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Financing Regional Peace and Security in Africa:
A Critical Analysis of the Southern African Development
Community Standby Force



By

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A Thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the
degree of Masters in Administration (MA) in Public
Administration

School of Government and Public Administration
Faculty of Management and Commerce

University of Fort Hare
South Africa

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January 2016

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In loving memory of Chief G. O. C. Ndaguba Esq.

(17-01-2016)
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Acknowledgement

All praise and thanks be given to the Almighty God, the giver of knowledge. To He alone be glory, honour and adoration for the completion of this study. For health in body and mind, divine direction, wisdom, guidance, and protection I say thank you.

To the entire member of my family especially my mom, Carol Ndaguba (Chief Mrs), thank you for urging me to pray always (prayer is the key). My brothers, David Ndaguba & Family, Obiekwe Ndaguba, Solomon Ndaguba, and the rest; Thanks for encouraging me thus far.

Also with a sincere heart I wish to thank my supervisor Dr. Ogochukwu Irouma Nzewi, who has shaped my ideas. I thank you particular for the grace to be patient with me.

To my EOC Ijeoma who deemed it fit to challenge my thought process by tasking me series of assignment. And the exposure in the publication sphere: I am very grateful.

To the best parents in the world, who despite all odds stood firm by me: I am exceedingly grateful, and I hope to show you great love soonest.


To my colleagues me in the struggle, God will crown your efforts, of particular note is Dr. Mupindu, Wiseman and Dr. Charles Okonkwo. God bless you for your time advise and guidance.

To Mr. Nebo, Godwin (PhD Researcher), Ms. Nwokolo, Nwabunwanne (PhD Researcher), Dr. Peter Prince and Mr. Iheanetu, Kelachukwu (PhD Researcher) who took turns in proofreading this work to some extent and several other academic papers, many thanks and be strengthened by our Lord.


To the union, where I draw strength, the entire family of the Rock of Ages Student Fellowship, thanks for your endless prayers.

Declaration

I, Ndaguba, Emeka Austin hereby declare that this dissertation is my own independent work, and has not been previously submitted by me or anyone else for evaluation at this university or any other university.

Signature




Date


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Abstract

Effective, viable and sustainable, functional Standby Force like the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) has been curtailed by over-dependence on foreign peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the region and by independent member state. The aim of this study is to develop a funding mechanism to finance peacekeeping operations for the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF). The objectives are to; (1) examine the theoretical and practical dimensions of security architecture. (2) Determine the challenges of security architecture in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). (3) Develop an analytical tool for proposing a partnership model for funding the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF). (4) Identify gaps and make recommendations on a suitable and sustainable funding mechanism for SADC Standby force. The study uses both existing empirical quasi-statistics and desktop. Two theories and eleven analytical frameworks were utilized. The study contends that with an effective and adequate funding mechanism that is home grown; the funding challenges of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) could be addressed. It recommends that the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) must have a separate budget account like the UN and NATO. That non-actors (citizens, multinationals and NGOs) must also be considered for funding the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF); and lastly, that a religious implementation of the Task on Tank Model as a means for funding PKO for the SADCSF must be explored.

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Abbreviations

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
AU	African Union
AU-APSA	African Union African Peace and Security Architecture
AU-ASF	African Union African Standby Force
AU-ECOSOCC	African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council
AU-PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMESA FTA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa-Free Trade Area
EAC	Economic Commission for Africa
EASF	East African Standby Force
ECCASSSF	Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWASSF	ECOWAS Standby Force
ESA-EPA	Eastern and Southern Africa-Economic Partnership Agreements
G/A	General Assembly
MDP	Mutual Defence Pact
MLD	Main Logistic Depot
MoU	Memoranda of Understanding
NARC	North African Regional Capability
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo

OPDSC	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PLANELM	Planning Element
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RISPD	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCSF	Southern African Development Community Standby Force
SADC-EPA	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	Southern African Development Community Brigade
SADCC	Southern African Development Community Conference
SACU	Southern African Custom Union
SADSEM	Southern Africa Defence and Security Management
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction

The context of peace and security is vague, in that, security laws cover an enormous spectrum of national and international laws ranging from defence, environment, religion, finance, information technology, culture, education and ideology. It states the meaning of “national security extremely broadly: it is described as the condition in which the country’s government, sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity, well-being of its people, sustainable development of its economy and society and other major interests are relatively safe and not subject to internal and external threats (UNHR 2015).” This study is hinged on defence security in relation to regionalism and regionalization of regional security agencies in the (SADC) region. On a global scale there are six main elements of defence security in relation to social sciences and regionalism, they include: Military Security (implies the capability of a nation to defend itself, and/or deter military aggression); Political Security (about the stability of the social order and specifically addresses threats to sovereignty); Economic Security (freedom to follow choice of policies to develop a nation's economy in the manner desired, forms the essence of economic security); Environmental Security (deals with environmental issues which threaten the national security of a nation in any manner); Security of Energy and Natural Resources (Resources include water, sources of energy, land, oil and minerals) and most recently Human Security (such as poverty, social grant and welfare) (Kotia nd:6). The study is principally being concerned with Military security in the context of collective security (securitization), thereby zooming into the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU).

The study focuses specifically on financing as a critical function of managing regional peacekeeping and in particular the SADCSF. According to the AU head of Peace Support Operations Division, “Funding is key, funding is everything...it determines capability, movement, equipment and maintenance, payments to injured soldiers. If we can sort that out, the rest can follow” (Allison 2012; Jackson 2013). Therefore, without adequate funding mechanism

for the Southern African Development Community Standby Force: planning, organizing, staffing, training, and coordination would seem difficult, if not impossible.

1.2. Background

The World War II coincided with the proliferation of visions that resulted in a shift in paradigm towards regionalism and regionalization emerging from the global politics of decolonization (Soko 2007:5; Alyson, Bailes and Cottey 2006:195; United Nations Security Council 2007, 2001; ASEAN ND; Long 2014). Hitherto, resulted in the establishment of multi-lateral regional blocs such as: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union (EU), Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, the Association of South East Asia (ASEAN) and later in 1963 the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU now AU: African Union in 2001) (Alyson et al 2006:195).

The African Union was launched in 2002 in the same way as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 after all African countries had gained their independence. When it identified the weaknesses of the OAU in conflict resolution, management and prevention, in a conference in Sirte the Assembly of Heads State in Libya formed the African Union in 2001. The invigorated AU implemented a number of strategic documents and institutions such as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2001, Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004, the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2006 and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) are few of the most striking institutional pillars of the revitalized AU (Mbugua 2013:2).

The ASF constitutes Standby Brigade (now Standby Force) in each of the five main regions of the continent: The East African Standby Force (EASF), The ECOWAS Standby Force (ECOWASSF), The North African Regional Capability, The Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (EC/CASSSF) and The SADC Standby Force (SADCSF) (Alghali and Mbaye 2008) to undertake complex peacekeeping missions in the regions. To understand as well as appreciate the SADCSF. It is important to have a grasp of SADC.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is made up 15 Member States (SADC 2015c). Its common agenda is to promote and encourage regional integration cum peace and

security (Meessen, Bungenberg, and Puttler 2009:389) in the region. SADC in 2007 formed an alliance of military cohesion that culminated in the SADC Standby Force (formerly SADC Brigade) through the instrument of the AU-PSC Protocol of 2003, with the aim of ensuring quick response to conflict areas premised on Article 13 of the AU-PSC Protocol (Engel and Porto 2010:133-137).

Since the establishment of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF), its operationability and smooth functionality has been curtailed due to lack of finance (SADC 2007; Solomon 2015; 2009; Cilliers 2010). This has further hampered peace operation missions or interventions in the region. From armed conflicts, to transnational criminality, particularly terrorism and military coup, to maritime piracy, xenophobia, flagrant violations of human rights, and military vandalism (Ayittey 1999:44; Naod 2001:3). It must be noted that the operationability and smooth functionality of the SADCSF is highly dependent on funding, funding being the reason why the Standby Force did not intervene in both cases of Lesotho 2014 and the crisis ravaging the Democratic Republic of Congo in the region. For instance, in the case of the Kingdom of Lesotho, it took the diplomacy of the South African President to mediate while the South African National Defence Force was used to protect the Prime Minister of Lesotho due to heightened tension amidst an alarm of a coup in 2014 (Low-Vaudran 2014; AFP 2014). For Democratic Republic of Congo, the SADCSF failed to intervene as well leaving individual member states military to (do so) intervene. The SANDF have been the principal peacekeeper in the deployment of military force in DRC in the region, with the help of the UN contingent and Federal Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FIB) following commitment of President Joseph Kabila of Democratic Republic of Congo to curtail all insurgents and terrorist in the State, led to the success of smashing the M23 terrorist group in 2013 and later the FDLR fighting force (Allison 2015; Mataboge and Pillay 2014).

It was reported (Scenario 1-6) that there exists a rapid response of Standby Force to multidimensional threats (Cilliers 2008:4). The biggest obstacle towards the operationability of the multidimensional force has consequently been lack of financial resource to intervene in regional disputes (Baker 2007:121; Pax Africa 2009:6).

One of the causes of this lack of finances has been the proliferation of various security institutions, programs, and budgets leading to the constant reviews of erstwhile programs and financing mechanisms for the continent (Jentzsch 2014:2).

Consequently, this proliferation of security institutions (ASF, SADC-OPSC, ECOMOG, ACIRC etc., to mention a few) has resulted in the shortage of funds, owing to five major blocs: “the inadequacy of UN reforms to overcome financing constraints; global financial meltdown; the insufficiency and unpredictability of voluntary contributions; restraint of contributor due to mixed track records of some peace operations; and the limited capacity of African regional organizations” (Jentzsch 2014; Sabra 2011:1).

Peace support mission is very expensive to maintain all over the world (UN 2009; Batware 2011:13-15; Jentzsch 2014:1; Gaibullov, George, Sandler, and Shimizu 2015; von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015:1-5). Notwithstanding, between 2010 and 2015, Africa recorded the world largest United Nations uniform peace operation with 16,815 in Darfur and 20,878 in Somalia.

SADC runs a tight budget. For instance, the 2013/2014 budget for the region was set at US\$79,398 million to contain a myriad of objectives including peace and security (SADC 2015d). With no clear stated amount voted for security, it becomes difficult to clearly show (unlike the UN) the security vote for peace support missions in the region.

Skill is critical to strategic studies and peace and security all over the world. With shortage of funds to attract critical skill to SADCSF (due to the inability of the Force to attract experts: engineers, maritime experts and under water military, naval officials, policy strategist etc.) which are in high demand in both the Force countries of origin and the Regional Force (GAO 2007; Christoff 2007:13) makes the Force culpable in engaging or intervening in peace operation missions in the region.

Capacity building and skill development are prerequisite to training. The state of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (R.PTC) facility in Zimbabwe is far from the standard set by the

UN, lacking significant equipment and capacity (Pax Africa 2009:6). The deficiency in capacity was compounded by loss of donor funders, due to sanctions on Zimbabwe (Pax Africa 2009:6). Training is a significant characteristic of peacekeeping operations by SADC RPTC in the maintenance and the enthronelement of peace and stability in the region (Chellah 2014:4). Recorded evidence shows that the Centre does not have the capacity to train sufficient numbers of personnel in line with peacekeeping standards of the UN and AU (Pax Africa 2009:6). More so, not all Member States in the region is buoyant enough financially to send its personnel or contingents to the peacekeeping training programme in the RPTC in Zimbabwe (Pax Africa 2009:6).

Studies have shown that some Member States of SADCSF are also Member of other regional economic community (REC) (Cilliers 2008:2). This creates a burden for the Member States on where their loyalty/ allegiance should be (financially that is). Consequently, having constraint on the financial allegiance of those Member States.

Thus other factors which could indirectly influence the financial challenges of the SADCSF would include: lack of political will and commitment of member states to fund peace operation missions; increasing number of failing and failed states; lack of synchronized security agenda (common interest), the improper coordination of regional economic communities RECs; high poverty rate; and debt servicing amongst Member States. Which has resulted in the inability to establish early warning systems (recruit and pay experts), resolve dispute and halt conflicts from escalating and spreading, can all be remedied with a suitable financial agreeable model for funding peace and security in the region (Baker and Maeresera 2009:109; Solomon 2009; Cillier 2010; Pax Africa 2007:6).

According to Nzewi and Zakwe, about 61% of the regions funding is derived from international aid and partners, while most of the remainder funding's are gotten from enterprise, contributions and commodities by member states. In addition, to the high level of indebtedness among SADC member countries apart from South Africa and Botswana (Nzewi and Zakwe 2009:37), which has shown some essential prospects for development. This shows the nature of the paucity of finance and prospect for funding the SADCSF in the region. In a region rooted in high

prevalence of poverty and inequality, funding the SADC SF is threatened.

1.3. Statement of the problem

From the background, the Southern African Development Community Standby Force has failed to intervene in any peace operation missions as a unit since inception in 2007 (the war in Democratic Republic of Congo, Political instability in Lesotho etc..) due to financial difficulties. This has resulted in a SADC SF, which though having operational status has no operational technical cum staff support and headquarters (due to inability to pay support staff and fund the construction of a headquarter) (Baker and Maeresera 2009:108; Cilliers and Mallan 2005:13). This has also resulted in the inability of SADC SF to finance its various mechanisms such as the Military, Police and Multi-Dimensional Civilian (MPMDC); Planning Element (PLANELM); Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADEM); Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC); and Main Logistic Depot (MLD) to function effectively in combating insecurities in the region, and most problematic is that there is no clearly stated amount/percentage contributed by member states (budget) towards the operationability of the SADC SF to quick response and deployment to conflict zones in the region. In simpler term there is no known funding mechanism of the SADC SF to source or derive funds for the functionality or effectiveness of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force, which have over the years resulted in failures of the Force to intervene.

1.4. Aims and Objectives of the study

The study aims to propose a funding model to fund peacekeeping operation of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADC SF) in the region.

1.4.1 Objectives are:

- Examine theoretical and practical dimensions of the peace and security architecture of regional bodies in Africa.
- Determine the challenges of security architecture in Africa
- Develop analytical tool for proposing a partnership model for funding the SADC SF

- Identify gaps and make recommendations on a sustainable funding mechanism for SADC Standby force.

1.5. Research Questions

- What are the theoretical and practical dimensions of the peace and security architecture of regional bodies in Africa?
- What are the challenges of security architecture in Africa?
- What analytical tool can be used in addressing the financial challenges of security forces in Africa in general and the SADCSF in particular?
- What recommendations can be made to address the gaps as revealed from the research?

1.6. Significance of the Study

The exposition of this study is to propose a model for financing regional peace and security of the SADCSF in particular and Africa in general, and contribute to research on Regional Peace and Security in Africa, particularly the SADC Standby Force. In that, since the commissioning of the SADCC now SADC there has been no regionally established funding mechanism for the region rather there have been various project model which were later adopted by member nations. The study also attempts to create a new perspective in the understanding of the nature of regional security in Africa, which have been largely ignored due to its complex nature, by taking a look at the funding mechanisms of the SADCSF. The study adds substantially to the body of existing knowledge on the subject matter, while also postulating solutions to the constraints experienced by the SADCSF, which have prevented it (SADCSF) from actually intervening in peace operation missions since 2007. It consequently attempts to simplify the ambiguity that exists in understanding the structure and operations of regional security, specifically the Southern African Development Community Standby Force and most importantly it proposes a partnership-funding model towards (as a way forward) an appropriate, suitable, and feasible funding mechanism for the SADC Standby Force.

1.7. Literature Review

The study adopts a theoretical, conceptual and legal framework towards understanding how the Southern African Development Community Standby Force is being managed. It uses theories from International Relations, and Global Governance relating to peace and security such as: Collective Security and Strategy Theory (Securitization, Strategic Planning and Ends and Means). The essence is to gain a perspective on the financial mechanism of the SADC Standby Force in achieving the goal of peace and security in the region.

Preliminary Foundation for the Research

1.7.1 Conceptual Foundation

1.7.1.1 Public Administration (PA; pa)

Public Administration is a concept used to connote a field of study and an activity of the State (public administration). Suited in the domain of a broader body of knowledge called Administration. While Public Administration is more limited in scope and activities; Administration involves a wider range of phenomenon.

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PA is seen like most social science concept as differing an accepted definition. Some definitions relevant to the discuss will be cited. PA is concerned with the translation of political thought to what individuals see on daily basis (Denhardt and Denhardt 2009). Rabin, Hildreth and Miller (1988) and Denhardt and Denhardt (2009), see PA as having a fundamental goal to advance management and policies of public programmes in order for government to function effectively. To Thornhill and van Dijk (2010:101), pa refers to phenomena practiced in a political environment with the aim of satisfying societal needs in a specific time and place. Meaning that PA has to have a focus and a locus. Other authors see it as an activity carried out in the executive branch of government that deals with the formulation and implementation of public policies, involving the regulation of human behavior and co-operative human effort in a public domain (Stillman 1980:3; Nigro and Nigro 1970:11). Most importantly PA in modern society is structured and organized to respond to public problems (Moyo 2011:1).

1.7.1.2 Peace

Peace and peace research are serious though emotional and sensitive concepts of intellectual inquiry, which only began in the 1960s (Johan Galtung 1969). Galtung claimed that there exists negative and positive peace. While negative peace tends to avert war or curtail violence by the absence of personal violence and direct uproar. Positive peace is a state where non-violence social justice, non-violence and ecological sustainability removed the causes of violence (Harris 2004:12).

1.7.1.3 Security

The concept of security has recently gained more momentum in various ways. Historically it was linked to the security of a state. However, in recent times the people centered approach of human security have gained more prominence, with its emphases on poverty, human rights violation and illness that kill much more people than wars (Stewart 2004). However, this study is premised in understanding security in terms of securitization (Balzacq 2010; Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998; Emmers 2007). Security in this study is seen as the degree to resistance to, or defense from harm; in essence it is seen as the presence of peace coexistence and absence of chaos amongst “communities.”

1.7.2 Legal provisions for regional peace and security in Africa

To have a proper grasp of regional peace and security, some of the legal aspect that culminated into what is today called SADCSP, which could be regarded as the legal foundation would be highlighted such as: League of Nations; UN Charter on Peace and Security; Geneva Convention Declaration on Peace and Security; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty; European Union Force Treaty; Association of Southeast Asian Nations Treaty; League of Arab States; Organization of Islamic Conference; Organization of American States; African Union Charter on Peace and Security; African Union Peace and Security Department; African Union Peace and Security Council Protocol; African Union African Peace and Security Architecture; African Union African Standby Force Protocol; Southern African Development Community Standby Force Protocol; to Southern African Development Community Standby Force MoU which is the core of our investigation.

1.8. Theoretical Foundations

This study intends to use two major theories in International Relations in analyzing the research questions of this study. The Theories to be used are Collective Security and Strategy Theory in answering the four research questions set out in the study.

Collective Security is used to query the theoretical and practical dimensions of the peace and security architecture of regional bodies in Africa and globally. It would also be used to understand and identify the funding mechanisms for regional peacekeeping in Africa and in the global context. In that, international co-operation promotes collective security. Ideas from alliance security and/ or collective defense, which are in line with the idea of collective security “All for one and one for all”, is also used. Based on the notion of shared defence and securitization in that “an aggressor against any one state is considered an aggressor against all other states” should create a dynamic in the nature and operation of the SADCSCF in combating security threats in the region. Therefore, it is expedient that an analysis be drawn from the nature, the modus operandi, and the bodies/ mechanisms constituting the SADCSCF. Collective Security and Strategy Theory is also being helpful in identifying and bridging the gaps that exist in the SADCSCF. Such as language, securitization, ends and means etc.

The strategy theory is also associated with strategic planning. Which would be used to determine the funding mechanisms for the SADCSCF, as well as the strategic configuration in other words the architectural design of the SADCSCF.

1.8.1 Strategy Theory

Strategy Theory is situated in the interdisciplinary academic field of strategic studies and strategic management, concerned with the study of peace and conflict strategies cum ‘strategic’ development of organizations. Most often than not, devoting special attention to the relationship between international diplomacy, geostrategy, military power, international economics, effectiveness, international administration, productivity and international politics. The theory can also be useful in the understanding of the role of diplomacy, intelligence, and international co-operation for (regional) security and defense operations and the way an organization can best function adequately (RU 2015; JHS AIS 2015; Weihrich 1982:2-4).

The variety of meanings and applications of the concept 'strategy' is best positioned in the glossary of Knootz et al (1980) work on Management 7th Ed.:

[Strategies are] "General programs of action and deployment of emphasis and resources to attain comprehensive objectives; the program of objectives of an organization and their changes, resources used to attain these objectives, and policies governing the acquisition, use, and disposition of these resources; tile determination of the basic long-term objectives of an enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and allocation of resources necessary to achieve these goals” (Koontz O'Donnell and Wehrich1980).

