



**University of Fort Hare**  
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**AN INVESTIGATION INTO INSTABILITY IN POST-GADDAFI LIBYA, MALI AND  
NIGERIA: A COMPARATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH.**

**BY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Since the ousting of Gaddafi from power in 2011, Libya, Mali and Nigeria have experienced high levels of instability. An investigation into the causes of instability is employed in the study to gain insights into the major cause of conflict in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. The study considered instability as a consequence of a combination of existing exogenous and endogenous factors which were examined according to various theoretical lenses. A comparative theoretical analysis was used so as to interpret and analyse data. The analysis was subjected to theoretical scrutiny according to four mainstream International Relations theories namely; realism, critical theory, constructivism and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, in order to determine whether they could effectively explain post-Gaddafi violence and instability.

The research findings revealed that the distinction between internal and external variables is artificial and the various causes cannot be exclusively differentiated from one other. The research also identified constructivism as the best possible explanation of instability in the particular context under investigation, through its recognition of the significance of normative as well as material elements, and the emphasis placed on the role of identity and ideas in shaping political actions.

**Key concepts:** Terrorism, Insurgency, Political Economy.

## DECLARATION

I the undersigned, Melody Chindoga hereby declare that the research study is my own original work and that it has not been submitted, and will not be presented at any other University for a similar or any other award.

.....

Signature

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Date

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## **DEDICATION**

To my parents Mr Kenneth Chindoga and Mrs Violet Chindoga, thank you for your unwavering support. You have been there every step of the way; I wouldn't have made it this far without your support and wisdom. May God bless you abundantly.

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## ACRONYMS

**AQI**- Al-Qaeda in Iraq

**AQIM**- Al Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb

**AU**- African Union

**BP**- British Petroleum

**ECOWAS**- Economic Community of West African States

**EIA**- Energy Information Administration

**EU**- European Union

**FDI**- Foreign Direct Investments

**FNDIC**- Federated Niger Delta Ijawo Communities

**GDP**- Gross Domestic Product

**GNC**- General National Council

**GSPC**- Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

**ICU**- Islamists Courts of Union

**IR**- International Relations

**IS**- Islamic State

**ISIS**- Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

**LNA**- Libyan National Army

**MEND**- Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

**MNC-** Multi-National Corporation/Company

**MNLA-** National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

**MUJAO-** Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

**MUJWA-** Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

**NATO-** North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NDSF-** Niger Delta Strike Force

**NTC-** National Transition Council

**OPEC-** Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

**US-** United States

**WB-** World Bank

# **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1 Background of the Study**

### **1.1.1 An overview of the history of Sub-Saharan Africa**

Geographically sub-Saharan Africa is defined as the part of the African continent located south of the Sahara desert. Sub-Saharan Africa is a vast land, rich in natural resources with great potential for investment opportunities, but sub-Saharan Africa is today considered to comprise of some of the world's least economically developed countries due to external and internal factors. Bergenas, Finlay and Tessler (2010) attribute this lack of development to political instability, pointing to the fact that over the last two decades the region has been plagued by a number of civil wars, making sub-Saharan Africa the most conflict-affected region in the world, with causes ranging from ethnic, religious, political, economic and social clashes, all of which have tended to lead to inter-state and intra-state wars. However, many of the hostilities are remnants from the colonial and Cold War eras, which institutionalised relations of conflict between groups that have persisted beyond these periods in Africa's political history (Bergenas, Finlay & Tessler, 2010), as will be discussed shortly. Notwithstanding the escalation of conflict over the past two decades arising from deep-rooted causes, there are also immediate triggers that have ignited conflict and instability. These tend to create the impression that they are the causes, rather than the catalysts of conflict, necessitating a thorough investigation, which is the intention of this research.

### **1.1.1.1 Religious factors**

The main religions in Africa are Islam and Christianity. Islam reached sub-Saharan Africa in 615 CE (Christian Era) whereas Christianity had arrived in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century before Islam. By the late twentieth century almost half (approximately 40%) of all sub-Saharan Africans were Muslim, as during the colonial period Islam made its largest entry into Africa (Hanciles, 2003). Over time, Islam became incorporated in African societies, as a result of which Islam has also become a thriving religion in sub-Saharan Africa.

Hanciles (2003) argued that after the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Christianity took a similar route and achieved a similar presence to that of Islam, due to the persistence of Christian missionaries who accompanied colonial exploration, and, later, exploitation. During the colonial era Muslims participated in social and economic activities, but after African states started gaining independence at the beginning of the 1950's, Islam became politically insignificant due to the imposition of western methods of governance. This was mainly because Islamic beliefs are embedded in 'Sharia law', which forms the basic principles according to which the state is organized. Sharia law is the Islamic legal system that is derived from commands in the basic texts of Islam, although its influence declined in the immediate post-colonial era. In the 21<sup>st</sup> Islamism has revived as a political force throughout many sub-Saharan African states, forcibly transforming and integrating the Muslim population into a more extremist one that is isolated from its non-Muslim neighbours, thereby creating a rift between Muslims and non-Muslim states, moderates and extremists (Hanciles, 2003). Islam thus far has worked and served for state building along secular nationalist lines with liberation movements fighting for state formation and in some cases against the state, for instance the case of Somalia. Political Islamism has over

the course of the years in North and West Africa gained a monopoly over expressing social and political discontent and its influence on global politics has grown due to the military strength of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Abdalla, 2011). However, the Islamic state comprises values that extend beyond religion and is based on Sharia law, which governs the entire way of life of the 'faithful'.

As observed by Haynes (2011: 91) "religion has made a notable return to political prominence in recent years, both domestically and internationally and it's now clear that religion has a durable and growing significance as a strong source of identity for millions of people around the world". However, despite the potential of religious differences for leading to instability, religion can also be of importance in helping to resolve conflicts, so the role of religion is ambiguous.

#### **1.1.1.2 Cultural factors: "clash of civilizations"**

The "clash of civilizations" hypothesis was put forward by Samuel Huntington in his thesis seeking to explain the primary source of conflict in the early years of the post-Cold war era. Huntington (1993) defines civilization first and foremost as a cultural entity that allows people to distinguish themselves from other regions, ethnic groups, nationalities and religious groups, all constituting distinct cultures with different levels of cultural heterogeneity. According to the 'clash of civilization' theory, conflicts are generally an outcome of the "fault lines" between civilizations and they are therefore based on complex cultural differences that extend beyond religion (Huntington, 1993). The thesis also seeks to explain the outburst of violent insurgency in sub-Saharan Africa. Violent extremism driven by Islamic Jihadists has become a threat to the region and constitutes one of the main causes of instability. The Jihadist movement, a contemporary armed jihad or war of extreme violence against non-

Muslims, especially targets states with non-Muslims living alongside the Muslim majority population (Cordesman, 2015).

Due to the far-reaching notion of 'civilization' as extending beyond religion, it is civilization rather than religion that is perceived as the cause of instability in the sub-Saharan region (Neumayer & Plumber, 2009: 712). After the end of the Cold War and the demise of the global power of Russia, the Union of Socialist Republics disintegrated into Muslim majority states, giving rise to conflicts between component entities struggling for influence within the various newly formed states.

Although different civilizations have different views and understandings of things, these differences do not necessarily mean conflict and violence (Fletcher & Lyigon, 2010). According to Huntington, however, conflicts are an outcome of "fault lines" between civilizations.

#### **1.1.1.3 Political factors: The aftermath of colonialism**

As indicated previously, some of the causes of instability in sub-Saharan Africa can also be seen to be effects of colonialism and the Cold War era. In their search for resources and power, the most powerful nineteenth-century Western nations, namely, Britain, Germany, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy, colonized Africa in the so-called "Scramble for Africa" (Moe, 2009). They established arbitrary political boundaries in accordance with their interests, thereby grouping together or dispersing different ethnical groups that had enjoyed historical relations of either animosity or amity.

Having inherited these colonial boundaries and due to the diversity of ethnic groups with each post-colonial state, newly independent African states failed to attain the unified cultural integrity and social cohesion that signifies the archetypal modern

state. Libya for instance, contains over 140 different tribes and since the fall of Gaddafi these tribes have been engaged in conflict for reasons including cultural, political or economic issues, or a combination of these.

Current political instability and social instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria therefore have their roots in the effects of colonialism (Alemazung, 2010). Sub-Saharan rulers seeking national unity adopted the colonial ruling style of authoritarianism and oppression to achieve stability, rather than seeking consent and participation of civil society. In Libya, for instance, Gaddafi used an autocratic leadership style for over four decades and it finally led to massive revolts against the regime in 2011.

#### **1.1.1.4 Economic factors**

Apart from political domination and subordination of indigenous peoples, colonialism also resulted in the exploitation of raw materials, which was the primary colonial intent. The appropriation of African resources by the colonisers promoted underdevelopment and a condition of economic dependence on the continued export of raw materials in the post-independence era (Nkrumah, 1975: 415). In addition, the internally skewed distribution of resources towards the political elite has meant that economic inequalities have presented a source of division and conflict. Economic inequality is particularly exacerbated in sub-Saharan countries with resources such as petroleum and minerals, which has heightened social inequality and created conditions for conflict and instability. The prospects for economic growth and stability in sub-Saharan Africa continue to be shaped by foreign interests, which heavily impact on the dynamics in areas related to governance (Ong'ayo, 2008: 5). Despite the existence of institutional frameworks which are supposed to guide the delivery of necessary services, the political and predatory nature of African elites working

together with external parties to serve their mutual interests also contributes further to the undermining of stability in the region.

### **1.1.2 Recent triggers**

Although the instability in some African states has been influenced by historical factors such as colonialism, differing religious beliefs and cultural factors embodied in the so called “clash of civilization” hypothesis, there are also immediate triggers which have led to the eruption of conflict and instability. These are most prominent in the events during and subsequent to the rebellions in North African states that started in 2011. Initially depicted as the “Arab Spring”, because it was envisaged that these would lead to the overthrowing of despotic North African regimes and the installation of democratic forms of government, the subsequent violence and anarchy and the return to conservative regimes and authoritarian regimes in most states has resulted in what is now termed the “Arab Winter”. The Arab Spring was a wave of mass demonstrations, riots, revolts, protests against monarchy and dictatorship and in favour of democratic forms of government, which led to intervention on the part of western powers and ultimately to civil wars in some Arab states in North Africa (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Mali).

The Arab Spring succeeded in removing North African Heads of States, namely Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Ben Ali of Tunisia, Toure of Mali and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. However the subsequent killing of Muammar Gaddafi as a result of the imposition of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “no-fly” zone, raised multiple security concerns, particularly in Libya and neighbouring states (Aning, Okyere & Abdallah, 2012). Although the Arab Spring represented the end of long-standing authoritarian regimes, it created a situation of political and social

uncertainty in North and West African states, mainly because of the absence of strong governments to control state territory and borders. The subsequent infiltration by numerous movements with different aims, ranging from arms-dealing to taking control of oil production, or the expansion of the Islamic state through the contemporary Jihad has had serious implications for peace and stability, making states susceptible to terrorist attacks (Danjibo, 2013).

## **1.2 Rationale of the Study**

Sub-Saharan Africa has drawn much attention in the international community as the region with the highest incidence of conflict, ranging from tribal and ethnic wars to religious, political, economic conflicts and ideological clashes (Bergenas, Finlay and Tessler, 2010). Much of the world's attention is focusing on the conflict as though this phenomenon is endemic to Africa, and some of the underlying facts and contributing factors are overlooked. This study offers and unpacks various explanations for the post-Gaddafi conflict in Nigeria, Libya and Mali, examining both the immediate and the underlying causes, with a view to determining whether or not it is possible to identify any single predominant factor as the primary cause. In doing so, it also aims at comparing and contrasting the explanations of mainstream (Western) International Relations theories with a view to establishing their ability to adequately explain the phenomenon of post-Gaddafi conflict and instability. This is because of claims that the failure of the 'Western lens' to take into account non-Western sets of values and beliefs has led to incomplete and flawed accounts of conflict and instability in Africa.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

Since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, the sub-Saharan African states of Libya, Mali and Nigeria inhabited by Muslim and non-Muslim populations have experienced an increase in civil unrest of various origins, namely, through insurgent groups, terrorist groups, and tribal, ethnic, political and religious clashes. Social and economic inequality has also created conditions for conflict, and this is compounded by the exploitation of the region's resources by foreign multi-national corporations from the globally dominant economic powers. The region has subsequently become the location of such frequent conflicts that instability appears chronic. However, there is a need to engage with the explanations for the various causes of hostilities, historic and more recent, so as to establish whether there is indeed one overarching factor to which instability and conflict can be ascribed. Furthermore, the intention is to establish whether Western theoretical perspectives offer satisfactory explanations.

#### **Research questions**

- To what extent have endogenous factors contributed to instability in the selected areas, and how have they done so?
- To what extent have external factors contributed to instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, and how have they done so?
- How applicable is mainstream Western International Relations theory in explaining conflict and instability in the selected areas?

### **1.4 Aim of the Study**

The study seeks to investigate the root causes of instability in the post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, utilising concepts selected by the researcher according to alternative hypotheses in the existing literature. The study also seeks to compare

and evaluate various mainstream Western IR theories on conflict and instability in post-independent Africa. In doing so, it also seeks to provide a better understanding of the reasons why stability is of greater significance to post-colonial governments, as opposed to democracy.

## **1.5 Objective of the Study**

### **General objectives**

The overarching objective is to examine and explore the causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

### **Specific objectives**

- To evaluate the political consequences of the ousting of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, Mali and Nigeria.
- To analyse and compare the adequacy of different IR theories relating to the causes of conflict and instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, with the specific aim of establishing whether they are weakened by conceptual gaps or epistemological bias.

## **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The study is of importance since it seeks to provide a thorough description and convincing analysis of the causes of instability in the post-Gaddafi era in Libya, Nigeria and Mali, according to different International Relations theoretical perspectives on conflict and instability. It may bring to light possible conceptual gaps

and Western ideological bias that lead to judgmental rather than scholarly approaches in analysing non-Western situations.

## **1.7 Scope of the Study**

The study focused on the aftermath events in Libya, Mali and Nigeria after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 and it examines events that occurred in the period from 2011 to 2015. The study investigated instability in the sub-Saharan states of Libya, Mali and Nigeria and prospects for stability, according to four mainstream theoretical perspectives.

## **1.8 Methodology**

### **1.8.1 Data collection method**

The study used qualitative research method. It is, firstly, descriptive in nature as it seeks to understand the consequences of the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 in Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Secondly, it allows for analysis according to the conceptual framework developed by the researcher. A qualitative method enables collection of wide variety of data that can be effectively analysed and evaluated according to the researcher's perspective, research aims and conceptual tools. The data collection technique used in this study is desktop research, and it concentrates on gathering data relating to the causes of instability as presented from various theoretical and analytical perspectives.

This research collected secondary data from books, journal articles and primary data from newspapers and official governmental documents available either in hard copy

form or online. In analysing the causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, an analytical comparison of the IR theories identified as realism, constructivism, critical theory and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis were used.

### **1.8.2 Data analysis**

The method of analysis in this study is descriptive, explanatory, as well as analytical, so as not to offer only a way of understanding the instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Nigeria and Mali, but also to present it within an analytical framework that explains and analyses data. Punch (2005) maintains that explanatory studies seek to account for descriptive information, and this must be executed through the development of an appropriate conceptual framework. The study seeks to establish the “truth” by scrutinising the data according to the conceptual framework established by the researcher and through using theoretical approaches to establish different representations and understandings.

The study used a thematic and conceptual analysis in answering the first and second research questions, with the aim of organizing data according to common themes or concepts identified in the literature, such as conflict, oil, insurgency, terrorism, economy, religion and culture, and forms of government. The aim was to establish whether any single underlying cause could be identified as the overarching contributing factor to conflict and instability.

The third research question subjected the literature to examination according to its thematic presentation in order to reveal the significance of different theoretical assumptions and their implications for “facts” or “truth”. The data was analysed according to the prominent IR theories of constructivism, realism and critical theory, and the ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis. It took note of the assumptions and

uniqueness of each theory and case and provided a comparison of the theories so as to reflect the complexity, detail and context of data in seeking to establish whether any theory in particular was able to explain better.

### **1.8.3 Ethical considerations**

The purpose of this study was to conduct research to be used for academic interest and purposes. The study has acknowledged sources and references, views and ideas of different authors used in recognition of the original scholarly contributions of the many works consulted. The study tried to be as objective as possible through the application and explanation of theoretical perspectives and their contextual significance, so as not to provide a biased argument.

## **1.9 Organization of final report**

### **Chapter One:** Introduction and Background

This chapter gives an introductory setting to the study. It provides the background, significance, objectives and rationale of the study and the methodology to be used.

### **Chapter Two:** Literature review and Theoretical framework

Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature which supports the study. This chapter used secondary data from journals, books, on conflict and instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria. A discussion of the different theoretical perspectives which support the study is given in this chapter.

### **Chapter Three**

Chapter Three answers the first research question, reading: To what extent have endogenous factors contributed to instability in the selected areas, and how have they done so?

### **Chapter Four**

Chapter Four addresses the second research question, reading: To what extent have external factors contributed to instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, and how have they done so?

### **Chapter Five**

Chapter Five addresses the third research question, as follows: How applicable is Western International Relations theory in explaining conflict and instability in the selected areas under investigation?

### **Chapter Six: Summary, Findings and Conclusion**

This chapter provides a summary as well as findings drawn from the study.

## **1.10 Chapter Conclusion**

The chapter presented a brief background of the history of sub-Saharan Africa and how religious, cultural, political and economic factors have all contributed in exacerbating conflict and instability in the region. It also presented the rationale and scope of the study on the investigation of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, covering the period 2011 to 2015. Since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, the sub-Saharan African states of Libya, Mali and Nigeria have experienced an increase in civil unrest of various origins, namely, through insurgent and terrorist groups, and tribal, ethnic, political and religious clashes. These events give rise to the problem

statement, which provided the three research questions on which the study is based. The chapter also specifies the aim of the study and the objectives it sought to achieve, its significance and the methodology adopted.

The next chapter will provide the literature review and theoretical framework. It will present different scholarly interpretations of post-Gaddafi instability in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, Chapter Two will identify the theoretical perspectives to be utilised in the study as the basis for analysis.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter seeks to provide a range of perspectives on the consequences of the fall of Gaddafi on sub-Saharan peace and stability offered by Western and non-Western scholars. In addition, given that every author chooses his or her theoretical position, whether made explicit or not, the chapter will provide an overview of the opinions of the utilized scholars and their theoretical views will be given particular consideration. Chapter Two also outlines different perspectives present in the literature. In doing so it identifies the theoretical positions that will be utilized in the study as a framework from which to conduct an analysis of the effects of the Libyan revolution.

Since 2011 sub-Saharan Africa has increasingly become characterized by a sequence of crises, ranging from terrorist attacks, insurgency, outbreaks of epidemics and threats to health due to infrastructural deterioration and disruption, and a general inability of states to exercise control over their territories (Danjibo, 2013). On the one hand it can be loosely argued that the causes of instability in sub-Saharan Africa are carried over from the colonial era; on the other hand, instability can be attributed to both internal and external forces, depending on various theoretical perspectives. Internal forces see instability as due to factors within the state and include factors such as tribalism, religious differences and the presence of extremist groups. External factors consider the role and influence of other states,

power blocs, transnational and international organizations, both commercial and non-commercial.

## **2.2 Background to recent instability**

Although the “Arab Spring” was a revolution that ended most autocratic regimes in North Africa in 2011, it also signified the end of strong centralized governments that had enjoyed absolute control over their territories, a control which also extended to the wider region and had a stabilizing influence on other states. Aning, Okyere and Abdallah (2012) argue that prior to the Libyan crisis, countries in the Sahara region, especially in North and West Africa, had battled wide-ranging security challenges, though there was progress in consolidating democracy through elections. However the persistence and increase in the military takeovers since 2011 has raised questions on the ability of states to secure stability as well as democracy in the sub-Saharan region. In 2012 Mali experienced a coup d'état which is believed to have been a consequence of emerging crises in the sub-Saharan region and the inability of the fragile state to control its territory. The fall of Gaddafi following the ‘Arab Spring’ has had enormous consequences on the sub-Saharan states since it is believed that it stirred up a combination of rebels, smugglers, refugees and vicious Islamic militant groups in the already politically weakened region (Aning, Okyere & Abdallah, 2012).

The advent of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has led to contestation of political power that weakened governments’ ability to control many aspects, including the immense boundaries of their territories. Various reasons are offered for the loss of control. These range from the presence of new, weak governments and the

proliferation of arms. The absence of strong authoritarian states has fostered an increase in the illicit arms trade, giving various militias and rebel groups access to small arms and light weapons (Danjibo, 2013). In most scenarios weapons intended to back rebel groups fighting against long-standing authoritarian governments have ended up in hands of social movements and militant groups (militias) who use them against fragile new sub-Saharan governments, creating a situation of great instability in the region. Dessi, Cristian, Muhlberger and Musso (2014) point out that North and West Africa, due to the recent instability, have fostered the development of antagonistic identities based on ethnicity and religion, resulting in civil war in countries such as Mali and Nigeria.

Dessi, Cristian, Muhlberger and Musso (2014) emphasize that the progressive deterioration of post-Gaddafi Libyan security represents a major concern throughout the region, most notably for Libya's powerful neighbours Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.

