring its impact on socioeconomic rights is difficult (Drury et al, 2006). There is a lack of centralised, collated information on incidents of corruption and their prosecution. Besides, it is difficult to measure the impact of corruption with certainty as it does not just refer to amounts of money lost, but also obstacles to development and increases in inequality which are much more difficult to quantify. Also, corruption is by its nature secretive so not much is known about where and how widespread it is. Corruption also “impacts on investment and growth, especially in countries in need of foreign productive capital”. Foreign investors, especially those likely to make long-term contributions to development, are discouraged, although some investors looking to make fast profits through questionable schemes may try their luck. Furthermore, corruption in aid programmes means less for those most in need and may compromise future funding. “The roots of corruption lie in the unequal distribution of resources in a society. Corruption thrives on economic inequality. Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption and, in turn, it leads to further inequalities” (Drury et al, 2006).

Furthermore, South Africa’s foreign policy towards SADC and its regional engagements have also come under scrutiny and criticism. One of the main challenges for South Africa’s regional role affecting its regional position in the medium and long term is the African acceptance of this role on one hand and the hesitant and indecisive position of the South African state that when examined critically, the case for South African hegemonic dominance over the SADC region is challenged by a number of issues.

Among them is the South Africa's weak material basis of power on the continent. This is reflected in anemic domestic policy makers on the practice and requirements of such a role. Schoeman and Alden (2014), economy confronting a host of deep-seated structural problems and reinforced by its relative economic decline in comparison with much of the "rest of continent where it now has less than 25 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's GDP (versus over 50 per cent in 1994)" (Alessi, 2013). Another challenge is the limited ability to translate many of the key features of South Africa's putative economic, financial and military preponderance over the rest of Africa into solid foreign and economic gains (Schoeman and Alden 2014). Beyond the classic 'power fungibility' dilemma raised above, the failure of South Africa to successfully exercise influence over other African regimes which deliberately act against its core interests, best represented by the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe where Pretoria had substantive economic leverage at its disposal.

4.2.6 Contestations with regards to quiet diplomacy

South Africa's policy of quiet diplomacy in the face of the economic and political crises of Zimbabwe has been criticized severely by both domestic and international observers who cite South Africa's "obvious hegemony" as sufficient to take a tough stance against the Mugabe regime (Schoeman and Alden 2003). Specifically, the Mbeki government's persistence on a policy of quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement, its reluctant criticism of the Mugabe regime and its declaration that the presidential elections of March 2002 was free and fair have been criticized severely, and in some quarters amazement at the South African policy choice has been evident. The frustration with and

disappointment in South Africa's policy behaviour can be traced to a number of distinct assumptions about foreign policy behaviour. First, the country's economic hegemony in the southern African region and the underlying assumptions of hegemonic theories lead many analysts to believe that South Africa could have done "much more" to address the Zimbabwean crisis (Schoeman and Alden 2003). In short, "South Africa's economic strength should, at the very least, have been used as an instrument to curb Mugabe's excesses and to ensure free and fair elections". Most importantly, Zimbabwe is a land-locked country with a high level of dependence on South Africa as far as transport and external trade are concerned, and is also for a large part dependent on South Africa for fuel, energy and, especially during times of drought, as currently experienced, on the import of maize. Taking all these tangible factors and South Africa's obviously more powerful position internationally into consideration, critics are then surprised by the lack of action on the part of South Africa in defense of the values that it sets such high store by.

Quiet diplomacy entails a style that is characterized by 'skillful negotiations, conducted with tact, persistence, and impartiality, but without fanfare.' (Bennett 1995). This definition was used on numerous occasions by South Africa's foreign policy makers to describe their approach. South Africa's second defense has been sovereignty. Just as Mugabe claimed that many of the issues in Zimbabwe that elicited international criticism were interference in matters within its internal jurisdiction, Pretoria also claimed a reluctance to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state as this would be contrary to the rule of sovereignty, that most hallowed of international principles (Nathan 2013).