The notion of the strategy theory, in strategic studies, as a tool of analysis has slowly permeated the parlance of international relations and political studies through works of Thomas Schelling and Colin Gray: Classic Strategic Theorists. Thus strategy theory has also become relevant as a tool to assist in the comprehension of decision-making (Yarger 2006; 2008).

1.8.2 Collective Security (CS)

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The idea of Collective Security (CS) and Regional Security are two sides of one coin. While the former try to ensure universal peace (World Peace: United Nation). The latter try to ensure peace in a region (Regional Peace: SADCSF, ASF). CS as an idea evolved as an instrument of the U.S. National Security traceable to (1) the collapse of the bipolar balance of power; (2) the success of the U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf war; and (3) the philosophical preference of the Clinton national security team for multilateral security especially the United Nations (Clark 1994; Clark 1995:237). CS is said to be line with Emmanuel Kant’s idea of peaceful community in Kant’s principle of: To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Kant 2003).

The philosophy of collective security is premised on the rock bottom principle that an attack on any one state will be regarded as an attack on all; “One for All and All for One” (Thompson 1953:755).


1.9. Research Methodology

There is no one best way/ method in social research (Nzewi 2009:17). Every social science research is hinge on the ability of the investigator to gather reasonable data, which could support the topic under review.

The study financing regional peace and security in Africa adopts an exploratory design method in its analysis, which, complies with meta-analysis and desk research approach, consistent with the qualitative paradigm.

The rock bottom assumptions of the desktop research are:

- Knowing where to look and what to look for
- Understanding the quality of the source material
- Ensuring you get the right information



The desktop approach is used for this study premised the following that:

- Issues on security and financing security is not be easily accessible
- The possibility of gathering official financial statement owing to the non-existent of an administrative building or support staff
- The secrecy in security
- No budget for the research

Data collection is based on secondary data:

Secondary Data Analysis is the practice of probing or scrutinizing data that have already been collected by someone else, often for a distinctly different purpose (Crossman ND). As a research method, it ensures brevity while saving time, money and unnecessary duplication of research actions (Crossman ND). An advantage of the Secondary means of Data Collection is that it is used to gain insight about a phenomenon. Its biggest weakness is the inability to generalize findings from such study. At the point of this presentation average of 200 articles, books, journal, blogs and websites have been read, scanned and skimmed, to produce this presentation. It is imperative to know that the desk approach is significant in explaining events of sensitive nature

(such as issues on regional peace and security), which every government intends to keep confidential; If not embargoed.




Figure 1.1: Proposed sample

Table 1.1: Summary of Proposed Method

The Method Adopted	The study explores the research question by using a qualitative paradigm (Desktop)
The Research Design	The Thesis is hinge on an exploratory research study, which helps to give perspectives to relatively new issues
The Logic of the Study	The rationale is to Validate and Discover the architectural and planning mechanism, the level of coordination and integration, and the organizational design of the SADCSF
The Approach	The study methodology used here is the Case Study approach which tends to give an holistic or critical view about a phenomenon
Data Collection Method	Data would be collected using a Secondary Methods of Data tion. At the point of writing over 230 materials have been scanned, ned and read.
Data Analysis	Data would be analysed using both the Secondary Data and Context Analysis.

1.9.1 Ethical Considerations

Every sources utilized in this study would be properly sited. Hence, the method of data collection would be of qualitative nature (secondary data). The study would not infer and will not pre-exempt what an author said. However, some explanations might be given their assumptions and statement, which must have a supporting author.

1.9.2 Scope and Limitations of the study

The research to be conducted should be outlined and the scope of the topic clearly defined. The following aspects may be taken into account

(Demarcation of study period)

- An understanding into the funding mechanisms for Regional Peace and Security in the African continent;
- It zoomed at understanding the financing the SADCSF;
- The study takes a regional perspective in understanding peace and security in global context;

- The seat of this study in public administration is seen as government at work or government as an activity (global governance);
- As a field of study, it has its roots in Global or International Administration;
- The study gives account of one or two international interventions in Africa;
- This work should be understood in the context of the AU.

1.10. Acknowledging Limitations

The study is restricted to financial mechanism of the SADC Standby Force in ensuring peace and security. Two theories would be used in answering the three main questions and drawing analysis on the fourth. The study is limited to Collective Security and Strategy theories. Collective Security is in the field of International Relations and the latter from Strategic Studies, and Pure Management.

Time, finance (no budget) and space also constituted factors that inhibited the study from conducting a field study. The study ignored such classical over-research International Relations Theories as: Realism, Liberalism, International Society and Constructivism etc., without diving deep into regional organizations that do not pertain to peace and security. Nor did the study favour the debate: regionalism vs regionalization.

It should also be noted that this study is not a comparative study nor is it intended to drive at establishing a theory towards Regional Peace and Security. Rather it is meant to create an understanding and to add to the existing body of knowledge, to fill the vacuum that exists and possibly propose a model for funding peace operation missions in the region.

Content Outline

Chapter One introduces the concept of financing regional peace and security in Africa. With a clear problem to the background of the study as well as contextualizing the background to the subject matter. The limitations and methodology were well spelt out. The coverage is concise and unambiguous. The objectives are clear and SMART. Showing the significance and contribution of this study as a springboard for further discuss in the field of financial regional peacekeeping

Chapter Two positions the study within the field Public Administration, using two theories and several conceptual frameworks in clarifying a path way towards financing peacekeeping in the SADC region. The legal provisions for regional peace and security in Africa were sharply discussed.

Chapter Three proposed an analytical framework divided into: Pull-Up Factors and Pull-Down Factors in postulating a pathway through which the model for funding regional peacekeeping was proposed.

Chapter Four deals significantly with proposing a financial model towards funding peacekeeping mission in the SADC region. In so doing it analyzed critical peacekeeping arrangement such as the UN, NATO, and the AU, to ascertain how these organisation are been funded and the lessons learnt from them were also used in building a model for funding peacekeeping missions in the SADC region through the SADC Standby Force. Also the African Peace and Security Architecture which the building block for all security apparatus in the continent were discussed and analyzed and also issues emanating from the African Standby Force which the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) was derived was also discussed. The model proposed in this thesis in funding the SADCSF is based on partnership. The model also stipulated clearly certain essential obligation of a member.

Chapter Five presents the summary of research output, the summary of findings derived from the research as well as make critical recommendations and vital conclusion

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
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2.0 CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical, Conceptual, and Legal Framework to the Study

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter two examine two theories from International Relations and Security Studies: Collective Security (IR); and Strategy Theory (SS) respectively in developing a partnership model for financing regional security forces in African generally and the SADC Standby Force in particular. It creates a conceptual framework that guides the approach to the study, while also giving justification for the establishment of the SADCSF drawing from selected protocols and legislative frameworks.



2.2 Strategy Theory

Strategy Theory is situated in the interdisciplinary academic field of strategic studies and strategic management (Furrer, Thomas, and Goussevskaia 2008:6), concerned with the study of peace and conflict strategies cum strategic development of organizations (JHSAIS 2015). Most often than not, devoting special attention to the relationship between international diplomacy, geo-strategy, military power, international economics, effectiveness, international administration, productivity and international politics (Gaddis 1982). The theory is useful in providing an understanding of the role of diplomacy, intelligence, and international co-operation for (regional) security and defense operations and the way an organization can best function adequately (RU 2015; Wehrich 1982:2-4).

However, there is a divided perception to the view of scholars and use/ misuse the concept. For instance, in the field of strategic management and strategic planning authors such as Richard Vancil, Kenneth Andrews, George A. Sterner, Alfred D. Chandler, and John B. Miner, focus on mainly the ends (Andrews, Learned, Christensen and Gut 1965; Chandler 1962; Steiner and Miner 1977; Vancil 1977). While authors as, Igor H Ansoff, Dan Schendel and Charles W. Hofer places much

emphasis on the means (Ansoff 1965; Hofer and Schendel 1978). Depending on which divide scholars' stands are, this study favours the ends to the means of achieving sustainable and enduring peace the region.

However, the concept like every other social science concepts differs universally acceptable definition. According to Knootz and Weihrich, strategies are generally referred to as programme of action and the deployment of resources to achieve an objective in an organization. Taking the following into consideration: the programme objectives, the resources deployed, and the policies and procedures stipulated for achieving the goal (Koontz and Weihrich 1980).

Recent studies have shown that strategy theory is important in decision-making in achieving the ends of a programme (Yarger 2006; 2008). According to ToddZenger, well-crafted strategies are road maps that guide policy makers in making decisions that generate values (ToddZenger 2015). In furtherance Knootz and Yarger, argued that the function of the strategy theory is to ensure the advancement, pursuit, and protection of interest (Knootz 1980; Yarger 2006). Yarger stated 15 assumptions that encapsulate the theory (Yarger 2006; 2008):

1. The strategic process is concerned with how leaders will use the power available to the state to exercise control over sets of situations and topographical locations to achieve objectives in accordance with state policy (Trager and Simonie 1973:36; Rosecrance and Stein 1993:4; US Department of Defense 2001:358; Garlup 2009:32).
2. *All strategies are governed by political purpose* (Jordan, Taylor Jr., Meese, and Nielsen 2009; Milward 1979:21; Burrowes 1996:29),
3. *The nature of the environment conditions the design of the strategy.* Every strategy is designed based on the understanding of the geographical location or landscape of the environment. While considering physical and metaphysical attributes of the environment. In that the environment must be studied properly and accurate information should be provided in conceptualizing and designing

6. *Strategies are formulated to solve a problem (No problem No strategy).* Strategies are not formulated in an intellectual vacuum. In that every strategy is formulated with a problem in mind, which the strategy intends to achieve or accomplish. Hill and Jones, argues that the *end* state of the strategist must be measured and achievement known (Hill and Jones 2010:27;). Therefore, if there are no problems nothing can be measured.
7. *Strategies are common to humans.* Strategy involves interests, culture values, human passion, and beliefs of strategist or policy maker for decision-making (Murray and Grimsley 1997:22).
8. *Resistance and conflict are inherent in formulating a strategy.* It is the discrepancy between applied strategy (workability of a strategy or strategy in practice) and the ideal strategy (theoretical experimentation of what it should be). According to Watts, friction/ resistance is a complex and chaotic description of human frailty and the environment (Cimbala 2001; Watts 2004:53), which must occur during strategy formulation.
9. *The main function for formulating a strategy is to focuses on finding the root causes and purposes of conflict or problem.* The primary focus of any strategy is to solve/ locate the root cause of the problem rather than the peripheral causes. The purpose is to locate the real problem to treating symptoms (Cimbala 2001; Metz 2014: 21; Steiss 2003:171).
10. *Strategies are ranked/ categorized based on priority and interest* (Finlan 2013:25). Every strategy function within a defined context and consequently structured based on the level of influence, power, resources, and strength. Most strategies in states is top-down. See figure 2.2 below:

Levels of War and Hierarchy of Strategy



Figure 2:1: Grand Strategy. Yarger, Harry R. (2006:12)

11. *Strategy has a symbiotic relationship with time.* A key attribute of human existence is thinking in time. A strategy is a going concern (i.e continuous). Therefore, there is need for the strategist to be able to predict the planned and involuntary consequences of the strategy in the future judging from past events. Every good strategy must emanate from the experiences of the past in terms of history, topography, formulation and preceding interactions (Jermy 2011).
12. *Strategy is cumulative.* The properties in strategic environments are increasing from several different perspectives. Once enacted, they become a part of the play of continuity and amendment.
13. *Strategies emphasis effectiveness to efficiency.* Because the major reason function of the strategy is to achieve a result which deals with the ends (result) to

the means (medium) of achieving a goal

14. *Strategies balance the relationship amongst the objectives, the methods used, and the resources available for accomplishing the goal in hierarchical manner.*

Every strategy intends to harmonize the ends, the means, and the methods of achieving a goal. These are integral part of the whole system, as well as contributing to the collective effects at the centre is critical in achieving the desired goal of the strategy.

15. *Strategies activities are inherently risky.* The risk involved in every strategic activity is twofold: nature of the environment and the uncertainty inherent in global community (Yarger 2006; 2008).

The functions espoused by Yarger can only be meaningful if the strategist takes cognizance of the following three constraints to successful implementation of strategies in global scale:

Holistic: An all-inclusive approach of a situation must be taken to action such as: finances, environment, timeline, communication pattern and stream, political, social and cultural dynamics, personnel, equipment, treatment facilities as well as the interactions and linkages connecting each strategic activity to the other (Gane 2007:256). The entire strategy must be seen as one with different parts that function effectively in maintaining the momentum of the central strategy from the onset. This could be likened to Ludwig von Bertalanffy proposition of a systems theory, which enables the strategic activities to be reinforced.

Sustainable: This deals with the capacity of a sector to provide current and future outputs that ensures the proper flow or deployment of finances, personnel and equipment (Gane 2007).

Equitable: Equity is key in life as it is to strategy. It speaks to justice and social order. Without equity no strategic activity can be accomplished, in that every strategy is premised on the central idea of a collective effort. Equity reduces doubts, seizes fears and repel discrimination, which are product of confusion. For

any strategy to succeed, cost must be distributed based on what was agreed at the initial stage through a fair accord, otherwise the essence of a strategy would be compromised (Gane 2007). Thus, every achievable strategy in military studies demands the collective effort of military professionalism in formulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing the strategy (Yarger 2006:ix).

2.3 Collective Security (CS)

The idea of Collective Security (CS) and Regional Security are two sides of one coin (Xavier 2015:4). While the former tries to ensure universal peace (World Peace: United Nation), the latter tries to ensure peace in a region (Regional Peace: Southern African Development Standby Force and African Standby Force). In that while CS could be premised on providing security to nations based on the principles of regionalization (by association), the latter RS is based on the principle of regionalism (geographical location). CS as an idea evolved as an instrument of the U.S. National Security traceable to (1) the collapse of the bipolar balance of power (based on military alliance); (2) the success of the U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf war; and (3) the philosophical preference of the Clinton national security team for multilateral security especially the United Nations (Clark 1994; Clark 1995:237). CS is said to be in line with Emmanuel Kant's idea of peaceful community (Kant 2003).

According to Organski there are five main assumptions CS (Nye and Donahue 2000), which includes:

1. In case of armed conflict member states identifies who the aggressor is.
2. All member states are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggressor, irrespective of its source or origin.
3. All member states have freedom of action to join in proceedings against the aggressor.
4. That the cumulative power of members of the alliance will be adequate to overpower the might/ strength of the aggressor.

5. In conflict zones the members' states must maintain momentum except the aggressor nation modify its policies, if unwilling to do so, will be defeated (Organski 1960:41; 1968; Nye Jr. and Donahue 2000:42)
6. The philosophy of collective security is premised on the rock bottom principle that an attack on any one state will be regarded as an attack on all; "*One for All and All for One*" (Thompson 1953:755).

The idea of CS is to improve the capacity and capabilities of the multidisciplinary components forces. In that threats to sub-regional securities transcend the geographical confines of a state. To this end, to ensure that no one state is too weak or too strong the idea of CS is critical. One of the limitations of the CS is non-interference in internal issues in member states. This therefore strengthens 'weaker or less developed' member state having fewer, military personnel, finance, equipment and facility. Based on the principle of all for one and one for all military alliance. This theory in all provides a balance of power in international relation.



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2.4 Conceptual framework:

2.4.1 Peace

The concept of peace differs universally acceptable definition like harmony, love, emotion, which can only be measured more appropriately by the lack of it. This is why a critical characteristic of peace is the absence of war, violence and conflict, which Galtung referred to as negative peace. According to Fast the major proponents of the concept are Kenneth Boulding, Elise Boulding, Adam Curle, Johan Galtung, Betty Reardon, Peter Wallenstein, including activists such as Martin Luther King Jr., Mohandas Gandhi etc., (Fast nd: 202).

2.4.2 Security

The concept of security has grown from the traditional approach of state-centric nomenclature to new security agenda, notably due to the fact that threats to security transcend a countries territorial confines (Hänggi 2003:4; Acharya 2009:1; Kerr 2003). The new security agenda places much emphasis on the ability of state and non-state

actors to both protect and provide for the wellbeing of its citizens. Implicit in this definition is ability to protect, which invariably speaks to capacity and capabilities of these actors to provide security within the confines of a state. However, recent events have shown that threats to security transcend the confines of a state, which calls for the involvement of dual or multiple interventions/ collaboration of a number of states. This study is of the opinion that if this intervention or collaboration involves multiple states not actors, with the view to protect, it will be referred to as a regional security. In so that security in the 21st century is multifaceted and multidimensional encapsulating different spheres of life: human, environment, economic, energy, political and social. Therefore, security in the new security agenda and in this study is seen and understood as incorporating state and non-state actors providing protection for its citizens through any means necessary. The figure below illustrates this position graphically.




Figure 2:3 New Concepts in Security. Hänggi (2003:4-8)

2.6.1 Security Sectors and Actors

The new standpoint of the definition of security takes into account a broader view of the security sector, proliferated with various actors. According to DAF It "recognizes the interrelated nature of the security and justice sectors and the need to balance increases in effectiveness with greater accountability (DAF :4)." It takes into account the four agreeable categories which actor's function in the security arrangement in the provision of security and justice:

1. State security and justice providers;
2. State governance and oversight mechanisms;
3. Non-state security and justice providers; and
4. Non-state governance and oversight mechanisms



Figure 2:4 State and Non-State Actors. Hänggi (2003:4–8)

2.4.3 Regionalism and Regionalization

Regionalism as a more general context is a phenomenon that refers to a formal scheme promoted by regional states based on geography, with certain shared sets of norms, ideas, identity and principles by participating member states (McColl 2005). The understanding of McColl is that it is based on a geographical proximity North, South, East and West. Nevertheless, definitions of region, regionalism, and regionalization are met with contestations, each focusing on one or more predominant factors, whether geographical proximity, economic unification, political stability, cultural identity or security interdependence (Cantori and Spiegel 1970; Buzan and Wæver 2003), all tend to champion regional alternatives based on regionness or regionhood (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006; Van Langenhove 2003).

This study sees regionalism as focused on state-based macro-regions (three or more states), as opposed to micro-regions or independent states. Geographic proximity have been argued as the basis for regionalism as opposed to regionalization, the former which is often seen through the prism of regionness principally for the purpose of trade, investment, interest and security, for example, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Trade Organization (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization are all based on a commonly identified global problem, ideology and most times for economic and strategic unification or for defence (Fawcett and Gandois 2010:619). Though both concepts are used loosely and interchangeably, this study considers both concepts as separate.

In sum regionalism according to Fawcett and Gandois is basically a collective political project of state actors for state gains. While regionalization encompasses an interaction of state and non-state actor to increase economic, political, security or social gains for the state actor or non-state actor (Fawcett

and Gandois 2010:619). Hurrel argues that regionalization involves growth in economic integration amongst members (Hurrel 1995a:39; Kacowicz 1998:9-11). In that its main motive is to promote trade and gains based on comparative advantage.

Regionalism strengthens the argument for regional integration, in that, it believes that the whole (a collective action) is greater than an independent action (single action), or as put simply by van Langenhove, regional integration is a “process in which units move from a condition of total or partial isolation towards a complete or partial unification (Van Langenhove 2005:5).” The point here is the movement of units from isolation to unification, which is the basis for collective action and collective security.

2.4.4 Regional Security

Both concept ‘region’ and ‘security’ are usually contested due to their vagueness in usage, in addition to undefined territory and what they connote essentially. While region to some means the continents of the world: Africa, Asia, Oceania, Europe and Americas etc., other see region as surrounding areas of sea such as Baltics, and Caspian Sea etc. However, this study sees region as various parts of a continent for instance Africa: East, West, North and South are seen as regions, while Africa, Europe and Americas will be viewed as continent. When the concept regional security is mentioned some see regionalism (geographical proximity based) others see regionalization (interest and value based). This study does not intend in any way to continue the arguments of both schools of thought (regionalism and regionalization) rather to find a way through which security is or can be provided through collective partnership either utilizing the principles of regionalism or regionalization is appropriate in ameliorating the menace of insecurity in the continent in general and SADC in particular. Nonetheless, for this study, the study favors regionalism based on its essential characteristic premised on geographical proximity as with the SADC standby force. According to Attina, regional security partnership deals with international security or security arrangement of a region through a consensus of intergovernmental integration of regional governments, to

cooperate in dealing with threats in a region thereby enhancing stability and peace through the use of treaties, agreement, instruments or mechanism in a region (Attinna 2005:4). For this study regional security is the collective effort of actors and non-actors in a region to provide security for that region.

2.4.5 Global Governance

Global governance is the study of the role and importance of international organizations in promoting cooperation between states. It is a common theme unifying all areas of the study in IR, in that states are no longer the only actors in the global system, and non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations and even terrorist organizations are having an impact on international security, international political economy and global governance. In understanding the changing nature of global system, global governance gives a picture of issues arising out of the involvement of non-state actors in the globe and the emerging global norm of humanitarian intervention, the rise of emerging economic powers such as China and India, the significance of regional integration (for example, the European Union and North America), the persistence of poverty and inequality between and within states, and the implications of the apparent decline in power of the United States, Canada's closest ally and trading partner.