However, the instability that followed the overthrow of Gaddafi has had repercussions much further south, extending into Mali, Chad, northern Nigeria and the Central African Republic, as will be seen. The debate on the subject revolves primarily around whether the instability is due to internal or external factors, and whether the roots of instability and conflict lay much further back in history, or whether the causes are more recent. The causes will be examined accordingly in the section to follow.

### **2.3 Internal causes of instability in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa**

A complex number of internal variables, including cultural and religious difference, poverty, the relative isolation of many communities and the absence of powerful

centralized authority, have contributed to the instability in sub-Saharan Africa that followed the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Although the fall of Gaddafi had negative consequences on the stability of the sub-Saharan Africa, the region had historically been unstable and Aning, Okyere and Abdallah (2012) argue that the post-Gaddafi instability in Libya may be the result of never-ending wars in post-independence sub-Saharan Africa. The internal causes of instability in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa presented in the literature will be examined below in accordance with different categories suggested in the literature, namely, tribalism, religious differences, extremist groups, the arms trade and trans-border movements.

### **2.3.1 Tribalism**

Tribalism can be defined as the state of advocating for a tribe or tribes whereas tribalism denotes the possession of a strong ethnic or cultural identity that separates one member of the group from another. Tribalism has always been a cause of concern in sub-Saharan and has led to some of the bloodiest wars in African history and post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa has experienced its own levels of conflict due to the rising tribal clashes.

El-Katiri (2012:1) argues that Libya cannot be regarded as a homogeneous country in terms of ethnicity or ideological precepts and that tribalism is a societal reality that has had a negative influence in the post-Gaddafi political era as a challenge to the post-Gaddafi government. Whilst tribalism had always been an issue of concern in Libya during the Gaddafi era, it had been contained by Gaddafi's authoritarian and manipulation of different groups. After his fall tribal clashes continued to prevail as tribes fought one another, instead of unifying into one solitary unit so as to achieve one common goal. Instead tribalism has caused divisions amongst the citizenry and

people tend to associate themselves on basis of tribes, leading to social fragmentation and disintegration.

Obeid (2001) agrees and observes that in the 1990's, certain tribes in Libya became the main sources of political legitimacy, due to their allegiance to Gaddafi, and this led to the alienation of other tribes from participation in political processes and role. It was therefore inevitable after the fall of Gaddafi that there would be tribal clashes between those previously included and excluded.

For this reason, during the civil war of 2011, tensions that were linked to tribal affiliations emerged. After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, residents in the cities that were regarded as the supporters of Gaddafi regime were attacked brutally because they were perceived to have supported the Gaddafi regime and were perceived to have been his loyalists. Bassiouni (2013) notes that for these reasons it created conditions of tense hostility amongst the citizenry and further divided the already torn and fragile communities, creating conditions of brutality towards one another.

The quest for political self-determination and cultural recognition on the part of the Tuareg in Mali contributed to their rebellion and the successful coup against the Malian state in 2012. Danjibo (2013) emphasizes that the post-Gaddafi situation in Libya, in particular, has allowed a proliferation of the illicit arms trade, and the accessibility of arms enabled pro-Gaddafi Tuareg fighters to renew their armed revolt against the neighbouring, state of Mali. The Tuaregs in Northern Mali claimed they had been marginalized by the Mali government and rebelled in 2012, seeking independence. In essence, the causes of instability are inter-linked and cannot be neatly separated. For instance the rise of the arms trade led to the proliferation of

small arms and light weapons which ended up in the hands of different tribes, contributing to them lodging rebellion against each other.

El-Katiri (2012), Danjibo (2013) and Bassiouni (2013) argue that in sub-Saharan Africa today, tribalism has been elevated to dominate national discourse, controlling how people think, oppose or support a certain tribe and have played a significant role in aggravating conflicts of religious differences. Due to the fact that tribalism and religion are often intertwined, the above-cited authors claim that it was inevitable that post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa would experience conflicts emanating from religious clashes.

### **2.3.2 Religious differences**

Religion can be best understood as a particular system of faith and worship based on a consensus on the existence of a supernatural deity whose authority cannot be challenged. Different religions have different names; for example the Muslim deity is Allah, and the Christian deity is God.

Atim (2013) emphasizes that religious attributes have often welded ethnic groups together and have given people their ontology and existence; however different approaches to religion can be a cause of instability and a source of conflict. Since the emergence of the post-Westphalia state, most Western nations have practiced the separation of politics and religion, but Islamic extremists in Middle East countries like Iran and Afghanistan advocate for theocracy in the form of rule according to the will of Allah. Atim (2013: 13) agrees that this influence spread to North African states in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, when the Arab states began to experience a series of religious conflicts.

Following Arab and European colonialism in the eighth and eighteenth centuries, respectively, the majority of people in sub-Saharan Africa has adopted and become deeply committed to two of the world's largest religions, Christianity and Islam. The former is practiced in the areas south of the Sahara colonized by the Europeans and the latter is practiced mainly in the area north of the Sahara and the Horn of Africa. Since 2011, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced an increase in religious clashes, apparently feeding from post-Gaddafi Libyan crises of instability. According to Gartenstein-Ross and Barr (2015: 14), the fall of Gaddafi cleared the way for extremists to enter the political realm as different Islamist militias fought one another for the control of designated territories within Libya.

Since 2011, Nigeria has also experienced an increase in religious clashes. Alozieuwa (2015) contends that Nigeria was targeted by its troubled neighbour and war-hardened returnees from the Libyan crises, spurred by the assorted arms streaming out from the tumult in post-Gaddafi Libya. The availability of arms has allowed extremist groups such as Boko Haram to conduct deadly attacks against Christians and to a lesser extent moderate Muslims, as it seeks to form a "pure" Islamic state within Nigeria. Boko Haram holds a vision of global Islamic State, with the ambition of Islamic theocratic state that overthrows all secular states. Onuah (2014: 4) agrees that Boko Haram tenacity and ability to wreak havoc in Nigeria has come to present a threat to the security and stability of Nigerian northern neighbours of Cameroon, Mali and Niger.

Apart from Nigeria, since 2011 Egypt has experienced an increase in violent clashes between Egypt's Muslim and Coptic Christians. Brownlee (2013: 4) asserts that for decades, recrimination between Muslims and Christians who make up 10% of the Egyptian population has been the inevitable, with many Muslims in Egypt refusing to

acknowledge the lack of harmony. Violence against Egypt's Coptic community, in Egypt is mainly because of Egypt's out dated laws and authoritarian institutions that have made Copts a target of social conflict. Hassan (2011) emphasizes that the subsequent ousting of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Gaddafi in Libya and instability in sub-Saharan since 2011 saw a notable rise in violence between the two religions especially in southern Egypt where large communities of Copts live. Due to the continuous religious clashes, the Egyptian state has been unable to ensure the physical security and political rights of its citizens, irrespective of religious denomination. This situation has prompted organizations such as Al Qaeda, Islamic State and other radical Islamic forces to take advantage of the chaotic conditions by promoting arms trade and trans-border movement, creating disorder, instability and having the potential of spreading this to neighbouring states.

### **2.3.3 Arms trade and trans-border movement**

Putting forward the arms trade as a primary cause of instability, rather than religion or tribalism, Boukhars (2012: 1) argues that main cause of sub-Saharan instability is the increase of military hardware from transnational trafficking of illicit goods. For instance the East Africa region is vulnerable to the uncontrolled movement of people and illegal weapons that have caused the weakening of governments and contributed to the collapsing of state institutions. According to Kimunguyu (2014: 5), "porous borders represent a major challenge in ensuring security and stability, hence allowing free movement of people and illicit cross borders". For instance the case of Kenya-Somalia border which has allowed easy and free flow of illegal weapons from Somalia to Kenya. Kimunguyu (2014) argues that the crises in Libya emerged as a major mechanism for wider dynamics of insecurity across sub-Saharan Africa; this is

because it created a major power vacuum that created room for regional armed groups and criminal networks operation.

Danjibo (2013) emphasizes that the collapse of the Gaddafi regime gave rise to the growth in numbers of rebel groups, militant groups, refugees, smugglers and an increase in violent Islamic militant activities. Dessi, Cristiani, Muhlberger and Musso (2014: 3) state that post-Gaddafi Libya's inability to secure 4,000 kilometre-long Saharan borders meant that several countries had to face social and political crises triggered by the inflow of refugees fleeing Libya and heading to surrounding countries whose stability was already precarious, such as Niger.

However, sub-Sahara had been a pipeline for smuggling and trafficking goods dating back to the Roman Empire. According to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2015), since the fall of Gaddafi, the smuggling and trafficking involving both armed groups and organized groups has increased drastically in sub-Saharan states. It has been worsened by the breakdown of the Libyan state, which has promoted the distribution of drugs, arms and counterfeit products within and beyond Libyan borders. Since 2011 there has been an increase of people fleeing Libya to neighbouring states such as Algeria and Mali with small arms and light weapons. Babatunde (2011: 38) argues that the death of Gaddafi was not the end of Libyan problems, instead giving rise to a major challenge of security beyond Libyan borders due to the proliferation of an illicit trade in Libyan weapons. The Tuareg uprising in Mali was part of the fallout from Gaddafi's demise, as it resulted in the uncontrolled movement of weapons and armed elements from Libya to Mali. Danjibo (2013) argues that the conflict in Mali was triggered by the Libyan conflict after the fall of Gaddafi; Malian Tuaregs who had served in the Libyan army returned back to northern Mali with large quantities of arms and fuelled the smuggling of weapons

from the fallen Muammar Gaddafi regime. Stewart (2013) points out that the Tuaregs gained experience during military service in Libya during the reign of Gaddafi and this helped them to mount a successful takeover of northern Mali in 2012. Tuareg militias wreaked havoc especially in the northern parts of Mali, leading to the coup d'état. Furthermore, the operations of Tuareg militias weakened the Malian state security system, paving the way for extremist groups which had close links with Al Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM).

Kashefi (2013: 17) signals as a cause of conflict in Tunisia the fact that this state harboured a vast influx of Libyan refugees. Since the fall of Gaddafi, the country has hosted over a million Libyan refugees, equalling 10% of the Tunisian population. It is evident that the entry of Libyan refugees into Tunisia has worsened the already fragile state by contributing to unprecedented economic, social and security challenges. Kashefi (2013) emphasizes that Tunisia bears the economic and social spill-over of the Libyan crisis, due to a shared 43-mile border with Libya which has become a smuggling route for oil, goods and arms for both armed groups and terrorists. Babatunde (2011) agrees that the border crisis between the two countries has opened pathways for extremist groups to send back and forth heavy weapons into Tunisia and training camps in Benghazi.

Finally, Danjibo (2013) concludes that sub-Saharan Africa states have become deposits of large catchments of arms and ammunition circulating in the region, making these countries potential grounds of hostilities for conflicts and instability. Due to the increase in trans-border trafficking of illicit goods, small arms and weapons, different extremists have gained momentum intensifying their operations in the region.

### **2.3.4 Extremist groups**

With an increase in the arms trade and trans-border movements, it is inevitable that there has been an increase in the momentum of attacks by different extremists groups since the fall of Gaddafi. A rise in the proliferation of trade in small arms and light weapons, which have ended up in the hands of extremist groups, has contributed to their violent rebellion against states and civilians. Chipaike (2012) argues that the fall of Gaddafi left a power vacuum that has promoted the proliferation of extremist groups in sub-Saharan Africa, challenging the stability of the region. This phenomenon supports the argument that not only internal, but also external factors have contributed to increasing instability in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa.

Chipaike (2012) points out that Gaddafi was the sole financier of Tuareg rebel groups within and outside Libya and his death impacted negatively on sub-Saharan regional peace. The fall of Gaddafi brought back the long-standing feelings of hostility between rebel or militant groups seeking autonomy from the state in the West African and the North African belt and governments of these states. This highlights the fact that the causes of instability are historically inter-twined and it impossible to isolate and separate them. Cultural and religious differences have contributed to the growth in extremism in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa, as the activities carried out by extremist groups are motivated by religious, social and political factors.

Chipaike (2012) claims that the movements have been influenced by the involvement of the West in North Africa and extremism in sub-Saharan Africa has been motivated by the desire to extend the Islamic State within Africa, eliminating

Western influence. The fall of Gaddafi ended the tight control that had existed over a large area that extended beyond Libyan borders and the subsequent instability kindled the desire of militant Islamic extremists in Syria to extend the Islamic State to Africa. This violent seizure of territorial control in parts of North and West Africa highlighted the threat to regional stability posed by the emergence and expansion of radical extremism in sub-Saharan Africa.

Ryan (2013: 1) points out that in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa, militant organizations that have emerged as uncontrolled forces and organizations, such as Boko Haram and AQIM, which have managed to put enormous pressure upon the sub-Saharan states of Mali, Nigeria and Algeria on their ability to govern their territory. Ryan (2013) emphasizes that the consequence is that the tenacity of the extremist groups' attacks is that they are able to challenge the legitimacy of the state, driving a wedge between the state and its citizens and throwing into doubt its ability to provide essential services such as protection.

### **2.3.5 Failure of regional organizations to prevent conflict**

Although factors such as religious differences, tribalism, arms trade and extremism have contributed to post-Gaddafi instability, the failure of regional organizations to prevent the escalation of conflict is also a contributory factor. Chipaike (2012: 46) agrees that the post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan crisis and instability since 2011 have left many questions concerning the ability of the AU to resolve conflicts that lead to instability of the region. As a result, the effectiveness of "African solutions to African problems" can be questioned in the case of Libya. During the Libyan revolution the continental body was reluctant to intervene in the conflict, owing to the respect for territorial sovereignty.

Chipaike (2012) points out that the stance taken by the continental body created the space for international organizations such as NATO to become involved and to assume responsibility for the subsequent sequence of events. The AU was not able to assure the Libyans, Africans or the world that it was a credible interlocutor for peace in Libya. It continues to assume a detached position vis-a-vis state crisis, notwithstanding its recognition that they exist, and this can also be largely ascribed to the fact that it simply lacks the capacity and resources to address them.

Atim (2014) emphasizes that Libya under Gaddafi was a leading funder of the African Union, accounting for almost 15% of its annual operating budget. The rapid drawdown of the Libyan assets in the wake of Libyan revolution had a negative consequence on the economies of the sub-Saharan states. Subsequently the fall of the Gaddafi regime had direct implication on the economic and political stability of sub-Saharan states; this is because many of the states were particularly dependent on Libya in economic as well as diplomatic terms. Gaddafi played a major stabilizing role in terms of diplomatic and economic stability and his demise provided a vacuum. Atim (2014) acknowledges that the lessons of the fall of Gaddafi on sub-Saharan Africa are multiple as this event ignited conflict and promoted the re-surfacing of instability in the region.

As mentioned above the failure of regional organizations prompted the Western intervention in the Libya crisis. However, external intervention in the 2011 Libyan revolution can also be considered as a cause of post-Gaddafi instability in the sub-Saharan region.

## **2.4 External causes of instability in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa**

### **2.4.1 The West, US and International organizations' influence**

Danjibo (2013) observes that the variables of instability are not only internal but included external forces and considers that in the view of these, it was inevitable that the Libyan revolution would have a negative effect on Libya and neighbouring states after the war. This is because of the involvement of western nations in the Libyan uprising and the military intervention of NATO as well as financial backing provided by French, American and British to the National Transition Council (NTC). NTC was concentrated with different militant groups and after the fall of Gaddafi these militant groups became too powerful to be concentrated by the government leading to the spill-over of conflict. Chivvis and Martini (2014), by way of contrast, argue that the influence of the West and the US in the name of good governance, transmitted via institutions such as the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) in the name of combating terrorism, can also be considered as partly responsible for the instability in the sub-Saharan Africa region.

Chengu (2014) points out that after the NATO's intervention, Libya became a failed state as the government failed to control state apparatus. However, it became clear that the West's objectives and 2011 intervention was clearly not to help the Libyan people, but to oust Gaddafi and gain control of Libya's natural resources. Chengu (2014) emphasizes that Libya is located at the strategic intersection of the African, Middle Eastern and European worlds; the Western control of Libya has always been a remarkable way to project power into these three regions and beyond.

Chivvis and Martini (2014) note that, NATO declared the 2011 mission in Libya as “one of the most successful in NATO history” whereas in reality it was not. Instead, it was a success for America’s military elite and companies. The military campaign may indeed go down in history as one of the greatest failures of the 21<sup>st</sup> century as instead of ending the conditions of hostilities in Libya it promoted the continuity of instability that have spilled over to neighbouring sub-Saharan states. Evidently the NATO campaign to overthrow Gaddafi radically transformed the political and security environment of Libya and ushered in a post-Gaddafi era largely characterized by civil conflict and sub-state violence (Shapiro, 2014: 29).

The Western intervention in Libya such as that of the US was not of helping Libya but to serve their own interests in gaining resources. According to Shapiro (2014: 28), during the mass revolt in Libya the Obama administration provided the rebels in Libya with arms in return for access to oil fields, even though the UN resolution prohibited the shipment of weapons directly to the Libyan rebels. Shapiro notes that the rebels also got their ammunition from multinational corporations who aimed gaining from the crisis by using rebels as conduits for securing oil. This promoted the proliferation of arms not only in Libya but across sub-Saharan Africa and made the rebels very powerful and impossible to control in the post-Gaddafi era, promoting conditions of instability.

O’Brien and Gowan (2012: 3) agree that the failure of UN to put in place a large scale post-conflict presence in place was responsible for the subsequent chaos in post-Gaddafi Libya. After the civil war, the Libyan security system was weak and it needed a large support system. Chivvis, Crane, Mandeville and Martini (2012: 2) claim that the so-called ‘light footprint’ approach adopted for Libya’s post-war transition had serious consequences. The international actors did not deploy post-

conflict forces, instead using a less involved approach in comparison to previous interventions in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. This arrangement made sense when it was devised so as to enable the Libyan government to start its own nation-building process independently. However, with this limited intervention, Libya struggled to regain its own internal security, build its own institutions and grow its own economy, consequently hampering the attainment of state stability and negatively spreading to sub-Saharan Africa.

## **2.5 Theoretical Framework**

The previous section provided a scholarly overview of the contributions on the topic by authors with different theoretical backgrounds in relation to possible explanations of the causes of post-Gaddafi instability. The following section seeks to align the perspectives provided in the literature with the four theories to be utilized in the study.

Since the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa has been the most conflictual area of this world and the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 opened doors for hostilities to escalate. The research aims to investigate the causes of instability in the post-Gaddafi era in Libya, Mali and Nigeria according to different theoretical perspectives that seek to explain the cause of instability in the afore-mentioned regions. There are various International Relations (IR) theories offering frameworks for analysis, but this research chooses to use realism, constructivism, critical theory and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis to critically examine causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Notably, the “clash of civilizations” is a concept that formed the basis of a hypothesis that relates to a specific phenomenon relating to a

particular setting, namely the Middle East and Europe and that was theorised and introduced by Huntington, rather than a theory of wider scope and general applicability.

While the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis argues that conflicts are an outcome of the fault lines between civilizations (Huntington, 1996), critical theorists argue that conflicts are the consequence of a historical process of the development and expansion of capitalism and its attempted subjugation of other societies. However, by way of contrast, constructivists emphasize that ‘identity’ lies at the core of the people’s interest and people act in a manner to preserve and promote their identity leading to conflict. Realists argue that conflict and instability are the result of human selfishness and they are promoted by the self-seeking behaviour of states in the absence of an international form of government to restrain them.

Though these theories explain the causes of instability with their own specific assumptions and emphases they nonetheless sometimes share common elements. For instance, critical theory and realism theory both emphasize the material grounds for instability, albeit that critical theory puts forward conflict as inextricably linked to the emergence of globally dominant and subordinated societies that occurred through the expansion of capitalism, whilst realism emphasizes militancy as an intrinsic element of the overriding aim of maximising power. Nevertheless, Cox (1985) admits that realism has its roots in an historical mode of thought and that to an extent critical theory ascribes the conduct of states to specific historical circumstances. Cox also argues that the historical context has been an important aspect for both realist and critical theory assumptions.

On the other hand, realism and constructivism, which emerged from critical theory, recognize the existence of an anarchic international system. They both embrace states as the fundamental actors in international politics, with the greatest influence on the structure and process of the system. According to realists, norms and institutions are completely structural and they have considerable influence over domestic society, with shared values and institutions in some cases shaping and propelling actors more strongly than structures.

However, constructivist theory emphasizes the ideological element, rather than the quest for power, as playing an important role in the decisions that are taken by states. In doing so, constructivism extracts an aspect from the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, proposing that the actions and interests of states that may lead to conflict are influenced by factors such as identity and historical views, which, when institutionalized, become a source of practice (Calsenaes, Risse & Simmons, 2007).

The preceding section has outlined four mainstream IR theories, namely, realism, critical theory, constructivism and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, and the following section illustrates how they are applied in explaining the cause of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. In summary, the “clash of civilizations’ hypothesis emphasizes the cause of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria as being the result of substantive differences between civilizations, whilst by way of contrast realism maintains that the state is the fundamental actor in international affairs, in the absence of an international government. However, unlike realism, critical theory argues that the post-Gaddafi instability is a result of social and historical productions of both structures and agents, including the political economy of oil and effects of colonialism, respectively (Devatak, 2009). Constructivism puts forward the ideas of factors such as tribalism and cultural differences as reasons for

instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria whereby individuals act in a manner of preserving their identities.

