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**THE RISE OF POPULISM IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF NATIVISM IN
MAINTAINING POLITICAL POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE.**



BY

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

ZANU-PF and ANC have been in power in their respective countries since the advent of democracy. However, the popularity of both the ANC and ZANU-PF has shifted from urban areas to rural areas, where their support bases are now concentrated (Clapham, 2012). Rural areas have benefitted the least from access to public resources and resource distribution yet despite this, they have provided the much needed support to both the ANC and ZANU-PF respectively.

The politics of nativism has been used by the Zuma-led faction in the ANC and ZANU-PF in maintaining political power in their respective domains in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Nativism has been identified as a form of populism that is used as a political strategy to gain and maintain political power. It arises from opposition to the mind-set of colonialism in the form of a 'reverse discourse' that seeks to undermine colonial ideas through the mobilisation of African culture and is reliant on cultivating opposition to a defined enemy. Therefore, the study seeks to investigate how the politics of nativism have been used by the Zuma-led faction in the ANC and by ZANU-PF respectively to maintain power, by focusing particularly on their rural support bases.

This study aligns itself with the broadly critical African perspective that is constituted by post-colonial theory and the accompanying oppositional canon of literature that is directly linked to the struggles against colonialism and oppression in former colonies, whilst also contesting contemporary representations of post-colonial societies emanating from those sources within which power resides.

The study took the form of qualitative research, within which an interpretive approach was utilised to explore and to analyse the responses by inhabitants of two rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe to the nativist strategies and discourse constructed by the Zuma-led faction of the ANC and ZANU-PF respectively, contributing to the ongoing electoral support for these parties in rural areas.

The research findings revealed that to maintain their popularity in rural areas, the nativist discourse of the Zuma-led faction of the ANC and ZANU-PF has exploited historical factors related to oppression and inhumane treatment by Whites. The research also established that nativist discourse was utilised in rural areas of South

Africa and Zimbabwe with varying success. It resonated with the experiences of the older generation of White domination, whereas most of the younger generation could not relate to its heavy reliance on anti-White sentiment. Those under the age of 35, typically considered as the youth, did not identify with much of the discourse and were sceptical of its racist foundation, preferring instead change in political leadership in order for change to occur.

Keywords: nativism, discourse, political power, rural areas, South Africa, Zimbabwe



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DECLARATION

I the undersigned, Melody Chindoga, hereby declare that the research study is my own original work and that it has not been submitted and will not be presented at any other University for a similar or any other award.

SIGNATURE:  _____

DATE: 12 April 2019



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DEDICATION

To my parents, Mr Kenneth Chindoga and Mrs Violet Chindoga, thank you for giving me the freedom to follow my dreams. Thank you for all your strictness and making me love school at a tender age. It is only now that I understand that you were not being cruel, but you had my best interests at heart. You were the motivation behind my not giving up; I knew how disappointed you would be if I did not finish and I wanted to make you proud. Makandikoshera vananyakubereka.



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ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
APP	America's People's Party
AU	African Union
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BLF	Black Land First
CBD	Central Business District
CODESA	Convention of a Democratic South Africa
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	Confederation of South African Trade Unions
EPWP	Expanded Works Programme
ERC	Election Resource Centre
FRELIMO	Mozambican Liberation Front
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe

MPLA	Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola-Party of Labour
MPNP	Multi-Party Negotiation Process
NDP	National Development Programme
NHA	National Heroes Acre
NP	National Party
NPA	National Prosecution Authority
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SANNC	South African Natives National Congress
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SONA	State of the Nation Address
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement



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PREFACE

As a young Black woman born in Zimbabwe a decade after the attainment of independence, I had only experienced the rule of the authoritarian ZANU-PF government, and whilst undertaking my university studies in South Africa, it was clear that the ANC enjoyed support in a democratic environment that did not rely on coercion to stay in power. This made me interested in understanding the various mechanisms on which governments in post-colonial states rely in order to retain power in their respective countries. As a result, I decided to investigate these two very different examples of post-colonial governments, in both of which the ruling party is a former liberation movement, and yet in one of which there is vibrant democracy, whilst in the other democracy exists on the thin pretext of holding elections.

When I started the research in February 2017, President Robert Mugabe was still the president of Zimbabwe and he had been in power for 37 years, whereas in South Africa President Jacob Zuma was president. In November that same year, Robert Mugabe was forced to step down six days after the military seized power and he was placed under house arrest. In the days preceding his resignation, the military rolled out armoured vehicles in the capital city Harare, and Mugabe was put under pressure from various groups, his own party, ZANU-PF, to relinquish power, and he was abandoned by those who had formerly been staunch supporters, the war veterans. On 18 November thousands of Zimbabweans marched the streets demanding his resignation, something they had never been able to do before without encountering the force of police and soldiers. Faced with opposition from the military, he had to concede defeat. After his resignation, Emmerson Mnangagwa, his deputy president, and instigator of the resistance, was appointed as the president of Zimbabwe. The change in regime was met with enormous optimism by citizens, who felt that there

would be substantial and significant reforms that would provide jobs and an improvement in the standard of living, as well as basic human rights in the form of freedom of speech and freedom of association.

When I collected data shortly afterwards in rural Zimbabwe in January and February 2018, barely two months after Mugabe had been ousted from power, the majority of people I interviewed thus felt free to talk and to express themselves without fear of the consequences, albeit that they were not comfortable with exposing their feelings in a group, where others would get to know their real thoughts and beliefs. Their confidence in the new regime was high and they believed that under new leadership, ZANU-PF would at last begin to implement changes they had long awaited.

In July 2018 the first post-independence election without Mugabe as a candidate were held. Mnangagwa's victory was disputed by the candidate for the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC Alliance), Nelson Chamisa. For a few days after the elections and before the announcing of the final election results, Zimbabweans took to the streets demanding the immediate release of the final results. The army was then deployed to combat the protesters and six civilians were reported to have been shot dead, whilst a dozen more were wounded. The army which had been held by many Zimbabweans as heroes when Mugabe was ousted was now once again the enemy of the citizens. This was a huge contrast to the free Zimbabwe that was envisaged when Mugabe was removed from power.

There were no socio-economic improvements and after the price of petrol was increased more than doubled in January 2019 by Mnangagwa, who owns more than half of the petrol outlets in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions called for a national stay at home and shut down, which led to riots in the streets of

Bulawayo and Harare, the largest cities. Government immediately shut down internet services for almost a week, blocking the flow of information, as the majority of Zimbabweans rely on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Whatsapp. Riots prompted the deployment of the military and the police to all urban areas throughout Zimbabwe, as well as some rural areas, and clashes between security personnel and civilians led to more citizens being beaten up and shot by soldiers, with estimated deaths reported by observers to be close to 30. Allegations of rape, torture and assault by soldiers was accompanied by the detainment of political activists and opposition party leaders, whilst soldiers now have a strong presence in the streets, in shops and on public transport, to prevent any gathering of citizens. This is a stark contrast to the free Zimbabwe that was promised by President Mnangagwa and citizens now ask themselves why they replaced a greedy dictator with one who is so ruthless.



Had I tried to gather data at any time after December 2018, it would have been impossible. The army clampdown has thoroughly intimidated citizens and they are terrified of the repercussions of expressing any opinions at all.

On the other hand, in South Africa President Zuma resigned in February 2018, after he was re-called from power by the ANC to end his nine year presidency. This came after Zuma's faction lost against Cyril Ramaphosa's at the ANC Elective Conference in December 2017. The end to Zuma's presidency similarly heralded a wave of optimism that the ANC would be purged of corruption and that as a result resource distribution and service delivery to the public would improve. There were also high hopes that the economic situation would improve, after years of minimal or even zero growth that has resulted in an unemployment rate of 40% in some urban areas and 80% in rural areas. Cyril Ramaphosa brought hope of a "new dawn" for citizens and

this was similarly met with optimism among all citizens, which was evident in the interviews I conducted in South Africa in May and June 2018.

Towards the end of 2018, the 'state capture' inquiry commenced, with investigations proceeding into the systemic political corruption that has infiltrated government at all levels and which, in South Africa, placed the former president at the centre. The inquiry has not only implicated Zuma, but so many other long-serving senior ANC members of the government that it appears almost every government department was involved. This has affected the confidence of citizens in Ramaphosa and in the ANC, with the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters party benefitting from the general disillusionment. With elections due in May 2019, the ANC is to be tested on the extent to which corruption has damaged its popularity. Once again, had I interviewed South African citizens in December 2018, it is unlikely that similar confidence in the ruling party would be expressed.



It is these unpredictable political events that change people's opinions from one day to the next, and this foregrounds the underlying significance of interpretivist studies as capturing a particular historical moment within the broad spectrum of social dynamics and presenting a reality that is finite and subject to change.

This study thus reflects a particular era that lies between the eras that preceded and followed it, and it shows the 'truth' that was real to the respondents under those circumstances. It does, nonetheless, point to the validity of the hypotheses that have been developed by post-colonial African scholars and that offered a broad framework for approaching this research.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Revolutionary parties represent a powerful phenomenon in Africa's political history for their role in liberating African states from colonial rule. Throughout Africa, there are movements that have fought long and hard in order to achieve the full liberation of their people and their territories from colonial regimes. After attaining liberation, former liberation movements invariably assumed power as national governments and recognised themselves as political parties (Clapham, 2012:4). Their validity to rule stemmed from the decolonisation process and they acted as representatives standing in on behalf of the people. Nonetheless, despite their popular support at independence, liberation movements have experienced considerable difficulties in making the transition from a command-system struggle movement to a democratic form of government in post-colonial states. In some instances, former liberation movements have failed to meet the needs of the citizens and in other cases, they have failed to maintain their support through democratic means, manifesting the characteristics of colonial oppressive rule. Despite their shortcomings, some of the post-independence governments have retained power through winning elections, despite not having met the expectations of the electorate. Nativism as a form of populism has been on the rise in post-colonial African states and has been used by former liberation movements turned post-colonial rulers as a mechanism to retain power. These two concepts will be discussed in greater detail shortly.


This study seeks to investigate, offer and unpack various explanations of the nature of nativism and the role nativist strategy has played in maintaining the popularity of the ANC and ZANU-PF, providing a comparison between the nature of the support for the

two revolutionary parties in two specific rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The study will adopt an interpretivist methodological approach located within the spectrum of post-colonial theory which rejects the use of structural frameworks and Western paradigms that originated with the Enlightenment and evolved into models of modernisation for post-independence African states. The research, therefore, strives to avoid uncritically adopting Western mainstream perspectives in both its methodological approach and theoretical stance. Post-colonial theory is a critical theory which focuses on the post-colonial experience, taking into consideration how it has impacted on independent governance in Africa. As a result, post-colonial theory is directly linked to the struggles against colonialism and oppression in former colonies (Leroke, 1998). More importantly, the use of post-colonial theory allows the research and topic under study to be investigated using an African lens suitable for an African phenomenon. Notably, the use of post-colonial theory allows and advocates for the use of conceptual framework applicable to the study and not borrowed from Western thinking.

The literature review rejects Western paradigms and rather advocates African conceptualisation frameworks. However, the literature will provide more information on a critical analysis and highlight different aspects from different Afrocentric scholarly reviews on the post-colonial African state, which provide oppositional literature to Western thinking by criticising colonialism and how it has negatively impacted the political, social and economic growth of post-colonial state.

As indicated earlier, as a populist strategy, nativism has been used as one of the mechanisms for retaining power by post-colonial governments in Africa. Dalio, Kryger, Rogers and Davis (2017) define populism as a political and social phenomenon that arises from the common man, who is typically not well-educated, and fed up with

wealth and opportunity gaps in society and a government that is not working effectively for them. In this regard, post-colonial governments and leaders have used populism as a mode of communication that proposes that ordinary people (targeting those who stay in rural areas) are exploited by the few elites, as a way of eliciting electoral votes and support. In today's African democracies, nativism as a form of populism has been used as a populist strategy for mobilising votes. Nativism is described as a political process or strategy of promoting the preservation of tradition and reviving indigenous culture, thereby protecting and favouring the interest of native population of a country (Fernandez, 2013). Importantly, nativism arises from an opposition to the mind-set of colonialism to reverse discourse, by seeking to undermine colonial ideas through the mobilisation of diffused African culture. Nativism has been used as a populist strategy articulated with the aim of concealing the party's shortcomings and enabling them to connect with the broader, rural-based section of the population. The nativist strategies in most African states focus on the electoral majority – rural dwellers – in order to retain power.



Since attaining independence in Zimbabwe and South Africa in 1980 and 1994, respectively, Zimbabwe's African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) have maintained power in their respective countries through elections. However, since the advent of democratic regimes, the popular support of both the ANC and ZANU-PF has shifted from the expanding urban areas to rural areas for reasons to be discussed shortly. Most notably, Afrocentric scholars like Mamdani (1996) argue that the colonial strategy enforced divisions between town and countryside, which produced what he refers to as the "bifurcated state", serving two publics. In a "bifurcated state" there is the institutionalisation of two sources of power under the same authority, whereby urban

strategy to rule is based on power and rights and the rural strategy to rule incorporates tradition and culture into the organisation of rule. As a result, the colonial legacy of domination and marginalisation was reproduced after independence, most markedly in the rural areas, where currently most of the popular support for the liberation movements turned post-independence ruling parties resides.

The legitimacy of liberation movements to rule in post-colonial states stems from their role in the struggle for independence against colonial rule. The main purpose for the formation of liberation movements in Africa during the colonial period was to bring about independence to the native Africans from the suppressive White regimes. The next section will provide an overview of notable liberation movements in pre-independence Africa, focusing particularly on Zimbabwe and South Africa.

1.1.1 Background of prominent liberations movements in pre-independence South Africa and Zimbabwe

Liberation has been defined by struggle and throughout Africa there are movements that have fought long and hard to achieve the liberation of their people and territories from the oppressors in the form of colonial powers (Clapham, 2012). The beginning of 1960s saw the formation of political movements that demanded radical change and questioned colonial rule; as a result, revolts and uprisings for political independence emerged. In this regard, liberation movements came into being across the African continent as a sentiment of dissatisfaction and political response to colonisation (Sithole, 2012). The liberation movements in South Africa and Zimbabwe – then Rhodesia – consisted of several organisations, but the ones that emerged as significant in the two countries were the ANC and ZANU-PF, respectively (Skagen, 2008). The ANC and ZANU-PF fought under intense and different circumstances, with the minority regimes repressing political activity among dissidents.

The ANC was founded in 1912 and is the oldest liberation movement in Africa. However, it was founded as a peaceful movement that would adopt non-racial and non-violent strategies. On its formation, the South African Natives National Congress (SANNC) – later known as the ANC – declared its aim to bring all South Africans together as one people to defend their rights and freedom. They resolved to protest against racial discrimination and to advocate for equal treatment, notably to protest that the Union of South Africa had been established as a union in which native Blacks had no voice in the making of the laws and no part in the administration. More importantly, the ANC opposed the Land Bill which had repercussions for all Africans – it placed restrictions on the right of Africans to own land outside the reserved areas (Houston & Modimowabarwa, 2012). In 1943, the ANC drafted the Bill of Rights which advocated equal rights which had been denied to Black people; these included equal access to education, health, jobs and the law. However, the ANC's pleas for justice were faced with an increase in repressive laws. Consequently, in 1948, after an all-White election which was won by Nationalist Party, the government introduced its policy of apartheid which embraced and advocated racial discrimination.

However, the ANC later adopted a more revolutionary approach after the imprisonment of its leaders at the Rivonia Trial in 1963 for acts of sabotage to overthrow the apartheid government. Consequently, after it's banning at the beginning of 1960s, it intensified its struggle for popular resistance against the apartheid regime and the armed wing – known as *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), "Spear of the Nation" – was formed by Nelson Mandela. Although the ANC attempted to launch a guerrilla war, it failed as a result of failing to gain support from the peasantry because they feared communism and the loss of their land, but they were highly successful in

mobilising strikes and protests in townships. The ANC worked closely with the South African Communist Party (SACP), which had strong ties with the former Soviet Union.

Although ZANU-PF is regarded as ushering in independence in Zimbabwe – and has been in power in Zimbabwe since independence – the fight for independence in Zimbabwe was fought by two fronts: The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and ZANU-PF, with the latter being a breakaway function. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was founded in 1961 and led by Joshua Nkomo. Although the organisation was anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, its party leadership was influenced by the scientific socialism of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and it also subjected the liberation movement to the concept of Pan-Africanism. ZAPU believed that change could only come through violent revolution and as a result, the Zimbabwe Liberation Army was formed (Riley, 1982). However, after the banning of ZAPU in 1962 by the Rhodesian government, in 1963 ZAPU split and this led to the formation of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Ndabaningi Sithole.

Notably, the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe against colonial rule was fought on two fronts by the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing for ZANU, and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing for ZAPU (Riley, 1982). This created a major split between the Shona and the Ndebele tribes, with the former generally backing ZANU and the latter supporting ZAPU. This was later to have consequences in post-independence Zimbabwe (Skagen, 2008). The colonial era nurtured and fostered tribalism which erupted in post-independence (Munemo, 2016).

After the attainment of independence by most of the African states – in most cases through bloodshed and revolts fought between colonial regimes and liberation

movements – newly independent post-colonial states were formed. The challenge for a post-colonial state was to make a transition from the oppressive regime to a newly democratic regime which upheld basic human rights. Post-colonial states in Africa symbolise the period after the attainment of independence, where issues such as the post-colonial rule and self-governance emerged. This period was marked with hope for newly independent states, but Austin (2010) believes that post-colonial African states did not deliver a positive influence on systematic development in the continent. In this regard, the post-colonial state in Africa has found itself the object of growing disapproval with patterns such as civil wars, disregard for the rule of law, dictatorships, and coups emerging, which contributed to the destabilisation of the state (Mokube, 2014). In the literature review in the next chapter, the research will dwell more on the post-colonial state in Africa.



As explained in the previous section, the post-colonial Zimbabwean state has been dominated by ZANU-PF. However, ZANU-PF as a liberation movement fought the suppressive minority rule for the independence of their people. As a result, the party's validity to lead post-colonial Zimbabwe stemmed from the decolonisation process, as they were leaders of the masses against colonial rule. Consequently, since the attainment of freedom in 1980, ZANU-PF have been in power because they embraced a socialist ideology and their war credentials appeared to be ideal for the post-colonial state.

1.1.1.1 Post-colonial Zimbabwe

Soon after the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF transitioned from being a liberation movement to a political party and the ruling party. As a result, ZANU-PF has dominated the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe in all spheres – political, social and economic. ZANU-PF has been in power in Zimbabwe since 1980 and its political

survival has been attributed to its form of government as a dominant one-party state, accompanied by political repression and the subsequent lack of effectively organised opposition leadership; it was bolstered by the strong rural support. Munangagwa (2011) points out that the ZANU-PF has maintained authoritarian rule as a one-party state and gained significant control of Zimbabwe's main strategic institutions, such as the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). Ryan (2003) argues that the subsequent socioeconomic deterioration, followed by violent seizure and control of farms owned by White commercial farmers by war veterans with the backing of the government, led to increased social, political and economic instability in Zimbabwe. In this regard, international institutions embodied by Western values, such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), condemned the land invasions, discouraged investment and imposed economic sanctions, thereby crippling the Zimbabwean economy.



As indicated earlier, the struggle for freedom against colonial rule in Zimbabwe was fought not only by ZANU-PF, but also by a movement known as ZAPU. After ZANU-PF assumed power in 1980, ZAPU became the main official opposition. Although the political leadership emphasised reconciliation, political rivalry emerged after 1980; this was evident in the violent conflict between ZAPU and ZANU-PF from 1980 to 1987 (Zhira, 2004). As the post-independence government was Shona-dominated and derived its support from the ethnic community and as the opposition ZAPU was Ndebele-dominated, it was inevitable that ethnic conflict would surface, rooted from regional and ethnic dimensions. While ethical tensions erupted in post-colonial Zimbabwe, it was during the colonial era that tribalism was nurtured, fostered and thrived (Munemo, 2016). The need to end the violence led to talks between the two parties and culminated in the signing of the Unity Accord that emerged. ZAPU and

ZANU-PF were to form a united ZANU-PF on 22 December 1987, thereby ending the violence.

ZANU-PF popularity has continued even in an economic and political crisis in the country, mainly because – according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni in Moyo (2014: 24) – its leader is projected as the champion for victims of colonialism. Moyo (2014) has pointed to issues such as the ability of ZANU-PF to use culture as a political mobilisation, which commended the regime more to the peasants who strongly believe in the power of African culture. He also argues that ZANU-PF has managed to avoid regime change attempts by identifying themselves with the rural population that constitute the majority in Zimbabwe. According to Moyo (2014), it therefore appears that a significant part of the rural population in Zimbabwe regard ZANU-PF as their only political party and as a result people in the eastern half of the country, where the ZANU-PF record is remarkable, cannot comprehend living under any leader, other than Mugabe.



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Nonetheless, the similarities between post-colonial South Africa and post-colonial Zimbabwe are that they have both been characterised by racism and domination in the past, and both the ANC and ZANU-PF had to revolt against oppression and take up arms to liberate their people. However, the main difference between the two parties is that the ANC allows for a difference of opinion. As a result, its hegemony is currently under threat due to extensive contestation from other parties and from factions within the party itself; whereas ZANU-PF has over the years used violent repression to maintain control. The next section will, therefore, provide an analysis on post-apartheid South Africa.

1.1.1.2 Post-apartheid South Africa

Nattrass (2014) emphasises that post-apartheid South Africa is one of the few African countries that has adhered to the principles of liberal democracy in the form of regular elections, freedom of the press and civil society activism to hold leaders to account. After 342 years of colonialism and apartheid, South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994. Since then, the ANC has emerged as a dominant electoral force in South Africa, conforming to what is referred to as “dominant party” status. However, it was dealt a blow in terms of declining support in major urban areas in the 2016 local government elections. South Africa has experienced a decline in voter turnout since 1994, from 86% in 1994, 72% in 1999, 58% in 2004, rising slightly to 60% in 2009, and then declining again to 57% in the 2014 national elections.

South Africa’s democratic principles are complicated by the fact that the ruling ANC party is in a tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP); this has led to the consolidation of ANC hegemony. Being a labour union, COSATU represents the rights of the workers, whereas the SACP ideology distances itself from that of the ANC, as it rejects the values of capitalism in order to represent the marginalised and alienated communities (Eidelberg, 1997). Notably, the alliance was successful in maximising oppositional forces against apartheid rule. However, the ideological differences in the tripartite alliance has promoted clientelism in the form of favours and rewards to supporters of the dominant ANC faction and a concomitant policy incoherence, creating implications for stability, growth, job creation and democratic consolidation, as well as sparking civil unrest through protests, especially in urban areas (Nattrass, 2014). Due to regular disagreements and factionalism amongst the alliance partners, the tripartite alliance has shattered the ANC hegemony. Despite less popularity, the

ANC has managed to maintain its rural support since 1994, mainly because inhabitants in rural areas regard the ANC as the only party that can represent the previously segregated Black South Africans.

In the early 1990s, COSATU was successful in mobilising support for the ANC with rolling mass action, especially during the transitional period in 1992. Webster and Adler (1995: 89) believe that the ANC considered COSATU's main purpose in the new democratic South Africa was to mobilise workers in support of ANC policies. The ANC was strategic in their recognition of the need for trade unions to actively participate in the new democracy (Cedras, 2013). The ANC seemed committed to consulting the union movement on economic policy and entrusting union leaders with implementing the government's plan for economic restructuring.

Populism has been regarded as one of the strategies that has been used for political survival and dominance of post-colonial governments such as the ANC and ZANU-PF in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The research investigates the nature and role of populism, particularly the use of nativism as a form of populism in eliciting support. The study will investigate how the politics of nativism strategy have been used by the ANC and ZANU-PF in maintaining power and the responses to nativism, focusing particularly on their rural strongholds support bases.

1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

African governments have drawn attention to the ability of liberation movements turned post-independence rulers to hold on to power for decades after liberating their countries from colonial rule. In some cases, they have been accused of electoral flaws, dictatorships, manipulation, intimidation and use of force to hold on to power and maintain dominance and popularity. Nativism as a form of populism could be one of

the reasons post-independence governments have maintained popular support in their respective countries. ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe has managed to maintain its rural support by using nativist strategies and discourse which have connected with rural peasantry (Ndlovu-Gatsheni in Moyo, 2014). Nativism has been on the rise in South Africa and was used by Zuma and his faction in the ANC for most of 2018 to retain his power base, primarily in KwaZulu Natal and North West Provinces. Issues such as anti-White monopoly capital emerged to back the proposed populist strategy of nationalisation and expropriation of land without compensation.

Since attaining independence in Zimbabwe and South Africa in 1980 and 1994, respectively, ZANU-PF and the ANC have maintained power in their respective countries with most of their popular support emerging from rural areas. This study seeks to investigate, offer and unpack various reasons and explanations for the role nativist strategy has played in maintaining the popularity of ANC and ZANU-PF, and providing a comparison between the nature of the support of the two revolutionary parties in two specific rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The popularity of both the ANC and ZANU-PF since the advent of democratic regimes has shifted from urban areas to rural areas, where their support bases are now concentrated (Clapham, 2012). Nonetheless, rural areas have benefitted the least from access to public resources and resource distribution; namely, services such as health, education and infrastructure development. Yet, despite this, the rural areas in the main constituencies provided support to both the ANC and ZANU-PF. The existence of this apparent contradiction needs to be investigated in relation to the factors that outweigh the negative influence of the absence of resources and lack of

development, such as traditional and cultural values promulgated by the ruling parties, which find favour among rural populations. This apparent phenomenon of electoral behaviour in rural areas, whereby inhabitants support ruling parties that have brought few material benefits, is a contradiction that forms the basis of this research. The reasons behind this seemingly strange behaviour need to be explored.

Research questions

- What are the various nativist discourses that have been used by ZANU-PF to maintain its apparent popularity, as demonstrated through the electoral system, in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe?
- How have the rural populations in the Chegutu rural district responded to the diverse nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF?
- What are the various nativist discourses that have been used by Zuma and his faction in the ANC to maintain political power, as demonstrated through electoral system in the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa?
- How have the rural populations in the Chris Hani rural district responded to the diverse nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC?

1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY

The study seeks to investigate how the politics of nativism have been used by the Zuma-led faction in the ANC and ZANU-PF in maintaining power, focusing particularly on their rural strongholds support bases. The study will also explore attitudes and experiences of the people and communities under study. The study also seeks to provide a comparison between the ANC rural stronghold in South Africa and the ZANU-PF rural stronghold in Zimbabwe. In doing so, it also seeks to provide a better

understanding of the reasons post-colonial governments in Africa have managed to stay in power.

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- To investigate the various nativist discourses that have been used to maintain the popularity of ZANU-PF and the Zuma-led faction in the ANC in the designated rural areas, respectively;
- To establish the response to different nativist discourses adopted by Zuma and his faction in the ANC and ZANU-PF and to determine the varying nature of support in rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study seeks to provide an investigation, understanding, comparison and analysis of the nature of political beliefs and perceptions in two rural areas in Zimbabwe and South Africa at a specific time. It will provide an explanation, based on the data collected from interviews and a reflection on the circumstances of those interviewed, for the rural support that is enjoyed by former liberation struggle movements that exercise government power – namely, ZANU-PF and the ANC – despite not providing substantial material benefits to the population.

The research will explore the apparent contradiction drawing from Mamdani's analysis of the “bifurcated state” and Ekeh’s hypothesis of the “two publics”, in which rural areas receive the least resources while providing the most support for the ruling parties. However, more importantly, it offers an explanation for and an understanding of the beliefs of people in rural areas in relation to who should rule and why, which forms the basis of their political behaviour and choices. The research is likely to present an argument against beliefs in the universal applicability of the liberal principles of “good

governance” and the widely touted claims that Western liberal democracy and the modern Western state are the “ideal”. In this way, the study aims to foreground the importance of recognising the unique nature of different societies and to underscore the principle that there are no common criteria for ideal forms of political authority, or, indeed, common grounds for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with government. Finally, the study hopes to contribute to further knowledge and understanding of African political behaviour and the basis for rationality, and to foster the use of methodological approaches that encourage scholars to engage in research from a stance that recognises the unique nature of the African historical experience as well as its contemporary existence and promotes the emergence of African perspectives.

1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE FINAL REPORT

Chapter One: Chapter One provided the introduction and background to the study and a brief background of prominent liberations in pre-independence South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. The focus was on the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). It also provided a brief background of post-colonial Zimbabwe and post-apartheid South Africa.

Chapter One also explained the rationale of the study, drawing on the rise of populism in Africa and the use of nativism as a form of populism for maintaining political power in both South Africa and Zimbabwe; the problem statement and the four research questions on which the study is based; the aim and the objectives; and finally, its significance.

Chapter Two: Chapter Two provided an overview of the literature which supports the study. Its main aim was to avoid using or trying to prove a Western theory in its

analyses of African situations, phenomena and events. The literature review provided what the researcher considered to be the most significant African scholarly perspectives that have been developed, removed from Western paradigms.

The chapter also provided a review of liberation movements turned post-independence governments in post-colonial states and information on the practicalities of maintaining power in post-colonial African states, paying particular attention to the situation in the rural areas of Africa.

Chapter Two also provided the theoretical framework, guided by post-colonial theory, which advocates the development of conceptual frameworks free from the influence and constraints of Western paradigms. Finally, the chapter provided the preliminary conceptual framework which was guided by the core concepts of populism and nativism, and the unique nature of legitimacy for African governments.

Chapter Three: Chapter Three of the study provided detailed information on the research design used and the methodology followed by the study. The research design and methodology chosen for the study aimed to answer the research questions posed. The study took the form of qualitative research within the interpretive approach to explore and analyse the circumstances and strategies that have contributed to the ongoing electoral support for the ANC and ZANU-PF in rural areas. Chapter Three also presented the methods of data collection, which included both secondary and primary sources. The chapter also presented insights into the two research areas under study. In addition, the data analysis technique adopted by the study was explained as drawing on content analysis for the investigation of nativist discourse used by the state, and of narrative and thematic analysis in working with the data collected from interviews. Chapter Three also outlined how the researcher accessed

the research sites and discussed the role of the researcher in the study. Finally, but not of least significance, the chapter also provided in detail the ethical requirements and process followed in conducting the research.

Chapter Four: This chapter answers the first research question: What are the various nativist discourse that have been used by ZANU-PF to maintain its apparent popularity – demonstrated through the electoral system – in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe?

In answering the question, the chapter was guided by content analysis. The chapter therefore provides information on the background and rise of nativism in Zimbabwe and includes both the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the political and economic crisis, which were catalysts for the rise in the use of nativism by ZANU-PF. The chapter also offers an overview of the nativist strategies and discourse used by ZANU-PF which include the most significant political speeches, the “Third Chimurenga” in the form of land for Africans (land expropriation in the form of the government seizing White-owned farms), anti-West discourse, propaganda channels and preservation of history.

Chapter Five: Chapter Five answer the second research question: How have the rural populations in the Chegutu rural district responded to the diverse nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF? Chapter Five of the study outlined and provided a detailed analysis of the responses to the different nativist discourse adopted by ZANU-PF.

In answering the question the chapter was guided by narrative and thematic analysis. This chapter presents and analyses the responses to nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF from a sample of the rural population in the Chegutu rural district in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Mashonaland West province of Zimbabwe.

One of the objectives of this study, apart from the actual responses to nativism, is to establish whether the responses in rural Zimbabwe differ from those in rural South Africa and, if so, how. The researcher found out that themes emerged from the responses; namely, gratitude, loyalty, fear, mistrust, impatience and trust. The chapter also noted the intersectionality of some of the themes, whereby one theme become manifested in another theme.


Chapter Six: Chapter Six will answer the third research question: What are the various nativist discourses that have been used by Zuma and his faction in the ANC to maintain political power, as demonstrated through electoral system in the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa?

In answering the question the chapter was guided by content analysis. The chapter begins by providing information which will include a background of the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as the recent period under the administration of President Zuma (2009 – February 2018). Chapter Six also traced factionalism within the ANC dating back to 2005 when there was an open clash between the pro-Zuma and pro-Mbeki factions. President Zuma initiated the use of populism as a response to the threat presented by opposition parties in the form of the EFF and the Democratic Alliance (DA). The chapter also provided information about nativist discourse used by former President Zuma after the emergence of challenges to his leadership within the ANC, which fostered factionalism within his party. Examples are drawn from significant political speeches that dwell largely on calls for the expropriation of land without compensation, accusations against “White monopoly capital” and appeals for “radical economic transformation”.

Chapter Seven: Chapter Seven answers the fourth research question of the study: How have the rural populations in the Chris Hani rural district responded to the diverse nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC?

In answering the question, the chapter was guided by thematic and narrative analysis. Chapter Seven provided responses to different nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction of the ANC. The chapter also provided in detailed an analysis of the nature of responses obtained from the sample of the population who support the ruling party (ANC) in South Africa, which is compared to the responses obtained from interviews conducted in Zimbabwe in the final chapter. The researcher found out that there were four main themes that emerged from the interview responses: loyalty, political identity and race, mistrust and betrayal.

Chapter Eight: The study concludes with a summary of the research and an overview of the research findings, followed by the conclusion drawn from the study and recommendations for further research.



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1.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The chapter presented a brief background on liberation movements in pre-independence Africa, focusing particularly on Zimbabwe and South Africa. It also provided background on the post-colonial Zimbabwean state and post-apartheid South Africa. It also presented the rationale on the rise of populism in Africa and the use of nativism as a form of populism for maintaining political power in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Since the attainment of independence in both Zimbabwe and South Africa in 1980 and 1994, respectively, ZANU-PF and the ANC have maintained power. It has been noted that the support for both ZANU-PF and the ANC has shifted from urban to rural areas despite rural areas receiving the least resources. This gave rise

to the problem statement which provided four research questions on which the study is based. The chapter also specified the aim of the study, the objectives it sought to achieve and their significance.

The next chapter will provide the literature review, and also the theoretical and conceptual frameworks to be adopted and utilised in the study as the basis for analysis.



CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide the literature review and the applicable theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The literature review will provide an overview of some of the most significant contributions to African scholarly perspectives which reject Western paradigms and advocate instead African conceptualisation and knowledge frameworks. Aligning itself with the principles of research and analyses of African situations, and phenomena and events outside and in opposition to the hegemonic Western lens, this study is located within the broad parameters of post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory opposes dominant Western paradigms that originated with the Enlightenment, evolved into models of modernisation for post-independence African states and advocates for research to enable indigenous knowledge to emerge.

Post-colonial theory emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, seeking to understand the effects that colonial rule and exploitation had on colonial subjects. Post-colonial theory criticises the Western paradigm and challenges modernisation as internal and relevant to the development of the Western model of the state that accompanied the industrial revolution and the social changes that occurred in Europe during the nineteenth century (Hamadi, 2014).

This chapter seeks to provide an overview of a range of the intellectual perspectives of prominent African scholars on the post-colonial African state, including post-apartheid South Africa. Aligned to the overarching aim of the research to foreground alternatives to Western conceptualisations of the “truth”, the chapter will commence

with an overview of intellectual contributions by prominent African scholars, followed by a review of liberation movements turned post-independence governments in the post-colonial states. It then shifts the focus to the practicalities of maintaining power in the post-colonial African state, showing how post-independence African leaders have maintained power in their respective countries. Finally, the chapter pays attention to the situation in rural areas of Africa.

The theoretical framework will be guided by post-colonial theory, which advocates the development of conceptual frameworks free from the influence and constraints of Western paradigms. In planning the research, the preliminary conceptual framework is guided by core concepts of populism, nativism, legitimacy and authority. Since the attainment of independence in Africa, different explanations have been put forward in relation to the manifestation of power in post-colonial African states, allowing diverse perspectives to emerge, as will be shown.



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2.2 PERSPECTIVES ON THE POST-COLONIAL STATE IN AFRICA

Colonialism lasted for almost 100 years in Africa and scholars have presented contrasting arguments on whether colonialism had positive or negative implications on African states. According to Western thinkers, there were positive outcomes of colonial rule in Africa. Scholars such as Rostow (1960) emphasised that colonialism brought about mechanised transport and investment in infrastructure and development in Africa. In this regard, colonialism left a legacy of scientific and technological development that have improved the basic conditions of human life in post-independence African states. Economic liberals such as Ferguson (2003) argue that the colonial empire paved the way for economic globalisation in Africa by adopting the values found consistent with modernity.

Prominent American scholar and anti-communist theorist Walter Rostow (1960) developed modernisation theory that highlighted the positive role played by developed and industrialised countries and proposed a five-stage developmental model for countries that have not developed an industrial base to their economies. Emphasising that colonialism brought about mechanised transport and investment in infrastructure and development in Africa, he claims that colonialism left a legacy of scientific and technological development that improved the basic conditions of human life in post-independence African states. In this regard, colonialism left a legacy of scientific and technological development that have improved the basic conditions of human life in post-independence African states. Therefore, Rostow's modernisation theory seeks to transfer the Western development experience to former colonies whilst ignoring the lasting impact of colonialism that was later foregrounded by Walter Rodney's response to modernisation theory in the form of his seminal work *How Europe underdeveloped Africa* (1973).



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Even the explicitly critical Marxist and neo-Marxist schools of thought, represented by scholars such as Andre Gunter Frank, offering an analysis of the effects of colonialism on the post-colonial African state, fails to conceptualise the African state and African society outside the confines of subordination by advanced industrial societies. Whilst recognising that international relations is organised in such a way that the interests of the dominant societies are protected at the expense of the productive progress of Africa, a Marxist approach does not allow for an alternative to the prototype of the modern industrialised state (Casal, 1998: 143). Neo-Marxists see Africa in its neo-colonial condition as an extension of Europe and other advanced industrialised societies without any substantial autonomy, as post-colonial African states are considered as victims in the form of dominated hostage states (Mandaza, 1999).

Lindner (2010) points out that Marx's arguments were derived entirely from Eurocentric sources that consistently ignored colonised subjects in non-Western societies, thereby failing to consider the possibility of a unique and independent trajectory for post-colonial societies.

In response to and as a critique of Western mainstream thinking, oppositional scholars offer an alternative to Western thinking and create a non-Western literature which suits the African phenomenon. Scholars such as Fanon, Rodney, Nkrumah and Mamdani have provided concrete arguments on why the post-colonial state in Africa cannot be considered as a replication of the modern state, rejecting the positivist expectation that African states should or can comply with a universal model of the modern state that originated in Europe centuries ago.

2.2.2 Fanon “Black Skin, White Masks” and “Wretched of the Earth” on Violence

Franz Fanon is regarded as one of the first post-colonial thinkers who emerged during the Algerian revolution. He provided post-colonial literature which was interested in the emotional effects of colonisation and racism and he became a leading critic of colonial power and influenced aggressive resolution. Fanon is believed to have laid the essential theoretical foundation for the future colonial theories in his famous books *Black Skin, White Masks* and *The Wretched of the Earth*. He lived from 20 July 1925 to 6 December 1961 in the French colony of Martinique in the Caribbean. He left Martinique in 1943 to volunteer in the Free French army in the Second World War. After the war, he stayed in France and became a psychiatrist, philosopher, revolutionary and writer whose work has made a positive contribution in many fields, especially in post-colonial studies. Fanon wrote numerous books, most notably *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) and *Black Skin, White Mask* (1961).

In his book *Black Skin, White Masks* he provided a psychological study of colonialism. According to Fanon, the encounter between coloniser's and black slaves and their descendants creates a unique social and psychological situation with a characteristic set of psychopathologies which meant that it fostered mentally disturbed behaviour. Fanon also explained cultural assimilation, whereby the native culture of the colonised is displaced by the culture of the colonial power. To Fanon, this damages colonised people, as the culture of the colonialism prevents the colonised from developing their own independent sense of identity, which has negative influence on psychological development (Fanon, 1952). Also, significantly, Western culture equates Whiteness with purity and excellence, or the 'ideal', and Blackness with impurity, evil and inferiority, as a result of which the colonised Black society aspires to be White and rejects its own identity.



In the first chapter of the book, Fanon explains the relationship of the Black subject to the French coloniser and argues that language promoted the racist social structure of France and its colonies and contributes to the alienation and the black inferiority complex (Fanon, 1952). According to Fanon, the Black man has to resist those who try to attempt to define him and should instead strive towards his own identify and define himself.

In chapter four of his book, Fanon criticises Mannoni's book *Prospero and Caliban: The psychology of colonisation* (1950) and its hypothesis that Black people allowed colonialism to happen because of their inferiority complex and the desire to become like White people. He thereafter developed the notion of the necessity of conscious resistance by Black people to Whiteness, laying the foundations for the development and embracement of Black Consciousness. By demonstrating the flaws in Mannoni's writing, Fanon cleared the way for his own analysis of the colonial condition.

However, in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), Fanon changed his focus to provide an argument on colonialism, especially the use of violence which reinforced the supremacy of White colonial structures, practices and values. In his book, *The Wretched of Earth* – written in 1961 and initially published in 1963 – Fanon focused specifically on the violent nature of colonialism and how it destroyed the indigenous social fabric, as well as the effects of colonial violence on human consciousness. To Fanon, the use of violence acknowledged the supremacy of White values and the aggressiveness which has permeated the victory of these values over the ways of life. Consequently, post-colonialism has seen African rulers reproducing the totalitarian nature of colonial exploitation. Post-colonial states seem to have adopted the practice of violence during the colonial period against its people, therefore the logic of violence is rooted within colonial era.



Fanon was one of the few scholars who participated in the decolonisation struggles that occurred after World War II. In his book, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) in chapter one, he put forward an analysis of the experience of colonialism, fight for liberation to post-colonial period and post-colonial states. In this regard, he provided the internal contradictions and limits to emancipation in anti-colonial resistance and organised liberation movements. Fanon had joined the Algerian liberation struggle and wrote at a time when the Algerian liberation struggle had not even ended, and emphasised the abuse of government power after the attainment of independence. He emphasised that national liberation, national renaissance and the restoration of the nation to its people, decolonisation, is always a violent process. To Fanon, the use of violence binds people together in fighting against a common goal. This is because violence was used as a tool for governing the colonial world which destructed the indigenous social, political and economic life. He points out that wherever there is

colonisation there is the institutionalisation of violence that strips natives of their human rights. He then argues that “destroying the colonial world means nothing less than demolishing the colonists’ structures or ejecting it from the territory” (1963: 9). Therefore, decolonisation required the total abolishment of colonial institutions and apparatus.

He points out that colonial regimes owe their legitimacy to the use of force and violence and therefore, the only way in which liberation movements could overthrow their governments was through violence. It is then argued that the liberation movements in Africa only understood the language of force and violence in expressing themselves and they have taken this to a post-colonial era with the consequences of authoritarianism, dictatorship and abuse of the masses.

Such practices existed in Zimbabwe during “Operation Gukurahundi” from 1980 to 1987, when opposition ZAPU supporters, who were mainly Ndebele-dominated, were executed by the ZANU-PF-led government, which was mainly Shona-dominated. Notably, political violence in Africa is more widespread, leading to Africa’s most tragic failed states, such as in Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia. In his argument, Fanon emphasised that colonialist tactics were not only a threat to the colonised, but it goes deeper and further than that – they were a threat to newly independent states, because their once colonised behaviour remains in touch with the colonialist way of thinking (Bhabha, 2004).

Apart from Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah has provided arguments on the post-colonial state in Africa. Like Fanon, Nkrumah fought against colonialism and was a critic of colonialism both in colonial and post-colonial periods. Nkrumah provided major contributions in the decolonisation period between the 1950s and 1960s. He provided

an argument regarding the emergence of the modernisation paradigm to which newly independent African states will seek to imitate European systems.

2.2.3 Kwame Nkrumah “Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism”

Kwame Nkrumah lived from 21 September 1909 to 27 April 1972 and he was the first prime minister and president of Ghana after independence in 1957. He was also an influential advocate for Pan-Africanism and a founding member of what was formerly known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), presently known as the African Union (AU). He was the founding father of the Convention People’s Party which won Ghana’s first elections after independence. Consequently, his administration was both socialist and nationalist until he was ousted from power in 1966.

Nkrumah features prominently as one of the post-colonial thinkers who advocated for Pan-Africanism as the way forward for post-independence African states. He cannot be considered as having a strictly post-colonial outlook, as he did not reject the modernity project, but rather advocated for an African unity which resembled that of the United States of America. However, the post-colonialism element can be seen in Pan-Africanism’s attempt to address the reality of enduring imperialism by homogenising Africa’s diversity into one unified political stance which moves Pan-Africanism’s master narrative towards a single end.

In his book, *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism*, written in 1965, Nkrumah argued that colonialism was by no means abolished entirely in the post-colonial African states. Therefore, this book was an effort to examine neo-colonialism, not only in its African context and its relation to African unity, but in a world perspective (Nkrumah, 1965). He emphasised that in place of colonialism as the main mechanism of imperialism, present-day African states are now in the neo-colonialism phase.