2.5 Positioning the study within Public Administration

Public administration is a broad and encompassing area of interest in international relations. This makes it difficult to focus on a particular area; rather scholars over the years have defined the concept and field based on their view of the concept. In recent times the discipline of PA has transcended into a transdisciplinary and to some a multidisciplinary approach through the help of its sub-field public policy and monitoring and evaluation.

2.5.1 Public Administration

Public Administration is a concept used to connote a field of study and an activity of the state (public administration), situated in the domain of a broader body of knowledge Administration. While Public Administration is more limited in scope,

practice and activity; Administration is more encompassing and applies to a wider array: business, financial, health and a lot of other forms of administrative studies.

According to Simon, administration is the activities carried out by groups or individuals cooperating together to achieve a common goal (). Simon reinforced that administration can only be said to have taken place when two men cooperate to roll a stone that none of the two can roll alone. The emphasis in this definition is cooperation or collective effort in achieving a commonly identified goal. Hence administration is concerned with cooperative effort of a group/s of people in achieving a certain aim; public administration therefore can also be seen as the cooperative effort of groups/individuals to accomplish the delivery of service to the public in a sustainable manner through accelerated policies and programmes. For this study therefore public administration would be regarded as the application of collective action of public, private and nonprofit sectors to resolve a common problem through collective efforts.

2.5.2 Public Administration as an Interdisciplinary Discourse

Public administration has evolved from its early years of disciplinary independence struggles, to lately evolving interdisciplinary perspective as a result of globalization sustained by a system of open trade/ market, open hybrid/ highways of information, ever-increasing organizational learning and the impact of trans-disciplinary and interdisciplinary approach in the social science have further shaped the disciplinary of PA around the world (Vigoda 2003:1). It could be argued that PA has had deep roots of interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary approach in its early years. Borrowing from works of Engineering: Winslow Taylor, to Max Weber: Sociology (Kettl and Milward 1996; Rosenbloom 1983), Change Theory from Nursing etc. Simplified in the view of Wright, PA is built on a variety of interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary approaches by adopting their values (Wright 2011:96). To this end, Marine opines that the discipline thrives by relying on other social science, management science, and applied and pure science disciplines for approaches and framework (Marine 2006:8). However reliant on other discipline to provide insight to activities and functions of government day-to-day activities, as well as resolve

government unending problem through various method borrowed from other discipline especially Psychology and Engineering, the discipline is undoubtedly important in the understanding government bureaucracies. It further contributes to building capacities, and ensuring that a government remains functional and efficient. It also helps government agencies, parastatal and department all over the world in fine-tuning policies and solving complex problems. Hence public administration is related to more than one discipline. For any government all over the world to effectively address the myriad of problems and challenges it faces, in terms of policy formulation and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, public financial management, public accountability, ensure the application of the principles of good governance, revenue allocation and sharing formula public administration cannot be undermined.

2.6 Legal provisions for regional peace and security in Africa

This section in this chapter traces or justifies the reason for the signing of the Memoranda of Understanding the Southern African region in 2007, which led to the formation of the Southern African Development Community Brigade (now Standby Force). The study traces the powers of the SADCSF from the UN Charter of 1946.

2.6.1 UN Charter

The UN Charter is the foundational treaty for intergovernmentalism signed on 26 June 1945 by 50 of the 51 original member countries. The overarching objectives for the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 (UN 2010b; 2010c) is to abolish war at all cost and build peaceful coexistence around the world through regional security agencies. Chapter VIII provides the basis for regional arrangements or agencies (OAS, AU, SADCSF) the Secretariat. The Charter emphasize that established regional agencies must be consistent with Purposes and Principles of the United Nations (Article 52, paragraph 1). Article 53, paragraph 1, states that the, Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined

in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

The UN operates through six major organs: The General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat, which are all responsible for specific issues (Boulding 200:247; UNAS 2015). The most powerful of the six is the Security Council with five permanent members UN 2015 (Goodrich 2015). The General Assembly is a meeting point for all member states of the UN and bills or laws are passed through consensus vote which could be vetoed by one of the five permanent members (UNGA 2015). UN Secretariat is the official bureaucratic organ that carries on with the day-to-day activities of the UN. The Trusteeship Council was suspended in 1 November 1994 after South Africa gained independence.

2.6.1.1 General Assembly

The General Assembly established under Chapter IV is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. All 193 Member States of the UN are represented in the General Assembly. This organ takes decision on intervention and budget based on a two third majority of the Assembly.

1.6.1.2 Security Council

This is the most powerful organ of the UN with five permanent members (USA, Britain, France, China and Russia) who are the major financial contributors to the UN. UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the determinant of the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression (Chapter 5 of the UN Charter).

Table 2:1 Contributions of the Permanent Five 2013-2015

No.	Member State	Effective Rate (%)
1	United States of America	28
2	France	7.22
3	United Kingdom	6.68
4	China	6.64
5	Russian Federation	3.15
	Total	51.69

UN (2015)



2.6.1.3 Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council is the principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the implementation of internationally agreed development goals as stated in Chapter X.

2.6.1.4 International Court of Justice

Chapter XIV provides for an International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its role is to settle, in accordance with international law, and legal disputes submitted to it.

2.6.1.5 Secretariat

The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General and tens of thousands of international UN staff members who carry out the day-to-day work of the UN as mandated by the General Assembly and the Organization's other principal organs (UN 2015).

2.6.2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a regional force (see regionalization) premised on the ideal of collective defense and military allegiance, established in Washington, D.C. on the 4 April 1949 (Curtis, 1992). Its member's springs from

North America, and several Eastern and Western Europe nations, with the aim of providing collective defense initially against the Soviet Union (HistoryState 2015b).

The Treaty and subsequent Protocols of the Treaty is intended to strengthen regionalization on the principles of collective defense. Its powers were derived from Chapter VIII of UN Charter of 1945.

The unique nature of NATO is seen in Article 5 of the Treaty, in that all “Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently [they] agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area ... and all measures taken...immediately be reported to the UN Security Council.” This is only possible with NATO because its members comprise of three of the five permanent members of the UN. More so, its individual strength cannot be overemphasized, with the contribution it remits to the UN, NATO could do otherwise the decision of the UN as seen with the invasion of Libya against Gadhafi. While every other regional arrangement speaks to community security and continental union, the ideology behind NATO’s success has been military allegiance (as stated earlier), which favours powerful/ strong independent member countries based on its principle of cost lie where they fall

2.6.3 Organization of American States

The Organization of American States (OAS) is arguably the oldest multilateral regional organization in the world today (Meyer 2014:2). The essence of the OAS Charter was to address the flaws of global conflict in the Post-War World and to contain conflicts within the region. In doing so, the Inter-American Treaty of

Reciprocal Assistance” (Rio Treaty) was signed in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro on tenets of collective security (USOAS 2015).

2.6.4 Organization of African Unity Charter

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in Addis Ababa on the 25th of May 1963 (African Association of International Law 2011; dfa 2015a); Commissioned by 32 Head of States and Governments (AU 2015a). Its overarching objective is to define a meaningful role for the region in international relations between the South and the North, and to safeguard and consolidate on the sovereignty and independence of African states (African Association of International Law 2011:79).” At this time the major security challenge as seen in the objective of the OAU was to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the continent, and eradicate all form of colonials, which could course harm in the continent (African Association of International Law 2011:79).

Though the organization succeeds in defending and protecting the sovereignty of African states and also championed the course for Africa’s liberation struggle from the West. Unity, Integrity, Coordination, Regional and International Cooperation were all lacking and also suffered dastardly as a result of three major flaws: weak financial strength and weak capacity, the doctrine of non-interference: which prohibit member states from interfering in internal matter in a member states and the rejection or otherwise the neglect of the Organ to chart it course by international organization. Conversely, in 2001 the African Union was born through the instrumentality of the Sirte Declaration of 1999, modeled after the European Union, due to the failures of the Organization of African Unity.

2.6.5 African Union Charter

The Constitutive Act of the AU is a radical shift from general doctrine of the OAU in every ramification (Yusuf and Ouguergouz 2012:1). Because while the Charter of the OAU was predominantly about struggles towards decolonization and safeguarding of the sovereignty of the continent. The Constitutive Act mandates, the AU to pursue collectivity and inclusiveness on behalf of the continent. In respect to member states

commitments to adhering to democratic values, while encouraging the lives of its citizenry (Yusuf and Ougergouz 2012).

According to Mbeki, African Union (AU) is a continental union comprising 54 countries in the continent, established in Addis Ababa on the 26th of May 2001 and was subsequently launched in South Africa on the 9th of July 2002 (Mbeki 2002). It is the principal organization for the promotion of socioeconomic integration across the continent. Notably of the objectives stipulate in Article 3 of the Act for the purpose of this study includes: promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; accelerate the political and social-economic integration of the continent; encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; and promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies.

Article 5 of the Constitutive Act clearly states six organs through which the AU is expected to fulfill the objective assigned to it: The Assembly of the Union; The Executive Council; The Commission; The Permanent Representatives Committee; The Peace and Security Council; The Pan-African Parliament; The Economic, Social and Cultural Council; The Court of Justice; The Financial Institutions; and The Specialized Technical Committees (EACLJ 2012). Of greater attention the Economic, Social and Cultural Council will be discussed in subsequent chapter. However, the PSC is the decision arm and the most powerful organ of the AU

2.6.5.1 Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council

The PSC established through the Durban Declaration on the 9th of July 2002, subsequently came into force on the 26th of December 2003 and was later launched on the 24th of May 2004 (Sturman and Hayatou 2010:57; Levitt 2005:213; Engel and Porto 2013:15). The protocol was essential in legitimizing the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System and several important institutions that are paramount for effective

functioning of the African Union. The AU-PSC is the most important and most powerful organ of the AU Union (AU-PSC 2004:3). The objects of the PSC are stipulated in Article 3 of the PSC:

- a) Promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in a bid to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;
- b) Anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peacebuilding
- c) Functions for the resolution of these conflicts;
- d) Promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;
- e) Co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;
- f) Develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;
- g) Promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.

Though the philosophy of the African Union is hinged on the principle of continental union according to Mbeki, the idea of continental union is vague, not tested, does have a background and foreign. If Africa must look forward in solving the proliferated disturbance and poverty in the continent, it must begin to look inwards to look for solutions to its problems, then rely on foreign measures, which can really not be measured. This CU is contested on the basis that from the European Union perspective, in that an increase in GDP affects the per capita income of citizens, which is largely not true in Africa. In that an increase in GDP has little or no significant relationship to increase in per capita income of its citizens (Nigeria, for example, with it becoming the most vibrant economy in the world and by far a

leading country for investors on the continent, it does little or no significance in the per capita income of its citizens). Therefore, if the basis for the application of continental union is based on a vibrant region with an engaging, diverse membership then Africa should not at this time act on such philosophy based on the reality that it lacks vibrant economic activities in the region as seen in the volume of trade within the continent.

2.6.5.2 African Union-African Standby Force Protocol

The Protocol establishing Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) give credence to the African Standby Force. The African Standby Force (ASF) emanates from Article 13 of the PSC Protocol and is “composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of origin and ready for deployment at appropriate notice” (PSC 2003; SADC 2015e). The mandate for deployment of the multidisciplinary contingents of the ASF is seen in Article 13, paragraph 3. Thus:

- a) Observation and monitoring missions;
- b) Other types of peace support missions;
- c) Intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with article 4(h) and (j) of the constitutive act;
- d) Preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
- e) Peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;
- f) Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and
- g) Any other functions as may be mandated by the peace and Security Council or the assembly

The Protocol establishing the African Standby Force created regional arrangement, which the ASF intends to utilize in ensuring peace and security in the Continent.

They include: The East African Standby Force (EASF); The ECOWAS Standby Force (ECOWASSF); The North African Regional Capability (NARC); The SADC Standby Force (SADCSF); The Economic Community of Central African States (FOMAC/ ECCAS) Standby Force (ECCASSF) (Fisher, Bah, Mniema, Okome, Tamba, Frederiksen, Abdelaziz, and Reeve 2010:40). The SADCSF is the ASF mechanism of ensuring sustainable peace in the SADC region through the SADC-OPDSC

2.6.5.3 Southern African Development Community Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation Protocol

The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Organ) (OPDSC) of SADC was launched in June 1996 as a formal institution to support the maintenance of security and the rule of law in the region (SADC 2015i; SADC-OPDSC 1996:2). The Protocol was established through the SADC Treaty of 1992 (SADC 2015k); premised on the reiterated commitments of the Heads of State and Government on a “shared future in an atmosphere (SADC) of peace, security and stability, regional cooperation and integration based on equity, mutual benefit and solidarity (SADC 2015j).”


The SADC Treaty, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) II are the key document that shapes the actions of the Organ (SADC 2015i). The objectives of the OPDSC were categorized into three: The overall objectives, the specific objective and the military and defence objectives of the OPDSC (SADC 2015i). The overall objective is to promote Peace and Security within the SADC region; the specific objectives is to ensure that the overall objective is realized through a series of specific objectives (Article 10A, SADC 1992); the Military/ Defence objectives is in threefold (1) to protect against instability and intra and interstate conflict and aggression (2) to develop a collective security capacity, and (3) to consider development of the Mutual Defence Pact (SADC 2015i). To achieve these objectives in 2007, 15 of its member states signed a Memorandum of Understanding towards quick response likened to the African Standby Force called SADC Standby Brigade.

2.6.5.3.1 Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade (SADCSB) now Standby Force (SADCSF)

The 2007 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade, was established through the instrumentality of Article 1 of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SADC- OPDSC), and in Article 1 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (The Pact) (SADC-PSADCSB 2007:3). Article 3 of the MoU states the composition of the SADC Standby Brigade which would consist of: Military, Police and Civilian Component. To perform the following function, as enshrined in Article 4:

The SADCBRIG shall participate in the following missions as stated in Article 13 of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the Constitutive Act.

Thus:

- 
- a) “Observation and monitoring missions;
 - b) Other types of peace support missions;
 - c) Intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with article 4(h) and (j) of the constitutive act;
 - d) Preventive deployment in order to prevent
 - i. A dispute or a conflict from escalating,
 - ii. An on-going violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, and
 - iii. The resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
 - e) Peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;
 - f) Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and
 - g) Any other functions as may be mandated by the peace and Security Council or the assembly”

The MoU, of the SADCBRIG 2007 is meant to liaise with the African Standby Force, its agencies, and other relevant international organizations and regional

organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs, where appropriate to sustain peace and avert security threat in the region. But to do this the SADC SF must look inward and ensure that it set realistic objective rather than replicating the objectives of the ASF.

2.7 Conclusion

The study framed the theoretical foundation and conception assumptions of the study. It used two theories from international relation to ascertain its ability in developing a partnership model for funding peace operation mission in the SADC region. It also states clearly the legislative provisions of selected regional organization while tracing the historical antecedents of the SADC Standby Force from the United Nations formation in 1946.

In sum both the strategy theory and collective security set certain principles, which if properly harvested is useful in proposing a vibrant funding mechanism for African security forces in general and the SADC Standby Force in particular. However, to propose a vibrant funding model for regional securities in Africa certain key financial elements are critical and vital such as: fiscal viability, economic landscape, fiscal sustainability, regional integration and fiscal responsibility will be discussed extensively in the subsequent chapter, without which funding the SADC SF will only be a wishful thinking.

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3.0 Chapter Three: Analytical Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a framework for analysis by presenting the factors that have inhibited the operations and functions of the SADC Standby Force. The aim will be to identify gaps that have led to failures in funding the SADCSF peace operation missions since its inception in 2007. The chapter argues that a suitable and sustainable financing model for the SADCSF is the first step towards full operation of the SADCSF. From the deductions from both discussions on collective security and strategic theory as seen in previous chapters, it is evident that collective action and strategic planning imbibed in strategy theory; is important in directing and formulating a blueprint that achieves the collective strategic objective of an agency like the SADCSF.

This means that for effective control and realization of the goal of the Standby Force to become operational, the institution saddled with the responsibility of coordination, strategic planning, compliance and priority setting must be optimally functional. More so, this study argues that in achieving financial viability: strategy planning and collective action are both means through which a suitable and sustainable model for funding the SADCSF can be proposed and built. Indeed, both strategic planning in strategic theory and collective action in collective security theory are critical in creating an understanding on regional governance and funding. In proposing a model, the chapter limits itself to assessing five economic analytical tools in proposing the partnership model for funding the SADCSF premised on collective action. They are referred to as Pull-Up Factor, which includes: regional integration, economic landscape, fiscal viability, fiscal responsibility, and fiscal sustainability. On the other hand, it identifies six major factors that undermine collective actions, regional trade, regional integration, regional development and the operationalization of the standby force. These factors are referred to as the Pull-Down Factors, which includes: nature of regionalism, political economy, weak region, weak capacity, weak institutions, and weak governance. The focus on economic analytical tools are based on the understanding that funds derived from trade and investment, are the same funds injected into the economies of member

states for growth and development, and are needed for funding regionalism efforts including the Standby Force. These factors as expressed constitute the analytical framework, which is proposed for this study as shown below.



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


Figure 3:1 Pull Factors of SADC. Author's Configuration © 2015

3.2 The Pull-Up Factors

The pull-up factors are guides that promote or increase the chances of the region in achieving economic growth and sustainable development in the region. As well as promotes and strengthens economic activities among member states in the region.

3.2.1 Financial viability

According to the National Regulatory System for Community Housing Directorate, financial viability is the ability of an agency to generate sufficient income to meet the operating cost, debts commitments, payments, and where applicable to allow for growth while maintaining operations (National Regulatory System for Community Housing Directorate 2014:3). In furtherance to this argument Koleda and Oganisjana, add that it is a complex phenomenon characterizing the level of usage of fiscal and any other resources towards the achievement of the aims of the agency (Koleda and Oganisjana 2015:196). Ventureline, agree with the above submission in stating that financial viability is the capability “of an entity to continue to achieve its operating objectives and fulfill its mission over the long term (Ventureline (2015))”. These definitions point to achieving a purpose, free from debt burdens, remuneration, operating cost and fulfilling management activities. Zhevak see financial/ fiscal viability as an economic condition that creates the prerequisites towards a stable favourable income- expenditure ratio, steady reproduction process and efficient use of resources under the conditions of active influence of internal and external factors (Zhevak, 2006). These authors argue that fiscal viability is all about achieving aims of the agency while ensuring it is still in operation. Zhevak in particular argues that fiscal viability deals with income and expenditure and economic upliftment taking into cognizance both internal and external influence of the organization to be stable, the major deviation in Zhevak’s argument is the internal and external influence. This invariably speaks to the capability of the SADCSF to not only operate as an entity capable of achieving its aims as set in Article 4 of the SADC MoU, but also ensuring that external influence through national governments and donor agencies does not impede on its operations.

For the purpose of this study fiscal viability will be referred to as financial independence of the agency (like SADCSF) to operate and function without interference from member state governments and the donor community. For instance, for an organization like the SADCSF to remain relevant it must source for avenues through which it can remain afloat without political interference from governments or donor agencies. Fiscal viability deals with both internal and external sources for this study internal source are seen as contributions from member states while external is taken as non-state actors (see diagram in chapter two) (donor, civil organizations, NGOs, corporate industries, security agencies) in the security arrangement in the region inclusive of international donors.

To achieve financial viability of the SADCSF, a model for financial partnership must be established, that must take into cognizance the issue of sustainability i.e. how it would be sustained overtime. Many regional experiments and organization have failed in Africa as a result of lack of realistic funding mechanisms. Though financial viability can be seen as the benchmark towards a SADC by SADC approach to the SADC Standby Force, without financial sustainability the operationability and functionality will only be for a while. This is because; financial viability can only be realized where there is continuous balance of inflows and outflows of income (CSA 2013:1). More so, fiscal sustainability is the ability of regional agencies to maintain these inflows and outflows, and income and expenditure overtime.

3.2.2 Fiscal sustainability

Krejdl, Balassone and Franco argues that fiscal sustainability or public finance sustainability is the ability of a government or a government agency or an international agency to maintain its current spending, viability, tax and all other policies in the long run without threatening the solvency or defaulting on all/ some of its liabilities or promised expenditures (Krejdl, Balassone and Franco, 2000). According to León (2001: 15-16), there are four pillars of financial sustainability, which deals with income generation. They are:

- Financial and strategic planning:

This deals with the amount of funds the organization itself needs to generate. In addressing and ensuring that they are financially stable. For instance, while the SADCSF have not been able to state categorically how much it needs to begin operation undermines their capacity to become operational in the nearest future. Unlike the African Standby Force that have recently come to say that for the operationability of the African Standby Force about \$USD 1 billion dollars is needed minimally to achieve the mission of the ASF. Despite needing \$USD 1 billion the ASF on its own do not have a financial roadmap/ plan of action through which it is going to generate the needed funds.