Returning to the focus of this research, the new outburst of instability and conflict in Libya, Mali and Nigeria could be explained by the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis (Huntington, 1993). According to this, conflicts are generally an outcome of the ‘fault lines’, or areas of substantive differences between civilizations. This hypothesis emphasizes that conflicts between tribes, clans, religious and ethnic groups have been prevalent because there are rooted in the identities of people and they tend to be brutal since the essential issues of identities are at stake. However, ‘fault lines’ within the state can be between group/groups which are located in certain geographical areas within a state and they fight with the government for their independence because they might claim to have been marginalized and in most cases not willing to settle for less. Huntington also argued that conflicts might arise between groups or states of the same civilization but are likely to be less intense.

Civilization is understood as a cultural entity, that is a notion or behaviour that spreads from person to person within a culture with standard of behaviour similar to humility such as ethnic groups, religious groups, nationalities all having distinct culture and understanding of the word. Huntington (1993) states that people of different civilizations have different views on how the world should operate and the conflict between Islamic and Westernized elements in parts of sub-Saharan Africa can arguably be attributed to this. The modernization of Africa by the West and the spread of religions such as Christianity and Islam have enhanced the probability of violence through ‘fault lines’ where conflict has been going on for over 1,300 years (Huntington, 1993: 31). Huntington’s main prediction is that most of the post-Cold

War era international or regional conflicts will not be essentially ideological or economical, but rather cultural in nature (Jakobsen, 2010).

Huntington's thesis prompted debate that has endured for more than two decades. Atim (2013) disagrees with Huntington's claims and emphasizes that religious attributes, rather than cultural, have often welded ethnic groups together and have given people their ontology and existence: instead; different approaches to religion can be a cause of instability and a source of conflict.

Similarly, Bell (2002) strongly disagrees with Huntington's assumptions that cultural differences tend to lead to conflict, as he argues that Huntington does not adequately deal with the fact that most of the brutal wars in history have taken place between culturally similar people. Bell (2002: 7) contends that conflict begins and continues, not because of differences amongst people, but because of their similarities. Out of loyalty to their own group, people are willing to sacrifice their lives, in the belief that "their" people or nation are in the right and others are in the wrong.

Opposing the "clash of civilizations" hypothesis with an anti-pluralist ideological inclination, Ashraf (2012) argues that Huntington's aim was consistent with the realist approach when he deals with world power politics, differing in that he identifies civilization as a basis for alliances, rather than national interest. Ashraf criticizes Huntington's emphasis on the conflictual influence of culture, as Huntington has neglected the fact that different civilizations can also co-exist and blend. Kashefi (2013) also criticised Huntington's theory, stating that conflicts are not as a result of a "clash of civilizations" and cultural identity, and that they rather take place around human rights and human dignity. In support of his argument, he observes that the 2011 'Arab Spring' uprisings were against the regimes with the same cultural identity

who suppressed the civil rights of the masses. Protestors seeking support from Western international organizations did not oppose Western values but their motive was social justice rather than western culture. Kashefi (2013) notes that thousands of Muslims have died in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Mali not due to clashes between Muslims and the West, but due to clashes with their own Muslim governments.

From the realist point of view, Haynes (2011) argues that Huntington missed the very important fact as to why radical Islamists revolt. For example, the activities of Al-Qaeda (an armed group that emerged from the Taliban's resistance to the US occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1980's) mainly targeted governments within the Islamic world that were deemed to be corrupt and conducting 'un-Islamist' activities (Libya, Egypt, and Nigeria). Chiozza (2001) claims that civilizational dyads, or cultural groupings, are predominantly less likely to get into conflict with each other and inter-civilizational dynamics are not strong enough to be able to generate conflict for countries of different civilizations. Huth (1996: 80) also criticized Huntington's theory, also claiming that the rights to self-determination along ethnic and linguistic lines are not strong enough to ignite territorial disputes.

By way of contrast, neo-realists maintain that the state is still the fundamental element and the key factor in international affairs and that the absence of an overarching international government is the main source and reason for conflict and instability. Neo-realists emphasize that people are by nature 'selfish and wicked and will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers' (Burchill et al, 2009: 32).

Neo-realism and classical realism share the notion that anarchy is a general condition within which states operate, with neo-realism giving more emphasis to an

international structure which is characterized by anarchy as an ordering principle for the distribution of economic and military capabilities. Apart from this, classical-realists perceive power as the end of state action, while neo-realists regard power as a means to the real goal of state alleviation: power is needed for security and state survival. Neo-realists emphasize the notion that constraints in politics are imposed by the selfishness of human beings and the unavailability of an international government which is able to dominate, hence necessitating the quest in political life for power as a means of obtaining security (Burchill et al, 2009).

Neo-classical realists underline the state as the primary element, saying that characteristic patterns of domestic political systems interact with international structural patterns to produce state behaviour. Classical-realists also argue that the actions of actors within a state are not guided by legal commitment or moral principle, but rather by considerations of interest and power. As the founder of these views, Machiavelli (1469-1527) emphasized that men never do good unless necessity drives them to it, and all do wrong to the same extent, if there is nothing to prevent them from doing it. In criticising constructivist theory, which puts forward identity and the desire to preserve it as reason for instability, neo-realism argues that anarchy and offensive capabilities leave actors within a state with little choice but to compete aggressively with each other, as trying to infuse communitarian norms is a hopeless cause. For this reason, according to neo-realists, the major reason for post-Gaddafi instability in sub-Saharan Africa is the problem of uncertainty within states in the face of anarchy exhibited by different powerful groups seeking dominance (Robert, Jackson & Sorensen, 2012). This, they claim, is not sufficiently explained by constructivists. Uncertainty is about the present intentions of the state and future intentions of the state to deal with the rise of conflict and instability.

However, neo-realism seems to have failed to explain effectively the complexity and instability that was experienced in Libya, Mali and Nigeria after the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the increase and gaining in momentum of the activities of terrorist and militant groups. This is mainly because neo-realism has failed to recognize that not only states can act in a manner to push for the maximization of their power: non- and sub-state actors equally do so.

On the other hand, critical theory places the emphasis on the historical context of the development of the global capitalist system. In contemporary North African states, competition between different interest groups, supported by their host states, is over material resources, in particular, oil. This, according to critical theory, provides the basis for post-Gaddafi instability in North and sub-Saharan Africa.

Deviating from the emphasis on historical materialism of critical theory, Devetak (2009) argues that unlike realism, which claims that the condition of anarchy and self-regarding actions of states are either natural or unchallengeable, critical theory accounts for the social and historical production of both structures and agents, which are taken for granted by traditional theories. However, critical theory comprehends the central features of contemporary society by understanding its historical and social development and tracing contradictions to the present, whilst constructivism puts forward the importance of ideas which it claims are under-played by critical theory. In this respect, post-Gaddafi instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria is a consequence of the historical process of development, expansion of capitalism and its attempted subjugation of other societies. However, the situation is more complex due to the presence of religious and cultural elements, which have a bearing on the role of identity and ideology, as claimed by constructivists.

Unlike neo-realists, who emphasize material structures in the balance of military power, constructivists argue that the social is more important than the material and that systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics exerting a powerful influence on social and political action (Burchill et al, 2012: 220). Constructivist theory extracts an element of the “clash of civilizations” thesis by arguing that the institutionalisation of factors such as identity and historical views may lead to conflict. Constructivist theory puts forward identity at the core of people’s interest, emphasising the importance of normative and ideational structures, and claiming that people act to preserve and promote their identity (Calsenaes, Risse & Simmons, 2007). People collectively draw artificial boundaries on the basis of social forces emanating from ethnicity, culture, historical experience and identity, leading to legitimation as well as contestation of boundaries. From this perspective, instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria can be best understood as a matter concerning the relationship between identities, norms and regional orders.

Wendt (1999) believes that the identities of persons or groups of people are important because they both inform interests and in turn lead to actions and in some scenarios these actions may be violent. When norms and ideas are institutionalized, they tend to define the meaning and identity of individual actors and the patterns of economic and cultural activity engaged by those individuals. The strength of an individual’s ethnic identity is mainly reliant upon economic and political circumstances and once a state begins to experience economic and political instability, ethnic identity becomes increasingly important in order to survive.

However, constructivism accounts of identity and the desire to preserve it as the reason for conflict, serve little purpose in the evaluation of ethnic identity as a politically relevant variable (Wendt, 1999). This is because the content, symbols and

meaning of a particular collective identity can evolve according to changes that occur in the socio-political environment. In effect, ethnicity is dynamic, not a fixed and immutable element of social and political relationships, as evident in the issue of ethnicity in the recent conflict in the Middle East and North Africa.

Each of the above mentioned theories offers an alternative explanation of the cause of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria by providing different bases for understanding conflict and instability in the regions mentioned above. Critiques and counter-critiques have arisen as the dynamic nature of conflict has changed, challenging theories to offer corresponding explanations and interpretations.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Though the fall of Gaddafi was celebrated by the West as a form of liberation of the Libyan people, in reality it allowed the re-surfacing of old conflicts not only in Libya but in the sub-Saharan region. The progressive deterioration of post-Gaddafi Libyan security represents a major concern throughout the region. To some scholars and analysts, internal variables such as tribalism, religious differences, the arms trade and trans-border movements have been the primary contributing factors to instability in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa. This is because whilst clashes due to ethnic, cultural and religious difference have always taken place; the magnitude of these has escalated since the fall of Gaddafi. Nonetheless, other scholars identify external variables in the form of economic interests and also the rise of militant extremist groups such as the Islamic State as contributing more significantly to post-Gaddafi instability. Danjibo (2013) argues that the involvement of the Western nations and the United States in the name of good governance transmitted via institutions such

as EU, UN and NATO, can also be considered as partly responsible for instability in sub-Saharan Africa. The causes of instability in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa have been theorised in different ways and the chapter has offered the overview of the causes.

The four theoretical perspectives outlined above offer different views in relation to the instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. These four theories will be examined further in Chapter Five, where a comparison of the approaches will be made and their limitations as well as epistemological gaps will be investigated. The next chapter will answer the first research question which was posed by the study.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF ENDOGENOUS FACTORS TO INSTABILITY IN THE REGIONS SELECTED**

### **3.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter offered a literature review and provided the theoretical frameworks that will be utilized in relation to their applicability to the study. The literature review offered an overview of the implications of the 2011 Libyan revolution for stability in sub-Saharan Africa, providing the perspectives of different authors.

The background to the study in the first chapter offered a broad conceptual division of the causes of conflict into external and internal causes, whilst the second chapter provided an overview of internal and external causes of instability in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa. Internal causes included variables such as the weakness of post-Gaddafi government, tribalism, religious differences, arms trade and the failure of regional organizations to prevent conflict, whilst the external causes included the role of the West, US and international organizations in sub-Saharan issues. Apart from this, the second chapter identified four main theories to be utilized in the study, namely realism, constructivism, critical theory and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis.

This chapter aims to present the data that explains the internal causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, by combining the conceptual division of external and internal causes made in the first chapter with the theoretical perspectives offered by different authors in the second chapter.

The previous chapters identified both internal and external factors as causes of post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria instability. In support of internal causes of instability El Katiri (2012) and Bassioni (2013) argue that in Africa today, tribalism and cultural differences have been elevated to dominate national discourse, controlling how people think in opposing or supporting a certain tribe, and these have played a significant role in aggravating internal conflicts. On the other hand, the role of the West, US and International organizations have been identified as alternative causes of instability of external origin in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Danjibo (2013), however, argues that the variables of instability include not only internal, but also external forces that claim to act in the name of good governance, whilst in reality doing the opposite.

Since the fall of Gaddafi, other states in North Africa such as Mali, Chad and Nigeria have experienced an increase in insurgency and terrorism due to armed groups operating in these states, causing high levels of conflict and instability. Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb, terrorist and Tuareg insurgents have fought with the governments of the above mentioned states, leading to civil unrest. The clarification of the concepts of terrorism and insurgency will be discussed when the role of violence is dealt with at a later stage in the chapter, as these two concepts form the basis of the researcher's analysis of the role of violent rebellion against the state as one of the causes of instability.

### **3.2 Promise of the “Arab Spring”**

Since the ousting of regimes in Libya, Mali, Egypt and Tunisia in the popular “Arab Spring” uprising, these North African states have struggled to install democratic regimes and instead they continue to experience civil unrest. Bernan (2013)

attributes the failure by these states to gain democracy to their authoritarian predecessors who ruled through forms of dictatorship that left their states entirely stateless after their removal, making it difficult for new governments to establish order. Notably, stable democracy requires more than just a shift in political reforms, it also involves eliminating anti-democratic social, cultural and economic legacies of old regimes and such processes take a lot of time and effort to be achieved. As a result, the toppling of longstanding authoritarian regimes was not the end of the process of democratization in North Africa, but the beginning. Berman (2013) argues that 2011 was the dawn of new era for North African states and although democracy does not necessarily cause social strife, it allows the distrust and bitterness built up under authoritarian regimes to surface, often with lamentable results.

### **3.3 Perspectives on the conflict**

The four main theories to be utilized in the study provided different views on the cause of instability in post-Gaddafi taking into consideration both internal and external variables as cause of instability. Scholars such as Ryan (2013), representing the realist point of view, centred on competition for power, present the view that in post-Gaddafi sub-Saharan Africa, increases in the activity of militant organizations have caused harm to civilians with the aim of achieving their political goals. Significant among these are the Tuaregs rebels, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) armed groups, who have put enormous pressure on the governments of the sub-Saharan states of Mali, Nigeria, Chad and Libya.

Aning, Okyere and Abdallah (2012), representing the constructivist point of view, assert that Libya, of all north African states, is the most predisposed to internal

divisions and instability, due to the fact that Gaddafi failed to eliminate ethnic and tribal barriers to create a national identity. He managed to contain conflict through authoritarian leadership and by cultivating strategic internal alliances with groups whose cooperation he required in order to retain power, but the pent-up tension was released after he was ousted in 2011. The instability in post-Gaddafi Libya spilled over to neighbouring states, creating conditions of hostility within the region.

Gartenstein-Ross and Barr (2015), representing the “clash of civilizations” view, which foregrounds deeply entrenched cultural divisions as a cause of “fault-lines” that are prone to conflict, assert that the fall of Gaddafi left a vacuum that cleared the way for extremists to enter the political realm. Huntington (1993) also argues that people from different civilizations have different views on how the world should operate and the conflict between Islamic and Westernized elements in parts of Libya, Mali and Nigeria can arguably attributed to this. The spread of religions such as Christianity and Islam have promoted the probability of violence through ‘fault line’ and the post-Gaddafi violence and instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria can be attributed to a “clash of civilizations”.

Danjibo (2013), representing critical theory, which locates conflict within the realism of the global political economy, argues that the desire by different groups to control different oil fields has led to the entrenchment of conditions of hostilities and civil unrest. In essence, the political economy of oil has led to instability in Libyan oil fields, with different militant groups fighting with the government for the control of the oil field (Chivvis & Martini, 2014).

Returning to the focus of this chapter, the aim is to unpack and provide possible answers to the first research question, namely; to what extent have endogenous

factors contributed to instability in the selected areas, and how have they done so? The chapter will offer an overview of the consequences of the fall of Gaddafi, not only in Libya, but also in Nigeria and Mali. It will apply the same conceptual and theoretical divisions that were used in Chapters One and Two. The focus area of this chapter is on the contribution of internal factors to instability in the above mentioned areas, whilst external factors will be examined in Chapter Four. The internal causes of instability, as theorized and presented by various scholars and discussed in Chapter Two, will be discussed fully in the presentation of data that follows in the next sections of this chapter.

### **3.4 Overview of the consequences of the fall of Gaddafi to Libya**

Subsequent to the 2011 uprisings and the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libya has experienced a transformation of its political system, with significant economic and social changes in the state and society (Combaz, 2014). Gaddafi was ousted from power by the National Transition Council (NTC), a group that consisted of different militias that opposed the Gaddafi regime, recognized by 114 United Nations General Assembly members on 16 September 2011 as the only legitimate representative of Libyan people (Chivvis & Martini, 2014). However, after the nominal accession to government by the NTC, they were unable to contain the increased power held by different armed groups leading to a state of chaos and uncertainty that has been exacerbated by the growth in the illegal arms trade and the empowerment of extremist jihadist movements. On the other hand, contemporary Libya does not resemble a state according to the commonly accepted western definition of a

modern state; for instance, a sovereign entity with recognized authority to exercise control over the population within its boundaries and monopoly over the use of force.

Prior to the 2011 uprising, for over four decades Libya was under the authoritarian rule of a leader who was described by the Western media as a “military dictator”. During Gaddafi’s reign, Libya operated with neither constitution nor parliament, and he used his much publicized “Green Book” which ensured the centralization of power, closing doors on other interests or opinions that might compete with his authority (Grifa, 2012). Apart from that, Gaddafi’s inner circle was concentrated with people from his tribe, loyalists and family members so as to ensure the continuation of his power. With Gaddafi’s so called “iron fist” ruling it was inevitable that after his ousting from power, deep rooted grievances would emerge, ranging from marginalization of anti-Gaddafi supporters and rivals, unequal distribution of wealth, tribalism, and deprivation of political freedom as being reasons for need of self-liberation.

Nonetheless, the mechanism used to oust Gaddafi from power was a transgression of sovereignty and NATO intervention in support of different militias to oust Gaddafi proved counter-productive in the end: instead of leading to the installation of a democratic system of government, levels of hostility increased (Chivvis & Martini, 2014). As a result of the escalation in tensions within Libya, it was inevitable that different interest groups would compete and fight one another for the control of the Libyan state. By supporting anti-Gaddafi forces during the 2011 uprising, NATO-empowered rogue militias who were not accountable to any authority, providing them with military hardware. In the aftermath of the anti-Gaddafi revolts, these militias could not be disarmed and were too powerful to be controlled by the newly installed government (Ibid).

The following section will explain the internal factors that led to the emergence of Libya as a “failed state” after the fall of Gaddafi. According to Brooks (2005: 160), a failed state can be defined as one that loses control over the means of violence and cannot create peace or stability for its population or control its territory. In this sense, the post-Gaddafi state fulfils the criteria of a failed state: the post-Gaddafi government lacks legitimacy in the sense of general popular acceptance of its right to rule, and it is therefore unable to implement rule of law or distribute resources effectively; there is a loss of sovereignty and it is unable to exercise power within its boundaries; and the state has lost control over oil production and sales. The result was an increase in the arms trade, the rise to power of armed militias and the expansion of disruptive activities by Muslim extremist groups which are able to move freely across uncontrolled borders.

### **3.3.1 Collapse of the state and government**

#### **3.3.1.1 Lack of legitimacy and authority**

Legitimacy of the state refers to a situation where the government abides by democratic principles and is accountable to its people, whereas authority is best understood as the power to make decisions, give orders and enforce compliance. The importance of authority ultimately comes from a need to stabilize Libya and since Gaddafi was toppled the new government has failed to exercise authority over its people. State authority can be defined as the power of the government to give orders, make decisions and enforce obedience. As explained in the previous chapter, post-Gaddafi instability can be attributed to external and internal factors, though this chapter focuses on the latter. The rise to power of extremist groups, together with ethnic and religious clashes, the arms trade and the involvement of

transnational organizations, have all contributed to the Libyan state's inability to attain legitimacy, or the popular acceptance of authority, displayed in democratic forms of government through general elections. The Libyan government has no control over different military circles that dominate their respective areas of influence in the east and the west. Rather than operating as homogenous combat entity, it operates according to a social contract between "an array of technocrats, individuals and prominent tribes" (Alaaldin, 2012).

After the ousting of Gaddafi; the NTC was endorsed by the UN as the new interim government, to pave the way for elections, which were held in July 2012. Conducting a free and fair election is one of the characteristics of attaining legitimacy and one of the mandates of the new interim government was to pave the way for conducting free and fair elections in Libya. According to the Constitutional Declaration of August 2011 (later amended by Constitutional Amendment in March 2012), the NTC was to promulgate an electoral law and conduct of elections within prescribed frame (Chivvis, Crane, Vandawalle & Martini, 2012).

In 2012, the Misrata and Zintan brigades both refused to recognize the authority of the interim government NTC. According to Alaaldin (2012: 34), the declaration of autonomy by Eastern regions, clashes between armed groups and abuse of prisoners indicate government's lack of authority. More profoundly, the lack of authority of post-Gaddafi Libya had negative consequences for the region, largely because of the proliferation of arms and the open borders that cannot be properly policed without organized security forces.

To ensure public participation in the electoral process a draft electoral process was held in January 2012 and elections were held in July 2012, attended by

approximately 17,000 national and international observers (Vandewalle, 2012: 2). However, despite these efforts, many Libyans complained that the process was not transparent, and they went as far as demonstrating and storming the NTC offices in late January 2012. One of the grounds for protests from the Islamic political sphere was that they wanted the electoral process to be embedded in the Sharia law.

To ensure that the election would be representative of everyone, both an individual-based system and a party-based system was to be used (Kadlec & Salem, 2012). The Higher National Election Commission (HNEC) issued a revised draft proposing that 120 of the 200 seats would be filled in a “first-past-the-post” outcome, with the remaining 80 seats filled through proportional representation amongst competing party lists. The fusion of the two electoral processes and the inclusion of propositional representation allowed the representation of smaller parties, civil groups and women in the national assembly.