According to Nkrumah (1965: 2), the core of neo-colonialism is that the state is independent in theory, but its political policy and economic system is engineered and directed from outside. In neo-colonialist territories, former colonial powers have the power to relinquish political control and if the conditions cause a revolt within the post-colonial state, the government will be substituted in its place. He argued that the post-colonial rulers derive their authority to govern not from the will of the people they lead, but from the support that they obtain from their neo-colonial masters. As a result, they see no need in developing education, strengthening the bargaining power of the workers or taking measures that would challenge the former colonial patterns (Nkrumah, 1965).

Nkrumah (1965) observes that after independence of former colonial states, imperialists simply changed tactics, consequently claiming to give independence to former subjects followed by the aid of development. Under such pretext, they devised a way to accomplish the objectives formerly achieved by colonialism and at the same time talk about the freedom of the post-colonial states. He emphasised that neo-colonialists trap post-colonial African states through multilateral aids, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Consequently, these organisations adopt a mechanism of forcing borrowers to submit information about their economies and policies, and they supervise their use of loans.

Nkrumah (1965: 25) proposes that when Africa becomes economically independent and politically consolidated, a new struggle will arise which will lead to the total collapse of imperialism. He argued that the only way in which the Western economic empire can be challenged is for post-colonial Africa to recover possession of its heritage and to act within a Pan-African basis through a united government.

Influenced by the idea of Nkrumah on Pan-Africanism, Mazrui was one of the prominent African scholars that rose in the post-colonial era and he advocated for the continental integration. He emerged as a critic of socialism and all alternatives of Marxism of the 1960s and 1970s, dubbing it Western imported ideology and arguing that it is an idea difficult to cultivate on African soil. He advocated that an African type of liberalism is the answer to the political ills of the continent. He promoted what he called his unique African liberalism. Like Nkrumah, he also strongly criticised the Western capitalist system as exploitative of Africa and the developing world.

2.2.4 Mazrui “Towards a Pax-Africanism: A Study of Ideology and Ambition”

Ali Mazrui (24 February 1933 – 12 October 2014), born in Mombasa, Kenya, was an academic professor and a prominent writer on African and Islamic studies and North-South relations. His writings were influenced by the ideas of Nkrumah, *pan-Africanism* and *consciencism*, which form the basis of his discussion on Africa’s Triple Heritage (Africanity, Islam and Christianity). Mazrui condemned the use of Western literature by African scholars and he advocated for radical Pan-African liberalism with essential features such as emphasising what is African, nationalising what is tribal, idealising what is indigenous, and indigenising what is foreign. With no historical background, Mazrui was interested in works that challenged the Eurocentric negative perceptions of Africa. Mazrui obtained his doctoral degree at Oxford University in Britain and ironically it was his schooling abroad that sowed the seeds of Africanism in him. In his book, *Towards the Pax-Africanism* (1967), he critically explores assumptions which lie towards unity, such as the racial concept against the continental concept of African unity. He emphasises the need for Africans to be their own guards by being less dependent on the Western world and taking initiatives to ensure peace and stability on their continent.

Notably, the end of the anti-colonial struggle and start of political independence saw the adoption of Marxist ideas and materialist understanding of the post-colonial society in Africa which became a symbol of serious commitment to the African cause of liberation and development (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014). In contrast, Mazrui condemned the use of Marxism by African scholars as amounting to the adoption of Westernisation. Instead, he advocated for radical Pan-African liberalism, arguing that *Towards a Pax Africana* is about nationalistic sensibilities of Africans, the basic principles in contemporary Africa and vocabulary in which ideas are expressed (Mazrui, 1967).

Ali Mazrui promotes the notion that Africa needs a process of “social engineering” to bring about nation-building, with essentials such as "emphasising what is African, nationalising what is tribal, idealising what is indigenous, and indigenising what is foreign". More importantly, he advocated for an approach that allows the possibility of being specifically African, and not merely dependent on Western models (Berman, 1990). He identified Pax-Africana as central to the ambition of self-government on the continent with the desire to see African solutions to African problems.

In his thesis, Mazrui promoted what he termed “Africanisation of capitalism” to produce a multi-racial bourgeois class; therefore opposing the adoption of socialism. He criticised post-colonial African leaders such as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere for turning East Africa, particularly Tanzania, into a centre of pursuit of a singular ideology of African socialism. Mazrui (1967) argues that post-colonial African states should first focus on attempting to achieve economic growth, rather than advocating to achieve equality in poverty. Mazrui agrees to the fact that pan-Africanism was helped by socialism in the sense that socialism helped rebel against European imperialism, but

he claims that socialism as an ideology was harmful to the development pan-Africanism.

Mazrui was concerned with the impact of colonialism in Africa. To Mazrui (1986), present-day Africanity was shaped by indigenous African culture as well as Western-imposed cultures on Africans. Mazrui argues that the post-colonial instabilities are a result of cultures at war with Africans fighting to rejuvenate Africanity (Mazrui, 1986). According to Mazrui (1986: 295), the reclamation of Africanity lies in two options: “the imperative of looking inwards towards Africa’s ancestors” and “the imperative of looking outward towards the wider world”. Apart from this, Mazrui also pointed out that the post-colonial African state is compounded by leadership crises, producing warrior leadership like that of Idi Amin in Uganda and monarchical leadership such as that of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (Mazrui, 2011), resulting in failure of post-colonial African states to uphold democratic order, and favouring military power or dictatorship.

Apart from Mazrui, Ake provided literature on the post-colonial African state. His point of departure was on the problems of political integration in the post-independence African state. Notwithstanding Mazrui’s arguments, Ake emphasised how the colonial experience and history have led to the failure of political integration in Africa.

2.2.5 Ake: “A Theory of Political Integration”

Claude Ake (1939-1996) is one of the most influential voices in African political thought. Born in Nigeria, he gained a PhD from the University of Columbia and held academic positions in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Nigeria. Ake firmly criticised Western imperialism as well as post-colonial corruption and authoritarian rule in Africa. His criticism was based on the failure of post-colonial governments to cope with the demands of citizens for social and economic advancements, and he noted that despite

African states being nominally independent, the West still controls post-colonial Africa. Ake was influenced by behavioural approach which was dominant in the 1950s and 1960s before the dependency theorists and post-behaviourists began to offer substantial challenges. During this time, he came under the influence of liberal Euro-Americans. Most of his work from this period concerned liberal ideological learning. He focused on the problem of political integration in Africa and other new states; notably, he researched Africa from a liberal perspective and as a result, his writings neither reflected the Afro-centric nor the neo-Marxist intervention in the debate of African studies. Arowosegbe (2011: 351) referred to "Ake's analysis of the problem of political integration and the legacy of its continuing relevance for understanding contemporary Africa and the challenges of the newly independent African states". In his book, *A Theory of Political Integration*, Ake (1967: 1) focuses on "formulating a theory of the conditions of political integration, engineered large-scaled social change, and political stability and the relations amongst the three phenomena".



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According to Ake (1967), the end of colonial rule saw much attention on how the post-independence governments managed their administration and how the efficiency of the party suffered greatly. Post-colonial governments failed to cope with the demands of social and economic advancements. He observes that despite being independent, multinational corporations are in control of post-independence economies. In this regard, Ake (1967) argues that to improve their communicative efficiency, these states must undertake social mobilisation – "the process through which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken down and people become available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour". He observes that the problem of political integration is not confined to Africa but is shared

by the post-colonial world and is one of the regressive features differentiating the state in the South from its counterparts in the West.

Ake sees the problems of political integration as involving “the transformation of a multiplicity of traditional societies into coherent political societies” (Ake, 1967: 96). To Ake (1967), the problem of post-colonial African states lies in the integration of new nations. He sees the problem of political integration in Africa generating from the limited autonomy of the state and its implications for the socio-economic development. This is because the state is regarded as the central actor of politics and the determinant of all of activities within the state processes. The limited autonomy of the state has negative consequences which may lead to the state not being able to meet its required responsibilities, such as nation-building, economic development and political integration.



Ake (1967) therefore traces the history of colonialism within Africa vis-à-vis capitalist penetration and the political legacy of colonialism, thereby refraining from referring to social formations in Africa as independent states. He sees that the legacies from Africa's colonial past have a major influence on the post-colonial state, and he identified limited autonomy as a major impediment for political integration in Africa. Despite being independent, post-colonial states have adopted the character of colonial states – such as absoluteness, statism and autocratic – thereby eliminating the citizens from economic and political processes. As a result, a struggle for state power has emerged in most post-colonial states, leading to exclusive politics in the struggle for state power based on efficiency norms, rather than legitimacy, and the imposition of being a dominant political control leading to primary grouping in society (Arowosegbe, 2011). In the process, society became divided and succumbed to

disintegration, leading to violence and wars over state power and natural resources; in some cases, leading to state collapse.

In his book, Ake tried to establish the link between development, knowledge production and state building in the post-colonial state and then suggested that democratisation cannot be ignored in post-colonial Africa. He then argued that Africa inherited the European system of government. Although the state of Africa is said to be independent, this system remains based on institutions which are not appropriate to the African condition (Ake, 1967). Sharing the same sentiments is Rodney, who strongly condemns imperialism and colonialism, pointing out that these are the reasons for post-independence underdevelopment in Africa.

2.2.6 Rodney “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa”

Walter Rodney (23 March 1942-13 June 1980) was a prominent writer and activist who was influential in anti-imperialist, Black power and socialist movements across Black and African worlds before he was assassinated by a car bomb whilst participating in local politics. In 1973, Rodney published his book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, which has become classical anti-imperialist literature. He delivers an argument that both European power politics and European economic exploitation and oppression have led to the impoverishment of African societies. He focuses on colonialism, imperialism and liberation struggle. With a Marxist perspective, he states that:

Power is the ultimate determinant in human society, being basic to the relations within any group and between groups. It implies the ability to defend one's interests and if necessary, to impose one's will by any means available. In relations between peoples, the question of power determines manoeuvrability in bargaining, the extent to which a people survive as a physical and cultural entity.

When one society finds itself forced to relinquish its power entirely, that is a form of underdevelopment (Rodney, 1973: 115).

Rodney (1973) argues that before Africa came under colonialism it was undeveloped, but it was certainly not underdeveloped. In this regard, underdevelopment is understood as a historical process of primitive exploitation of Africa for the benefit of Europe. He argued that colonialism destroyed institutions and cultural forms, and brought about social isolation; even when change takes place it will become an individual experience. Rodney emphasised that the relations between Africa and Europe were based on exploitation and oppression. As a result, the underdevelopment of the post-colonial African states resonates from the capitalist exploitation of Africa that permitted the looting of Africa's wealth and manpower (Magubane, 1973). As a result, independence of African states was theory, but they were still dependent upon former colonies economically.



Rodney (1973) utilises the essence of historical materialism, where he argues that for one to understand the present post-colonial state one must understand the past. He provided arguments of African history from the early empires to the modern day, showing how Europe built immense industrial and colonial empires at the expense of African slaves and labour. As a result, he holds the global capitalist system responsible for socio-economic problems in Africa. Therefore, Rodney sees capitalism as an obstacle for human social development in Africa. In his argument, Rodney (1973: 7) condemns the capitalist global system and pointed out that post-colonial African development was possible only if there is a radical break with the international capitalist system. To Rodney, the agent of change was by Africans who were conscious of the international capitalist system that have underdeveloped Africa.

In his book, Rodney describes the establishment of a dependency relationship between the West and Africa at the expense on Africa; meanwhile, a combination of economic dependence and weak authority has divided the society and encouraged what Ekeh describes as two publics in Africa.

2.2.7 Ekeh “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement”

Peter Ekeh was born in 1937 and is one of the influential voices on the post-colonial African state. His early interest was in sociological theory, but he has since developed a special interest in African politics and history in which he has some leading publications. His article, *Colonialism and Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement* published in 1975, is one of the most cited publications in the field of African studies. His main argument in this article was that the experiences of colonialism in Africa have led to the emergence and existence of two publics instead of one, and that the post-colonial African state has two publics which are differently linked to it. He called these two publics the primordial public and the civic public. According to Ekeh's distinctions, the primordial public, rooted in tradition, is moral, and it operates on the same moral imperative as the private dominion, whereas the civil public in Africa lacks moral imperatives in its dealings as it has a set of obligations different to those common in the modern European societies. As a result, the differentiation between the two publics has come to characterise the nature of the African state in African politics.

In his article, Ekeh (1975) argued that there are two bourgeois groups that have influenced the colonial state and continue to influence the post-colonial states. These two classes are the European bourgeois and the African bourgeois which were produced out of the colonial experience. As a result, the emergence of the “two publics” owe their origins to these groupings. Ekeh (1975: 93) regards bourgeois as a

“privileged class that wield much power but have little authority, which may have a lot of economic influence, but enjoy little political acceptance”. To Ekeh, the African bourgeois depend on colonialism for their legitimacy to rule. Most notably, post-colonial governments and leaders have adopted the use of colonial experience and history to remind people how bad colonialism was, and as a result they hold on to power. Ekeh argues that the African bourgeois claim to be competent enough to rule, but do not have any traditional legitimacy to rule; as a result, they had to introduce their own ideologies to justify and legitimise their rule.

Ekeh (1975) noted that the dependence on colonial ideologies has led to the African bourgeois creating ideologies of their own to replace colonial rule and legitimise their hold on to power and their people. Consequently, most of the post-colonial African leaders adopted the use of post-colonial ideologies of legitimation such as anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-White. The African bourgeois had no basis of legitimacy which was independent from colonialism and, as a result, they undermined their own legitimacy and contributed to the inefficiencies of governments in post-colonial states by demanding rights which were in excess of the resources available (Ekeh, 1975: 103).

During colonialism, the Europeans used a “divide and rule” strategy in many African nations to undermine the ability of the African bourgeois to obtain tradition as a basis of legitimacy by restoring the chiefs and kings to power. Ekeh (1975) observed that these divisions, which were implemented by the colonial rulers, have persisted in post-colonial African politics. More importantly, these divisions have led to the adoption of ideologies such as ethnic domination and superiority of education by African bourgeois to legitimate its threatened post-colonial politics.

Ekeh (1975) emphasised the corruption and tribalism in post-colonial Africa. Tribalism emerged from colonialism as a direct result of the friction between the two publics in most cases, where leaders of the primitive public wants to channel resources from the civic public to individuals who belonged to the same tribe as them – whereas corruption, according to Ekeh (1975), arises from immorality of the civic public and the legitimization of the need to seize generosity from the civic public to benefit the primordial public. Nonetheless, post-colonial Africa has been characterised by the colonial past which has defined the principles that have dominated politics. To Ekeh, Africa's problems may be solved by acknowledging that civic and primordial publics are rivals and that the civic public needs to embrace morality. Mamdani like Ekeh, provided an analysis of the nature and characteristics of the post-colonial state. Mamdani provides an extension on Ekeh's hypothesis of the 'two publics' in his analysis of what he termed "bifurcated state"



2.2.8 Mamdani's "Citizen and Subject"

Mahmood Mamdani (13 April 1946) is a Ugandan academic, author and political commentator. He obtained a Doctor of Philosophy in Government degree from Harvard University in 1974 and returned to Uganda to join Makerere University as a teaching assistant, only to be later expelled by former Ugandan president Idi Amin due to his ethnicity. Mamdani is one of the prominent twenty-first century African scholars who specialises in African and international politics, colonialism and post-colonialism. In his book, *The Citizen and Subject* (1996), Mamdani argues that the colonial state in Africa operated in a bifurcated manner, and he provided an analysis of cases in South Africa and Uganda in which he argued that the colonial bifurcated state legacies persist after independence in contemporary African states.

By “bifurcated” Mamdani referred to a state divided into two publics or systems of power under one authority: one urban, which is based on civil power and rights, and the other rural, where tradition and culture are incorporated. The bifurcated state was based on the indirect rule in the countryside by which colonial powers ruled through local chiefs, and more of a democratic nature in the city, based on civil power and rights; but excluded the colonised based on race (Mamdani, 1996: 276). As a result, the struggle for liberation was waged to abolish traditional authority and promote the authority of the modern state. However, traditional authority has never been completely abolished and therefore the bifurcated state exists with its dual nature of authority.

To Mamdani, colonial rule in Africa did not seek to marginalise the “natives” but rather to incorporate them into the “arena of colonial power”; namely, within the dominion of political power, but outside of “politics”. In this regard, Mamdani’s argument is that the state in contemporary Africa owes its advent to colonialism and apartheid. The characteristics of apartheid and colonialism, such as the bifurcated state, did not disappear with the dawn of independence and democracy in many African states. Instead, liberation movements turned African-rulers opted for minimal reform retained the bifurcated system, thereby deracialising but not democratising the system of decentralised despotism.

Mamdani’s *Citizen and Subject* (1996) offers an analysis on the political impact of direct and indirect rule used during the colonial period in post-independence African states. To him, a citizen is a member of civil society and fully incorporated into the politics of the state, whereas a subject is ruled by tradition and is not included in the day-to-day running of the state (Thornton, 1996). In his argument, he maintains that the failures of democratisation stem from the inability of most African governments to

reform the colonial mode of indirect rule via “customary” tribal authorities that prevail in rural Africa. Mamdani’s argument was that the colonial state in Africa had two different modes of rules for the “citizens” in the urban areas and “subjects” in the rural areas (Mamdani, 1996). The post-colonial state deracialised the system, but failed to dismantle the built-in urban-rural disparity, resulting in the continuation of the bifurcated state as well as its citizens and subjects, thereby forming a major obstacle to real democratisation in Africa (Oomen, 1998: 172). Therefore, Mamdani’s main argument is that of the inability of African states to deliver effective democratic governance has its roots in Africa’s colonial past, rather than any central lack of ability of Africans to govern (de Goede, 2017: 12).

Mamdani’s argument locates the limitations of democracy in post-colonial Africa as emanating from its failure to expand civil society and to carry the domain of democratic struggle to rural areas (Hemson, 1998: 247). Mamdani argues that rural power has neither been detribalised, nor has it joined the idea of democratisation; as a result, the neglect of the reform of rural areas means independence will remain superficial and explosive.

Mamdani points to the limited range of democratic rule in post-independence Africa states, where the masses of the population participate in the elections which have no effect over the form of rule they experience. An electoral reform that does not affect the native authority (self-governing), leaving rural areas out of the consideration, sees the re-emergence of decentralised despotism (Mamdani, 1996: 289). In contrast, the liberation movements fought colonial powers to detribalise native authority, but there is continuity of indirect rule by post-colonial regimes who fought to dismantle the system.

Considering Mamdani's views, the common despotism in post-colonial states characterises the lives of rural people, deforms civil society and distorts the assertion of democracy. According to Mamdani, the "bifurcated state" has enabled populism to thrive in Africa. Consequently, most liberation movements turned post-independence parties in Africa tend to concentrate their campaigning messages on matters of inequality and imbalances between the urban and rural areas. As a result, post-colonial leaders have used strategies such as nativism to appeal to the rural dwellers and, in return, receive electoral support

2.2.9 Mafeje on the African post-colonial state

Archibald Mafeje (1936-2007) was born in Ngcobo in South Africa. He enrolled in tertiary education at the University of Fort Hare before moving to pursue his studies at the University of Cape Town, where he became politically aware. As an intellectual activist against Western and European systems of education, which he regarded as being used to brainwash African minds, he championed indigenous and original African scholarship and he challenged Western perspectives about Africa and Africans in general. He was a pioneer in the discussions and interrogations of Western education and its decolonisation project and in his prolific writings Mafeje traced the weaknesses of the post-colonial African academe vis-à-vis the West.

Mafeje in his book *The theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations* (2002) observes that all African countries were born in the context of Western capitalism and imperialism which eroded indigenous social institutions. Notably, in his argument, Mafeje pointed out the foundation of the African state on the basis of capitalism as the key to African problems. To Mafeje, the post-independence African state inherited colonial state structures and built the foundation of the post-colonial state from colonial

structures. He emphasised that the weakness of the post-colonial state is its modern petit-bourgeois class in its character in the global economic and political system.

To Mafeje (1977), the reason for Africa's weak position is the fact that Africa has historically been dominated in the global system. It was the biggest source of slaves in modern-day history, and consequently was not only a direct product of colonialism, but persistent global capitalism. Despite Africa being weak, post-colonial African leaders adopted the Western capitalist system as a norm after independence, resulting in the underlying vulnerability in the global system. Mafeje pointed out that between the 1960s and 1970s the dependency paradigm provided the underlying root causes of underdevelopment in Africa. It was therefore necessary to look at new conceptual frameworks on why that which had been identified could not be eradicated (Nabudere, 2011). He emphasised that the focus should also be on the social classes that wielded power leading to the emergence of class categories such as bureaucratic and state petit-bourgeois. In his argument, Mafeje pointed out the reason why the African petit-bourgeois had encountered problems, unlike the Western world which transformed all political and economic institutions into progressive social hegemony. He argued that the petit-bourgeois inherited colonial institutions with which the mass of the people did not identify.

Fanon, Rodney and Mafeje locate their analyses of the African condition within the context of a global system of domination and subjugation, focusing on the relationship between coloniser / imperialist and the colonised and the broad consequences thereof. Ake, Ekeh and Mafeje, whilst recognising this, extend the difference at the political level of the state, to explore the nature of the post-colonial African state. These insights and hypotheses will be further detailed in the theoretical section that follows in this chapter.

2.2.10 A summary overview of scholarly perspectives

This overview of the thinking African scholars has illustrated the critical thinking that exists on the post-colonial African state in understanding the unique nature of post-colonial Africa. In his argument, Fanon emphasised that post-colonial states seem to have adopted the practice of violence during the colonial period against its people; consequently, post-colonial rulers have adopted the use of violence to legitimise their rule. On the other hand, Nkrumah points out that Africa was independent only in theory, as the reality is that Western nations still control Africa in what he terms as “neo-colonial” relationships. With similar sentiments to Nkrumah, Rodney provides an argument on how Europe reduced Africa to a state of under-development and subordination to industrialised nations. He emphasised that it was European power politics and European economic exploitation and oppression that have led to the impoverishment of African societies. Ake observed that the challenges of political integration are not confined to Africa but are shared by the post-colonial world and constitute some of the regressive features differentiating the state in the South from its counterparts in the West. Alongside the above contributions, Ekeh believes that the African bourgeoisie that took over power from the colonial rulers depended on colonialism for their legitimacy to rule. As a result, post-independence leaders have adopted the tactic of using “the colonial experience” and colonial history to convince people that colonialism is the continued cause of current socio-economic and political problems. Assigning blame to colonialism thus validates their holding on to power in the face of the failure of the modernity project and looting of the modern state’s resources. His main argument in this article was that the experiences of colonialism in Africa have led to the emergence and existence of “two publics” instead of one, and that the post-colonial African state has two publics which are differently linked to it and

many of the post-colonial state's problems originate from this distinction. Extending on Ekeh's views, Mamdani provided an argument for the continued rural-urban divide and the ongoing poverty and deprivation in rural areas in what he termed a "bifurcated state". He emphasised that colonial rule left a legacy of the bifurcated state, whereby a single state is divided into two publics; urban (civic) and rural (subject).

Mafeje observes that all African countries were born in the context of Western capitalism and imperialism, which eroded indigenous social institutions. In his argument, Mafeje argued that the foundation of the modern African state based on capitalism is the key to African problems today. Mazrui does not assign blame to the choice of political ideology or the existence of global capitalism but promotes the notion that Africa needs a process of "social engineering" to bring about African nation-building, with essential elements such as "emphasising what is African, nationalising what is tribal, idealising what is indigenous, and indigenising what is foreign". More importantly, he advocated an approach that allows the possibility of being specifically African and not merely dependent on western models.

More importantly, the views and ideas of the above-mentioned scholars provided a standpoint that African states cannot be understood using a Western perspective or held up to scrutiny alongside the western model of the modern state.

As indicated earlier, after independence, leaders of the post-colonial African state aimed at developing society through implementation of the modernity project that is associated with the modern industrial Western state. Former liberation movements assumed responsibility as post-colonial rulers and it was their task to exchange a military project aimed at political liberation for the modernity project aimed at developing and modernising African societies as replicas of the Western model of the

state. Post-colonial governments have therefore maintained the characteristics of their predecessors, as indicated by Fanon, with the new political elite simply changing places with the former colonial administration.

2.3 LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TURNED POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA

This section seeks to review the literature on liberation movements turned political parties in post-independence African states. Liberation is defined by struggle, and throughout Africa, there are movements that have fought long and hard to achieve the liberation of their people and acquire territories from the oppressors (Zezeza, 2007). Britz (2011) defines liberation movements as social movements which use revolutionary tactics to achieve their liberation goals, with the view that the people of a nation are not free. In this regard, the specific goal of liberation movements was to overthrow an authoritarian government on behalf of the majority of the citizens. Consequently, the end of colonialism saw the rise of liberation movements and the overthrowing of existing powers of imperialism and oppression by minority rule, and the ushering in of the newly independent African governments, with African liberation movements assuming power as government.

The legitimacy of liberation movements to rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonisation process as representatives acting on behalf of the majority of the people. During the liberation struggle, these liberation movements promised freedom, equality, democracy and economic development. As a result, after the attainment of liberation, a sense of promise and hope was felt, and the role of the liberation movements turned government was to fulfil transformation to effective governments that advocated democratic principles for which they strived (Henning, 2009). However,

according to Gumedé (2017), post-colonialism regimes that emerged from these movements have failed to provide the leadership values and norms or and behaviour that lead to enhancing democracy, socioeconomic equality, prosperity, civil and human rights to the people whom they govern. Instead, post-independence “reflects the contradictions and challenges of revolutionary optimism turned into self-righteous entitlement culture of the predatory elite” (Henning, 2009: 79).

By way of contrast, being an Afro-American scholar positioned within a Western intellectual environment that influences her thinking, Edozie (2009) points out that democracy was indeed established throughout the post-colonial states after independence, and she develops matrices to indicate the extent to which various expressions of democracy exist in African states. Scholars such as Huntington – in what he termed “Third Wave of Democracy”, according to Edozie (2009: 4) – misclassified Africa as authoritarian and failed to understand democratic development in Africa as he did with other regions in his analysis. In this regard, many Western literatures regarded post-colonial African democracy as a failure and stated that transition failed to happen in Africa because of the lack of liberal culture. The classifying of Africa as non-democratic failed to recognise that democratic transition was made through African Renaissance – the continent’s own version of the Third Wave, which was free from Western influence and analysis (Edozie, 2009: 9).

Ayittey (1997: 7) points out that the end of colonial rule and the ushering in of independence was viewed by many black people in Africa as a positive development and that post-colonial governments were regarded as liberators of the masses and received popular support. However, running a liberation movement is not the same as running the state and government (Clapham, 2012: 3). In this regard, liberation movements that have attained power faced challenges in the transition to holding

office as government, tending to maintain the characteristics of the liberation movement. This included top-down decision making, and insistence on unified opinions, views and perspectives with no dissent.

Liberation movements were structured in a top-down command system with all powers centred on the leader along the Soviet Marxist-Leninist or Chinese Communist Party lines. Consequently, many post-independence governments have adopted the command system, thereby restricting ordinary members and citizens from actively participating in governmental processes (Gumede, 2010). Suttner (2008) argues that many liberation movements in Africa, during their fight for independence, only concentrated on the acquisition of power as the final moment when liberation is achieved, instead of viewing power as a set of relationships of domination and exclusion that needed to be transformed. As a result, new governments found themselves tied into a whole range of complex relationships with a variety of centres of power that needed to be transformed or challenged to ensure that democracy was consolidated, and transformative goals were achieved. Zeleza (2007) points out that, after the liberation struggle ended and former liberation movements assumed power, they had a sense of entitlement that made them feel that they were entitled to rule because they had fought for political freedom. For this reason, they endorsed themselves as rightful claimants to permanent state power, excluding those who did not participate in the struggle and deeming as treacherous those who opposed their authority. Regarding the 2008 presidential re-run, the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, was quoted saying:

We are not going to give up this country because of mere X, how can ballot and pen fight a gun? We fought for this country a lot of blood was shed (Bate, 2008). During the liberation struggle, the only opposing force was the enemy from

outside, therefore the concept of enemy and opposition was used interchangeably, resulting in discouraging opposition to post-independence governments (Osabu-Kle in October, 2015).

However, with regard to South Africa and Zimbabwe, the popular support of the ruling parties shifted from the urban areas to the rural areas which form the majority of electorates.

2.3.1 Post-independence parties who have maintained power

African states began to achieve independence in the early 1960s. Long after the attainment of independence, some African ruling parties have maintained power; for example, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana. During the colonial era, the liberation movements had broad membership which cut along class and ethnic lines and could monopolise political loyalty even after independence (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013). This has had a lasting effect in strengthening the dominance of the post-independence governments, even in a democratic context (Salih, 2003). The liberation struggle turned post-independence rulers are constant reminders to the voters or citizens of the liberation struggle. Although the liberation movements in most African states have successfully transformed into political parties, they still embody nationalistic politics which has enabled them to maintain power since independence.

In contrast, Salih (2007) argues that post-colonial regimes resisted the path of democratic consolidation, instead erecting authoritarian forms of rule that have enabled them to stay in power. For example, Angola gained its independence in 1975 and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Party of Labour (MPLA) has ruled Angola for 31 years (Salih, 2007). The former liberation movements and their leaders have continued to govern their countries for decades, which can be attributed

to increased centralisation of power in cases such as the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe (Sithole, 1997).

Where the ruling party has retained power, the support for post-independence governments in Africa has shifted significantly from urban areas to rural areas (Maseremule, 2008). Rural areas have provided much needed electoral support for their longevity in power, despite receiving the least in terms of resources.

2.3.1.1 Retaining of power in rural areas

As indicated above, the popularity and support base of most post-colonial African governments has shifted from urban to the rural areas. Given that the majority of Blacks live in rural areas, post-colonial Africa has been dominated by parties whose legitimacy to rule stems from a rural support base (Harding, 2012). Boone (2013) emphasises that the control over rural majority has allowed many ruling parties to withstand urban opposition. In most African states, notably Zimbabwe and South Africa, rural dwellers constitute the majority of the electorate; therefore, gaining popular support allows the parties to wield change. More importantly, the majority of rural dwellers are less educated and less informed, and households are not close to each other, making it difficult to communicate or share information and therefore difficult to make changes. In contrast, urban dwellers are more educated and informed, and households are in close proximity, so they communicate, organise form opposition parties easily. For instance, in Senegal, the ruling party maintained its popularity despite facing urban-based opposition movements in the 1980s and 1990s, succumbing only when it lost its popularity in its rural strongholds (Borne, 2013).

Harding (2012) claimed that most post-independence governments have engaged in voter bribery, giving their parties a significant advantage in distributing goods during

elections. As a result, rural areas show the presence of patron-client hierarchies which have given most of Africa's post-independence parties a strong support base. Most of the rural voters tend to be older, less educated and mostly female. These factors, amongst others, make it possible for people in rural areas to vote on the basis of loyalty to the dominant government.

Various tactics have been used to retain power, such as the presentation of history by the post-colonial governments which romanticises and glorifies the liberation struggle and the contribution of the ruling party. The role of history has proved to be a key element of identity and validation in the rural constituency (Onslow, 2011). Tinhu (2013) pointed out that ZANU-PF's long stay in power has been due to its ability to interpret history and remind people of the history of liberation and how ZANU-PF, as a social and political organisation, helped shape their identity. Post-independence governments have used strategies that appear to resonate with anti-Western, anti-imperialistic and anti-colonialism sentiments, thereby connecting mostly with rural peasants.

2.4 POPULISM

Populism as a concept does not exist in isolation but is defined in relation to concepts such as the popular, people versus the elite and democracy. The term populism is not just used to describe a particular phenomenon, but is also used to commend or condemn it, express approval or disapproval (Houwen, 2011). Populism has been on the rise not only in European countries and America, but also in Africa. The concept of populism concentrates on how strategies of populism have been adopted by post-colonial African states to maintain popular support from its people. As mentioned earlier in the literature, the gaining of independence in most of the African states was

a positive development, as people had hopes of a better life. However, the failure of post-colonial states to deliver their promises threatened revolt from the masses – instead, the leaders adopted a populist stance to conceal real issues at hand, which in some cases turned out to be totalitarian in nature.

Populism arose in the nineteenth century when the notion of democracy, “government of the people, for the people and by the people”, became keywords in modern politics (Houwen, 2011). People came to be identified as holders of sovereignty and politics became attached to the notion of “people”, as a result of which political actions had to occur in the name of the people. Dalio, Kryger, Rogers and Davis (2017) define populism as a political and social phenomenon that arises from the common man, typically not well-educated, and fed up with wealth and opportunity gaps in society and a government that is not working effectively for them. Populism does not necessarily divert from the basic assumptions of democracy but it is seen in some cases as an alternative style of politics to the perceived shrinkage of democracy (Mathekga, 2007).

The first example of populism was used to qualify the Russian notion ‘narodnichestvo’, which describes agrarian socialism in the second half of the nineteenth century and could by-pass the capitalist stage of development (Houwen, 2011). Populism was a name given to anti-authoritarian Russians who opposed the Tsarist regime from 1860 to 1880, advocating for a better form of government in Russia than Tsarist autocracy (Martinelli, 2016: 14). In the 1880s in the United States, populism was a movement that gave rise to the America’s People’s Party (APP) which was founded in 1892, condemning conflict between the poverty-stricken rural areas of the Midwest and the wealthy industrial and financial centres in the east that had monopolised power (Giusto, Kitching & Rizzo, 1999). The emergence of America’s People’s Party (APP) was a reaction to the failures of both Republican and Democratic Parties to represent

farmers and workers; the APP claimed to represent the farmers and workers. The French revolution in the late eighteenth century (1789–1799), although led by wealthy intellectuals, used populist sentiment against the elitist excesses and privileges. Consequently, in the period between the 1920s and 1930s – periods of interwar and economic depression – many countries in the world adopted the use of populist discourse. In this regard, Giusto, Kitching and Rizzo (1999) agree that populism is both a reaction to and a product of growing distances between the citizens and the institutions that govern them.

Martinelli (2016) observes that populism has emerged as a global phenomenon, with mounting public discontent with the status quo; this includes post-independent African states. Populism has been on the rise in Africa's political campaigning as a strategy in policy choices, political organisations and forms of mobilisation. Employment of populist tactics, not only by presidential candidates but by political leaders in Africa, is becoming an increasingly notable feature (Resnick, 2010), where the slogan "people shall govern" does not give the people power to govern (Mukamunana, 2005). The demands for the restoration of "the power of the people" represents the collective desire for representative democracy; therefore, populist leaders present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the will of the people. Populist leaders claim a monopoly of political legitimacy because of the connection with the masses (Giovanni, 2005).

Resnick (2010) observes that post-colonial African leaders have pursued populist stances, firmly orientated with a mixture of charisma and anti-elitist sentiments aimed at presenting the impression of social inclusion and in some instances these leaders have adopted ethnolinguistic appeals aimed at specific rural dwellers. For example, leaders like Jacob Zuma in South Africa, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Raila

Odinga in Kenya have pursued populist strategies such as anti-imperialism, appropriation of land without compensation and anti-White monopoly capital with the aim of mobilising support from the majority of the rural dwellers.

Jackson and Rosberg in Mukamunana (2008) argue that after taking a populist stance that appeals to the sentiments of the broader public, most post-independent African leaders converted their form of government into authoritarian regimes soon after independence, although they claim to be democratic states. In most cases, populism is associated with military regimes; for example, the Gaddafi regime, which came to power through a military coup, adopted the populist strategy under the banner 'jamahiriya'. Most military regimes in Africa have tried to consolidate their power by building new public institutions that close the gap between the state and civil society (Thomson, 2010).



It can be noted that the colonial and apartheid legacies have promoted the concept of populism in Africa. Mamdani is one of the scholars who provided an argument on colonial and apartheid characteristics, which he termed the "bifurcated state" (Mamdani, 1996). As a result, post-colonial leaders in Africa have taken advantage of the divisions between the rural and urban areas, thereby campaigning and gaining popular support from those in marginalised societies who recognised the unfair balance of economic and social resources. Therefore, populism has been used by post-colonial rulers as a tool for political mobilisation because of its ability to galvanise new forms of political engagement (Houwen, 2011).

However, it can be observed that in some post-colonial African states populism has eroded democratic values and institutions ushering dictatorial regimes (Jackson & Rosberg in Mukamunana, 2006). Populism with similar views of democracy, such as

the will of the people, cannot possibly be constrained, implying that no checks or balances to the power of a leader who receives his inauguration directly from the masses can be tolerated. The above-mentioned form of populist leadership builds on concepts of populism as a political strategy through which a charismatic or self-seeking leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct support from large numbers of mostly unorganised supporters.

In today's African democracies, nativism as a form of populism has been used as a populist strategy for mobilising votes and has become prevalent. Nativism is described as a political process or strategy of promoting the preservation of tradition and reviving indigenous culture, thereby protecting and favouring the interests of the native population of a country (Fernandez, 2013).

2.5 NATIVISM



Nativism is understood in different ways. It can be a nation-building ideology in the way nationalism worked in the modern period. It can be a mechanism to change already existing constructions of nationhood along native and non-native lines. As indicated in the literature, post-colonial African states inherited most if not all the colonial structures and as a result, Black people are still struggling to regain their lost identities and take full control of their institutions and structures (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). It is with this view that African political leaders have adopted the use of nativism to retain their histories, values and identity, as the African public discourse was determined by the colonial masters during colonialism. Post-colonial African states have used nativism as a politically mobilising tool to gain support and popularity. Notably, nativism has similarities with populism and in some cases it has been used as a populist strategy. Nativism arises from an opposition to the mind-set of

colonialism as counter discourse by seeking to undermine colonial ideas. On the other hand, nativism has been used as a populist strategy articulated with the aim of concealing the party's shortcomings and enabling them to connect with the broader, rural-based section of the population.

As mentioned above in the literature, post-colonial and post-apartheid states continue to show the characteristics of colonialism and apartheid, even decades after the gaining independence. The colonial set-up which Mamdani (1996) regarded as bifurcated in nature has far-reaching consequences on the colonial states that segregated along racial lines into citizens and subjects. Rodney (1974) also argues that the reason Africa is underdeveloped today is because of colonial atrocities. Nativism, therefore, arises from this setting of the mindset of colonialism as a reverse discourse seeking to weaken and undermine colonial ideas through the mobilisation of decentralised African culture (Parry in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). It is within this context that Black people fall back on nativism to correct what was imposed on them by the colonial regimes. The concept of nativism is often justified along racial, religious or nationalistic lines.

Suzack in Hawley (2011) states that the concept of nativism is often associated with nationalistic and anti-imperialistic rhetoric. As a result, post-independence rulers' criticism of colonialism is often accompanied by the resurgence of the indigenous pride for the reclamation of African traditions, reversing European racist rhetoric. Notably, nativism has been used in political platforms to strongly oppose Western colonialism and impact in post-colonial African states.

2.5.1 Nativism as a populist strategy in Africa

Fanon (1968) stated that “from nationalism, we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism and finally to racism”. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (1999), the resurgence of nativism as a populist strategy has its roots in the decline of developmental nationalism. In a critique of nativism in Africa, Mbembe in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) argues that nativism was a language used to provide a repetition of the “sorry history it pretends to redress”. As a result, Mbembe saw the rise of modern nativism being associated with the political disorder and cultural disturbance.

Post-colonial states adopted the politics of nativism to reverse the representation ascribed to them by colonialism and apartheid practices. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007) stated that the emergence of nativism in post-colonial societies in Africa is rooted in what he termed the “national question”. This included issues such as expropriation of land, nationalisation, indigenisation of the economy and a state where Black natives feel in control. The application of the politics of nativism is not only about populism, but has deeper foundations in political, economic social and cultural processes.

The next section will provide interpretivist approach to post-colonial theory which rejects Western theorising and conceptualising. As illustrated in the literature review, which provided an overview of post-colonial African states from African scholars’ perspectives, the next section will provide a conceptual framework guided by concepts which suit the study.

2.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.6.1 Introduction

The previous section provided a scholarly overview from different African authors who contributed to the conceptualisation of the post-colonial African state in a global

setting. The following sections will provide an explanation of the theoretical and conceptual framework applicable to the study.

There are fundamental differences between Western and oppositional African perspectives of the trajectory of the modern post-colonial state in Africa. Most African scholars argue that colonisation had only negative implications for post-colonial African states, since it was characterised by the oppression and exploitation of native Blacks and Africa. In his books *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961, 1963), Fanon in chapter four provided an analysis of the psychology of domination resulting from colonisation and in chapter one provided an analysis on the tactics to stay in power used by the post-colonial political elite respectively. In *Black Skin, White Masks* Fanon provided an analysis of the lived experience of colonialism and its impact on Black people in terms of their psychological desire for Whiteness. Whereas in *The Wretched of the Earth* he provided an argument on provided an argument on colonialism, especially the use of violence by the rulers that destructed indigenous social fabric. To Fanon, the use of violence reinforced the supremacy of White values and the aggressiveness which has permeated the victory of these values over the ways of life of the colonised. In *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Rodney (1973) provided an analysis within a Marxist perspective on European political domination and economic exploitation that has led to the irredeemable and irreversible impoverishment of African societies. The underdevelopment of post-colonial states is a result of and a necessity for European capitalist exploitation and profiteering through the establishment of a relationship of domination and exploitation at the expense on Africa.

Drawing from the combination of economic dependence and weak authority, Peter Ekeh (1975) describes how the modern colonial state disrupted traditional social structures without entirely destroying traditional social relationships, creating authority in the form of the colonial state. The post-colonial state, formed according to this mould, straddled a society divided into modern and traditional sectors that Ekeh describes as the two publics in Africa.

In *Citizen and Subject* (1996), Mahmood Mamdani presents the “bifurcated state” as one that is divided into two systems of power under one authority: one urban, which is based on civil power and rights, and the other rural, where tradition and culture are incorporated. He emphasised that the colonial rule left a legacy of a bifurcated state, as illustrated by Ekeh in his two publics hypothesis. More importantly, the above mentioned prominent African scholars provided a standpoint that Africa cannot be understood by using Western perspective.



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However, whilst colonial rule has ended in Africa the former colonised world has not been fully decolonised as traits of colonialism still persists. Western modernisation theory argues that post-independence Africa's irresponsible leadership, coupled with mismanagement of the state and public properties – rather than colonialism – is largely responsible for the continent's underdevelopment and impoverishment (Alemazung, 2010).

This study however aligns itself with the broadly critical African perspective that is constituted by post-colonial theory and the accompanying oppositional canon of literature that is directly linked to the struggles against colonialism and oppression in most former colonies (Leroke, 1998). Post-colonial theory attempts to trace the effects of European colonialism on a composite comprising various aspects of formerly

colonised societies – economic, economic, political, social and cultural – and on the lives of the colonised, by resisting dominant Western paradigms, particularly in relation to their conceptualisation and explanation of former colonies (Hamadi, 2014).

Post-colonialism as a concept encompasses the historical period or state of affairs representing the aftermath of Western colonialism; however, the term can also be used to describe the contemporary project to reclaim and rethink the history and agency of people subordinated under various forms of imperialism. In its retrieval of the colonial past, post-colonialism as a theory defines itself as an area of study which is willing not only to make, but also to gain theoretical sense out of the past (Gandhi, 2015).

Post-colonial theory emerged from former European colonies at the end of World War Two from the regions which were experiencing the decolonisation process (Golden, 2015). As a result, post-colonial theory emerged from anti-colonial movements as activists joined with intellectuals in cultural resistance to colonialism, thereby introducing new forms of knowledge (Styers, 2009: 850). Post-colonial theory emerges as its own counter-knowledge, and from diverse cultural experiences from those in the West, presenting the notion that the West should relinquish its monopoly on knowledge and take other non-Western critical perspectives into consideration (Gandhi, 2015). It focuses on an exploration of the ways in which the culture of the colonised can use the tools of the dominant discourse to resist its political or cultural control, whilst trying to shift away from Western theorising to provide an understanding of aspects of colonialism and its effects which have persisted even after colonial rule (Leroke, 1988). Nonetheless, post-colonial theory is seen by some to have been influenced by Western theory such as Marxism, with its radical critique of the global


development and expansion of Western capitalism that marginalised and subordinated non-Western societies to the needs of dominant industrialised societies. In response, post-colonial discourse seeks to provide a critique of post-independence societies and the relationship they have with dominant advanced industrialised nations. Fanon can be regarded as one of those scholars who was influenced by Marxism, though he developed his own analysis of the position of the national bourgeoisie in the post-colonial state, to be discussed shortly.