- Income diversification:

This refers to not merely internally generated income but a number of activities that could generate income externally perhaps. The idea is that every organization must have other means of ensuring that it remains a going concern (remains alive). For instance, if an organization has 15 donors it does not necessarily meant that such organization (non-profit) would be fiscally sustainable. Despite having 15 donors the organization might still remain fiscally vulnerable. Most especially where there is a parasitic relationship, where there exist no commonalities or results from investment, in such a case where the economy of the donor countries is faced with stringent sanction and more importantly if only one of these 15 donors are effective.

- Sound administration and finance:

This deals essentially with sound bookkeeping and financial planning mechanism that insures prudent financial management of the resources of the organization. That enables an organization knowledgeable of the finances of the organization per time. By strengthening strong accounting-administrative procedures that fits the needs of the organization.

- Own income generation:

This is one of the ways to diversify the economies or revenue of an organization. Most effective security arrangement, all over the world has device means through which they generate income internal, while supplementing in some cases with external and other means. For instance, the United Nations uses 10 assessment scales or member state's contribution. In NATO's orientation, it is referred to as cost lie where they fall. In the African Union, it is referred to as assessment scales or member state's contribution. However, the SADCSF, and its principal the ASF have no mechanism for generating funds internally other than reliance on partners and the AU. However, there two principal methods through which funds can be generated internally (i) funds from institutional building or operations, and (ii) contributions to a trust/ endowment fund (León 2001:15-16).

For a non-profit agency like the SADC Standby Force a trust/ separate budget like that of the United Nations is critical in achieving financial sustainability, as it enables it to cover its administrative cost and priorities without disputes with funders/ partners or national governments of member states over decisions on peace missions in the region. In essence, a separate budget should be created for the standby force if financial viability and sustainability of the standby force would be achieved like that of the UN as seen in the next chapter. However, the availability of studies that examine or proffer models towards financial sustainability of security agencies in the region in particular or the continent in general taking into cognizance the economic landscape and regional integration on the basis of intra-trade or investment are few.

According to León, fiscal sustainability tends to give clear direction on the administration and prudent financial management of an agency to manage its resources judiciously and other means through which funds can be generated for the agency (León 2001:17). Since efficient procedures for administration and finances are governed by a series of institutional policies that help an organization make the most of its resources. This also guarantees transparency in fiscal management. Therefore, the SADC Standby Force must

not be solely dependent on donor funds and funds from the region, but must seek another source of deriving its funds, in order to sustain the momentum of the agency (going concern). Though, the standby forces in all the five regions have relied and dependent solely over the years of donor funding and contribution from member states without any creativity to ensuring that they source funds from other means, even the AU is guilty of this as well.

Though both fiscal viability and sustainability could be unproductive and disdained; if a measure of fiscal responsibility is not applied. In recent times, the UN, World Bank and IMF and other donor agencies have emphasized the need for the application of the principles of good governance and monitoring and evaluation, as a measure of ensuring accountability project/ programme carried out in a country or region.

3.2.3 Fiscal Responsibility

The concept fiscal responsibility is one that politicians and administrators from all divides have all agreed upon as a necessary tool to avoid fiscal irresponsibility and recklessness. Conover refers to fiscal responsibility as “a catch phrase that seemingly no politician can do without (Conover 2012)”. Fiscal Responsibility emphasizes the need for a balanced budget, stability, fairness, efficiency, transparency, paying down debt, sustaining debt levels in relation to the size of the economy, and strengthening the economy (Wisegeek 2015; Conover 2012). Basically, the central idea of fiscal responsibility involves strategies for managing methodologies for smart spending (fiscal discipline) and debt management. This speaks directly to the principles of good governance and more.

Perhaps a wider understanding on the need, scope and meaning of fiscal responsibility is essential in developing a mechanism for funding the SADCSF. It is expedient to see the concept through the prism of countrywide legislations and international organization perspective, which emphasized its importance, defined or described the concept.

According to the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act of 2003 in India, fiscal responsibility implies institutionalized financial discipline exercised to reduce fiscal deficit, improve macroeconomic administration and the management of public funds to ensure a balanced budget. The ends of fiscal responsibility are to achieve a balanced budget, which is to eliminate revenue deficits.

In the South African context, it speaks to the disbursement of funds to the three spheres of government and how the spheres efficiently utilize the funds to achieve the goals and objectives of the government based on its budget. According to Momoniat, fiscal responsibility in South Africa is mainly concerned with how government revenues are shared and expended by the three spheres with the Province receiving (57,7%), Local government (4.7%) and the National having (37.6%) based on the revenue sharing system as stipulated in the constitution (Momoniat 2005:5). The basic assumption of the revenue sharing system of SA is that cost lie where they fall, in that the three distinct spheres are financially responsible for the provision of the services that falls under its jurisdiction as seen in the provision of the constitution.

According to Buti and Carnot, the European Commission sees fiscal responsibility as its key pillar in ensuring the strategic growth and structural reforms while boosting investment in the region, as well as confronting current dilemmas of member states appropriately (Buti, and Carnot, 2015; European Commission 2014a). Since fiscal responsibility in the European Union (EU) context means ensuring that member states of the EU secure long-term control over debt and deficit levels, including having a proper budgetary plan for accelerated growth in member states (European Commission 2014b). Implicit in these definitions, is that fiscal responsibility is concerned with viable fiscal policy, coupled with rules that govern the expenditure and disbursement of government finance and stability in an economy. Therefore, without responsible fiscal machinery for the regional integration and governance, it would be of little importance, if a funding partnership model is proposed or adopted in the long run. For instance, if a member state cannot be fiscally responsible, there might be tendencies that it might still not be responsible with finances concerning the SADCSF. However, fiscal responsibility is not

the Eldorado of financing the SADCSF in South Africa, also cognizance must be paid significantly to the nature of commodity, wealth and exchange that enhance regional cooperation, most importantly the economic indicators that could be harnessed and developed to accelerate increased income in the region.

3.2.4 Economic landscape

There are ten economic indicators that determine economic growth and development in a region. These are GDP, Unemployment, Interest rates, Inflation, Business spending, Energy, Housing, Retail sales, Trade deficit and Practical Economics columns (Payne, Somerville, Patterson, Sermeño, and Babb 2015).

The SADC member states have shown exceptional commitment in increasing GDP in the region (Bezuidenhout 2015:1). Member states such as Angola have seen a steady rise of GDP over 10% in the past one year. Others are: Mozambique (7.3%), Zambia (6.7%), Tanzania (6.6%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (6.6%) and Botswana (5.3%) (Zambia Daily Mail 2015).



The GDP of the region makes SADC member states amongst the fastest growing economies of developing nations across the world with a growth rate of between 5-7% annually (Tax 2015). See table 1 below

Table 3:1 Gross Domestic Product of SADC

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GDP rate	3.46	2.69	2.68	2.98	4.89	4.80	6.16	6.74	4.00	2.20	5.23	5.14*

Source: SADC (2015a)

While the GDP of Southern Africa increased significantly in 2006-2007 at a steady rate. It was short lived as a result of rate the depression in 2008 (global meltdown), which crippled most economies in the world. The global meltdown played a significant role in reducing the GDP in the region to about 4% and 2.20% subsequently in 2008-2009. However, there was a turnaround in 2010 when the

market economy began to make strides owing to government investment in businesses.

On the contrary, the rate of unemployment, interest rates, inflation, foreign direct investment, retail sales, energy and housing cannot be said to have improved significantly. Rather the rate of unemployment has been on the increase, despite the millions of dollars spent on energy (generation and distribution); there have not been much significant difference in most of these member states in terms of electricity and unemployment. Other indicators for economic landscaping except GDP have been on a geometric decline (Payne, Somerville, Patterson, Sermeño, and Babb 2015). Though there are multiple of approach that could accelerate economic growth and development. But the most effective approach, which the AU also prescribes in reshaping the landscape, is through cooperation or integration amongst member states in terms of trade, investment, capacity development, capital and production.

3.2.5 Regional Integration/ Co-operation

Regional or continental unification otherwise integration has been argued as a basis for African growth and development. Nkrumah referred to as the father of Pan-Africanism was the first to call for such unification/ integration. In his book *Africa Unite*, Nkrumah admonished the continent to *unite or perish* (Ojukwu 2013; New African Magazine 2013). The concept of African unity is based on the assumption that regional integration and co-operation is the only means through which Africa can bridge the gap between the South and the North. This is one of the major aim for the establishment of NEPAD by the AU, “to promote regional economic integration by bridging Africa's Infrastructure gap (AU 2015)” with the West. Founders of organisation such as Thabo Mbeki were of the view that there will be no meaningful development in the continent. Except the regions is properly harmonized in terms of regional economic trade unification. This aim can achieve through an accelerated trade and investment by providing adequate and reliable infrastructure in the regions.

In the SADC context, the AU vision is engendered through a “common future, a future...that will ensure economic wellbeing, improvement of the standards of living and

quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa... anchored on the common values and principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist between the peoples of Southern Africa (SADC nd:21)”.

From the SADC perspective, there are three major areas where regional integration will result in the actualization of the visions of the AU in line with regional integration. Which is also in-line with the visions of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISPD) and Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation and the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (OPDSC and MDP) in the region. These three major aspects are trade and investment, economics otherwise political economy, and security. For the intents of this subject area, these three are perilous to peace, stability, development and security in SADC in particular and Africa in general.

For instance, trade breeds innovations; it also creates employment and reduces dependency syndrome as well. Based on the improvement of science and technology, which in turn increases significantly, foreign direct investment. This ultimately results in the creation of employment and empowerment thereby reducing poverty. The political economy of regionalism establishes a direct organization of administration leading to the following, a balance of payment, increased labour, prudent use of land; political will, increase transaction and strengthened regional governance and capability, including security. It also makes the standard pressure for sustainable development and growth in every society.

With the nexus of security and development long established (see Chandler 2007, Stern and Öjendal 2010, and Uvin 2002). Hence the conflict, wars, terrorism, and disharmony threaten the investor's willingness to inject funds in an uncertain economy. Examples can be drawn from the 2015 xenophobic incident in South Africa. The long period of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Boko Haram terror group in Northeast Nigeria in recent times, challenges the infusion of a legitimate investor. Therefore, without peace and security no economy can grow nor claim to develop (see Syria, Afghanistan, DRC).

According to Bösl, regional integration as carried out by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is the most important and successful instruments of economic growth, political cooperation, socioeconomic development and general stability in the region (SADC nd:25). The globalization process has beclouded the region with more threats than opportunities. The region must adopt models and policy direction in terms of accommodating immigrants, employment opportunities for all, inclusive security, and so forth. To avoid such threats as, massive immigration, technological advancement, chemical weapon and diseases. In addition to the economic growth and viability, regional integration can perhaps also play a compelling role in pursuing and resolving matters of common concern through such the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

In this sense, regional integration and strong RECs in general could pay substantial dividends in the region, especially in the context of identifying and resolving common challenges that is beyond the borders of individual states. Which may include transnational crimination, piracy, human rights abuses, and diverse threats to peace in the region: terror groups, insurgency, xenophobia and a host of others. It can be argued that the global and regional challenges ravaging the region are a major indication of collective action to prevail over individualism in order to stimulate regional cooperation. That predominantly leads to strengthening its organs. Hence there is little or no chance of any individual member states to make significant impact in the global arena. Nevertheless, the nature of commodity, wealth, capital and resources have been the major pitfalls of the regional integration agenda of the SADC member states

3.3 Pull-Down Factors

The pull-down factors are factors/ indicators that inhibits/ limits the region from achieving economic growth and sustainable development in the region. As well as limits and weakens economic activities among member states in the region.

3.3.1 Political Economy

Political economy is a science that rest on the assumption that capital, value, commodity, land, wealth, and labour constitute its basic elements (Jevons, 1957:1). It maintains that

value depends entirely on utility (Jevons, 1957:1). In as much as two parties freely agree to exchange things of value; because both see a profit in the exchange, total wealth is increased. Hence exchange depends on the value, interest and rationality of such exchange assumed to be profitable. This is one the reasons, most member states opt for exchange with multinational organisations from Europe and America based on a favourable balance of trade, quality of product, and reduced cost compared to products produced in the region.

Political economies determine everything in terms of the use of resources of national, regional, continental and world government. This is because it is driven by both philosophies from politics and economics, which invariably determine a nation's existence. This in no small measure portrays the extent and influence of the concept of political economy in national or regional government.

Political economy determines the entire essence of a government or supra-government, regional or a continental body. As, it constitutes all attributes of politics, governance, trade, and economics that determine the government's ability to function effectively or malfunction arbitrarily. The concept political economy is one of the three major areas in international relations alongside international security and global governance. That has had long-standing contention in the security of states. Predominantly based on the fact that there exist no world government in international relation to provide for collective welfare and the security of its inhabitants (Drazen, 2000; Varoufakis, Halevi, and Theocarakis, 2011).

Political economy in international relation is concerned with the impact of globalization and interdependence of global trade, production and finance. Finance is the nucleus through which the operationalization of the SADC standby force in the region and the continent can be guaranteed. As Allison argues finance is key, finance is everything determines production, capacity, skill set, payment, equipment, machinery and covering every facet of an agency like the SADCSF (Allison, 2014)


From a political economist's viewpoint, certain questions arise in relation to funding the SADCSF. These are: what does SADC member states exchange? What are their means of production? And what do they produce that could be of value? Basically the trade and exchange of most states in the region are raw materials, engaging primarily in agriculture and mining. That are consequently exported, processed and imported into the region in a much higher cost. This has a tendency of depleting the foreign reserves of member states in the region. The means of production are bourgeois oriented. Land, capital, labour and entrepreneurship, three (land, capital and entrepreneur) of these are concentrated in the hands of a few in the economies of member states in the region. Despite concentrating production capabilities in the hands of a few, these few have not been able to improve significantly the region's volume of trade. The region's epileptic volume of trade in international scale is less than 1% of the global market. Which are principally raw products resulting from poor production capacity, weak and ineffective structures and institutions that inhibit interaction and significantly lacking organization procedure (UNCTAD 2010). This strengthens the financial viability and sustainability of the SADCSF.

It is important to note that the budget of most of the SADC member states is far from being fiscally viable, sustainable nor responsible (see figure 3.2). In that, most (if not all) member states run their country's financial budget in deficit, loans and aid. This creates burdens on the institutions and governments to make/ take decision subject to the lender. This is the nucleus of political economists for they concern themselves not only with the mechanics of economics. As well as with the ideology that supports the translation from decision making to policy implementation. The ultimate concern of political economist is the relationship between individuals and the state. As well as what influence this relationship or what influences the relationship between the state and the citizens (see Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke).

Though classical economist believes that state intervention in the means of production hampers competition. The assumption is "when two parties freely agree to exchange things of value, because both see a profit in the exchange, total wealth increases (Smith

1776)". But with the paucity in the volume of trade among member states, it is important that the Keynesian model be considered. On the basis that government should intervene in the economy. And possibly run a deficit budget in times of depression unlike the classical model championed by Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and John Stuart Mill by the 18th and early 19th century economist.

The study argues that the Keynesian model economist position is desirable in times of depression and economic meltdown. But the realities of time from the diagram have shown that before and after the meltdown in 2008, member states of the region had already been running their budget on deficits. The nature of structural deficit, in most of these member states, questions the region's capacity to finance a viable, responsible and sustainable SADC Standby Force in the region (see figure 3.2).



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


Figure 3:2 SADC Member States Government Budget 2011-2015¹

According to the diagram above with over 90% of member states consistently operating a structured deficit, the feasibility of funding a SADCSF is low. The culture of running a deficit budget is not just limited to member states. The regional body as well is plagued with the same challenges (see table 2 below).

Table 3.2 SADC Fiscal Balance

Year	2008	2008	2010	2011	2012
% GDP	2.4	-4.3	-3.2	-4.8	-3.6

IMF, WEO, and SSA (2011)

The overall fiscal balance (including grants) is calculated as revenue minus total expenditure. The fiscal balance over the last years has fluctuated widely in the different SADC member states. Almost half of the member states end this period with a greater fiscal deficit than in 2008 (SADC 2015a). This is as a result of the nature of regional and dependency syndrome, which have continually plagued the region and the continent in general.

3.3.2. Nature of regionalism

There is a plethora of definitions of region, regionalism, regionalization and regionness. Each of the definitions, focusing on one or more factors such as geographical proximity, economic unification, political economy, cultural identity or security interdependence (Cantori and Spiegel 1970; Buzan and Wæver 2003). All definitions provoke the study of regional alternatives either as regionness or regionhood (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006; Van Langenhove 2003). This study sees regionalism, as state-based macro-regions (three or more states), as opposed to micro-regions, or territorial areas smaller than states. Geographic *proximity* has been argued as the basis for regionalism, as opposed to regionalization. Regionalization is often seen through the prism of regionness, which is principally for the purpose of trade. For example, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Trade Organization

(WTO), all follow or have a *common* identity, ideology and sometimes culture (Fawcett and Gandois 2010:619). Though both concepts are used loosely interchangeably, this paper considers both concepts as separate, though linked. While, the former (regionalization) refers to a process that encompasses an increase in region-based interaction and activity by state actors and non-state actors (non-state actors are usually the driving force such as individual, corporate organization and nongovernmental organizations). Regionalism is simply a political project of state actors (Fawcett and Gandois 2010:619).

Regionalism again differs from regional integration that refers to “processes of complex social transformations characterized by the intensification of relations between independent sovereign states (De Lombaerde 2006, 9).” The philosophy driving regional integration as a tool in regional development studies is premised on the structuralist ideological perspective that emerged in the 1960s and 70s. Which sees regionalism, as a tool in the struggle for and seizure of political power of homelands from the North. By ending, the exploitation of the South (developing countries) from the North (industrialized countries) through liberation struggles (Fawcett 2008:15).

The argument for regionalism is that it strengthens the whole (a collective action). In that collective action has more effect to independent action (single action). As put simply by van Langenhove, regional integration is a “process in which units move from a condition of total or partial isolation towards a complete or partial unification (Van Langenhove 2005:5)”. In this case, the unification towards strengthening regional security forces to combat the threat and avert violence in the Southern region of the African continent is necessary, as the only means through which sustainable peace could be fast-tracked.

With already established interconnection between peace-security and development in the late 1980s and 90s. International laws and academics in international development and conflict resolution agrees that the roles regional economic and security organizations play in conflict management, conflict stabilization, peacebuilding, and nonviolent mechanism are critical in averting vehemence (violence) and ensuring integration in post war

situations in Africa (Francis 2002).

The challenges of securing Africa and ensuring development of its citizens can be traced to the division of the continent for the administrative convenience by the west, consequently resulting in a completely misconceived analogy (Gibb 2009:702), which Champion and Thayer (1987:78) referred to as “arbitrary grouping of activities.” Though the essence of regionalism encompasses efforts by group of nations to integrate and enhance their political, economic, cultural, and/or social collaboration to improve the living standard of the citizens through mutual interaction (Lee 2002:1; Chingono and Nakana 2009:396). Such efforts can take on different forms, including regional cooperation, market integration, development integration, and regional integration. The African Union (AU) has continually argued that economic integration and cooperation is the engine to propel African development (Ginkel, Court, van Langenhove 2003:1). This strengthens the idea of regionalism and regional integration as a major tool towards achieving growth and development in the continent, premised on mutual cooperation and agreement. Though the regions have not enormously profited from the assumptions of the regionalism and regional integration as a result of, ideological difference, political undertone of most issues in Africa; in that most issues on a regional scale are economically and/or politically motivated. For example, the intervention of South African Defence Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Allison 2015; Mataboge and Pillay 2014) according to sources where economic motivated because South Africa was trying to protect its mines in DR Congo.

Another cause of this lack of cohesiveness is the lack of finances on a regional scale as a result of the proliferation of various security institutions, programs, and budgets, which has constantly led reviews of erstwhile programs and financing mechanisms for the continent (Jentzsch 2014:2). Consequently, this proliferation of security institutions (ASF, SADC-OPSC, ECOMOG, ACIRC etc., to mention a few) has resulted in the shortage of funds, owing to five major blocs: “the inadequacy of UN reforms to overcome financing constraints; global financial meltdown; the insufficiency and unpredictability of voluntary contributions; restrain of contributor

due to mixed track records of some peace operations; and the limited capacity of African regional organizations” (Jentzsch 2014; Sabra 2011:1). Several studies have shown that some member states of SADC are also members of other regional economic community (REC) (Cilliers 2008:2). This creates a burden for SADC to exert loyalty from member states; these consequently have devastating effects on the financial allegiance of those member states.

3.3.3 Weak Regions and Weak Regional Integration

The African continent though showing exceptional growth patterns in recent times especially with regards to economic landscape, the continent has witnessed a consistent increase in GDP amongst developing regions of the world; hence Africa is considered one of the fastest growing economies (Okoth 2015). The continent strong holds arguably are Nigeria and South Africa. However, the insecurity in both nations has hampered trade and foreign direct investment. Despite this shortcomings and security breach, the economies of the continent continues to show some potential of growth in the GDP, but Foreign Direct Investment suffers (especially in Northeast Nigeria) as a result of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the fear of xenophobic attacks, coupled with stringent immigration requirements in South Africa linked with the cold war or perhaps rivalry between both member states (Buzan and Wæver 2013:249-250), have further hindered collaboration towards guaranteeing enduring peace in the continent. This tends to question the potency of the Pan-African ideological (championed by the AU) assumption as merely been theoretical in the state of these divisions and conflicts.