Nonetheless, due to a lack of voter education and knowledge most of the Libyans in July 2012 elections voted along tribal and familial lines, rather than on the basis of ideological principles or alliances. Apart from that (Griffa, 2012: 3) points out that most observers of the Libyan national and security scene were sceptical of the fairness of the elections due to the proliferation of weapons and the fear was that these were used for political ends. However, despite these fears of violence, the turnout for the post-Gaddafi elections was high and approximately 62% of the registered voters cast their votes (Griffa, 2012). Given the political importance of this election its success was important for post-Gaddafi state stability. The success in conducting the election and the handing over of power from the NTC to the GNC, and the dissolving of the NTC, was one positive step towards attaining stability. In

November 2012 Ali Zeidan was sworn in as the democratically elected prime minister of Libya.

Nonetheless, the GNC government failed to establish authority or to obtain *de facto* legitimacy as different groups continued to fight the government for the control of designated territory. By and large it failed to bring about the peace and security required to achieve stability in post-Gaddafi Libya. Despite the handing over of power by the NTC to the GNC, which signalled a goal towards attaining government legitimacy, the continuation of in-fighting between and amongst armed groups prevented the government from exercising control over its territory.

In February 2014, the GNC was supposed to resign and hand legislative power to a democratically elected parliament, yet they refused, igniting the eruption of protests and violence. In addition, in March 2014 the GNC dismissed its Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, based on reports of his failure to stop armed groups from exporting oil independently, and it elected Ahmed Maiteg as prime minister. After Zeidan was ousted from power, the crisis deepened in Libya. In May 2014, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by general Khalifa Haftar, launched military airstrikes against Islamist militant groups in Benghazi and attempted a failed coup d'état, accusing Prime Minister Maiteg of supporting Islamist groups (Yasar, 2015: 9). Consequently, in June 2014 Maiteg resigned as Libyan Prime Minister after a court ruling held that his appointment was illegal. The instability swelled in June 2014 due to the fact that Islamist factions performed poorly in 2014 parliamentary elections and armed groups that backed them launched a violent campaign against the new parliament, which ultimately gave them control of the two largest cities in Libya, Tripoli and Benghazi (Blanchard, 2015). The June 2014 elections were marred by relatively low turnout and violence that prevented voters from electing representatives in some areas.

Libya was drawn deeper into a wide struggle between pro- and anti-Islamist forces. Consequently, the democratically-elected parliament led by Abdullah al-Thinni failed to wrest control from militias in these cities, forcing them to move their seat of power to the eastern city of Tobruk. Alarmed by the escalation of violence in Libya, the UN interfered in 2014 with the aim to create a nationally united government. In December 2014 a peace deal was brokered between the two competing parties marking the end of fighting between the two competing parliaments (Blanchard, 2015). Despite all the efforts the Libyan government has failed to end the hostilities within its territory.

Although the peace deal was brokered, fighting and violence continued with the LNA led by retired General Khalifa Haftar, rejecting the agreement and continuing the military campaign against the Islamist militias. In May 2015, Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni survived an assassination attempted by gunmen who attacked his car in the city of Tobruk. Nonetheless, the prime minister's power has been challenged by a body formed in the capital city Tripoli that claimed to be the legitimate government of Libya. Blanchard (2015) argues that al-Thinni has struggled to stamp authority in post-Gaddafi Libya since he came into power in March 2014. With the consistence fighting between government forces and Islamists militias who have pledged alliance to the Islamic State militant group al-Thinni's government has failed to make an impact and provide peace and security in Libya.

Chivvis and Martini (2014) emphasize that in the Gaddafi era government stability was gained through the use of force against the civilians. However, after the ousting of Gaddafi, authority was lost due to the desire by and ability of different militias to gain control of parts of Libyan territories, especially the oil fields. Without control over this source of revenue, the post-Gaddafi government was significantly weakened.

It is critically important to note that although the post-Gaddafi Libyan government tried to achieve stability, it lacked sovereignty over its own territory. Sovereignty is defined as the right and power of a governing body within a state to govern itself without. During the uprising, the rebels groups never unified into a single army and when the war ended they returned to occupy their own territories. The new Libyan state authorities thus the NTC lacked the monopoly over the legitimate use of force and they had also inherited the security institutions of the Gaddafi regime (Chivvis, 2012). This fragmentation of security in the Libyan state after Gaddafi made the state vulnerable and presented the state with the risk of not achieving a successful transition.

Gaddafi and his army were displaced and replaced by militias that represented diverse interests of different groups and clashes were inevitable (Tripp, 2013: 62). Despite the military aid that the anti-Gaddafi protestors received from National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN to topple Gaddafi, thereafter there was little material assistance to stabilize the post-Gaddafi state. Terrorist violence and insurgency became a problematic issue for the new Libyan state, with groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State establishing bases in Libya after infiltrating its borders and conducts acts of violence against the civilians. The new government failed to put an end to the acts of terror against its civilians.

In trying to gain peace and security the post-Gaddafi Libyan state took the measure to disarm militias and security-sector reforms. However they faced resistance and levels of compliance were very low and because of the government's lack of legitimacy to enforce its measures, the disarming of armed groups and militant groups was not successful (Chivvis, Crane, Mandaville and Martini, 2012).

The lack of the post-Gaddafi government's sovereignty and authority, evident in its inability to control activities within its territory, promoted the proliferation of trade in small arms and light weapons. The high concentration of small arms and light weapons has been a major cause of the on-going conflict in the entire sub-Saharan region, and it is to the internal arms trafficking that we now turn our attention.

### **3.3.3 Internal arms trafficking**

Although many Libyans celebrated the ousting of Gaddafi as their liberation from his dictatorship, the post-Gaddafi government failed to obtain legitimacy in the form of popular acceptance of its right to rule, or to exercise sovereignty that is, control over the territory within its borders that would enable it to effectively implement the rule of law. The absence of *de facto* legitimacy and sovereignty contributed to the increase in the illegal arms trade and the free movement of armed militias around Libya and surrounding areas. Boukhars (2012: 1) argues that the main cause of instability in sub-Saharan Africa is the increase of military hardware from transnational trafficking of illicit goods. Complementing Boukhars' view, Kimunguyu (2014) emphasizes that the post-Gaddafi crises in Libya emerged as a mechanism of insecurity because Gaddafi's demise created a power vacuum, subsequently creating room for the operation of regional armed groups and criminal networks.

The Libyan civil war of early 2011 was one of the bloodiest conflicts in the sub-Saharan region, with an estimated 30,000 people killed and 50,000 injured (Karasik, 2012: 1). While the death of Gaddafi marked a political change in Libya, the months of turbulent violence that preceded it saw a massive build-up of arms and ammunition in the country. The high concentration of arms in Libya was a product of Gaddafi's own large stockpile and acquisition of ammunition. According to Karasik

(2012) between 1970 and 2009 Libya is believed to have spent \$30 billion on weapons. Despite the UN arms embargo on Libya between 1992 to 2003, Gaddafi maintained multi-million dollar arms contracts to successfully consolidate his arsenal. It is evident that on the onset of the 2011 revolution Gaddafi escalated his arms supplies. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011), Libya received supply of arms just before United Nations (UN) imposed its second embargo in 2011 and this precipitated the massive flow of arms and weapons in post-Gaddafi Libya. Karasik (2012: 2) claims that prior to the ousting of Gaddafi, African jihadist group Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda militants, Tuareg insurgents, Somali pirates had all acquired weapons from within Libya, leading to extremist violence in the sub-Saharan region.

Post-Gaddafi Libya has been awash with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that could transport easily due to porous borders and desolate deserts that provided trouble-free routes for smugglers. Under Gaddafi, the departments at the borders were split deliberately so as to retain Gaddafi's personal rule; however after his fall various groups took control of the border allowing the smuggling and trafficking of small arms and weapons (Chivvis & Martini, 2014). Insecurity has had negative repercussions across Libya and the precipitation of arms strengthened jihadist movements seeking to form an Islamic State within Libya. It is necessary at this stage to turn our attention to the phenomenon of Jihadism and the emergence of the Islamic State movement in North and sub-Saharan Africa.

### **3.3.4 Jihadist movements**

Over and above the above mentioned atrocities, Libya has continued to deal with high levels of instability worsened by the desire of forming "Islamic State" in Libya by

jihadist extremist groups. The Islamic State can be seen as product of major geopolitical and generational changes that have been unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa. *Jihad*, according to Islamic faith, is a struggle or 'holy war' against unbelievers, which may take a violent or non-violent form. A holy war is well-phenomenon in human civilization of fighting on behalf of God's religion. Jihad came about towards the end of the eighth century and their primary aim was not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defence of the Islamic state. Peters (1997) asserts that due to the stagnation of Islamic expansionism, the notion of Jihad became internalized as a moral or spiritual struggle.

The Islamic State (IS) emerged from social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and it began after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 as Sunni jihadist groups opposing the US occupation. It mainly challenges the territorial divisions that had been imposed on the Middle East region following the collapse of Ottoman Empire a century earlier by carving out for itself a large area of territory (Barrett, 2014). The Libyan revolution allowed the frustrated Islamists who had been marginalized by the Gaddafi regime for over four decades to 'blow off steam' by supporting foreign jihadi rather than pushing for reforms in Libya (Azoulay, 2015).

The ousting of Tunisian, Libyan, Egyptian and Malian leaders in the popular "Arab Spring" is believed to have undermined the power of violent jihadist movements such as Al-Qaeda, which had attempted to overthrow Arab governments in states like Tunisia and Egypt but failed (Byman, 2011: 49). Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda and its allies evidently benefitted from the unrest, as, AQIM an affiliate group of Al-Qaeda, had greater operational freedom of action in the post-revolution period, leading to further unrest. However, secular revolutions in the above-mentioned states were

mainly pro-democracy and this posed challenges to the fundamental beliefs of jihadist movements, as they believe that democracy puts man's word above God, which defies their belief in the supremacy of Islamic law. Dictatorship had crumbled, but nothing solid was in place to ensure stability of these states.

Subsequent to the Libyan uprising, jails were emptied, putting experienced jihadists back into the streets. Amongst those released were extremists willing to wreak havoc on their enemies. Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had a long history of working with jihadist movements against mutual enemies and during the uprising against his regime, Gaddafi employed jihadists to fight "on his corner" (Byman, 2011). In the post-Gaddafi era, jihadist movements have rebelled against the new government and successfully expanded their propaganda efforts. As a result, opportunities for the expansion of organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State arose in the wake of unrest. "Territorial" fighting has turned to civil war, with AQIM and Islamic State affiliates enjoying a strong presence in Libya.

The desire to form an Islamic caliphate in Libya has contributed to the instability within Libya and the vulnerability of the state has allowed armed gangs to penetrate within borders of Libya, claiming allegiance to the Islamic State. In August 2014 Ansar Al-Sharia, a militant Islamic group in Libya with ties to the IS, announced the occupation of Benghazi (main city in the Eastern Libya and one of the major economic, industrial and financial centres), and declared the formation of an 'Islamic emirate' there, though the Libyan government denied the claims as false (Azoulay, 2015). The subsequent growth in numbers of extremist groups within Libya has contributed significantly to the rise of armed militias in Mali and Nigeria. The expansion of the Islamic State in Libya, Mali and Nigeria will be dealt with in chapter Four when dealing with external causes of instability in the selected regions. The

next section will provide in detail the overall consequence of post-Gaddafi instability on children.

### **3.3.5 Impact on children**

As indicated earlier, there were many negative aspects to the overthrow of Gaddafi, and these included the negative impact on the welfare of children. Many people were displaced during the uprising, including women and children. For example, the NATO military air raids are believed to have displaced and claimed the lives of hundreds of women and children. As a result, children became the main victims because of their vulnerability before and after the war (Amusan, 2013). After the fall of Gaddafi, the psychosocial effects of war on children became a source of concern. The devastation of basic infrastructures such as schools, roads and hospitals, and the relegation of the role of many children to the status of parental care have affected their psychosocial development.

A further socio-political element was the recruitment by jihadist movements during the 2011 uprising of children as child soldiers who were trained to kill. The availability of weapons in the hands of children in the post-Gaddafi era has allowed conflicts to re-ignite, and in some instances permitted child soldiers to coerce their communities into taking specific actions, further contributing to instability, not only in Libya but also in neighbouring states (Amusan, 2013).

To a large extent, the lack of legitimacy of the Libyan government, the rise of the arms trade and the gain in momentum of extremist jihadist movements contributed to the chaos not only to Libya but also in neighbouring states. The next section seeks to explain the spill-over effects of post-Gaddafi Libyan instability to Mali and Nigeria. These states, though not sharing borders with Libya, have experienced the spill-over

effect of Libyan instability and since 2011 these states have experienced high levels of instability that have threatened their social, political and economic stability. Although this chapter is dealing with internal causes of instability, they cannot be dealt with independently from external causes since they are intertwined and this is made clear by looking at Mali and Nigeria.

### **3.4 Instability in Mali**

Aning, Okyere and Abdallah (2012) point out that the 2012 coup in Mali was triggered by the on-going instability in Libya that spilled over to neighbouring states and the rest of the region. Prior to Gaddafi's demise, for over twenty years, post-independence Mali had been considered as a model of democratic evolution in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it can be argued that the Libyan uprising and instability ignited the 2012 uprising in Mali. Nonetheless, post-independence Mali had faced rebellions of their own that have threatened to destabilize the state and it was a matter of time till the rebellions re-surfaces again with much intensity.

The fall of Gaddafi regime in 2011 triggered existing instability from historically underlying problems in Mali. As we have seen earlier, most of the popular rebellions were conducted by the nomadic ethnic group, the Tuaregs, nomadic Berber ethnic groups in north-eastern Mali and parts of Libya. The Tuareg insurgents had rebelled against the Malian government in 1963 to 1964, 1990 to 1996, and 2006 to 2009 and in January 2012, respectively. The first three uprisings were intra-state conflicts seeking independence from the Malian government, with the Tuaregs claiming that they had been marginalized, a deep-seated claim that was the underlying cause of all subsequent uprisings (Belik, Grebovic & Willows, 2012).

However, before the Libyan crisis, Mali had also been destabilized due to the presence of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as we have seen. Both AQIM and Tuareg armed groups were engaged in an anti-government campaign in Mali. An armed rebellion launched on 17 January 2012 managed to expel the army in the north of Mali and by March 22 in the same year the president of Mali was ousted from power by the military junta (Africa Report No 189, 2012). These events ushered Mali into a 'state of emergency' that threatened the neighbouring states security and stability.

Arieff (2013) argues that despite disarmament programs, peace agreements, the Malian state has been accused of marginalizing the northern region and, as a consequence, north-south relations in Mali remain tense. The conflict in Mali has had regional and international implications, with devastating consequences on stability in neighbouring states. The North of Mali became a haven for occupation by Islamist extremist groups, posing a serious threat to Algeria's security and stability. Although not sharing a border with Mali, Nigeria was also seriously affected by the crisis in Mali, with intelligence reports claiming that AQIM provided Jihadist training to Boko Haram, which has wreaked havoc in Nigeria (Francis, 2013: 10).

### **3.4.1 Attempts to restore democracy in Mali**

According to the UN Security Resolution 2085 adopted in December 2012, the first round of elections was set for July 28 the following year. In early July 2013 numerous problems arose, with the interim president vowing not to run for elections. The MNLA, a previously existing old rebel group which emerged from the uprisings of 1990's, and which was still in control of Kidal in northern Mali, threatening to block the process of voting in the city. These problems gave rise to concerns of the

legitimacy of the election in which the country seemingly looked as if it was not ready. According to the Amnesty International Report (2014), although Mali conducted elections in July 2013, the new government has failed to gain control of the northern part of the country which remains under the control of the heavily armed groups AQIM, Tuareg rebels and the MNLA.

Not only can post-Gaddafi Libya be blamed for igniting instability in Mali in 2012, but according to Allen (2015), the instability in Libya has aggravated conditions of instability in Nigeria. Although it has been pointed out that Nigerian stability was under question long before the ousting of Gaddafi, with Boko Haram intensifying attacks against civilians. The spill-over of instability following the post-Gaddafi Libyan crisis to neighbouring states has contributed to the escalation of hostilities led by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria since 2011, as will be discussed next.

### **3.5 Influence of the fall of Gaddafi on Nigerian stability**

Nigeria is rich in natural resources and is regarded as one of Africa's economic powerhouses. Since it has sufficient productive resources at its disposal, it has the capacity to enforce or make economic decisions within Nigeria that will impact the whole region of Africa. However, it is estimated that over 50% of its local population is poor (Ploch, 2013). Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria remains highly underdeveloped and this has sparked internal infighting within Nigeria. Since independence Nigeria's unfair economic conditions between the North and the South makes political power-sharing in Nigeria a sensitive issue and this has always been problematic for national stability.

Notwithstanding the view that ethnic and religious strife has become common, divisions between North and South, and between Christians and Muslims, often stem from issues relating to lack of access to socio-economic development (Ploch, 2013). Catalysts of outbreaks of conflict in Nigeria arise from economic inequality, social violence between and amongst different tribes and ethnic groups, political contestation and religious fundamentalism. Although political instability in Nigeria owes much of its cause to internal factors, the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 nonetheless seems to have aggravated internal hostilities.

The fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 aggravated hostilities in Mali in 2012, which was a cause of concern to Nigeria. It is argued by Allen (2015: 115) that the ousting of the Malian regime in 2012 and the creation of conditions of hostility encouraged the blossoming of criminal groups, drug traffickers and arms smugglers, and the upsurge in the armed insurgent activities in Nigeria may have benefitted.

Boko Haram, an Islamic armed group operating in Nigeria, has intensified its operations since 2011, gaining momentum from the vulnerability of Nigeria's borders and instability in Mali. After 2011, Boko Haram tactics became more sophisticated and it started using suicide bombers, suggesting that it was receiving assistance from some elements of the jihadist movement. The bombing of the UN building in Abuja on August 24, 2011 marked the departure of the group's exclusive focus on domestic attacks. In 2012, the growing in strength of Boko Haram in the North intensified ethnic and religious violence in the middle belt. However, violence in the North and the Middle Belt has since become continuous, rather than periodic, acquiring distinctive religious, rather than ethnic or tribal dimensions (Hesterman, 2014: 37).

Notwithstanding the reality of religious extremism as a cause of instability, the political economy of oil must also be taken into account. Nigeria's oil has long been a source of political tension, and criminality in the Niger Delta has always been higher than Nigeria's national average, with low socio-economic standards and levels of unemployment characterizing the region (Ploch, 2013: 15). Rather than bringing prosperity and better living conditions, oil has brought in instability, conflict, insecurity, crime, violence and social tensions. Oil and gas exploration in Nigeria is mainly done by multinational companies (MNC) and it has been noted that the nature of the relations between these oil companies and Nigerian government is at the root of the problems of conflict and instability. Ploch (2013) argues that MNC's such as Shell, Total, ExxonMobil and Agip have disregarded the welfare of local communities and in retaliation armed gangs of marginalized and impoverished communities in the oil region have conducted acts to sabotage oil operations. On the other hand MNC's in the Niger Delta oil region in Nigeria had been blamed for supporting different armed groups and providing monetary payments so as to gain security for installations leading to instability.

Nigeria, as a heterogeneous society in terms of religious, ethnic and cultural pluralism, is prone to conflicts and it was easy for the Nigerian state to feed from the Malian and Libyan crisis creating their own conditions of hostilities (Segun, 2013). Instability in the above mentioned states have prompted the rise of armed militias who have taken advantage of the vulnerability of the states.

### **3.6 The rise of armed militias in Libya, Mali and Nigeria**

Notwithstanding the fact that the historical attributes such as colonialism has been some of the internal reasons for instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, the rise of armed militias has significantly contributed to instability. Different militias have become very powerful causing civil unrest and instability in the above states. However, it is important to distinguish between the nature of these groups and their role in instability.

This section will unpack the significant differences between the concepts of “terrorism” and “insurgency” in order to distinguish between the two, in examining the activities of groups that organise armed rebellion against the state. This section will also examine the impact on post-Gaddafi instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria of the activities of Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb and Tuaregs.

#### **3.6.1 Terrorism versus Insurgency**

“Militant”, “rebel”, “insurgent” and “terrorist” are terms that have often been used interchangeably, though they have different meanings and need to be understood as defined by the researcher for the purpose of this research. According to Kennedy (2009), an “insurgent” refers to a person who belongs to a specific organization and tries to achieve the mainly political objectives of the organization. In essence, an insurgent is a person who is armed with ammunition and indulges in violence to achieve the objectives of the movement. Insurgency denotes a political movement inside a state and is aimed against the institution holding power, namely, the state. It does not necessarily aim at overthrowing the state, and if it does, it does not aim at extending its activities beyond the state.

Terrorism can be defined as the use of violence against random civilian targets in order to create generalized pervasive fear, for the purpose of achieving political goals that are not only aimed against the state and carried out by groups within the state, but which are part of a wider struggle that extends beyond the scope of the state (Danjibo, 2013). Terrorism generates terror in the minds of the establishment as it often chooses civilians targets to draw attention to its cause. Similarly, insurgency uses violence but it is mostly engrossed in achieving specific political changes to accomplish its internally based political agenda (Kennedy, 2009). In some cases insurgent groups have transformed to being terrorist groups, for instance Al-Qaeda in the Islamists Maghreb (AQIM), which started as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Originally a group seeking to oust the Algerian government, changed its focus to become a social movement linked to Al-Qaeda, at which stage it became part of a wider movement with a broader set of aims at a different political level.