However this can be critiqued by stating that since 1963, the OAU placed restrictions on how member states involved or intervened in domestic state affairs, until in 2002 when the AU new deal opened a new chapter to allow intervention and interference in situations of crisis government. Nwosu (2005:231) suggests “that the AU provisions for intervention in internal affairs of member states were set to ensure adequate security and sustainable peace in Africa”. In its turn, Pretoria asserted that tough action would be inappropriate Zimbabwe was a sovereign state and no other country had the right to interfere in its domestic affairs but the way South Africa preferred to engage with Zimbabwe, was on the basis of quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement. In relation to the sense of African unity and respect for other governments, “South Africa’s quiet diplomacy and mediation efforts in dealing with the various crises in Zimbabwe around 2007-2008 have been viewed as being in favour of the government” (Tjonneland 2014: 5).

South African foreign policy seems to oscillate between public support for the Mugabe regime, based on the conviction that the objective should be to contribute bilaterally and multilaterally to an internal solution to the crisis, and bouts of public, though guarded, criticism based on frustration with the deteriorating situation and the impact on South Africa and the rest of the region (Schoeman and Alden 2014). The result, though, would seem to have been not so much an opportunity for South Africa to put reformist-pressure on the Mugabe regime, but rather that it removed the South African government, the ANC and Cosatu ever further away from the opposition MDC in Zimbabwe. This distancing itself from Tsvangirai and his MDC was also a result of the MDC’s ever closer ties with

white interests both in Zimbabwe and abroad. This however means that South Africa's policy of quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement has followed a line of constant support for and defence of the Mugabe regime.

4.2.7 South Africa's lack of Will Power

A hegemon should not only have capacity and capability to perform its duties, but it should also have the willingness to project and provide the necessary resources. South Africa has been reluctant to assume a more prominent political leadership role in SADC; a posture that has been blamed mainly on an enduring sensitivity to regional fears of domination. For example, since the late 1990s, and until recently, there has hardly been a South African national amongst the SADC Secretariat staff. According to Nganje (2014), this undermines regional integration in two ways. Firstly, it has created a strategic vacuum in the leadership arrangement within the SADC, which no other state in the region is either willing or able to fill. Secondly, it is worth noting that South Africa's unwillingness or inability to lead SADC may detract from its economic hegemony in the region (Nganje, 2014).

This means that South Africa might refrain from its role as a hegemon and central base to provide goods in the region. Without a recognised regional hegemon, regional integration is undermined. The "neo-liberal perspective of hegemonic stability theory posits that an open and liberal regional economy requires the necessary and compulsory existence of a hegemonic and dominant power" (Destradi, 2010: 91). The balancing act between suppression and assertion forms the basis of scholarly discussions on South

African leadership in international affairs, and leads to the predominance of 'hegemony' in discourse about the country's foreign policy. The academic debate on South African hegemony has not yet been able to resolve the issue about its willingness to lead, which is a key determinant of hegemony. According to Habib (2009), this willingness by a country to lead is the expression of agency and distinguishes a 'hegemon' from a 'pivotal state': Every hegemon is a pivotal state. But it has to be more. Hegemons not only aspire to leadership, military, economic and other resources, they ought to have political and socio-economic visions about their transnational environments, and political willingness to implement those visions. It takes responsibility in the last instance to ensure that the features of its vision are operationalized in the region it sees as its sphere of influence (Habib, 2009). A second element of hegemony implied in Habib's description is the ability to enforce. Not only should a hegemon be willing to take the lead, it should also be the guarantor of such a vision, bringing into line those who do not follow.

According to Alden and Le Pere (2009) "this unwillingness to 'enforce' is the reason why it is difficult to categorize South Africa's actions as hegemonic: 'in many respects it is not behaving as a hegemon". South Africa's response (or lack thereof) to the crisis in Zimbabwe is an important example of when it relinquished the mantle to 'enforce'. According to Schoeman and Alden (2014: 241), "South African hegemony is neither complete in its material form, nor has it demonstrated consistent ability to exercise leadership even where it has the means available". They argue that "the key feature that is inhibiting South African foreign policy is less a material one as such but rather resides in the realm of the structured characteristics of its designation as a regional leader".