Post-colonial theory has also been characterised as being epistemologically indebted to both post-structuralism and post-modernism (Ahluwali, 2011). However, Appiah (1997: 435) argues that post-colonial theory is essentially different from post-structuralism and post-modernism in that it is grounded in an appeal to an ethical universal principle and it emanates as an intellectual response to oppression in Africa. In other words, it is not a sequel to any other form of conceptualisation and it arises from and is informed by its own context. Proponents of post-colonial theory, such as Said (1978), Bhabha (1994), Mudimbe (1988) and Kwame Appiah (1991), reject Western theory, arguing that it is exclusively relevant to the West and instead they provide critical thinking around those societies that are peripheral to historically dominant societies. As a result, post-colonial theory advocates the development of methodologies and conceptual frameworks that are applicable to the study and not borrowed from Western paradigms (Bhabha, 1994).

By way of contrast, critics of post-colonial theory regard the theory as ambiguous and even superstitious. Slemon in Rukundwa and Van Aarde (2007) argues that post-colonial theory is problematic as it lacks consensus and clarity and keeps mutating through new forms of social collectivity as they emerge in a post-colonial world. These

new forms require new descriptions, making it difficult to keep pace with the changing world and keeping the definition of post-colonial theory unchanged. In agreement, Thosago (1999) argues that the concept of post-colonialism is problematic and difficult to define because of the diversity of places and the wide area that post-coloniality covers.

Nonetheless, despite the debates within postcolonial theory on whether it should have an element of constancy by offering a more definitive conceptual framework, the uniqueness as well as the continually changing nature of post-colonial societies requires a flexibility that can accommodate the diversity and dynamics of post-colonial societies. This study draws on post-colonial theory to examine two elements of post-colonial society, namely, the post-colonial state and the subaltern in post-colonial society, those marginalised by the state. It then examines the attempted exercise of power by the post-colonial state through its nativist discourse and the responses to state discourse by the subaltern.



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2.6.2 Postcolonial theory and the state

As indicated previously, post-colonial theory is believed to have been influenced by Marxism's systematic critique of capitalism, particularly in relation to the nature of the state and its exploitative role. However, unlike Marxism, post-colonial theory is "a less unified and slippery unit" (Parry, 1997: 14), meaning that it is regarded as a dynamic and ever-changing theory which does not have a singular or formal framework. Marxism provides a highly structured and overarching analysis of the historical development of the forces and mechanisms of capitalist society, whereas post-colonial theory analysis is largely centred on deconstructing what it sees to be the overarching power of Western capitalism, imperialism and modernity (Sinha and Varma 2015: 4).

Some post-colonial theorists accuse Marxism of defending the Eurocentric model of political emancipation that constantly overlooks the experiences of colonised subjects in non-Western societies and of failing to develop studies that provide a fully elaborated analysis on how imperialism impacted on Africa (Lindner, 2010). Furthermore Marxism neglected disenfranchised subaltern groups in non-western societies such as colonised subjects of various social classes.

The influence of Marxism is seen in Fanon's writing on the role of the national bourgeoisie in the post-colonial state in his seminal book *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), which is believed to have laid the essential theoretical foundation for future post-colonial theory. This followed on his first book, which draws on his personal experiences as a psychoanalyst on the trauma inflicted on Black people by colonialism that he documented in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952). The latter showed the relationship between colonised and coloniser in terms of the 'psychology of domination', observing the lasting destructive effects of white domination to Black subjects and the emotional damage to both colonised and coloniser. In the first three chapters of *Black Skin, White Masks* Fanon provided an analysis of the lived experience of colonialism and its impact on Black people in terms of their psychological desire for Whiteness. In Chapter Four, he critically questioned and analysed Maud Mannoni's book *Prospero and Caliban: the psychology of colonisation* (1950) hypothesis that Black people allowed colonialism to happen because of their inferiority complex and the desire to become like White people. He thereafter developed the notion of the necessity of conscious resistance by Black people to Whiteness, laying the foundations for the development and embracement of Black consciousness.

However, in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), Fanon changed his focus to provide an argument on colonialism, especially the use of violence which reinforced the supremacy of White colonial structures, practices and values. Consequently, post-colonial states seem to have adopted the practice of violence during the colonial period against its people, therefore the logic of violence is rooted within colonial era. In the first chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth* Fanon sees the colonial world as divided into the colonist and the colonised to maintain the superiority of the coloniser. Colonialism is defined by violence on the part of the coloniser and Fanon described its psychological effects on the human cognisance of the colonised. Fanon considers violence as underpinning the ordering of the colonial world, destroying all that was native and in doing so emphasising the supremacy of White society and its values through ferocity. Violence was brought into the homes and minds of natives by the agents of colonial governments who spoke “the language of pure force” and used oppression and domination to secure their ends (Fanon, 1963: 41). He further argues that the reason why post-independent African states fail is not the inefficiency of the national bourgeoisie, but its role as manipulated and manipulator as a product of a decolonisation process which includes compromise between national political parties and the colonial national bourgeoisie, forming a ‘pseudo’ independent state (Gibson, 2016). Fanon saw minimal re-adaptation, barring a few superficial reforms, as the pseudo independent state does not in any way transform or change the life of the peasants (Fanon, 1968). As a result, huge discontent arises amongst the unrecognised masses, who, according to Fanon, begin to complain and will eventually revolt against the post-colonial national bourgeoisie.

As indicated above, the national bourgeoisie took over power after independence through negotiated settlement and was trained to participate in the capitalist system

of the oppressors. The national bourgeoisie in post-independence African states became the 'transmission mechanism' for the continued exploitation of Africa and ordinary people. Fanon's argument was that post-colonial leaders rejuvenated the former colonial masters' style of rule which had been implanted in their minds, essentially validating their Western values. As such, anti-colonial movement leaders entered positions of political leadership only to interpret general freedom as their individual and selfish aims, to the disadvantage of the masses. They pursued class distinction through the adoption of colonial institutions and violent tactics, assimilated the coloniser's mentality and considered themselves superior to their own native people (Ukavwe, 2014).

Resonating with a Marxist perspective, Fanon also argued that on independence and through certain strategies, colonisers ensure that former colonies remained economically dependent and subjugated, despite the fact that colonialism had ended, so that the relationship of domination persisted. As a result nativism seeks to reverse or counter the discourse or idea. Consequently, Chapter Four and Chapter Six of the study provide examples of nativist discourse adopted by ZANU-PF and the Zuma faction of the ANC respectively that highlights the exploitative nature of western powers and attacks them as being responsible for Africa's continued poverty. In this study, this use of nativism is perfectly aligned to Fanon's analysis of the strategies used by the liberation party turned political elite in order to retain power for the purpose of maintaining their popularity and to deceive the subaltern, as will be seen in the next section about discourse theory

2.6.3 The postcolonial state and nativist discourse

The above discussion illustrates how the post-colonial state seeks to retain power through nativist discourse, deceiving the masses, or civil society, and trying to conceal its own predatory nature and actions. The following discussion will dwell on the responses to the state's nativist discourse by the subaltern. Post-colonial theory is built around the concept of resistance as subversion or opposition to this Western world view of ontological superiority and derives from the academic linguistic project being conceptualized as resistance to colonial discourse. In terms of the formal development of post-colonial theory, the first phase of resistance is the cultural framework predominantly used in post-colonial studies. Post-colonial linguists believe that writing constitutes an act of resistance since it exposes the binary that underlies the colonial narrative by providing an alternative reading (Shahjah, 2011). The second phase of resistance is subversion, whereby the hegemony and authority of colonial knowledge is undermined. In terms of the concept of resistance post-colonial theory has been developed as a form of resistance against colonialism whereby post-colonial thinkers provide an alternative way of expression to the European colonial historiography (Greenberg, 2002). In this regard, nativism arose from pro-native and anti-colonial ideas based on the fundamental idea of opposing and reversing colonial ideas and beliefs. It is instilled with a discourse aimed at overthrowing the hierarchy and the concepts of the colonial narrative and rejecting the position of suppression reserved to the colonial (Shahjahan, 2011). In this study, nativism as a counter-discourse to colonial ideas will be seen to advocate for notions such as pro-tradition, anti-West, anti-White, radical economic transformation and the need for expropriation of land for the benefit of the historically disadvantaged populations.

As indicated earlier, post-colonial theory was also influenced by post-structuralist theory. Post-structuralist theory subscribes to the belief that all communication is miscommunication. Post-structuralism came about as a response to the structuralist school of thought which subscribed to the notion that language creates, rather than reflects, meaning. Post-structuralism criticised this view by saying that language reflects the power held by those who construct meaning. The prominent post-structuralist Michel Foucault concentrated on the relationship between discourse, power and the conception of subjects (Greenberg, 2002). He argued that the discourse of power must be traced back and exposed, pointing out how the state uses powerful discourses to proliferate its ideas, which are filtered down to the population and become the basis of understandings and explanations (Foucault, 1972). Foucault questioned the Western subject, who is decentred by the same language-frame within which he is constituted. People are subject to the power of language and that of the state, exposing the relationship between the state, political power and state discourse, by means of which language is used as a tool to enable the exercise of power.

Whereas Fanon analysed the nature of the post-colonial state's exploitative power, exercised by the national bourgeoisie, Said analysed the nature of the discourse of domination in *Orientalism* (1978), based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the "Orient" and "the Occident". Said's *Orientalism* exposed the Eurocentric universalism which took for granted both the superiority of what is Western, and the subordination of what is not (Barry in Sewant, 2011). Said identifies a European cultural tradition of Orientalism, which is a particular and long-standing way of identifying the East as inferior to the West. He pointed out that that the knowledge about the Orient which was produced in Europe was a direct influence of colonial power, as a result maintained and extended the European hegemony over the

once colonised (Ambesange, 2016). According to Said, the Orient has always been identified as the primitive and uncivilised in contrast to the advanced and civilised West. He believes that such discourse was used as a justification for the occupation of the Orient and resistance that it was met with. In this regard, the consequences of colonialism still persist in form of chaos, coups, civil wars and corruption which is a consequence of colonialism (Hamadi, 2014).

Fanon's writings about the "Other" in *Black Skin, White Masks* Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), even though Said is often considered as the first to theorise post-colonialism through foregrounding the global ontology manufactured through discursive initiatives to glorify Europe and to despise and degrade the "Other". The concept of "Otherness" sees the world divided into two mutually excluding opposites that are "Self" and "Other", "Self" which is regarded as rational and has order, whilst "Other", is regarded as being irrational and chaotic (Shahinaj, 2011). Fanon's conception of the "Other" was generated by relations of domination and subordination between European coloniser and the African colonised, revealed in Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, in which. Fanon foregrounds the denial by Black people of their own identity and the self-embrace of racial identity of the White "Other". In this regard, the concept opposed the oppression of Black people and describes the feeling of dependency that Black people sense in a Western-dominated world, caused by the detrimental legacy of colonial rule (Shahinaj, 2011).

Whereas Fanon examined the influences on and nature of power in post-colonial states, he did not examine the role of language, Said focused on the use of language to justify domination through the creation of meaning that reinforces power. In doing so, Said is influenced by Foucault, who linked the construction of knowledge through

language to the exercise of power. Said's major analytical contribution is in the form of the binary, or the oppositional relationship between the substance of Europe and that of the Orient which, through the use of language – or discourse – has portrayed Europe as the ideal and the Orient as representing the negative "Other". Said points out that even seemingly objective texts written by well-meaning western Orientalists are biased, portraying the Orient as the irrational, odd, weak "Other", juxtaposed with the rational, strong, masculine West (Said, 1978). He emphasised that the West needed to portray this difference to legalise its domination of the superior "civilized" West over the inferior "primitive" Orient. To Said, the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power and domination of varying degrees to maintain a complex hegemony. Drawing from Said's work, post-colonial literary theorists seek to create a post-colonial version of their own societies that reject Western literature, which is polluted with negative depictions (Barry, 2006: 194).



Colonial discourse thus rationalised colonialism through rigid binary oppositions such as progressive/primitive, developed/developing, maturity/immaturity or civilisation/barbarism (Gandhi, 2015). In this regard, the African experience of colonialism reveals the notion of the African as a minor whose mind is incapable of growth. This perception of the colonised as fundamentally childlike or childish feeds into the logic of the colonial civilising mission which is fashioned, quite self-consciously, as a form of an apparently disinterested project concerned with bringing the colonised to maturity, as the coloniser is principally and exclusively regarded as an educator (Gandhi, 2015).

In agreement with Said, Parry (2005) comes to a positive conclusion in relation to nativist discourse as a narrative of decolonisation, arguing that it is one of the ways that post-colonial states reclaim Africa by challenging the truth claims of western

history. As a reverse discourse, nativism uses the same categories and the same vocabulary of the dominant discourse to subvert, undermine, and decentre the latter and to expose the binaries that are at the basis of inequality (Parry, 1994). Nativist discourse seeks to critique and subvert the dominant Western style by allowing and empowering the marginalised societies. By way of contrast, while seeking to appear as identifying and clarifying the source of continued problems in post-colonial Africa, through nativist discourse ZANU-PF and Zuma sought to disguise their own role in oppression and exploitation of the masses, precisely at the point when their legitimacy and credibility as leaders was challenged.

As a counter-discourse to the perseverance of colonial beliefs and practices, nativism challenges the colonial narrative and promotes African tradition and culture, while vilifying the “Other”, in the form of the western coloniser.

However, whilst nativism is seen by Parry as a reverse discourse that challenges the dominant society, Fanon points to its spurious nature when used by the ruling party and the political elite in the post-colonial state to promote tribalism and secure allegiance from particular sectors of society. Fanon thus scorns nativism as a mechanism that is used purely for the purpose of securing and maintaining power over the state. In *The Wretched of the Earth* Fanon analysed the use of nativism by the national bourgeoisie for the purpose of personal entitlement and not for the benefit of the ordinary people, noting that their behaviour has nothing to do with transforming the lives or circumstances of the masses but is purely for their own benefit. Fanon disagreed with the idea of going back to tradition and culture, arguing that culture derives from national consciousness which is a shared sense of national identity, he emphasised that culture does not produce nationhood as it group people according to

shared cultures rather than cutting through cultural divide. To him culture must follow nationalism, and not the other way round (Fanon, 1963).

The tension between coloniser and colonised, and dominator and the dominated is at the core of post-colonial theory, signifying the importance of binary oppositions in post-colonialism. Post-colonial theory as a result represents opposition to the unequal relations of power based on the binary opposition of "Us" and "Them", "White" and "Black", "Powerful" and "Powerless", "Coloniser" and "Colonised" (Kehinde, 2006: 108). The self-attributed superiority of the White race clearly implies that "the Black man must forever remain working as a slave so as to provide cheap labour" (Kehinde, 2006: 109).



Because much of post-colonial theory deals with the role of language in creating and perpetuating domination, the attempt to expose binaries often expresses itself in the re-writing of recognised stories that are at the basis of inequality, with the result that this re-writing sometimes reverses a binary opposition, so that what used to be the bad becomes the good (Kehinde, 2006). Similarly, a reality is conjured up through a presentation of 'truth' that creates, magnifies and exemplifies ordinary traits and events to transform people into heroes. This can be seen in the nativist discourse of those holding power in the post-colonial state, where the ruling party or state leader targets glorify not only the past, but those who belong to the past.

In addition, the critical nature of post-colonial theory brings about the disturbance of Western thought, by giving room to the marginalised voices to be heard and in finding alternatives to the dominant voices (Asma, 2015). It is in this sense a critical theory which focuses on colonial experience from the colonised society's point of view (Sewant, 2011). With this in mind, Chapter Five and Chapter Seven respectively give

voice to the subaltern in the presentation and analyses of the responses to nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF and the ANC's former president. Chapter Five of the study provides an analyses of the responses to the nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF from a sample of the population in Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe, while Chapter Seven provides an analyses to the responses to the nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC from a sample of the population in Chris Hani rural district if South Africa.

Prominent post-colonial theorist Gayatri Spivak (1999) argues that the problem is not only that the subaltern cannot speak, but also that the dominant will not listen. She emphasises that the powerless are unable to express themselves and that the experiences of such groups are distorted by the perspectives of the elite, who act on their behalf and describe them. In line with Edward Said's views, she criticises the way in which the Western literature have presented the Third World (subaltern) in their academic discourse (Ambesange, 2016). Though post-colonial states are independent, the characteristics and influence of the authoritarian and exploitative colonial state still persist. Zimbabwe and South Africa still shows characteristics of the colonial and apartheid eras in the form of poverty, lack of development and deprivation, especially in the rural areas, where the subaltern of this study reside. Precisely to foreground the voice of the subaltern, post-colonial theory advocates for the voice of the voiceless and the interpretation thereof. In this research, the discourse of and discussion by the subaltern paves way for the marginalised voices to be heard. Without implementing these ideas, narration and explanation of the postcolonial way of being will continue to reinforce dominant ideas and beliefs.

The interpretive methodological approach of this study resonated with the overarching approach of post-colonial theory, avoiding the adoption of established perspectives by allowing unfiltered and undirected perspectives of the subaltern to emerge, so that the “truth”, or reality as perceived by those interviewed, could emerge in the complexity of human sense-making.

In concluding, post-colonial theory is appropriate for this particular research precisely because its broadness and multi-faceted nature enabled two analytical tools at two different levels: one in the form of the state’s nativist discourse; and the other the responses to the nativist discourse by the subaltern.

Chapters Four and Six will present nativist discourse that have been used in Zimbabwe and South Africa to attack colonialism and its protagonists, namely, the West and Whites (Europeans), appealing to the subaltern in the form of the rural Black peasantry for support. Chapter Five and Chapter Seven provide an analysis to the nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and responses to the nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC respectively.

As indicated earlier, post-colonial theory advocates the development of a conceptual framework that is applicable to the study and free from Western thinking. The next section will elaborate on the conceptual framework that the study has adopted, which includes populism, nativism and political legitimacy.

2.7 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Miles and Huberman (2011) define a conceptual framework as a concept of a model of a planned study. In this regard, conceptual framework adopts the use of a concept grounded on a phenomenon that constitutes an empirical generalisation. This study

will be guided by concepts which include populism and nativism, which were discussed in the literature review, and political legitimacy, which will be discussed shortly. Populism was defined as a mode of communication that proposes that ordinary people are exploited by the elite; it may also be conceived as a political strategy by self-interested leaders to win power. Nativism has been described as a political process or strategy of preserving and reviving indigenous culture, thereby protecting and favouring the interests of the native population of a country (Fernandez, 2013).

2.7.1 Political legitimacy

Political legitimacy is understood as the belief that a ruler, leader or institution has the right to govern. Gilley (2006) defines legitimacy as how power may be used in ways that citizens accept, whilst Weber sees legitimacy of a political system going beyond philosophy and contributing directly to the state system of stability and authority. However, the legitimacy of the post-colonial governments in Africa was premised on fulfilling their promise of independence, exemplified in the ideas of liberation movements and behaving in accordance to the expectations of the society.

In the case of the post-colonial African state, when most states proclaimed independence, liberation movements became post-colonial governments and their legitimacy to rule stemmed from their war history of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The legitimacy of liberation movements to rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonisation process as representatives acting on behalf of the majority of the people. As indicated in the literature by Ekeh (1975), most of the post-colonial African leaders adopted the use of post-colonial ideologies of legitimation, such as anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-White sentiments. The dependence on colonial ideologies has led to the African bourgeois creating ideologies of their own, used replace colonial rule and legitimise their hold on power and their people. As a

result, African leaders had no basis of legitimacy which was independent from colonialism. The concept of legitimacy in post-colonial African states is associated with the use of colonial history and experience as a way of gaining political power and acceptance by the citizens. African bourgeois adopted the use of these strategies to meet national unity as proposed in the ideology of liberation movements; consequently, they easily won the popular support of the citizens with little or no opposition.


The concept of legitimacy in post-colonial African states is often associated with the use of violence against dissidents. Fanon indicated that colonialist regimes owe their legitimacy to the use of force and violence against Africans; consequently, liberation movements were to use violence to overthrow colonial governments. Liberation movements in Africa only understood the language of force and violence in expressing themselves and they have taken this to a post-colonial era adopting the use of violence to legitimise their rule. In some cases, political legitimacy of African states has been associated with the cohesive use of violence.

2.8 CONCLUSION

The literature review provided an overview of the contributions of leading African post-colonial scholars, commencing with Fanon and concluding with Mamdani, whose conceptualisation and analysis of the bifurcated nature of the post-colonial state underpins this research. More importantly, the views and ideas of African scholars provided a standpoint that African states cannot be understood using a Western perspective or held up to scrutiny alongside the Western model of the modern state. The literature review rejected Western paradigms and rather advocated African conceptualisation frameworks. As a result, the literature provided more critical analysis

and highlighted different aspects from different Afrocentric scholarly reviews on the post-colonial African state. It provided an overview of oppositional literature to Western thinking by criticising colonialism and how it has impacted negatively the political, social and economic growth of post-colonial states, as well as a critical analysis and scholarly review of populism and nativism.

Aligning itself with the principles of research and analyses of African situations, phenomena and events outside and in opposition to the hegemonic Western lens, this study is located within the broad parameters of post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory was adopted by the study, rejecting the use of Western paradigms in understanding an African phenomenon and therefore advocating for the use of a conceptual framework which suits the African phenomenon. Post-colonial theory was divided into two distinct theoretical elements which is state power and discourse. On the other hand, populism, nativism and legitimacy concepts were utilised in the conceptual framework of the study.



The Chapter also provided a literature review on liberation movements turned political parties in post-independence African states. It also discussed the relationship between post-colonial governments and the rural population. The next chapter will therefore provide in detail an overview of the research design and methodology.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of the study was to provide an understanding of the continued support for revolutionary regimes turned post-independence ruling political parties in Africa, examining the reasons for and providing a comparison of the ANC and ZANU-PF popularity in selected areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. As indicated in Chapter Two, the research is located within the broad parameters of post-colonial theory, which opposes dominant Western paradigms with a view to enabling indigenous knowledge frameworks and systems to emerge. The previous chapter also provided an overview of a range of the intellectual perspectives of prominent African scholars on the post-colonial African state, including the post-apartheid state. The chapter also paid attention to how post-independence African leaders have maintained power in their respective countries, with a focus on rural areas of Africa.

This chapter seeks to provide detailed information on the research design used and the methodology followed in the research. The research design and methodology chosen for the study aim to answer the research questions posed. The research design is the planning of the research and indicates the type of study undertaken, while the research methods indicate the steps taken, instruments used, and techniques implemented to complete the research process (Mouton 2001). The chapter will, therefore, provide in detail the research design, methodology, access to the research sites, data collection process, data analysis procedures, and ethical considerations.

3.2 THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design refers to the plan according to which the study was executed. It involves the overall assumptions of the research, the methods of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2005). This study took the form of qualitative research within the interpretive approach to explore and analyse the circumstances and strategies that have contributed to the ongoing electoral support for the ANC and ZANU-PF in rural areas. Qualitative research is a form of social inquiry that focuses on the way people make sense of their experiences and the world in which they live (Newman & Benz, 1998); within the range of qualitative approaches, interpretivism involves interpretation by the researcher of how people perceive their own lived reality, or “truth”. As the interpretive approach has a subjective epistemology – it usually follows inductive reason and uses qualitative methods – the study at hand aims at in-depth detail and investigates whether it is possible to utilise theory. The study, therefore, adopts an interpretive methodological approach within the overarching approach of post-colonial theory, while trying to avoid established perspectives in its interpretation of data, allowing open-ended perspectives to emerge to enable the “truth”, as perceived by those interviewed, to emerge.

Post-colonial theory advocates the development of conceptual frameworks that are independent of Western paradigms. An interpretive approach allowed the researcher to look beyond what was said by also paying attention to what was not said by the respondents, and to include in the investigation body language, tone of voice, facial expressions and emotions. Unlike the quantitative approach, a qualitative approach is flexible and factors such as attitude, behaviour and experience can be explored. As noted by Trauth and Jessup (2000), the focus of interpretive research is on the complexity of human sense-making as the situation unfolds.

Qualitative design allowed the researcher to present the experiences and meaning attached to reasons for the continued support of ZANU-PF and the ANC in rural Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively. ZANU-PF and the ANC resemble each other in that they are both former liberation movements, but their post-independence existence as ruling parties differs in ways that are crucially important in order to understand the responses of inhabitants in rural areas to the nativist discourse employed.

3.3 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

Methodology is a specific method or principle used to interpret, identify, process, analyse or solve a problem and it varies according to the topic. The methods of collecting qualitative data include interviews, focus group discussions, case studies and documents. This research drew on primary sources in the form of interviews, original documents on government policy, political speeches and newspaper articles to investigate how these are interpreted by the target populations in rural areas and the extent to which they are accepted and absorbed as the “truth”, or, alternatively, rejected. Secondary sources in the form of books, journals and Internet sources were also used to broaden the knowledge base of the research. The study adopted two stages of collecting data: content and interpretivist.

3.3.1 Secondary data

Secondary data is the data which has already been collected and is available. The secondary data is data collected by someone else for another primary purpose (Johnston, 2014). The research also draws on secondary sources such as books, the Internet and journals which provided original African perspectives on liberation

movements turned post-independence rulers in African states, as well as on the nature of the post-colonial African state.

Like most research, the researcher started by investigating what is already known and what remains to be known about the topic and this included supporting literature on previously collected data. The researcher used the Internet for online newspapers, journals, books and government documents. The use of secondary data provided the researcher with the opportunity of gathering the primary data by acting as a guide, as it provided background and literature. Secondary data was used to answer the first question in Chapter Four and the third research question in Chapter Six of the study. These two chapters were qualitative and based on content analysis. Chapter Four presents and analyses the data that was obtained from secondary research to identify nativist discourse used in Zimbabwe and seeks to answer the first research question posed by the study: What are the various nativist discourses that have been used by ZANU-PF to maintain their apparent popularity, demonstrated through the electoral system, in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe. Chapter Six presents and analyses data which was obtained from the secondary research to identify the nativist discourses used by former president Zuma to try and ensure that his faction of the ANC retained power. The chapter seeks to answer the third research question: What are the various nativist discourses that have been used by Zuma and his ANC faction to maintain their apparent popularity, demonstrated through the electoral system, in the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa.

Whilst collecting secondary data, the researcher encountered problems such as not being able to find articles or books that directly fit the aims of the research. In some instances, data collected on one location for a particular topic may not be suitable for the areas under study due to the variables in the environmental factor.

3.3.2 Primary Data

The use of primary sources is in the form of discourse originating from interviews, focus group discussions and from government documents, political speeches by political leaders of the political parties under study and newspaper articles to analyse how nativism was used as a strategy for winning popular support. Primary sources enabled the researcher to have first-hand information that can be interpreted directly. Primary sources were used to answer the second research question in Chapter Five and the third research question in Chapter Seven. Chapter Five presents and analyses the responses to nativist discourse (through in-depth interviews) employed by ZANU-PF from a sample of the rural population in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Chegutu rural district. The chapter seeks to answer the second research question: How have the rural populations in the Chegutu rural district responded to diverse nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF? Chapter Seven of the study presents and analyses the responses to nativist discourses employed by the Zuma faction of the ANC from a sample of the rural population in the Engcobo local district of the Chris Hani rural district. The chapter seeks to answer the fourth research question: How have the rural populations in the Chris Hani rural district responded to nativist discourses employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC?

3.3.2.1 Case Study

Case study research originates from qualitative approaches to research. The case studied provides a way of looking at an issue, collecting data, analysing information and reporting results (Rwegoshora, 2014: 140). Harrison, Birks, Franklin, and Mills (2017) acknowledge a case study research as an effective methodology to understand and investigate complex issues in the real world. Case study research involves

comprehensive and in-depth investigation and is used to gain an understanding of real-life settings.

The research comprises case studies of two rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe, where the ANC and ZANU-PF have enjoyed popular support, respectively. The places were chosen because they are typical rural areas and receive the least resources compared to urban areas, but they provide the much-needed support for maintaining power by the two above-mentioned parties.

In the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe, the researcher was able to execute eighteen out of the twenty scheduled interviews as the villages were far apart from each other and it was the rainy season, when there is heavy rain. There was no transportation, as the roads were impassable, and bridges had flooded. However, in the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa the researcher managed to interview the intended number of respondents. In qualitative research, the aim is to continue researching and probing until no new aspects are presented, and until no new data emerges.

The researcher conducted the research in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Chegutu rural district in the Mashonaland West Province of Zimbabwe. This constituency is located slightly over 100 kilometres from the capital city, Harare, and it takes close to two hours by bus from Harare to Mhondoro-Mubaira. The Chris Hani district is a landlocked district situated in the centre of the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa and is made up of six local municipalities. Most of the communities in the district live in rural areas and the research study was in one of the six local municipalities; namely, the Engcobo local municipality. The primary data was obtained through interviews with samples of the population.

3.3.2.2 Sampling

Sampling is a process used to select a fraction of the population for the purpose of collecting primary data for the study. Qualitative research is usually focused on a small number due to the intensive nature of the methods used, such as in-depth interviews, which require a substantial amount of time for each interview. The selection of appropriate participants and a research site is crucial to the validity of the research findings. Sampling in a qualitative paradigm is often purposeful to yield cases that are information rich with limited resources. It involves selecting individuals or groups that are knowledgeable or experienced with a phenomenon of interest (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 288). Purposive sampling implies that the researcher's sample must be tied to the objectives of the study. Etikan et al (2016: 2) describe the purposive sampling technique, also called non-random sampling or judgment sampling, as "the deliberate choice of a participant due to the qualities the participant possesses". The idea of purposive sampling in this study was to focus on people with particular characteristics who would be able to assist with information relevant to the study. The "logic and power" of purposeful sampling used in qualitative research lie primarily on the quality of information obtained per sampling unit as opposed to their number per se (Sandelowski, 1995: 179). In order to achieve this, the researcher conducted interviews with knowledgeable people who lived in the in two rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively, to answer the research questions. The purpose of the researcher using these locations is because they are typical of the rural areas where ZANU-PF and ANC, respectively, have strong support bases.

In this study, twenty respondents, aged eighteen and above, in the Chegutu rural district in Zimbabwe and twenty respondents above the age of eighteen, in the Chris Hani rural district in the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa were interviewed. The

justification for interviewing respondents of over eighteen years is because they are no longer minors and are able to express political opinions in the form of voting choices. The justification for using the sample size is because qualitative research is concerned with deep engagement rather than arriving at generalizable statements. The objective was not to reach a specific numerical goal, but to conduct the interviews until no new data emerges. Furthermore, qualitative research is labour-intensive, so that analysing the themes that emerge from a large sample make it impossible to have deep engagements with respondents for their own individual versions of the truth to emerge.

3.3.2.3 In-depth interviews (primary data)

According to Morris (2005), in-depth interviews involve the researcher asking questions and following up on the responses of the interviewee in an attempt to garner as much information as possible from a person who has expertise on the topic in which the interviewer is interested. The benefits of using an in-depth interview are that it gives the researcher an opportunity to determine why people construct the world in a particular way and think the way they do (Siedman, 2013). As indicated above, one-on-one in-depth interviews were used as a tool to obtain deep, rich information from the respondent. The researcher avoided entering the research with subjectivity that was imposed on the respondents, allowing their views to frame the key topics in interviews and pursuing particular themes that were identified and interpreted by respondents.

Prior to the interview, the researcher had to seek permission from traditional authorities in the areas under study; this included approaching chiefs and village headmen. Without obtaining permission to interview the villagers, conducting

interviews would be breaking protocol and villagers would simply refuse to be interviewed as they would be reprimanded.

The interviews were semi-structured, whereby the researcher gave the respondent a chance to answer in their own words based on knowledge, ideas, understanding, history and experience. Using semi-structured interviews seems to give the respondent unlimited leverage in the narratives; on the other hand, the researcher remained in control of the interviews by ensuring probing questions were asked, to pursue the interview guidelines to their fullest extent. The respondents were asked about their responses to nativist discourse detailed in Chapter Four for Zimbabwe, and nativist discourse in Chapter Six for South Africa, respectively. The face-to-face interview between the researcher and the respondent allowed the researcher to observe non-verbal cues such as facial expression, body language, gestures and emotions. This non-verbal communication allowed the researcher to observe and compare spoken and unspoken views. For instance, one respondent in the Chegutu rural district started narrating his experiences during colonial times, and while he reminisced he became teary-eyed, with his facial expression showing great sadness and even anger. But when he started to narrate life under ZANU-PF rule his facial expression lightened up and his voice was full of joy.

In conducting the interviews, the researcher had an interview guide with intended questions, derived from the data presentation chapters. However, as this is an interpretivist study and the aim is to enable the “truth” of every subject to surface, the researcher had to abandon uniformity to allow the interview to be flexible and create a natural dialogue. This resulted in follow-up questions to navigate through important asked or raised questions. This also made the researcher listen more to the respondent narrating his or her story with sadness or happiness, depending on

experience and history. In some circumstances, depending on how the respondent responded to questions, the researcher chose not to ask some of the questions in the interview guide with the intention of not provoking or causing unnecessary discomfort during the interview session. The respondents were encouraged by the researcher to talk freely, although sometimes the discussion went off-track and allowance was made to ease the conversation and to ensure that all themes were covered.

Coincidentally, as explained in the preview to this research, in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the interviews were held after the resignation of President Zuma in South Africa in February 2018 and the ousting of President Mugabe in November 2017. In rural Zimbabwe, people were inclined to talk more freely after Mugabe had stepped down and there was an atmosphere of carefree elation. However, this was a brief period before the run-up to the July 2018 elections and a return of tactics of intimidation, but it presented an opportunity for people to speak more freely without fear of the consequences, something that they had previously never been able to do. Most of the respondents in Zimbabwe preferred to be interviewed in private without anyone hearing their conversations, but the researcher also assured them of the confidentiality of both the interview and their identity. The researcher asked the respondents to sign consent forms.

By way of contrast, in rural South Africa, the respondents were not worried about being interviewed in the presence of other people and they talked freely, although the researcher also assured them of the confidentiality of their identity and all the respondents signed consent forms.

The researcher first asked permission from the respondents to record the interviews. The researcher could not keep notes of all the aspects and opinions, so all the

interviews were tape-recorded – except one interview with a respondent in the Chegutu rural district who preferred not to be recorded. Interviews were recorded to enable the researcher to capture all that was being said by the respondents. The researcher also took interview notes in such circumstances where there was noticeable body language and other gestures which could not be recorded. This was done to avoid misinterpretation of data due to forgetfulness.

The themes that were used for discussion in the interviews in the Chegutu rural district were as follows:

ZANU-PF discourse:

- anti-White discourse relating to settler farmers
- anti-West discourse
- pro-tradition discourse



ZANU-PF practices

- preservation of history
- land for Africans

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The themes that formed the basis of discussion in the interviews in the Chris Hani rural district were as follows:

- anti-White sentiments
- radical economic transformation/anti-White monopoly capital
- expropriation of land without compensation

3.3.2.4 Focus group discussions

A focus group discussion is used to follow up on data already obtained from individuals by means of collecting further data on emerging themes from a group of people (Creswell, 2005). The intention of focus group discussions is to conduct exhaustive

research until no new data emerges. However, ultimately the researcher did not conduct focus group discussions for two reasons. One of the reasons, particular to the Chegutu rural district, was that respondents preferred to be interviewed in private without an audience. They did not wish to discuss their thoughts and experiences around others, probably due to fear of others knowing their opinions. This points to a deep underlying unease within the community due to the possible presence of ZANU-PF informers. However, the most important rationale for abandoning the proposed focus groups in both Chegutu rural district and Chris Hani rural district was that the same themes had emerged during individual interviews and had been pursued thoroughly and in great depth, and there was no need for further elaboration.

Importantly, in order to overcome the language barrier, the researcher had to brief a translator what the research was about, including the research objectives and aims. The researcher also explained to the translator what the interviews sought to achieve; after the translator fully understood what the research was about, they proceeded with the interviews. Using a translator was a way of enabling the natural flow of information in circumstances where the researcher failed to understand responses from the respondents, as the translator would provide interpretation.

3.3.2.5 Translation during and after the interview

In the Chegutu rural district, the researcher only used English in one interview and the other seventeen were carried out in Shona, the native language of this area. The English interview guide questions were translated to Shona by the researcher. Consequently, the researcher faced the task of translating the interviews from Shona into English during the transcription phase in order to present the data. In some instances, the researcher struggled with translation of specific Shona words that had no direct equivalent in English. The task of the researcher was then to find the best

possible translation that suited the respondents' views, taking into consideration any gestures that might have been shown by the respondent.

As the researcher understands most isiXhosa but is not a fluent speaker of the language, and because the majority of the respondents preferred to be interviewed in isiXhosa, the assistance of a translator was essential to ensure that valuable data was not lost through the researcher's inability to correctly frame questions or fully understand the finer details of the responses.

3.4 RESEARCH LOCATION AND SITE

The research took place in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe and the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa and the researcher first collected data in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe between January and February 2018. Chegutu is located in the Mashonaland West province of Zimbabwe and is approximately 100 kilometres from Harare. The researcher had to travel by bus from Harare to the designated area and it took more than two hours to arrive at the destination; the roads were not in a good condition and the bus had to move carefully and slowly. The researcher stayed in the area and conducted interviews in eight villages in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Chegutu rural district; namely, Mutunhamombe village, Muzhuzha village, Gukwe village, Gobvu village, Mhariwa village, Mandenga village, Mhizha village and Kagoro village. The researcher faced difficulties in travelling from one village to another as they were far apart and in some cases the researcher had to walk. Since it was the rainy season, some bridges were flooded, making it impossible to move from one village to another and having to wait until the flooding eased. As protocol, the researcher had to seek permission to interview people from different traditional authorities in different villages. Villagers –

even those who were not interviewed – treated the researcher as one of them and were very welcoming. The researcher gained the trust and confidence of the local people because of the researcher's familiarity with the customs, values and the language.

The second data collection was done in the Ngcobo local municipality of the Chris Hani rural district in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa between May and June 2018. The researcher managed to collect data in six villages; namely, Sitebe village, Didi village, Mhloplekazi village, Cefane village, Luhewini village and Mvala village. Travel in the area was easy as there is regular transportation between villages and the road networks are in a relatively good condition. The researcher once again had to seek permission from one chief and six traditional leaders to conduct interviews in the six villages.



3.5 ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER

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The researcher had to be as objective as possible in all processes to avoid personal bias and misinterpretation at all costs. In the interviews in the Chegutu rural district, the researcher had to be constantly alerted to the risk of appearing partisan to particular views – even through facial expressions – throughout the interviews since the researcher was a citizen of the country and therefore aware of some issues discussed. Despite the researcher's own political identity and belief, the researcher's role was to remain as neutral as possible. However, in some interviews, some respondents posed questions for the researcher. The researcher then had to try and shift the respondent's questions by emphasising that the researcher was not part of the communities under study and the researcher's views and opinions were not important. In another tricky scenario, the researcher was interviewing a respondent

who was elderly and believed that young people take for granted the sacrifices made by ZANU-PF to free the country. As a result, the respondent would frequently use “you” as a reference to the younger generation’s ungratefulness – saying “you” with his finger pointing at the researcher. The researcher then had to remain calm to gain the trust of the respondents so that they could fully engage without fear of being spied on. The researcher tried to forge a relationship of mutual trust by carefully explaining exactly what anonymity and confidentiality entailed, so that the respondent could feel at ease when answering the questions and tell his or her own story.

Similarly, when analysing the data, the researcher had to remain as objective as possible and avoid letting her own values and prejudices interfere. In preventing bias, the researcher had to identify themes that emerged from the views of the respondents. More importantly, the researcher did not choose themes beyond the actual questions asked around certain aspects of nativism. Data that emerged from the interviews is not arranged into pre-determined themes. Self-conscious and rigorous examination for bias was simultaneously adhered to throughout the research.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

The analysis of data is an integral part of the research. Flick (2014: 6) defines qualitative data analysis as the classification of visual or linguistic material to make statements about explicit and implicit dimensions and organisations of meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it. Sunday (2002) defines qualitative data analysis as the range of processes and procedures whereby there is a move from the qualitative data that have been collected into some form of explanation and interpretation of people and situations being investigated. Qualitative methods included content analysis of the nativist discourse, and narrative analysis and

interpretive thematic analysis of the responses to nativist discourse by inhabitants of rural areas.

3.6.1 Content analysis

Krippendorff (2004, 18) defines content analysis as a research technique for making valid interpretations from texts to the context of their use. Content analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts. Content analysis requires available text to examine or answer the research question. In content analysis, data is organised in accordance with content elements and analysed. In order to answer the first (Chapter Four) and third (Chapter Six) research questions, the researcher had to code text in Chapters Four and Six into manageable themes and then examined the themes using content analysis. The researcher had to continuously check on the growing interpretation of the answers to check on emerging themes and how they related to each other. Since the study's aim was to provide the nativist discourse used by ZANU-PF and nativist discourse of Zuma and his ANC faction, respectively, to maintain their popularity, content analysis allowed the researcher to organise content elements according to themes and analyse them.

3.6.2 Narrative (story telling) analysis

The narrative analysis relies on visual or spoken words, where there is a focus on the lives of individuals through their own stories. Sarbin (1986) suggested that to understand the social world, one needs to be guided by narrative structures, where meaning is interpreted from experience, knowledge and history. People often shape their responses and reporting of experiences as stories. After conducting the interviews, the researcher repeatedly listened to each audio recording with the intention of understanding how each respondent narrated his/her story. Each context

was explained to the respondents so that they had a frame of reference for the words or acts presented to them. The researcher had to evaluate their narratives based on personal experience and history that shaped each respondent's response to the various extracts from speeches and public addresses employed by specific individuals within the ANC and ZANU-PF, respectively, at specific times and in specific contexts. In this way, the researcher was able to look beyond the narrative itself to underlying feelings and beliefs that informed the themes which emerged.

3.6.3 Thematic analysis

Thematic analysis is the process of identifying themes, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within qualitative data. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), it is a word rather than a methodology, meaning it is not tied to any particular epistemological or theoretical perspective. The goal of the thematic analysis is to identify a pattern or themes that can be used to address the research or say something about the issue under study (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). The researcher did this to elicit responses to specific speeches or events and these would provide the data used to identify themes that emerged in the responses. After the collection of data, translation and transcription the researcher read and re-read the interview responses and employed open coding to organise data into various themes. This involved locating quotes or narrations from different respondents that were representing similar themes and grouping them together. It is important to note that in some instances, one theme presented more than one sub-theme; for instance, loyalty as a theme was based on fear and gratitude. However, the researcher also kept in mind the research aim of the study whilst continuing to be open-minded to new data emerging. The researcher analysed the interview transcriptions under the notion that meaning was formulated and facilitated in the interview process and reality is fluid. This meant that

reality is constantly changing, and it differs from one person to another, despite people having gone through the same experiences – each person may perceive them differently and may offer conflicting understanding.

3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethics deal with beliefs about what is regarded as right or wrong, good or bad (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001). The ethical requirements for conducting the research were followed throughout the study. The researcher had a mandate to protect the rights and the privacy of the people and communities that formed part of the study. The researcher applied for and received ethical clearance in 2017 through the university Ethics Committee at the University of Fort Hare. The researcher was then provided with an official ethical clearance certificate. Social researchers investigate the social lives of other people and the study therefore paid attention to informed consent, confidentiality and plagiarism.



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3.7.1 Informed consent

Informed consent is a mechanism for ensuring that people understand what it meant by participating in a research study, so that they can decide whether or not to participate (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest & Namey, 2005). The researcher made sure that the respondent was told about the purpose of the research and what it sought to achieve before starting the interview, so that he/she could be fully informed and decide whether or not to participate. The researcher read the consent form aloud to each respondent and used the appropriate language which would enable the respondent to understand what it meant. Once the respondent was satisfied and fully understood the research and his or her rights as a participant, the researcher asked the respondent to sign the consent to be interviewed. In all the explanations, the

researcher emphasised to the respondent that the interviews were voluntary, and they were not forced to participate and even in the middle of the interview they had the right to stop the interview if they felt they could not continue.

3.7.2 Confidentiality and anonymity

Confidentiality and anonymity of participants are central to ethical practice in social research. The researcher's aim was to assure participants that every effort would be made to safeguard that the data they provided could not be traced back to them (Crow & Wiles, 2008). The researcher had to protect the respondents' identities and their personal lives. As a result, the researcher used letters of the alphabet as respondents' identification which had no links with either respondents' names or surnames. The researcher gave the respondents assurance that their identities were confidential and that the interviews were done in anonymity. More importantly, for confidentiality purposes, the researcher conducted interviews at the discretion of the respondents. The respondents had the right to choose the place where they felt comfortable and, in most cases, the interviews were done in the respondents' houses. The respondents, as a result, chose places where it was safe from eavesdroppers or spies. However, this was done mainly in the Chegutu rural district, where respondents preferred to be interviewed in private. In some cases they were sceptical about being recorded and they believed that their voices could be easily be recognised. However, the researcher assured them that no one would hear the audio recordings. However, in the Chris Hani rural district, the respondents talked freely, and they did not mind being interviewed in the presence of other people.