Apart from terrorism, insurgency has become one of the main challenges in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Re-capping the meaning assigned to insurgency, it refers to organizations that essentially engage in internally organised armed opposition and resistance against governments and ruling regimes (Okumi & Ikelegbe, 2010). Insurgent movements are committed to the nation-state, but seek to overthrow the existing state and replace it with new political order and to 'build alternative political authority'. Socio-economic and political conditions in Africa have produced grievances that have been used by insurgents to justify violent actions. Post-Gaddafi instability has created conditions that have been favourable for insurgent groups such as the Tuaregs to operate in Mali since 2012.

In sum, the key difference between insurgency and terrorism is that insurgency is understood to be a rebellion against constituted authority within the state, whilst terrorism is defined as the use of violence so as to achieve political goals constituting a wider struggle that extends beyond the scope of the nation-state.

The next section will deal with the internal causes of post-Gaddafi instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria in the form of a rise in terrorism and increasing activities conducted by insurgent and terrorist groups. A distinction will be made between these groups, due to their significant difference in the reasons for their existence and how they conduct their activities.

### **3.6.2 Insurgency as the origin of terrorism**

It is difficult to separate exclusively internal from external factors of instability when it comes to terrorism and insurgency this is mainly because they are intertwined and interrelated. However in order to understand the internal elements of insurgency and terrorism this section seeks to explain in detail how the rise of wider struggle by armed groups that extend beyond the scope of the state (global terrorism). This began since the end of the Cold War and the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States has contributed to the rise of terrorism in the above mentioned regions.

After the end of the Cold War, Middle East oil became more accessible to global powers, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which terminated its control over the Middle East region. At this stage control over the entire Persian Gulf region over the supply of Middle Eastern oil were among the United States' chief political-economic concerns. The US used its power to safeguard its national interest in the Middle East region. However, after the Cold War the fundamental issues that

influenced America's interests in the Middle East were the Arab-Israel conflict, the Soviet Union's threat to the United States and the importance of the Middle East oil (Modigs, 2003). Subsequently with the fall of the Soviet Union in early 1990's US interests in the Middle East were emphasized to achieve regional stability, primarily by securing Israel and the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. In this essence, Israel became important as a key component in projecting US economic and political interests in the region and to counterweight the Arab nations. However this was met with resistance from Palestine and its allies who had prompted vicious fighting and terrorist activities in the region, spreading to North and West Africa.

The origins of terrorism can be traced back to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan prompted by the Soviet Union invasion in the late 1970's and the US being interested in counter power against the Soviet Union (Gasper, 2001: 4). Consequently, the US provided extremists groups in Afghanistan, known as the *mujahideen*, with military hardware and training so as to fight the Soviet Union and overthrow the Afghanistan ruler. Eventually, Russia withdrew from Afghanistan in late 1980's; however, this did not help the country since it had collapsed into virtual anarchy. After the Cold War the Taliban group emerged profoundly and transformed from being a group seeking to overthrow Afghanistan regime to being a group threatening global peace, taking advantage of a strategy of 'theological indoctrination' and backed by the military training it had received from the US (Gasper, 2001). However, US support for Taliban ended in 1998 when Osama Bin Laden allegedly organised the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, after which the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan refused to extradite Bin Laden to the US. In response the US retaliated by launching cruise missiles into the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan at Bin Laden's alleged camps. The terrorist group Al-Qaeda

emerged from the Taliban led by Osama Bin Laden, who had received funding from the US so as to fight against the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan before Al-Qaeda emerged as a militant force and began a campaign of aggression against the US.

Bergenas, Finlay and Tessler (2010) point to the fact that over the last two decades the Middle East region has been plagued by a number of civil wars. This has made sub-Saharan African the most conflict-affected region in the world because the Middle East instability has spread to North Africa, facilitated by the absence of state sovereignty manifest in porous borders. Africa has been susceptible to the free flow of small arms and light weapons, with causes ranging from ethnic, religious, political, economic and social clashes, all of which have tended to lead to inter-state and intra-state wars. Many of the hostilities are remnants of the colonial and Cold War eras, as will be seen below.

The Cold War, which started in the 1940's and ended in the early 1990's, engulfed the world in the competition of dominance by two super powers, the US and Russia, as well as their respective allies, and Africa was caught in between the two. This period saw a dramatic increase in terrorism brought forth by competing powers of the bipolar system and this has continued beyond the Cold War. Nonetheless, the end of cold-war saw African countries dealing with the array of nationalist terror groups that had emerged in the Cold War in either support of the Soviet Union or United States (Smith, 2000). This divided African states and in the post-cold war era such divisions became a reason for inter-state and intra-state wars.

The legacy of colonialism can also partly be blamed for post-Gaddafi instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria. In search for resources and power during the 19<sup>th</sup> century

Western nations established arbitrary colonial boundaries in accordance with their interests, thereby grouping together or dispersing different ethnical groups. For instance, in the case of Tuareg, the tribe was dispersed over West and North Africa due to arbitrarily established boundaries. Libya contains over 140 different tribes and since the fall of Gaddafi these tribes have viciously fought one another for greater control and influence, so as to get recognition by the interim government and outsiders as having greater authority (Alemazung, 2010).

Notwithstanding historical religious and colonial factors as causes of conflict and instability, the increase in the acts of terrorism by Al-Qaeda since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US have been of concern in the region contributing to worsening conditions of instability. On 11 September 2001, henceforth known as “9/11”, Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda conducted attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C and over 3,000 people were killed. More profoundly it became evident that the Al-Qaeda attack on the United States was in retaliation to the US oil wars and what was deemed their “obsession” to gain control over oil production in the Middle East. Boukhars (2012) argues that these attacks are believed to have opened the doors for hostilities between US and Al-Qaeda. As a result making Africa a target for social movements’ activities with Somali being one of the first targets of terrorism in Africa though it was already struggling from social movements targets from Islamic Courts of Union (ICU).

After the so-called “9/11” attacks, the US became deeply involved in “counter-terrorism” activities. According to the US, its main aim was to prevent the growth of the militant Al-Qaeda movement in the sub-Saharan region. However, the so called “war on terrorism” by the US against Iraq could be regarded as the reason for the spread of instability in sub-Saharan Africa especially in East, North and West Africa

(Boukhars, 2012). This was because the attack on Al-Qaeda at the core of anti-US resistance, with the aim of combating terrorism, allowed for the rise of affiliated groups such as the Al-Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM). In fact Al-Qaeda transformed from being a unitary organization to a hierarchical social movement with many network affiliated organizations over which Al-Qaeda has no control (Ibid).

Organizations such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and AQIM, due to the fact that their struggle aims at achieving wide-ranging political goals that extend beyond the scope of the nation-state, can be described as social movements that use terror to achieve their goals. Because of the political climate of vulnerability of North Africa and sub-Saharan states, these organizations have been able to gain support and expand. For instance the Al-Qaeda affiliated group AQIM focus has become broader and more regionally based than nationally based and appears capable of overthrowing African regimes. This is evident in its successful attacks in Tunisia (Boukhars, 2012). The ability of social movement organizations to operate throughout these states is mainly as a result of weak governments that are unable to exercise control as sovereign states over large territories with porous borders, and inadequate strategies to combat and prevent the operation of these dangerous groups (Bergenas, Finlay & Tessler, 2010).

According to Alexander (2015: 4), statistical records show that terrorist attacks in 2014 have increased by 25% compared with 2013, with AQIM conducting most of the terror attacks. The most affected countries in 2014 were Libya (with a total of 201 incidents), Mali (35), Tunisia (27), and Algeria (22) (Ibid). According to the Global Terrorism Index (2015), in 2015 Nigeria and Libya were rated 3<sup>rd</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> place for having the most terror attacks in the world, respectively. Whereas terrorism can be understood as the use of violence against random civilian targets in order to create

generalized pervasive fear, for the purpose of achieving political goals, but does not seek to overthrow state government. Furthermore, terrorists unlike insurgency targets governments or societies to advance ideology and is not confined to a state whereas insurgents use ideology to target governments and are mainly confined to the state. The spread of extremist violence has increased, with Nigeria, as the most densely inhabited nation in the continent, being a prime example of destabilization and bloodshed invoked by Boko Haram, which seeks to enforce its version of radical Islamic law in the country and beyond (Alexander, 2015). For instance Boko Haram since 2011 has expanded its operations in Nigeria, attacking mostly Christians, but also moderate Muslims, and taking control and overpowering the Nigerian army in the north of Nigeria. The violent attacks and the movement of Boko Haram have also diffused and spread to neighbouring state Cameroun.

Boko Haram is based in northern Nigeria and its origins are in its rejection of Western education, with its original purpose being to seek independence from the Federal State of Nigeria. Al-Shabaab, which is based in Somalia, has attacked civilian targets in neighbouring Kenya seeking to change Somalia into an Islamic State. Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) based in Libya, Algeria, Mali and Chad has conducted regular attacks on these with the dedication of dismantling regional governments and implementing Sharia law (Boukhars, 2015).

The West African sub-region, particularly northern Nigeria, is grappling with threats posed by Boko Haram. Prior to the Libyan crisis, West African states became susceptible to wide-range security challenges caused by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and this has created conditions favourable to the advancement of militant extremist groups such as Boko Haram.

### **3.6.2.1 Boko Haram**

Boko Haram is an Islamic movement that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt and false Muslims and it seeks to wage war against them and the Federal Republic of Nigeria and to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by Sharia law (Walker, 2012). The Sharia law that Boko Haram wants to impose does not, however, correspond to the belief system of the majority of Nigerian Muslims (Ibid).

The origins of Boko Haram date back to 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf (an Islamic scholar) and his followers protested against the corruption of Nigerian society. Barna and Michalko (2014) maintained that the group wanted to establish its own community where Muslim values could be pursued. Boko Haram won public support in the local communities in Northern Nigeria, an area largely deprived of public resources, owing to people’s dissatisfaction with the state. Following the death of Yusuf in 2009, the movement was radicalized and extremism was accentuated. Under the leadership of Yusuf, its attacks were mostly on security forces and police, and since 2010 its attacks have taken place on large scale, increasing the geographical reach of the organization. However, since 2011 Boko Haram has transformed from being a local insurgent group opposing the Nigerian state to a terrorist group that has the intention of spreading the influence of the Islamic law throughout African states.

Initially, Boko Haram was a locally-based Salafi-jihad insurgent group fighting against Western education. The objects of its attacks since 2011 have expanded beyond the borders of the Nigerian state and it has targeted Western organisations such as the UN as well as local civilian organisations and institutions. The kidnapping of western nationals has also been attributed to Boko Haram (Michalko,

2014). Subsequent to its affiliation with Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has advanced from being a jihadist insurgent organization based in Maiduguri, in the northeast of Nigeria, to part of the Islamic State movement, to which it pledged allegiance in 2014 (Ibid). The groups' methods have evolved from poorly planned open conflict with state security forces, to assassinations, ambushes, suicide bombings and kidnappings aimed at disrupting society and overthrowing the western state, rather than its original goal of opposition to western education.

Boko Haram was the first armed organization in Nigeria to be declared by the US and its allies as a terrorist organization on November 13 of 2014. Akpan (2014: 151) emphasizes that the violence the group has unleashed on the Nigerian state is unprecedented and peace negotiations with the group are unlikely because the group rejects western models of democracy and western principle of good governance. He thus contends that the Nigerian government should treat Boko Haram as a terrorist group, instead of freedom fighters with legitimate demands, as was the case at an earlier stage.

The fall of Gaddafi in 2011 and the instability in the post-Gaddafi Libya is believed to have strengthened and ignited the extremist hostilities of Boko Haram as the group is believed to have acquired ammunition from Libya (Blanchard, 2015). Boko Haram's main aim was to destabilize the government led by the then Christian Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan. In May 2013 the government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states located in Northern Nigeria, as security crises deepened, with Boko Haram seizing control of the states. Boko Haram gained increased international attention in 2014 due to its widely condemned abduction of over 250 school girls from Chiboko village a town in Borno (Blanchard, 2015: 8). US Report (2014) estimated in reports that Boko Haram

may consist of 4,000 to 6,000 hard core fighters operating within the state of Nigeria and mainly concentrated in the North of Nigeria. According to the United Nations Report (2015) from 2009 to May 2015 more than 17,000 civilians had been killed and over 1, 5 million people had been displaced and over 800,000 people have fled the conflict zone in Nigeria. Since then the group has expanded its activities into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

### **3.6.2.2 Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM)**

Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) emerged from Algerian civil war of the 1990's and it was named after its location in North Africa (Roussellier, 2011). It evolved from the Algerian militant group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). It was the largest armed group in Algeria and it aimed at conducting operations directed at government and military targets, seeking to overthrow the Algerian government, with the goal of installing an Islamic regime. Though the GSPC started as an insurgent group with goals confined to Algeria, and also aimed at ending western influence in Algeria, in early 2000 the GSPC started to evolve and spread its influence across Algerian borders to neighbouring Chad and Niger. The GSPC was labelled by the US and its allies as a terrorist organization on March 27, 2002 mainly because of its transformation and moving from beyond Algerian borders. In 2007 GSPC changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb pledging its alliance to Al-Qaeda in support of Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda changed the group's strategic direction, refocusing its ideology and selection of targets towards a global jihad (Levy & Thornberry, 2011: 2).

The evolution from GSPC to AQIM affected the security situation of Mali, Libya and Nigeria. This is mainly because the group became distracted from its goal of overthrowing the Algerian government due to Algeria's security apparatus infiltrating

the group, as a result started expansion into the Sahara region especially in North Africa and its alternative to contraband trafficking and ransom demands (Harmon, 2010). AQIM is a source of insecurity in Mali and Libya. It has a considerable source of income and capability to conduct random acts of violence against civilians and the state, aimed at disrupting social organization since it is one of the Al-Qaeda wings operating to advance the Islamic extremist interests.

The fall of Gaddafi's regime enabled the AQIM to further its influence and make inroads in other parts of the region where alliance were reportedly forged with other social movement organizations such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab (Chivvis, 2013). The 2011 Libyan revolution opened opportunities for such organizations to pursue extremist agendas in Libya itself. The challenges triggered by the Libyan crisis, are feeding on old unsettled insecurities, developing into new threats against states in the region with the group setting base in Libya. After a brief period in which AQIM appeared relatively inactive, in 2011 it conducted several kidnappings in Mali and Algeria, as well as suicide bombings directed at political and government targets influenced by the uprisings in North Africa.

In 2012 AQIM was one of the Islamist groups that wreaked havoc in the northern Mali leading to the coup d'état and it claimed control of some parts of north Mali. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2013 raised concerns over AQIM advanced transnational 'terrorist plots' and pointed out links between AQIM and extremist groups in Libya, Nigeria and Mali as a major concern for regional political and security situation (Arieff, 2013). It is also argued by Arieff (2013: 10) that AQIM has reportedly gained significant wealth by holding kidnapped Westerners for ransom and through involvement in cross-border smuggling operations. This has led to it being referred to as "Al-Qaeda best funded, wealthiest affiliate" and has used

the money garnered from ransoms and trafficking to fund its sophisticated communications equipment and vehicles.

AQIM is believed to have conducted multiple kidnapping in Algeria, Niger, Libya, Mali and Tunisia. In February 2013, 14 foreign nationals were kidnapped in the northern Mali and the group demanded ransom, and in June 2014, it claimed responsibility for the attack of then-Interior Minister of Tunisia in the western town of Kasserine. AQIM remains active in its criminal enterprise of kidnapping for ransom so as to finance the group's operations. Although perceived by the West and the US as a terrorist organization AQIM has tried itself as a protector of the people supplying locals with food, water, medicine and has been careful of not targeting local communities in the area of their interests (Levy & Thornberry, 2011).

### **3.6.2.3. Tuareg insurgency in post-Gaddafi Mali**

Tuaregs are a minority ethnic group of Arab descent with an approximately 1.2 million population and its dissatisfaction and rebellion against the government has been a source of conflict and instability for Libya and Mali. As pastoralists, they have established political networks through the region of North Africa; Gaddafi was regarded as one of the sole-financier of the Tuaregs and in return the Tuaregs became the most reliable ally to Gaddafi and helped him stay in power for over four decades (Brownie, 2013). In order to reduce the predicament of the Tuaregs, Gaddafi issued unrestricted residence permits to all Nigerian and Malian Tuaregs. Before the French colonized North Africa the Tuaregs occupied a distinct territory with traditional rulers who directed their affairs and during colonization their territory was dismantled and divided amongst a number of states thus Niger, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Libya, Mali, Algeria, Morocco and Chad. Whereas the creation of these

states resulted in Tuaregs becoming marginalized in these states because they automatically become the minority tribe (Danjibo, 2013).

Tuaregs could be categorized as an insurgent group due to the fact that they expressed their dissatisfaction with the Malian government and rebelled against the government on the basis that they have been historically marginalized. Their resistance against the government intensified after the fall of Gaddafi, leading to the 2012 coup in Mali, since when they have seized control over more than half of Mali (Alexander, 2015).

The quest for political self-determination and cultural recognition in these states contributed to them lodging a rebellion against the state of Mali in 2012 and succeeding in a coup. As a result after the defeat of Gaddafi the Libyan anti-Gaddafi forces transferred their aggression to the Tuaregs, owing to their support for the Gaddafi regime, leading to their dispersal across the sub-Saharan African, through in Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Morocco and Algeria (Danjibo, 2013). However, this promoted the transfer of large catchments of arms and ammunitions in possession of Tuaregs. When this group arrived back to northern Mali in 2012, it rebelled against the Malian government. Trafficking in drugs or small arms and light weapons was not prominent up until the ousting of Gaddafi in 2011, the evidence of Tuareg rebel from Libya to Mali suggested that post-Gaddafi opened window of opportunities for criminal activities to expand where state institutions were weak or fragile. During his reign Gaddafi fuelled arms depots and the collapse of his regime left unsecured warehouses filled with ammunition. Alexander (2015) maintains that Tuareg fighters from Mali that had served as Gaddafi mercenaries looted weapons from Gaddafi's warehouses and transported them to Mali enabling them to create conditions of hostilities

It is estimated that over 3, 000 Tuaregs of Malian origin left Libya in 2011 after the fall of Gaddafi. They merged with Tuareg armed groups located in Mali and the Coalition of Azawad Movements; the jihadist coalition Ansar Dine, AQIM, Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) (Amnesty International Report, 2014). This coalition contributed to the northern region of Mali becoming a central location of diverse groups with Al-Qaeda-linked organizations seizing control of the region. These groups took arms against the Malian government in 2012 in a bid to establish the independent state of Azawad in northern Mali. The declaration worsened the political crisis in Mali and showed the inability of the military junta to resolve the deepening conflict. Once the movement had control of the north of Mali, each group established a base in one of the main cities AQIM in Timbuktu, MUJAO in Gao and Ansar Dine in Kidal. Though they have revolted against the Malian government for several decades, the 2012-2013 rebellion saw the US, EU and France embarking on military exercises to restore order and maintain peace.

The call for autonomy by the Tuareg people was supported by externally sponsored organizations such as the Islamic State (IS), which wanted to seize control over and impose Sharia law in Mali. Tuaregs have been blamed for destabilizing Mali since they have always sought autonomy from the Malian government and participated in many uprisings. The Tuaregs, unlike Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO, wanted Azawad, as they referred to the north, to be an independent state from Mali. However, although the Tuaregs are Muslims, their interpretation of Islam differs from that of Islamic extremist groups (Arieff, 2013).

Arieff (2013: 30) supports the view that the withdrawal of the Malian state in the above mentioned regions in Mali aggravated long-standing community distrust,

ethnic divisions and lawlessness that presented a window opportunity for militant groups, terrorist groups and rebels to settle and thrive on illicit trafficking of arms and weapons. On the other hand, Tuaregs are believed to have trafficked arms to Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria and compromising the stability of these states. Danjibo (2013) argues that Tuareg insurgents after the fall of Gaddafi made inroads to Nigeria and they provided Boko Haram with ammunition acquired from post-revolution Libya. However, even before the ousting of Gaddafi in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria was already conducting war of terror against civilians.

To a large extent the growth and expansion of insurgency and terrorist groups in the post-Gaddafi era has attracted and facilitated the expansion of the Islamic State movement within the volatile states of Libya, Nigeria and Mali. Due to the existence of discontent among Muslims in these areas, it was inevitable that the Islamic State movement would take advantage of the volatile conditions in these states to pursue their interests.

### **3.7 Chapter conclusion**

With the increase of instability in 2011, it is evident that the fall of Gaddafi created a significant void that fuelled contest and conflicts over control of illicit resources and this promoted the rise of criminal activities weapon smuggling, arms trade and promoted conditions of hostilities (Azoulay, 2014: 30). This chapter has dealt with internal causes of instability in the above mentioned states, including factors such as an ineffective post-Gaddafi government, religious differences, cultural differences, tribalism, arms trade and the resultant general insecurity. Due to the dynamic nature of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, it was seen that existing internal

causes of instability mutated to become externally driven. The researcher established that post-Gaddafi Libya provided the conditions for extremist jihadist groups to operate, giving rise to a militancy that subsequently incorporated existing counter-state struggles into the broader aim of the Islamic State movement, that of establishing a borderless state.