Although South Africa sometimes shows an interest in working with the SADC, the country does not wish to surrender its sovereignty and self-determination. Under the “current president, Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s foreign policy has taken a pragmatic turn, focusing on deeper involvement with the BRIC countries and the G8. This in effect means a reduced interest in economic cooperation with neighbouring and fellow African states” (Welz 2013: 135).

While South Africa is a large investor in the rest of the region, “the country’s political influence and normative leadership over the neighbouring countries is highly constrained” (Taylor 2011: 1237). Being conscious of its history of apartheid, which, arguably is not yet far away in time, South Africa has been reluctant on imposing pressure on other SADC governments. In the build-up to potential interventions, South Africa has sought to find an “African consensus”. This is evident within Southern Africa, “for example in the case of South African diplomacy related to the crises in Zimbabwe” (Tjonneland 2014: 5). Also in Swaziland, “there have been reports of violations of human rights and suppression of protests voicing people’s want for democracy. Zuma and South Africa remained silent on this issue” (Gebrewold 2014: 17). As in other SADC member states, further regional integration is hampered by South Africa’s recurring reluctance to share sovereignty.

The unwillingness to yield sovereignty is linked to South Africa’s history. The legacy of the liberation struggle which led to the establishment of a democratic order in the early 1990’s is still alive in South African politics, where up until the present day all democratically elected presidents have come from the ANC. Several developments have

“cast doubt over whether South Africa actually wants deeper and more far-reaching integration through the AU or even SADC” (Kraxberger and McClaughry 2013: 22). Although the country’s leadership emphasized cooperation between African states since the time of liberation, “South Africa does not view the AU as a federation or union of states, but rather as an intergovernmental organization” (Welz 2013: 135-136). While the institutional building blocks of regional hegemony, coupled to the expansion of South African corporate activism on the continent, may have been put in place during the Mbeki presidency, global recognition of South Africa’s status as *primus inter pares* in Africa did not protect it from criticism (Schoeman and Alden, 2014). Concurrently, since coming to office in 2009, President Jacob Zuma has embraced a more assertive foreign policy explicitly rooted in national interest that has further complicated relations with many African governments. Bolstered by South Africa’s selection as Africa’s only representative on the G20, and in late 2010, the invitation to join the BRIC, Pretoria began to take a more forthright approach to regional concerns.

However, the more assertive foreign policy approach towards Zimbabwe, with Zuma deliberately shunning Robert Mugabe at SADC meetings and pushing for free and fair elections, did not produce the expected changes in that country. Indeed, in the aftermath of Mugabe’s re-election, friction over South African political interference and dominance of their economy has only escalated (Lee, 2012; Business Reporter, 2013; Ncube, 2013). Even Swaziland’s embattled monarchy, despite overwhelming dependency on South Africa, has so far been able to defy South Africa’s efforts to introduce political reforms even to the extent of turning down needed economic assistance. As far as the material

basis for its hegemonic position on the continent is concerned, South Africa's economic position vis-à-vis the rest of the continent is also weakening. Nigeria is, "at least as far as crude GDP growth is concerned, on the rise resulting in speculation that Nigeria might in the foreseeable future eclipse South Africa's 'big economy' status on the continent" (O'Neil, 2014). It is also clear that early expectations of South Africa as the gateway to Africa are overrated. Moreover, within the context of South Africa's structural power position in SACU, Pretoria has found it increasingly frustrating to provide the kinds of benefits expected from SACU members. The country contributes 98 per cent of the pool of customs and excise duties shared between SACU members, but it has little say in the way in which the revenue is spent. There are strong indications that South Africa wants a portion of these revenues to be set aside for regional integration and development and that it wants to place some restrictions on how SACU revenue is spent, (Holmes, 2013) pointing to a more assertive approach to its neighbours.