3.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the research design, methodology and process followed in the research. The research adopted a qualitative research design using an interpretivist approach that has been described above with the aim of answering the research questions posed by the study. Qualitative research is flexible and factors such as attitude, behaviour and experience can be explored. The methods of data collection were from both secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources included books, journals and Internet sources, whereas primary sources included government documents, political speeches, case study and interviews. The chapter also provided the data analysis techniques adopted by the study; namely, narrative analysis, content analysis and thematic analysis. The chapter also provided in detail the ethical requirements followed in conducting the research.

The next chapter seeks to answer the first research question posed by the study. It will provide the nativist strategies and discourse adopted by ZANU-PF with the aim of maintaining political power in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER FOUR: NATIVIST DISCOURSE USED BY ZANU-PF TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL POWER

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Nativism has been identified as a form of populism that is used as a political strategy to gain and maintain political power. Fernandez (2013: 72) explains nativism as the political process or strategy of promoting the preservation of tradition and revival of indigenous culture. Importantly, nativism arises from an opposition to the mindset of colonialism to reverse discourse by seeking to undermine colonial ideas through the mobilisation of diffused African culture. For example, nativism is broadly manifested in the slogan of “Africa for Africans”.

As indicated in Chapter Two, post-colonial states were unable to assume the mandate of the modern state and to take full control of their state institutions; they were unable to reverse the socio-economic disruption that left post-independence states poverty-stricken and faced with the challenge of resource provision to meet the high expectations of the electorate. In the face of the impossibility of meeting the demands of citizens, African political leaders adopted the use of nativism as a discourse that not only distracted attention from the present by glorifying the past, but also assigned blame for the present on the former colonisers. Nativism has been used as a political mobilisation tool to retain support and popularity, particularly when these started declining, as ruling parties failed to deliver on their promises of greater prosperity for the masses.

The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has been in power in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. As indicated in Chapter Two, the post-independence government was Shona-dominated, and ZANU-PF derived its support

from the ethnic community and opposition ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), but being Ndebele-dominated, it was inevitable that ethnic conflict would surface, rooted in regional and ethnic dimensions. The Shona population comprises approximately 76% and the Ndebele approximately 18% of the population. While ethical tensions erupted in post-colonial Zimbabwe, it was during the colonial era that tribalism was nurtured, fostered and thrived (Munemo, 2016).

Nonetheless, it has been noted in the previous chapters that ZANU-PF popularity has shifted from urban areas to rural areas, which constitute the majority of the electorate in Zimbabwe. Notably, rural Zimbabwe is considered as the stronghold for the ZANU-PF support base, due to the party's ability to use culture as a political tool of mobilisation (Moyo, 2014). This has commended the regime more to the peasant who strongly believes in the power of African culture. By identifying with the rural population, the ZANU-PF regime has managed to avoid regime change attempts by getting important votes from a section of the population who constitute the majority in Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2014).

The chapter seeks to answer the first research question of the study: What are the various nativist discourse that have been used by ZANU-PF to maintain its apparent popularity and demonstrated through the electoral system in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe? In answering the question, the chapter was guided by content analysis. The chapter therefore provides information on the background and rise of nativism in Zimbabwe and includes information on the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the political and economic crises which were catalysts for the rise in the use of nativism by ZANU-PF. The chapter also offers an overview of the nativist strategies and discourse used by ZANU-PF which include the most significant political speeches, the "Third Chimurenga" in the form of land for Africans

(land expropriation in the form of the government seizing White-owned farms), anti-West discourse, propaganda channels and preservation of history.


4.2 THE RISE OF THE USE OF THE POLITICS OF NATIVISM BY ZANU-PF IN ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe was colonised by the British in the 1890s and gained its independence in 1980, with ZANU-PF assuming responsibility as the government. Since the attainment of independence, the ZANU-PF liberation movement turned post-independence government has been at the helm of government and decision making in Zimbabwe (Chigora, Guzuru & Ndimande, 2015). Despite the emergence of opposition political parties, the party has maintained its power through the electoral processes, although it had been accused of “electoral flaws”, intimidation, rigging, and violence (Chigora, Guzuru & Ndimande, 2015). ZANU-PF enjoyed popular support mainly in the eastern, northern and western parts of the country which are Shona-dominated, especially during the first years of post-colonial experience, because it embraced a socialist ideology appearing to be ideal for the newly independent state (Moyo, 2014). The socialist features included equality, social justice and promises of land redistribution. As a result, the dominance of ZANU-PF can be attributed to the hegemony of the Shona people in Zimbabwe and the quest to dominate Matabeleland socially, politically and economically (Mabhena, 2014: 1). The presentation of colonial history and experience – a strategy to constantly remind people of colonialism as a brutal and exploitative system that oppressed and dehumanised Black people – has been critical in the survival of ZANU-PF, as history provides a key element of identity and validation (Moyo, 2014).

ZANU-PF was led by a veteran whose liberation struggle credentials were seemingly unquestionable, and as a result the party's popularity continued, even during an economic and political crisis in the country that set in during the 1990s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007: 3). Mugabe used his oratory skills to conceal the fact that he had been absent from the liberation struggle and that he had assumed a leadership role from a distance, while residing in Mozambique, becoming party leader based on his rhetorical skills and political acumen. After the liberation struggle, the people in Matabeleland believed that ZAPU and its military wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), had fought and won the war and deserved to be the leaders of government. However, it was not the case, as ZANU, representing the Shona majority, won the first democratic election. During the negotiations for the transition from colonial to an independent state, the delegation which included ZANU and ZAPU and other small revolutionary movements, negotiated as a collective under the banner of the "Patriotic Front" alliance (2007, 3). After the agreement for the transition was reached, ZANU declared it would contest the elections outside the alliance and aimed to win the first democratic elections. This led to the ethnically based dispute between the Shona and the Ndebele that erupted soon after independence, as ZANU believed that they had been used by ZAPU, which had not contributed as much in the liberation struggle.

This prompted the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF government to embark on a multi-pronged strategy to eliminate the opposition. Part of the strategy was the use of state-controlled media to portray Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU as traitors who were not heroic liberators – like ZANU – and who were a threat to hard-won independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). The media portrayed ZAPU as a party that supported dissidents and indeed the entire Matabeleland as comprising anti-liberation dissidents. As a result, anti-Ndebele sentiment was actively cultivated among the majority Shona population, so

that a feeling of being unwanted and excluded emerged amongst the Ndebele people of Matabeleland. The second and even more dangerous element of the strategy began in 1981 when then Prime Minister Mugabe established the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), which the Prime Minister said it was to deal with dissidents and any trouble in the country (Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice, 1989). This brigade was called “Gukurahundi”, a Shona word meaning the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains. The brigade was not integrated into the army, but was answerable to Mugabe and the Central Committee, who deployed the army in Matabeleland between 1983 and 1987 in a series of massacres, justified by claims that the Ndebele were dissidents and needed to be exterminated. An estimated 20,000 people were killed in these ethnically directed massacres, which continued until ZANU-PF and ZAPU signed a treaty of unity on 22 December 1987, forging an alliance through which ZAPU became part of ZANU-PF, leading to a one-party state (Mabhena, 2014).



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
Despite being unpopular in Matabeleland as a result of this, ZANU-PF successfully won elections in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013 and 2018 in the midst of an economic and political decline, and amidst accusations by international media and observers, as well as Zimbabwean commentators, of fraud and unfair practices such as the violent nature of the electoral process.

4.2.1 Political and economic crises in post-colonial Zimbabwe and the emergence of MDC

The post-independence Zimbabwe economic crisis emerged from a political problem, whereby the government retained the systems of control that were used by the colonial government and its failure to develop a credible economic strategy. The end of the 1980s saw the beginning of economic deterioration in Zimbabwe which was a result

of widespread corruption, loss of private investments, mismanagement of parastatals and collapse of the agricultural sector as production declined.

As a result of the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, the Zimbabwean government took loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to rescue the economy. The government then adopted the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) of the World Bank (WB), whose objective was to stimulate foreign investment activities to boost trade and production, in return boosting the economy. The SAPS package as a general set of principles and advocated practices included trade liberalisation, export promotion and currency devaluation. Consequently, the state was removed as the principal economic agent, thereby returning to and adopting the role of the private sector (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2004). However, instead of allowing a free market to run without government interference in Zimbabwe, the state seized funds and transferred them to beneficiaries; namely, senior members of the ZANU-PF regime.



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The strategy behind the SAPS left African countries crippled by debt and led to economic failure which had destructive social consequences (Thomson, 2010: 194). In the late 1990s, the Zimbabwean economy experienced a shortfall in output leading to collapse in bank lending and as a result, the government increased the rate at which they were printing money, some of which was used to finance the war in the Congo and to increase salaries of officials and soldiers. Additionally, the government faced debt obligations from the IMF. In 1997, war veterans of the Second Chimurenga (war for liberation) played a central part in the escalation of Zimbabwe's economic and political disorder due to their existence as a unified force and their ability to challenge state power (Ryan, 2003). This was because at independence the new government had promised land and wealth re-distribution to those who had fought in the liberation

wars. However, nothing was done and as a result, the war veterans became frustrated over unfulfilled promises. The war veterans represented ZANU-PF's primary source of political legitimacy, and their dissatisfaction presented a threat to then Mugabe-led government power. In 1997, the government was forced to make a payment of ZWD \$50,000 and a monthly payment of ZWD \$2,000 to each war veteran, an expense which the government had not budgeted for, consequently collapsing the economy. The government approved unbudgeted expenditures which amounted to 3% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for bonuses to more than 60,000 independence war veterans (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2011).

Furthermore, in a move widely criticized, Zimbabwe entered the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998, again necessitating unbudgeted expenditure on a war in another African state. As a result, in 1998, the government spent a significant share of the GDP on its involvement in the war in the Congo. As the efforts to cover the payments with tax increases failed and the economy was in decline, the government debt also increased, and the government responded by printing more money, which caused more inflation and basic conditions of living declined. By 2003, Zimbabwe's economy was the fastest shrinking in the world – 18% per year (Munangagwa, 2011). As a result, ZANU-PF started losing its popularity, especially in the urban areas, leading to the emergence of the opposition party.

In the late 1990s, the formation and rise of an urban-based opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), brought to a climax ZANU-PF fears of losing political power. The urban support base of MDC led to ZANU-PF targeting issues that appealed to rural communities with traditional views. In addition, the defeat in the constitutional referendum of February 2000 made it clear that the support for ZANU-PF had shifted away to the MDC, forcing ZANU-PF to strategies to retain

popular support (Alexander, 2003). The constitutional referendum vote in 2000 was to vote in favour of or against a proposed new Constitution. The proposed constitution prescribed power to the government to seize farms owned by White people without compensation. However, the majority of Zimbabweans, through voting, rejected the constitution proposed by President Mugabe and ZANU-PF (Slaughter & Nolan, 2000). More importantly, the MDC campaigned for voting against the adoption of the new constitution. Evidently, the decline in living standards due to political and economic crises was one of the main reasons for the growing dissatisfaction with the ZANU-PF-led government; this led to the galvanising of civic groups and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) forming a political party, the MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai (Maroleng, 2004).



Since the unity accord in 1987 between ZANU and Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union (ZAPU), there had been no serious threat to ZANU-PF dominance until the emergence of MDC in 1999. Consequently, the defeat of ZANU-PF in the February 2000 referendum provided a huge threat to ZANU-PF. The parliamentary elections held in June the same year revealed that ZANU-PF had lost its grip on the urban constituencies, with the MDC gaining popularity and ZANU-PF getting a tiny majority. ZANU-PF realised that in order to maintain its dominance, it needed to rely on the rural areas and make progress on longstanding issues such as land redistribution.

The rise of the politics of nativism in Zimbabwe can be traced to the late 1990s after Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis started manifesting itself. In attempting to mobilise support, it was used by ZANU-PF as a tool to detract from these issues (Muzondidya, 2010). Although the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe date back to the early 1980s, when the Mugabe regime failed to adequately address the problems facing the post-colonial state, it was only in the late 1990s that ZANU-PF

adopted nativism because it became clear that the country was moving towards social and political implosion. The political and economic crises and the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by Morgan Tsvangirai, a former trade union leader, can be foregrounded as the major impediment to the monopoly of ZANU-PF rule; this resulted in the rise of the politics of nativism.

4.3 ZANU-PF AND NATIVISM

After a steady economic decline and rising social unrest in the 1990s, the beginning of the twenty-first century saw ZANU-PF plunging into a crisis. The failures of the post-colonial state to deliver on the promises of prosperity forced the ruling party to adopt a new strategy to regain support, which led to the increased use of nativism as a form of appealing to public sentiment. The nativist strategies of ZANU-PF overlooked the urban modern set-up, therefore, and involved a hegemonic programme that romanticised the past and included glorifying history, traditions, liberation songs, departed heroes, appeals to a pan-African solidarity and music (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). This comprised a validation of the liberation war history and reinforcement of the heroic role of those who participated in the struggle, a promulgation of annual commemorations of departed nationalist heroes, and a re-definition and re-configuration of the notion of nation and citizenship by restoration of land to its original native owners (Moyo, 2005). This was supported by concomitant attacks on colonialism, Europe and White settlers, who constituted the “Other” and were depicted as the enemy.

To advance the ZANU-PF nativist stance, President Robert Mugabe used different platforms, such as national celebrations speeches on Independence Day held annually on 18 April, Heroes Day celebrations held annually on the second Monday of


August or international platforms such as UN and AU summits. However, in disseminating information, ZANU-PF also used propaganda channels to further nativist strategy and discourse. Different themes included anti-White settler farmers and anti-Western sentiments, alongside those in favour of tradition, preservation of history and land for Black Zimbabweans, all of which will be discussed.

4.3.1 Propaganda channels

ZANU-PF used state-owned broadcasting corporations and media to connect and transfer their message to the population whilst neutralising counter-discourse. Public broadcasting is a state-owned broadcasting service made for the public and financed by the public, therefore the mandate of broadcasting is to provide programmes for the general public with material which is supposed to inform and enrich the public domain (Masuke, 2011). However, historically, state-owned or state-controlled media have been used for the purpose of disseminating propaganda in support of the state. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) which had one television channel and four radio stations as a public broadcaster in Zimbabwe is defined by the Broadcasting Service Act (2001) as a broadcasting entity owned by the state and controlled by the state, although ZANU-PF has been accused of monopolising the state broadcasting corporation. In 2001, the Zimbabwe broadcasting act was passed – this Act imposed 75% local content on all broadcasters. The Minister of Information, Professor Jonathan Moyo, advocated the production of pro-government songs (Chimurenga songs) in support of policies such as the land redistribution programme (Masuke, 2011). Consequently, in 2003 the state broadcasters were required to play 100% local content.

Radio is the most popular source of news and information in rural areas in Zimbabwe and as a result, the coverage of the glorifying of ZANU-PF enabled it to connect with

its broader rural support base. More importantly, the post-2000 period saw state broadcasters frequenting “Chave Chimurenga” (“revolution has taken off”) songs that praised the government works in reclaiming the land and the importance of embracing the initiative. Sibanda in Mawere (2015) states that there was an increase in propaganda dissemination released under the series “Chave Chimurenga”. This included songs such as “Sisonke” (“we are together”), “Uya uone kutapira kunoita kurima” (“come and witness” how beneficial farming is), “Rambai makashinga” (“remain resilient”) and “Sendekera mwana wevhu” (“keep on fighting child of the soil”). These advertisements were given excessive airplay; for instance, in 2003 “Rambai makashinga” was aired about 288 times a day, 8 640 times per month on four state radio and 72 times a day, 2 160 times a month on state television (Sibanda in Mawere, 2015). As a result, the repetitive manner, nature and persuasive discourses of the songs promoted the “patriotic identity” and popularity of Mugabe-led ZANU-PF, as a significant number of the Zimbabwean population relied on radio and television as their source of information.



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As noted above, the ZBC and state-owned newspapers, which act as ZANU-PF mouthpieces, were used by ZANU-PF to justify the fast-track land reform programme which received a lot of condemnation from the international media (Chiumbu, 2004). State-owned newspapers such as *The Herald* and *The Sunday Mail* have been used as mouthpieces for disseminating ZANU-PF populist sentiment. Since 2000, when former president Robert Mugabe launched the land reform programme, foreign and independent media outlets have had to delegitimise Mugabe’s government for what they perceived as land reform injustices and allegations of vote rigging. However, *The Herald* newspaper, according to Mutsvairo (2013), has maintained its pro-ZANU-PF stance, blaming Zimbabwean political and economic crises on the influence of the

West which included the White farmers, the British government and its collusion with the MDC.

One of the unquestionable loyalties of *The Herald*, *The Sunday Mail* newspaper and ZBC to ZANU-PF was the continuous glorification of ZANU-PF as being the only party entitled to govern Zimbabwe by attacking any party or individual with differing discourse.

4.3.2 Nativist strategies and discourse used by ZANU-PF

Nativism comprises two elements to mobilise support: One promotes and glorifies tradition and culture, and the other vilifies the “Other” – both aim at uniting the target audience. The first relies strongly on history, which incorporates past events and memories that can be embellished through presentation and interpretation to maximise the impact.




4.3.2.1 Zimbabwe Independence Day Celebrations (18 April)

Zimbabwe gained its independence from colonial rule on 18 April 1980, which was declared a public holiday. The government also declared every second Monday of August as National Heroes Day holidays. Post-2000, President Mugabe has used these holidays to advocate for nativism through celebrating these days in a manner which ensures the maintenance of Mugabe and ZANU-PF political legitimacy and hold on to power (Mpofu, 2017).

National holiday celebrations, such as Independence Day and Heroes Day, are often addressed by the president of the country. The Independence Day official ceremony is often held at the National Sports Stadium, is publicised through radio, television and media and is attended by foreign delegates, government officials, party officials and members of the public. In his speeches, President Mugabe often starts by revisiting

the past and highlighting the sacrifices made the Zimbabweans during the liberation struggle (Willems, 2013). As a result, Mugabe often used the commemorations to advocate for the politics of nativism, as national days are an important part of a nation's collective memory. However, since 2000 when the political support of ZANU-PF started to deteriorate, ZANU-PF has often used Independence Day for political mobilisation. In 2000, the Independence Day celebrations were held under the slogan "Zimbabwe will never be a colony again". In this slogan, Mugabe utilised the issue of colonialism as not only a political or ideological tool that attacked colonialism, but also to promote the notion that indigenous Zimbabweans are any persons who had been disadvantaged on the grounds of their race before independence.

Consequently, on the 23rd Independence Day celebrations in 2003, President Mugabe accused the British and the United States of trying to re-colonise Zimbabwe, leading to an international campaign against his policies. In a speech, he stated:



We abhor imperialistic machinations and iniquitous efforts by Britain and its ally, the United States, to re-colonise us and we stand ready to resist such attempts...Africa is for Africans and Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans...Our land, our dear Zimbabwe will never again fall into foreign hands. Never and never again will Zimbabwe be a colony again (Chinaka, 2003).

He said this to a loud applause of over 20,000 supporters in the stadium (Chinaka, 2003). However, the sentiments came at a time when the West accused Mugabe and ZANU-PF of rigging the 2002 presidential election. On the other hand, the celebrations came at a time when Zimbabwe was facing social, political and economic instability.

In numerous speeches, Zimbabweans were encouraged to guard their hard-won independence. In his 2007 Independence Day speech, Mugabe stated:

Today as we come to the same venue (of the first independence), we want to repeat to those in Britain whose ears are apparently deaf that: Your flag went down here. Makasunga twenyu tikati endai kwamunobva (you packed your things and we said go to where you came from). Ko chomoramba muchititambudzira chii zuva ranhasi (Why do you keep on bothering us)? Wenyu mureza hausisipoka muno (your flag is no longer here). Waakubhururuka ndewedu wevanhu veZimbabwe. Tiregerei, siyanayi nesu (the flag which is flying is of the people of Zimbabwe, leave us alone)! Let the sound of our celebrations reach the ears of Britain and her allies, and let them know that we shall never, never again be their colony. Congratulations Zimbabwe, congratulations comrades and friends, on our refusal to be recolonised! [...]. Blair, who are you to Zimbabwe, to decide on regime change in Zimbabwe?" (The Herald, 19 April 2007).

Mugabe increasingly directed his speech at foreign powers, such as the British and its allies, for disturbing Zimbabwe's peace. In the middle of the speech he starts using the Shona language to appeal to the Shona people who had provided much needed support for his regime to remain in power and excluding the Ndebele-speaking people who he once termed as dissidents.

Mugabe added:

These heroes and heroines of the struggle would turn in their graves if today we were to bequeath anything less than full, uncompromised independence and sovereignty to the future generations of the country. Thus, today is a day when we also celebrate our continuing electoral successes and victories over British-sponsored negative forces, however, organised (Pan-African News, 19 April 2007).

These sentiments portrayed ZANU-PF as the only legitimate ruler to rule Zimbabwe in order to honour past heroes.

From 2000, Mugabe's speeches at Independence Day celebrations fitted in with war language and determination in safeguarding the country's sovereignty by reminding

the citizens of the past and present threats (Mpofu, 2016) and portraying ZANU-PF as a party that has protected the country's sovereignty and restored people's dignity in the post-colonial era.

4.3.2.2 The Zimbabwe National Heroes Acre

More significantly, after the attainment of independence, the government made provision for provincial heroes' acres in the ten provinces in the country and the National Heroes Acre (NHA) monument which is located a few kilometers from the Harare Central Business District (CBD). The NHA was officially opened in 1984, a period when there was political instability in Matabeleland, which is anti-ZANU-PF, and the Midland provinces. These monuments have been used as the burial sites of war heroes and heroines of the Second Chimurenga. Monuments are created as a legacy that links the past and the present to remind the future generation of the contribution to the present of those who have passed (Kulterman in Samwanda, 2013: 31). More importantly, monuments serve as useful symbols of the past that stir political sentiments that touch not only individual, but a collective memory (Samwanda, 2013: 29).

According to "A Guide to the Heroes Acre", first printed in July 1986, heroes are classified in three categories and reflect the departed hero's or heroine's contribution to the nation (Mataire, 2016). The Guide to the Heroes Acre also states that it was created as a location of national memory and the "pride of the people of Zimbabwe". According to the National Heroes Act, Chapter 10:16, designation of a hero's status is made by the president "where the president considers that any deceased person who was a citizen of Zimbabwe has deserved well on his country on account of outstanding, distinctive and distinguish service". Mugabe regards a hero as a "revolutionary who fought oppression...against the resolute will of the unjust and powerful...political and

economic calculations...of the oppressor nations of the West” (*The Herald* in Mpfu, 2017). As a result, the NHA is believed to signify nationhood and civilisation pre-empting the ones restored by the coming of the Whites (Magadzike, 2011).

A hero/heroine to ZANU-PF was one whose history and lifestyle resonated with party ideology and paid tribute to Mugabe, whereas deviation from the party and criticism of the leader automatically disqualified one from being conferred the status of hero. The ZANU-PF politburo alone determines who deserves to be a hero or heroine, as a result of which questions have risen on the impartiality of the process. Critics have maintained that the awarding of hero or heroine status should be done by the national government, rather than a political party (Sibanda, 2013). History has shown that participation in the liberation war is no guarantee that one will be conferred national hero status. For instance, revolutionary figures such as Ndabaningi Sithole, who was once ZANU leader during the liberation war, and James Chikerema, who was one of the early nationalists to fight the colonial regime, failed to be conferred hero status because of their fall-out with Mugabe (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 30 September 2010). Whilst speaking at the burial of Kumbirai Kangai in September 2013, President Mugabe for the first time openly admitted that the NHA was preserved for ZANU-PF whose history in the struggle for independence was unquestionable. He was quoted as saying: “We told them (referring to the MDC) that there are many places to choose to bury their own heroes. This is ours (ZANU-PF) and we chose it and paid for it” (Sibanda, 2013).

In one of its feature articles, state-owned *The Herald* (29 August 2011) stated:

Coincidentally...all true heroes belong to one party, ZANU-PF. This party with its purported sins organised, fought and liberated this country. So, in terms of patriotism ZANU-PF and its cadres demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt

they are patriotic. However, when ZANU-PF and its cadres celebrate this unquestionable proud legacy, they are accused of personalising the struggle or restricting patriotism to a political party.

In this sense, true Zimbabwean heroes are supposed to originate only from ZANU-PF, fought the liberation struggle and after independence served the party and government (Mpofu, 2017).

Post-2000 saw ZANU-PF instituting a “Patriotic History Project” which was meant to restore Zimbabwe’s liberation war heritage and history, in which it claimed it was under attack from Western powers and the MDC (Mawere & Mubaya, 2016). The patriotic history provided anti-colonial history which glorified ZANU-PF heroism. In public discourse, the NHA has been reserved as the burial place for ZANU-PF loyalists and a platform used by ZANU-PF for mobilising support. Since 2000, ZANU-PF has used the NHA for restoring its popularity amongst the Black majority by denigrating the West and White farmers whose land was violently seized. Cementing these views, President Mugabe was quoted at the burial of Ephraim Masawi in 2010 as saying:

This national shrine (NHA) is a place of renewal and re-dedication that strengthens our resolve and pledge that Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again. For, as we look at the pantheon of heroes and heroines who make our roll call today, what greater challenge, what greater patriotism is there than to faithfully and resolutely guard that which cost us tens of thousands of lives to achieve? Where would our honour be if we were intimidated by the tired trickery of imperialism’s tired trickery into letting go of our sacred land?” (*The Herald*, 10 August 2004).

Mugabe’s speeches at the NHA have constantly pointed to the view that Zimbabwe was a sovereign state, that it belonged to the Black majority and that the British and its allies should leave the country alone. He constantly called for Zimbabweans to be patriotic and defend their country like the heroes buried at the NHA (Mpofu, 2017).

4.3.2.3 Land for Africans (Black Zimbabweans)

Since British conquest and colonisation, return of the land has been the main aim of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. During the colonial period, land in Zimbabwe was expropriated through colonial legislation, with colonial laws successfully segregating indigenous Black people from their land and assigning it to the White minority (Palmer, 1977). The first land legislation by the White colonial rulers was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which allocated better land to White farmers and made provisions for evictions of Black farmers in dry and infertile land. It also designated half of the country's land exclusively to Whites who comprised of 5% of the total population (Nyandoro, 2012). They also passed the Land Tenure Act of 1969 which replaced the Land Apportionment Act and ensured that each race shall have its own area and neither race can own land in the area of other race, unless given a permit. This act ensured complete segregation of the Black majority. As a result, the continued imbalance of land ownership has not been due to the shortage of land, but because of historically unfair distribution patterns. Therefore, the issue of land has always been at the epicentre of national struggle in Zimbabwe.

As a result, the land issue in Zimbabwe is both a consequence and a cause of the struggle for liberation and has always been at the centre of the country's social, economic and political struggles. The land issue came to the forefront during the Lancaster House conference in 1979, where the British and Zimbabwean representatives met with the aim of resolving the transferring of power and ushering independence to Zimbabwe (Huddle, 2007). One of the outcomes of the Lancaster House conference was that land rights were to be entrenched in the bill of rights in the new constitution. They adopted the willing buyer willing seller policy, and also secured land rights for White farmers for a period of ten years from 1980 (Chavanduka &

Bromley, 2011: 2). In the early 1980s, the state formalised land occupation through the implementation of a resettlement model, and in cases where land occupations threatened to disturb commercial farming activities the government intervened to evict occupiers. However, this model failed to pursue the land redistribution plan that would enable to resolve the land imbalances that existed.

Consequently, a vibrant opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) led by Edgar Tekere, was formed in 1990 as a result of growing disapproval of the slow pace of land reform. In response, the ZANU-PF-led government amended Section 16 of the Lancaster House-crafted constitution which stipulated that all land, not just underutilised land, was subject to compulsory acquisition (Masiyiwa, 2004). The National Land Policy of 1990 set out plans for an accelerated programme of resettlement. In the run-up to the 1990 elections, ZANU-PF stressed the need to speed up the land redistribution programme in order to keep past promises in return for maintaining its popular support. The ZANU-PF government argued that compensation was never given to the Black people for the land that was unlawfully taken from them. By the late 1990s, the war veterans of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle became increasingly frustrated over the unfulfilled promises of land and wealth distribution (Groves, 2009). Ironically, the war veterans were ZANU-PF's primary source of legitimacy. Consequently, the war veterans, triggered by ZANU-PF's delay in land reform, began occupying land in rural areas in late 1998.

However, by the year 2000, the reclamation of land by Black Zimbabweans from White settlers was a prominent issue (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). Rural peasants, liberation war veterans, unemployed youth and the emerging Black bourgeoisie formed the backbone of what was called the "Third Chimurenga". War veterans started to seize and take control of White-owned commercial farms in a "spontaneous demonstration"

which had the backing of the government. As a result, in February 2000, land invasions, led by perceived landless Blacks and war veterans, led to the violent removal of White commercial farmers. Due to the nature of these removals, they were known as “jambanja”, which means “force” in Shona (Shumba, 2014). Despite the judiciary ruling on 17 March 2000 that found the seizures of land illegal, the land occupations continued to intensify (Ryan, 2003). Following the land invasions by war veterans and other ZANU-PF supporters, President Mugabe endorsed the land grabs on the ZBC television channel, when he was quoted as saying:

I will never order the war veterans to retreat from the farms they are on ...what are we supposed to do? Ah, you are the ordained ones by the Almighty, by virtue of your White skin and by virtue of your being British, royal blood every one of you, and we will not touch your land? No. The end has come; the land will now come to the people (ZBC News, 9 April 2000).

His sentiments showed how Mugabe viewed the matter of the land issue being embroidered on the racial issue and cemented by his use of Almighty (God), pointing out the superiority of Whites on a religious basis. He used such phrases to rekindle the colonial repressive past and in return gain support from those who had suffered the atrocities of the colonial period (Tevera, 2015).

In his speech at the Independence celebrations on 18 April 2000, Mugabe reiterated that Zimbabweans were sons and daughters of the soil and the land was native Black Zimbabweans’ heritage. In this regard, he connected to land and identity, inferring that without land, Black Zimbabweans had no identity. He was quoted as saying:

Land reform is the last colonial question, heavily qualifying our sovereignty. We are determined to resolve it, once and for all. Let us continue to cherish our independence as well as uphold the principles of our sovereignty. Let us defend our freedom and deliver the benefits of independence to our people...Tiri vana

vevhu... (We are sons and daughters of the soil) Ivhu inhaka yedu (Our land is our heritage (BBC News, 18 April 2000).

In response to the March 2000 citing by a court ruling that land grabs were illegal, the then Mugabe-led government enacted the Land Acquisition Act in May 2000, which amended the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. This was approved in July 2000 and paved the way for the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme (FTLRP). In the Act, the government removed its obligation to pay compensation in respect of agricultural land required for resettlement purposes. It stated that compensation for the land shall only be payable if an adequate fund for such purpose is established as prescribed in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Chambati, 2001).

In support of the FTLRP, in December 2000, Mugabe was quoted at a ZANU-PF congress as saying:



Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of a White man, our real enemy. The courts can do whatever they want, but no judicial decision will stand in our way...My own position is, we should not be defending our position in courts. This country and land is our land...They think because they are White they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. The White man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans (Chinaka, 2000).

This statement indicated Mugabe's stance in promoting the invasion of White-owned farms. He regarded Whites as not being Zimbabwean; therefore, they do not have the right to own land. In justifying the FTLRP, Mugabe was quoted as saying:

We are now talking about the conquest of conquest, the prevailing sovereignty of the people of Zimbabwe over settler minority rule and all it stood for including the possession of our land. Power to the people must now be followed by land to the people (*The Herald*, 6 December 2005).

Significantly, the land redistribution programme started when ZANU-PF was losing its legitimacy, with the emergence of a neo-liberal opposition party MDC challenging the

political status quo and an economic crisis through the defeat of ZANU-PF in the 2000 referendum.

In 2002, the Land Acquisition Amendment Act was put forward as a formal structure of the FTLRP with two models: the first model was to resettle people from overcrowded communal farms and the second was to establish small to medium-sized commercial farms managed by Black indigenous farmers. Beneficiaries of the land invasions (veterans) became the militant wing of ZANU-PF and were accused of using intimidation and violence against opposition supporters, resulting in a marginal victory in the elections in 2000 that were dominated by the terrorising of rural populations by youths belonging to ZANU-PF (Ryan, 2003: 67). In response to these accusations, organisations such as the European Union and British Commonwealth condemned the land invasion as a violation of human rights and claimed that Zimbabwe had fallen under autocratic rule and that further investment in the country would lead to wasted expenditure, after which economic sanctions were imposed. However, a criticism of these claims is that the land reform programme led to genuine changes in the ownership of land and human capital through the introduction of agricultural education and democratic practices in rural society (Bajaj, 2013). In this regard, a sense of dignity was gained by ordinary Black Zimbabweans due to ownership of land and this could translate into long-term economic benefits (Bajaj, 2013).

More importantly, ZANU-PF used what is referred to by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) as “nativist racism” that denied the White Zimbabweans citizenship, regardless of whether they were born in Zimbabwe, so that they could take land from them. As noted earlier, Zimbabwean citizenship became exclusively available for Black people born in Zimbabwe, not Whites. This was concluded by the Citizenship Act (2001), which stripped Whites of their Zimbabwean citizenship. In support of this act, in an interview

with Christine Amanpour (CNN senior reporter) on CNN in 2009, former Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe was quoted saying:

Zimbabwe belongs to Zimbabweans, pure and simple, white Zimbabweans even those born in the country with legal ownership of land, have a debt to pay. They are British settlers, citizens by colonisation (CNN, 24 September 2009).

Evidently, Mugabe's sentiments during the interview confirmed his ideas of "Africans for Africans", with Africans being exclusively indigenous Black people. In addition, his sentiments were followed by the passing of the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act that defined indigenous Zimbabweans as Black and African, whereas Whites could not claim to be Zimbabwean and neither could they claim ownership of land (Hwami, 2013: 127).

In 2017, at the annual National Heroes celebration justifying the FTLRP, Mugabe was quoted in *The Herald* saying:

Let us keep this land to ourselves and not bring back the Whites because there are already talking, asking why we took back the land if we failing to utilise it. It is not true that Zimbabwe chased away White settlers land was only repossessed...they fled on their own (*The Herald*, 14 August 2017).

He added:

Unity means we have to share the same ideology. But there are some who are still crawling by night going to Britain and her allies pleading for sanctions.... Zimbabwe belongs to all of us. We say Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe for indigenous Black Zimbabweans (*The Herald*, 14 August 2017).

However, though he urged unity amongst Zimbabweans, in fact he threatened anybody who opposed him.

In Kwame Nkrumah's book, *Neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism* (1975), the first president of an independent African state argues that colonialism was not

abolished completely in post-colonial African states and that in reality, Black people were not liberated. In line with this view, the transfer of land from White settlers to indigenous Zimbabweans is one of the doctrines of ZANU-PF nativism intended to undo in neo-colonialism, in order to acquire total independence. The land expropriation reforms received mixed reports and reviews from both external and internal observers and commentators. The negative argument stated that land reform was a process that was driven by political expediency and that the sole justification was the survival of ZANU-PF, which was struggling to retain power (Hwami, 2013). On the other hand, land redistribution was said to be implemented to redress the issues of land that had not been addressed since independence because “the willing buyer willing seller” approach adopted after independence was proceeding very slowly, as most of the population, especially the communal and rural peasantry, did not have the money to buy land from the Whites. The apparent failure of the land redistribution programme in the first decade of independence was used as a nativist strategy to secure popular support, especially in the rural areas which constitute the majority of the Black electorate in Zimbabwe.

Furthermore, in addition to the land redistribution programme being a political strategy for ZANU-PF to elicit votes, it created a patron-client relationship between ZANU-PF and new native land owners. Notably, the recipients of land under the land reform programme tended to support ZANU-PF because they feared losing their land. In their argument about the land reform, the MDC emphasised that ZANU-PF land reform was neither genuine nor about redressing past colonial imbalances, but instead it was a “vote-buying patronage gimmick” (News24, 7 May 2015). It was evident in early 2000 that ZANU-PF was losing its popular support with the emergence of MDC threatening its hold on to power. However, ZANU-PF not only adopted the land reform programme

vis-a-vis “Africa for Africans” as the only nativist strategy to gain popularity, but it also used anti-West rhetoric through speeches at political rallies, conferences or national celebratory gatherings.

4.3.2.4 Anti-West discourse

Alongside the element of nativism, which promotes and glorifies indigenous values, history and culture, populism is the element which identifies and attacks a source to which blame is attached, which in the case of Zimbabwe is the West – Britain – as the former coloniser, and White people as British settlers.

Mugabe fashioned himself as a liberator in making widely publicised political speeches challenging and condemning Western imperialism. From the late 1990s onwards, Mugabe used platforms such as annual Independence celebrations, National Heroes’ celebrations, the burial of liberation struggle heroes at national monuments, and United Nations General Assembly meetings, among other public gatherings, to advance ZANU-PF nativist rhetoric.

ZANU-PF anti-West rhetoric was intensified by imposed economic sanctions against the ZANU-PF-led government by the US and the West. Economic sanctions are actions undertaken by one or more countries to end or limit economic relations with a targeted country to persuade or force the recipient country change its policies or behaviour (Prinslow, 2010). Types of sanctions may include financial, travel, commodity boycotts and arms embargoes. The European Union’s (EU) first economic sanctions were imposed following the land reform enforced by Mugabe, where farms owned by Whites were forcibly seized. On 18 February 2002, the EU foreign ministers agreed to impose “smart” sanctions against Zimbabwe and withdraw EU election monitors in the country after the head of the monitoring team was expelled from

Zimbabwe. The EU stated that it was concerned about the political violence, serious violations of human rights and the restrictions on media, which questions the fairness of the 2002 presidential elections (*The Guardian*, 18 February 2002). The sanctions included arms embargoes, as well as travelling and financial sanctions against selected individuals seeking to reinforce the ZANU-PF-led government drive for change in reflecting the democratic will of the Zimbabwean people.

On March 6, 2003, the US also imposed “smart” sanctions on selected individuals of the Zimbabwean government. These were reinforced in 2005 and a number of people and business entities were targeted with further sanctions added in 2008. Smart sanctions are sanctions targeting specific political leaders, organisations and political elites believed to have conducted objectionable behaviour; in the case of Zimbabwe, they targeted ZANU-PF political leaders, organisations and political elites who are believed to have abused basic human rights. In his statement about imposing economic sanctions, President Bush of US stated:



Over the course of more than two years, the government of Zimbabwe has systematically undermined the nation's democratic institutions, employing violence, intimidation and repressive means, including legislation, to stifle opposition to its rule. Mugabe's rule not only harmed Zimbabwe's people but also posed an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy interests of the United States” (Stout, 2003). However, in response, President Mugabe described the sanctions against his regime as racist and illegal, but the US dismissed his claims arguing that he wanted to divert the people's attention from the real issues (*The Financial Gazette*, 11 September 2009).

According to the United States, it imposed economic sanctions on some individuals serving in Mugabe's regime as a result of the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons undermining democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe (Mpofu, 2014). However, the implementation

and effects of these sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy and society at large are debatable (Mpofu, 2014). The US and the EU maintained that the sanctions were not aimed at the general economy and did not impose any economic blockade on Zimbabwe.

By way of reaction to the sanctions imposed by the US and the West, Mugabe-led ZANU-PF set out its anti-imperialist vis-à-vis anti-White and anti-West solidarity project around Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Mugabe utilised the politics of nativism on every platform and at every opportunity to attack the West and the US.

In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 2002, President Mugabe delivered a lecture against Britain and then-Prime Minister Tony Blair and pointed out that they should not interfere with the Zimbabwean affairs. He was quoted as saying:



I appeal to the General Assembly to convey to Britain and especially to Tony Blair that Zimbabwe ceased to be a British colony in 1980 after Prince Charles on the behalf of the Royal Kingdom government graciously lowered the British flag...Zimbabwe fought for independence and was ready to defend it (Warren, 2002).

His remarks were directed against the criticism by Western countries of the land reform programme which had started in 2000. In the same speech, he said:

My country elected me, and the elections were held to have been valid by Africa...but Europe said 'no' and it was Europe that yesterday was our oppressor and colonial master. Who do we listen to - the Whites in Europe or the Blacks in Africa? (Warren, 2002).

His sentiments came after the 2000 presidential elections which ZANU-PF had won, although it had been widely accused by international observers of violence and voter intimidation.

In the same year, Mugabe again orchestrated an attack on the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and Britain at the UN Earth Summit in South Africa, blaming Britain for Zimbabwe's problems (Butcher, 2002). Mugabe was quoted as saying:

We say this as Zimbabweans, we have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty; small as we are, we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed our blood in sustenance and maintenance and protection of that independence. We do not mind having and bearing sanctions banning us from Europe; we are not Europeans; we have not asked for any square inch of that territory. So, Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe (Mugabe, 2002).

His sentiments were received with a round of applause from representatives of former colonies. However, these sentiments received criticism from Western nations, with the New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clark, blaming Zimbabwean policies for the low crop yields and food shortages in that country and for exacerbating the food crisis in southern Africa.



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This event was probably one of his proudest moments, as he garnered the international limelight on major television networks, newspapers, radio talk shows and news agency reports. His speech exposed what he termed the "Western coalition" against Zimbabwe and gave the Third World a new voice to speak with boldness against neo-colonialism being brought about in the name of globalisation and democracy. According to the state newspaper, *The Herald* (4 September 2002), the speech exposed the British machinations against Zimbabwe and its hate sanctions campaign based on blatant lies. As a result, according to its view, the speech conveyed the message that Zimbabwe is a truly free country and he (Mugabe) would die to protect its sovereignty. Mugabe's speech continued with ZANU-PF's constant rhetoric, amongst others, that included:

We are not for sale, Zimbabwe is not for sale... not for the highest bidder and let Mr Blair hear... we are not for the British bidder, Sanctions, Public Enemy Number One, Economic saboteurs do not have a place in Zimbabwe, Africa's cause is our cause and Zimbabwe will never be a colony again (Mpofu, 2017).

Mugabe's speech reiterated the effects of neo-colonialism, whereby an economy is subordinated to the needs of the powerful advanced industrialised economies, which Mugabe claimed to be the United Kingdom.

In launching his ZANU-PF 2005 parliamentary elections manifesto, Mugabe criticised the West for constantly trying to undermine his leadership by calling him a tyrant. Notably, then US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice described Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny. In response, at the manifesto launch in 2005, Mugabe was quote saying:



If Zimbabwe were indeed a tyrant, the first person to lose his head would be Ian Smith (former minority rule president). We have kept him and protected that head. He eats our food, lives in our home comfortably and is protected by our rules of law and order (Aljazeera, 20 February 2005).

In the same year, 2005, Zimbabwe was to conduct parliamentary elections; during the previous presidential election ZANU-PF was accused of political violence. In defence of these views at the manifesto launch, Mugabe was quoted as saying:


The Blair I know is a bliar [meaning liar]. He goes telling lies to the rest of Europe that the problem here is the lack of democracy ... lack of human rights, lack of transparency. How many countries in the world have been as consistent with elections, holding them in a timely fashion, even in Africa here I want to know (Aljazeera, 20 May 2005)?

His sentiments were received with loud cheers from thousands of the ZANU-PF supporters who had gathered for the manifesto launch.

After the isolation of Zimbabwe by the West from 2000 after ZANU-PF land grabs, in his 25th anniversary speech at Independence Day celebrations in 2005, Mugabe attacked the West for their continuous desire to dominate Zimbabwe and rather advocated for the “look East” policy. In his speech, he was quoted as saying:

We have turned east (Asia), where the sun rises and given our back to the West (Europe and US), where the sun sets...We made our democracy and we owe it to ourselves, not to anyone, least of all Europeans. Until we beat them at the battlefield, Britain and her kith and kin here would not concede voting rights to Africans (*The Guardian*, 18 April 2005).

However, 25th Independence celebrations came at a time when Zimbabwe was facing socio-political and economic decline. Evidently, agriculture had collapsed to the extent that the country had to rely on international relief and the majority of the population was unemployed and living in poverty.



Mugabe continued to use platforms established by Western powers such as the UN General assembly to drive forward his anti-Western and anti-imperialism sentiments. At the 62nd UN General Assembly, he emphasised the sovereignty of Zimbabwe as an independent state, stating:

Zimbabwe won its independence on the 18th of April 1980 against British imperialism which denied us human rights and democracy. The West still negates our sovereignties by way of controlling our resources, in the process making us mere chattels in our own lands..... That control largely persists, although it stands firmly challenged in Zimbabwe, thereby triggering the current stand-off between us and Britain, supported by her cousin states, most notably the United States and Australia. I am termed dictator because I have rejected this supremacist view and frustrated the neo-colonialists. Let the sinister governments be told here and now that Zimbabwe will not allow regime change authored by outsiders. We do not interfere with their own systems in America

and Britain. Mr Bush and Mr Brown have no role to play in our national affairs (Mugabe, 2007).