Post-Gaddafi Libya has been labelled as a failed state due to lack of government legitimacy, insecurity, lack of authority and loss of sovereignty. Griffa (2012) argues that the mechanisms used for the ousting of Gaddafi from power were a transgression of sovereignty and in the end instead of installation of democratic systems of government the levels of hostilities escalated. The lack of sovereignty, authority, legitimacy and insecurity promoted the proliferation of small arms and light weapons which had been a major concern for instability.

Although it is true that the ousting of Gaddafi and subsequent instability in Libya ignited conflict in surrounding states, in particular Mali and Nigeria, these states were already prone to conflict. Historically, the governments of both Mali and Nigeria have failed to unify the northern and southern regions, leading to marginalisation of people living in the northern regions. Their grievances fostered the rise of insurgency, which later became incorporated into broader-based jihadist movements. Consequently, their activities no longer targeted the national state, but all western institutions, aiming not only to eliminate the western model of the state, but all associated institutions such as boundaries, and to install an Islamic State under Sharia Law.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN POST-GADDAFI LIBYA, MALI AND NIGERIA**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter unpacked and provided possible answers to the question as to the causes of post-Gaddafi instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria, concentrating on internal causes of instability. It also demonstrated how insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, AQIM and Tuaregs became transformed into externally aligned aggressive forces linked to either Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. This chapter will examine external other causes of instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Scholars such as (Chivvis, 2012) argue that the deterioration of security in the post-Gaddafi Libyan state made the state vulnerable and presented the state with the risk of instability that has spread to Mali and Nigeria. This chapter examines the underlying causes of the weakened state and presents arguments claiming that these are based on external influence. The political economy of the region, based on resources such as oil and uranium, the increase in the arms trade, and the escalation of activities of jihadist movements in response to the global battle for hegemony in the Middle East and North Africa, will be investigated.

This chapter seeks to unpack and provide possible answers to the second research question, namely, the extent external forces contributed to instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, and how they did that. The following section will provide in detail information on external factors to instability in post-Gaddafi mentioned regions. It

will discuss factors related to the political economy and how the need by foreign companies to gain control of illicit resources such as oil and uranium impacted on the stability of the affected states. Since the fall of Gaddafi, the scramble for access to oil fields by foreign companies has led to conflicts and vicious fighting among Libyan militias for illicit control over this resource. In addition, the section will also present data on the consequences of the expansion of the Islamic State as a response to western involvement in the Middle East and North Africa.

## **4.2 The political economy of North Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa is home to some of the world's fastest growing economies, many of them buoyed by the gas and oil industry. According to the figures released by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), sub-Saharan African oil reserves in the last decade have grown by 120% with Libya, Egypt and Nigeria being the top three oil-producing countries in Africa (Vandewalle, 1998). Since the beginning of 2011 we have witnessed crises and uprising in sub-Saharan Africa especially in North and West Africa. These regions possess reserves of crude oil and they play an important role in the global security for energy supply and it is unsurprising that they have become the centre of wars and instability as various sources of political power compete for control over production and supply to their markets. Libya holds Africa's largest proved oil reserves (2, 9% of the world's reserves), while it also accounts for 0, 8% of the world's gas reserves (Vandewalle, 1998).

## **4.2.1 Background to the Libyan political economy of oil under Gaddafi**

### **4.2.1.1 The discovery of oil in Libya**

Oil exploration started in Libya in 1953, shortly after the discovery of oil in the neighbouring state of Algeria. Oil was discovered in 1957 and the first commercial exploitation was in 1959 at Zaltan (Ariweriokuma, 2008: 6). In 1969 another major oil discovery was recorded in the southeast of Sirtica Basin field and through intense exploration and development activities led to the discovery of new oil deposits around Libya. Oil was discovered in Libya at the time of King Idris al-Sanusi's rule, when the Libyan economy was mainly agrarian and kinship was the main mechanism for economic distribution (Vandewalle, 1998). Nonetheless, the form of government at the time, monarchy, benefited enormously from royalties received and it advocated for a capitalist philosophy, limiting government involvement and encouraging private sector development. Consequently, at the time of the oil discovery, Libya was one of the world's poorest countries, with an estimated annual per capita income of around \$25-35 and the discovery of oil was supposed to change the economic outlook.

A new revolutionary government came to power in 1969, led by Muammar Gaddafi, who promised to distribute the resources received from the oil industry to the masses, transferring the economy from a capitalist to a socialist orientation. Gaddafi suspended the constitution and disbanded parliament, leaving him with absolute power to completely transform the political, social and economic structure of the country (Grifa, 2012: 1).

#### **4. 2.1.2 Gaddafi's centralization and nationalization of oil (1970-1990's)**

To a large extent, Gaddafi regime managed Libya's political economy through Gaddafi's "Green Book", which contained Gaddafi's political philosophy. According to Grifa (2012), it reflected the regime's interest in protecting itself and closing the door of other opinion or power that may compete with his authority. So as to ensure his supremacy he appointed his close family members and loyalists to run various sectors of Libya's economy. Talani (2014) argues that under the Gaddafi regime, patronage and corruption became entrenched in the country's political and economic structures, as a result of the centralization of power in the hands of Gaddafi and a small political elite. However, it is important to note that Gaddafi's political-economic experiment was possible because he took power when Libya had become a fully-fledged oil-producing country and the economy of the country benefited enormously from the revenue received from this (Talani, 2014).

In the 1970's Muammar Gaddafi proposed the need for the nationalization of the Libyan oil. At the same time, the regime reduced the production quotas for individual companies, paving the way for more control over the oil industry. This began with demands for higher petroleum prices and bigger shares for Gaddafi regime and led to the withdrawal of some multinational companies from the Libyan oil industry. Despite an attempt by international oil businesses to counter Gaddafi's actions, the period 1971 to 1973 was dominated by Gaddafi regime declaring majority shares in all of the remaining oil companies active in the country, including US oil companies Texaco and California Asiatic, the Libyan Oil Company and British Petroleum (BP) (Vandewalle, 1998: 76).

Subsequent to the nationalization of oil companies, Gaddafi's arrangement diverted profits to himself, as the supreme central authority, for re-distribution as he deemed appropriate. He then aimed at controlling the oil industry through leadership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC had been established by mainly Arab states in 1960 in reaction to the domination of the global political economy by multinational companies, owned mainly by the US and western nations. The main aim of OPEC was to control the global oil market so as to implement a collective strategy to retain the oil profits made by multinational companies. Its twelve member states today include Libya, Nigeria, Kuwait, Angola, Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Ecuador, UAE and Venezuela and currently it produces 41% of the world's oil (Colgan, 2012). In the early 1970's, Libya was one of the member states that declared an embargo on oil shipments to the US, in the wake of the 1973 war between Israel and Arab States.

In retaliation, the US imposed restrictions on the purchase of military equipment by Libya and Libya was added to the list of potential enemies of the US. In trying to force Gaddafi to reverse his nationalization policies, the US implemented a policy to stop all imports of crude oil from Libya and all exports to Libya from US (Talani, 2014: 210). Although Gaddafi tried to attract oil companies back to Libya by offering incentives, the Libyan economy was negatively affected by the US actions. Talani (2014) points out that in the mid-1980s the declining oil revenues forced the Libyan government to start cutting back on expenditure. At the same time the average price of Libyan crude oil went down and Libya lost potential income and the economy showed deficit. However

despite economic woes, Gaddafi retained popularity within Libya due to populist redistribution measures and the victory over multinational oil companies.

In essence Gaddafi was a socialist, and his 'Green Book' expounded on the virtues of the people and society. Mikael (2013) points out that the 'Green Book' was a reaction to excessive inequalities of capitalism and neo-liberal practices imposed by western influence. Throughout his four decades of rule Gaddafi was intolerant of the West and internal dissidents and was often labelled by Western media of being antagonistic towards the West and religions other than Islam. He also frequently discredited western and other foreign actors for plotting against Libya and seeking to interfere with the country's internal affairs (Mikael, 2013: 2). Gaddafi was engaged in prominent anti-US and anti-imperialist actions and he positioned himself as defender of colonized people, providing military and financial backing in the 1970s and 1980s to different liberation movements in Africa who were seeking independence from colonialists.

Nonetheless, in the 1990's Libya was forced to withdraw its nationalization policies due to the UN sanctions imposed in retaliation to Libya's involvement in the Lockerbie bombing of 1988, which brought down a civilian Pan American World Airways flight above Scotland (Kennedy, 2011). The damaging effects of various sanctions on Libya made the overall economic structure of the country weaker and unable to cope with the pressure of modernization in the oil industry. At the time Libya was not only suffering from effects of international economic sanctions but a massive drop in oil prices was placing a huge stress on the Libyan state's ability to finance its unproductive public sector. However, the embargo had also had some consequences for the US and the UK with oil companies of other countries eager to gain access to the Libyan oil reserves.

Consequently, Libya had to target other European countries and started trade relations with Germany and Italy (Talani, 2014). However, the strategy by the Gaddafi regime in the 1990s to attract foreign business and revenues was unsuccessful and the Libyan economy continued deteriorating.

#### **4.2.1.3 The liberalization of Libyan oil markets**

Due to western imposed sanctions that affected negatively the economy, Gaddafi was left with no option but to renounce Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2003, creating a more cordial relationship with the West and enabling him to pursue efforts at reintegrating Libya in European trade, geared towards economic development through Western investments and markets. From 2004 to 2005 significant structural reforms were introduced, including the elimination of import monopolies and liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI). The privatization aim was ostensibly to reduce the role of the public sector and enhance the role of private sector in the economy.

Talani (2014:219) argues that by 2007 Gaddafi finally bowed down to international pressures and decided to adopt the neo-liberal practices associated with laissez-faire economic liberalism policies such as privatization, free trade, deregulation and reduction in government expenditure. This was due to the wake of the collapse of the Libyan economy following more than two decades of isolation and sanctions. International pressure from organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) managed to convince Gaddafi to adopt neo-liberalism.

It is indeed difficult to ignore the fact that the history of the political economy of isolation reveals, oil and energy have played a pivotal role in the dynamics of the relations

between the West and Libya and continues to do so (Talani, 2014). This does not alter the fact that it was partly the desire by Gaddafi to control the oil business so as to finance his personal projects which was one of the causes of the 2011 revolt. Socio-economic factors were a major cause of internal dissatisfaction prior to the 2011 revolt, as the Gaddafi government failed to use its oil revenues to strengthen and diversify the economy. Over time, unemployment became a persistent problem and infrastructure development in Libya lagged. Due to high levels of corruption in the oil business, Libya under Gaddafi remained underdeveloped, despite being rich in oil resources (Ibid).

#### **4.2.2 The Libyan political economy of oil after Gaddafi**

Due to a rise in Libyan unemployment and the concentration of wealth within the small elite group of Gaddafi loyalists, the base of Gaddafi's support narrowed and resistance to his rule increased. Motivated by the success of the so called "Arab Spring" in Tunisia, which overthrew the existing regime, the grievances of Libyan people became a motivational factor in undertaking a rebellion against the Gaddafi regime.

After the fall of Gaddafi, whose leadership had, despite criticisms of his autocratic style, resulted in a highly centralized and stable situation internally, the state was weakened by contestation for power. This allowed gangs and militant groups to take control of multiple sources oil production, bypassing the state and driving the production of oil down. Armed militias were involved in supplying multinational corporations with oil and the inability of the Libyan government to resolve disputes over the export of crude oil have made it difficult to stabilize the state economically (Chivvis & Martini, 2014). Such conditions encouraged Europe and the USA to increase investment and to gain control over the Libyan oil supply, therein reducing Libya's prospects for developing policy

independently of Western economic interests. In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring revolution, multi-national corporations such as Shell, Total SA and British Petroleum (BP) provided financial aid and ammunition to militant groups to oust Gaddafi. This was so as to secure trade benefits to their advantage and the weaker post-Gaddafi state is the greater to their advantage (Ibid).

The collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya led to new regional tensions over the control of the oil fields and contributed to a number of security incidents, specifically targeting the oil ports and terminals in the eastern part of the Libya. The new government in Libya resorted to using petroleum and natural gas sales to fund the military forces, so as to try and maintain order. At the same time, different militias fought one-another so as to gain control over areas of Libya, specifically the lucrative oil wells. The oil industry is the backbone of the Libyan entity, representing the country's 96% domestic revenue and 98% of foreign revenue (Finucci, 2013). However, political instability and security issues since 2011 have led to the decline in oil production, impacting negatively on the new government's ability to exercise sovereignty.

#### **4.2.2.1 Events in the oil regions of Libya (2011-2015)**

The Libyan oil industry was affected by a post-Gaddafi legacy of violence, with the growing instability proving to be a major impediment to progress to economic recovery. The capture of oil facilities by militias in post-Gaddafi era brought about oil production to a post-war low causing the Libyan government to lose revenue (Chivvis & Martini, 2014: 58). Since the official ending of the Libyan uprising in October 2011, both the interim and the elected government have been unable to restore security in the country where numerous armed militias are active.

In July 2013 an armed group under the leadership of Jedhran in eastern Libya seized control of Libya's nine oil terminals and forced the country's largest oil field to close. As a result the output fell to a low of 150, 000 barrels per day causing a budget crisis that forced the Libyan central bank to use its reserves so as to keep the country operating in the wake of a decrease in oil sales (Sohn & Froude, 2014: 45). The inability of the Libyan government to exercise control over its most valuable resources revealed the power vacuum left by the Gaddafi regime. Only after the UN and international forces intervened was the Libyan government able to force Jedhran militias to return oil facilities they had seized to the government (Ibid).

During the first half of 2014, Libya experienced mounting protests at major oil fields and export terminals, leading to a fall in production levels to 155 000 barrels per day by May 2014. The year was marked by intense oil field shutdowns, with different factions maintaining key oil production sites (Mansour, 2015). In mid-2014 a political agreement was reached by Prime Minister Al-Thinni with armed militias so as to re-open major oil fields and export terminals, and oil production began to recover, though it fell again by the end of 2014, due to the deteriorating security situation (Mansour, 2015: 3-4). Instability was worsened by the 2014 capture of Tripoli by a coalition of Islamic militias that forced the elected government to move to the eastern region.

In early March 2015, Islamist militias rumoured to be Islamic State (IS) affiliates managed to overrun Mabruk oil field, which is located 500km from Tripoli (the capital city of Libya) and believed to be one of Libya's biggest oil fields (Bachmann, 2015). The seizure of these oil fields by Islamic State militias created more pressure on Libya's oil-

reliant economy, which was barely functioning because of the battles among different rival forces, driven by local grievances and political differences.

With militias strengthened by wealth accrued in the oil fields, post-Gaddafi Libya has come closer to the brink of state failure. Despite Libya's considerable oil wealth the continued loss of control of oil fields by government to different militant groups has ensured the slowing of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the post-Gaddafi oil economy has continued to deteriorate. Bachmann (2015) points out that Libya without oil revenue has little chance of rebuilding the state. The government has become increasingly irrelevant, as it is unable to execute its core functions.

The post-Gaddafi economic and political future remains uncertain because rebel and militant groups have not been disbanded and continue to act under their own authority by aligning their forces against the government in different regions of the country (Chivvis & Martini, 2014). Whilst Libya has encountered escalating levels of instability, Nigeria has also been affected by a spill-over effect of the oil conflict in its oil-producing regions – notwithstanding the fact that the Nigerian oil region was unstable even before the ousting of Gaddafi. It is to this matter that attention will now be turned.

### **4.2.3 Nigerian Political economy**

Nigeria is another African large-oil producing state, also facing instability. The Niger Delta oil region has become a lawless zone, with different militant groups operating and carrying out deadly and paralysing attacks on oil and gas facilities. The Niger Delta, comprising the three Nigerian states of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers, is strategically located along the Gulf of Guinea and contains high quality oil reserves. For over a

decade, it has been plagued by attacks from armed groups the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) and Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF) (Obi & Rustard, 2011). The escalation of violent conflict in the Niger Delta has brought the region to the forefront of international energy and security concerns. Given Nigeria's position as one of Africa's leading oil producer and exporter, the 'oil war' in the Niger Delta is a major contributor to Nigeria's political instability and economic growth. Instability in the Niger Delta is closely linked to Nigeria's internal contradictions and politics. Obi and Rustard (2011) maintain that the conflict in the Niger Delta is a long-standing issue, embedded in the history of struggles for self-determination and arising from the political and socio-economic impact of transatlantic trade on the region.

The instability in the Niger Delta has increasingly attracted international attention due to the growing security threats it presents for the Nigerian state and also due to its impact on international oil prices. The threat of outright rebellion against the state and multinationals have made the region unstable (Obi & Rustard, 2011) and the fall of Gaddafi exacerbated the situation, promoting the proliferation of trade in and distribution of small arms and light weapons to different militant groups in the Niger Delta.

#### **4.2.4 Political economy of Mali**

Unlike the Libyan and Nigerian economies, which are heavily dependent on oil production and exports, the economy of Mali is based on agriculture and minerals such as gold, uranium and diamonds. However, the 2012-2013 political and security crises which led to the overthrowing of the government by a military junta had enormous consequences on the Malian political economy. Before the security and political crisis,

Mali's economy had grown rapidly and poverty had decreased. Immediately after the 2012 coup in Mali, the AU and UN imposed sanctions on Mali with ECOWAS, closing borders between Mali and member states, thereby depriving the landlocked Mali of access to seaports (Look, 2012).

Mali is rich in natural resources and it is one of the world's largest developers and producers of uranium, a mineral that powers nuclear production. This mineral resource plays an important role in international politics as any country that owned the technology of processing it will virtually become a threat to international security. Uranium is found in the Northern part of Mali and is the focal point of interest for both Western companies and Islamists.

France is one of the world's leading producers of nuclear energy and it sources a substantial share from Northern Mali, territory that is now exclusively claimed by the nomadic Tuareg tribes. "French interests in exploiting uranium in Northern Mali prompted them to intervene in the Malian crisis in the area that concerned them", (Prince, 2013). Because of the presence of French troops, uranium production during and after the revolt in Mali was not affected much by the instability. The Malian economy was affected negatively by the 2012-2013 revolt; this is because the French protected their interest by directly getting involved in the 2012 uprising.

#### **4.2.4.1 French military intervention in Mali**

Immediately after the 2012 coup, the question of external intervention in Mali was inevitable, since the central government was unable to operate effectively. There had been a number of summit meetings by the African Union (AU) but none produced

tangible progress, and the Economic for West African States (ECOWAS) failed to put in place a concrete strategy to deal with insurgency in Mali. The impasse triggered a French intervention (Sambe, 2012). The French president Hollande, at the request of the interim government of Mali in 2013, agreed to provide military support to defend Mali from Islamist extremists with the full support of African Union (AU), European Union (EU), United States (US) and China (Harmon, 2013: 209). In January 2013 French-led military intervention to fight against Tuaregs insurgency group, AQIM and other the militant groups that has precipitated insurgency in Mali. The military intervention appeared to have been a solution to stability since overall security in the country remained far from being stable.

The French military intervention was considered as the most important in bringing about a rapid and decisive military end to conflict in northern Mali and in the justification of the intervention, French president stated that France had no option but to intervene and prevent the emergency of a terrorist state that would have serious security repercussions for France at large and the West. According to Francis (2013: 4) the West feared the possibilities of counter-hegemonic eastern movements such as Al-Qaeda that would expand and spread their sphere of influence within Africa if the Azawad existence would come to reality.

However, instead of minimizing conflict, instability escalated, barely a week after the French intervention in Mali the Islamist militant group AQIM seized control of a natural gas complex in an Algerian town. French military intervention was by and large able to beat back the Islamist rebels in northern Mali, though a number of challenges remained. Following the success of the French-led offensive against the Tuaregs insurgents and

Islamist movements and the subsequent drawdown of French forces in April 2013, an interim peace contract was negotiated between the Tuaregs rebels operating in the north Mali and the government in June 2013 (Harmon, 2013). The truce broke down after Malian soldiers allegedly shot and killed Tuaregs protesting against a visit by Malian prime minister in Kidal, but overall violence did not increase.

Though France and US assisted the Malian state in stopping the expansion of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, National Movement of Liberation of Azawad (MNL) and Movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), both countries had motives for protecting and projecting their respective interests, especially the fact that Mali contains vast resources, among other minerals, uranium and gold. Arieff (2013) maintains that the Western powers were fearful of the rising influence of the Muslim fundamentalists in Mali because of the geostrategic position of Mali and the possibility that the Muslim fundamentalism would spread further through West Africa.

On the other hand, the justification of French military intervention in Mali in 2013 reflected the extent to which the interests of French, particularly in relation to the exploitation of resources, were vested in the area. Although France maintained the 'war on terror' as its bases for military intervention Shuriye and Ibrahim (2013) argue that it was not the case, as France was trying to protect its interest since it strategically depended on uranium extracted from Mali and Niger in order to produce nuclear energy. As uranium is one of France's leading industries, forming the basis for lucrative contracts for the supply of energy around the world.

The post-Gaddafi situation in Mali, Nigeria and Libya challenged the effectiveness of the state in countering terrorist, extremist and insurgent groups in Africa. Consequently, the vulnerability of the states under discussion increased, due to porous borders and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This prompted the expansion of the Islamic State into these states by pledging alliances with armed groups of insurgents that were already in existence, transforming their activities into terrorism. As a result, conflict and instability intensified, prompting the escalation in its aim of overthrowing the western form of state altogether, with the aim of the establishment of a borderless Islamic State under Sharia Law.