4.2.8 Exploitative nature of South Africa's regional economic engagements

South Africa's relations with other regional states are complex. Its investments in the region reflect a genuine attempt to lead Africa's rebirth, and improve its negative image on the continent. However, these attempts have not always been successful, and its pursuit of its national interests has made other African states doubt its commitment to regional integration. South Africa often "concentrates on states with which they share a border and a longer history of trade agreements and the economic cooperation and benefits achievable through SACU are of a higher importance than dealings with SADC" (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 63). Concurrently, the opening of diplomatic ties with the rest of

Africa provided opportunities for South African business to expand beyond its borders as never before. The result was an outward investment push that saw South African mining and construction firms, retail, media and telecommunications giants and parastatals seek out investment opportunities and markets in the relatively unrestrained African environment. Within a short time, the area of historically recognized South African economic dominance the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and to “some extent the broader Southern African region began to be supplemented with a growing presence in rest of the continent through the spread of South African consumer goods and the opening of branch offices by some in its corporate sector” (Schoeman and Alden 2014:245).

Furthermore, Nganje (2014:4) states that “South African companies continue to infiltrate and dominate southern African markets, and in some cases their operations have worked to undermine the developmental objectives of SADC’s integration agenda”. Thus without an evident political commitment to drive the institutions and processes that would produce equitable outcomes from regional integration, South Africa’s non-assertiveness in the wake of an integration process that is gradually yielding to the logic of economic liberalization, inadvertently reproduce the very perceptions of domination and exploitation it seeks to alleviate (Nganje, 2014). The expansion of South African business into Africa has resulted in the closure of various local enterprises. Besides this, South African businesses operating outside South Africa often source goods in South Africa rather than locally, thus further contributing to trade imbalances in the region (Tjonneland, 2013). For example, former President of Zambia Levy Mwanawasa,

criticized the South African retailer Shoprite and Checkers for importing bananas from South Africa instead of buying them from Zambian farmers who, in his view, produce better bananas than their South African counterparts. It is widely acknowledged that the market-driven approach to Africa's rebirth has yet to achieve the intended goals of reducing unemployment, and creating a thriving African middle class. According to Nganje (2014), "these misgivings are strengthened by the fact that South African investments have resulted in the creation of very few and mainly short-term jobs. Deepening poverty has driven many Africans to South Africa".

According to this view, South African investments are seen as identical to a 'recolonisation' of the continent (Tjonneland, 2013). The assumption that what is good for South Africa is good for SADC has often conjured up some uncomfortable historical encounters between SADC and South Africa's powerful establishment, encounters which, despite the miracle attached to South Africa's transformation, have scarred SADC's essence (Schoeman and Alden 2014). It can also be argued that South African government is not selflessly aiming to uplift the regional economy. (Nganje, 2014) argues that "by extending the mandate of state-owned enterprises such as the IDC and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to fund projects elsewhere in the region, it intends to maintain hegemonic control over the regional economy". He contends that South Africa's R1 billion 'economic rescue' package to Zimbabwe in 2002 was not an act of generosity but part of a wider plot to secure this country's strategic interests, and to position it as a sub-imperial power in the region. This reveals that South Africa seeks to "position itself as the main third world arbiter of globalization in matters such as trade,

finance, aid, sustainable development, non-alignment politics, and many others” (Nganje, 2014:4).

4.2.9 Negative perception of South Africa’s hegemony by SADC countries

South Africa’s destructive apartheid past “still looms fresh in its neighbours’ memories, stirring distrust and apprehension around its engagements and this enduring sentiment has proved to be difficult for South Africa to assuage” (Vickers, 2015:23). Therefore, the prevailing background within which it operates is peppered with a tension in which it is expected to take the lead in resolving crises in the region, but acting too decisively or unilaterally opens it to the accusation that it is reverting to its former role. Arguably, awareness of this has informed South Africa’s decision to couch regional political and military engagement in the rubric of consensus-driven regional politics (Lalbahadur, 2015). The absence of a consensual order is further the reason for the irrelevance of South Africa’s apparent hegemony (as measured in material resources) is perhaps the most important. South Africa is simply not accepted as a hegemon and “has not established a ‘consensual order’ that determines behaviour in its sphere of influence” (Alessi 2013). To the extent that hegemony refers to an acceptance of the values of the hegemonic power, It has remained difficult for the ‘new’ South Africa to become accepted as a ‘genuine’ African country, not least by Zimbabwe, whose high profile on the continent and in the southern African region means that it can to some extent determine South Africa’s acceptance or rejection by the rest of the continent.