He emphasised the issue of sovereignty and pitted himself as a victim because he has rejected the desire of the West and the US to control Zimbabwe; as a result he was called a dictator. His emphasis was on the desire of Zimbabwe to be left alone and make its own decisions without outside interference.

In 2008, Zimbabwe entered a violent political crisis after the 29 March harmonised elections and 27 June presidential election re-run. Harmonised election was a situation whereby presidential, parliamentary and local government elections were done on the same day. Nonetheless, the violence came to a climax after ZANU-PF lost the first round of the presidential elections to the MDC. At a political rally Mugabe was quoted as follows:



MDC will never be allowed to rule this country, never ever? Only God can remove me, not MDC not the British. We will never allow an event like an election to reverse our independence just through the strike of a pen on ballot paper for the matter of our sovereignty, our sweat, and all we fought for and all our comrades died fighting for. It is God who put me in this position, not British (*The Herald*, 2008).

In this regard, he positioned himself in as divine and God-given.

However, even after Mugabe won the run-off in June, the political violence continued prompting the UN to send a fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to commission a report to be presented at the UN Security Council (International Responsibility to Protect, 2008). The group was, however, denied visas by Zimbabwean authorities, preventing the international community and civil societies from investigating the mass human rights abuses and the systematic repression in the country. In response to the alleged human rights abuse in December 2008 at the burial of former ZANU-PF national

commissar, Elliot Manyika, Mugabe warned against interference by external parties in Zimbabwe in the form of the UN fact-finding mission in Zimbabwe, which he said was orchestrated by Western powers whom he described as deceitful. He was quoted saying:

Zimbabwe will never be a colony again...It doesn't matter what happens, Zimbabwe is my country. They now want to topple the Mugabe government, Mugabe must go because Bush is going. Zimbabweans will refuse that one of their sons must accompany Bush to his political death," (*The Herald*, 8 December 2008).

His sentiments sought to use anti-West rhetoric to justify his re-election as president in June, despite his party not having won the elections. He alluded to foreigners as being those who did not wish him to be in power, rather than recognising that it was the wish of the majority of Zimbabwean citizens. By referring to the involvement of the UN, Mugabe sought to identify this body as representing the same interests as the repressive pre-independence colonial regime.

Following this, Mugabe used the burial of heroes/heroines at the NHA to again express anti-West sentiments. At the burial of then deputy president, Joseph Msika in 2009, which coincided with the National Heroes Day celebrations, Mugabe was quoted as saying:

Zimbabwe is a free country. Zimbabwe needs not to be tied in any one corner of the world, least of all a corner of former imperialist and racist colonisers. We are not part of Europe and the United States. Anyway, are these the only parts of the world we should deal with? Kwadzinorohwa matumbu ndiko kwadzinomhanyira! (We should not rush back into the hands of our enemies). We are part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The West seeks to divide us and disturb our peace. They have never welcomed the understanding that we are able to build our own tutelage..... (Maingire, 2009).

These sentiments came after ZANU-PF had won the presidential elections, but the MDC had won the majority in Parliament in 2008. The negotiations were mediated by the SADC delegation led by the South African president, Thabo Mbeki. This was a political negotiation amongst MDC, ZANU-PF and a smaller splinter group of the MDC. These negotiations were intended to end partisan politics and abuse of basic human rights. The talks took place from July 2008 to September 2008 when an agreement was met where Mugabe was to remain president and Tsvangirai, the leader of MDC, was to become prime minister.

The 2008 Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, signed by Mugabe in 2008, supposedly aimed at promoting the involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in business and the distribution of economic resources (Shumba, 2014). In 2013, at the burial of Retired Air Commodore Karakadzai, *The Herald* quoted Mugabe as saying:



Kana zvedu zvauya (when we get angry and show our wrath), aahh, so they should not continue to harass us. The British and Americans we are treating their people well here. There will come a time when we also lose our patience. We have not done anything to their companies here, the British have several companies in this country and we have not imposed any control or sanctions against them.... But time will come when we will say well tit for tat; you hit me, I hit you. You impose this on me I impose this on you. We have a country to run we must be left free to run our country. We don't run it by taking ideas from London or Washington, our ideas come from us.... (*The Herald*, 27 August 2013)

His remarks came after the West had condemned the ZANU-PF led government for assuming majority (51%) ownership of all foreign-owned firms, including banks and mines, with failure to comply, resulting in their licenses being revoked.

In 2016 at the African Union summit in Ethiopia where Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary-General, was in attendance, Mugabe ended his position as one-year chair of the

African Union with a speech indicating the intolerance for the West's involvement in Africa's matters. Advocating his anti-West stance, Mugabe said: "Regime change, Mugabe should not be there, we want someone else," referring to Western countries and the US. In cementing his position as Zimbabwean president he went on to say that, "I will be there until God said come and join the others. But as long as I am still alive, I will still have the punch." However, in his speech he went on to insinuate that then American President, Barack Obama, was a puppet of the United States and by implication, White Western interests, saying: "There is Obama today, yes but what is he? A voice to speak their language, to act their act and not our act, but their act. They are still superiors" (eNCA, 31 January 2016).

Nonetheless, ZANU-PF's anti-West sentiments came at a time when Zimbabwe started facing an economic meltdown. As a result, nativist discourse concentrated mainly on blaming the White people and the Western countries for their economic problems. More importantly, Mugabe-led ZANU-PF set out its anti-imperialist vis-à-vis the anti-White and anti-West solidarity project around Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Mugabe utilised the anti-West sentiments on every platform and at every opportunity to attack the West and US, consequently popularising his discourse.

4.4 CONCLUSION

The main aim of the chapter was to provide the nativist discourse and strategies employed by ZANU-PF. The chapter was qualitative and, based on content analysis. The chapter provided information on the background and rise of nativism in Zimbabwe. The emergence of the MDC as a vibrant opposition in late 1990s threatened ZANU-PF's hold on to power and consequently, since independence in 1980, ZANU-PF's hold on to power was never threatened. More importantly, the MDC came at a time

when ZANU-PF was facing an economic crisis. As a result, it was seen as one of the catalysts for the rise in the use of nativism by ZANU-PF in trying to maintain its popularity.

ZANU-PF's nativist discourse included anti-West sentiments, anti-White sentiments and land for Blacks. Alongside the promotion and glorification of indigenous values, history and culture is the element which identifies and attacks a source to which blame is attached; in the case of Zimbabwe this was the West, in particular Britain as the former coloniser, and White people as British settlers.

Former president Mugabe fashioned himself as a liberator in making widely publicised political speeches challenging and condemning Western imperialism. From the late 1990s onwards, Mugabe used platforms such as annual Independence celebrations, National Heroes' celebrations and the burial of liberation struggle heroes at national monuments, and also United Nations General Assembly meetings, among other public gatherings, to advance ZANU-PF nativist rhetoric. However, propaganda channels such as the state-owned broadcasting corporation and media, where used to transmit the nativist message to the targeted audience, mainly in rural Zimbabwe.

It has been noted that the support of ZANU-PF has shifted from urban areas to rural areas which constitute the majority of the electorate in Zimbabwe. The next chapter provides responses to the above-mentioned nativist strategies and discourse by using a sample of the rural population in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Chegutu rural district in the Mashonaland West province of Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESPONSE TO THE NATIVIST DISCOURSE EMPLOYED BY ZANU-PF IN RURAL AREAS (CHEGUTU RURAL DISTRICT OF ZIMBABWE)

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter explored different nativist discourse and strategies used by ZANU-PF in its efforts to maintain its popularity amongst the rural electorate. Chapter Four provided in detail information about what are considered some of the factors that ignited the rise of nativism, which included the intensification of socio-economic deterioration and the subsequent political crisis after the emergence of a vibrant urban opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Public media in the form of state-owned newspapers and state-controlled radio and a television station were used as propaganda channels in disseminating anti-West and anti-White sentiments, with blame for the ZANU-PF government's failure to carry out socio-economic reforms to raise the standard of living for all Zimbabweans assigned to the West and to Whites. In addition to nativist discourse, nativist practices included the expropriation of land from White farmers and allocation to Black people through the land reform programme and the glorification of certain historic figures and events under the preservation of history project, which assigned remembrance sites.

This chapter seeks to unpack and provide answers to the second research question posed: How have the rural populations in the Chegutu rural district responded to the diverse nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF?

This chapter presents and analyses the responses to nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF from a sample of the rural population in the Chegutu rural district in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Mashonaland West province of Zimbabwe.

The Mashonaland West province is Shona-dominated and forms one of the strong support bases of ZANU-PF, in contrast to the Matabeleland North province, where the majority are Ndebele-speaking people and since independence have not supported ZANU-PF. One of the objectives of this study, apart from the actual responses to nativism, is to establish whether the responses in rural Zimbabwe differ from those in rural South Africa and, if so, how. The nature of the responses to nativism obtained from a sample population who support the ruling party (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe will later be compared to the responses to nativism from a sample of the population who traditionally support the ruling party (ANC) in South Africa.

The previous chapters have indicated that since the advent of democracy in Zimbabwe, the post-2000 period saw the popular support of ZANU-PF shifting from urban to rural areas, as evident in the electoral results (Election Resource Centre). As indicated in Chapter Two, Zimbabwean rural dwellers constitute the majority of the electorate and, more significantly, rural dwellers are less educated and less informed. Households are not close to one another, making it difficult to share information. Therefore, they rely mostly on the news they get from the state-owned radio, which had been accused by opposition parties of being biased in favour of ZANU-PF. By way of contrast, the urban dwellers are more educated and better informed, and households are in close proximity and are able to communicate and discuss matters easily, thereby developing opposing views, which leads to organising politically to contest official government discourse.

As indicated in Chapter Two, the study aligns itself with a broadly Africanist and interpretive approach, which focuses on the uniqueness of the colonial experience and its impact on the independent post-colonial state in Africa. Post-colonial theory strives to prevent knowledge being constrained by a particular paradigm and resonates with

the aim of an interpretive approach, which explores the circumstances and strategies that have contributed to the ongoing electoral support for the ANC and ZANU-PF in rural areas and the responses to it. Despite the researcher's intention not to locate the study within any particular paradigm, it is impossible to overlook the relevance of the hypotheses developed by Ekeh and Mamdani, relating to the nature of the post-colonial state and its relationship with its citizenry. Chapter Two of the study discussed in detail Ekeh and Mamdani's hypotheses of the two publics and the bifurcated state, respectively, which provided a convincing analysis of the reality of the post-colonial state, the political elite and bureaucracy and their relationship with citizens. Ekeh's hypothesis of the two publics and Mamdani's bifurcated state theme were used as a preliminary conceptual framework to help the researcher approach the study.

Comparing rural and urban areas in Zimbabwe, the rural areas are far less developed than the urban areas; in rural areas, people still value their tradition and customs. There is a sense of obligation to the ruler – now the state – as there was in traditional society conforming to the notion of two publics referred by Ekeh and the bifurcated state by Mamdani. Despite being less developed, they produce the much-needed support for the survival of ZANU-PF. In 2008, 2013 and 2018 ZANU-PF won presidential run-off elections by 85,5% after the MDC candidate pulled out of the race, and 61% against 34% from MDC and 50,8% against MDC 44%, respectively (Election Resource Centre). However, in the parliamentary elections in 2013 and 2018, ZANU-PF obtained a two-thirds majority. Noticeable in all the election results, it obtained more than 80% support in rural areas and lost the majority of the urban votes. Both Ekeh and Mamdani argued that two publics and a bifurcated state, respectively, were characteristics of the colonial state and these characteristics did not disappear with the dawn of democracy and independence. Consequently, ZANU-PF has used this

legacy of colonialism in propelling its nativist discourse to appeal more to the rural dwellers; in return, they receive electoral support, taking advantage of the fact that tradition and culture are the bases of the state in rural areas.

Significantly, when the researcher was conducting interviews in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe the researcher had to seek permission from village leaders known as “*sabhuku*” (headman). Without permission being granted to interview the villagers, conducting interviews would have been breaking protocol and villagers would have simply refused to be interviewed and if they did agree, they would have been reprimanded. This is evidence of Mamdani’s observations that rural areas still maintain a system of authority in which tradition and culture are incorporated, and that this system supplants the bureaucratic structure of the modern state. There is a culture of conformity rather than dissent in rural areas and the customs, norms, and traditions are generally followed by the population. There is seldom a dissenting voice, certainly not among commoners, as this would lead to isolation. Debate takes place between the chief and those whose counsel he seeks, normally the elders. If the chief or other traditional leaders say something, it is accepted and obeyed.

5.2 RESPONSES TO NATIVIST DISCOURSE EMPLOYED BY ZANU-PF

As previously stated, the study adopts an interpretivist methodological approach within the overarching approach of post-colonial theory to enable the “truth”, as conceptualised by respondents, to emerge. Of the 20 respondents over the age of 18 interviewed in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe, the oldest respondent was 77 years of age, whilst the youngest respondent was 19 years of age. During the


interviews, the researcher discovered that the views of the younger people were completely different from those of the older people, as will be shown. Semi-structured interviews were used to obtain responses to specific questions about the nativist discourse of the ruling party without suppressing what the respondents wanted to say, and to this end, open-ended and follow-up questions were asked to explore particular topics and themes.

The interviews were conducted after the ousting of President Robert Mugabe in November 2017 in what was essentially a coup d'état, under the guise of a voluntary decision by Mugabe to step down. This heralded the end of what had become a repressive dictatorship and in the subsequent atmosphere of optimism for change, the researcher felt that interviewees were more inclined to open up and give their honest opinions, without the usual fear that their views would be leaked to the government by the researcher and followed by reprisals. This had been the case under the Mugabe regime, which relied heavily on the use of informers in civil society to uncover and eliminate dissident views.

ZANU-PF has taken advantage of the reality that much of what is known about Zimbabwe's liberation heroes is associated with the ZANU-PF's recognition of individuals who defended its hold on to power. In turn, this has helped them maintain credibility as liberators, therefore seeking to retain the loyalty of the electorate, especially in rural areas. Nonetheless, in relation to authority, rural electorates still maintain a high degree of trust in their Chiefs and headmen, who are on the government payroll and are, in some cases, ZANU-PF members. As a result, the Chiefs work as ZANU-PF mouthpieces in advancing ZANU-PF agenda and therefore maintaining its popularity. Chiefs and headmen are very powerful political forces with enormous local power; they are motivated by their gratefulness to ZANU-PF.

The respondents were asked about their responses to ZANU-PF discourse detailed in Chapter Four comprising anti-White settler farmers and anti-Western sentiments, alongside discourse in favour of tradition, preservation of history and land for Black people. Notably, in disseminating information they also used state media channels as a strategy. During the in-depth interviews, four distinct themes emerged; these included gratitude, loyalty, fear and trust, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

As posited by Ekeh and Mamdani in their hypotheses of the two publics and the bifurcated state respectively, rural people acknowledge the norms of traditional culture and are guided in their views and behaviour by long-standing customs and morals. Instead of a neutral role, modern bureaucracy is supposed to assume, with the role of the state, that of organiser and driver of modernisation. Rural populations still nurture emotional relationships with the state, which emerged strongly in the interviews and the themes identified by the researcher.



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The intersectionality of these themes is also evident; for example, feelings of gratitude and trust become manifest in loyalty, but on the other hand fear, mistrust and impatience can also have the same outcome of coerced loyalty.

5.2.1 Loyalty, Gratitude and Trust

Loyalty is defined as a strong feeling of support, faithfulness or allegiance (Clark, Golder & Golder, 2006).

5.2.1.1 Loyalty and trust

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) stated that during the liberation struggle, ZANU adopted the Maoist mobilisation strategy of “fish and water”, whereby rural peasants were the “sea”, accommodating the ZANU-PF military wing, the Zimbabwe Armed National

Liberation Army (ZANLA), which was the “fish”. The “fish and water” relationship of mutual inter-dependence promoted loyalty and was crucially important during the struggle for independence. Rural peasants acted as the eyes and ears of the ZANLA forces, and they provided them with important local information and information about security forces and their response to ZANLA activities (Skagen, 2008).

During the liberation wars, younger boys and girls in peasant society played a major role by joining the guerrillas: The females were called “*mujibas*” and males “*chimbwidos*” and they provided the guerrillas with food and water, amongst other things. However, this implied a great danger for the peasantry, as they were killed by the Smith regime when targeting ZANLA guerrillas. The legacy of the liberation struggle has left a deep memory in the rural population who experienced this period, who regard ZANU-PF as an emancipatory force. Similarly, this is reciprocated in post-colonial Zimbabwe by ZANU-PF, which continues to view rural people as the “water” they need for political survival.



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5.2.1.2 Trust in ZANU-PF as the sole source of “truth”

As indicated earlier in the chapter, rural areas lack development and there is less communication infrastructure compared to urban areas. The lack of development in rural Zimbabwe has worked in ZANU-PF’s favour. There is a lack of accessibility to basic information services as they have to rely on state-owned radio stations which had been accused of transferring ZANU-PF populist messages whilst neutralising counter-discourse (Chiumba, 2004). For instance, in 2003, the state broadcasters were required to play 100% local programmes which boosted ZANU-PF propaganda messages; radio is the most popular source of news in rural areas. As a result, the glorification of ZANU-PF by state broadcasters, especially the radio, is uncontested in the rural areas.

The researcher arrived at respondent L's house where the respondent was sitting outside basking in the morning sun. Respondent L stays in Muzhuzha village and he looked as if he was in his late 50s; he was not at liberty to disclose his exact age. What caught the researcher's attention upon arrival was that the respondent was sitting close to a small radio which was positioned in a strategic way in order to receive radio signals. As the researcher sat down to start the interview, the researcher heard that the respondent was listening to Shona news which was being read on Radio Zimbabwe. While listening to the news, he was nodding his head in agreement with what was being said. When the news bulletin ended the researcher asked the respondent what was in the news bulletin. He then explained that it was about members of ZANU-PF who had been expelled from the party for being dishonest and wanting to destroy the party. When asked if he believed what was said, he replied: "Absolutely, (nodding his head) why would they lie?"



The researcher then asked the respondent about his thoughts on news from Radio Zimbabwe and which station he regularly listened to. Respondent replied:

I listen to news on what is happening in the country on Radio Zimbabwe [state-owned radio station]. Radio Zimbabwe tells you news as it is without bias for instance what the president or the government tells you is the same as what is reported on the news. Radio Zimbabwe accommodates us all they use our mother's language [Shona] which we all understand and can relate to.

When the researcher asked the respondent if there was any other source of information channel at his disposal, he stated that there were no other alternative sources of information since the area was remote and they had to rely on Radio Zimbabwe for information. When the researcher asked the respondent if he was worried that his only source of information is Radio Zimbabwe, respondent laughed and said: "Absolutely not we trust them, they tell us the truth".

Coinciding with the above respondent's view, respondent E had this to say about private and public broadcasters:

I do not listen to private owned radio stations and I hardly read private owned newspapers because it is not accessible I can only get to see or read them when I go to towns but I do not trust their reporting as there are always attacking ZANU-PF. They seem to have an agenda of destroying ZANU-PF and favouring opposition parties, mmmhh it might be possible that they are being used by the West to try and manipulate us.

Respondent P from Mhizha village said she was 73 years old. When asked by the researcher how she is informed about what is happening in the country, she replied that she gets informed when she attends village meetings which are usually conducted by the village leaders; she seemed delighted about attending village meetings. She explained that the village meeting is normally held twice a month and every member of the village can attend. She also said that when there is an emergency, they receive a directive to attend an emergency village meeting, as sometimes the matter could not wait for the next meeting. She said the elderly are the ones who normally attend the meetings. She then explained that when Mugabe resigned as president they were called to an emergency meeting and they were told what had transpired and told not to panic. When asked by the researcher if the information was enough for her, she smiled and responded: "Absolutely yes! The headmen and our chief provide us with adequate information. There are our representatives and they are the link between us and the government (ZANU-PF)". When the respondent was asked what kind of information they normally received, she stated:

Normally we are told about government intended programmes such as food relief and other developments. We are also given an update on challenges being faced and to safeguard our countries as it is under threat from the White people and

the MDC. These meetings are so important that I do not want to miss them we also get to interact and socialise with other villagers and I also get informed.

The respondent kept on saying that she trusted their traditional authority and they knew her by name, so to her it meant that the country's leader also knew about her. When asked if she knew about Facebook or WhatsApp she said she did not, and it was of no use to her since she could neither read nor write and she trusted information from the leaders.

In contrast to urban areas where there is a variety of information channels, rural Zimbabweans depend mainly on the radio as a source of information. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Instagram have changed the way information is disseminated countrywide, but especially in urban areas and this has been useful in drawing the attention of citizens to issues of national interest. However, most parts of rural Zimbabwe do not have access to the advanced information avenues and therefore rely on traditional forms of information channels – the radio channel had been accused of favouring ZANU-PF and giving a one-sided analysis of events of national interests.

The lack of development of access to other means of quick information channels has led the rural populace to depend on one source of information, making it easier for ZANU-PF to transmit their anti-West, anti-MDC, pro-tradition and land for Black people message to the targeted audience; namely, the rural population. The rural population are sceptical of social media platforms and believe and trust that whoever claims to speak from the perspective of tradition is speaking the truth. ZANU-PF has capitalised on this, strengthening its relationship with the traditional authority of rural Zimbabwe.

Respondent B, 39 years old, lives in Gobvu village. The respondent's house was close to the growth point and his house was built with bricks. When the researcher arrived

at the respondent's house, the researcher noticed that the respondent had a large kraal of cattle and he also kept chickens. In rural areas, having a lot of cattle is a sign of wealth. When the researcher asked what the respondent's thoughts were on the political leadership of ZANU-PF and whether it targeted real enemies that prohibited progress and development, the respondent replied that the ZANU-PF government had failed the people but emphasised that it was not entirely their fault because there was a hidden hand fighting against the people's party. When asked to explain what he meant by a hidden hand, he explained that it had often been said on the radio, and even at political gatherings, that the West is in a fight against the people's party (ZANU-PF) so that they can come back and colonise Zimbabwe. They have failed because ZANU-PF remained resilient and they have now resorted to attacking ZANU-PF to make it look as if it is failing as a government. His response portrayed ZANU-PF as a victim of the West for protecting its people, he also said:

I agree with Mugabe when he said the West and the Whites are prohibiting development, they are bitter because we took our land back; they camped in neighbouring countries like Zambia, South Africa, and Mozambique in anticipation that if the country is led by those they want they will come back. But once they saw that Zimbabwean people still support and trust ZANU-PF, they imposed economic sanctions which is the reason for our suffering.

The dominant narrative is that ZANU-PF is the sole champion of the independence of the country which is under constant attack from the Western countries (Onslow, 2011). To rural people in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF represents the anti-colonial party and as a result, the main explanation of the country's economic difficulties and unwarranted imperialist interference is that it is under constant attack from the West.

5.2.1.2 Loyalty and gratitude

Part of the success of nativism in rural Zimbabwe is due to people's feelings of extreme gratitude to ZANU-PF for its role during the struggle for liberation. Gratitude is defined as the quality of being thankful and readiness to show appreciation.

Respondent H, who is 67 years of age and has been a headman (traditional leader) for over fifteen years in his village, explained how ZANU-PF has a relationship with people from his village which dates back to pre-independence and continued during the liberation struggle. Before the interview started, the respondent took the researcher on a tour around his house, showing the researcher his wealth; this included cattle, goats and his farm land where he grew maize and cotton. He said he was given farming input by the government and this has enabled him to farm easily. He explained that once he harvests his crops, he will take the harvest to the Grain Marketing Board where he will sell it. His wife, who accompanied us on the tour, agreed with what he said, and she explained how farming has enabled them to feed their families and send their children to school. The respondent stated that he only started farming after independence because of the help from the ZANU-PF government. He started explaining that during colonialism the Smith regime only catered for the interests of the Whites and this was one of the reasons why Blacks decided to start the struggle for independence. When asked by the researcher how life was during the struggle for independence in the rural areas, he paused for a while and took a deep breath and he said:

Uummm the time was a very difficult one, we had no choice but to be brave and have the courage to fight against well organised and resourced White regime. We took up arms joined and helped them (ZANLA forces) in the best possible way, that cemented our relationship with them and the enemy could only be defeated if we worked together.

The respondent also said that during the liberation war he took an active part in mobilising resources such as information, food, water and shelter for the guerrillas. He then went on to say:

My people in this village share a special bond with ZANU-PF which dates back from the liberation time. We fought the struggle together and we went through one of the most vicious time together. The freedom fighters would come to our houses for food or shelter to hide away from the colonialist security forces and we would protect them in the best possible way. For that reason, we will forever be thankful for their bravery and our bond will never be broken.

The memory of the rural revolutionary is in fact a memory of ZANU-PF as an emancipatory force, thereby enforcing the need for loyalty that resonates from a feeling of gratitude to ZANU-PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014). Respondent H uses “we” when referring to the village members; an indication of a shared view amongst the people in the area. Headmen command a lot of respect from the people they lead and have an influence on how people behave or think politically.

ZANU-PF has used anti-West and anti-White rhetoric as a reminder of the colonial past and the struggle for independence. This resonates with the claim by Ekeh (1975) that the credibility of post-colonial African rulers depends on blame laid by the new political elite on colonialism for the disruption to traditional African society, as well as its claims to legitimacy resting on having liberated Africa from the oppressive colonial past. President Mugabe frequently reminded citizens of their negative colonial experience and history. He reminded people, especially in rural areas, how oppressive colonialism had been. ZANU-PF was contrasted with the MDC as the party which would prevent a re-occurrence of White domination to retain the loyalty of the rural citizenry. Within this discourse is the implication that no other political group has

earned the right to rule. ZANU-PF's anti-White sentiments are particularly directed towards those who experienced domination and war in the rural areas.

5.2.1.3 Gratitude in form of obligation

Respondent A, an old lady who says has been living in Mutunhamombe village (Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency) in the Chegutu rural district for over 67 years, was in her late 70s at the time of the interview. The respondent lived with her two grandchildren and she said that her husband had passed on fifteen years previously and she depended upon her children, whom she said worked in a town called Kadoma in Zimbabwe, for survival. The respondent's compound has two huts which were built with clay with grass thatching. Behind the huts were the graves of the family. The respondent explained how she experienced the pre-independence and post-independence periods. She explained the reality of what she went through and said she worked as a domestic worker at a White person's farm. She went on to state that sometimes she would not get her salary in full or on time, but she would not report this to anyone, as Whites were superior to Blacks. She emphasised that her basic rights as an employee were not upheld. She was constantly abused verbally not only by the employer, but also by her employer's kids who were young enough to be her children. When asked by the researcher about changes that she had seen since independence in 1980, she stated:


What I have seen since 1980 is that ZANU-PF liberated us, as the people of Zimbabwe we have found the freedom to move freely without restrictions and to govern ourselves and our territory. They have been a change in how people used to be treated harshly by white people and being led by ZANU-PF who had the majority of the Black people at heart.

To her, ZANU-PF was a party which brought about the end of the harsh treatment that they received from the White minority rule and regards ZANU-PF as a champion of

democracy who liberated the country from the minority rule, thereby obliging her to be loyal to the ZANU-PF. Throughout the interview, the respondent acknowledged her gratitude towards ZANU-PF in bringing about freedom. She said:

When I think of colonial rule and independent Zimbabwe, I see light at the end of the tunnel. After all our suffering we eventually became free. ZANU-PF is our saviour they indeed led us to our promised brighter future. It is a people's party which represents the formerly oppressed Black majority. ZANU-PF saved us! Words alone failed to explain how I felt that day when the colonial flag was pulled down and the Zimbabwean flag was raised. Till death I will forever honour my party.

The researcher asked her if she believed that she would be able to enjoy her freedom if ZANU-PF were to be removed from government, she replied without hesitation that removing ZANU-PF from power would be the same as handing back the country to the Whites. She said:




Our freedom was hard earned, ZANU-PF fought for the freedom that we all enjoy today, we can move freely, talk freely unlike during the Smith regime. Let it be known that if ZANU-PF was to lose power then it also means us losing our freedom we cherish so much. For that reason, let us all safeguard our freedom and be happy and thankful and protect it.

In line with the respondent's views, ZANU-PF has managed to use the existing feeling of colonial experience in sustaining its anti-White and anti-West rhetoric, thereby managing to sustain the memory and the negative sentiment of the colonial experience. The respondent is thus compelled to feel the need to support a party that sacrificed a lot for their freedom. As a result, the loyalty to ZANU-PF is backed by a feeling of obligation based on past experiences.

5.2.1.4 Loyalty based on ZANU-PF being the liberator

ZANU-PF's appeal to people's memories of the struggle has worked in their favour, while demeaning the opposition MDC. Respondent F who has lived in Mhariwa village for over 70 years and claims that he is a war veteran who fought during the second Chimurenga (liberation struggle), sees anyone opposing ZANU-PF as a sell-out. The respondent's house was built with bricks and the house was visibly bigger than the surrounding houses in the village. The respondent used solar energy since they did not have electricity in the village. During the interview, he became agitated, annoyed and angry at the mention of either the MDC or the Whites, emphasising that people's loyalty should be with ZANU-PF unless they want another war. At some point, he even warned that if the researcher kept bringing up the MDC or Whites in the interview he would not continue with the interview. When the researcher asked him if it was possible to have a future without ZANU-PF governing the country, he shook his head and stated that ZANU-PF was and is Zimbabwe and liberated the country.



The respondent started explaining what the Smith regime did to him and his family.

He said:


I joined the liberation struggle under the ZANU-PF military wing ZANLA together with my friends. When I joined I had to hide it from my family as they will not allow me to because they feared what might happen. They eventually knew about it and warned me of the consequences, but I was so determined to fight for my freedom and theirs as well. One evening the security forces of the White regime visited our villages and they started beating up people who they suspected to be working with the ZANLA forces. I was not spared either was my family, they burnt the huts we lived in and we were left homeless. My family had to go and live with relatives and this event changed my life forever. Uummhh painful as it was, I decided to dedicate my life to the struggle and I became more actively involved. I left my family behind and stayed in bushes, received military training spent close

to six years without seeing my family and them not knowing if I was alive or not. Painful as it was I had no choice since returning or getting in contact with them will put their lives in danger. So, who can blame me when I say the country belong to true liberators that is ZANU-PF?

He was then asked by the researcher if ZANU-PF's anti-White and anti-MDC stance was justified and whether he agreed with one of former president Mugabe's speeches. In the speech, Mugabe was quoted at a rally as saying:

MDC will never be allowed to rule this country, never ever. Only God can remove me, not MDC not the British. We will never allow an event like an election to reverse our independence just through the strike of a pen on the ballot paper for the matter of our sovereignty, our sweat, and all we fought for and all our comrades died fighting for. It is God who put me in this position, not British (Mail & Guardian, 2008).

He agreed with these sentiments and stated:



ZANU-PF and other war veterans like myself liberated this country and it is a fact and it is something we wish not to see again in our lifetime. We lived in bushes not knowing what we going to eat tomorrow or if we going to be alive to see the next day. I do understand why they (ZANU-PF) get angry when they see the White people trying to take back our country through the opposition MDC. Even our ancestors are not happy with what MDC wants to do hell will break loose if people defy the ancestors and bring back the British. Are we an independent state, right? and so we should be left alone. The only problem is you the youth who think know better than us because they now call us old, no you didn't see our struggle so don't think of reversing it because ZANU-PF won't hesitate to clamp down. So, people should not play with war to some of us it is a painful experience hence we remain loyal to ZANU-PF.

In line with the respondent's view, any support other than that given to ZANU-PF is not acceptable. ZANU-PF to him is the liberator of the people from the colonial rule and as a result, they are entitled to rule. With such rhetoric, ZANU-PF located

declarations of political legitimacy by articulating liberation war histories to prove political claim. They grounded their political consolidation on memories of the war of liberation against colonial rule. ZANU-PF's portrayal of MDC as a party that seeks to bring back the White minority rule has evoked the need to protect the sovereignty of the state at whatever cost.

5.2.1.5 Land redistribution, gratitude and loyalty

The ZANU-PF strategy of re-distributing land to the Black majority has been perceived to be tailored to meet the interests of the rural dwellers, since they depend on farming as their source of living and ZANU-PF has connected with the rural population. The loyalty to ZANU-PF by some rural dwellers is based on a feeling of gratitude, which then leads to a sense of obligation and commitment that is manifest in continued support of the party.




Respondent D, a 62-year-old woman who has been living in Mhizha village in the Chegutu rural district since 1971, is a beneficiary of the land reform programme. She was allocated a plot under the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme. Throughout the interview, she talked with excitement about how the land has changed her life for the better. She mentioned that she was glad that it enabled her to send her children to universities, as she is a widow. When asked whether ZANU-PF's strategy of land reform for Blacks was justified, she replied with excitement and said:

We are glad, and we appreciate ZANU-PF land reform programme because we were given land freely and in the open, wealth is through farming. When we were given the land in the first few years the governments provided us with the farming inputs. I always tell my children and grandchildren never to go against ZANU-PF as this will mean betrayal to the government that has been good and generous in giving us land our source of wealth.

To most of the rural peasants, owning land is a source of wealth and the majority believe that land is their heritage. Being a recipient of land meant that life would change for the better. The respondent's sentiments show how ZANU-PF has managed to use land in the form of a land reform programme to receive appreciation and support.

5.2.1.6 Buying loyalty with gifts

In return for the luxuries such as cars and expensive farming tools that they receive from the government, traditional leaders provide them with loyalty and ensure that the villagers provide the much-needed support for ZANU-PF, as they have a major influence on the communities that they lead. According to ZBC News Online (23 January 2018), in January 2018, the ZANU-PF- led government gave 226 cars to chiefs and traditional leaders in rural Zimbabwe out of an estimated 280 chiefs countrywide.



ZANU-PF manipulates traditional and community leaders to deliver rural votes and in return they receive favours such as electrification for their homes, the privilege to allocate scarce food aid, farm inputs and equipment (Masunungure, 2009).

This had been going on for a while, said one of the community leaders (respondent I), aged 55 years. He said he was a village headman and chaired the community meetings. He also mentioned that he was an elected councillor, representing ZANU-PF at local government level. When asked by the researcher about his role as the village headman, he stated that he acted as the spokesperson for the chief. The chief in most cases tells him information that he intends to share with his community and the community also shares with him the information they want their chief to know, so he acted as a liaison officer between the chief and the villagers.

Notably, the researcher conducted the interview at the respondent's supermarket where he sells groceries to the local people. He mentioned that he obtained the shop because of "*musangano*" – by this term he was referring to his involvement in ZANU-PF. The researcher then asked the respondent if it was possible for someone who was not ZANU-PF or non-partisan to also have the opportunity of renting the council's shop premises. The respondent then said: "It is not possible, as one has to be a member of ZANU-PF and his/her credential will speak for themselves because they don't want to give traitors who will betray them". When asked how ZANU-PF has improved their lives since 1980, he said:

During the White minority rule our positions as community leaders were not valued. But it is a different case with ZANU-PF they value our efforts and we receive a lot from the government that includes farming inputs amongst other things. For sure we can see that the enemy is not the government of the day. As a community leader, my duty is to ensure that I tell every member to vote for this party or we lose what we have been receiving from the government.

This illustrates the co-existence of reciprocal relationships suggested by Ekeh (1974: 179), whereby there is a generalised exchange. The exchange/transaction between a collective and an individual/a party is the result of conformity to normative obligation. According to Ekeh, the reciprocal relationship comprises exchange of favours, whereby the group that receives favour assures the other group that it will return the favour when needed. Notably, ZANU-PF was rewarded with loyalty once the community leaders received the benefits.

5.2.3 Loyalty as protection

ZANU-PF presents itself to citizens as protecting them from the West, who it claims wanted to recolonise the country. The researcher asked about the respondent's thoughts on the West's alleged interference in Zimbabwean domestic affairs, citing the

speech by Mugabe at the United Nations Earth Summit in 2002, where he was quoted as follows:

We do not mind having and bearing sanctions banning us from Europe; we are not Europeans; we have not asked for an inch of that territory. So, Blair keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe (Mugabe, 2002).

Respondent F, who said earlier that he was a war veteran, responded by saying:

We are an independent state and I support ZANU-PF's views that the West should leave us alone. I have seen the West come into our country and they try to use their powers in our country forgetting we have our own leaders and they tend to not listen. We trust and believe in ZANU-PF leadership that's why we continue to support the party and ask to be left alone. ZANU-PF is the only party that we can trust in preventing external factors from taking our country.

The researcher then asked him what he knew about the sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe. He responded, raising his voice in an angry tone:

Sanctions were sanctions, those people who imposed sanctions 'havasi vanhu, imhuka' [they are ruthless like wild animals]. How can you impose economic sanctions that will ensure the suffering of the ordinary people simply because we refused to be colonised again?

The researcher then asked the respondent what the sanctions meant to an ordinary person. He then started describing how people's lives had worsened after the imposition of sanctions. He said most of the companies in big cities closed and people were left unemployed, without jobs and income; some of them were breadwinners and they had to move back from the cities to live in the rural areas. When asked by the researcher if he was affected by the sanctions, he said: "Yes, absolutely yes, the sanctions affected me badly". He then stated that his oldest son who had worked in a cotton factory in a town called Chegutu lost his job, and the owners just closed the factory without warning and did not pay employees their pension money. He also told

the researcher that his son used to take care of them by sending groceries, but now he no longer sends anything, and life has become difficult for them. He blamed countries like the United States (US) and Britain for the suffering and he praised ZANU-PF for remaining resilient and not allowing them (the West) to bully them into “selling” the country despite harsh economic sanctions.

Respondent K, 47 years old, says she been living in Kagoro for over 15 years. The respondent’s house was located far away from the other villagers and there was no proper road to get to the village. As a result, the researcher had to pass through a bush to get to the respondent’s house. However, around the respondent’s house there was a maize field which she said was to be used for making mealie-meal for them. When asked by the researcher if she knew what the sanctions meant and why they were imposed, she paused for a while and took her time to answer then she responded by saying that she did not know how the sanctions worked, but she knew sanctions were put in place to make the people of Zimbabwe suffer because they supported ZANU-PF. Despite the respondent claiming that she did not know what the sanctions meant to do or even how they worked, she also claimed that they were put in place to ensure the suffering of people. The researcher then asked the respondent why she was saying sanctions were put in place to make Zimbabweans suffer, yet she said she did not know how the sanctions worked. Looking a bit confused and annoyed by the question she then said:

Had it not occurred to you that our suffering started soon after these so-called sanctions by the West. Why so huh? Because we decided to support our own and not them. I believe that our suffering is not because of ZANU-PF failure but it is because of the Whites. They imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe and our economy suffered heavily. They could not stand the fact that we were reclaiming what is ours that is our land and that the ZANU-PF was supported by

the whole country. ZANU-PF protected our territory and because of that, they had to put in place those sanctions. We don't need them (West) I trust our government will work in stabilising the country.

The majority of the rural population in Zimbabwe are less educated than the urban population and do not have a full understanding of the economic dynamics or policies (Jambawo, 2017). This has worked in ZANU-PF's favour as their narration of what sanctions are, reasons for them and how they affect the people is what is known and believed, as illustrated above.

5.2.4 Fear and Loyalty

Not only has loyalty to ZANU-PF by rural electorates been embedded in the feeling of gratitude and trust, but also fear has inclined rural electorates to be loyal to ZANU-PF. However, the fear in rural electorates is in different forms. Some people are fearful of losing what they have benefitted from ZANU-PF, some are fearful of being punished for disloyalty and some are fearful of the recurrence of war or the return of minority rule if ZANU-PF loses – this makes them more loyal. Alleged acts of violence and intimidation inducing fear has increasingly become a feature of Zimbabwe's politics from pre- to post-independence Zimbabwe. According to Gallagher (2013), the use of violence and intimidation has helped ZANU-PF boost its struggle for physical survival, especially in rural Zimbabwe. In agreement, Kriger (2005) states that the use of violence and intimidation by ZANU-PF led to its first electoral victory in 1980. ZANU-PF's use of intolerance was noted in the first decade against the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) supporters in what was termed as the "Gukurahundi massacre" in Matabeleland and the Midlands regions of Zimbabwe (Alexander & McGregor, 2013). After 2000, when its authority was challenged and threatened, it resorted to the use of violence to hold on to power.

ZANU-PF leaders had been accused of using violence and threats against those who joined the opposition and voted against them. Consequently, in the run-up to parliamentary elections in June 2000, whilst addressing ZANU-PF supporters, Mugabe boasted that he has “a degree in violence”. When conducting interviews, the researcher noted that respondents preferred to be interviewed in private where no-one could hear or listen and some even preferred not to be recorded, but rather asked the researcher to listen and write down important points.

5.2.4.1 Fear of spies and reprisal

One of the prominent post-colonial thinkers, Fanon (1961), pointed out that former liberation movements in Africa only understood the language of force and violence and they have taken this to the post-colonial era. As a result, the post-colonial governments have resurfaced the characteristics of colonial rule. Coinciding with Fanon's view, whilst addressing delegates at the Zimbabwe embassy in Cairo, Mugabe was quoted saying:


Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have has been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people's vote and the people's guns are always inseparable twins (Mugabe, 2006).

He again warned:

The gun will lead the ballot and if ZANU-PF loses the election we will go back to the trenches and fight to get our country back, MDC is the puppet of our erstwhile colonisers used to reverse the gains of the struggle and the land reform (ZBC-TV, April 2008).

This came after ZANU-PF had lost its majority in parliament to the MDC in March 2008 and trailed behind the MDC in the first round of presidential ballot.

Rural Zimbabweans have often been marred with political violence and intolerant of different political views; as a result, people live in fear of being labelled sell-outs – therefore, they are inclined to be loyal to ZANU-PF. Respondent M from Mutunhamombe village says she is a “born free” (born after 1980) and was 22 years of age. The respondent stated that she only went to school until she was in Grade Seven because her parents could not afford to pay further. The respondent stayed in one small hut with her husband and three children and neither were employed. As a result, they survived on either hand-outs or working in people’s homes. She believed that ZANU-PF failed the people of Zimbabwe, but maintains she is loyal to the party. The researcher then asked her why she still supports a party which she believes has failed her. She then said:



My fear is going against ZANU-PF since they have spies everywhere and going against them will mean that my life will be in danger. So I will continue to give my full support to ZANU-PF even if they have failed us as the youth. Look I am suffering here we are not employed my husband and I and we depend on doing part time jobs for local villagers. It is not only us but there is a lot of youth who are unemployed and some even went to school, but they are not employed.

Whilst conducting the interviews, the researcher observed that fear of spies is common in rural Zimbabwe.

Respondent G from Mhariwa village, who said she was above 50 years of age, agreed to be interviewed only if the researcher was not going to record her. The respondent’s house was close to other village houses and they were all built with clay and had grass thatching. The respondent had to sneak the researcher into her house because she didn’t want people to see them; as a result, the researcher arrived at the respondent’s house before 6 am in the morning whilst neighbouring people were sleeping. More importantly, the respondent emphasised that without even her name disclosed, people

could easily identify her voice, despite the researcher's assurance of confidentiality. At some point, the respondent also asked if the researcher could be trusted and if the researcher was not a spy. The researcher showed her the ethical clearance from the institution where the researcher studied. However, she refused to respond to most of the questions and she continuously referred to herself as an outsider and that she was not equipped to give her thoughts. After only responding to a few interview questions she abruptly ended the interview, saying:

I am sorry this is all I can say, I don't want to talk more since we do not know who might be listening, and what if you have been sent to spy on us. I don't want to put my life and my family even yourself in danger. Let's rather not talk about politics.

In agreement that people in the rural areas fear ZANU-PF, respondent N who has been staying in Mhizha village for less than three years shared the same sentiments with the above views. He believed that ZANU-PF had failed the people, especially in that area, as he considered it to be less developed and he stated that loyalty to the party was based on fear rather than willingness. He said:

What I have come to learn in this place is that people are scared to speak out and to do right. Everyone sees we are suffering because of this government but for some reason, they fear to tell their story. ZANU-PF hides with the idea that Whites are our enemies, yet they are the ones who are our enemy of progress. A lot of things happen here, I heard people get harassed and threatened with violence and intimidation if they criticize the government of the day, therefore, making it difficult to speak u. How can they not be loyal to the party when they fear?

The above sentiments show that the fear of punishment for being a dissenting voice has led to the loyalty to ZANU-PF. Sachikonye (2011) argued that politically motivated violence in rural areas has been a major instrument of ascendancy to power and

retaining power, as well as barricading against contenders for that power. This has shaped people's perception of who to support and who not to support.