### **4.3 The expansion of the Islamic State**

The Islamic State (IS) emerged from social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and it began after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Sunni jihadist groups opposed the US occupation. Chengu (2014) points out that the 2003 American invasion of Iraq created pre-conditions for radical Sunni groups like IS to take root. Rather than promoting unity and religious integration, the US policy in Iraq promoted sectarian divisions and created a fertile breeding ground for Sunni discontent.

Originally known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) its roots can be traced back to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), though it is not controlled or influenced by Al-Qaeda (Gulmohamad, 2014). Instead, the IS is an extremist jihadi group that is founded on the notion of a self-proclaimed caliphate, led by Sunni Arabs from Syria and Iraq. IS opposes western involvement in the Middle East and initially it mainly challenged the

territorial divisions that had been imposed on the Middle East region by the western Allies (France, Britain and the US) following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War One (Barrett, 2014). Mainly because of the power vacuum that was created by the fall of the Ottoman Empire, control over land, power and resources was contested by the victorious parties after the First World War. Intervention by non-Islamic western decision-makers was more likely to increase the likelihood of violent conflict, rather than alleviating it (Ibid). Today, natural resources such as oil and gas are still at the centre of rivalry between the most powerful states.

Today, the ambition of the IS is by no means limited to Iraq and Syria, and its name change reflects that and has found its way to sub-Saharan Africa, seizing territorial control of some parts in Libya, Mali and Nigeria. The violent seizure of more than half of Mali's land by radical Islamic militants since 2012 and the growing of violence by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria have heightened the attention on the emerging expansion of the IS to the sub-Saharan region of Africa. The main target of IS are non-believers and both established Muslim and non-Muslim governments. Marginalization and state failure are conditions favourable to the success of IS and model of state failure has existed in North Africa prior to the Arab revolutions (Azoulay, 2015).

According to Meyerle (2014), the Islamic State (IS) is a movement that uses some of the tactics employed by Al-Qaeda. More profoundly, the IS rejects completely all western notions of state and society, including concepts of the western state, boundaries and democratic practises such as elections. It also believes in Sharia law, whereby private and public aspects of life are regulated according to Islamic faith as contained in the Quran. The IS uses violence to impose control over local structures,

but it is more prepared to adapt to the local state of affairs to the mutual benefit of itself and local jihadi groups (Ibid).

“The prevalence of radical Islamist groups within Africa makes the continent particularly vulnerable to new threats driven by the rise of the Islamic State” (Allison, 2014: 3). To a great extent the fall of Gaddafi and the instability that followed in the post-Gaddafi era in Libya and other northern African states attracted the desire of IS to extend the Islamic State from the Middle East, where it originated, to Muslim-dominated areas in Africa.

Post-Gaddafi Libya conditions of conflict and instability and a lack of internal security allow jihadist extremist groups seeking to form an ‘Islamic caliphate’ to operate. In August 2014, Ansar Al-Sharia, a militant Islamic group in Libya that appears to have ties to the IS, announced the occupation of Benghazi and declared the formation of an ‘Islamic emirate’ there. Though the Libyan government denied the claims, it has failed to contain the expansion of the IS within Libya, and IS has continued to seize control over parts of Libya (Allison, 2014). Since December 2014, IS has focused on civilian attacks in Libya. On January 28 2015 a video was circulated which depicted the execution of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians on a beach in Libya by militants claiming to be part of the IS. This drew international attention to the fact that Libya had become a new realm of jihadist activity (Winter, 2015).

Not only has the IS penetrated the borders of Libya, it has also spread to neighbouring states and in August 2014 the Islamic militant group Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the IS. The IS claimed responsibility for the attack in Tunis, the capital city of Tunisia, on 18 March 2015, in which 21 people were killed. Later, on 26 June 2015, an attack was

conducted by IS on a tourist resort at Port El Kantaoui, in which 38 people were killed (Siddique & Jalabi, 2015). This high-profile attack allowed IS to mark its presence not only in Libya, but on a wider scale in North Africa.

#### **4.4 Chapter Conclusion**

The ousting of the Gaddafi regime has had major repercussions not only on Libya but also on Nigerian and Malian instability. The prevalence of conflict and instability in post-Gaddafi Libya and Mali has been influenced by the ousting of Gaddafi, whose rule had concentrated power and control under his personal leadership. Conditions of conflict and instability subsequent to his demise, together with a lack of government sovereignty and the absence of adequate internal security measures, allowed the groups aligned to Islamic State seeking to form an 'Islamic Caliphate' to operate within the mentioned region. However, the distinction between internal and external causes has been as artificial in the light of what happened to insurgent groups after the fall of Gaddafi, whereby they transformed from being limited to nation states to being social movements with wider struggle that extend beyond the scope of the state.

After the fall of Gaddafi it became evident that Gaddafi was the sole leader who had managed to contain different rebel groups such as the Tuaregs and Berbers, avoiding the eruption of conflict. After his demise these different rebels who had previously been kept under his wing became difficult to control, causing tension in Libya, Nigeria and Mali (Danjibo, 2013). Different militant groups seized control of the Libyan oil fields, leading to violent clashes with the government. External factors such as foreign

multinational companies with vested interests in the Libyan oil economy as well as in other resources in the North African region intervened so as to secure their interests by making direct arrangements with non-state actors and worsened the existing condition of a lack of sovereign power on the part of the Libyan state.

The influence of international organizations such as the United States and France and extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS has promoted conditions of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Existing conditions of instability were exacerbated by the absence of the strong control that Gaddafi had wielded, allowing the IS to successfully penetrate into these states, in some instances declaring total control over large areas of these countries. The acceleration of terrorist attacks conducted by the IS on military and civilian targets worsened the already fragile and unstable conditions in these states.

# **CHAPTER FIVE: THE APPLICABILITY OF WESTERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IN EXPLAINING CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN POST-GADDAFI LIBYA, MALI AND NIGERIA**

## **5.1 Introduction**

The previous chapters outlined in detail how the ousting of the Gaddafi regime contributed to instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Chapters Three and Four identified exogenous and endogenous factors as the possible cause of current instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria respectively. The internal variables included post-Gaddafi Libyan inability to exercise the rule of law and how the instability has spread to Mali and Nigeria. The rise of armed militias and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons were also identified as a contributory factor. However, insurgency was perceived as an endogenous factor as indicated above but became transformed into an exogenous factor due to the penetration of the IS movement. Exogenous factors included the expansion of the Islamic State and the effects of the geo-political location of Libya in relation to global political economy of oil and the international arms trade.

This chapter seeks to unpack and provide possible answers to the final research question posed, namely; how applicable selected Western International Relations theories are in explaining conflict and instability in the areas under investigation. It will outline, compare, analyse and evaluate the research findings in the previous chapters in

the context of four main theoretical assumptions, namely, realism, constructivism, critical theory and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis.

Because these four theories advance different explanations for the causes of conflict and instability, each theory has different assumptions and “truth claims” in relation to their respective hypotheses. However, all are relevant to the study. Notwithstanding the fact that International Relations (IR) theories have been criticized for not representing African beliefs, norms and structures, this is because they are believed to ignore many issues that are more significant to African nations, having been established based on Western experience. The practical and intellectual origins of these theories are firmly rooted in European historical experience and applying them to African phenomenon may seem like a hopeless cause. This chapter, however, seeks to explore their relevance and usefulness in relation to African phenomena.

A theory is a generalization of an idea or concept, gathered from data with the purpose of helping to understand the social world in a new sophisticated way, which can be tested in different settings (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 11). Facts cannot be separated from theory, and instead, facts must be considered in relation to the assumptions of a particular theory. “Facts” are interpreted by theory and are always the result of interpretation. Similarly, concepts have to be understood in relation to their function of conducting an analysis according to the assumptions of a particular theory.

The concepts utilized in the study included, *inter alia*, terrorism, insurgency and the political economy, and it is appropriate at this point to remind the reader of how they were defined by the researcher. As discussed earlier in the study, terrorism is understood as the use of violence so as to achieve political goals which go beyond

overthrowing the state, constituting a wider struggle that extends beyond the scope of the state. By way of contrast, insurgency denotes a political movement inside a state and is aimed against the institution holding power, namely, the state. It does not necessarily aim at overthrowing the state, and if it does, it does not aim at extending its activities beyond the state (Kennedy, 2009). The concept of the political economy, drawn from critical theory, refers to the crisis of modernity whereby the need to acquire domination and of material power has led to conflict and instability to focuses more widely on power and domination in the world, in which currently multinational and transnational corporations exert maximum influence. In the context of this research, the political economy referred to the political and economic role of crucially important resources such as oil and uranium in Libya and North Africa. The investigation embraced the struggle for control, legitimate or illicit, over these resources, and investigated the influence of various parties involved, including global organisations, hegemonic states, foreign companies and internal armed groups.

Returning to the focus of this study, this chapter will apply the same conceptual divisions that were used in Chapters Three and Four in analysing the causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya and sub-Saharan Africa. The concepts previously identified will now be scrutinized according to different theoretical perspectives. The first section of this chapter will explain in detail the internal causes of instability in relation to applicable theoretical frameworks, whilst the second section will address external causes in relation to theoretical stances. It is important to note that thus far no single factor has been identified to account for instability in post-Gaddafi Libya and neighbouring states. Furthermore, the fluid and dynamic nature of post-Gaddafi society

has made it impossible to isolate the causes that have been identified within an unchanging context. As a consequence, in examining the internal and external causes, the repercussions of the contextual dynamics of post-Gaddafi Libya will be observed in relation to the ability of theory to accommodate such fluidity.

## **5.2 Theoretical perspectives on internal causes of instability**

Chapter Three puts forward the rise of insurgency during the Gaddafi era as contributing to the post-Gaddafi proliferation of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons beyond Libyan borders to Mali and Nigeria, where they equipped armed militias and groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamists Maghreb (AQIM) and the Tuaregs. These insurgents fought against the governments of the above-mentioned states during the Gaddafi era, leading to high levels of civil unrest at the time. The increased availability of illicit arms in the post-Gaddafi era heightened the resistance, whilst at the same time impacting on the nature of resistance offered.

The concept of insurgency at the core of the analysis of internal causes of instability foregrounded the aims of insurgent movements as opposing their respective governments. In the post-Gaddafi era it was seen that resistance had progressed beyond these original aims, as insurgents joined forces with jihadist groups originating in the Middle East who pursued a wider set of goals. These were not restricted by the notion of state as being defined by territorial boundaries and encompassed a broader political struggle conducted across state borders against western forms of government and western institutions in general. The researcher identified this form of struggle as

terrorism, which, as it was not contained within national boundaries, made it impossible to isolate insurgency as a particular cause. This kind of complexity is observed to impact on the theoretical analysis.

Chapter Three also identified the inability of the government of Libya to control its territory, which was seen to have promoted the proliferation of trade in small arms and light weapons, strengthening the militant operations of anti-state groups. Thus, the complexity of what had originally been identified as internal causes of instability that already existed during the Gaddafi era, were seen to have become compounded by the emergence of external factors. In other words, it proved to be impossible to isolate internal factors as causing instability in post-Gaddafi Libya and the surrounding areas. It is therefore necessary to consider that instability is in fact the consequence of a combination of existing internal and external factors, which will be examined according to various theoretical lenses.

The following section is going to deal with the rise of insurgency and its mutation to terrorism in relation to the conceptualisation of the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis.

### **5.2.1 The “clash of civilizations” hypothesis**

As seen in Chapter Two, Huntington (1993) defines civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest cultural identity people have, being differentiated from each other by history, culture, tradition and religion. The hypothesis emphasized that clashes between civilizations will become threats to peace and that “fault lines” between civilizations will be the battle lines for the future.

As indicated in the previous chapters, the emergence after Gaddafi's death of an Islamic fundamentalist movement that had not previously been active in Libya, driven by highly sophisticated technology and aimed at eliminating non-Islamic forms of rule and existence has been identified as one of the drivers of post-Gaddafi instability. The Islamic State movement cultivated ties with existing groups of insurgents, aligning its own aims to theirs, and extending their scope to pursue its own ends.

Huntington's (1993) "clash of civilizations" hypothesis claims that insurgency comes as a result of grievances as 'ethnic apathy', ethno-nationalist struggles for political hegemony, the security dilemma between ethnic groups and marginalization of ethnic minority group from power. These resonate with the reasons for the existence of groups on insurgents resisting national state governments during the Gaddafi era. Huntington's argument that war in the future would be fought along "fault lines" that broadly cross between Western culture and Islamic culture, was correct in many aspects at the time. The rise of insurgency in the states under consideration embodies the culture elements that were defined by Huntington as the reason for future wars. However, it is clear that the Islamic fundamentalism that emerged in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century as a response to the increased US presence in the Middle East, culminating in what the researcher terms terrorism, goes beyond challenging ideas and beliefs, and instead aims at eliminating Western forms of state and society altogether.

Post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria are deeply divided states in which major political issues have been vigorously contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious and regional divisions. As indicated in Chapter Three, Tuaregs in Mali rebelled against the Malian government prior to the fall of Gaddafi, seeking autonomy from the state and

claiming that their tribe had always been marginalized by the Malian state. This sparked fear within government, leading to violent clashes between the state and the insurgents.

However, the events giving rise to an Islamic fundamentalist movement in the Middle East in the 1990s, leading to terrorist attacks against the United States (US), is entirely different to the deep and long-running civilizational conflicts that existed in Africa. The US involvement in the Middle East in the 1990s, enabled after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Russian troops, was driven by its desire to safeguard its interests in Middle Eastern oil. The direct interference of the US in internal state affairs prompted the emergence of anti-Western movements such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. These organised on the basis of the Islamic faith to attack Western targets that were perceived as preventing Islam as a complete way of life that governs moral, spiritual, economic, social and political facets in the region (Said, 2001). With the anti-Western sentiments evolving on a large scale, radical Islamists hoped that the West would come under pressure and withdraw from the area, enabling the fulfilment of strategic objectives of radical Islamic groups such as Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. However, Africa's institutional weaknesses, economic marginality and porous borders gave rise to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the late 1990's which seek to fight against Western influence.

As a result, the "clash of civilizations" hypothesis is not enough to explain the rise of anti-Western movements in Nigeria, Mali and Libya. The anti-Western social movement is the consequence of interference in these countries by Western states, primarily the US, Britain and France, whose support is often crucial in preventing Islamic bids for political influence. US interference in North Africa provided antagonistic social

movements with additional incentives for targeting various Western institutions besides the military. Huntington “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, with its emphasis on cultural and civilizational division, is inadequate to explain the patterns of resistance to military occupation and political and economic interference behind the rise of terrorism in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. Said (2001) rejects the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis entirely, arguing that it generalizes cultural assertions, but he posits that if there is a “clash of civilizations”, it is much more likely to be political rather than civilizational.

Notwithstanding the ability of the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis to explain the rise of insurgency in North Africa prior to the fall of Gaddafi, due to the fact that insurgency mutated into the phenomenon that the researcher has defined as terrorism, which exists across borders and has political intentions, the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis cannot be utilized as a basis for analysis of instability after the fall of Gaddafi.

Having dismissed the “clash of civilisations” hypothesis as the most appropriate explanation for post-Gaddafi instability, the following section will analyse in detail the external causes identified in Chapter Four in relation to other theoretical perspectives.

### **5.3 Theory in relation to external causes of instability**

Chapter Four of the study examined the external causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. The chapter presented arguments based on three causal factors, namely, the political economy of these states, the increase in the arms trade and the escalation of the activities of jihadists.

Scholars such as Chivvis and Martini (2014) pointed out that after the ousting of Gaddafi, Libya experienced a scramble by Western and US-owned foreign companies to access oil fields, which led to vicious fighting among Libyan militias for the illicit control of resources. Boukhars (2015) singles out the rise in terrorism as the primary factor, whilst Blanchard (2015) draws attention to the role of the covert arms trade. The analyses by these and other scholars of causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria will now be examined according to various theoretical perspectives, commencing with a discussion of realism.

### **5.3.1 Realist assumptions on terrorism**

Political realism is the oldest theory in IR and emphasizes the ‘reality of power’ (Donnelly, 2009). Realism regards states as the main actors operating in a logical goal-orientated way in the international system. According to realists, the international system is characterized by anarchy and as a result, the rational interest is the maximization of power, so as to ensure the state’s survival (Mearsheimer, 2001). State sovereignty is a prominent concept in realism and it emphasizes states as being independent role-players. However, as discussed in previous chapters, the basic principle of state sovereignty ceased to exist in post-Gaddafi Libya, when different militias claimed control over portion of the hitherto state territory so as to benefit from oil revenues and wield power over the inhabitants of those areas. In Nigeria and Mali, while state sovereignty has not collapsed, it is being continuously challenged by different armed groups seeking autonomy from these states. Undoubtedly, realism is unable to accommodate the contemporary phenomenon of non-state actors like the Islamic State (IS), Boko Haram and AQIM, which so not recognize the western concept of states

according to defined and recognized physical boundaries. Realism has very little to say about terrorism, because it deals with the quest for power and relations between and amongst states, whilst social movements such as IS, AQIM and Boko Haram are not states.

Mearsheimer (2008) states that terrorism cannot be fully explained by realism, but the state's response to terrorism can be. Due to the fact that armed groups have the capabilities to force sovereign states into doing things that sometimes they do not have interest in doing, it matches the characteristics of state-like power without any physical or institutional assets of statehood (Schild, 2011). Realists argue that social movements such as Boko Haram and AQIM, IS in post-Gaddafi Nigeria, Libya and Malip, respectively, emphasize ideology so as not to confront their realist goals of trying to gain control of parts of these countries' territory, with the ultimate goal of forming an Islamic caliphate. Nonetheless, from a realist perspective, the rise in terrorism in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria is caused by the imbalance of power, with social movements seeking an alternate distribution of power.

Realism has been presented with a conceptual challenge through the phenomenon of the IS movement and its increasing strength through forging ideological as well as military alliances. In this way, because it cannot conceptually deal with the socio-political and ideological forces driving these movements, realism fails to provide a fully convincing argument.

On the other hand, realism does correspond with critical theory in arguing that the reason for instability is the desire to dominate through material power, although critical theory includes ideology and institutions as the other elements required for the exercise

of hegemony. However, realism essentially ignores the historical development of capitalism as generating relationships of power and resistance, which is the starting point for critical theory. In this case, the effects of the aggressive expansion by the US into the Middle East in the 1990s in its quest for control over oil fields, is not considered by realism as giving rise to the IS movement.

It is therefore appropriate to proceed to the next section by looking at how critical theory seeks to provide a possible explanation for post-Gaddafi instability, through an examination of the roots of resistance in the political economy of oil.

### **5.3.2 Critical theory in relation to the political economy of oil**

Unlike realism, critical theory disagrees that the conditions of anarchy in international relations condemn political communities to the “tragedies” of power politics. Cox (1981) argues that traditional conceptions of theory tend to work in favour of stabilizing prevailing structures of world order and their accompanying inequalities of power.

Critical theory provides an understanding of instability by examining the role played by the West and multinational corporations in the context of the significance of oil in the global political economy. Critical theory as a theory of IR is not confined to an examination of States and the system, but focuses more widely on power and domination in the world, in which currently multinational and transnational corporations exert maximum influence (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010: 287).

As discussed in Chapter Four, the desire by the US to control the oil fields in the Middle East, and later, Libya, has been identified as one of the major contributions to instability

in Libya. Since the fall of Gaddafi, different militant groups have fought against one another and the newly installed Libyan government for the control of oil fields.

Critical theory argues that the international order is anything but static, but is rather being continually reshaped by changing social and historical circumstances. Critical theory emphasizes the crisis of modernity and its implications in relation to domination, power and control (Devetak, 2009). It sees the growing influence of private material interests to have blurred the boundaries between public and private authority in the global realm and claims that “sovereignty” in the global political economy is rapidly changing (Rouch, 2008: 269).

The instability in the oil regions of Libya is viewed by critical theorists as one of the implications of modernity and the growing influence of private actors such as armed militias for illicit control of the resource. According to critical theorists, Libya was destabilized by the involvement of private actors and state actors in post-Gaddafi oil and arms trade. As indicated in Chapter Four, the desire by different militant groups, backed by Western-owned companies, to control oil fields, has sparked vicious fighting between the government and different militant groups. Critical theory puts forward the influence of material forces that assert themselves above the level of society, yet the economic nature of the state is entirely a socially constituted nature (Rouch, 2008). In the case of Libya, the hegemony of non-state forces in the form of the control wielded by multinational companies over the oil industry has made it difficult for Libya as a state and society to build a sustainable productive base for itself in the global market. Consequently, critical theory sees the desire for dominance as a hindrance to human

emancipation, because one set of ambitions – economic, emanating from multinational oil companies – subverts the political ambitions of Libyan society, promoting the interest of the more powerful group over the other. Critical theory is in this way able to explain the role of powerful multinational corporations in Libya in directing the political economy of oil to the advantage of the economic interests of dominant societies.