The consensual order that South Africa has created is not generally accepted across its borders and for some of its neighbours, Zimbabwe in particular, South Africa is a puppet of the West, an agent of international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and a willing captive of its own white business sector. After the South African government's open criticism of Mugabe in December 2002, the Zimbabwean government controlled Herald newspaper's editors complained about 'a plot to overthrow the ruling Zanu pf government' and proclaimed. Gibb (2009) argues that "regionalism channeled through multilateral organisations is considered to be an intuitive remedy for many African policymakers as an effective mechanism to address the political marginalisation and fragmentation that took place under colonialism".

Multilateral engagements can, therefore, be interpreted as a trick by South Africa to concentrate its individual power in favour of a more inclusive, consensual style to stimulate global reform. This is laudable, but perhaps not consistent. Many respondents in the survey found South Africa's political engagements to be at odds with its economic ones, especially with regard to Southern Africa McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (2008) accuse South Africa of being a "self-aware, selfish hegemon' in its economic dealings with SADC". For them, "South Africa's economic dominance is largely attributed to the structural advantages of relative economic development, which places it in a 'completely different category to its neighbours". These structural advantages, combined with an untransformed capital class (principally still white businesses), skew the way in which the country interacts with the region.

4.3 Chapter Conclusion

South Africa's hegemonic role is crippled by its domestic base that is hampered by high levels of crime, corruption and violence in the form of service delivery protests and xenophobic attacks. Most of these factors are a result of the inefficiency of the South African government to provide goods and services to its population. This is further characterized and accompanied by the government's reluctance to responding to crisis. Therefore before South Africa can play the role of provision of goods and services in the SADC region, the state has to ensure that it adequately provide such goods and services to the general population of its inhabitants. The kind of leadership that South Africa is expected to play in the region comes with the ability to rationalize the use of available state resources (both human and material) through effective systems of coordination, accountability and regeneration. This would be crucial in streamlining the often competing priorities of different government departments and rallying them around the integration agenda. Strong state capacity would also ensure that South Africa has reliable and sustained representation in regional bodies and capitals to promote its vision for the region.

It is incomprehensible that South Africa does not use this leverage for the benefit of Zimbabwe's citizens by ridding the country of that tyrant that occupies State House. South Africa continues to engage in "quiet diplomacy where rationality and truth have no meaning.' Hegemony, however, means more than simple hard power in terms of military and economic might and from a Gramscian perspective, the real power comes not so much from tangible resources, as from the fact that the hegemon's ideology (its structure of values and understandings) is acceptable and unquestioned and forms a 'consensual

order' that determines behaviour in its sphere of influence. Evans and Newnham (1990) put "this well when they stress that 'a hegemon's ability to lead is derived as much from what it stands for as from how it seeks to achieve its goals". The essence of hegemony is that the power of the hegemon lies in the broad acceptance of 'what it stands for' and not in the exercising of its military and/or economic power in a crude and direct fashion, though these latter aspects of power undoubtedly contribute to the creation of hegemony. Unless the 'hegemon' is accepted as such within its sphere of influence, it is doubtful that its strategies and tactics of achieving its goals will be successful.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of findings

Fundamentally, the aim of this study was to examine South Africa's role as a hegemonic power in the maintenance of peace and stability in the SADC region. This is based on the understanding of the rhetoric that Southern Africa requires a region requires a rallying point from where they can integrate and mobilize their resources in order to have a security community, which acts both as a deterrent to the outbreak of conflict and regional block to manage conflict. While chapter one laid the background, problem statement and the justification of the study, the concern of chapter two in this study was to establish and connect the study within current and existing literature and also foregrounding the study within a theoretical framework which is the hegemonic stability theory. The third chapter explores the characteristics that make South Africa a hegemon in the SADC region. The chapter also investigates the role that South Africa as a hegemonic power play in enhancing peace and stability in the SADC region. This is followed by chapter four which explores the challenges of South Africa's hegemonic role in the SADC region.