In the 2015 fragility index, 32 member states of the continent were seen amongst the first 50 countries on the list, this tends to show the level of lack in the continent from fulfilling and providing basic amenities of life to its citizens as sited by the MDG (Messner, Haken, Taft, Blyth, Lawrence, Pavlou, Umaña, 2015). This is further weakened by poor or haphazard integration of the regional economic communities (REC) (Chachaa, 2014) owing to the separatist nature, which the Europeans used in demarcating the continent, regardless of cultural and socio-political ties of the habitant of such groupings (Fisher 2012). This weakens regional integration for the continent in general and regions in particular to fully integrate, which have continually plagued the continent till date,

resulting in a lack of collaborations amongst member states in the region in particular and the continent in general.

The basis for the integration of SADC member states was formalized in 2003 through the Regional Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The framework though not a legally binding document enjoy political legitimacy and is often seen as the architecture for regional integration in the region (Hartzenberg 2008:2). The RISDP provides the roadmap for the establishment of FTAs by 2008, Southern African Custom Union in 2010, Common market in 2015, monetary union by 2016, and a single currency by 2018 (Hartzenberg 2008:2).


According to Althusmann, economic regional integration is capable of unlocking the potential for economic acceleration of the African continent (du Pisani, Erasmus, and Hartzenberg, 2014:iii). But have been limited by unsuitable and unsustainable formulas which do not address the challenges confronting regional integration in the region, as a result of shortages in capacity, finance, equipment and resource concerns, overlapping member states of RECs in the region, lack of experts and most importantly the political will to fulfill the lofty agreement (in Windboek Protocol, RISDP, PACT, OPSDC, SIPO), which have consequently reduced the volume of intra-regional trade to a large extent.

The volume of trade in most African markets is small, thereby making transactions more expensive, in addition to the high risk of doing business in the region as a result of uncertainty (USAID 2011) as a result of low trading, low economic power and deficiencies of benefits from the economies of scale amongst member states (Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006 in Geda and Seid, 2015:23). However regional integration has been identified as the most adequate mechanism towards continental development (Geda and Seid, 2015), but this have been hindered by the fact that “35 percent of the population and one-third of the economies in the continent are trapped as landlocked countries whose trade and development depend on what happens in their costal neighbors...most countries in Africa are small in size and hence their economic feasibility and global bargaining position individually are highly limited (Geda and Seid, 2015:3).” Therefore, making the

member states in the region and the continent to rely otherwise depends on global political economy to favour them, because they (African countries) have no say in the global market based on production, marketing, merchandise, transportation etc.

The volume of trade between Africa and the rest of the rest of the world is close to insignificant. While Agriculture employs 65% of its workforce (World Bank 2008), yet the continent is far from achieving food sufficiency or sustainability. More so 90% of African economies cannot guarantee satisfactory quantity and quality of competitive exports in global market as seen in the graph below (Geda and Seid, 2015:23), heightened by severe competition from other relatively developed and developing economies such as China and India. Hence most economies in the continent are specialist in producing small number of primary commodities for export, while importing significantly finished products (Geda and Seid, 2015:23; UNCTAD, 2013). This act alone has significant devastating consequences, for instance, when a product is exported as raw material, it returns back with higher percentage, cost and interest, for example crude oil, it returns back to Africa as PMS, bitumen, kerosene and at a higher cost in all ramification, which creates an imbalance in the trade parity with the West, such can also be said of the continents agricultural products especially cocoa. This has subsequently reduced the size of the continents capability to fund its projects without relying on intervention from the rest of the world.

Figure (1) Global Share of Merchandise Exports by Region (2000-10)



Source: UNCTADstat

Figure 3:3 Global Share of Mechandize Export by Regions. UNCTA 2012

Another major problem with regional integration is overlapping membership of RECs; in that every member state of Southern Africa are members of other regional trade zones as seen the table below:

Table 3:3: Multiplicity of Regional Trade Zones

Country	COMESA	COMESA FTA	SACU	ESA-EPA Configuration	SADC	SADC-EPA Configuration	EAC	WTO
Angola	X				X	X		X
Botswana			X		X	X		X
DRC	X	X		X	X			X
Lesotho			X		X	X		X
Madagascar	X	X		X	X			X
Malawi	X	X		X	X			X
Mauritius	X	X		X	X			X
Mozambique				X	X			X
Namibia			X		X	X		X
South Africa			X		X	X		X
Tanzania					X	X	X	X
Swaziland			X		X			X
Zambia	X	X		X	X			X
Zimbabwe	X	X		X	X			X

Saurombe, A. (2009)

The table above shows that global unification and the one world government weak regional (trade) integration, which most African leaders tend to favor more often regional integration. This has a way of creating imbalance and questions the loyalty member states that are part of other regional trade zone. More so, it has left intra-regional trade in the continent in general and the regions in particular in a very poor state as seen in the figure below, showing the volume of trade within Africa and Africa's interaction in terms of trade with the rest of world.

Another significant issue is that of transportation; it is cheaper to do business with the West than doing business within Africa. For instance, while an importer could import a car from France to Abidjan the cost of \$1,650USD; the cost of importing the same car from Abidjan to South Africa is within the range of \$4,650USD, because every vessel has to go through Europe before returning back to Africa (Essoh 2013). This has further limited and discouraged intra-regional integration in the continent basically as a result of motion, time and cost. It can be said of communication as well, that while it is cheaper to call America, Europe and Canada; it is five times more to call from Nigeria to South Africa or neighbouring Benin Republic or from South Africa to neighbouring Zimbabwe. This has a way of discouraging to some extent regional integration and due largely to the weak capacity of states in the region. These are just some of the many reasons that have inhibited trade in the continent in general and the region in particular.

3.3.4 Weak Regional Capacity and Weak Regional Institutions and Systems

According to Rudolfsen, capacity is a broad term that can entail aspects such as coherence of institutions, economic development, and extractive and repressive capabilities (Rudolfsen 2013:5). It could therefore be said that state capacity is weak when it lacks: coherence of institutions, extractive and repressive capacities and economic development. we cannot talk about repressive capacities and coherence of institutions without looking at economic development, because peace and tranquility brings about development in all faceted as proven in the peace development nexus. Coherence of institutions therefore brings us to study (SADCSF).

The SADCSF has five mechanisms (can be also seen as institutions) through which it is meant to achieve sustainable peace and security in the region. But this is inhibited by the lack and weakness in staffing the SADCSF for effective deployment. As the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank argues that the challenges of capacity building in a region is determined on sectorial basis across all sectors of an institution. In that government (national or regional) are generally desirous of ensuring that services are delivered in a timely and sustainable manner (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank 2005:viii). Sustainability in this context implies, that the standby force is deployed to member states where there is a bridge to peace as seen in Article 4 of the SADCBRIG MoU, and a need for intervention by the agency in a like *light speed* manner, quick response as fondly called.

With the shortage otherwise absence of personnel, equipment, offices, headquarters and logistics centres in the region, while it is not practicing the principle of NATO-cost lie where it fits. The capability of the SADCSF to respond quickly to member states experiencing human right abuse, crimes against humanity, transnational 'organized' criminality, armed conflict proliferations etc.; the question arises if there is a better way to protect civilians? As well as modalities that best support systems to sustains post-war/post-conflict. Can the SADCSF bring about peacebuilding in a conflict-devastated country in the region? These questions are of global imperatives as it is to the region in particular and the continent in general as they all deal significant with *capacity to protect*.

More so, with a weak financial strength heightened by dictation from the West who are major partners and funders of most member states in the region inhibits in reality the tendencies of the SADC SF to facilitate sustainable peace in the region. Which has significantly affected the ability of the SADC SF to deploy troops effectively, in addition to a non-existence or weak regional institutions like RISDP, OPSDC, SIPO and Planning Element (PLANELM).

Weak integration affects to a large extent the ability for the region to have regionally robust integrated institutions, which seeks to resolve one problem and speak with one voice. Despite the gross acknowledgements thrilling the need for 'good, strong and vibrant' institutions for accelerated economic performance in the region (Helpman 2008; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004) there is still much uncertainties and economic effect thrilling specific institutional structure (Nzewi 2009:6; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004). Improper institutional support threatens the existence of an organization to be counterproductive. Poor or weak governance structure results in poor institution which therefore curtail the potency of various institutions (of the SADC SF such as SADSEM, PLANELM) to interact, strategize, plan actions: stipulate actions of guideline and procedure, method of approach and reason for deployment, when to use diplomacy as a means of intervention or military force. This also affects the operationalization in terms of: policies, conduct, vision, mission, and strategic thinking of the standby force to function optimally. These is visible in the method and approaches PLANELM; SADSEM and other institutions of the SADC SF plan and operate separately and independently. With no clear procedures for effective communication, deployment, coordinating, organizing and directing, it makes it difficult to understand what the agency (SADC SF) intends to achieve. Though funding is key to the functionality of the SADC SF others factors such as mentioned is clearly in dire of harmonization. All this threatens the probability that a SADC SF can be fully operational and functional.

In another study Zondi, linked poor/ weak institutions to failures in the socio-economic challenges of the region, when Zondi argues that poor governance has resulted in serious socio-economic challenges such as food insecurity, poverty, high prevalence HIV and

AIDS, increasing unemployment rate, low levels of social service delivery, cynicism, social alienation, inequality and criminality (Zongi 2009:4) are major product of a failed institution or an improperly constituted and coordinated institution. These developmental upheavals are imminent characteristics of a failing, failed or weak government systems and institution. To fight these scourge identified, which studies have revealed are the main causes of insecurity, criminality, transnational criminality and even terrorism as against the earlier nomenclature of religion (Suleiman, and Karim, 2015; Caruso, and Schneider, 2011). However, with all these barriers identified, it is the view of this study that having a good financial mechanism is a clear indication of the first step in having a functional and operational standby force in the nearest future. To do this a clear method for financing the standby force must resist foreign influence and ensure financial viability and sustainability, which can only be addressed by a framework that deals with the dilemmas of regional integration and cooperation in the region and all over the continent.

3.3.5 Weak Governance System

The government system of SADC has little potential of been influential to decisions reached in individual member states neither does it have the mandate to ensure compliance of its decision on security issues on member states, as a result of two major reasons: most countries in the region are donor driven and secondly sovereignty of member states (Nzewi 2009). This has significantly curtailed the influence the regional body has on its member states. With most of the member states been an appendage in reality to their donors who determines policies, project and programmes to be implemented in these nations (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2008:1).

One of the major characteristics of the structure of government is the existence of the three arms of government: the executive, the legislature and the judicial. It can be argued to some extent that while the executive arm of government might be seen to be present. The judicial and the legislative arm of government are yet to be fully established (International Democracy Watch 2015; AU 2015). Thereby showing significantly a fused system of government where the executive combines the functions of implementation with law making, interpretation, and adjudication, which threatens the democratic

sentiments in the region, which could arguably justify the system of government in Zimbabwe.

Again the issue of security governance is indeed a very sensitive (Caparini, and Marenin, 2006:217) concept as stated ab initio in Southern Africa as it is to the entire continent. The difficulties in determining what security threats are and what security denotes has been problematic in contextualizing in different member states, which have culminated into greater confusion to: who determines act of grave consequence, intervention in member states and preventive deployment in order to prevent? With no proper governance structures and a judicial arm for the interpretation of these events but the OPDSC: In addition to the nonchalant political will to what constitute security governance/ reforms and security threats in the region (Hänggi, 2003:4–8). It will be difficult to interpret such ambiguous and vague terminologies as seen in the SADC MoU document of 2007 as observation and monitoring mission considering the observation and monitoring of election in Zimbabwe utilizing military veteran, which could lead to military intimidation of voters; coupled with the nature of poorly trained personnel in the region as well as the continent. The study argues that peacebuilding and post-conflict disarmament and demobilization are a misfit for the SADCSF without an operational funding mechanism devoid of donor influences.

3.4 Summary

From the discourse, it is evident that much still needs to be achieved for the SADC Standby Force to possibly be operational. Thus, the study identified 13 indicators, which it divided into two pull factors: Pull-Up factor and the Pull-Down Factor. While the later contains reasons that have limited the operationability of the SADC Standby Force from securing funds. The former deals with indicators that tend to promote continuous inflow and outflow of income in order to maintain a prudent and functionally financial viable, responsible and sustainable standby force in the region.

The analysis from the study portray that much is yet to be achieved in terms of fiscal viability, sustainability, responsibility and integration. However, a continuous

adjustment, pedaling and movement are essential toward greater unification/integration in the region. The study suggests that by creating vibrant institutions and structures that determines interaction of events/ activities in the region in particular and the continent in general as seen in the pull-up factors is vital.

In conclusion, though it seemed impossible for the SADC SF to become fully operational and carry out its basic responsibility of peacekeeping premised on the identified pull-down factors. However, it is the view of this study that creating a partnership-funding model is the first step towards realizing an achievable and functional SADC standby force. In order for a model to be proposed from the analysis in the study, the pull-up factors must be critically harnessed and cognizance must be paid to the pull-down factors, which limits the regional force from securing funds likewise the continent. Therefore, it is important to take lessons from other regional security arrangement and the principal security agency on how they have managed to fund peacekeeping missions, and the funding mechanism used in financing peacekeeping operations over the years.

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4.0 Chapter Four: Financial Models and Alternative for Peacekeeping Operation

4.1 Introduction

The ideology that permuted peacekeeping operation post-World War II created an arrangement that devolved power, functions and responsibilities to regional and continental bodies (see Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) such as: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation of African Unity (now African Union (AU)), Organization of American States, European Union, Arab League and a number of other regional security arrangement and sub-arrangement such as European Union Force, Southern African Development Community Standby Force, Economic Community of West Africa States Standby Force; and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to mention a few. For the purpose of brevity and to ensure that the essence of this discourse is not vague, the funding model/ instruments of two of these regional arrangements AU and NATO, alongside the UN will be utilized in proposing a funding mechanism for the SADC SF in this chapter. As such this chapter four presents argument towards a sustainable mechanism for funding SADC Standby Force. Which will lead to the development of a *Partnership model* for funding regional peace operations for the Standby Force called the *Task on Tank model*[®].

The chapter uses a thematic approach cushioned by informed knowledge, provided in previous chapters (especially the analytical framework), in proposing a partnership-funding model for the SADC SF called the *Task on Tank model*[®]. This is premised on the ideal of collective action and co-operation, as opposed to unilateralism and competition. In achieving this, the chapter is broken into three sections. The first section examines the mode of funding of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the African Union in peace operation missions. These agencies are critical in terms of intervention and peacekeeping across the globe. In addition, what can be learnt from their successes and failures for the SADC SF is also critical to the discourse. While the UN and NATO can be seen as powerhouse for peacekeeping operation on global scale,

the AU can be seen as the powerhouse for stabilization purposes in the continent. Lessons learnt from UN and NATO, could be used in proposing a suitable model for funding the security arrangement in Africa, in understanding two main perspectives: the feasibility of funding a regional security arrangement and the feasibility of funding the African by African mantra embedded in Pan-Africanism as championed by NEPAD. The second section proposes a sustainable model for the SADC SF. The study contends that if this is explored and incorporated in the SADC security framework religiously, the model could possibly ensure a responsible, viable and sustainable mechanism for funding peacekeeping missions in the SADC region and the processes for such partnership constitutes the third section.

4.2 United Nations: Background

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation Unit was inaugurated during Cold War (Koops, MacQueen, and Williams, 2015), as a result of growing rivalries global governance, which continued to threaten peace and the security of states. The Unit (UNPOU) was formed to solely maintain, stabilize and implement a ceasefire accord, in a bid to resolve conflicts through peaceful resolutions (UN 2015a). In May 1948 the first UN contingent was dispatch to monitor ceasefire and supervising the ARMISTICE AGREEMENT in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) (UN 2015b). The second mission in January 1949 likewise the first was to observe otherwise to oversee unarmed ceasefire between Pakistan and India: United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) (UN 2015c; UN 2015a).

However, the twist in armed peacekeeping operation was first witnessed on the African soil in 1956. After the six-day war between Israel and the Arab World especially the conquest of Egypt and land expansion of Israel in November 1956. The United Nations Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1) was deployed after the six-day war to secure and monitor the cessation of hostilities in Egypt (Leonard, 2006:1252), as well as monitor the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, United Kingdom and Israel from Egyptian borders and territories (UN 2015a). Consequently, the UNEF mission was aborted in May-June 1967 at the request of Egypt (UN 2015d). This is not the case in recent times,

when UN and the US reluctantly occupy territories against the wish of the host countries. For example, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In 1960 the deployment of military personnel to Congo marked the largest military presence of UN uniform soldiers in the century. Accounting for nearly 20,000-armed uniformed military personnel in the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (UN 2015a). Who's intent was to ensure the withdrawal of the Bulgarian force from the Congolese territories. The ONUC mission would have been successful, if it had achieved its goals and objectives such as, assisting the government in maintaining law and order, political independence and territorial integrity, providing technical assistance, securing the removal of all foreign military, preventing the occurrence of civil war, securing the withdrawal of all paramilitary and advisory personnel who are not under the UN command (UN 2015e).

However, most of these pledge otherwise aims were largely not achieved. Though on the basis of strategic importance (as one of the reason for UN intervention) their aims were achieved. In that while Congo gained independence and the Bulgarian troops and staffs withdrew. The country was left in state of comatose with little or no governance structure, lack of capacity and skilled manpower, little or no technically skewed individuals, only a single graduate from a territory existed in the country. These are the vices that have continued to fuel insecurity in the continent and regions unabatedly. Both the UN, donor agencies and national and regional government are guilty of not addressing the root causes of the multidimensional problems facing the continent, the regions and national government of various member states. Rather in most case, they link critical issues with politics, subsequently treating symptoms than cure. To provide panacea for the resolution of the malingered crises across the continent, while ensuring quick response in UN deployment to conflict areas. Understanding the mode of financing the organisation is important.

4.3 United Nations Funding Mechanism

The general resolutions governing budget preparation, approval and implementation of the UN programme/ project budget are explicitly spelt out in the General Assembly

(G/A) resolution 65/252 of 2010 (UN 2013: 388). The G/A publishes approved finances on the entire programme/ projects it intends to achieve for a given financial year, while also allocating finances to such agencies and department (UN Handbook 2013).

Notably, the UN has diverse means of generating income: income from staff assessment, general income, services to the public, contribution from member states, troop-contributing countries and voluntary donations and multinational forces (UN 2013:390; Homan 2006:23; Yussuf, Larrabure, and Terzi, 2007; International Trade Centre 2013:1). Financial contributions of UN member states are determined by their ability to pay. The approach or method of payment is derived from income levels using the GDP-per capita of the member state (Homan 2006:22).

Another source of funding is the assessment scale which according to the General Assembly (G/A) 55/5B of 2000, was revised from 5 grade scale/ scale of assessment G/A resolution 41/213 (1986), 42/211 (1987) and 45/248 (1990) to 10 scale of assessment, that links the contribution of each member state based on their ability to pay and their GDP (GA/AB/4040).