5.2.4.2 Fear of a recurrence of the war

Fear of the recurrence of the war is not the above-mentioned fear by the youth of being punished for dissent, but rather the fear of experiencing the war again. The majority of the rural dwellers in Zimbabwe are elderly people, most of whom experienced colonial rule and saw the struggle for independence. They do not wish to see it happen again, and therefore prefer to support ZANU-PF. Respondent A, in most of her responses on ZANU-PF anti-White and anti-West sentiments, showed how terrified she was when thinking about the colonial experience. Sometimes, she would pause talking, seemingly overwhelmed by the painful memories. In one of her responses, when she was asked about her experience during the minority rule, she states:



During colonialism we were treated worse than dogs, there were clear lines of segregation we were not allowed to move freely some places were for Whites only and if you happen to go there then you will be jailed. Life was unbearable until we said enough is enough and the struggle for independence started. The experience that was unbearable friends and relatives died, blood was shed, and I wish never to see it again in my lifetime. It is important that we don't go back to that period.

The fear which was shown by the respondent was not necessarily the fear of ZANU-PF, but rather the fear of going back to live under colonialism, driven by the fear of what happens if ZANU-PF loses power. Notably, in one of Robert Mugabe speeches at a political rally in 2008 towards a run-off election, he was quoted as saying:

MDC will never be allowed to rule this country, never ever. Only God can remove me, not MDC not the British. We will never allow an event like an election to reverse our independence just through the stroke of a pen on the ballot paper for the matter of our sovereignty, our sweat, and all we fought for and all our

comrades died fighting for. It is God who put me in this position, not British (*Mail & Guardian*, 27 June 2008).

When respondent L, who stayed in Mutunhamombe village for over 60 years, was asked about her thoughts on the above statement, she said:

I believe that there should be no entitlement to leadership and I am against the idea that ZANU-PF is the only party ordained to be in power in Zimbabwe. Even those who did not go to war have the right to be leaders, but my worry is voting against it meant bringing back the colonial rule. I have seen the Chimurenga war (war of liberation) and I have lost my son he was killed during the struggle. I don't want to go through that painful experience again, the liberation struggle was a painful time people died and it is our past which should not repeat.

The respondent was then asked why she thought that there might be war. She then explained that she feared that if ZANU-PF loses, especially to the MDC, then it means the return of the White people to Zimbabwe. She also mentioned that ZANU-PF made it clear most of the time that they would not allow White people to rule this country again and if it happens, they would not hesitate to take up arms and she knew they could do it; "So better we continue supporting them rather than we put our lives in danger. I am too old to survive in a country at war it will mean my death".

The idea of the possibility of the recurrence of the war if ZANU-PF loses deliberately managed to evoke people's memories of former conflict, past violence and what might happen – therefore inciting fear amongst the rural electorates. This type of memory has been easily been exploited by ZANU-PF and elaborated into the ideology of hegemonic violence in Zimbabwe (Chi tukutuku, 2013: 28). ZANU-PF has managed to remind the rural people that it is a party of the gun; as a result, if they lose an election, they will not hesitate to use the gun to fight for their hold on power (Mutandiri, 2009).

5.2.4.3 Fear of the return of White minority rule

Zimbabwe was colonised by the British in the 1890s and was granted independence in 1980. Under minority rule, the Black majority were treated unfairly. However, this all changed after the attaining of independence where Blacks and Whites were treated as equals. Most of those who lived under colonial rule and experienced the oppressed nature of the regime do not seek to experience that again. The researcher spoke to respondent E, who lives in Mhizha village and is a well-known farmer in the village. He explained how difficult it was living under minority rule and how the thought of Whites returning to rule the country frightened him. He said he experienced living under the oppressive Smith regime (colonial rule) and he was very emotional when he started talking about how badly Blacks were treated by the White minority rulers. Throughout his narration of life under the Smith regime, his voice was shaking, and he was trying hard to hold back his tears and emotions. He described the colonial period as follows:

Living under the colonial rule we experienced oppression at its highest level. The whole system was not equal from education, health, judiciary, and law. We lived like refugees in our own land. We could not even move freely, there were restrictions on where Blacks should and should not go or it will be jail time. We were deprived of our basic rights to vote. Mmmh ... it was just not an ideal situation for Black people to live in. we were treated like animals even animals were better we were treated less than animals. It is disheartening to hear that our fellow countrymen want to bring back these evil people through the back door.

The researcher then asked the respondent about his thoughts on ZANU-PF anti-White and anti-West sentiments. Without hesitation, he stated that it was justified and said:

We fully support ZANU-PF anti-White and anti-West sentiments. We lived during the Smith regime (White minority rule) and we have a clear picture and understand how ruthless the minority rule was. My wish is we never go back to

that time, blood was shed. As a result, I fully support the idea that they (Whites) should not intervene in our affairs and any individual or party who tries to bring them back should be crushed.

Respondent F shared the same sentiments as respondent E. When she was asked about her views on ZANU-PF's anti-West and anti-White rhetoric, she said:

ZANU-PF is right in protecting our history and making sure that what happened during Smith regime (colonial rule) will not happen again in our lifetime. The radios should keep playing war songs so that people know where we came from and be reminded that if they don't listen and vote with the enemy (MDC), a repeat might happen, and they would not like the consequences of another war.

In this image, loyalty to ZANU-PF is based on the fear of the return of minority rule which was cruel to the Black majority. To the respondents, supporting another party meant endorsing the re-colonisation of the country.

Respondent C who, was 40 years old, started the interview by telling the researcher that he is a strong ZANU-PF supporter and said that he would appreciate it if the interview would not denigrate ZANU-PF. The respondent at the time of interview was wearing a ZANU-PF regalia and this included a ZANU-PF T-shirt and cap. He then stated that the issue of leading the country was non-negotiable; ZANU-PF is ordained to do so. He also said:

This country should only be ruled by those who went to war. The MDC thinks it is clever and that we don't see that it wants to bring back the Whites so that we can relive the colonial experience. ZANU-PF has the sole right to govern us and it should not be challenged. Even myself I will not allow an outsider to come and chase me out of my household.

ZANU-PF portrays itself as the legitimate party to rule Zimbabwe, since it participated in the liberation struggle and portrays the opposition, the MDC, as being used to

reverse colonial independence. Its anti-West discourse has been embedded in the idea that the Western countries seek to re-colonise Zimbabwe by using the MDC.

5.2.4.4 Fear of losing land

Because ZANU-PF took land from the White commercial farmers and gave it to mostly the rural peasants, the majority of the rural households have a strong attachment to ZANU-PF. Ironically, the benefactors have no title to the land; as a result, it can be easily be taken away from them – they see loyalty to the party as the only way for them to keep their land. As a result, their loyalty is embedded heavily in the fear of losing their land. This fear is linked to gratitude for land, but simultaneously fear that it will be taken away, so it generates a sense of obligation. However, this fear is different from the fear of punishment for dissent, fear of being re-colonised or fear of war.

Respondent E, who is a 67-year-old farmer, said:



Voting against ZANU-PF will mean that our land will be taken away from us. Look we do not have papers stating that the land is ours, so it is easy for them to chase us away for we will not be able to claim. I depend on farming as my source of income and once it is taken away from me I will not be able to feed my family.

Respondent F, in his late 60s, said he was born in Muzhuzha village. He shared the same sentiments as respondent E and was quoted as saying:

I support the land reform programme and I was a beneficiary and I thank our government. I always tell people around me never to go against the party as this would mean reversing our gains. We were not given title deeds to the land, it's been over ten years now, so I see it not wise for us to go against the government of the day. What if another party comes in and decides to reverse the program, then what will happen to us? What if we get chased out of our land?

The respondent was then asked by the researcher why it was taking longer to get the title deeds of the land. The respondent seemed hesitant to reply at first and later said

he did not know the reason for the delay. He was then asked if he was not scared that one day the government might come and take the land away from him. He then stated that it can only happen if ZANU-PF loses power but if it does not, then his land is safe.

It is for this reason that some of the rural citizenry feel compelled to vote for ZANU-PF and be loyal to the party – they fear that they will lose their land if another party is voted into power, since they do not have any proof that they are legitimate owners. It is through this strategy that ZANU-PF has managed to solicit loyalty amongst the rural dwellers, who fear the consequences of disloyalty.

5.2.5 Mistrust ZANU-PF

Mistrust is a feeling of no confidence which resonates from being suspicious and not trusting someone or an institution. Mistrust can be caused by past and present experiences.



Respondent Q from Mhariwa village said he was 30 years at the time of the interview and worked as a security guard at a certain farm near the village. The respondent explained that being a security guard was not his choice, but he could not find employment in the urban areas and decided to relocate to his rural home. He heard that someone was needed to look after a nearby farm, and hence he found employment. At the beginning of the interview the respondent made it clear that he was not a supporter of ZANU-PF and he had no trust in the party. He then told the researcher that he did not trust ZANU-PF because it had been making empty promises – as a result, he lost his trust in them. The respondent was then asked by the researcher about ZANU-PF anti-White and anti-West sentiments and whether they were justified. He replied:

ZANU-PF has failed us period! It is in black and white and we can all see it. No matter how much they try to shift blame we can see right through them that there are lies. White people were chased away long time ago and they took over companies now all those companies has closed, they took over farms but now those farms have no production.

The researcher then asked the respondent why, if he works on a farm, he feels that farms are not productive. Looking a bit irritated the respondent replied:

I meant that majority are no-longer productive, if you look in this area this farm is one of the few that are still productive but the rest there is no activity because there were given to people who did not know how to utilise the land.

The respondent was then asked about his thoughts on sanctions being the reason for poverty and suffering in the country, as was often mentioned by ZANU-PF. The respondent said:



Those are lies they always tell people. Luckily some of us we have access to other means of getting information on our phones rather than relying on what they tell us. I do not trust anything they say. We the majority are suffering, and they are living a good life at our expense. Our poverty is because of them that they failed as a government they need to admit. Who can honestly believe that?

The respondent also explained to the researcher that at election time ZANU-PF always tell them that they would create employment, but after elections nothing is done. Therefore, to him ZANU-PF is a party which has been in power too long, and he no longer has trust or confidence in the party.

5.2.6 Impatience with ZANU-PF

‘Impatience’ can be defined as a feeling of wanting change to happen as soon as possible.

Respondent K, who lives in Gukwe village and is 28 years of age, lived with his parents at the time of the interview. He reiterated the need for a generational renewal of the

country's leadership. The respondent kept on stating that ZANU-PF has served its time and it was now time for young leaders to lead the country. When asked by the researcher why ZANU-PF is still in power, and not the youth he is talking about, the respondent stated that ZANU-PF has made it hard for change to happen. He was then asked by the researcher how ZANU-PF has made it hard for change to happen and he replied:

ZANU-PF is known for using violence on any opposition voice as a result they continue being in power. Everyone is tired of them and wish for a change because instead of them making our lives better they continue to make our lives miserable. There is need for change and change is needed now not tomorrow. We are tired of promises which are never fulfilled its either they shape up or out.

The respondent was then asked about his thoughts on the view that ZANU-PF are entitled to rule because they brought about independence. The respondent said:

It is now in the past; we can't continue focusing on something which happened way back. Yes, they played their part and we are grateful but now they should hand over to others as they have made a lot of damage. The struggle for independence is over its time passed we need to focus on now.

In the interview, the respondent showed no interest in ZANU-PF's struggle for independence, but he showed a lot of anger and impatience pertaining to the need for betterment of the future.

The respondent's views show that he was becoming impatient with ZANU-PF and would prefer a radical change which he believed would bring positive change. When asked whether ZANU-PF or the West had failed the people, he quickly pointed to the fact that he was an unemployed graduate and with no hope of getting employment in the near future and that it was the failure of government and not the West. The respondent also noted that he did not agree with the ZANU-PF anti-West/anti-White

rhetoric which constantly reminded the electorates on how bad colonialism was, and how voting against ZANU-PF would lead to the recurrence of the struggle (Chimurenga war). He believes that war was in the past as it happened decades ago, and the country should focus on the present and future, rather than dark war days.

5.3 CONCLUSION

ZANU-PF has maintained power since Zimbabwe's independence. However, its support base is in rural Zimbabwe, which constitutes the majority of the electorate. ZANU-PF has used different nativist discourse, such as anti-White, anti-West and land for Black people. The chapter therefore illustrated different responses to the nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF, using a sample of the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency in the Chegutu rural district. In the responses from the respondents, the nativist discourse evidently appealed more to the older generation who are in favour of maintaining the status quo, whereas the younger generation believed that it was time for change. The main themes that emerged – namely; loyalty, fear, gratitude, trust, fear, mistrust and impatience – emerged as some of the reasons why ZANU-PF has been able to maintain its popularity in rural Zimbabwe.

Loyalty to ZANU-PF has been embedded in fear of spies and reprisals, which may lead to punishment. There is also fear of the recurrence of war if ZANU-PF loses – most of the rural dwellers are elderly people who experienced the war and do not seek to experience it again. Another fear is that colonial rule may return – ZANU-PF have managed to sustain the memory and the negative sentiment of colonialism and people fear they will lose their land if ZANU-PF loses power. Some respondents' views show that loyalty to ZANU-PF is based on trust in the party's ability to protect the country's sovereignty from external threats, as they believe the country is under constant attack

from Western countries. Significantly, loyalty to ZANU-PF has been embedded in gratitude, as ZANU-PF has managed to appeal to the rural dwellers as their sole liberator. It is through all these strategies that ZANU-PF has managed to solicit support amongst rural dwellers.

As indicated in the study, the research aim is to explore the nativist discourse used by Zuma and his ANC faction in trying to maintain popularity. The next chapter therefore looks at the nativist discourses employed by Zuma and his faction of the ANC.



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CHAPTER SIX: NATIVIST DISCOURSE USED BY ZUMA AND HIS FACTION IN THE ANC TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL POWER

6.1 INTRODUCTION

As indicated in the previous chapters, nativism has been identified as a form of populism used as a political mobilisation tool to gain support and popularity as part of a political strategy to maintain political power. Nativism rose as a pro-native and anti-coloniser idea and it is still based on this fundamental background, based on negative allegations pitched against another group. As the researcher indicated in Chapter Four, in many post-colonial African states nativism has risen from an opposition to alien values and ideas, along with the imposed social structure and lifestyle of colonialism – or in the case of South Africa, apartheid. It seeks to reverse discourse, by attempting to undermine the elements of colonial (or apartheid) ideas through the mobilisation of African culture. However, in South Africa, nativism was not evident in the immediate post-1994 period after the country became a democracy. It only started emerging towards the end of President Zuma's second term in office, as will be discussed in this chapter.

Since the end of apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC) has been in power, heading both the state and the government, and in the 1990s under the late Nelson Mandela's presidency, government had the specific aim of uniting South Africans. This has changed in the recent past, especially in the final years of Jacob Zuma's presidency, when racial antagonism flared up, inspired or fuelled by divisive discourse emanating from the Zuma faction of the ANC and the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party.

The chapter seeks to provide answers to the third research question of the study: What are the various nativist discourses that have been used by Zuma and his faction in the ANC to maintain political power, demonstrated through the electoral system in the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa?

This chapter will be developed on the basis of content analysis performed on a range of speeches by former president Zuma and members of his faction in the ANC.

The chapter begins by providing information which will include a background of the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as the recent period under the administration of President Zuma (2009 – February 2018). President Zuma initiated the use of populism as a response to the threat presented by opposition parties in the form of the EFF and the Democratic Alliance (DA). The chapter will also provide information about nativist discourse used by former President Zuma after the emergence of challenges to his leadership within the ANC, which fostered factionalism within his party. Examples are drawn from significant political speeches that dwell largely on calls for the expropriation of land without compensation, accusations against “White monopoly capital” and appeals for “radical economic transformation”.

6.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO BLACK RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

As indicated in Chapter One, South Africa was colonised by the Dutch in 1652, after which the settlers imported slaves from Dutch colonies and began to implement racial segregation policies (Young-Yun, 2004). The British imperial conquest ended Dutch rule by the nineteenth century, when the Cape became a British colony. Rebel Dutch farmers who did not want to be under the jurisdiction of the Dutch or British had in the eighteenth century begun to move away towards the interior, and they became known

as the *Trekboers* (“farmers who pulled away”, or left the colony) and began to fight against and attempt to subjugate the indigenous black peoples they encountered in order to obtain land for farming.

The colonial (and *Boer*) occupation was the result of invasion and conquest and led to the subsequent White domination over Black society. By the mid-nineteenth century, the British controlled both the Cape colony and the eastern coastal zone of Natal. The *Voortrekkers* (*Trekboers* who led the expeditions away from the British administration) conquered indigenous people living in the interior regions and set up independent *Boer* republics which they called the Transvaal (originally founded as the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek) and the Orange Free State. In 1867, the discovery of diamonds and gold led to the migration of European settlers into the *Boer* republics (Kaplan, 2014). Consequently, instability and fighting were experienced amongst settlers of different nationalities, mainly the British and the Afrikaners. The British were determined to get political control of the gold and diamond fields. This led to the South African war from 1899 to 1902, through which the British under Cecil John Rhodes secured control over the Southern African territory. In 1910, South Africa became a union, no longer governed by Britain, with an independent White minority government, but White domination over Blacks persisted in society.

The South African Native National Congress (SANNC), renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923, was formed in 1912 with the aim of fighting for the rights of Black South Africans – this included the right to vote and the right to own land. SANNC was formed as a reaction to the Act of Union passed in 1909, in terms of which Black people were regarded as non-citizens. The aim of the organisation was to defend the rights and freedom of the all the Africans. Consequently, the SANNC fought against the Native Land Act No. 27 of 1913 which was an Act of the South African parliament,

aimed at regulating the acquisition of land. It set aside 7.3% of the total South African land area as reserves to accommodate the “native” population (Youla, 2009). It also put in place certain restrictions to the possibility of natives buying land outside the reserves. The Act also prohibited Whites from acquiring land in reserves, stating that the purpose of the Act was to ensure the territorial segregation of the races. Black people were prevented from owning land in almost the entire country and were assigned smaller, scattered areas. Movement of Black people was controlled by discriminatory “pass laws” which were engineered to ensure a cheap labour supply for Whites who owned the mines, farms and urban industries.

The victory of the Afrikaner National Party (NP) in May 1948 was a shift from the pro-British United Party that had largely dominated government since 1910, ushering in an era of pro-White Afrikaner government policies that were characterised by violence against and humiliation of Black people, who were deemed inferior, and further oppression, including the right to organise politically (Youla, 2009: 32). From 1948, the country was under ‘internal colonisation’ through White minority rule without Black representation; this was known as apartheid (Oliver & Oliver, 2017). Apartheid is an Afrikaner word which means “apartness” and it represented the White supremacist policy that existed in South Africa from 1948 to 1994 (Kaplan, 2014). It was a social, political and economic system which severely disadvantaged the majority population based on race. The state was simply an instrument of patronage for the White Afrikaner, ensuring their interests through policies and policy implementation (Kaplan, 2014).

The rules of apartheid dictated that people be classified under racial groups (Black, Coloured, Indians and Whites). As a result, the ANC, together with other resistance movements which included the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), adopted the

defiance campaign in the early 1950s under the banner of non-violent resistance. The PAC was formed in 1959 as a break-away political party due to the lack of consensus on the Africanist debate within the ANC when the Freedom Charter was adopted in 1955. However, the ANC and PAC were banned by the apartheid government in 1960 and were thereafter denied the right to organise politically. However, by the late 1970s and 1980s popular resistance took place in the form of mass defiance campaigns which were mainly in urban areas, especially in townships where younger militant Black people could meet and discuss politics. The ANC organised mass resistance underground and in exile, as well as staging war from the neighbouring states.

In mid-1964 the government of Tanzania under Julius Nyerere allowed the ANC to establish a base with training facilities for its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) (Lissoni, 2008). During that period, the liberation struggle was fought from the neighbouring frontline states of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Zambia, Angola and Mocambique. The following decades were characterised by political turmoil leading to the final release of political prisoners and the unbanning of liberation movements in 1990 (Nattrass, 2014). The year 1994 was a ground-breaking year for South Africa, as the country became a democracy led by the first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela. Since the attainment of freedom, the ANC liberation movement turned post-apartheid ruler in South Africa had been at the helm of government and decision making in the country.

Since the advent of democracy, the support base of the ANC has shifted from urban to rural areas (Nattrass, 2014). Despite recently declining popularity, the ANC has managed to maintain its rural support, mainly because inhabitants in rural areas regard the ANC as the only party that can represent the previously segregated Black South Africans. In all elections held since 1994, the ANC have shown popular support,

conforming to the status of a “dominant party”. The next section will provide an overview of developments in the pre-apartheid (from 1990-1994) and post-apartheid ANC (from 1994 to 2018).

6.2.1 ANC from 1990 to 1994

The restrictions on previously banned political parties, the ANC, SACP and the PAC, were lifted in 1990, soon followed by the release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, leader of the ANC. When political organisations were unbanned in 1990, the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) agreed to work together and formed the tripartite alliance so as to ensure victory at the polls in the first democratic elections. COSATU is a labour union which was launched in 1985 and played an important role in the struggle against apartheid by organising wider community struggles, stay-away protests and consumer boycotts (Webster & Adler in Cedras, 2013). COSATU's importance in the alliance was its ability to mobilise workers in support of the ANC, while the SACP, formed in 1953, also claimed to represent Black workers and for this reason was drawn into the alliance.

Importantly, Mandela was instrumental in the decision of the ANC to organise a branch that would engage in guerrilla warfare, “Umkhonto weSizwe”, or Spear of the Nation (Kaplan, 2014). Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) planned a strategy of sabotage and arranged military training for guerrilla. On 11 June 1964 Mandela and his co-accused were found guilty of treason at the Rivonia Trial, where they were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. After serving 27 years of imprisonment, he was released by President FW de Klerk amid growing international pressure and domestic insurrection. After his release from prison along with other members of the ANC and

PAC, he participated in the negotiated settlement that led to the first democratic elections in 1994, when he was elected as president.

6.2.2 The ANC from 1994 to 1999

When the ANC came to power in 1994 under the leadership of President Mandela, it faced the challenge of national unity as a result of South Africa's deeply divided past. There are nine different ethnic groups in South Africa, the Zulus being the largest and the Zulu monarch had resisted transition to democracy until 1993 and had supported the Afrikaners being in control of state apparatus, such as the police and army.

The beginning of the post-apartheid era saw divisions and disagreements between the alliance partners emerging with the ANC's ascension to power. As early as December 1994, divisions started showing in the alliance partners, with COSATU attacking the ANC's policy shifts to privatisation, and cuts in social expenditure and the civil service (Cedras, 2013). In 1996, the ANC government adopted the Growth Employment and Redistribution plan (GEAR), developed not by the alliance, but by the National Treasury as a strategy that proposed a set of medium-term policies aimed at liberalisation of the South African economy and privatisation of state assets. COSATU and the SACP opposed the liberal reforms, arguing that they were passed without consulting the alliance partners (Twala & Kombi, 2012). However, the ANC defended the GEAR policy, claiming that it would help with economic growth and lead to job creation, redistribution of income and opportunities.

COSATU pointed out that the ANC, as the leader of the alliance, should not be entitled to be the centre of policy making, but that all partners should participate; however, this was viewed by ANC leaders as an attempt to hijack the ANC (Twala & Kombi, 2012: 182). Allowing COSATU and the SACP to have an equal say in deciding the country's

social, economic and political direction would be understandable within the context of coalition, but the ANC, as the party voted into office by the electorate, was ultimately and constitutionally responsible for what happened in South Africa (Twala & Kompi, 2012).

As a result of factionalism, the period after 1994 was marked with political violence in the KwaZulu Natal province of South Africa. In the pre- and post-apartheid era, KwaZulu Natal was divided in terms of political authority, with provincial power vested in favour of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (a conservative party) and national power with the ANC (Rupert, 2002). In 1994, Jacob Zuma, a struggle veteran and long-serving member of MK, was appointed MEC of Economic Development and Tourism for the KwaZulu Natal provincial government. In 1963, Zuma had been arrested – along with other MK members going to Botswana – and sentenced to ten years on Robben Island for trying to overthrow the apartheid government (Island, 2018). After his release in 1973, he helped the ANC to mobilise resistance and was instrumental in the re-establishment of ANC underground structures in KwaZulu Natal. It was during this deployment that he made contributions to ensure peace and stability and an end to violence in the province.

However, the ANC deployment of Zuma in KwaZulu Natal from 1994 to 1999 was strategic, as it sought to end the ANC rivalry with the IFP and to end IFP dominance over the ANC in the province (Ndletyana & Maaba, 2007). Unlike other ANC members who were pro-modern and anti-tradition, Zuma represented traditional elements of the ANC, especially the Zulu tradition. Up to a third of the South African population lives in areas where traditional authorities are influential. Kings, traditional leaders and chiefs hold powerful positions over communities in rural areas. Notably, Zuma found himself being embraced by the Zulu king; as a result, reducing the perception that the

ANC was less Zulu or was against the Zulus (Ndletyana, 2007). Zuma persuaded the Zulu king to come on board and this swung the power for the ANC because Zulus are the majority group and they used to support the IFP. The subsequent shift of support from the IFP to the ANC in KZN can be credited to Zuma. An important factor was that Zuma was Zulu and grew up in poverty; the people saw him as a warm, patriotic leader who would remember his roots when formulating important economic and domestic policies (Crowell, 2012).

In 1999, Zuma became the vice-president of the ANC which was led by Thabo Mbeki after Mandela declined to contest for second term as president.


6.2.3 The ANC from 1999 to 2009

Thabo Mbeki was the second democratically elected president from 1999 to September 2008. Following Mandela's example, Mbeki was a pro-liberal. During Mandela's tenure as the South African president Thabo Mbeki was the deputy-president. Mbeki became South Africa's president in 1999 and chose the "African Renaissance" as a doctrine for Africa's social, economic and political renewal (Ngesi, 2013).

Mbeki adopted neo-liberalism which emphasised cutting public expenditure and social services, free market and privatisation (Mbeki, 2016). Liberalism comprises political views based on liberty and equality, whereas neo-liberalism is a form of liberalism which tends to favour and support the free market and capitalism. However, the ANC tripartite alliance partners – the SACP and COSATU – disapproved of the promotion of capitalism. In their argument they stated that the adoption of capitalism disadvantaged most of the historically disadvantaged Black majority, and they rather advocated for the adoption of socialism. On the other hand, COSATU and the SACP

accused Mbeki of centralisation of power and side-lining the alliance partners in decision making.

COSATU and the SACP criticised Mbeki for supporting GEAR. GEAR was a macro-economic policy framework of the South African government strategy developed in 1996, which was designed to ignite faster economic growth which was required to provide resources which would meet social investment needs. COSATU argued that GEAR had failed to improve the lives of general South Africans who are unemployed, poor and starving (Jahiya, 2000). In criticising these views, whilst addressing the ANC policy conference in 2007, Mbeki warned the ANC's alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP, not to stipulate to the government what it should or should not do and reminded them that the ANC was not a socialist party (COSATU, 2015). As a result, the Mbeki government became the centre of differing ideology contestations between the capitalist and socialist groups and this led to divisions between the government and the tripartite alliance.



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The already existing divisions in the ANC were precipitated by the firing of Deputy President Zuma by President Mbeki in 2005. The firing of Zuma was based on the conviction of Zuma's associate, Schabir Shaik, on charges of corruption relating to the government's arms deal (Sarakinsky & Fakir, 2015). In contrast, Zuma supporters argued that the recalling of Zuma as deputy president by Mbeki in 2005 showed an intention of preventing Zuma from succeeding Mbeki. As a result, ANC members were forced to choose sides between Zuma, who led them to believe he was pro-socialism, and Mbeki, who was pro-capitalism. In 2007, at the ANC Polokwane elective conference, Zuma contested against Mbeki for the ANC presidency and Mbeki lost to Zuma who had the backing of COSATU and the SACP. Consequently, there were two conflicting centres of power; Zuma being the head of the ANC and Mbeki the head of

the state and government. As a result, the ANC recalled Mbeki and it was engineered by Zuma that there could not be two centres of power. This led to Mbeki resigning in September 2008, just eight months before the end of his term – he was replaced by Kgalema Motlanthe (Sarakinsky & Fakir, 2015). However, Mbeki's decision to resign further divided the ANC, leading to a breakaway faction of pro-Mbeki supporters who went and formed a party known as Congress of the People (COPE).

As indicated earlier in this section, Mbeki was later recalled by the ANC and he resigned in 2008, eight months before his term came to an end, and was replaced by Kgalema Motlanthe. However, the ANC under the leadership of Jacob Zuma won the 2009 general elections.


6.2.4 The ANC from 2009 to 2018

Zuma had served as the South African deputy president from 1999 to 2005 before he was dismissed on alleged corruption charges related to the acquisition of arms from a German supplier through a government deal. Zuma was elected as ANC president on 18 December 2007 after defeating Thabo Mbeki at the ANC conference. Zuma came from impoverished beginnings in rural Zululand, was not well educated and was therefore seen to represent the humble and the ordinary worker. Zuma was Zulu and grew up in poverty. The people saw him as a warm, patriotic leader who would remember his roots when formulating important economic and domestic policies (Crowell, 2012). Zuma was perceived to be anti-capitalism, unlike Mbeki who was a capitalist. Zuma upholds and preserves Zulu cultural values, to which Zulus constitute up to 22% – the biggest minority population (Matthee, 2015). In this regard, Zuma represented the traditional Zulu elements in the ANC.



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Zuma's election as a Zulu traditionalist from the KwaZulu Natal province evidently appealed to the Zulu people who considered him one of them – in the 2009 elections, the ANC in KZN won with an outright majority for the first time. Zuma's relationship with King Goodwill Zwelithini paved the way for him to have access to amakhosi (chiefs, kings, traditional leaders) in the region. King Zwelithini is a central figure in validating "Zuluness" and gaining political support on this basis. As a result of winning over the King's support, Zuma won over the support of the Zulu nation. After infiltrating the amakhosi, the ANC became instrumental in how the rural populace in KwaZulu Natal voted, as the amakhosi were convinced that Zuma as a Zulu would favour the rural population in KwaZulu Natal in resource distribution (Twala, 2009). Consequently, mobilising support along ethnical lines, it was suggested that Zuma was the victim of an anti-Zulu campaign; this boosted his candidature for the ANC presidency and subsequently helped the ANC in the general elections, with ANC members and the general populace of KwaZulu Natal rallying around him.



As indicated in the previous section, factionalism has become one of the characteristics of the ANC since 2005 when two camps emerged – namely, the pro-Zuma and pro-Mbeki camps – in the lead-up to Polokwane conference (Kompi & Twala, 2012). The ANC under Zuma has been rocked by an increase in factional wars. The ANC has a long history of factionalism dating back to its formation in 1912. These wars were always along personal lines, rural-urban divisions, generational differences and less emphasis was on ideological differences. More significantly, in the apartheid era, the ANC acted as a unifier, uniting and accommodating people across different ideological backgrounds, the goal being to defeat the apartheid state and bring democracy to the people. However, after achieving the goal of democracy, the differences within the ANC surfaced and was

marked by deeper factionalism – as illustrated by the firing of Zuma as deputy president in 2005 – which entrenched divisions in the organisation. After Zuma's victory at the Polokwane conference in 2007, officials not associated with his faction were purged and President Mbeki was ousted from the presidency (Mukwedeyya, 2015). In addition, at the 53rd National Conference in Mangaung in December 2012, ANC secretary general, Gwede Mantashe, stated that the biggest challenge that had confronted the ANC was factionalism that has become institutionalised. However, as a nationalist party, the ANC's role was supposed to unify, as unity is one of the important objectives of nationalism.

Factionalism in the ANC was inevitable, since the party consists of trade unions which represent different ideologies, neo-liberals, traditionalists and communists. President Zuma came to power with the backing of COSATU (trade unions), SACP (communists) and traditionalists and was opposed by the liberals. More importantly, Zuma has been accused of using factional battles in the ANC to consolidate his power. Evidently, Zuma rewarded his key loyalists with key leadership positions in organisations such as South African Airways and Eskom, the power utility, as a way of controlling and retaining power (The Conversation, 6 August 2016). Zuma's legitimacy and credibility were tainted by allegations of corruption which led to him turn on his rivals within the ANC and resort to the use of populism in claiming to represent the masses.

Rogers and Davis (2017) define populism as a political and social phenomenon that arises from the common man, typically not well-educated, fed up with wealth and opportunity gaps in society and a government that is not working effectively well for them. Zuma took advantage of the tenuous relationship between the educated elite and the masses, and he has exploited this weakness as the base of his populism (Mangcu, 2007). He then used populism as a dimension of returning power to the

people. Zuma's populist stance was based on anti-modern, anti-capitalist values, threatening the cosmopolitan embodiment of modernity by Thabo Mbeki (Mangu, 2007).

In the 2009 national elections, the ANC retained power with an outright majority due to the impact of the new leader of the party, Jacob Zuma. Zuma portrayed himself as pro-poor and anti-elitist and this appealed to the masses across South Africa, the majority of whom are Black and poor (Vincent, 2011). His style of politics appeared to have assured the masses that they have a role to play in the democratic politics of their country. He portrayed himself as a defender of the poor, rural and vulnerable, and was against a conspiracy between White institution and Black middle class (Gumede, 2012). President Zuma came to power with a populist insurgency, promising that he would bring radical change and address Black poverty.

Zuma and his allies have used political rallies and gatherings to advocate populism. For instance, former African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) leader, Julius Malema, speaking at a Youth Day rally, was quoted as saying:

The youth of South Africa would die in supporting ANC president Jacob Zuma. Remnants of the counter-revolution including the DA (opposition party) and those opposed to Jacob Zuma becoming the next president must be eliminated.... If you don't leave Jacob Zuma alone, we will make this country ungovernable.... (SAPA: 2008).

These sentiments contributed to the rise of Zuma to power and the redeployment of president Mbeki. In May 2008, Zuma was quoted at the ANC rally in Khayelitsha as saying:

"God expects us (ANC) to rule this country because we are the only organisation which was blessed by pastors when it was formed. It is even blessed in heaven. That is why we will rule until Jesus comes back. We should not allow anyone to

govern our city when we are ruling the country (Sowetan Live, 9 September 2008).

In his view, opposing the ANC meant that you would be going against God's will.

In one of his populist developments in 2012, President Zuma introduced the National Development Plan (NDP). The plan proposed the adoption of strategies that would bring about faster economic growth, higher investment and greater labour absorption. In a statement at the Women's Day Celebrations, Zuma stated that the NDP made it possible to create a future that is many times better than the present and its goal was set to transform and deracialised the economy (Keet, 15 September 2012). In addition, the NDP states that the fragility of South Africa's economy lies in the biased forms of ownership and economic exclusion planted by apartheid policies, the effects of which are still evident in both employment and income differences. However, the Zuma administration was accused of rendering the NDP plans unachievable and unattainable, as alleged corruption and maladministration by public officials had been the order of the day (Berkowitz, 2017).

With growing public dissatisfaction in his leadership, Zuma introduced the Expanded Works Programme (EPWP) under the pretence of job creation, offering short-term low paid jobs such as road construction. This drew support for him (Zuma, 2004). However, the first phase of EPWP was launched in 2004 and Phase Two started in 2009. In 2014, Zuma launched the third phase of EPWP, the aim of which was to provide an avenue for labour absorption and income transfers to poor households in the short to medium term. It aimed to employ workers on a temporary basis by the government or contractors of non-governmental organisations under ministerial conditions of employment. In support of the EPWP, Zuma was quoted as saying:

“The ANC remains best placed, together with the people, to make qualitative change in people’s lives” (*Business Tech*, 20 May 2016).

However, the EPWP did not benefit the South African economy or workers as he promised; instead, it benefitted his image of providing and creating employment and being the saviour of poor South Africans.

Despite all these efforts to attract the poor Black majority voters, the ANC under Zuma continued to lose the confidence of the citizens as shown in the decline of support in the 2014 and 2016 general and local government elections, respectively. The gaining of political ground by opposition parties – the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – has challenged the dominant party status of the ANC and can be regarded as one of the catalyst factors that have led to the intensification of the politics of nativism by the ANC. According to the Independent Electoral Commission report, the DA received 12.37%, 16.66% and 22.23% in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 national elections, respectively, threatening the dominance of the ANC. Evidently, the support for the DA in municipal elections has increased from 16,3%, 24,0% and 26,9% in 2006, 2011 and 2016, respectively (Mkhabela, 2016). The ANC lost major metropolitan municipalities to the DA; these included the Nelson Mandela Bay (Eastern Cape Province), City of Cape Town (Western Cape province), City of Johannesburg (Gauteng province), City of Tshwane (Gauteng province). However, despite its poor credibility in terms of origins, it has managed to appeal to many urban Black voters because it boasts efficiency, anti-corruption and anti-patronage, which the ANC has been accused of accommodating and promoting.

Unlike the DA, which had been unable to appeal to rural Black voters and instead drew much of its support from urban voters, the EFF has managed to appeal to the Black voters, especially the poor and historically disadvantaged. The EFF was launched on

11 July 2013 by former ANC youth leader, Julius Malema. As a radical populist party, the EFF was able to capture support from the poor Black voters who did not get what they expected from the ANC government (Mbete, 2015: 35). The EFF presents itself as continuity in the struggle against imperialism, capitalism and racism (Shivambu, 2014: 1). In their arguments, the EFF proclaimed that the country's wealth needed to be equally shared amongst South Africans, the land expropriation without compensation was non-negotiable, and that the mines and banks should be nationalised. The EFF came to life at a time when the ANC, under the leadership of Jacob Zuma, was being scrutinised with issues such as state capture, abuse of tax payers' money for renovating Zuma's Nkandla household, corruption and alleged abuse of office. Less than a year after its formation, the EFF contested the national elections in 2014 and received 6.35% of the votes, making it the third largest party in South Africa. However, in the 2016 local government elections it received 8.26% of the votes (Mkhabele, 2016). Evidently, the EFF political style as a populist party has been embraced by a portion of the South African electorate, enabling it to have an impact on South African politics and thereby threatening the dominance of the ANC. One of the reasons ANC popularity was declining was loss of confidence in Zuma; his legitimacy has become questionable amongst the majority of South Africans. It began in 2011 when it was revealed that Zuma made upgrades to his rural home in Nkandla, but Zuma insisted that the upgrades made at his rural homestead were paid for by his family (News24, 1 April 2016). As a result, in 2013 the DA asked the Public Protector to launch an investigation into the spending on the security upgrades on the Nkandla homestead. In March 2014, the Public Protector released the findings and ordered President Zuma to pay back a portion of the money that was spent and that the National Treasury and South African Police Service should help determine the

amount. However, the decision was criticised by the Zuma faction in the ANC and argued that the Public Protector had misled the nation. The EFF and the DA then approached the Constitutional Court regarding the failure of parliament to act in accordance with the findings and hold the president accountable for violation of the constitution and the law (Munusamy, 2016). Consequently, in March 2016 the South African Constitutional Court found that Zuma had failed to uphold the constitution by not acting on the directive of the Public Protector that he should pay back public money spent on renovating his rural home (*Mail & Guardian*, 27 July 2016). Zuma resorted to the use of the politics of nativism to fight for his political legitimacy and authority.

6.2.4.1 The nativist discourse used by Zuma and his faction of the ANC

As indicated in the previous chapters, nativism is one of the populist strategies that has been used by post-colonial governments in Africa for mobilising support. Nativism is described as a political process or strategy of promoting the preservation of tradition and reviving indigenous culture, thereby favouring the interest of the native population of a country (Fernandez, 2013). As a result, nativism has been used as a populist strategy aiming to conceal the party's shortcomings and enable them to connect with the broader, rural-based section of the population. These strategies include radical economic transformation, anti-White sentiments and expropriation of land without compensation.

6.2.4.1.1 Expropriation of land without compensation

The issue of land has always been a complex issue in South Africa, as it has roots in politics, history and race issues. Land ownership dates back decades beyond the apartheid era. The Native Land Act of 1913 prohibited the establishment of new farming operations, sharecropping or cash rentals by Blacks outside the reserves where they were forced to live. In 1955, the Freedom Charter (a statement of core

principles that included the ANC) was formulated as the basis of the liberation movement agenda. It proclaimed that:

Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger; the state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers (Freedom Charter, 1955).

The issue of land has been one of the driving factors to fight and end apartheid. The apartheid period presented little opportunity in terms of economic empowerment and social mobility amongst the majority of the Black people within South Africa. During the period, White South Africans retained huge tracts of fertile land and socio-economic inequalities were visible. This led to political activism through the formation of the ANC (Chitukutuku, 2013).



However, when the ANC came into power in 1994, land restoration was one of the promises it made to the historically disadvantaged Black majority. The land question in South Africa is a highly sensitive matter, as it is characterised by a history of discrimination and oppression. The debate around the land issue has increased due to current high unemployment and poverty rates (AgriSA, 2018). In this regard, access to land was a solution to socio-economic challenges and as a result, land expropriation has become an increasingly contested issue in public discourse as a measure which seeks to address past injustices and arguably uses a nativist stance seeking to rally votes (Umraw, 2018). During the period of ending apartheid, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991 was introduced but by 1994, 80% of the land was still owned by Whites. The Constitution of 1996 Section 25(3) states that “the amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable”.

In 1998, the ANC government established a land reform and restitution programme to address the forced removal of people from land through the 1913 Land Act and apartheid, but it suffered from backlogs and lack of funding from the government (Tolsi, 2012). The aim of the land restitution programme was to redress past racially discriminatory legislation and policies, and to provide compensation to the people who were victims of resettlement. In line with land restitution, all people who were removed from their land by the 1913 Native Land Act should have their land returned to them (Cousin in Sibanda, 2010). Therefore, the land restitution was rights-based and the law provided that there should be either restoration of land rights or cash compensation to those who were forcefully removed from their land. By the time that the third democratic elections took place in 2004, the land reform and redistribution showed relatively little advancement. Black South Africans started showing discontent with the slow agrarian reform – especially those who live in communal and rural areas. Zuma's speeches of expropriation of land without compensation are evident from the beginning of 2015 after the 2014 Public Protector's findings that he should pay back the tax payer's money that was used to upgrade his Nkandla household. At the 103rd birthday celebrations of the ANC, Zuma emphasised that the ANC government would expropriate land, but emphasised that it would be done in the confines of the constitution. He was quoted as saying:

We commit that the land will be returned to our people and the ANC calls on its government to act with necessary speed to put the legislation in place this year. Expropriation will be done in line with the Constitution and the Act to be passed this year (*The Citizen*, 1 October 2015).

To cement the sentiments that he had expressed at the ANC birthday celebrations, during his State of the Nation address in February 2015, Zuma proposed to bar foreign

nationals from acquiring farming land in South Africa as a step to address the imbalance left during the minority rule. He was quoted as saying:

During this year of the 60th anniversary of the Freedom Charter, land has become one of the most critical factors in achieving redress for the wrongs of the past.... We are taking these actions precisely because the fate of too many is in the hands of too few” (Browdie, 2015).

Whilst addressing the National House of Traditional Leaders on 3 March 2017, Zuma was quoted:

You can’t have a constitution that keeps people in poverty; then that constitution is not good for the people.... If you are in poverty you don’t have dignity. We are saying let’s amend the constitution. That is not anything wrong, constitutions are amended all the times to fix the wrongs there is nothing irresponsible about that (Makinana, 2017).

Traditional leaders play an important role in our societies, especially in rural communities. They are the custodians of African heritage and culture (Dayimani, 2015). Therefore, assuring them of land redistribution will boost their confidence in the ANC government and will influence their communities to support the ANC. He continued by saying he was not calling for the Zimbabwean-style land grab; instead he stated that, “no one is saying let us go grab land; we are saying let us do everything within the law, or if we don’t have the law, or the constitution does not agree, let’s correct the constitution” (Makinana, 2017). More importantly, the expropriation of land without compensation will be a departure of ANC’s willing buyer, willing seller approach to a more radical approach.

Whilst addressing the Freedom Day celebrations in 2017, Zuma emphasised land expropriation and said:

We are also very much aware of our people's quest for land. We reiterate that we will use all available instruments necessary in expediting land restitution and respond to land hunger. The land question will feature prominently in the policy conference discussions of the governing party in June, including the debates of the expropriation of land without compensation (Zuma, 2017).

After the release of the State Capture report in 2016, Zuma faced one of the biggest challenges of his legitimacy to rule. State capture is a situation whereby there is a type of systemic political corruption in which private individuals influence a state to undertake certain decisions for their own benefit. President Zuma's integrity was under intense scrutiny when the Public Protector released a report in August 2016 which revealed that the Gupta family had gained control over decisions on spending departmental budgets, to its own advantage in the form of numerous contracts awarded to companies in the Gupta empire and that there was a high level of corruption within the government (De Wet, 2016). As a result, Zuma's ANC faction was losing credibility as the majority of them were implicated in corrupt activities and they were losing support from the public. To conceal his shortcomings, he indicated that he was being targeted because of advocating anti-White monopoly capital and land redistribution, using Mandela's legacy as justification. Consequently, in 2017, whilst addressing the youth in commemorating Nelson Mandela Day, Zuma encouraged the youth to emulate Mandela and achieve the radical economic transformation in their lifetime. He added:

Should we remain landless forever? Should we remain in an economy that has been dominated by a few? That is our task today we need a youth that is bold. That is clear like what Mandela.... The youth need to come together on the economy and land issues to cement Madiba's (Mandela) togetherness and carry on where he left. We want patterns of ownership to be changed, and not be held by a few, who is called White monopoly capital (News24, 2017).