This study was conducted within the framework of the following four objectives: i) to identify the features which make South Africa a hegemonic power in the SADC region ii) to explore South Africa's role as a hegemonic power in promoting peace and stability in the SADC region iii) to identify the challenges faced by South Africa as a hegemonic power in fostering peace and stability in the SADC region iv) To recommend ways forward

for South Africa in solving these challenges in order to efficiently play its role in the region. The first and second objectives of this study are explored in chapter three of this study. Literature discussed and theoretical framework of this study revealed that a state has to possess some characteristics for it to be considered a hegemon. These include the basic elements of state power like economic, political and military power, population, geography and availability of natural resources. This is accompanied by willpower and capacity possessed by the state in question and acceptance of such hegemonic leadership by other states within the region. From this study it can be said that what makes South Africa a regional hegemon, are the basic elements of state power that South Africa has. In the SADC region, South Africa enjoys supremacy in economic and military terms as well as moral authority of its leaders like the late Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki who were the catalyst for solving political and socio-economic challenges in the SADC region.

Furthermore, South Africa is strategically located at the southern edge of the African continent. This means that it does not lie between other African states and the most important factor is that it is the only African country that possesses shores on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. As a result South Africa occupies a distinct position of advantage and influence in Africa. Other factors which made South Africa a regional hegemon include its role in regional integration and development, its nature of absorbing foreign investment and being the hub for multinational cooperations. South Africa has, to an extent, taken on the role of regional hegemon in the SADC region. Its foreign policy strategies have over the years suitably demonstrated a calculated move aimed at reinforcing a hegemonic ambition. One of the findings of this study is that South Africa as a hegemony holds a

legitimate amount of power and has the ability to coordinate beneficial social, economic and political as well as security relations with SADC states. South Africa's role of maintaining peace and stability in the region is informed by its foreign policy and its pursuit of national interest and protection of its borders. It can be concluded that the reasons for South Africa taking part in peacekeeping especially in Zimbabwe and Lesotho are to ensure the following: stability in the region and; prevention of refugee crisis; keeping foreign troops out of the region; developing markets for investment, goods, services and labor. Being deployed to intervene in the neighboring Lesotho in 2014 was not only a test for South Africa's peace and security leadership capacity but taking the initiative signifies South Africa's willpower to resolve conflicts in the region. Therefore South Africa's successful intervention in Lesotho was one way to hegemonic intervention and a stronger state perpetrating a weaker neighbour in an attempt to create regional peace and stability.

South Africa's willpower is also accompanied by its capacity and capability as well as acceptance as a hegemon within the SADC region to resolve conflict. Most of the mediation efforts that South Africa has facilitated (Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and DRC) have been a mandate from the SADC. This mandate by the SADC is a clear indication of acceptance of South Africa's leadership role and acknowledgement of its capacity to play a role of maintaining regional peace and security. South Africa's role in the DRC can be understood as part of South Africa's policy towards the continent as a whole. As stated in its foreign policy white paper, Africa and particularly SADC, was the cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy. Additionally, South Africa as an emerging middle power is

committed to promoting peace and stability in the southern region. Lastly, South Africa as a hegemonic power also facilitated conflict disputes in other countries like Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique. The study further identified and discussed the challenges of South Africa's hegemony in the SADC region. More importantly, specific focus was on the internal and external constraints that confront South Africa. This is because such constraints impose serious restrictions on South Africa's capacity and capability to effectively trigger more hegemonic influence in the SADC region. Firstly the composition of South Africa's domestic terrain has had an impact on South Africa's capacity, capability and its willingness to play a hegemonic role in the SADC region. From this study, it was discovered that South Africa's domestic base is hampered by a culture and history of violence especially violent service delivery protests. These protests are mainly as a consequence of government's failure to adequately render public goods and services to its inhabitants. Therefore before South Africa can play the role of provision of goods and services in the SADC region, the state has to ensure that it adequately provide such goods and services to the general population of its inhabitants.