More so, the UN regulates the contributions of member states in three phases:

- The maximum contribution by a single member state would not exceed 22%
- The floor minimum contribution at 0.001%, and
- The maximum contribution of the Least Developed Countries at 0.01% (Ruggie, J. 2011; UN Handbook 2013:290). See table 4.1 for detailed contributions of member states from 2013-2015 financial year in percentage below:

Table 4.1: Contribution of UN Member State by Percentage

UN Member State	Percentage	UN Member State	Percentage
Afghanistan	0.005	Algeria	0.137
Albania	0.010	Angola	0.010
Andorra	0.008	Argentina	0.432
Antigua and Barbuda	0.002	Australia	2.074
Armenia	0.007	Azerbaijan	0.040
Austria	0.798	Bahrain	0.039
Bahamas	0.017		

Bangladesh	0.010	Barbados	0.008
Belarus	0.056	Belgium	0.998
Belize	0.001	Benin	0.003
Bhutan	0.001	Bolivia	0.009
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.017	Botswana	0.017
Brazil	2.934	Brunei Darussalam	0.026
Bulgaria	0.047	Burkina Faso	0.003
Burundi	0.001	Cambodia	0.004
Cameroon	0.012	Canada	2.984
Cape Verde	0.001	Central African Republic	0.001
Chad	0.002	Chile	0.334
China	5.148	Colombia	0.259
Comoros	0.001	Congo	0.005
Costa Rica	0.038	Côte d'Ivoire	0.011
Croatia	0.126	Cuba	0.069
Cyprus	0.047	Czech Republic	0.386
DPRK	0.006	DR Congo	0.003
Denmark	0.675	Djibouti	0.001
Dominica	0.001	Dominican Republic	0.045
Ecuador	0.044	Egypt	0.134
El Salvador	0.016	Equatorial Guinea	0.010
Eritrea	0.001	Estonia	0.040
Ethiopia	0.010	Fiji	0.003
Finland	0.519	France	5.593
Gabon	0.020	Gambia	0.001
Georgia	0.007	Germany	7.141
Ghana	0.014	Greece	0.638
Grenada	0.001	Guatemala	0.027
Guinea	0.001	Guinea-Bissau	0.001
Guyana	0.001	Haiti	0.003
Honduras	0.008	Hungary	0.266
Iceland	0.027	India	0.666
Indonesia	0.346	Iran	0.356
Iraq	0.068	Ireland	0.418
Israel	0.396	Italy	4.448
Jamaica	0.011	Japan	10.833
Jordan	0.022	Kazakhstan	0.121
Kenya	0.013	Kiribati	0.001
Kuwait	0.273	Kyrgyzstan	0.002
Lao PDR	0.002	Latvia	0.047
Lebanon	0.042	Lesotho	0.001
Liberia	0.001	Libya	0.142
Liechtenstein	0.009	Lithuania	0.073
Luxembourg	0.081	Madagascar	0.003
Malawi	0.002	Malaysia	0.281
Maldives	0.001	Mali	0.004
Malta	0.016	Marshall Islands	0.001
Mauritania	0.002	Mauritius	0.013
Mexico	1.842	Micronesia	0.001
Monaco	0.012	Mongolia	0.003
Montenegro	0.005	Morocco	0.062
Mozambique	0.003	Myanmar	0.010
Namibia	0.010	Nauru	0.001
Nepal	0.006	Netherlands	1.654
New Zealand	0.253	Nicaragua	0.003
Niger	0.002	Nigeria	0.090
Norway	0.851	Oman	0.102
Pakistan	0.085	Palau	0.001
Panama	0.026	Papua New Guinea	0.004
Paraguay	0.010	Peru	0.117
Philippines	0.154	Poland	0.921
Portugal	0.474	Qatar	0.209
ROK	1.994	Republic of Moldova	0.003
Romania	0.226	Russian Federation	2.438
Rwanda	0.002	Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.001
Saint Lucia	0.001	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001

Samoa	0.001	San Marino	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.001	Saudi Arabia	0.864
Senegal	0.006	Serbia	0.040
Seychelles	0.001	Sierra Leone	0.001
Singapore	0.384	Slovakia	0.171
Slovenia	0.100	Solomon Islands	0.001
Somalia	0.001	South Africa	0.372
South Sudan	0.004	Spain	2.973
Sri Lanka	0.025	Sudan	0.010
Suriname	0.004	Swaziland	0.003
Sweden	0.960	Switzerland	1.047
Syrian AR	0.036	Tajikistan	0.003
Thailand	0.239	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.008
Timor-Leste	0.002	Togo	0.001
Tonga	0.001	Trinidad and Tobago	0.044
Tunisia	0.036	Turkey	1.328
Turkmenistan	0.019	Tuvalu	0.001
Uganda	0.006	Ukraine	0.099
UAE	0.595	UK	5.179
UR of Tanzania	0.009	USA	22.000
Uruguay	0.052	Uzbekistan	0.015
Vanuatu	0.001	Venezuela	0.627
Viet Nam	0.042	Yemen	0.010
Zambia	0.006	Zimbabwe	0.002
Total			100

UN Handbook (2013:390-392)

The table above shows the percentages each member state commits to the UN for 2013-2015 financial year of the organisation. Of note is that the total contribution of 54 African countries in percentage is less than 1%. Contrary to the 5 permanent members of the Security Council who contribute exactly 40.358% of the 5 permanent members; Yet, much of the interventions of the UN peacekeeping is mainly focused on Africa while it is headquartered in Washington (USA) and Geneva (Switzerland) where intervention is least useful. Tardy (2013:2), corroborated with the assertion by affirming that 81% of PKO budget in 2013 was covered by the EU member states, the US, Japan, Australia and Canada, who contributed collectively <6% of the troops as of September 2013. On the other hand, the top 10 member states contributing troops represents 55% yet their contribution towards the operationalization or budget of the UN PKO is less than 1% or equals 1% (Tardy 2013:2).

The UN grading system is set by the Ad Hoc Scale of Assessments reviewed every three years for UN Budgets. The 10 grading system was through the G/A resolution 55/235 of 2000 (in place of G/A resolution 3101 XXVIII of 1973). This resolution proposes a new

methodology and criteria in the following 10 levels: Level A- Level J (GAO/NSIAD-94-206; UN Handbook 2013:395). The revision of the 5-grade scale to 10 levels was to ensure an inclusive administration based on the increasing and decline in member state GDP considering the notion of the UN principle of, ability to pay.



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Level A: Permanent Members of the Security Council

USA	China	UK	France	Russian Federation
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Level B

Andorra	Australia	Austria	Bahamas2	Bahrain2
Belgium	Canada	Cyprus	Denmark	Estonia
Finland	Germany	Greece	Iceland	Ireland
Israel	Italy	Japan	Liechtenstein	Luxembourg
Malta	Monaco	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway
Oman2	Portugal	ROK	San Marino	Slovenia
Spain	Sweden	Switzerland		

Level C

Brunei Darussalam	Kuwait	Qatar	Singapore	UAE
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Level D

Czech Republic

Level E

Saudi Arabia	Trinidad and Tobago
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Transition to E

Slovakia

Level F

Antigua and Barbuda Barbados	Hungary
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Transition to F

Croatia	Saint Kitts and Nevis
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Level G

Latvia	Libya	Lithuania	Poland	Seychelles
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Level H*

Bulgaria	Romania
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Level H1

Chile	Mexico	Turkey	Venezuela
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Level I

Albania	Algeria	Argentina	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Belize	Bolivia	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana	Brazil	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Colombia	Congo	Costa Rica	Côte d'Ivoire	Cuba
DPRK	Dominica	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Fiji	Gabon	Georgia
Ghana	Grenada	Guatemala	Guyana	Honduras	India	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq
Jamaica	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya	Kyrgyzstan	Lebanon	Malaysia	Maldives
Marshall Islands	Mauritius	Micronesia	Mongolia	Montenegro	Morocco	Namibia	Nauru	Nicaragua
Nigeria	Pakistan	Palau	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Republic of Moldova
Saint Lucia	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Serbia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Suriname	Swaziland	Syrian AR	Tajikistan
Thailand	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Tonga	Tunisia	Turkmenistan	Ukraine	Uruguay	Uzbekistan	
Viet Nam	Zimbabwe							

Level J: Least Developed Countries

Afghanistan	Angola	Bangladesh	Benin	Bhutan	Burkina Faso	Burundi
Cambodia	Central African Republic	Chad	Comoros	DR Congo	Djibouti	Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea	Ethiopia	Gambia	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Haiti	Kiribati
Lao PDR	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania
Mozambique	Myanmar	Nepal	Niger	Rwanda	Samoa	Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal	Sierra Leone	Solomon Islands	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Timor-Leste
Togo	Tuvalu	Uganda	UR of Tanzania	Vanuatu	Yemen	Zambia

Figure 4.1: Assignment of contribution levels for 2013–15. UN Handbook (2015:393-395)

The grading system stipulated above is the new methodology in which contribution is derived from member states in funding peacekeeping operations around the globe which replaces the former 5 grading systems. Where Level A (the permanent five UN member states) contributes 63,15% and Level B consisting of European Union member states and OECD countries contributes 34,78% totaling 97,93% (Homan 2006:23). Also all of Africa, Asia (Exempt: Japan and China), the Pacific (exempt: Australia and New Zealand), South America, and some part of North America contribute 2,07% needed for peacekeeping operation around the world (Homan 2006:21-23). However, threats to security predominantly emanate and are perpetuated in these countries that contributes 2,07% financially to PKO budget of the UN. But what the UN have ignored for a long is that most of these nations that contributes a paltry sum of 2.07%, contributes 55% of troops to UN PKO (UN 2015; Homan 2006).

This study is of the notion that GDP should not be the only option for measuring contributions of member states. Because when the concept of the GDP by Simon Kuznets, a Russian-American economist and statistician presented the idea to the US Congress he warned against the use of the GDP as a general principle for understanding global economics, the idea of the GDP was to understand the US economy and not global economy. As well he warned that GDP should not be used in measuring wellbeing or the welfare of a nation, this directly speaks to the ability to pay used as a tool in the United Nations (Malik, 2014). The idea of the GDP is one of many shortfalls of the UN in providing finance for PKO, due to the partitioning or assessment of member states wealth (the original meaning of wealth is wellbeing) based on GDP figure, have limited a lot of member states from contributing financially towards the functionality of the UN, especially with regards to African and Asian countries. In addition to the inability of the UN to intervene timely has resulted in the proliferation of security arrangement over the years.

One of the most effective and functional regional security arrangement with global mission have been the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Created under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter of 1945. To foster peaceful cooperation around the

regions, with the notion of arrogating cost to the nations that deploy such forces, which is a conglomerate of national military security alliance composed chiefly of North America and Europe.

4.4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is distinct in terms of formation, operation and structure from the UN and the African Union (NATO 2015a). While both the UN and the AU are largely intergovernmental arrangement (like NATO) it differs significantly on principles, motives, objectives and structures (Daalder, 1999). The UN is essentially humanitarian organization (Beigbeder, 1991:21) and the AU (from its predecessor OAU) is largely for economic and security purposes. NATO on the other hand, is essentially towards a political movement supported by Military Alliance that exists to ensure that their views are implemented among member countries and recently across the globe (NATO 2015a; Daalder, 1999; UN Handbook 2001:201).

The organisation is largely dependent on member countries to ensure its smooth functionality (Morgan 2011). This means that, every cost for its functionality is borne by member countries. These costs include: deployment costs, procurement costs, physical military assets such as sub-marines, ships, tanks, aircraft, weapon or artillery, radar-bearing aircraft (NATO Handbook 2006:57). This is unlike the UN and AU that bear the cost of deployment and reimbursement of member states for the use of their artillery and weaponry. Although all three agencies have some similarities such as, the lack of owned military force, deployment by national government, contributions to fund operationalization etc.; NATO uses an imbalance system that suppresses weaker member countries in PKO based on the principle that cost lie where they fall. The idea of cost lies where they fall in funding peace operation mission, implies for instance if a member state sends 10 soldiers for an operation is it only responsible to foot the bill of the 10 soldiers, while if it decides to send 1,000 soldiers it foots the bill of the one thousand soldiers (Homan 2006:20). Meaning that the member country that is actually sending the soldiers or troops caters for every soldier sent for an operation. Therefore, weaker (poorer) member countries are skew-fully or technically excluded.

It is arguably said, that NATO runs one of the most realistic and 'effective' military arrangements around the world. The nature of its funding mechanism has enabled the regional security arrangement to achieve financial self-sufficiency, viability and sustainability overtime.

The funding mechanism of the NATO is similar to that of the European Union Force (EUF), where there is a correlation between troop commitments and financial involvement (cost lie where they fall) of the member country unlike the UN and the African Union (AU). Where there seem to be no relationship between troops commitment and financial engagement of member states as show above. Hence 15,000 NATO military officers are consistently posted to international headquarters, all of whom are charged from the assigning nations account (Homan 2006; NATO Handbook 2001:203).

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities jointly through the following means: Cost Sharing, Civil Budget, Military Budget, NATO Security Investment Programme, Resource Management, Financial Management, and Financial Control (NATO 2015; NATO Handbook 2001:199-202).

4.4.1 Cost Sharing

The idea of cost sharing is to distribute the common expenditure of organisation to all member country of the organisation, through which majority of the resources derived is to run the organisation. NATO has five primary organs whose expenditure is commonly shared by member countries. They include: International Military Staff, the International Staff and Military Committee, Peace Support Operations, Partnership for Peace activities, and NATO Security Investment Programme (Ek, 2010; NATO Handbook 2001:203-204; 2006:58). The sharing formula (18 excluding France) is thus seen in table 4.2 for contributions by percentage of member countries.

Table 4.2: Percentage Cost Shares of NATO Member States: NATO Security Investment Programme

NATO Member Country	Expenditures shared at 18	Expenditures shared at 19
Belgium	4.24	3.72
Canada	4.025	3.22
Czech Republic	1.0333	0.9
Denmark	3.44	3
France	0	12.9044
Germany	23.135	20.254
Greece	1.05	1
Hungary	0.7463	0.65
Iceland	0	0
Italy	9.1	7.745
Luxembourg	0.2	0.1845
Netherlands	4.74	4.14
Norway	2.895	2.6
Poland	2.8474	2.48
Portugal	0.392	0.345
Spain	3.7793	3.2916
Turkey	1.13	1.04
United Kingdom	11.7156	10.1925
United States	25.5311	22.333

NATO Handbook (2001:212)

It is important to note that the funding structure of NATO is both decentralized and diverse. This means that multinationals, research institutes, various commissions across Europe, and member countries with resources can fund a mission to intervene in a region or a state could do they have need to do so (Chazalette, 2015; NATO Handbook 2006:58).

NATO shares its financial burden to each member country, which is determined through a convention agreed by delegates of member countries, this has over the years resulted in the formula for disseminating financial responsibilities to member countries as seen above (NATO Handbook 2001).

4.4.2 Civil Budget

This Civil Budget is an objective framework, supervised through the Civil Budget Committee of NATO to establish clear trajectory between NATO's Strategic Objectives and the resources needed to accomplish such strategic objectives. Its finances are mainly derived from the Foreign Ministries of member countries who contribute in order to cushion the: operating cost of approved civilian activities and programs, maintenance and running cost of facilities, personnel cost, cost of International Staff at NATO

Headquarters, conference services, meeting for NATO committees and sub-committees/groups, and security services (Ek, 2010:1; NATO Handbook 2006:59; 2001:204).

The civil budget is meant to fulfill four critical objectives:

- To provide timely and effective policy planning strategies to increase the resource to support NATO missions in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond;
- To conduct needful policy and planning activities in furtherance of improved Alliance capabilities and responsibility;
- To support cooperative and consultation engagement with partners to strengthen security and respond to new security challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic region;
- To build consciousness of, and support for, NATO, its missions, and its function in fostering security through public diplomacy.

The support objectives consist in:

- To offer professional support services to the North Atlantic Council, the International Staff and subordinate committees;
- To operate and maintain facility and site in NATO HQ;
- To ensure that NATO-wide security policy provides a safe and secure environment for all staff and operators in HQ (NATO Handbook 2006:59).

In order to give financial credence to the organisation in 2000, the total budget of the civil budget was US\$ 133 million, incorporating cost such as, personnel, special programme, capital and operating cost stood at US\$ 80 million, US\$ 35 million and US\$ 18 million respectively (UN Handbook 2001:205).

4.4.3 Military Budget

Member Countries Ministry of Defence largely funds the military budget. The budget is established and executed through the Military Budget Committee and implemented by individual budget holders. The budget covers such activities as: NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NATO-AEWCF), the International Staff and military agencies, NATO Strategic Commands: ACE and ACLANT and associated commands among others (Ek, 2010:2; NATO Handbook 2001). In 2014, it was agreed that 2% of the GDP of member states must be set aside for military spending. Since the agreement only

Estonia and the USA have been able to consistently met this expectations of the NATO spending goals of the organisation (Bender 2015; Beale 2015). As seen in the figure below




Figure 4.2: Military Expenditure. Bender, J. (2015)

Military expenditure				
Nato member state	Budget 2014		Budget 2015 (approved or planned)	
	Actual expenditure	% of GDP	Projected expenditure	% of GDP
UK	\$55bn	2.07	\$54bn	1.88
Germany	\$44.3bn	1.14	\$41.7bn	1.09
France	\$40.9bn	1.5	\$41.2bn	1.5
Italy	\$17.3bn	1.2	\$16.3bn	n/a
Canada	\$14.3bn	1	\$12.2bn	n/a
Poland	\$10.4bn	1.9	\$10.4bn*	1.95
Netherlands	\$8.7bn	1	\$9bn	n/a
Norway	\$5.8bn	1.58	\$6.8bn	1.6
Romania	\$2bn	1.4	Not yet announced	1.7
Hungary	\$1.08bn	0.79	\$0.79bn	0.75
Bulgaria	\$604m	1.3	\$565m	1.16
Estonia	\$430m	2	\$461m	2.05
Lithuania	\$359m	0.78	\$474m	1.11
Latvia	\$252m	0.9	£283m	1
Other: US	\$582.4bn	3.6	\$585bn	3.4

Note: Euro to dollar exchange rate 1.12 as of 25 January 2015

*includes repayments for F-16 jets bought from US

Figure 4.3: Military Expenditure. Beale, J. (2015)

From the foregoing the central difference between the civil and the military budget is that, the civil budget is used for payment of operational staffs at the Headquarters at Brussel and other offices of NATO. The military budget on the other hand, used to procure equipment that is commonly used by member countries of NATO.

4.4.4 NATO Security Investment Programme

The Security Investment Programme of NATO is funded principally by the Ministries of Defence of individual member countries of the Alliance, supervised through the Infrastructure Committee and approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO SIP projects/ programmes are implemented through individual host member countries, different NATO agencies or NATO strategic commands with respect to area of expertise (Ek, 2010:3; NATO Handbook 2006:60).

The programme mainly finances such activities as, the provision of facilities and the installment of support roles for NATO Strategic Commands, Defence Capabilities Initiative: capabilities such as; communication, information system, control systems and commands, military HQ, fuel pipelines, satellite communications, navigational aids, power systems, harbours, and repairs of rail and roads (Kernan, 2001:7; NATO Handbook 2006:60; 2001:205).

4.4.5 Resource Management

The resource management of NATO promotes and supports the functionality of capability packages as well as establishing the Senior Resource Board (SRB) (Rimanelli, 2009:389). That is saddled with NATO's overall management resources except civil budget (NATO 2014; NATO Handbook 2006).

The Board is also responsible for the allocation of financial resources, chaired by representatives of the Military Committee, national representatives of member countries, NATO Defence Manpower Committee, Chairmen of Military Budget and Infrastructure. The Board as well prepares the budget for the next financial year and well as for short-term financial activities usually for a four-year period, subject to the approval by the NAC (Rimanelli, 2009:389; NATO Handbook 2006).

4.4.6 Financial Management

NATO operates a financial management structure that rests the burden of its expenditure on member countries, which supports the cost of independently or by consensus within/ among member countries (Amara, 2006; UN Handbook 2006:61; 2001:207).

In managing the finances of NATO no single body (Secretary General, Subordinate Commanders, NATO Strategic Commanders and other designated Head of NATO) have direct managerial control over all four principal elements of the Organisation's financial structures such as, the Security Investment Programme, the International Military structure (military budget), International Staff (civil budget), and the Production and Logistics Organisations or the agency (UN Handbook 2006:61).

4.4.7 Financial Control

The financial controller though appointed by the NAC is saddled with ensuring correct preparation and execution of the budget (military and civil budget). The financial controllers are also responsible for managing the financial activities and statements of the NSIP (Becker, 2012; UN Handbook 2006:63), while ensuring financial responsibility and oversight on the implementation of the budget and the programme.

The financial controllers are seen as the internal auditors of the Organisation. to ensure that financial standards conforms to standard financial procedures and the execution of the budget is appropriately implemented based on the Financial Regulations and their constitutive rules and procedures.

The financial controllers ensure that the funds derived from contributing countries are called up on time to ensure smooth operationalization of the Organisation. In accordance with the agreed common shared cost and cash holding in international treasury of the Organisation (UN Handbook 2006:64). However, independent International Board of Auditors for NATO audits the entire accounts of the different NATO bodies. It is worthwhile to states that the Board Members are drawn from individual member countries of the organisation, which might have some standard transgression in terms of its audits. However, the main aim of the Board is to assure member countries that the funds of the organisation are not been mismanaged in terms of effectiveness.

However, the emphasis in the funding modalities of NATO is principally that cost lie where they fall. It begins with the voting process. In that once a member country votes for a course the member country (ies) are liable to contribute inf funding such course.

Once a member country raises concerns over issues it must be prepared to honour otherwise back/ support such declarations in financial terms. The central theme of NATO activities is political solidarity, which it identified as the hallmark for the implementation of its initial agreement in 1949 (see the agreement document NATO 1949). However, doubt and various contentions have been raised with regards to the undemocratic nature of the organization, based on its idea of political solidarity and activity against cost, have limited member countries with strong financial strength to be lord over others with weaker finances and military strength (Homan 2006:20-21).

Worthy of note, NATO is an organization of 28 independent member countries (NATO 2015) yet 15,000 military troops rovers around the territory of its international offices consistently like it was preparing for a war (NATO 2006). However, no matter how depressed weaker member states are, and how undemocratic NATO is in apportioning responsibilities on finance, and money conscious NATO, without finance no activity can occur. This is why NATO is still largely regarded as the most financially viable regional security arrangement currently as a result of two reasons: because it is more of a political solidarity than security agency (ii) because it really does not need much finances for operation or running cost. Hence member countries pay for deployment, equipment, material and every needed instrumentality essential for PKO. Therefore, its contributions are largely used for payment of day-to-day staff of the organization rather than payment for deployment and reimbursement unlike the UN and the AU. In that the methodology for financing NATO, rests the burden of its expenditure on individual member countries.