He then argued that Mandela belonged to the ANC and reiterated that some elements within society were intent on separating Mandela from the ANC, the only political home that he knew.

In December 2017 the ANC elective conference resolved to expropriate land without compensation as a matter of urgency. The ANC spokesperson Zizi Kodwa stated:

Conference resolved that the ANC should, as a matter of policy, pursue expropriation of land without compensation. This should be pursued without destabilising the agricultural sector, without endangering food security in our country and without undermining economic growth and job creation (Mulholland, 2017).

As a result of the above-mentioned resolution, the ANC agreed to vote in parliament in favour of the motion put forward by the EFF for constitutional review in order to allow for the expropriation of land. On 27 February 2018, the National Assembly agreed in principle to the expropriation of land without compensation within the context of food security and radical economic transformation. This resolution cemented the 2017 ANC national conference, where it had been resolved that the ANC as a matter of policy should undertake the expropriation of land without compensation.

6.2.4.1.2 Radical economic transformation

Malikani (2017) defined radical economic transformation as changing the composition of output that the economy is producing, and ownership and control patterns. According to this view, the radical economic transformation agenda was to benefit all South Africans and build an economy and society that includes everyone. The ANC argued that Black people constitute almost 80% of the total population in South Africa, yet the ownership of land and companies remains in the hands of the White people who comprise 8% of the population (Hans, 2017). Evidently, a large portion of the

South African population has grown discontent with the ANC government with regard to delivering its promises; as a result, ANC support has shifted from urban to rural areas. The sentiments for radical economic transformation seek to reverse past socio-economic injustice and the ANC has used the concept of radical economic transformation as an opportunity to employ the politics of nativism. Jacob Zuma is regarded as the forefather of radical economic transformation and has pushed for the attainment of the change. In his arguments for radical economic transformation, he emphasised that unity amongst Black people is the only way that radical economic transformation will be achieved.

At the 2017 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Zuma emphasised the need for political freedom amongst South Africans:



The objective of our struggle in South Africa as set out in Freedom Charter encompasses economic emancipation. It is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without return of the wealth of the country to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy; and our drive towards national emancipation must include emancipation. To allow the existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the roots of racial supremacy and exploitation (Zuma, 2017).

He then described radical socio-economic transformation as a significant change in the structure, systems, patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of South Africans, especially the poor – the majority of whom are Black (Zuma, 2017). However, Zuma made his address after disruptions from DA, COPE and EFF members who argued that Zuma should not address the nation because of several issues that included the Constitutional Court ruling on state expenditure on his private Nkandla residence and the rules of parliament that he had

broken (Davis, Theletsane & White, 2017). EFF members argued that Zuma should not be allowed to address the nation, but the EFF was forcibly removed from parliament and Zuma was able to deliver his speech. Before the start of the SONA, there were clashes between police officers and people who were protesting against Zuma and demanding that he resign as South African president. Nonetheless, Zuma used SONA as an opportunity to advocate for radical economic transformation (nativist stance), seeking to appeal to the majority of poor Black South Africans who would relate to what he was saying.

Whilst addressing ANC supporters at the Freedom Day celebrations on 27 April 2017, advocating for his nativist stance through radical economic transformation, Zuma stated:



We have achieved political freedom, but economic freedom still remains largely elusive. It is for this reason that we speak about radical economic transformation. The majority of Black people are economically disempowered and are dissatisfied with economic gains from liberation. The level of inequality remains high. White households earn five times more than Black households (Zuma, 2017).

In his criticism of radical economic transformation, Sibindana (2017) argued that radical economic transformation was nothing more than a state looting ideology that would benefit those connected to members of a faction of the ANC.

As indicated earlier in the chapter, Zuma was recalled as the president by the ANC and resigned on 14 of February 2018 after losing the party presidency to Cyril Ramaphosa at the ANC National Elective Conference in December 2017. Consequently, speaking at gala dinner after his resignation as state president, he stated that he was being targeted by White monopoly and his only crime was to

spearhead radical economic transformation and the expropriation of land without compensation. He was quoted as saying:

Whenever someone says something which people dislike, he is attacked by White establishment using Black people. This means that we are not free because we are still under their control. They threaten you to such extent that you end up avoiding being targeted by them (Hans & Mtshali, 2018).

In line with these sentiments, Zuma was being persecuted for his stance on radical economic transformation and had become a victim of conspiracy because he had used the office of the state president to advocate and push for radical economic transformation (Hans & Mtshali, 2018). In this regard, BLF believes the corruption charges against Zuma are a fabrication to silence him.

6.2.3.1.3 Anti-White discourse

The ANC was formed in 1912 to unite the African people and one of its key objectives was the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. More importantly, in the ANC's first democratic election manifesto, the party committed itself to building a non-racial, non-sexist South Africa. The first post-apartheid president advocated for a non-racial South Africa and promoted the notion of a rainbow nation. However, with the legitimacy of Zuma being questioned and continuous marches for him to be removed as president, he started using race as the reason why his leadership and authority were under threat. In April 2017, South Africans marched countrywide demanding that Zuma resign; in response, he stated that the demonstrations that took place against him showed that racism was real and existed in South Africa (Hlongwane, 2017).

It is often argued that in most cases race determines the electoral outcome without any considerations to other factors. The presidency of Zuma has seen his faction of



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the ANC advancing towards racial politics that employs identity politics. Mobilisation for political power has taken place based on historical racial divisions and electoral support has been drawn from past divisions; not on the contestation of middle ground. Consequently, the nativist appeal of racial politics has found space in societies that are deemed to have been historically disadvantaged and there is evidence of racial inequality and poverty (Shain, 2017: 6). The apartheid era in South Africa was characterised by social, political and economic inequalities across racial lines. Racial politics has been in South Africa since the late eighteenth century when it became colonised. However, since democratic elections in 1994, the issue of race has played a role in political choice but the first democratically-elected president, Nelson Mandela, advocated for what he termed a “rainbow nation” where there was multiracial unity (Macdonald, 2012: 8). In contrast to the ideas of a “rainbow nation”, Zuma has used racial politics for mobilising support and justifying his political legitimacy.

In 2016, before the local government elections, the fight against racism was one of the themes that the ANC used for campaigning – therefore playing the politics of racial identity as a nativist strategy. Makhanya (2016) observed that apartheid as a system was demolished in 1994, but before the 2016 elections, the ANC constantly reminded voters that apartheid could easily return if they voted for opposition parties. In 2016, before the local government election, the ANC spokesperson, Zizi Kodwa, was quoted in the Business Tech as saying:

It's a glaring sign that the DA's attempts to woo the Black electorate are floundering and they will stop at nothing to blackwash their chequered history as a Whites-only party by thrusting a few tokens Blacks into positions of leadership and appropriating even symbols that have always shunned them (26 July 2016).

These sentiments followed ANC president Jacob Zuma's appearance at a rally in Nelson Mandela Bay, where he accused the DA of being "snakes, an offspring of the apartheid era", saying that they did not believe that Black people could lead and did not deserve the chance to lead the country.

The ANC spokesperson accused the DA of being a "safe haven for racists". He stated:

The DA has been at pains to remind the Black voters that it is founded on the principles of non-racialism when in fact it is a reconstitution of National Party (apartheid regime) which found refuge in the DA to carry forward the button of racist oppression under a new guise (*BusinessTech*, 26 July 2016).

He continued that:

The ANC reiterates its long-held position that the DA is a haven for racists, and its upper echelons dominated by individuals who hark back to the days of apartheid. The Trojan Horse of apartheid draped in the deceptive colours of non-racism (*BusinessTech*, 26 July 2016).

Whilst addressing guests at Tobeka Madiba Zuma Foundation (TMZF) dinner in April 2017, where Zuma and other ANC members were guests, Ekurhuleni Mayor, Mzwandile Masina, a pro-Zuma supporter, warned White people that they needed to "back off" and let the government get on with the business of running the country (De Villiers, 2017). Masina's anti-White comments were part of a campaign by Zuma and his faction in the ANC to utilise race as a strategy to maintain power. More importantly, as Mugabe did in Zimbabwe, Zuma was appealing to the poor and with the claim that the South African economy was mostly in the hands of White people. Masina was quoted as saying:

It is very important that we send a very strong warning...we will crush any individual who stands in the way of the project of nation building and social cohesion in South Africa. We are not monkeys. We are people. Now this thing of

being shown middle finger everywhere by White people because they've gained a new confidence must come to an end. I want to say to our White counterparts in South Africa, they must be very careful (De Villiers, 2017).

Whilst addressing religious leaders in KwaZulu Natal and advocating for nativism, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a pro-Zuma supporter, lashed out at White people, whom she accused of opposing radical economic transformation (Hans, 2017). She emphasised that if she was to become the ANC presidential candidate, she would implement radical economic transformation despite opposition from White business people. She was quoted as saying:

Whites talk too much against radical economic transformation saying we want to use it to loot. Who are they to talk about looting? They have been stealing ever since their arrival in this country. They stole our land, if everything goes according (meaning if elected ANC president),

However, after losing her presidential race to Ramaphosa, she dropped her nativist sentiments, arguing that it was necessary for a change in leadership for the South African economy to grow and vowed to support Ramaphosa, a neo-liberal.

Free higher education for poor Black students

In what was viewed as a populist stance, President Zuma announced free tertiary education to those who could not afford it the day before the start of the ANC elective conference in December 2017 (Rensburg, 2017). Zuma used the ANC conference to ensure his legacy of radical economic transformation was put in place. However, the announcement was strategic as Zuma supported the faction of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma against the Ramaphosa faction for the ANC presidential race. As a result, voting at the conference against Zuma's preferred faction meant voting against free education. Furthermore, the decision made by Zuma meant that there was no room for the new president to reverse or take a different direction on higher education

(News24, 16 December 2017). If the new president was to reverse the decision after the conference, then Zuma would look good and tertiary learners would revolt against the president. The ANC 2017 elective conference ended with Cyril Ramaphosa being voted ANC president against Zuma's preferred candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Zuma resigned as state president on 14 February after being recalled by the ANC and he was replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa. The ANC pointed out that one of the reasons for recalling Zuma was the Constitutional Court ruling in 2016 that found that the president failed to uphold the constitution when taxpayer's money was used to renovate his Nkandla rural home (Komisa, 2018). Throughout his presidency, Zuma embraced populist rhetoric and later adopted nativism as a form of populism as a way of appealing to South Africans.

6.3 CONCLUSION



Chapter Six looked at the nativist discourse used by former President Zuma and his faction in the ANC after the emergence of challenges to his leadership. In order to answer the question, the chapter provided information on the background of the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as the period under President Zuma's administration, to illustrate the roots of factionalism inside the party. It was established that President Zuma came to power based on a mistaken belief that he would promote a socialist agenda, after he had promised that he would bring radical change and address Black poverty. Zuma adopted nativist discourse after the emergence of challenges to his leadership, borrowing ideas from the EFF to form a populist campaign that was based on slogans and discourse around nationalisation of banks and mines and expropriation of land without compensation. Zuma then used this discourse to frame accusations against "White monopoly capital" and appeals for

“radical economic transformation”, whilst also unilaterally announcing free university education shortly before the National Elective Conference that ousted him in December 2017.

The ANC had a long history of factionalism along personal lines, urban rural-divisions, generational divisions and ideological differences. Zuma utilised these differences strategically to consolidate his power, whilst employing discourse that portrayed himself as pro-poor and anti-elitist to appeal to the masses across South Africa, the majority of whom are Black and poor (Vincent, 2011). As a result, he portrayed himself as a defender of the poor, rural and vulnerable against a conspiracy between White capital and the Black middle class, promising to bring radical change and to address Black poverty.



The next chapter provides an analysis on how a sample of the poor Black masses in the rural area of Ngcobo in the Chris Hani district in the Eastern Cape of South Africa responded to Zuma's discourse.

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CHAPTER SEVEN: RESPONSES TO NATIVIST DISCOURSE EMPLOYED BY THE ZUMA FACTION IN THE ANC IN THE CHRIS HANI RURAL DISTRICT OF SOUTH AFRICA

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter explored different nativist discourse used by former South African president, Jacob Zuma, to try and maintain political power. Chapter Six provided a trajectory of the ANC from 1990 to 2018 and provided background information on the long-standing factionalism within the party that enabled Zuma to engage in tactics relying on nativist discourse in order for his faction to retain power in the ANC. This discussion thus traced factionalism within the ANC, highlighting the 2005 clash between the pro-Zuma and pro-Mbeki factions. The chapter also pointed out the allegations of corruption against Zuma and his allies which tainted Zuma's legitimacy and credibility, prompting him to rely on nativist discourse to try and distract attention from the allegations against him. Importantly, the growth in popularity of the opposition party – the Democratic Alliance (DA), which managed to appeal more to urban voters in the 2016 municipal elections – challenged ANC dominance and as a result prompted the escalation of anti-White nativist discourse. Finally, and most significantly for this research, Chapter Six also identified nativist discourse employed by former president, Zuma, including discourse around the expropriation of land without compensation, radical economic transformation and anti-White capital.

This chapter seeks to unpack and provide answers to the fourth research question posed: How did rural populations in the Chris Hani rural district respond to nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC?

The Chris Hani district municipality is a landlocked district with six local municipalities, which are mainly rural, and it is situated in the centre of the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. During the apartheid era it was part of the 'Bantustan', or independent homeland of the Transkei to where many Xhosa-speaking Black people were moved by the apartheid government (Wotshela, 2009). One of the economic problems in Transkei was that the area of land was too small and infertile to support the population. As a result the majority of the men were compelled to seek employment in industrial urban areas and they were absorbed by the gold mines in places like Johannesburg (Bernstein & Bernstein, 2015). Even after 1994, migrant labour is a main foundation of the rural economy and many men spend most of their working lives in Gauteng or other industrial centres. This was confirmed in interviews with some of the respondents, who stated that they were working in urban areas and only came back to their rural homes after retirement.



Since 1994, Chris Hani has been one of the strongholds of the ANC. The majority of its inhabitants are Xhosa-speaking, Xhosa being the second most widely spoken language in South Africa. As indicated in Chapter Five, one of the objectives of the study, apart from the actual responses to nativism, was to establish whether responses in rural South Africa differ from those in rural Zimbabwe and, if so, how. The nature of responses obtained from a sample of the population in South Africa were later compared with the responses obtained from interviews conducted in Zimbabwe.

As explained in Chapters Two and Five, the study aligns itself with broad post-colonial perspectives and an interpretive approach to conducting research. The study therefore advocates for the emergence of knowledge that is independent from a borrowed

paradigm, one that relies on the explanations provided by members of the subaltern themselves.

As indicated in Chapter Six, the aim of the researcher was not to locate the study within any particular paradigm, but it was impossible to overlook the importance and relevance of the hypotheses developed by Ekeh and Mamdani, which related to the nature of the post-colonial state and its relationship with the citizenry. As a result, the researcher recognised Ekeh's hypothesis of the 'two publics' and Mamdani's of 'the bifurcated state' as a preliminary framework to approach the study. The linkages between traditional and modern forms of authority that exist in rural areas foster the survival of practices and beliefs that are centred around the notion of a common solidarity in rural areas and loyalty to recognised authority. Zuma recognised this propensity to loyalty in a common Black identity in seeking the audiences for his nativist discourse and took advantage of the disparity between urban and rural South Africa to attract rural electorates in KwaZulu Natal. This research, however, was not carried out in KZN, but in the Eastern Cape, far from his traditional support base.

Despite rural South Africa being less developed than the urban areas, it provides the much-needed support for the survival of ANC as a dominant party. In the 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 national elections, the ANC obtained a 62.7%, 66.4%, 69.7%, 65.9% and 62.15% majority respectively (Independent Electoral Commission). However, in the 2016 local government elections, the ANC lost major metropolitan municipalities to the DA; these included Nelson Mandela Bay (Eastern Cape Province), City of Cape Town (Western Cape province), City of Johannesburg (Gauteng province) and the City of Tshwane (Gauteng province).

However, in the 2016 local government elections, the ANC managed to maintain its grip on municipalities, especially in rural areas (Dufour & Calland, 2016). According to the Independent Election Commission (IEC), in municipal election results in Ngcobo, the ANC obtained 87% and 83% in 2011 and 2016, respectively, whereas, in the 2014 national and provincial election results in Ngcobo, the ANC obtained 84% and 84%, respectively (IEC).

Rural South Africa still adheres to traditional authority, customs and culture. As a result, when the researcher was conducting interviews in the Chris Hani district of South Africa, the researcher – together with a translator and an insider from the village/villages – had to seek permission from the five traditional leaders to conduct the interviews. This included one chief and six village leaders in each of the villages. Rural customs and culture are still obeyed in post-apartheid South Africa and as protocol, the traditional leader should grant permission to interview villagers.

Four main themes emerged from the interview responses; namely, loyalty, political identity and race, mistrust and betrayal, to be discussed in detail in the following section.

7.2 RESPONSES TO DISCOURSE EMPLOYED BY ZUMA AND HIS FACTION IN THE ANC

The researcher interviewed 20 respondents over the age of 18, both male and female, because, according to the constitution of the republic, voting age starts at 18. Significantly, whilst conducting interviews, the researcher noticed that the responses from the younger people were distinctly different to those of the older generation. The interviews were again conducted in a semi-structured format, as was the case with the interviews conducted in Zimbabwe. The researcher drew interview questions from the

themes that emerged from speeches by Zuma presented in Chapter Six as a guide for conducting the interviews. The semi-structured interviews allowed the respondent to respond to questions about the discourse used by the Zuma faction, as well as to tell his or her story.


As foregrounded in the preview, it is highly significant that the interviews were conducted after the resignation of Zuma as president of South Africa in February 2018 after he was recalled from power by the ANC, but before the disillusionment with his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa, set in.

The researcher conducted interviews in six villages of the Ngcobo local district; namely, Didi, Mvala, Mhloplekazi, Cefane, Luhewini and Sitebe. These are typical rural areas, far away from cities and towns. The closest town is Mthatha in the Eastern Cape, which is approximately 86 kilometres and the closest city is East London in the Eastern Cape, which is approximately 240 kilometres away. The roads linking villages are gravel roads, but these are in relatively good condition.

In some villages, households are in a dispersed settlement pattern, normally on an incline in higher lying areas and not in valleys, where flooding can occur over the rainy summer season. Some households were close to one another, making it easy and fast for the researcher to move from one respondent's household to another. As a result, the researcher went on foot and only occasion used public transport in the form of a motor vehicle between villages. Some of the houses were huts built of clay and had grass thatching and others were built with bricks. There were small 'spaza' shops run by householders that sold cigarettes, bread and air time, but most of the villagers had to travel to nearby towns to get basic commodities.

There are a few high schools that are shared amongst villages and one clinic that caters for the above mentioned villages but compared to urban schools and clinics the infrastructure, facilities and services were inferior. Infrastructure such as primary school buildings were in poor condition and needed either rebuilding or major renovations. One respondent mentioned that in extreme weather conditions the classrooms are not habitable.

Despite rural areas being far less developed than urban areas and very poorly resourced, the ANC has managed to retain its popularity with the broader rural electorate because it is regarded as a party that represents the poor Black majority and a party that liberated the country from the apartheid regime. It is in seeking to understand the continued support for liberation movements turned ruling parties that this research explores the effectiveness or lack thereof of nativist discourse, drawing from the data presentation and analysis below.



7.2.1 Loyalty

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Loyalty is defined as a strong feeling of support, faithfulness or allegiance (Clarke, Golder & Golder, 2006). Black rural electorates in South Africa are loyal to the ANC as a party; this has been evident in past election results as the ANC has maintained its popularity in the rural areas where the majority of the Black South Africans reside. The ANC was an urban-led party during the struggle for democracy, but it gained the support of the rural areas when these became apartheid homelands. Because of the strong police and army presence in the homelands, supported by the South African state, and because of the lack of roads and infrastructure in the rural areas, the ANC was largely active in urban areas (Skagen, 2008). Prior to 1990, the ANC saw the strategic value in getting the support of migrant workers in urban areas, but in recent years support for ANC has shifted from the urban to rural areas.

7.2.1.1 Loyalty to the ANC

Respondent A, 57 years old, who has lived in Sitebe village for over seven years, preferred to be interviewed in English and as a result the researcher conducted the interview. The respondent lived in a big house which had electricity and said she was a teacher at a local school and that he supported the ANC. He stated:

I support the ANC because the ANC is the one which brought us freedom, which we enjoy today. Leaders like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu fought against the apartheid regime and there were imprisoned for so many years.

When asked whether, since he supports the ANC, he also supports Zuma and his faction in the ANC. The respondent replied:

President Zuma had multiple cases of alleged corruption that date back to decades ago and he used taxpayers' money to renovate his rural home in Nkandla. My loyalty is with ANC, not the leaders, ANC is our party, I might dislike the leadership, but I cannot ignore the fact that our lives as Black people improved under the leadership of ANC. I never liked Zuma when he was president of ANC because of his past but I still voted for ANC, not for Zuma's sake but for the future.

The researcher then asked the respondent if he supported the calls by Zuma and his ANC faction about the radical economic transformation and the expropriation of land. Without hesitation the respondent replied:

Yes, I support the calls for land redistribution and it is a right thing to do. Since Zuma is speaking on behalf of the ANC I support his sentiments and the government should ensure that this is going to be done without failure.


The above respondent's view shows that Zuma's discourse appealed to the respondent because he was believed to be speaking on behalf of the ANC.

In line with the above respondent's views, respondent H, a 64-year-old woman from Luhewini village, emphasised that her blood was "green and yellow" (ANC colours).

The respondent lived in a small house with her family and did not have electricity or a water supply at her house. The respondent said her bond with the ANC was unbreakable and she felt connected to the party because it is the party that brought freedom. She went on to say:

Nelson Mandela was Xhosa and he was from the same province. Apart from Mandela, Thabo Mbeki is Xhosa as well as Walter Sisulu was Xhosa and he came from the Eastern Cape Province. All these people are struggle icons who fought against apartheid under the ANC banner.

The respondent also said that she was not happy with the ANC of today because there were factions and fighting. When asked by the translator about the factions within the ANC, particularly the Zuma faction and its discourse such as the radical economic transformation, she replied:



I support the idea of the redistribution of wealth it might have come from Zuma, whom I do not trust and like but he represents the ANC that I support. I believe that what needs to be done we cannot say we are liberated yet we lack economic independence and it is in the hands of a few White people.

In line with the above views, the support for Zuma and his faction in the ANC is rather embedded in loyalty to the party which fought and sacrificed a lot for their freedom. Despite not trusting Zuma, they support him because of their loyalty to the ANC. To the respondent, the ANC is the liberator of the people from the apartheid regime. Despite shortcomings of leaders like Zuma, she believed that his loyalty should be focused on the ANC as a party, rather than individuals or leaders.

7.2.1.2 Loyalty based on gratitude

Gratitude is understood as the quality of being thankful and can also be understood as an emotion which is similar to appreciation.

Respondent F, in her mid-50s, said she had lived in Cefane village since she was born. The respondent explained that her husband had passed away over eight years previously and that she was unemployed and lived with her children and grandchildren. She lived in a house which was built with bricks but did not have electricity. When asked about changes that she had seen since Zuma became president of the country, she said:

I am very grateful and thankful to Zuma and ANC for a lot have been done for us the poor. I could start by saying that I myself could not afford to build a decent house for family. You see this house that we are in (pointing to the house that there were sitting in) I received it through the government-funded social housing project RDP [Reconstruction and Development Programme]. Before I was living in a shack but now I have a home, my life has improved under the ANC. Apart from that, Zuma's the government has ensured that we have a water supply and it is for free we only pay for electricity.

She was then asked if this was an indication that the government was looking after its people, she replied:

No, no, no, it is because of the leaders like Zuma who understood the struggles of the poor that we received these houses.

When asked about her thoughts on Zuma's discourse that there was a need to redistribute (anti-White monopoly capital), the respondent said,

Zuma is correct to say that it is evident that the fewer White people are rich at our expense, this need to be corrected. This is why I say Zuma is pro-poor and for that reason I am forever grateful to Zuma and the ANC.

Respondent I, 67 years old and from Mhloplekazi village, shared with the above respondent her gratitude to Zuma and the ANC. The respondent said she had been living in the village for almost 40 years. The respondent explained that most of the people who resided in the village were poor Black people who depended on social

grants from the government for survival. The respondent was asked what social grants are, and she explained that it was a grant in form of money paid to the poor. This includes those who are over the age of 60, the disabled and child support grants. When asked by the translator if she was a recipient of the grant, she happily replied that she was, and that she received R1 690 per month, but it was not enough. She added:

Of course, it is not enough everything here in South Africa is expensive. But we are thankful to the government as there was no such thing during the apartheid regime. With the hope that in future there will increase the grants. I thank our government for taking care of us the poor and looking after the needs of us the elderly.

The respondent was asked of her thoughts on Zuma and his faction's view that White people are the cause of their poverty. The respondent replied:

Yes, White people are the reason why we receive grants from the government because they looted everything. There is not one White person who you see receiving social grants because they have all the wealth. As a result, I am grateful to Zuma and ANC for looking after the needs of us the poor'.

The respondent's view shows that Zuma's discourse managed to appeal to her: she believes that Zuma and the ANC have long been fighting for the poor Black South Africans. As a result, her loyalty to Zuma is embedded in how grateful she is to him.

7.2.1.3 Loyalty based on Zuma's liberation war credentials

Zuma's ability to become ANC leader stems from his role in fighting against the apartheid system. This has worked in his favour as his liberation credentials seem to grant him credibility among the rural poo.

Respondent J, in his late 50s, claimed that he was a former uMkhonto WeSizwe military veteran and he had been living in Sitebe village for close to ten years. When

the researcher arrived at his homestead, he was happy to see them. He explained that the reason for his happiness was that political matters are close to his heart and he was more than willing to talk about anything; he did not mind having interviews for a whole week. Throughout the interview, the respondent spoke with much passion as he kept on reminding us that political matters were close to his heart, because he regards himself as one of the people who liberated the country. When asked about his thoughts on Zuma's claims that the DA wanted to bring apartheid back, the respondent said:

Yes, they are correct, there is no way that we will allow them to bring back apartheid. We experienced the harsh conditions of living under the Boers and it is something that we do not want to experience again. Zuma's love for the Black majority is not questionable, a lot of ANC veterans fallen and alive sacrificed a lot in order for the country to be liberated that alone can tell you which party is for the people. Is it either the White apartheid masters who hide behind the banner of DA or it is the ANC which fought for the country to be liberated?

The respondent described some of the harsh conditions in which they had had to live during the apartheid times. He explained that they were segregated; Blacks were not allowed to mix with White people and movement was restricted. He then explained that once an individual trespassed, it meant punishment, and this might include being thrown into jail for a long time. As a result, he was clear that no party which seeks to bring back the apartheid regime directly or indirectly should be given a chance. To him, the liberation credentials of Zuma were unquestionable and therefore he deserved the support of Black South Africans.

Respondent C, aged 47 years and living in Mvala village, said he was a teacher by profession at a local school. He stated that he obtained his teaching degree at the University of Fort Hare through government funding soon after South Africa gained its

independence. The respondent lived in a well-built house which was bigger than the surrounding houses, with livestock and a small vegetable garden in his garden. The respondent spoke of Zuma's commendable liberation credentials and stated that the ANC sacrificed a lot for the country to be liberated. This included leaders like Mandela who went to jail and lived in exile fighting for the freedom.

After he was asked about the anti-White discourse employed by Zuma, he said:

We have achieved political freedom, but economic freedom still remains largely elusive. It is for this reason that we speak about radical economic transformation. The majority of Black people are economically disempowered and are dissatisfied with economic gains from liberation. The level of inequality remains high. White households earn five times more than Black households Zuma is amongst the people who fought for South Africa to be free and his role is not questionable. Therefore, without a doubt, he is right to say that White people are the reason for our poverty. Zuma is part of the ANC which fought against apartheid and sacrificed a lot. Besides the fact that might not trust Zuma, I personally support his discourse, we cannot take away the fact that he is part of the ANC we love and respect so much and who fought for our freedom. Despite Zuma's so called wrong doing we cannot take away the fact that he loves this country and sacrificed a lot for this country. To me, his sentiments are coming from a right place and rather than vilifying him and calling him names let us search deep inside we will agree that he might be right.

The respondent's views show that despite Zuma's shortcomings, he still valued his input to the liberation struggle and respected the fact that he fought against the apartheid regime. Notably, Zuma's credentials as a liberation struggle leader made the respondent feel the need to support Zuma's discourse because, together with the ANC, he sacrificed a lot for the freedom to be attained. As a result, he aligned Zuma with the ANC and his loyalty is based on the idea that he was a liberator and therefore more interested in the well-being of the majority of Black people.

Respondent M was 53 years old and had lived in Mhloplekazi village for close to 35 years. He lived in a small house with his wife, children and grandchildren. The respondent also mentioned that he worked at a local supermarket at the till. The respondent believed that the ANC has changed the country in a positive way. He then went on to say that they now have electricity, health services and they easily get information through radio and television and that this was not the case during apartheid. The researcher then asked the respondent if he still believes in the leadership of ANC, despite the alleged corruption of some of its top leaders like former president Zuma and his allies in the ANC. The respondent replied by saying that he still supports Zuma and his allies in the party because they are some of the people who liberated them from White minority rule and apartheid. He then said that all the freedom and benefits that the people are enjoying today are because of people like Zuma and other ANC members who fought against the apartheid system. The respondent then said:



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You could have easily become uneducated if it wasn't for these people who fought against the apartheid system, and would have been doing manual work like me, but because of ANC you went to school (pointing and referring to the researcher) and you have or will have a better life because of them. It is all their work that now you and I are free and you younger people were given the opportunity that some of us failed to get because of apartheid. Despite its shortcomings Zuma and the ANC there are our liberator from the apartheid and without their bravery we might have been still living in a system that did not recognise us Blacks. Without them we wouldn't have been able to access services such as education and health".

Notably, in line with the above respondent's view Zuma's liberation credentials has invoked a feeling of loyalty as he is regarded as one of the champions of democracy in South Africa

7.2.2 Political identity and race

Political identity refers to a specific party affiliation or partisan identity. Identity is the sameness and belonging of identification (Xiaomei, 2014). For many decades, South Africa was under the apartheid regime which discriminated against Blacks until 1994 when democratic elections were held. The ANC took over power in 1994 in a racially divided nation. The ANC represented the poor Black majority, who could easily identify themselves with the party. The ANC represented a party that would redress history. In South Africa, race remains a visible dividing factor; Whites are the minority and are better off in relation to most Black people, especially those residing in rural areas. The next sub-section deals with various aspects that emerged during the interviews, including Zuma and his faction of the ANC being regarded as representative of the poor Black majority.



7.2.2.1 Representation of the poor Black majority

Respondent K from Didi village – aged in his mid-60s – said that since the ANC took over power in 1994, he feels he is a South African and that South Africa even belongs to Blacks and he does not need to be White in order to feel South African. The respondent stated that he was a recipient of a social grant and it was his only source of income to feed his family; however, it was not enough. The respondent had a three-roomed house which had electricity supply but there was no water supply. The researcher asked the respondent why he was only now feeling like South African, whilst he was indeed South African. The respondent stated it was only after 1994 when the ANC took over power that he felt that he was represented, as a Black person in this country. The respondent was then asked by the translator if the ANC was a party for all South Africans and if Whites were welcomed. He replied and said:

Yes, ANC is a party for all South Africans including Whites, but it is the White people that do not want to be part of the ANC and are always finding fault and accusations. This is because ANC looks after the needs of us the Black majority and this does not sit well with them as they still dream of continuing the apartheid legacy.

The respondent was then asked about his thoughts on President Zuma's statement during 2017 State of the Nation address that White people earn five times more than Black people, there is a higher level of inequality and Blacks are poor because of greedy White people. In his reply, the respondent said,

Zuma is right to say that and give us a proper understanding of the inequalities that we face and how we are disadvantaged. If you are to compare this province of the Eastern Cape majority whom are Black and that of the Western Cape majority are White people you will see a big difference. You might even think that these are provinces in two different countries. So, such sentiments by Zuma and his faction are justified as they talk on behalf of the poor. We ended apartheid and there should be equal opportunities for all, but it is not happening. In reality, we will still live in the shadows of apartheid. Zuma represents us the poor Black majority and the problem is now that he has spoken, he is now being labelled anti-White. He was never anti-White the problem in this country is when one speaks the truth of the inequalities in the country, he or she is labelled anti-White because they do not want the truth to be told. Even some of the persecutions that he and his family are facing I have no doubt that these are charges that were brought up against him because they do not want him to tell the truth. I support Zuma very much of what he said as there is a need to address the imbalances. There is no need to even argue about what he said because that is reality. He is

only hated for speaking the truth because he is a threat to the Whites who have captured everything in the economic sector.

Respondent D, who lives in Sitebe village, said she was 47 years old and owned a small shop (known by the local people as a spaza shop) which caters for villagers who live nearby. She said her spaza shop was her only source of income and she used it to send her children to school, since she was a single mother. She emphasised that she was a strong supporter of Zuma and the ANC and she has only voted for the ANC. When asked if Zuma and his ANC faction were being sincere about the need to address the economic imbalances and expropriate land, the respondent emphasised that Zuma spoke on behalf of the majority of the voiceless and he represented the needs of the people previously disadvantaged by the apartheid government. The respondent then said:



To be honest majority of the Black South Africans live in poverty and majority of us who live in poverty stays in rural areas where there is poor service delivery for everything. Have you ever met a White person or Indian living in Sitebe village? The answer is no so there is no because there are not poor. That is why I say Zuma is talking on behalf of us the poor Black majority and he represent us the Black people period. We cannot say we have been liberated whilst there is a clear discrimination whereby Black people are still segregated. This need to be corrected and I support Zuma and his allies fight for economic justice starting from the expropriation of land!

The above responses show that the respondent believes that Whites are the problem. Zuma's anti-White discourse connected well with the respondents who already see White people as the reason why the Black majority are poor.

7.2.2.2 Land expropriation

Zuma and his faction consider land as a means of socio-economic redress and they focus on land as a key which will remove the majority of Black South Africans from chains of poverty. However, there has been little progress in redistributing land since 1994. Authority over the land in communal rural areas of South Africa is held by traditional authorities such as kings, chiefs and headmen and as a result access to land is provided through traditional authorities, rather than the ANC. This gives them considerable status and power and this anomaly in a modern state remains a contentious issue.

Respondent G who said she was 64 years of age, lives in Sitebe village and was a retired nurse. When the researcher arrived at the respondent's house, she could see how different the house was from the other houses. It was bigger, beautiful and well built. When asked by the researcher what changes she has seen since 1994, the respondent stated that there was little change and spoke about the need for the government to redress history. The only change she could point out was freedom, but in terms of equal access to opportunities such as ownership of land, wealth and access to production there was no change, as it was still in the hands of the White minority. The respondent explained that she used to be a nurse and lived in Pretoria where she was working. She could see a huge difference between her rural home and the home where she used to live. The respondent then said that Zuma was correct when he said that the economy was in the hands of the few and this needed to be corrected:

You cannot say you are liberated whilst you still live in the same conditions that you once lived under captivity. There should be a difference.

When asked about her thoughts on the expropriation of land without compensation she said:

Mmhhh, this is a very important matter that needs to be dealt with. I fully support the expropriation of land as Blacks we have been disadvantaged for long. This land belongs to us if you go back to history you will understand that it was stolen from our forefathers and after apartheid, there were given enough time to bring back the land, but we must be careful and not end up being like Zimbabwe.

When asked by the researcher if she owned any piece of land, the respondent replied and said:

The only land that I own is that which I have built my house on I bought some years ago when I was still working and staying in Pretoria.

The researcher then asked the respondent whom did she bought the land and whether it was from the government or from a private White person. After a bit of hesitation, she responded and said: "The vast land around this area is controlled by the chief so I bought the land from the chief". The researcher went on to ask the respondent why she said that the land must be given back to Blacks, when she said it was controlled by the chiefs. Looking a bit annoyed and uncomfortable with the question the respondent quickly dismissed the question by saying:

When I said land must be given back to Blacks, I did not mean in reference to where we are staying, land I am referring to is productive land which Whites took away from our forefathers and up to now they are still owning the large pieces of land.

The respondent was then asked by the researcher if in her own view the land will be given to those people who are in need, and not politicians. She said:


I believe land will be given to those in need of it, not just that in need of it but those who can use it and that the government will ensure the land will not end up in the hands of corrupt officials.

The respondent's view shows that she supported the calls for the expropriation of land without compensation, because she felt that Blacks needed to be given their land

back. As a result, Zuma's calls for the expropriation of land without compensation managed to appeal to the respondent and she believes that land was taken away from her forefathers by the minority rulers.

Respondent N said he was 42 years of age and was from Mvala village. The respondent said that he started living in the village six years previously when he got a job as a caretaker at a local school. He said he supported Zuma's sentiments whilst addressing the nation in parliament at the State of the Nation address in 2017, when he stated that there was a need to redress the economy and the land issue. He said that Zuma was right in fighting to end the inequalities in South Africa. When asked if Zuma was being sincere and honest, the respondent said:

Yes, Zuma was telling the truth we all can see that us as Blacks we are disadvantaged. But now Zuma is being attacked and vilified by those who are benefitting from the system.



The respondent was then asked whether Zuma was not trying to hide from his allegations of corruption and state capture. He replied:

Mmhh that is tricky, Zuma has his own skeletons and he might be using the issues of inequalities to try and hide away from his own sins. He might be doing so but the truth is that there is a need to address the inequalities in the country. Land needs to be re-distributed and there is a need for the radical economic transformation so that we all enjoy the fruits of being a liberated country. I am behind Zuma's sentiments and the government needs to address this besides the fact that Zuma is no longer the president of the country this needs to be addressed.

The above respondent's views show that Zuma's sentiments for the urgent need to address the economic imbalances connected well with the rural peasantry, the majority of whom live in poverty and believe that land is a form of wealth

Another respondent, respondent Q, aged 22, lives in Mvela village. He was unemployed and lived with his parents and his two children. When he was asked his thoughts on the need for land redistribution, the respondent said it was time for radical change, starting with resolving the land issue. The respondent said that from a young age, he had been hearing about the need for Blacks to be given land, but it is only now that he is older that he understands the importance of land. The respondent continued:

Zuma and other members of the ANC were talking about the expropriation of land without compensation which is a good idea. We need the land to be empowered remember this land was taken from our grandfathers, so it is our right to get our land back. I support the idea of expropriating the land, even us the young people can get to own land and use it to our best ability. I have also heard that the government is in a process to change the constitution so that land can be expropriated without compensation which is a very good thing.

Respondent B, who lived in Mhloplekazi village, said he voted for the first time in the 2016 local government elections after turning 18. The respondent believed that there was a need for the expropriation of land without compensation and it needed to be done urgently. The respondent, however, emphasised that Zuma started calling for the expropriation of land, not because he wanted to, but it was because he was facing stiff competition from the EFF which had been seen to have captured the hearts of the young Black South Africans. When asked why he said this. The respondent replied:

The local government elections in 2016 results showed clearly that the ANC was losing its control in the urban areas and the EFF was also winning the hearts of the majority of the Black people who feel that the land needs to be redistributed. All of a sudden Zuma and his allies in the ANC then started saying that they support the expropriation of land and there was need for the constitution to be changed yet they had been quiet about the issue since 1994. The land should have been redistributed a long time ago and now because they see a potential of them losing the support they now talk of distributing land. Zuma has been in

government since 1994 why did he not initiate it from the time that ANC took over power.

7.2.3 Mistrust of Zuma

Mistrust is a situation whereby people do not have confidence in one and are suspicious of every move or decision one takes. Jacob Zuma's rule has been tainted by allegations of bad governance that included corruption, abuse of tax payers' money and state capture; this has resulted in mistrust.

Respondent E says he was 23 years of age and was born in Didi village. The respondent was born after 1994, and as a result, he had no experience of living under apartheid. When asked about changes he had seen, the respondent told the translator that he had seen life becoming harder every day. The respondent also said that the government had failed the people; instead of making life easier, they have made the life harder. When asked why he said this, the respondent replied:

We are not employed, there is no employment. The government has failed to create employment for the youth and there is a high unemployment rate. I have to rely on my grandmother's pension grant and it is not enough to feed us all. We want change which is radical and imminent.

When asked what the reason for the unemployment could be, the respondent stated that leaders in the ANC, like Zuma and his allies, are there only to take care of themselves and forget about the rest of South Africa and do not create employment. The researcher then asked the respondent if he had ever heard of Zuma's sentiments that there was a need to redistribute wealth and whether it was a way of creating employment. The respondent laughed off the question and said he did not see it that way. He then said:

Zuma is the worst leader who is followed by controversy everywhere; he seems to like trouble. When he came to power, he even made things worse. In fact, I blame the ANC – they knew from the start that he was a troublemaker but still they chose him as their president. So, there is no way that he is sincere when he talks of redistributing wealth probably he meant redistributing it to himself and his friends in the ANC.

The respondent was about Zuma's discourse that White people are the cause of poverty in South Africa; he shook his head in disagreement. The respondent then said:

Lies, lies, lies! Who is the head of the government and state? Surely not the Whites he is talking about? Why can't the man just say sorry and apologise that he failed the nation as a leader? Where do White people get into this equation? Zuma is trying to play us all and play the blame game instead of us focusing on his corrupted ways of him and his friends he wants us to turn a blind eye. That is never going to happen. Zuma is well known to be a corrupt leader that's why he has corruption charges against him and now he wants to make people think that Whites are the enemies of progress. He had fooled us so many times but not on this one. He should first acknowledge his wrong doings then we can move and talk of the White people. I am not saying that the White people are saints either, there are also part of the problem so as Zuma and his ANC.

The respondent was also asked about the need for radical economic transformation and whether the expropriation of land was justified:

I support the need for the redistribution of land and wealth, but my question is why now? Zuma has been in power from 2009 up until 2018. Why is it he started to talk about the need for transformation when he was found guilty of using tax payer's money to upgrade his Nkandla rural home? Why did he not advocate for such change the moment that he took over power? Why did he start to understand the struggle of the poor when his hold to power was under threat? Zuma wants to use the struggles of the Black majority as a way of gaining sympathy from the people, as he seems to be speaking on their behalf. Yes, the inequalities are there is a need for the expropriation of land, and radical economic transformation but what I refuse is for him to use that as his way of gaining

support so that people can fight his battles. He failed to address our problems a long time ago, so he better leave us alone.

The respondent even added that if land distribution is not done in a proper manner, it will only benefit corrupt politicians and the rest of South Africa will not benefit.

Respondent N from Mhloplekazi village, who said she was 28 years of age and was a graduate of Walter Sisulu University, expressed his disappointment in former president Zuma. When asked if Zuma was being sincere and honest about the need for radical economic transformation and land expropriation, the respondent said:

Zuma is telling the truth when he talks about Whites earning more than Blacks but him being sincere I don't think so. This has been common knowledge that the Black people are disadvantaged in this country since the days after apartheid. Zuma has been quiet all along and he has been benefitting from the system now he wants to talk about correcting the past. For so many years ANC has been in power and they failed to correct the past now that they feel threatened by the rise of a prominent opposition party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) they now want to talk of inequalities. There is a big difference between rural and urban South Africa and Zuma could have changed that when he came to power if he was for the people. Now that he is being haunted by corruption charges he now wants to draw sympathy from us and shield himself for facing justices. We cannot be fooled by Zuma and friends and make us think that there are fighting for us whilst there are fighting for their own battles. He has been in government for long why didn't he start the fight for Black emancipation the moment he entered into government. He only thought of us when his corrupt ways started haunting him. Believe me, we will get our land back, but it shall not be the Zuma or ANC way, but it shall be our way led by the leadership of the EFF. The youth of this country shall rise and take what's ours.

The above respondents' views show that they believe and accept that there is a need to address the unequal share of the economy and that land should be expropriated. However, they do not agree that Zuma and his faction in the ANC are the right persons

to talk about the inequalities, as they have betrayed their trust. The responses show that they believe Zuma is using issues that mattered to the poor Black people to get their sympathy and support against his alleged corrupt activities.

7.2.4 Betrayal of trust

Betrayal of trust is understood as an act of doing something very bad and hurtful to those who have trusted you – this causes loss of respect.