However, critical theory fails to fully explain the rise of social movements like the IS, AQIM and Boko Haram, since its emphasis is mainly on the material and ideological forces of capitalism. Similarly, it also failed to explain the end of the Cold War mainly because it did not recognize the significance of social forces at work in the former Soviet Union (USSR). The failure of critical theory to explain how communism ended highlights, in a sense, the missing dimension of the role played by ideas (Heywood, 2014: 225). Nonetheless, the social identity of the USSR informed its interests, and in turn, its action, as it disintegrated and allowed new states to emerge on the basis of strongly nationalist sentiment. Critical theorists, however, viewed communist regimes as stable and cohesive, especially in terms of their ability to deliver economic and social security. In this regard, it failed to explain the emergence of Eastern European states, which sought to reverse the history of socialism.

As a result, critical theory is not able to incorporate and explain adequately the rise of Islamic fundamentalism movements that had been a reason for conflict and instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

However, it should be recalled that constructivism has its roots in Critical Theory, which, in relation to social forces and ideas, underplays their role alongside that of the material source of relations of power in the political economy. The end of the Cold War gave rise

to further theorising and this led to the emergence of constructivism. It is therefore appropriate to proceed to an investigation into how constructivism approaches the phenomena of the current instability in North Africa.

### **5.3.3 Terrorism according to constructivism**

As indicated above, constructivism as an IR theory came about in the 1980's, as an offshoot of critical theory, similarly challenging the rationalist and positivism of neo-liberalism and neo-realism. However, the significant difference is the importance that is assigned to ideas and the social constructs that emerge from particular situations. This conceptualisation of social change was able to explain the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the demise of communism as an oppositional ideology, and the development of independent states, despite the overarching power wielded by Russia at the centre of the Soviet Union. Reus-Smit (2009: 212) emphasizes that constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, and on the role in which identity and ideas shape political actions. Constructivists stress the importance of ideational and normative structures precisely because these are thought to shape the social identities of political actors. The events leading to the end of the Cold War, the demise of communism as a globally significant ideology and the disintegration of the USSR, set the stage for constructivism as an outgrowth of critical theory, foregrounding the importance of ideas and agency in social change.

It is within this framework of analysis that the researcher is able to revisit two of the concepts selected as the basis for analysing the causes of post-Gaddafi instability, namely, insurgency and terrorism. Whereas the researcher defined terrorism in Chapter

Three as constituted by acts of violence conducted in order to achieve political goals that are not limited by the existence of nation-states or confined to national boundaries, constructivism considers terrorism as a fundamentally social phenomenon whose nature is not inherent to the violent act itself. Constructivism places ideas and social agency at the centre of its analysis, so that terrorism is considered as a social construction that requires human institutions for its existence. It is not a “given” entity in the real world, but instead the consequence and interpretation of events and assumed causes that has social origins (Reus-Smit, 2009). Constructivism approaches the rise in social movement acts in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria by emphasizing the importance of understanding culture, identity, and ideas that give rise to these acts. Similarly, constructivism views insurgency from the lens of human ideas and institutions and regards it in the same way as a social construction. If viewed in this way, terrorism and insurgency are no longer differentiated by their political aims as being confined to change inside the state, or as political aims that extend beyond state borders. Instead, they are both seen as essentially social constructs.

As discussed in the previous chapters, during his reign Gaddafi allowed terrorist organizations to engage in training operations in Libya, but at no stage did he lose control over their activities. After his demise, the ensuing power vacuum chaos allowed these movements to move around Libya and to cross borders into other North African states. Alexander (2015) points out that after the ousting of Gaddafi, extremist violence escalated due to the proliferation of arms and the increased arms trafficking, with groups such as Boko Haram and AQIM taking advantage of the situation to diffuse their operations and spread to neighbouring states. Constructivism does not therefore

distinguish between insurgency and terrorism, initially defined by the researcher as two distinct concepts. Constructivism considers these as social movements that owe their existence to social conditions. Both Boko Haram and AQIM had started as insurgent movements operating in Nigeria and Algeria respectively; however, they extended their activities further to North and West Africa. Ideologically, Boko Haram and AQIM seek to enforce their interpretation of Islamic law according to a particular interpretation of the Quran, and yet this needs to be understood in the context of the social conditions of exclusion in the case of the Tuaregs in Mali and of invasion and attempted domination by the US in the case of the Middle East in the 1990s.

Boko Haram seeks to promote an Islamic 'identity' that defines the interests of all Muslims as necessary in order to confront and overcome Western forces and to shape the environment in which Muslims politics are contested. Constructivists therefore consider the ideological element represented by Boko Haram and AQIM as fostering instability in its quest to overthrow western states and install one borderless Islamic State, based on Sharia Law, according to a strict interpretation of the Quran. What motivates these groups to pursue terror attacks is not merely a sense of commitment to direct authority, but a sense of commitment to shared principles (Reus-Smit, 2009). These anti-Western norms compel Muslims towards the violent action necessitated by their belief, directing their actions within the scope of a jihadist movement and enabling them to transform isolated ideological goals to a global ideological quest.

The constructivist explanation of the phenomenon identified by the researcher in Chapters Three and Four as terrorism stresses the importance of perception and how it has influenced context. Constructivism provides an understanding of a group's norms

as the key to the group's strength. Mainstream IR theory in the form of realism fails to account for the rise of terrorism through its inability to accommodate non-material aspects, whilst critical theory could not explain the rise of social movements, since its emphasis is mainly on the material and ideological forces of capitalism. Constructivism nonetheless offers an explanation derived from social and non-material factors overlooked by realism as well as by Critical Theory.

To constructivists, social movements are best understood by paying attention to the role of ideational concerns in determining their actions, thus examining how the group norms influence the action of the organization (Schild, 2011). The extent to which these groups strategies have worked in destabilizing the states that form the subject of this research proves the power of ideas. If the ideational strategy has the ability to force Libya, Mali and Nigeria to take action against these groups, then clearly the constructivists' assumptions of ideas are more convincing. In this respect, it is only through constructivist analysis, such as the one pursued in this study, that an appropriate understanding of the important role played by ideational concerns influencing IS, Boko Haram and AQIM can be sufficiently achieved.

As a result, constructivism emerges as the most successful IR theory in explaining the cause of conflict and instability in the areas under consideration in this research.

## **5.4 Conclusion**

Realism, constructivism, critical theory and the "clash of civilizations" hypothesis have been examined in relation to their ability to explain the cause of instability in post-

Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. The extent to which they have successfully explained the situation researched varies, and it is important to note that the dynamic and constantly changing nature of post-Gaddafi instability has reduced the applicability of the majority of the theories rooted in western assumptions.

Realism failed to explain effectively the cause of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria due to its inability to accommodate the hostile role played by non-state actors. Unlike realism, critical theory argued that the instability in the oil regions of Libya was due to the growing influence of private actors such as multinational corporations' armed militias in the quest for illicit control of the resource (Devetak, 2009). However, critical theory fails to fully explain the rise of social movements like the IS, AQIM and Boko Haram, since its emphasis is mainly on the material and ideological forces of capitalism. As a result, critical theory similarly failed to provide the most convincing argument.

Finally, the "clash of civilizations" hypothesis was able to explain the rise of insurgency in Libya, Mali and Nigeria before the fall of Gaddafi but failed to provide an explanation for the widespread and borderless military resistance to western intervention that promoted the resurgence of jihadist movements based on political, and not cultural intentions, that spread through North Africa after the fall of Gaddafi. It was seen that constructivism was able to identify the expansion of social movements and the escalation of hostile acts against the western-backed state in post-Gaddafi Libya, and in Mali and Nigeria, by emphasizing the importance of social situations, identity and ideas that foster the emergence of social movements. As a result, constructivism provides the

most convincing theoretical argument in relation to the cause of conflict and instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

## **CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides a summary of all the chapters in the study, and also an overview of the findings in relation to causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. It also raises questions relating to further research that can be undertaken on the basis of these findings. It also provides the limitations to the study and the study conclusion. The next section will provide a summary of all the chapters utilised in the study.

### **6.2 Summary of chapter content**

#### **Chapter One**

Chapter One presented the introduction and background to the study. It presented a brief background of the history of sub-Saharan Africa and how religious, cultural, political and economic factors have all contributed in exacerbating conflict and instability in the region. It also presented the rationale and scope of the study on the investigation of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, covering the period 2011 to 2015. Apart from this, Chapter One also presented the problem statement, which provided the three research questions on which the study was based on. The chapter also provides the aim of the study and the objectives it sought to achieve, its significance and the methodology adopted.

## **Chapter Two**

In Chapter Two the main focus was on the literature review, whilst also offering an overview of the four mainstream IR theories selected by the researcher as possibly applicable to the study. The literature review was divided into two sections that broadly embraced the researcher's conceptualisation of external influences and internal causes of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. The second part of the chapter provided an overview of the four theoretical approaches utilised by the researcher, namely, the "clash of civilizations" hypothesis, realism, critical theory and constructivism. These offer different bases for understanding conflict and instability in the above-mentioned regions and the researcher returned to these in Chapter Five.

## **Chapter Three**

Chapter Three of the study seeks to answer the first research question, namely, the extent to which endogenous factors contributed to instability in the selected areas, and how have they done so. The chapter explored the contribution of internal factors of instability, as theorized by various scholars and presented and discussed in Chapter Two. It provided an overview of the consequences of the fall of Gaddafi on Libya and how it has spread to states such as Mali and Nigeria. Chapter Three also unpacked the significant differences between the concepts of "terrorism" and "insurgency" in trying to examine the activities of the groups that organised armed rebellion against the state. However it was established in this chapter that due to the nature of the post-Gaddafi instability, insurgency and terrorism could not be exclusively differentiated due to the fact that insurgency mutated into the phenomenon that the researcher has defined as

terrorism, which exists across borders and has political intentions. The researcher identified the complexity of what had originally been identified as internal causes of instability to have been by the emergency of external factors. It examined the impact on post-Gaddafi instability in Libya, Mali and Nigeria of the activities of Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb and Tuaregs.

## **Chapter Four**

Chapter Four of the study seeks to answer the second research question, namely, the extent to which external factors have contributed to instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria, and how they have done so. It identified the political economy of oil and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as the causes of post-Gaddafi instability. Since the fall of Gaddafi, Libya experienced the scramble for access to oil fields by foreign companies which has led to vicious fighting among militias for the control of the illicit resource. The post-Gaddafi situation in Mali, Nigeria and Libya challenged the effectiveness of the states in countering terrorism, prompting the expansion of the Islamic State into these states by pledging alliances with armed groups of insurgents that were already in existence, transforming their activities into terrorism. The investigation embraced the struggle for control, legitimate or illicit, over these resources, and investigated the influence of various parties involved, including global organisations, hegemonic states, foreign companies and internal armed groups. However, the chapter concluded that the distinction between internal and external causes has been as artificial in the light of what happened to insurgent groups after the fall of Gaddafi, whereby they transformed from being limited to nation states to being social

movements with wider struggle that extend beyond the scope of the state. Therefore external factors cannot be exclusively separated from internal factors.

## **Chapter Five**

Chapter Five of the study outlined and provided a detailed analysis of research findings in previous chapters. Its goal was to answer the last research question, namely, how applicable four selected International Relations theories of western origin are in explaining post-Gaddafi conflict and instability in the selected areas. Chapter Five outlined, compared, analysed and evaluated research findings in Chapter Three and Four in the context of the four main theoretical assumptions namely, realism, constructivism, critical theory and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. The concepts utilised in the chapter included terrorism, insurgency and political economy. The researcher find out that the concept of insurgency is at the core of the analysis of internal causes of instability foregrounded the aims of insurgent movements as opposing their respective governments, and yet in the post-Gaddafi era it was seen that resistance had progressed beyond these original aims.

On the other hand, terrorism was defined as constituted by acts of violence conducted in order to achieve political goals that are not limited by the existence of nation-states or confined to national boundaries. Due to the nature of post-Gaddafi instability insurgency mutated into the phenomenon that the researcher has defined as terrorism, which exists across borders and has political intentions In this regard, theories were used to interpret the cause of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria taking note of the concepts. The chapter noted that the constantly changing nature of post-Gaddafi

instability has reduced the applicability of the majority of the theories rooted in Western assumptions.

The research established that realism fell short to explain the cause of instability due to its failure to accommodate the role played by hostile non-state actors, whereas critical theory emphasis was on material and ideological forces, it failed to accommodate the rise of Islamic fundamentalism such as the Islamic State as cause of instability. The “clash of civilizations” hypothesis was able to explain the rise of insurgency in Libya, Mali and Nigeria before the fall of Gaddafi but failed to provide an explanation for the widespread and borderless military resistance that promoted the resurgence of jihadist movements based on political and not cultural intentions. It was therefore seen that constructivism was able to identify the expansion of social movements as a possible cause of instability as a result constructivism ideas were identified as the best possible explanation of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

### **6.3 Findings**

The main aim of the study was to provide an understanding of instability faced in Libya, Mali and Nigeria after the ousting of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, seeking to establish whether a single factor could be identified. Furthermore, the analysis was subjected to theoretical scrutiny according to realism, constructivism, critical theory and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, in order to determine whether these could adequately explain the phenomenon of post-Gaddafi violence and instability, that is, a phenomenon occurring in an African context. Prior to looking at theory, various internal

and external forces were identified as causes of instability as outlined above, and were categorised in themes as conceptualised by the researcher.

It was stated that the “Arab Spring”, a wave of mass demonstrations, protests and revolt in North Africa in 2011, influenced rebellion against the Gaddafi regime and led to his demise from power as the authoritarian leader of the Libyan state. This had negative repercussions not only on Libya, but also on the rest of North Africa and some parts of West Africa, because of the absence of what had been stringent control and effective exercise of sovereignty by the Gaddafi regime. The subsequent infiltration of North Africa, through Libya, by numerous groups and movements, with aims ranging from arms-dealing to taking control of oil production, or the expansion of the Islamic State through a contemporary Jihad. The power gap and absence of legitimate and effective state authority enabled contestation originating from various sources, triggering the escalation of conflict, and bringing to the surface deep-rooted and in some cases dormant issues such as cultural and religious differences. However, the structural and institutional legacy of the colonial and Cold War eras, in terms of which economic power is entrenched in sources outside Libya, enabled the further de-stabilisation of the region. A combination of these factors, which by and large have long-standing historical roots, has resulted in the intensification of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

The first research question engaged with endogenous factors that have contributed to instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. This chapter dealt with internal causes of instability, including factors such as the ineffectiveness of post-Gaddafi government, religious differences, tribalism and cultural difference, with the arms trade

as an exacerbating factor that fostered conflict. Through the western lens, post-Gaddafi Libya has been labelled as a failed state, due to the lack of state sovereignty, legitimacy and authority, which are deemed as responsible for insecurity. Grifa (2012) argues that the mechanisms that were used to oust Gaddafi from power constituted a transgression of sovereignty in the first place, and merely succeeded in effecting an escalation of the existing tensions, enabling these to break out into unprecedented levels of hostility that extended beyond Libyan borders.

Two concepts utilised by the researcher, namely insurgency and terrorism, were identified as possible causes of instability. However, it was established that it is difficult to separate exclusively internal from external factors of instability when it comes to terrorism and insurgency, because of the dynamic nature of social movements and the inter-relationship of their origins and aims. Subsequent to the fall of Gaddafi, West and North Africa grappled with threats posed by social movements such as Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb. As a result, not only have Libya, Mali and Nigeria become susceptible to instability and conflict, but the rest of North and West Africa have been exposed to threats to state security posed by these movements.

In conclusion, in answering the first question, internal cause of instability cannot be exclusively differentiated from external causes this is because what started as internal causes of instability mutated to become external cause.

The second question investigated the extent to which external forces have contributed to instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. The exogenous factors included a discussion of the political economy and how the need by foreign companies to gain

control of illicit resources such as oil and uranium impacted on the stability of the state. The discussion also included the consequences of the expansion of the Islamic State. After his demise, it became evident that Gaddafi had been the sole source of authority and that he had managed to contain different rebels groups and prevent the escalation of tensions into an eruption of intra-state violence and civil war. The power gap resulting from his demise led to tension extending beyond Libyan borders to surrounding states that include Nigeria and Mali (Danjibo, 2013). Primarily due to the increased availability of arms after his fall and the escalation of the illicit trade in arms, different militant groups and social movements initiated campaigns to seize control over areas beyond those where they had traditionally enjoyed influence. In Libya, militias seized control of oil fields, leading to violent clashes with the government, and foreign companies with invested interests in Libyan oil provided militias with financial backing, worsening the conditions of a lack of sovereign power. Due to the vulnerability of the Libyan state, the Islamic State was able to penetrate into Libya and beyond into surrounding sub-Saharan states, in some instances declaring control over parts of these countries. To a large extent, the Islamic State presence in states such as Mali and Chad has worsened the already fragile and volatile conditions in these states.

In conclusion, in answering the second research question, the power gap which was left after the demise of Gaddafi allowed external elements to take advantage of the volatile situation, expanding their interests and influence so as to gain illicit control of resources. In this way, movements such as the Islamic State declared control over large parts of Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

Finally, the third question examined the applicability of Western International Relations theories in explaining conflict and instability in the selected areas. The international relations theories selected for the study included realism, constructivism, critical theory and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. The “clash of civilizations” seeks to explain the rise of insurgency through cultural factors such as ‘ethnic apathy’, ethno-nationalist struggles for political hegemony and the escalation of grievances due to the marginalization of minority groups from power. However, the “clash of civilizations”, with its emphasis on cultural and civilizational facets, is inadequate to explain the patterns of resistance to military occupation and political and economic interference behind the rise of terrorism in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

Realism, on the other hand, emphasizes the reality of power, but it failed to explain effectively the cause of instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria due to its inability to accommodate non-state actors in the form of the IS movement and its apparently ideological – as opposed to material – aims.

Critical theory seeks to provide an understanding of instability by examining the issue of conflict within the context of the global political economy. It focuses on the historic role played by the West and the current situation is scrutinised from the standpoint of the involvement in the Libyan and Nigerian oil industry of hegemonic powers, multinational corporations and local interest groups such as militias and the political elite. Similarly, in the case of Mali, critical theory locates conflict within the context of the strategic importance to France of the uranium industry. In relation to African states, critical theory emphasizes the crisis of modernity and its implications in relation to domination, power and control (Devetak, 2009). Critical theory in this way was able to explain the role of

powerful multinational corporations in Libya in guiding the political economy oil to the advantage of the economic interests of dominant societies. However, its weakness in explaining instability in post-Gaddafi is its inability to fully accommodate and explain the rise of social movements such as the Islamic State, which has had a dramatic and unprecedented effect on international relations theory, through its outright rejection of western notions and its intended declaration to drive societies conceptually and ideologically backwards, rather towards the future. Nonetheless, this is the same weakness in critical theory that led to the emergence of constructivism in the first place, this is because it failed to analyse the impact of social movements that led to the disintegration of the USSR, and the demise of Russia as a global power at the end of the 1990s.

For this reason, constructivism was seen as best able to explain instability through its recognition of normative as well as material structures, and emphasis on the role in which identity and ideas shape political actions. Constructivism places ideas and social agency at the centre of its analysis, and regards terrorism as a social construction, in so doing explaining its origins, ideological intentions and its success as a transformational force – albeit reactionary – given that it requires human institutions for its existence. Constructivism considers the ideological element represented by Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb and Islamic State as of the most significance in fostering the emergence of an oppositional counter-hegemonic social movement in the form of Islamic State so as to overthrow western states and install a borderless Islamic State, based on Sharia law. With mainstream IR theory such as realism failing to account for the rise of terrorism through its inability to incorporate non-material aspects, and critical

theory not being able to explain the rise of social movements since its emphasis is mainly on the material and ideological forces of capitalism. In the final analysis it is constructivism that provides the most convincing theoretical argument in relation to the cause of conflict and instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria.

## **6.4 Conclusion**

As indicated in Chapter One, the research only covered instability in post-Gaddafi Libya from 2011 to 2015. As a result, the study did not take into account recent events such as the bombing of the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali on November 20, 2015. Also the bombing of the Libyan police camp in January 2016 and over 60 policemen killed, and also the killing of more than 80 civilians by Boko Haram in a village in northern Nigeria on February 1, 2016. Another limitation in this study is the physical location; the study concentrated on post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria thereby ignoring events in Somalia and northern Kenya that present different analyses. Another limitation of the study was the objectives in the study which were not problem-solving and as a result did not aim at identifying solutions.

The aim of the study was to provide an understanding of the cause of conflict and instability in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mali and Nigeria. To a larger extent the researcher's answers have provided an understanding in showing in detail the complexity, dynamic, inter-related nature of different variables at play. Apart from this, the research study also provided an understanding on the fluidity of situations involving power struggles, seizure

of territory and failure of states to consolidate power. Nonetheless, the use of constructivism as the best possible explanation of post-Gaddafi instability provides an understanding on how ideas and norms shape the social identities of political actors' as a result influencing practise. In this regard, constructivism enhances a better understanding to the causes of post-Gaddafi instability mainly because its main aim is not at problem-solving and finding solutions to the problems, but rather providing an understanding on society and change.

Nonetheless, the researcher has put forward the impossibility of reaching a definitive conclusion in International Relations. This is as a result of the fluidity and internal complexity and dynamics in an international society that contains different and most often directly oppositional values, beliefs and norms, which in turn provides a guide for practises. The recent events in the Middle East emanating from social movements such as the Islamic State in a quest to overthrow Western influence in the region, has impacted directly on Europe as well as African states especially in North Africa points to the need of a new theory. Likewise, there is need for a theory that will accommodate and incorporate the constantly evolving dynamics and is flexible enough to provide an analysis in the dynamic nature of the International Relations.

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