Finally, the idea of NATO conceptualization is arguably an extension of member countries functionality. In that, it favours member countries with stronger economy as Homan (2006) also alluded. This cripples the idea of collective security and collection actions. Collective responsibility and actions are jointly taken with regards to perceived common good. If member countries do not support an activity, it does not necessarily put a stop to such activity. It only means that the member country that intends to embark on such activity must bare its cost alone.

In sum, both the UN and NATO have diverse means of generating funds for peacekeeping operation. While the UN is a humanitarian organisation; NATO is more of a political organisation that uses the Alliance to ensure the securitization of member countries. Both NATO and the UN generate significant amount of their budget from the contribution of member states/countries through the assessment scale based on the GDP. Both organisations are to large extent self-reliance. However, the 2% ground rule of the GDP of NATO member countries have not yield the desired result, because 21 of the 23 member countries of NATO have not met contributing 2% of GDP to fund the organisation. On the other hand, since 2005 the UN has been met with brick-wall/resistance in mobilizing both militia and funds for the organisation, as a result of allegation of mismanagement and corruption in the organisation (Park 2014; The Economist 2005). However, both have made and are still making significant strides towards ensuring fiscal: viability, sustainability and responsibility (fiscal responsibility is seen and appreciated more in line with the principle of cost lie where they fall as practiced under NATO).

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To ensure the purpose of the discourse is not loose, vague or lost. This study shall henceforth concentrate on African perspective in the light of the African Union, African security architecture and the financial mechanism of SADC Standby Force.

4.5 African Union (AU)

The African Union is a continental union consisting of 54 countries in Africa, exempting Morocco (Mbeki 2002; The Library of Country Studies 2004; Ibp Usa 2004; Ojukwu 2013), modeled after the European Union (Bhalla 2001). The Constitutive Act is its supreme legal document empowering AU member states to mediate and intervene in the following instances: war crimes, crimes against humanity, act of grave circumstance and genocide (Bah, Choge-Nyangoro, Dersso, Mofya and Murithi 2014:16), which was a severance or a breakaway from the original nomenclature of the Organisation of African Unity of non-interference in national issues.

To fulfill the objectives of the African Union as seen in chapter two of this study, while keeping to its principles and visions. The AU established the following Organs as stated in the earlier chapters: The Assembly (see Article 6); The Executive Council (see Article 10); The Commission (see Article 20); The Permanent Representatives' Committee (see Article 21); Pan-African Parliament (Article 17); ECOSOCC (Economic, Social and Cultural Council) (see Article 22); The Court of Justice (see Article 18); The Specialized Technical Committees; The Financial Institutions (see Article 19); The AU Commission (see Article 20) and Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (see Article 9 amended 2003) (AU 2015; AU-PSC 2003), and the African Peace and Security Architecture was established in 2001. That is seen as the AU key machinery towards ensuring sustainable peace in the continent

4.5.1 African Peace and Security Architecture

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is an umbrella term that defines the key mechanisms of the AU in promoting peace, security and stability in the continent (Article 3 of the Constitutive Act; AU 2014:30), established by the African Union in collaboration with Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs); With the aim of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the continent. The framework outlines tools for such, prevention, management and resolution of conflict in the continent.

The highest decision-making authority of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which has the sole authority of mandating and terminating an AU peacekeeping operation (Kasumba and Debrah 2010). It utilizes the early warning arrangement for facilitating timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in the continent (Kasumba and Debrah 2010). The impetus for the creation of the APSA in 2001, parallel with the African Union was to prevent the reoccurrence of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in the continent.

RECs are the building blocks of APSA. In that for the impact of the APSA to be felt, there must be synergy between RECs and the AU arms on; conflict prevention and management, and early warning systems in intervening and resolving crisis in the continent. Kasumba and Debrah emphasize the need for this synergy; the APSA brings

together a number of key interconnected components concerned with political decision-making (the Peace and Security Council), gathering and analysis of information (the Continental Early Warning System), mediation and advisory capacity (the Panel of the Wise), peace support operations (PSO) capacity (the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee), and a Special Fund (Kasumba and Debrah 2010). To ensure quick response in conflict areas, while seeking diplomatic solutions to the crisis. The legalization of the APSA was done through the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU in 2004.

4.5.2 Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU was ratified in 2004 under a Protocol of the Constitutive Act adopted by the AU Assembly in July 2002. The Protocol defines the PSC as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and effective response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (AU-PSC 2003). The Protocol establishing the PSC stipulates other responsibilities such as: prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, post-conflict peace building and developing common defence policies (PSC 2003). The PSC has fifteen members elected on a regional basis by the Assembly similar in intent and operation to the United Nations Security Council. This means its decisions need approval from the UNSC.

The PSC established six essential organs, African Standby Force, New Partnership for African Development, Continental Early Warning Systems, Military Staff Committee, Panel of the Wise, and Common African Defence and Security Policy

However, the study shall focus on the African Standby Force (ASF) and will consequently zoom into the functionality and financial mechanisms of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force.

4.5.2.1 African Standby Force

The ASF was envisioned to serve as a continental rapid-response team of complex PKO in the continent, composed of multidisciplinary component: civilian, military, and police on standby in the five regions in the continent, ready for quick deployment at appropriate notice (Alghali and Mbaye 2008). The ASF constitutes Standby Brigade (now Standby

Force) in each of the five main regions in the continent as follows: The East African Standby Force (EASF), The ECOWAS Standby Force (ECOWASSF), The North African Regional Capability (NARC), The Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (ECCASSSF) and The SADC Standby Force (SADCSF) (Alghali and Mbaye 2008).

The ASF has no known financial mechanism through which it generates its income, rather than relying on the AU and international partners for funds. It is therefore expedient to understand the nature of the African Unions funding mechanism which all organs and agencies of the Union relies for support.

4.6 African Union Financial Mechanism

Unlike the UN (humanitarian) and NATO (political), the idea of the African Union is that of mainly economic unification from its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The financial statements of the AU are prepared and presented by the AU Commission Chairperson and approved by the PRC of the AU.

The AU has basically four sources of funding: Member States Contributions based on member states assessment similar to that of, UN and NATO; Peace Funds likened to the Special PKO account of the UN, Sanctions on arrears, and International Partners (AU Handbook 2015:166). Of which two are ineffective such as, the Peace Fund and Sanction on arrears. While the Peace Fund is yet to be established, the Sanctions on arrears is uncalled for, taking cognizance to the fact that the contribution is based on the ability to pay. This therefore questions the assumption of the AU, on the basis of sanctions. For instance, if a member state is unable to contribute to current expenditure of the AU, what guarantees does the AU have that such member state, would possibly be able to pay arrears for the functionality of the Union. Taking into cognizance the dwindling oil prices, increasing poverty in the continent, increasing number of failed and failing states, as well as the increasing rate of inequality, marginalization, migration, and unemployment in most African states.


Another issue is on the over-reliance on the GDP as a measurement tool could be misleading. Hence in most member states, significant amount of the GDP are repatriated to the nationalities of the multinationals, whose major aim is to repatriate profits to home states (Sharples, Jones, and Martin, 2014; Sornarajah 2004:11), the study posits that these are debates that critically surround the notion of pan-Africanist, regional integration and the AU and its RECS. For this speaks directly to practical issues surrounding poverty, capital flight, agriculture, global political economy, corruption, underdevelopment of most African states and failed and failing states.

Worthy of note that while the 2015 budget of the AU is approximately \$USD 522,121,802; \$USD 131,471,086 is shared among member states, while International Partners contribute USD 225,536,171. This tends to question the debates and proclamations of Pan-Africanism by African Leaders and Global Partners. In 2015 the AU proposed a budget deficit of approximately \$USD 149,266,824 (AU Handbook 2015:166). This tends to show the high level and complex web which the African continent is caught up with, by extension for the Union to be supported so much financially from donors threatens to a large extent inter-trade and regional integration to a large extent. This could also be linked to the decline of inter-trade activities in the continent and has a negative effect on the continents contribution to the global capital market and the over-patronage of foreign goods (Sharples, Jones, and Martin 2014). That invariably affects the continent in global political economy decisions. This is what Nkrumah referred to as the worst form of colonialism called neocolonialism. To this end, the study will analyze the two 'functional methods' used in financing the African Union: Scale of Assessment (Contribution by member states), and International Partner. See table 4.4 for nature of contribution by member states:

Table 4.3: Member states contribution percentage and actual amount for 2014 and 2015

Member States	Scale of Assessment	2015 Assessment (US\$)	2014 Assessment (US\$)	Difference 2014/2015 (US\$)
Algeria	12.904	16,965,029.03	16,265,607.88	699,421.16
Angola	5.275	6,935,099.83	6,649,184.87	285,914.96
Benin	0.374	491,701.86	471,430.36	20,271.51
Botswana	1.004	1,319,969.71	1,265,551.02	54,418.69
Burkina Faso	0.475	624,487.66	598,741.77	25,745.90
Burundi	0.100	131,471.09	126,050.90	5,420.19
Cabo Verde	0.113	148,562.33	142,437.51	6,124.81
Cameroon	1.442	1,895,813.07	1,817,653.95	78,159.12
Central African Republic	0.103	135,415.22	129,832.42	5,582.79
Chad	0.437	574,528.65	550,842.42	23,686.22
Comoros	0.031	40,756.04	39,075.78	1,680.26
Congo	0.612	804,603.05	771,431.50	33,171.56
Côte d'Ivoire	1.306	1,717,012.39	1,646,224.73	70,787.66
DR Congo	0.599	787,511.81	755,044.88	32,466.93
Djibouti	0.076	99,918.03	95,798.68	4,119.34
Egypt	12.904	16,965,029.03	16,265,607.88	699,421.16
Equatorial Guinea	0.752	988,662.57	947,902.75	40,759.82
Eritrea	0.113	148,562.33	142,437.51	6,124.81
Ethiopia	1.419	1,865,574.72	1,788,662.24	76,912.48
Gabon	1.165	1,531,638.16	1,468,492.96	63,145.20
Gambia	0.050	65,735.54	63,025.45	2,710.09
Ghana	1.993	2,620,218.76	2,512,194.40	108,024.36
Guinea	0.270	354,971.93	340,337.42	14,634.51
Guinea Bissau	0.045	59,161.99	56,722.90	2,439.08
Kenya	1.784	2,345,444.19	2,248,748.02	96,696.17
Lesotho	0.161	211,668.45	202,941.95	8,726.50
Liberia	0.042	55,217.86	52,941.38	2,276.48

Libya	12.904	16,965,029.03	16,265,607.88	699,421.16
Madagascar	0.457	600,822.87	576,052.60	24,770.26
Malawi	0.269	353,657.22	339,076.92	14,580.31
Mali	0.494	649,467.17	622,691.44	26,775.73
Mauritania	0.199	261,627.46	250,841.29	10,786.18
Mauritius	0.688	904,521.08	867,230.18	37,290.90
Mozambique	0.519	682,334.94	654,204.16	28,130.78
Namibia	0.757	995,236.13	954,205.30	41,030.83
Niger	0.290	381,266.15	365,547.60	15,718.55
Nigeria	12.904	16,965,029.03	16,265,607.88	699,421.16
Rwanda	0.300	394,413.26	378,152.69	16,260.57
Sahrawi Republic	0.037	48,644.30	46,638.83	2,005.47
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.014	18,405.95	17,647.13	758.83
Senegal	0.761	1,000,494.97	959,247.33	41,247.64
Seychelles	0.058	76,253.23	73,109.52	3,143.71
Sierra Leone	0.142	186,688.94	178,992.28	7,696.67
Somalia	0.059	77,567.94	74,370.03	3,197.91
South Africa	12.904	16,965,029.03	16,265,607.88	699,421.16
South Sudan	0.625	821,694.29	787,818.11	33,876.18
Sudan	3.457	4,544,955.47	4,357,579.54	187,375.92
Swaziland	0.254	333,936.56	320,169.28	13,767.28
Togo	0.173	227,444.98	218,068.05	9,376.93
Tunisia	2.849	3,745,611.26	3,591,190.08	154,421.18
Uganda	0.924	1,214,792.84	1,164,710.30	50,082.54
UR of Tanzania	1.215	1,597,373.70	1,531,518.41	65,855.29
Zambia	0.837	1,100,413.00	1,055,046.02	45,366.98
Zimbabwe	0.361	474,610.62	455,043.74	19,566.88
TOTAL	100.000	131,471,086.74	126,050,898.00	5,420,188.74



4.6.1 Scale of Assessment (Contributions by Member States)

According to Paul (2015), the scale of assessment is a reflection of a country's contribution to the regular budget of the AU, UN or NATO revised every three years. Based on the following: the capacity of the member state to pay; gross national income of the member state, the population size, per capita income, debt burden of member state. While the idea of the revised UN scale of assessment was to distinguish between least developing countries and using further indices to determine payment, that of the AU is largely unknown (UN 2015f; 2015g).

The contribution by Member States as alluded earlier is based on the ability of the member state to pay. This assumption is principally dependent on the GDP of member states, which does not take cognizance of other factors such as the means of production, volume of trade, inter-trade and many others. For instance, while the GDP of Nigeria has improved the poverty levels have also increased in geometric proportion: 38% in 1985, 43% in 1992, 47% in 1996, 54.7% in 2004, and 60.9% in 2010 (Una 2015; Nwabughioqu 2015; Aigbokhan 2000; BBC 2015). This speaks to the fact that while GDP might be on the increase if other factors as discussed under the pull-up factors are declining (as discussed earlier in the analytical framework), there might be no significant change in wellbeing of the citizens. And it is more complicated with the Southern African countries, in that most of these countries rely and make national budget on donor funding (Miller 2011). This limits the influence of that national government in determining its course of action in terms of trade and investment relationship within and outside Africa.

Another critical twist to the argument while GDP is not best suited for determining scale of assessment; in accounting Gross depicts a situation or stage before expenses. Which implies less expense of, shareholders' income, profits repatriation, endorsement and advert, charity and etc. Premised on these realities the study is proposing that rather than the GDP of countries be used for assessing member states ability to contribute the Net Domestic Product should be used (Spant 2003). In that NDP gives a real feedback to the actual figures in monetary terms of fund in the economy. In mathematical term the $NDP =$

GDP-depreciation (Karabarbouni and Neiman 2014:6) (net domestic product (NDP) equals the gross domestic product (GDP) minus depreciation of goods and services)

4.6.2 International Partners


The Union relies heavily on external source to fund its operation. The 2015 budget of the AU shows that international partners contribute over 40% of the Unions budget. And another approximately 30% to fund its operations is borrowed. Leaving only 30% for the continent to source from member states. This idea of foreign national championing the activities (financially with 70%) questions the notion of Africa by Africans debate in all ramifications as led by NEPAD (Bostan 2011; AU 2015). Also justifying the reason for the continents failures of regional economic development.

In all, a look at the budget for the UN and NATO shows no clue of external funders or borrowings. Hence these organisation skillfully used the methods been suggested in the chapter two and three of this study. Prioritizing strategy theory and the pull-up factors. From the analysis of both the UN and NATO, in addition to their financial mechanisms for generating and disbursing funds for programmes/ projects accountability and transparency is the ultimate emphasis but in the Africa Union, it still remains a long walk for the Union. Having all these in mind it will be wise to streamline into the context of the discourse, which is one of the identified five mechanisms of the African Standby Force in ensuring sustainable peace and security in the regions of the continent as alluded earlier, the Southern African Development Community Standby Force

4.7 Southern African Development Community Standby Force

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is comprised of 15 Member States (SADC 2015c). Its common agenda is to promote and encourage regional integration cum peace and security (Meessen, Bungenberg, and Puttler 2009:389). In 2007 it formed an alliance of military cohesion that culminated in the SADC Standby Force (formerly SADC Brigade) through the instrument of the OPSC and SIPO, with the aim of ensuring quick response to conflict areas in accordance with Article 13 of the PSC Protocol (Engel and Porto 2010:133-137). The main goal of SADC Member

States as seen in the Windhoek Treaty of 1992 (which transformed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to Southern African Development Community (SADC)) was to establish full economic union with integrated monetary and fiscal system as well as a regional parliament in 2034 (Holden 1998). The objectives of SADC include “To achieve peace and security; economic development and growth; enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa; alleviate poverty; and to support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. These objectives are to be achieved through increased regional integration, built on democratic principles, through equitable and sustainable development” (SADC 2015b).



The SADC Standby Force is the African Standby Force mechanism to “prevent dispute; observe and monitor mission; intervene in accordance with Article 4(h) and (i) of The Act; preventive deployment in order to prevent: a dispute or conflict from escalating in the region, an on-going violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring states or regions, and recovery of violence after parties to conflict have reached an agreement; peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; couple with humanitarian assistance in the region. As well as to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support other functions as may be authorized by the SADC Summit (Article 4 of the SADC MoU on SADCBRIG).

The SADC Standby Force is comprised of five components that intend to reduce significantly threats of insecurity in the region (Baker and Maeresera 2009:106). They include, Military, Police and Multidisciplinary Civilian Component, Planning Element (PLANELM), Southern Africa Defence and Security Management (SADSEM), Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), and the Main Logistic Depot (MLD) of the SADCSF, amongst all these mechanisms stipulated none of which talks about how the agency will be funded, or what its income and expenditure will look like, or how it intends to generate its resource. This therefore questions the genuineness of the agency in addressing the insecurity issues confronting it as well as the functionality aspect of the SADCSF in the nearest future.

4.7.1 Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) Funding Mechanism

The Southern African Development Community Standby Force has no known financial mechanism other than depending on the African Standby Force, SADC SIPO, and International Partners, which is the primary basis for this study. To propose a partnership model that could feasibly accelerate the functionality of the SADCSF, on the basis that funding is the first step towards the operationalization and functionality of the SADCSF to fulfill the mission, aims and visions for which it was established in Southern Africa.

4.8 Partnership model for funding the SADCSF (*Task-On-Tank model*[®])

4.8.1 Conceptualizing Task on Tank[®]

Task on Tank[®] is a model argues that for every task certain amount that justifies the ends to that task (based on strategic Ends and Means) is set aside. In simpler terms Task means mission, assignment or operation and Tank on the other hand, means funds or resources that sees to the completion/ ends of the Task (it is not just funds but funds that see to the completion of the Task). So every Task has a corresponding Tank that sees to the completion of the Task. To have a broader understanding of the concepts, the concept is broken down for easy assimilation.

Task: Task is a function completed to ensure development or growth of an organisation or phenomena (Borman and Motowidlo 1997:99). In that, the completion of a task increases the chances of meeting the organizational goal of establishment. Each strategic goal is met by skillful manpower and financial resources. This is the idea of the Task on Tank model, that every Task must have a corresponding Tank that fuels the operation towards the realization of such Task. The essence is to ensure that in funding an operation or a mission only one thing is prioritized: Ends. And the resources needed to achieve the Task are very paramount; because if the Tank (resources) to achieve the Task is cut the operation is abandoned, the troops are at risk. More so one Tank must be set aside/ must serve to achieve one Task (T1 = T1 meaning 1 Task equals to 1 Tank). It is like simply saying, “if you chase two rabbits, both will escape” (Myra and Shelley 2010), therefore

Task must not lose track of the Tanks vis-a-vis. For where there is not fund, there is hardly any intervention/ operation.

Tank: The Tank on the second hand as stated above clearly deals with the finance, resources or funds that fuels the operation or the Task in peacekeeping as stated earlier.

4.8.2 Assumptions of the *Task on Tank*[®] model

The idea towards a partnership model for funding regional securities of similar kind to the Southern African Development Community Standby Force is based primarily on collection action (as against national action), collaboration (as against national interest), and collective good (as against national good). The framework called the *Task on Tank*[®] model for funding the Southern African Development Community Standby Force has five (5) basic assumptions:

Assumption 1: The extent to which a car has fuel in it; is to that extent it functions. Therefore, the extent to which the security agencies in Africa have a budget (separate from the overall budget of the region) to fund the 5 elements of the SADCSF is to the extent to which it can function. If it does not have resources and does not have means of generating funds, it will be difficult if not practically impossible for any principle of management to take place. As Allison and Jackson state, “funding is key, funding is everything, it determines capability, movement, equipment and maintenance, payments to injured soldiers. If we can sort that out, the rest can follow” (Allison 2012; Jackson 2013).

Assumption 2: Hence every car has one fuel tank (to avoid blockage and complexities). All the resources of the SADCSF should be channeled/ streamed to a single agency. For instance, this reduces complications to the hose of the car. Also regional securities forces must have a single agency, to avoid complexity, multiple force and troops performing same functions directly. This increases the cost on member states, in a bid to ensure financial viability and sustainability.