South Africa as a state has to also demonstrate and prove its ability as hegemony to solve its own internal instability and maintain peace. In its quest in consolidating its democracy, South Africa has faced an enormous challenge to curb xenophobia attacks on foreign nationals within South Africa. In addition to issues of intolerance and the general dislike of foreigners, the study also discovered that xenophobia is also sparked by the negative utterances and sentiments by the political leadership in the country. As a result the violence on foreign nationals undermines South Africa's stability in "social integration,

which is an important factor in learning to operate globally” (Amoako 2005:2). South Africa’s domestic base is further characterized by high levels of crime, corruption and racism. One significant element from this study is that these factors are accompanied by the government’s reluctance to responding to crisis. Therefore the findings of this study reveal that South Africa capacity to play any meaningful hegemonic role must be tied to its ability to quickly address widespread domestic social problems that it is confronted with. South Africa has explicitly demonstrated and harbored clear ambitions to play “an increasing leadership role in the SADC region, on the strength of its economic and military preponderance and acknowledged internationally political clout and Its contribution to the restructuring of the regional political and economic architecture is testament to this fact” (Alden and le Pere, 2009).

Nevertheless, while South Africa appears to fulfill all traditional conditions to be a regional hegemon in Africa, it however fails to fulfill this requirement of hegemony. Even within its sub-region, its influence and the acceptance of its leadership is still contested. The question of followership of any leader raises fundamental issues for instance around the acceptance of the leader to lead. Adebajo and Landsberg (2003:172) “also raised this concern of whether South Africa has the confidence of majority of African states and the ability to convince them to entrust Pretoria with a leadership role in in SADC and Africa”. These worries are also about possibilities of states that are envious and resentful of South Africa to undermine its attempts to act as a regional hegemon. Pointing to the importance and necessity of regional powers in conflict resolution. Lehmann and Steinhilber (2006:2) also cautioned that “proximity can sterilize regionalism because of ‘historical baggage’

the solidarity shared over history by regional states. When taken on face value, South Africa's status is unquestionable". The major problem that South Africa encounters as a 'regional hegemon/power' is that there is no known documented evidence of the endorsement or acceptance of South Africa's leadership by other members either within the Southern African sub-region or the African region. South Africa is the biggest economy in the Southern African region. The Southern African region expects South Africa to use its economic power to make a positive contribution to regional stability. Fellow regional countries expect South Africa to cooperate with them as a "partner and ally" and not as a regional "super power", in order to accomplish symbiotic economic partnership.

However, South Africa has followed a neoliberal economic strategy as part of post-apartheid economic development. It has therefore adopted a leading role in the process of regional economic reconfiguration, guided by economic prescriptions of a market-oriented and export-led (capital) accumulation process in the region. Other business sectors in which South African corporations operate on the region incorporate construction, financial services, manufacturing, property, retail, tourism and transport.

Some countries have expressed discontent, arguing that South Africa's MNCs have adopted self-centered attitudes in their markets, driven by selfish profit-making, market share, and exclusion of competition. As a result South African corporate invasion of southern African countries ultimately drives out such countries' small businesses. South Africa benefits more from trade relations than do its southern African counterparts. This makes South Africa a dominant economic actor exploiting its

continental counterparts. On the one hand, these imbalances generated criticism levelled at South Africa, that it is a selfish hegemon aiming to pursue its national interests at the expense of weak and under-resourced SADC states. Furthermore, South Africa's policy of quiet diplomacy has been subject to criticism. It can be argued that South Africa needs to give up on its tactic of “quiet diplomacy”, as it may be sending the wrong message to the surrounding governments that the South African government’s support for such treatment of minorities is acceptable, and that human rights are not as important. Many people use South Africa’s stance over Zimbabwe as the yardstick to discount South Africa’s leadership credentials and its approach to conflict resolution. From this study it was gathered that South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy” and mediation efforts in dealing with the various crises in Zimbabwe around 2007-2008 have been viewed as being in favor of the”government and against the opposition.