Respondent L, a 63-year-old man from Sitebe village, had experienced life under apartheid and felt betrayed by the ANC, especially leaders like former president Zuma and to some extent, Mbeki. The respondent lived in a well-built house in isolation from other nearby village houses. The researcher also noticed that there was a large kraal of cattle in the yard and also a flock of sheep. The respondent narrated how life had been under the apartheid system. The respondent then said that living under apartheid was unbearable as discrimination and oppression were everywhere. The respondent also stated that under apartheid, Black people lived like second-class citizens – slaves in their own motherland. However, to him, the end of apartheid was a dawn of a new era which promised to bring change and prosperity to the historically disadvantaged Black majority. The respondent explained that the first two presidents, Mandela and Mbeki, did not live up to his expectations, because he saw little difference from the apartheid era – Blacks were still disadvantaged. However, when Zuma came into power in 2009, his hopes were renewed, because he regarded Zuma as someone who understood and connected well with the majority of the poor Black South Africans. When asked whether former president Zuma and his ANC faction managed to deliver according to his expectations, he responded and said:


They have delivered on some things, but I expected more from them. Zuma's background to me reflected that he understood well the troubles of the majority

of us Black South Africans, but it turned out that I was wrong about him, I counted my eggs before there were hatched. But mmhhh they have failed to deliver basic services instead corruption is the order of the day. Zuma whom we respected and expected more from him but what did he do he stole from the country. ANC was there watching him looting and not doing anything about it to end.

The researcher then asked the respondent if he had ever listened to Zuma's radical economic transformation sentiments; for example, he said there was a need to address the inequalities. The respondent said:

Yes, I did but this is all talk and no action we have been there. It's been over two decades since we got independence but there only talk about land now as if it's an issue which has never been there. Whilst this issue of the land is the one which made us fight for the end of apartheid. They should have addressed it way back and by now we should have been owning land. What they only know is ensuring that their families benefit from the looting of the state resources.

The respondent was then asked by the researcher who he referred to, he then responded and said:

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Leaders like Zuma and his friends in the ANC have betrayed the nation. Instead of them working for the betterment of the Black poor they worked for feeding their bellies. We have heard and seen through the radio and television about corruption that he is said to be involved in. These cannot be all lies no-no-no. Yet they come here and say Whites are our enemies whilst there are also looting from us. Indeed, I feel betrayed by him as someone I looked up to and though he would represent the poor. I expected more from them.

The researcher then asked the respondent if Zuma's call for radical change in the economic sector and ownership of land was his way of correcting his mistakes and doing the right thing. He responded by saying:

What I have come to realise is politicians only look after themselves and Zuma and his faction of ANC is not spared. The socioeconomic equalities are not something which just came out now. It has always been there, and he knew about

what needed to be done. What I see is a man who has lost his tight grip to power and he is trying to gain popularity again by making it look as if he is fighting for the historically disadvantaged, yet it is for his selfish reason.

In accordance with the above respondent's views, his dream of the post-apartheid South Africa was a freedom which was associated with economic emancipation and societal balances. In line with the above views, Mandela and Mbeki failed to end the economic imbalances which were created by apartheid, and when Zuma came to power all hope was restored, as the respondent considered him to fully understand the plight of the poor. However, Zuma did not live according to expectations; instead, he betrayed the people's trust, although he talked about radical economic transformation and expropriation of land. The respondent believed that Zuma was talking about radical agendas of nationalisation and expropriation of land as he had lost his grip on power and he was trying to win sympathy of the poor Black South Africans.



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Respondent P from Mvela village, aged 59. He felt that Zuma and his faction in the ANC had failed the people. When asked about the changes he had seen since Zuma took over power in 2009, he stated:

Zuma has managed to provide housing, water, and electricity supply; however, the living conditions of Black South Africans are still bad in many areas. It's been years since apartheid ended but ANC has worked to enrich itself not the ordinary people. We have heard on the news how Zuma has contributed to the wide spreading of corruption and captured various sectors of the economy for their benefit. So, I say Zuma and his faction of ANC has failed the people, this is not the independence that we all dreamed of at least he should have changed some things; instead he had made it worse.

The respondent was then asked whether Zuma and the ANC or the White people had caused the inequalities in the country. The respondent explained that apartheid

caused social and economic imbalances, but when ANC took over power it was their responsibility as the government to ensure that this imbalance ended, but they did not do so. The respondent also explained that the situation did not improve because of the failure to end the imbalances. The researcher then told the respondent that in Zuma's sentiments of radical change he was talking about the imbalances and the need to end them immediately by redistribution of wealth and land – did he believe that? The respondent replied:

Yes, I have heard him and some of his allies in the ANC like Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma talking about radical change. But I believe it's all talk, like I said earlier Whites are not only the problem but there are also part of the problems as some of them have looted from the poor. So I do not even think there are doing it for the benefit of the ordinary South Africans but for themselves there have always done that in the past.

Respondent R from Sitebe village said he was 53 years old and had just migrated to the village from Johannesburg. The respondent said he moved to Sitebe after he lost his job and could not afford to live in Johannesburg. He explained to the researcher that he had built his house in the village whilst he was still working in Johannesburg. The house was well-built compared to the surrounding houses. The researcher asked the respondent whether what Zuma and his faction of the ANC said was true – that White people were indeed the reason for the poverty of the Black people. The respondent said:

Yes. Before 1994 they were (White people) the cause of poverty since Blacks were discriminated and resources were shared unequally favouring them (White people). As of now, things have changed, and they are not the cause of poverty. I have met a number of White people who are willing to help and mentor Black people to be able to do farming. So, we cannot just blame White people for the cause of poverty since we have been liberated.

The researcher then asked the respondent about her thoughts on Zuma's sentiments that White people earn five times more than Black households. He then explained that it was the truth but to him, it was not solely White people who caused the problem.

The respondent stated:

We all know that corruption has been rife and leading to the failure of the government to deliver. Zuma and his friends are trying to shift the blame of their own failure. He is trying to justify his wrongdoings by putting the blame on other people. White people did not steal public funds but him (Zuma) and his friend in the ANC did and they should pay back the money. Nonetheless, the fight for poverty is a national issue which needs to be addressed by those heading the government, so why make it look as if the White people are the only problem. ANC took over power in 1994 but what had happened instead so who is leading the government. If they failed as leaders, they should apologise to people and correct their wrongs.

The researcher then asked the respondent if he was familiar with the sentiments of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Zuma's former wife and political ally in his campaign to retain the presidency of the ANC in 2017. She said:

Whites talk too much against radical economic transformation saying we want to use it to loot. Who are they to talk about looting? They have been stealing ever since their arrival in this country. They stole our land, if everything goes according (meaning if elected ANC president) I will show these White people that there are people who live worse than their dogs (Hans, 2017).

The respondent looked annoyed and irritated and raised his voice to respond:

What has she done herself to end poverty? She has been in government since 1994 what different did she make? Except looting together with her former husband Jacob Zuma. They are such an embarrassment to this nation. They should start by showing us what they looted from us then after that we can go and look at what White people looted. This is nonsense she should be the last person to talk about looting".

The researcher also asked the respondent whether Zuma was being targeted by the “White media”. The respondent replied that the ANC had failed the nation and left leaders like Zuma to destroy the country. The respondent added:

No no no, why would he be the target? Why was Mandela not a target? Why was Mbeki not a target? Zuma is corrupt to the core, his government did nothing but increase the poverty in the country. Zuma only enriched himself and his friends in the ANC. Why hide the truth the ANC failed the people, they let Zuma be and now we are in this mess. No media is targeting anyone, they just do not want to hear the truth. The problems we are facing right now could have been avoided if we had an accountable government which is for the people”.

The above respondent’s views show that the anti-White strategy failed to appeal to him, as he believes that the present-day poverty was caused by the ANC and its failure to hold its leaders to account.



7.3 CONCLUSION

The main aim of the chapter was to provide an analysis of the responses to nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC. Three major themes of nativist discourse emerged from Zuma’s speeches, including radical economic transformation, anti-White beliefs and expropriation of land without compensation, from which interview questions were drawn. Consequently, four major themes emerged from the responses to nativist discourse; namely, loyalty, political identity and race, on the one hand, and mistrust and betrayal of trust on the other.

In some of the responses, loyalty was embedded in the ANC rather than Zuma; in contrast, some responses showed loyalty to Zuma based on gratitude to Zuma for his role in fighting to end apartheid. On the theme of political identity and race, the responses showed that they regarded Zuma as representing the poor Black majority and they believed he sought to correct history by either radical economic

transformation or expropriation of land without compensation. However, there was also a theme of mistrust, whereby responses showed that they believed Zuma was using issues that mattered to the poor Black people to get their sympathy and support against his alleged corrupt activities. The responses were also embedded in the theme of betrayal of trust, whereby respondents believed that Zuma and the ANC in general had failed the public.

Nonetheless, it is highly significant that on the issue of land the majority of both the younger and the older generation shared the same sentiments that there was a need for the expropriation of land without compensation. This particular issue had been seized upon by the EFF, which had captured the attention and gained the following of a sizeable portion of the unemployed younger generation, especially those with a low level of education and skills. Zuma opportunistically started advocating for the expropriation of land without compensation and the ANC, under pressure from the EFF to radicalise and losing support among the unemployed youth, was forced to adopt expropriation of land without compensation as part of their manifesto.

Apart from the issue of land, the majority of respondents from both the older and younger generation believed that White people were responsible for the ongoing impoverishment of Black people. Nonetheless, other respondents from both the younger and older generation believed that corruption within the ANC was the cause of ongoing poverty among Black people.

The responses of the older and younger generation differed on the issue of radical economic transformation in the form of increased Black empowerment, whereby most of the younger people rejected this element of the discourse, saying that ANC had been in government for over a decade and they had failed to transform the economy

because senior party members had benefited from the imbalance. All the older respondents, on the other hand, supported this notion.

In conclusion, Zuma's nativist discourse exploited historical factors related to past oppression and as the injustice of apartheid still lingers in the minds of the older generation, this discourse resonates. Not having experienced apartheid directly, the younger generation could not relate entirely to Zuma's race-based discourse.

The next Chapter will provide a summary of all the chapters, the study findings and the conclusion of the study.



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CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

8.1 INTRODUCTION


The chapter provides an overview of all the chapters in the study and outlines the findings in relation to the research questions, aim and objectives, as well as the conclusion and recommendations for further research.

8.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER CONTENT

Chapter One - Introduction and Background

Chapter One offered the setting of the research; it provided the introduction and background to the study and a brief background of prominent liberations in pre-independence South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. The focus was on the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). It also provided a brief background of post-colonial Zimbabwe and post-apartheid South Africa. African governments have drawn attention to the ability of liberation movements turned post-independence rulers to hold on to power for decades after liberating their countries from colonial rule. In some cases, they have been accused of electoral flaws, dictatorship, manipulation, intimidation and use of force to hold on to power and maintain dominance and popularity. Since attaining independence in Zimbabwe and South Africa in 1980 and 1994, respectively, ZANU-PF and the ANC have maintained power in their respective countries, with most of their popular support emerging from rural areas. The phenomenon of nativism as a form of populism has been on the rise since the latter part of the last century and it is being used by post-independence governments to try

and maintain electoral support in their respective countries. Nativism has emerged in South Africa and is currently being used by Zuma and his faction in the ANC, who highlighted in their public discourse issues such as anti-White monopoly capital, after losing ground in the 2016 municipal elections to the Economic Freedom Fighters, where the term originated. Similarly, in the run-up to the ANC National Electoral Conference in December 2017, where Zuma and his faction hoped to beat the neoliberalism-inclined Ramaphosa faction, Zuma backed the proposed strategy of expropriation of land without compensation. Since the 1990s, nativism was also used in Zimbabwe by ZANU-PF under former president Mugabe. It was based on the same issue of expropriation of white settler farms for re-settlement of Africans, but with a stronger and more enduring anti-West and anti-White settler theme.



Chapter One also provided the rationale of the study, drawing on the rise of populism in Africa and the use of nativism as a form of populism for maintaining political power in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. It has been noted that the support for both ZANU-PF and the ANC has shifted from the urban to rural areas, despite rural areas receiving the least resources. This gave rise to the problem statement which provided four research questions on which the study is based: These were centred around the nativist discourse used by ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and the responses to them in selected rural areas, and also the nativist discourse used by Zuma and his faction in the ANC and responses to them in selected rural areas in South Africa.

The chapter also provided in detail the aim of the study which included the investigation of how the politics of nativism strategy have been used by the Zuma-led faction in the ANC and ZANU-PF in maintaining power, focusing particularly on their rural support bases. It also provided the objectives of the study, which included establishing the response to different nativist discourses adopted by ZANU-PF and by

Zuma and his faction in the ANC, and to determine the varying nature of support in rural areas in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. Finally, the chapter presented the significance of the investigation, and analysis and understanding thereof. In doing so, it will provide an explanation for the rural support that is enjoyed by former liberation struggle movements that currently exercise government power – namely, ZANU-PF and the ANC – despite these parties not having provided substantial material benefits to the population and despite the continued allegations of corruption against both.

Chapter Two - Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

In Chapter Two, the main aim was to present an overview of the literature as well as the applicable theoretical and conceptual framework. The aim of the study was to avoid using or trying to prove a Western theory in its analyses of African situations, phenomena and events. The literature review unpacked some of the most significant African scholarly perspectives that have been developed in opposition to Western paradigms derived from the modernity project, advocating African conceptualisations and knowledge frameworks. The literature review provided a standpoint that African states cannot be understood using a Western perspective or held up to scrutiny alongside the Western model of the modern state.

The chapter also provided a review of liberation movements turned post-independence governments in post-colonial states. The end of colonialism saw the rise of liberation movements and the overthrowing of existing powers of imperialism and oppression by minority rule, and the ushering in of the newly independent African governments with African liberation movements assuming power as government. The chapter therefore unpacked literature on post-colonial governments and the attainment of independence in Africa. Different explanations have been put forward in

relation to the manifestation of power in the post-colonial African state. The chapter also focused on the practicalities of maintaining power in the post-colonial African states, paying attention to the situation in the rural areas of Africa.

Chapter Two also provided the theoretical framework, guided by post-colonial theory, which advocates the development of conceptual frameworks free from the influence and constraints of Western paradigms. Post-colonial theory provides an oppositional framework which analyses the nature of domination and does not propose a defined conceptual framework, but rejects Western conceptual tools that are inappropriate. As a result, the aim was to be guided by principles emphasising indigenous, original methods and analytical tools. In this respect, the hypotheses of two African scholars, Peter Ekeh and Mahmood Mamdani, were found to be useful in framing the research. Ekeh's hypothesis on "two publics" and Mamdani's theme on "the bifurcated state" were used as a preliminary framework to help the researcher approach the study, thereby offering her own conceptual framework. Despite the aim of the research being to avoid locating the study within any particular paradigm, it was impossible for the researcher to overlook the importance and relevance of the hypotheses developed by Ekeh and Mamdani, which related to the nature of the post-colonial state and its relationship with the rural citizenry. Finally, the chapter provided the preliminary conceptual framework which was guided by core concepts of populism and nativism, and legitimacy.

Chapter Three – Research design and Methodology

Chapter Three of the study provided detailed information on the research design used and the methodology followed by the study. The research design and methodology chosen for the study aimed to answer the research questions posed. The study took

the form of qualitative research within the interpretive approach to explore and analyse the circumstances and strategies that have contributed to the ongoing electoral support for the ANC and ZANU-PF in rural areas. By adopting an interpretive methodological approach within the overarching approach of post-colonial theory, the study aimed at avoiding the use of an established perspective in its interpretation of data, allowing findings to emerge without the constraints of pre-established conceptual tools – beyond that of nativism – that could interfere with the analysis of the data that was collected. This would enable the “truth”, as perceived by those interviewed, to emerge. A qualitative design allowed the researcher to probe the feelings, experiences and beliefs of the respondents to give deeper meaning to their reasons for their continued support of ZANU-PF and the ANC in rural Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Chapter Three also presented the methods of data collection, which included both secondary and primary sources. The research also draws on secondary sources such as books, the Internet, and journals which provided original African perspectives on liberation movements turned post-independence rulers in African states, as well as on the nature of the post-colonial African state. They were used to broaden the knowledge base from which the research departs. The use of primary sources is in the form of discourse originating from interviews, focus group discussions, information from government documents and political speeches by political leaders, which made it possible to investigate how these are interpreted and the extent to which they are accepted and absorbed as the “truth”, or rejected. The chapter also presented an insight into the two research areas under study, as primary data was obtained through interviews with samples of the population. The research is based on two case studies – the rural populations in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. The researcher



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had to collect data by conducting interviews in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe and the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa.

The chapter also provided the data analysis technique adopted by the study which consists of content, narrative and thematic analysis. The aim of an interpretive approach is to avoid established perspectives in its interpretation of data, allowing open-ended perspectives to enable the “truth” to emerge. As a result, narrative analysis allowed the researcher to evaluate the narratives based on personal experiences and history that shaped the respondents’ views. In this way, the researcher was able to look beyond the narrative itself to underlying feelings and beliefs that informed the themes which emerged. Thematic analysis allowed the researcher to locate quotes or narrations from different respondents who were representing similar themes or a particular theme and grouping them together, bearing in mind that the aim of the research was to be open-minded to emerging data. On the other hand, content analysis allowed the researcher to code text in the form of secondary data and allow themes to emerge.

Chapter Three also informed how the researcher accessed the research sites and discussed the role of the researcher in the study. The chapter also provided in detail the ethical requirements followed in conducting the research.

Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven

Chapter Four of the study sought to answer the first research question of the study: What are the various nativist strategies that have been used by ZANU-PF to maintain their popularity, as demonstrated through sustained support at the polls in the Chegutu rural district of Zimbabwe?

The chapter therefore provided information on the background and the rise of nativism in Zimbabwe and the catalysts for the rise in the use of nativism by ZANU-PF. Chapter Four also dwelt on the overview of the nativist discourse used by ZANU-PF, which included the most significant speeches, land for Africans, anti-West and anti-White strategies, propaganda channels and the preservation of history. Chapter Five of the study outlined and provided a detailed analysis of the responses to the different nativist discourse adopted by ZANU-PF. Its goal was to answer the second research question: How have the rural populations in the Chegutu rural district responded to the diverse nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF? The chapter provided a detailed analysis of the responses to nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF from a sample of the rural population in the Chegutu rural district in the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Mashonaland West province of Zimbabwe. The researcher found out that themes emerged from the responses; namely, gratitude, loyalty, fear, mistrust, impatience and trust. The chapter also noted the intersectionality of some of the themes, whereby one theme was manifest in another.

Chapter Six of the study answered the third research question posed by the study: What are the nativist discourses that have been used by Zuma and his faction in the ANC to maintain political power, demonstrated through the electoral system in the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa? The chapter provided information which included a background of the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as the recent period under the administration of President Zuma (2009 – February 2018). Zuma initiated the use of populism, leading to the rise of ANC factionalism and the emergence of two opposition parties – the Economic Freedom Fighters and the Democratic Alliance. Chapter Six also traced factionalism within the ANC dating back to 2005 when there was an open clash between the pro-Zuma and pro-Mbeki factions.

The chapter also pointed out the allegations of corruption against Zuma and his allies which tainted Zuma's legitimacy and credibility as a reason that ignited the use of nativist politics. Chapter Six also provided detailed information on recent nativist discourse used by former President Zuma after the emergence of challenges to his leadership within the ANC. These included significant political speeches that dwell largely on calls for the expropriation of land without compensation, accusations against "white monopoly capital" and appeals for "radical economic transformation".

Lastly, Chapter Seven answered the fourth research question which was posed by the study: How did rural populations in the Chris Hani rural district of South Africa respond to nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC? Chapter Seven provided responses to different nativist discourse employed by Zuma and his faction of the ANC. The chapter also provided in detailed an analysis of the nature of responses obtained from the sample of the population who support the ruling party (ANC) in South Africa, which is compared to the responses obtained from interviews conducted in Zimbabwe in the final chapter. The researcher found out that there were four main themes that emerged from the interview responses: loyalty, political identity and race, mistrust and betrayal.

The responses also revealed that the majority of respondents from both the younger and older generations accepted Zuma's discourse on the issue of land expropriation without compensation and also on Whites as being responsible for continued Black impoverishment. They saw land redistribution as essential for redress of past injustices in the form of White colonization and identified White domination as having caused the lingering condition of Black poverty.

8.3 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS


Nativism has been identified as a form of populism that is used as a political strategy to gain and maintain political power; it arises from an opposition to the mind-set of colonialism to reverse discourse, by seeking to undermine colonial ideas through the mobilisation of diffused African culture.

The main aims of the study were to investigate the politics of nativism used by the Zuma faction in the ANC and ZANU-PF in maintaining political power in their respective domains in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. The findings were obtained through an analysis of the responses to nativist discourse by respondents in rural areas of Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Although the primary objective of the study was to investigate responses to nativism, a secondary aim was to explore whether responses in rural South Africa differed from those in rural Zimbabwe, and if so, how.

The study drew on post-colonial theory in examining two elements of post-colonial society, namely, the post-colonial state and the subaltern in post-colonial society. It examined the attempted exercise of power by the post-colonial state through its nativist discourse and the responses to state discourse by the subaltern.

Despite the researcher's aim and intention of not locating the study within any particular paradigm, it was impossible to overlook the relevance of the hypotheses developed by Ekeh and Mamdani relating to the nature of the post-colonial state and its relationship with the citizenry. This was because the researcher noted that rural people acknowledge the norms of traditional culture such as maintaining a high degree of respect for the authority of traditional leaders in both South Africa and Zimbabwe.



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In the case of Zimbabwe, being powerful political forces, traditional leaders have acted as the ZANU-PF mouthpiece in maintaining its popularity.

8.3.1 ZANU-PF nativist discourse

The first major research question looked at the nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF to maintain their political power. In order to answer the research question, the background and the rise of nativism in Zimbabwe was explored. It was evident that factors such as the emergence of a vibrant opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the late 1990s at the height of an economic crisis, was one of the catalysts for the rise in the use of nativism by ZANU-PF. Consequently, nativism as a political strategy is perfectly aligned to Fanon's analysis of the strategies used by the liberation party turned political elite in order to retain power. It uses reverse discourse that in many respects correctly assesses the grounds for the continued domination of Black people in post-colonial states. However, it fails to disclose the alliances between the foreign (Western) national bourgeoisie and the ruling elite in the form of the liberation movement turned political party, which has clandestinely entered an alliance of domination with foreign capital.

The chapter provided an overview of the nativist discourse used by ZANU-PF which included the most significant political speech, "Third Chimurenga" (land redistribution programme in the form of the government seizing White-owned farms), anti-West/anti-White discourse and preservation of history. It was established that ZANU-PF used state-owned broadcasting corporations and media to connect and transfer their message to the population whilst neutralising counter-discourse, enabling the disseminating propaganda in support of the state.

It was established that the ZANU-PF nativist discourse overlooked the urban modern reality of contemporary Zimbabwean society. Instead, it pursued a hegemonic programme that made an artificial representation of Zimbabwean society that romanticised and glorified the past and included an emphasis on liberation struggle history, customs and traditions, liberation songs, remembrance of departed heroes and appeals to a pan-African solidarity and music. This was supported by the constant attacks on colonialism, Europe and White settlers as the enemies of progress. The chapter dwelt on various themes that included anti-White settler farmers and anti-Western sentiments, preservation of history and land for Africans.

The ZANU-PF nativist discourse comprised three elements to mobilise support: land redistribution, and the promotion and glorification of tradition and culture – the aim of both is to unite the target audience. The nativist discourse articulated by ZANU-PF instituting a “Patriotic History Project” aimed to restore and preserve Zimbabwe’s independence – which it claimed was under attack from Western powers and the MDC – and, in turn, glorify ZANU-PF heroism. This discourse served to portray ZANU-PF as having the best interests of people at heart as their protector from external threats.

It was established that the nativist strategy of the reclamation and redistribution of land from 2000 by black Zimbabweans (war veterans, wealthy black businessmen and unemployed youth) from White settlers was the most prominent issue. It attracted the interest of landless Zimbabweans who had to carry ZANU-PF cards in order to be considered as recipients. The land issue in Zimbabwe is both a consequence and a cause of the struggle for liberation and has always been at the centre of the country’s social, economic and political struggles. Thus, land redistribution was key to economic emancipation of the masses, with a strong message that “our land, our heritage”. This

message connected well with most rural peasants whose rural livelihoods depended upon land.

The findings also foregrounded the anti-West/anti-White discourse which promoted and glorified indigenous values, history and culture whilst constantly attacking the West. It was discovered that ZANU-PF anti-West rhetoric intensified after the intensification of economic sanctions against the ZANU-PF government by the US and the West.

The study also established that most of the nativist discourse was transferred through political speeches at national or international gatherings and propaganda channels were used to transmit the message. ZANU-PF used state-owned broadcasting corporations and media as their mouthpiece in transferring their message to the population whilst neutralising counter-discourse. In most cases, the message would be repeated often on radio and television. As a result, the repetitive manner, nature and persuasive discourses of the nativist message promoted the popularity of Mugabe-led ZANU-PF, as a significant number of the Zimbabwean population relied on radio and television as their source of information. The study, therefore established that state-owned media and broadcasting corporations had fostered loyalty to ZANU-PF through continuous glorification of ZANU-PF as being the only party entitled to govern Zimbabwe. As a result, they attacked the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, which had a differing discourse.

In conclusion and answering the first question, in pursuit of the nativist discourse by ZANU-PF, three main themes emerged; namely, land for Africans, anti-West/anti-White discourse and preservation of history. The messages were largely disseminated

by means of political speeches at political gatherings and through propaganda channels.

8.3.2 Responses to ZANU-PF discourse

The second question explored the responses to the nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF, paying particular attention to the Mhondoro-Mubaira constituency of the Chegutu rural district. The chapter provided an analysis of the responses to the nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF from a sample of the rural population. Chapter Four presented the focal points of ZANU-PF discourse, comprising themes of anti-White settler farmers, anti-Western sentiments, promotion of tradition, and preservation of history and land for Africans. To do this, respondents were asked their opinions on the nativist discourse and strategies employed in different circumstances. It was established that during the interviews distinct themes emerged; namely, feelings of gratitude, mistrust, loyalty, fear, impatience and trust. The intersectionality of the themes was evident in that these feelings were not exclusive and were manifest as part of a composite of emotions.

The research discovered that part of the success of nativism in rural Zimbabwe is due to older people's feelings of extreme loyalty and gratitude to ZANU-PF. Understandably, those who had directly experienced war and settler oppression displayed these emotions, whereas the younger respondents, who had not been affected, were not similarly inclined to feel loyalty. Instead, they displayed impatience and mistrust. From the responses gathered, loyalty was earned by ZANU-PF because of its role in the struggle for independence, being the liberator of the people and gratitude for the land redistribution and protection from external threats. The older generation displayed trust in ZANU-PF and considered dissident views or opposition as a threat. This contrasted with the younger people's views, as those who had access

to a variety of information channels – such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram, from which they could get information from diverse points of view – did not trust ZANU-PF.

The research also noticed in the responses that not only has loyalty to ZANU-PF become embedded in feelings of gratitude and trust, but a sense of fear has also inclined rural electorates to be loyal to ZANU-PF. Some people are fearful of losing what they have benefitted from ZANU-PF, some are fearful of being punished for disloyalty and some are fearful of the re-occurrence of war or the return of the minority rule if ZANU-PF loses, all of which leads to their compliant and conformist position of loyalty.

It is significant that the responses of the young people and the older people were completely different. The younger people believed that it was time for change in political leadership and that the younger generation should lead. This therefore shows that the younger generation in Zimbabwe saw through the ZANU-PF tactic of nativist discourse which was used by the state to dominate and exploit its citizens, as explained by Fanon. On the other hand, the older generation believed in maintaining the status quo; that is, retaining existing structures, systems values and the ruling political party. The fact that the majority of the older generation had experienced minority rule enabled ZANU-PF to appeal more to them by constantly reminding them of the brutal past. In this regard, the older generation, in accepting the discourse as truth, submits itself to exploitation by the state. On the other hand, the younger people believed that ZANU-PF had failed the people and was using past atrocities, such as minority rule and liberation struggle, to hide their failure and they believed that the past should be left in the past and that people should rather focus on the present. In contrast, the older people accept as “truth” the information communicated to them by

the chiefs, government communication systems and the media. Clearly, social media has undermined the ability of the nativist discourse to appeal more to younger people.

In conclusion and answering the second research question, the response to nativist discourse by the older generation, who are conservative in nature and seek to maintain the status quo by preserving ZANU-PF's hold on power, is positive. ZANU-PF have taken advantage of their ongoing gratitude and loyalty in targeting the older generation of the electorate as the recipients of their discourse.

8.3.3 The discourse of the Zuma faction in the ANC

The third research question explored the nativist discourses employed by Zuma and his faction in the ANC. In order to answer the question, the chapter provided information that included the background of the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as the recent administration of President Zuma. It also provided factors which have ignited the rise of the politics of nativism, including the escalation of the intensity of factionalism in the ANC and the emergence of a strong opposition as a threat to the dominance of the ruling party by the EFF and the DA. The chapter then provided an overview of nativist discourse used by former President Zuma; this included significant political speeches that dwelt largely on calls for the expropriation of land without compensation, accusations against White monopoly capital and appeals for radical economic transformation.

Zuma's speeches on the theme of expropriation of land without compensation were evident after the release in March 2014 of the report by the public protector on upgrades to Zuma's rural residence. Her findings concluded that he should pay back the tax payers' money that he had used to upgrade his rural home. Due to this, President Zuma's integrity was under scrutiny and the ANC began losing credibility as

many of Zuma's loyalists became implicated in allegations of corrupt activities and they were losing support from the public. Taking advantage of the fact that land has been a complex and unresolved issue in South Africa's post-apartheid era, the EFF included nationalisation of land as part of its manifesto. Targeting the rural and urban poor, Zuma began including the issue of land in his public discourse for the first time in his State of the Nation address in February 2016, advocating for the expropriation of land without compensation as a measure of addressing the past injustices.

Zuma next advocated for radical economic transformation, again prompted by the EFF's inclusion of nationalisation of mines and banks in its manifesto. Radical economic transformation was presented as a significant change in the structure, systems, patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of South Africans, especially the poor Black majority. In so doing, Zuma positioned himself as a victim and his criminal allegations were a result of being targeted for fighting for the poor by advocating radical economic transformation.

Race is the underpinning element of nativism, which emerged as a response to colonialism, and Zuma and his faction have embraced racial politics that employs identity politics based on pro-Black and nativist discourse. Zuma started being vocally anti-White in the context of monopoly capital after the Gupta scandal on state capture came to light. Each nativist discourse was the consequence of allegations or information that tarnished his image. It has been established that Zuma has used racial politics for mobilising support and justifying his political legitimacy with the aim of appealing to the historically disadvantaged, the majority of whom live in rural South Africa.

In conclusion and in answering the third research question, three main themes emerged from the nativist discourses employed by Zuma and his allies in the ANC; namely, radical economic transformation, anti-White sentiments and expropriation of land without compensation.

8.3.4 Response to the discourse of the Zuma faction

The fourth research question looked at the responses to Zuma and his faction in the ANC discourse by a sample of residents of the Ngcobo local district of the Chris Hani rural district. The chapter provided an analysis of the diverse responses to discourse around radical economic transformation, anti-White sentiments and expropriation of land without compensation. Four main themes emerged from the responses: loyalty, political identity, race and mistrust.

Interviews were held after Zuma resigned as president and respondents could criticise or support him. Loyalty to the ANC had been established in past election results, showing continued support for the party by the black rural electorate in South Africa. However, it was clear that people are more loyal to the party than to an individual, as the responses indicated loyalty to ANC rather than to Zuma.

The nativist discourse appealed more to the more to the older generation than the younger generation, as their responses showed that they connected with the discourse. Again, in accepting the discourse, they open themselves to exploitation by the state. It was also established that the older generation connected more with Zuma's nativist discourse because they valued and respected his active role in liberating the country from apartheid rule. In contrast, the majority of the younger generation believed it was time for younger politicians like the EFF to assume political leadership, as Zuma and the ANC had failed the nation.

In answering the fourth research question, themes such as loyalty, political identity, race and mistrust emerged from the responses with the discourse appealing more to a larger number of the older generation, whereas many of the younger respondents expressed the need for radical change.

8.3.5 Comparative findings between the nativism of ZANU-PF and Zuma

One of the aims of the study was to investigate how the politics of nativism were used by the Zuma faction in the ANC and by ZANU-PF in maintaining popularity in their rural stronghold support bases; the primary objective of the study was to investigate responses to nativism. The secondary aim was to explore whether responses in rural South Africa differed from those in rural Zimbabwe and if so, how.

The researcher noted that in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, nativism has been used to maintain political power and popularity. However, ZANU-PF's nativist discourse was party-driven and started when ZANU-PF's hold on power was challenged by the MDC in the late 1990s; whereas in the ANC, it was Zuma and his faction in the ANC who adopted the politics of nativism when his dominance in the ANC was challenged.

Responses in rural Zimbabwe are similar to those in rural South Africa. In the rural areas in both countries there is much respect for traditional authority and in both countries the norms of traditional culture are acknowledged and maintain a high degree of authority. Before conducting the interviews in both these areas, the researcher had to seek permission from the traditional authority, as without being granted permission, it would have been impossible to conduct the research. Respondents would have been mistrustful of the researcher's intentions and unwilling to talk to the researcher as an outsider, if she had not received approval from the traditional leaders in both areas.

In both Mhondoro-Mubaira in Zimbabwe and Ngcobo in South Africa, similar themes emerged as responses to nativist discourse and strategies. The rural electorates in both countries showed that they were loyal to ZANU-PF and the ANC, respectively, because they had fought for the liberation of their respective countries, which compelled people to feel loyalty. Despite nativist discourse in South Africa being driven by Zuma and his faction in the ANC, rather than the ANC, respondents showed similar traits of loyalty to the party.

The theme of White people being the reason for continued impoverishment was also evident. Evidently both rural areas, compared to urban areas in their respective countries, showed lack of development and they believed that it was indeed due to previous domination and exclusion by White people that there was still poverty. In both Zimbabwe and South Africa, the younger generation seemed to defy the model of traditional authority; even though they lived in rural areas, they embraced a modern outlook similar to their counterparts in the urban areas, believing that it was time for radical change and time to move on from the past.

Both Zuma and ZANU-PF's nativist discourse has exploited historical factors related to oppression and inhumane treatment by Whites to maintain their popularity in rural areas. The horrors of apartheid and colonialism are still fresh in the minds of the older generation.

However, the issue of fear of the existing ruling party differed. For instance, the response in rural Zimbabwe espoused a great deal of fear. In most cases the respondents preferred to be interviewed in private so that they could not be heard by a third party. In some instances, their responses showed that they did not approve of the nativist discourse and they hesitated in expressing their own opinions.

In Ngcobo, on the other hand, respondents showed no fear at all in criticising Zuma and his faction in the ANC as they are confident of their rights in a democratic society. The varying responses showed that rural people in Zimbabwe suppress their political views because of fear of repercussions in a society in which repression of dissidents clearly still exists.

As an inevitable outcome of the historical experiences of colonial domination in both Zimbabwe and South Africa, nativist discourse by both ZANU-PF and the ANC was centred round the issue of a past of racial domination and exclusion under minority rule. Elderly respondents in both the areas agreed that the Whites were the reason for their suffering and as a result they supported both anti-West and anti-White sentiments, as well as supporting ZANU-PF and the ANC, who fought for the liberation of their respective countries against White supremacists. However, in the rural areas of both countries, the younger respondents could not relate entirely to the anti-White sentiments as they had not experienced life under White minority rule. Notably, the younger generation in both South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively clearly recognised the exploitative nature of the discourse used by the state in trying to distract from its failures and weaknesses in relation to offering leadership and organising resource distribution, commonly known as service delivery.

The researcher also established that the responses to the expropriation of land showed that older people in both rural areas regard ZANU-PF and the ANC, respectively, as representatives of the poor Black majority. As a result, the rural population in Zimbabwe sympathise with ZANU-PF, stating that its failures were not their doing but that they were caused by the West. In South Africa, on the other hand, the majority of both the older and younger respondents in South Africa also believe that Zuma was talking on their behalf about the need for radical economic

transformation and as a result he was being targeted by wealthy White people for representing poor Black South Africans.

In South Africa, the majority of younger respondents also supported the need for expropriation of land and believed that it will improve the lives of the poor Blacks. In contrast in Zimbabwe, the majority of the younger generation were against the land reform program and their responses showed that they believed ZANU-PF had failed in its land reform and it was one of the main reasons there is the persistence of economic challenges and poverty.

The nativist anti-White discourse, which was centred on the history of White domination before independence by both Zuma and ZANU-PF, triggered a reflection on the past atrocities in the older people's memories, as shown in their responses. Many of the elderly respondents in Zimbabwe feared the return of war if ZANU-PF were to lose power, as they had bad memories of traumatic experiences. The majority of younger respondents did not connect with the discourse mainly because they did not experience White oppression and others believed that ZANU-PF was using the discourse to shift blame of their failures. In South Africa, the majority of respondents – elderly, middle-aged and young – believed that White people were the reason for Black people's impoverishment because during the apartheid era there was unequal distribution of wealth and the system favoured Whites over Blacks. As a result, they believed that the legacy of apartheid still persisted in their continued poverty caused by White people and supported the notion of radical economic transformation. The respondents were concerned about the visible disparity between the urban and rural areas, pointing out that where White people lived conditions were better, whilst rural areas were neglected.

The researcher noted that most of the older respondents regarded ZANU-PF and ANC respectively as representing the poor Black majority who have been disadvantaged by the oppressive rule. Nativist discourse thus appealed to them as they accepted its narrative of reversing the colonial claims of spreading civilization through modernisation and development. In both South Africa and Zimbabwe the majority of young respondents' responses showed that they did not believe that ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and Zuma in South Africa respectively had the benefit of ordinary people in mind. Instead they saw nativism as being used to conceal the shortcomings of ZANU-PF and Zuma respectively and to distract people from the real issues at hand of government being complicit in causing the lingering poverty of its people instead of serving them.



However, one of the distinct differences between Zimbabwean and South African respondents is that in rural South Africa most of the respondents, both young and old, mistrusted Zuma and his faction in the ANC. The respondents were from Ngcobo, which is not in Zuma's constituency in KwaZulu Natal where he is popular but are from a traditional ANC stronghold fairly close to where the older generation of leaders like Mandela were raised. The responses showed that they did not trust Zuma; as a result, they questioned his sincerity when it came to issues affecting them. They agreed with the need to address inequalities, but they did not believe that Zuma was the right person to talk about this, since he had continuously betrayed the people. However, in rural Zimbabwe it was only the younger respondents who expressed a distrust of ZANU-PF, while the older people's responses showed that they believed that the party had their best interest at heart.

The researcher discovered that rural people in Zimbabwe, particularly the elderly, are politically conservative and that their political views are dominated and manipulated

by nativist discourse employed by ZANU-PF. On the other hand, the young people expressed a strong wish for political change in the face of suppression by ZANU-PF, where fear prevents them from articulating their political opinions. However, in rural South Africa neither the young nor the elderly are fearful of openly expressing their political opinions and their dislike of Zuma. The elderly are loyal to the ANC as a party, whereas the younger people are impatient for a radical change of leadership.

8.4 CONCLUSION

This interpretivist study explored and analysed the responses to nativist strategies and discourses that have been employed by the ANC and ZANU-PF in rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe, with a view to discovering how people conceptualised and understood the activities and discourse used. Adopting both the stance of post-colonial theory, which positions itself in opposition to dominant Western paradigms, and utilising an interpretivist approach, greater freedom was given to the researcher to explore the circumstances, strategies and discourse that have been used by political parties and to make sense of the responses to it.

Post-colonial theory was able to explain how nativism has been used by the state to dominate or exploit the subaltern. Post-colonial theorist Foucault pointed to the use of discourse by the state to proliferate its ideas, which are filtered down to the population and become the basis of understandings and explanations. This was evident in the nativist discourse by ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and by Zuma in South Africa, in terms of which language is used as a tool to enable the exercise of power.

As an inevitable outcome of the historical experiences of colonial domination in both Zimbabwe and South Africa, nativist discourse by both ZANU-PF and the ANC is centred on the issue of a past of racial domination and exclusion under minority rule.

It has been noted that the support for both the ANC and ZANU-PF has shifted from urban areas to rural areas, as a result of which nativist discourse targets rural dwellers. A significant difference is that ZANU-PF nativist strategies and discourse is party-driven, whilst in South Africa nativist discourse is driven by Zuma and his faction in the ANC, subsequent to his losing a grip on power due to the allegations against him after 2014.

To a large extent the nativist discourse by ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and by Zuma in South Africa has worked in their favour as they have managed to maintain popularity in the rural areas. Despite the failure of the discourse to attract and appeal in its entirety to the youth, the discourse has been effective in rural areas as the majority of the rural dwellers in both countries are the elderly and they have experienced life under the White oppression therefore can relate to the discourse.



8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Interpretivism is a methodology from which no firm recommendations can be drawn, because it accepts the subjective nature of research, relies on those involved in the research to offer their own understandings and recognises the subjective nature of research. Because people change opinions from one day to the next, depending on the context, events or experience, everything is subject to change. Interpretivist studies capture a specific moment and present a reality that is unique for that setting and time only. While no firm recommendations relating to action to be taken can arise from interpretivist studies, there are thus infinite prospects for further research.

Therefore, in view of the findings of the study the two recommendations for future research spring to mind:

- A similar study can be conducted in both rural South Africa and Zimbabwe now that regimes have changed and disappointment with the ruling party has set in.
- A study comparing rural perceptions and urban perceptions on nativist discourse can be conducted.

8.6 END NOTE

In conclusion, the research represents views at a specific time and presents data in a unique moment in both South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. In Zimbabwe, it was a period after the ousting of Mugabe from power and people were filled with hope of a free and better Zimbabwe where basic human rights were respected. On the other hand in South Africa it was a period after Zuma had resigned from power, and people similarly had high expectations of socio-economic improvement. The situation changed afterwards in both countries. In Zimbabwe the oppressive regime has re-surfaced whereas in South Africa the socio-economic situation has deteriorated even further amidst escalating allegations of corruption amongst senior ANC public officials, which are likely to have changed people's views and perceptions. As a result, the study constitutes a representation of the 'truth' that was real to the respondents under those circumstances at that time, foregrounding the finite and unique nature of truth and reality in empirical research.

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APPENDIX ONE: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE



University of Fort Hare
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ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE REC-270710-028-RA Level 01

Certificate Reference Number: JOH061SCH101

Project title:

The rise of populism in Africa: An examination of the role of nativism in maintaining political power in two rural areas in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Nature of Project

PhD in Political Science

Principal Researcher:

Melody Chindoga

Supervisor:

Dr P Johnson

Co-supervisor:

N/A

On behalf of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) I hereby give ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project and research instrument(s). Should any other instruments be used, these require separate authorization. The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this certificate, using the reference number indicated above.

Please note that the UREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the document
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research


The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

Special conditions: Research that includes children as per the official regulations of the act must take the following into account:

Note: The UREC is aware of the provisions of s71 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 and that matters pertaining to obtaining the Minister's consent are under discussion and remain unresolved. Nonetheless, as was decided at a meeting between the National Health Research Ethics Committee and stakeholders on 6 June 2013, university ethics committees may continue to grant ethical clearance for research involving children without the Minister's consent, provided that the prescripts of the previous rules have been met. This certificate is granted in terms of this agreement.

The UREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Ethical Clearance Certificate if
 - Any unethical principal or practices are revealed or suspected
 - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
 - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
 - The conditions contained in the Certificate have not been adhered to
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project.
- In addition to the need to comply with the highest level of ethical conduct principle investigators must report back annually as an evaluation and monitoring mechanism on the progress being made by the research. Such a report must be sent to the Dean of Research's office



The Ethics Committee wished you well in your research.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'L. Majova-Songca', is written over the printed name of the Acting Dean of Research.

Professor Lindelwa Majova-Songca
Acting Dean of Research

10 November 2017

APPENDIX TWO: INFORMED CONSENT FORM



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

Department of Political Science and International Relations.

Dear participant

I, Melody Chindoga, a PhD student in the department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Fort Hare. In fulfilling my study I am conducting research into perceptions of the post-colonial and post-apartheid experience amongst rural citizens and your participation is being requested for the purpose of this study. Participation in the research is limited to a face to face interview which will take between 25 to 30 minutes. Participating in the research is entirely voluntary and there are no direct benefits which can be expected in participating in the interview. You have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time or refuse to answer any question which you feel makes you uncomfortable.

Your participation will be kept confidential and your identity will not be revealed to anyone, nor will information be asked for that can be linked to you. Your name will not be recorded anywhere and as a participant you will remain anonymous.

Should you have any further queries please contact the researcher on +27783864472 or via email at 201407682@ufh.ac.za or melchindoga@gmail.com and the researcher will answer any questions that you may have during or after the project.

INFORMED CONSENT

I hereby agree to participate in this research. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop this interview at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively.



University of Fort Hare
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Signature of participant.....

Date...../...../.....

Yours sincerely,

Melody Chindoga