Assumption 3: Intervention must be based on two reasons; either the nation under attack is a member state of the regional security arrangement or for strategic gains (strategic importance) accruing to member states

Assumption 4: The tank must have means through which it could be refillable (inflow and outflow). The regional arrangement must ensure it uses a dashboard measurement tool that enables it to track the inflow and outflow of funds in the agency.

Assumption 5: The driving force of all international agencies is based on complementing efforts of other member state/s to competing with efforts and ideas of other member state/s. This is the basis for proposing this model of collective action rather than individualism. Take a car for instance, most cars in Africa cannot function without a battery; the car cannot turn properly without a steering wheel. Therefore, each relies on the efforts of the other to function properly and adequately. So should member states of the SADC/SF operate, each relying on the strength of the other to ensure a smooth flow of finance for the functionality of the SADC/SF. This is because the effort of each instrument in a car complements the other not compete with the other nor exposing the weakness of the other. This model is based on the knowledge of collective security and relying on the dictum of military allegiance *all for one and one for all*.

4.8.3 Elements of Task on Tank Partnership Model[©]

There are five elements that condition the functionality of the Task on Tank partnership model borne out of the theoretical, analytical and abstract knowledge derived through this study.

Table 4.4: Elements of the Task on Tank Partnership Model[®]

Empowerment:	Preparing to Partner Sustaining Drive
Member-States Collaborations	Assessing Needs and Strength Coming together
Financial realities	Viability Landscape Sustainability
Strengths Focused	Creating Common or Shared Vision and Plan Collective Action
Social Justice	Evaluating and Celebrating Progress Maintaining Momentum

Five Element of the Task on Tank Model[®] of Regional Security Arrangement

The five elements set the tone or things to consider before adopting the Task on Tank model[®]. The diagram below emphasizes the idea of the model for funding the SADC Standby Force as seen below:




Figure 4.4: Task on Tank® partnership model for funding the Southern African Development Community Standby Force

Table 4.5: Task on Tank® Process Board for Funding the SADC Standby Force

Preparing to Partner

Where to begin?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A familiarity must be drawn from those in the SADC region on who intends to be part of Standby Force. The first stage in this partnership process is to identify member-states willing to be a part of the Standby Force 2. Align the common goals and vision of member-states to ensure uniformity of thoughts and interests 3. Align the visions and goals of the SADC Standby Force to the regional architecture of the region (OPSC) 4. Use research-based evidence of how partnerships foster peace operation missions achievement in the region (contextual) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the political, social and economic and culture of member states? 2. What are the beliefs, attitudes, fears and values of member states? 3. What are the commonly shared security challenges of member-states? 4. What are the commonly shared visions of the member-states? 5. Why should the UMPIRE (AU) give SADC Standby Force the opportunity to form the partnerships? 6. What are its consequence of the partnership? 7. Can a partner backdown? |
|--|--|

Shared common value and plan

How do I get everyone on board and on the same page?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use identified needs to create a partnership plan. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Build on existing partnerships. b. Do not consider starting a new alliance if one exists earlier to avoid proliferation. 2. The strategy must be shared with | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What strategies/partnerships would you and the team use to implement the plan? 2. What is the time line for implementing plan? 3. How will barriers and challenges such non-payment and withdrawal from |
|--|--|

every partner. Feedback and ideas are helpful medium of strengthening the partnership

3. The strategy should be based collective action and democracy.

4. A logical model must be established that guarantees transparency and representation

5. The financial plan should be threefold:

a. A one-year financial plan

b. A 1-3-year financial plan

c. A 3-5-year financial plan

5. A timeline of the operations and activities of the partners must be clearly known yearly

operation affect the plan?

4. What are the pros and cons of involving external forces?

What role can the media play or are there benefits for involving the media?



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Assessing strategic needs and strength

How to identify the goals of the partnership?


1. Organize a conference to ascertain the needs and strengths of the member-states (assuming anything at any time is dangerous in partnership).
2. Conduct needs assessment surveys with member-states on what the partnership aims to achieve and on what circumstance or ground should the force intervene in PKO (not premised on the overall framework of the UN, AU, or EU rather based

1. What is the status of the civilian component in member-states?
2. What are the ends of any/ every intervention?
3. What are the strengths and needs of the military component in member-states?
4. What are the strengths and needs of the police personnel in member-state?
5. What partnerships lesson can be learned from other existing Standby Force? For instance what is the

on indigenous knowledge)

3. **Conduct one-on-one needs and strengths assessment of member-states to actualize where their strengths and weaknesses lies (some member-states might be poor in finance but might have dedicated soldier some sharp shooter others good pilots). Talk to all member-state.**
4. **Community policing must be encouraged, thereby involving the communities in the securitization of the region.**
5. **Individuals of influence (social, political and cultural heads and personalities) must be involved in generating funds for the Force.**
6. **Uncover existing RECs partnerships and their effectiveness.**
7. **Create a community asset framework/ roadmap.**

ECCAS doing that works that SADC Standby Force could learn from?



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Collectivity

How to bring partners together?

1. **Use the identified strengths to create the plan.**
 2. **Examine the identified needs and strengths of member states.**
 3. **Feedback of identified needs and strengths and ideas member states must be taken to account.**
1. Who are the potential partners?
 2. Who determine what constitute a security risk or threat to regional peace?
 3. Who are the identified social and cultural brokers and persons of influence?

4. Connect with potential partners, social and cultural brokers, and persons of influence.

5. Share with potential partners how they can help.

4. What are the roles of member states in times of conflict?

Collective Action

What will we do and how would we achieve the desired result?

1. Delegate responsibilities to member states and partners.

2. Formulated partnership agreement based on common shared threat must be Implemented.

3. Strategically plan to overcome the challenges you anticipated, but implement anyway.

4. Involve the media.

1. What strategies/partnerships would partner and member states use in the implementation process?

2. Every programme implementation must have a time line for such implementation plan

3. How will partners and member states overcome challenges and barriers anticipated?

4. Is there any benefit in involving the media?

Impact Assessment

How and who determines success or failure of the partnership?

1. Impact is critical to accountability and evaluation.

2. Monitor and evaluate the result the finances have achieved in an operation.

3. Measure the implementation processes to ensure procedures are not subverted.

4. Successful accomplishment should be shared, celebrated and rewarded.

1. How and who measures and evaluate results of the partnership?


2. Who should identify and report the differences made through the partnership? Taking into cognizance, what worked? What did not work? why it failed or was successful? And what can be learnt.

3. How would partners be celebrated?

Maintaining Momentum

How will the partnership be sustained?

1. Constantly revisit the plan.	1. what strategies could be used in sustaining the partnership?
2. Evaluation results must be improved upon	2. How can the partnership be improved upon?
3. Partners and member states feedback must be improved upon in revisiting the plan.	3. What are the requirements for admittance into the partnership?
4. New plans must be shared and communicated to all stakeholders.	4. Who are the new partners and member states?
5. In any case of disturbance or insecurity within a region, member states and partners must be put on high alert.	5. What do they have to offer?
6. Source for possible new partners and member states that would add value to the partnership.	



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Table 4.5: Task on Tank Model ©

The Task on Tank model[©] is explained in abstract terms in Table 4.5 above. The analysis for the proposition of the Task on Tank Model[©] in this study is based on the fact that the SADC Standby Force since inception in 2007 have not been able to intervene in any peacekeeping mission date back to its inauguration, due to lack of fund. Therefore, the Task on Tank model[©] proposes a means through which funds can be generated for the operationability and functionality of the SADCSF. The Task on Tank model[©] shows conditions through which funding the SADCSF is feasible, as well as poses critical questions towards forming the partnership. Consequently, two columns are proposed as seen in Table 4.5; the first section deals with conditions for partnership and the other dealt significantly with questions that partners must consider before engaging in any partnership.

So far one thing is clear about this Task on Tank model[©]; it is not based on any form of assumption or presumption. For instance, that a member state belongs to region does not

invariably or automatically mean that such member states is interested in security issues or will be willing to finance issues of security on a regional scale through the SADCSF. So the idea for proposing this model is not based on compulsion or coercion rather voluntary. Being the reason the study argues that the *Task on Tank model*[®] is not based on assumptions but on realities facing nation-states across the continent in general and the SADC region in particular. The *Task on Tank model*[®] is built on the basis of the pull-up factors (as seen in chapter three of this dissertation), while taking into cognizance the pull-down factors that undermines growth and development in the continent.

In conclusion the study proffer more realistic options for funding the SADCSF unlike the proposition by AU-ECOSOCC. Which predominantly was discriminatory by proposing Airline Tariff as an alternative means of funding. It is discriminatory because only a few States operates national carriers in the continent. The proposition of the study aligns more to the reality of time and space holistically in proposing the alternative means to fund SADCSF. The study suggests that the use of Commissions and Travels Fees as a possible means of funding. This recommendation is based on the fact, that very insignificant number of member states own and run (less than 5 of 54) National Carriers. Rather every member states have an airport, seaport and multinationals earning a gross profit above \$50 million. So charging multinationals in terms of having a trust fund or import and export charges, including transport duties can be applied across board. Which is a fair enough deal for every member state. See figure 4.5 for the proposed alternative means of funding the Southern African Development Community Standby Force and other regional forces faced with similar challenges in the continent and abroad. A religious implementation of the *Task on Tank model* is sequel to functionality in funding peace operations in Southern Africa and abroad.



Figure 4.5: Alternative Source of Generating Funds. Author's Configuration ©

This recommendation is based on the understanding that few Southern African nations operate a national carrier. This suggestion is in tandem with the summation of the study. In proffering a realistic funding mechanism for financing the operations of the Southern African Development Community in Southern Africa.

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Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

This chapter five offers a summary to the entire study, while also summarizing critical findings of the study, through which certain recommendations were proposed.

5.1 Summary to the study

This study gives a general introduction to the need for a partnership model for funding the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Standby Force (SADCSF) towards ensuring peace operation mission in the region. The study clearly states the financial challenges confronting the SADCSF towards full-operationability by problematizing the background to the study. Which describes the problem statement, culminating into a research objective and research questions, which were duly addressed in chapter 2, 3 and 4 of the study.

The study methodological was clearly stipulated as desktop cushioned by informed knowledge and quasi-quantitative. Subsequently the study conceptualized essential terms used in the study such as the new concept of security, peace, regionalism and regional integration to mention a few. The study drew from two International Relations Theories, which are very imperative in the study of collection action and strategic planning. They are, Collective Security on the basis of collective action which SADC is based on; and Strategy Theory based on Strategic Planning taking into cognizance the Ends and Means approach, which emphasizes the achievement of the end product of activities to the means through which such task or activity is accomplished in the SADC region.

To have a proper grasp of the foundation of SADCSF, the study rationalizes Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, as the basis for the legitimatization of regional and sub-regional security arrangements, including SADCSF, which is a progeny of the African Standby Force (ASF); which the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union (AU) posit as its mechanism for sustainable peace, and security in the continent.

However, the ASF and its progeny (SADCSF) have been limited by finance since inception. In order to understand the challenges in securing funding for the SADCSF in

the region eleven analytical tools in economics, politics and administration were utilized. The 11 analytical tools were divided into two: pull-up factors and pull-down factors. The former referring to factors that enhance the chances of growth, income generation and development in the region, for the region to comfortably fund the SADCSF. The latter are factors that have limited or inhibited the growth and integration/unification of the region, as well as factors that have hampered the SADCSF to generate funds towards full operability. Furthermore, the pull-up factors were considered as means through which the region could fund the SADCSF.

Therefore, the study used the pull-up factors in proposing a partnership fact called the Task-on-Task model to fund the SADCSF in the region. This is the basis for the study. The Task-on-Task partnership model is based on collectivism: collective responsibility and collective action. The idea of the model champions: collectivism to individualism; cooperation to competition; and collective action based on interest to collective action based on compulsion for members in a region. The ending chapter give a summary of the entire study, specific findings and synthesis, while recommending means through which the SADCSF would function adequately, emanating from the research problem, research objectives and the research literature.

In sum, the study contends that with an effective and adequate funding mechanism homegrown like the *Task on Tank*; the funding limitations of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) could be addressed.

5.2 Summary of Finding

The findings of the study are divided into five sections: Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the African Union, and the African Standby Force mainly on financial mechanism as seen below.

5.2.1 Southern Africa Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF)

1. The SADCSF is not in operational as a collective unit, rather it uses individual member states for intervention as seen with cases of DR Congo and Lesotho;

2. The SADCSF does not have financial mechanism than to depend on the African Standby Force or the SADC secretariat;
3. The funds used in funding the SADCSF is not generated from within;
4. The regions finances are on deficit, which question its ability of the SADCSF not to follow suite
5. That the SADCSF has five mechanisms through which it is meant to intervene in peacekeeping operations. Yet none of these (Military, Police and Multi-Dimensional Civilian (MPMDC); Planning Element (PLANELM); Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADEM); Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC); and Main Logistic Depot have reached its full potential in terms of been operational due to the lack of finance
6. The SADCSF does not have any mechanism through which funds are derived for peacekeeping operations in order to respond to crisis in the region quickly.
7. That most funds used for intervention in the region and budget of some member states are partially funded by donors and international partners
8. That the SADCSF have no known financial mechanism for funding its operation
9. That there is no clear budget for the SADCSF by SADC
10. There is no clear financial plan and/or manual or trajectory for the SADCSF to get funds from the ASF
11. The regional economic communities (RECs) in region is completely heterogeneous, and most champion and favour the European model than the SADC model
12. There seems to be no tendency for ensuring financial viability, hence there exist no inflow or outflow of funds
13. No measure to ensuring fiscal sustainability, hence there exist no measure to enhance any form of inflow or outflow of funds in the SADCSF
14. That while the region is experiencing growth in GDP; other indicators of economic landscape such as, housing, unemployment, poverty index etc., are at the opposite side,
15. While several other studies (Cilliers, Makan etc.) have shown that the SADCSF have been deployed and have intervened in some countries. It must be stated

clearly that none of these funds were generated from the budget of the African Union, the African Standby Force, SADC or the SADCSF itself. They were mainly from either the UN or the EU

5.2.2 United Nations

1. There are symptoms of undemocratic tendencies in the operations of the UN, as a result of the Veto by the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council;
2. There is no clear mechanism or stated amount arrogated to regional arrangement from the UN;
3. The UN peacekeeping operation runs a separate budget from the general budget of the UN, to ease deployment and interventions in member states. Yet, the UN have had some challenges in some scenarios in securing fund for PKO;
4. The undemocratic tendencies of the UN can be understood in terms of one of its reason for deployment and intervention called: Strategic Importance. Which questions the deployment strategies of the UN, on account of who determines what is of strategic importance to the UN in order words, who determines where to intervene and where not. This could be argued is one of the many reasons for the non-intervention of the UN in Rwanda '94;
5. Another avenue, through which the undemocratic tendencies of the UN are glaring, is with the issue of declaring Palestine a sovereign state. With 139 of member states of 182 member states voting that Palestine should be referred to as a sovereign state. The UN is yet to make proclamations to such effect. Considering that democracy is premised on the argument of majority rule. Perhaps 138 of 182 is not considered a majority;
6. The study shows that while the UN have demarcated member states on 10-assessment scale. The permanent five of the UNSC contributes above 40%, while Africa, some part of Asia (except Japan and China), some parts of North America, and some parts of Europe contribute less than 3% of the total budget to UN budget;
7. That while Africa contributes less than 1% of the total budget of the UN, it contributes above 30% in troops deployment to the UN. This has been largely disregarded; and

8. That while Africa contributes less than 1% to the UN budget over 25% of the UN budget is deployed or devoted to resolving crisis in the continent. This tend to show the strategic importance of Africa to the globe.

5.2.3 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

1. That the funding mechanism of NATO undermine the principles of collective security premised on the principle of cost lie where the fall;
2. That the model of funding (cost lie where they fall) does not give room for poorer member countries to make significant contribution, because contribution is tied to finance;
3. The principle of cost lie where they fall is a abrasion, while it uses cost lie where they fall in principle in action the Alliance still have permanent civilian and military staffs, including international staffs who are catered from the budget of NATO;
4. That the funding model practiced by NATO is not suitable and will hardly be replicated in most regional security arrangement around the world
5. That this method used by NATO is not sustainable, feasible or viable for a regional security arrangement as the ASF and SADCSF

5.2.4 African Union

1. That the security arrangement of the African Union is merely a stabilization force in the continent, in that it keeps watch before the intervention from United Nations Peacekeepers arrives.
2. The African Union does not operate a separate budget for peacekeeping operation unlike the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
3. That the method for funding the African Union is highly dependent on who they term international partners, who provides at least 40% of its budget
4. This found that the method of assessment scale employed by the AU, does not take into account the fact that most member states who's GDP are high seemed to have been the countries with increasing prevalence of poverty (see Nigeria, Libya, South Africa)

5. That while Libya was contributing 12% to the total budget of the African Union, the AU was unable to defend Libya when NATO invaded Libya in 2011, which has resulted in large militarism, gun proliferations and mass migration in the continent after the death of Gaddafi
6. That there is no clearly stated methods for funding the over 40 sub-regional mechanisms otherwise attached of the African Union, especially the African Standby Force and the SADC SF
7. That the nature of funding the AU is not fiscally viable, sustainable or responsible. In that the budget as shown in chapter three, where over 20% of its budget is intended to be borrowed, which in variation from that of the UN and NATO;
8. That the idea of relying about 60% to fund the budget of the AU proves to a large extent that the idea of Africanising the continent “Africa by Africa model” is not feasible owing to this dependency syndrome. This questions the sincerity of Africanism as championed by NEPAD and other agencies

5.2.5 African Standby Force

1. There exist no known financial mechanism than borrowings from international partners and the AU;
2. Though the African Standby Force has nothing less than 15-20 mechanism which ensures its operationability yet a financial plan is lacking
3. The African Standby Force is mainly seen as a theoretical perception of what a regional security arrangement should be, because without funding there is little or nothing any security arrangement can achieve.

5.3 Recommendations

For Africa to have a voice in global politics in security, it must look inwards, develop its capacity, encourage local content and improve the living standard of the communities in various regions. The lack of these is questioning the idea of Africanism, which is a good idea, however without finance, it will be impossible for Africa to achieve true Africanism as posited by the African Union. Therefore there is a need to ensure that member states

develop institutions that enhances interaction to inhibit interaction. Promote indigenous ideas and develop local construct to solve local problems than depend on foreign/ alien economic and political model. This can only be achieved, at a point when the regions in the continent are capable of maintaining a high fiscal: responsibility, viability and sustainability, which strengthen economics of a region or a member state.

The study suggest that for safety of lives and property to be guaranteed and for the genocide otherwise terrorism in Rwanda 1994 never to repeat itself in the continent or to the SADC region. It is important that SADC look inwards to generate funds that could lead to a successful operationalization of the SADC Standby Force. In doing this, it is the view of the study that cooperation should be above competition in the region. That collective action is rooted deep in the region as against individualism of individual member states.

The study suggests that the idea for collectivism or collective action (integration) could accelerate the operationalization and functionality of the SADCSF in the region much speedily.

Again, it commends that the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) must have a separate budget account like the UN and NATO, to ensure timely intervention in peacekeeping operation in the region.

It suggest that non-actors (see chapter 2) must also be considered as alternative means of funding the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SADCSF) in the region. As Sen argues, “the need for popular participation is not just sanctimonious rubbish. Indeed, the idea of development cannot be disassociated from it” (Pritchett, and Woolcock, 2002:2). Hence non-actors or civil participation is not hypercritical to development, it should then be useful in providing funds for the SADCSF.

Finally, the study suggests among others, that if the Task-on-Tank model as developed in this study based on the pull factors is adopted religiously. It is believed that the funding

challenges of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force could be a thing of the past. However taking cognizance of the pull-down factors as seen in the study.

5.4 Conclusion

Though there are diverse ways through which the SADC Standby Force could become functional and operational. This study posits that finance is the first step in a series of steps towards the operationability of the force. For according to the AU Head of Peace Support Operations Division, “Funding is key, funding is everything, it determines capability, movement, equipment and maintenance, payments to injured soldiers. If we can sort that out, the rest can follow” (Allison 2013; Jackson 2013). This statement guarantees that for a functional peacekeeping force like the SADCSF, the first step or measure that promise operatonability is funding. Taking into cognizance the factors as exemplified in the pull-up and pull-down factors. The pull-up factor is the basis for the proposition of a funding mechanism.

The crux of the study was achieved through the pull-up factors (proposing a funding model for the SADCSF). The study also shows that there are other means through which the operationability and timely intervention of the SADCSF in conflicts zones is needful. An understanding into how a well-developed and structured system of governance, increased mechanization and production, increased volume of trade among member states as well as the nature of Africa’s political economy based on commodity and exchange can be examined. However, the study proposes that funding as the first step in a sequence of steps in ensuring the operationability and functionality of the Southern African Development Community Standby Force in the region. Without financial, sustainability, viability and responsibility on the part of member states the partnership model as proposed will make no meaning.

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