5.2 Conclusion

South Africa’s role in the history of the region is of course an important factor in this and often a reason for South Africa’s caution in its interactions with its neighbours. Within SADC, South Africa is considered as the celebrated regional leader and as a result, the rest of the world has “an anticipation of South Africa’s role in resolving and addressing regional disputes” (Habib 2009:155). South Africa’s influence is more conspicuous “within the Southern African sub-region and specifically among the SADC and SACU member countries with Pretoria holding economic sway for well over a century” (Alden and le Pere 2004:284). South Africa’s strength in Africa is alluded to but not directly stated for fear of rejection by other African countries. South Africa’s identity as a regional

hegemon is consequently still a subject of contention, hence, any explicit claims to hegemony or even leadership may be interpreted as a another brand of colonialism. Any “claim to regional leadership may cause consternation especially among the frontline states that had first-hand experience of apartheid” (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003). South Africa thus “recoils from calling itself a leader lest it incurs a wide range of regional rejection” (Flemes 2007:20). Furthermore, South Africa’s obvious leadership spot is a source of apprehension both to the ANC ruling party and countries like Angola and Nigeria who see themselves as having the power sufficient to rival that of South Africa’s. It is for this reason that Pretoria “is disillusioned about using material power to prove its strength and rather opts for conversational means and multilateral frameworks to approach African challenges” (Flemes 2007:7).

5.3 Recommendations of the study

Drawing from the findings of the study and building on existing research, the following are the recommendations and suggestions on what needs to be done to enhance South Africa’s hegemonic role in the SADC region:

- ❖ The first and the most practical approach to enhancing the roles of South Africa in promoting and maintaining peace and stability in the SADC region is for the political leadership to ensure that they address the domestic challenges that they are currently faced with. South Africa also needs to attend to the issue of racism, xenophobia, poverty, crime and service delivery. In as much as serving as a catalyst and tool for regional peace and stability requires substantial resources ,

the needed buy-in for the agenda from the citizens will be easier if the citizens' welfare is guaranteed.

- ❖ The issue of xenophobia in South Africa leads to not only to the negative perception of South Africa's hegemonic role by SADC countries, but also resistance of its hegemonic status. Therefore, the South African national government should develop strategic objectives and framework for addressing the levels of unemployment especially among the youth. A framework that will facilitate the reconciliation and the foster good relations with non-South African nationals.
- ❖ South Africa should identify and capitalize on its points of leverage obtained by virtue of its regional position, capacity, capability and its contributions to peacemaking and stability in the region. This means that there should be improved coordination among the state and non-state stakeholders to achieve maximum impact.
- ❖ The South African government needs to reprioritize SADC in its foreign policy, first by ensuring that other foreign policy priorities do not undermine SADC's development vision but instead reinforce it, but also by dedicating sufficient resources in pursuit of this vision.
- ❖ South Africa's future as lead an influential state in the SADC region is tied to its willingness to lead the region to peace and prosperity. Therefore the study recommends that South Africa has to be pro-active and play a greater role in underwriting the stability and prosperity of its own neighbourhood.

Opportunities for further research

- ❖ Since this study only focused on South Africa within the SADC region, future research should replicate this study, but also include another regional hegemon and the role it plays in its particular region. This will provide a comparative study on the role of regional hegemonies in maintaining peace and stability in their regions.
- ❖ This study identified various factors and challenges of South Africa's quest as a hegemonic power to maintain peace and stability in the SADC region. There is a need to investigate further on these challenges especially the domestic factors. This points to the need for studies aimed at designing mechanisms that are effective to mitigate such challenges.
- ❖ While the hegemonic influence of South Africa is traceable to its foreign policy aspiration for Africa, future research should investigate the leadership role played by South Africa as indicative of its hegemonic influence.

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