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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE NEXUS BETWEEN PETROLEUM ENERGY SECURITY AND SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

Dissertation Submitted in Fulfilment for the Award of a Master of Social Science Degree in Political Science.

BY

SESHIBEDI S.S
202100717

SUPERVISOR: DR VALERY FERIM

2022

DECLARATION

I, Sydney Seshibedi, the undersigned, declares that this dissertation is my own original work. Where other people's ideas and works are relied upon to shape this work, I have cited the sources of such works and ideas in accordance with established academic citation conventions. I also confirm that this study has not and will not be submitted to another university or any institution of higher learning for an award of a degree as it has been put together for the degree of Master of Social Science (Political Science) at the University of Fort Hare.

Signature……

Date: 10TH March 2023

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to three women who played their different roles in my life in different times. My mother, Matlala Anna Seshibedi, (1947-2013) loved me and my siblings without conditions and toiled all her active life to raise her six children. Her education consisted of only the first and second grade. She could not read or write, yet her wisdom was unmatched. She supported all my eneavours to satisfy the persistent hunger to get education and trusted that I knew better about my journey. She left this world in 2013, when she was only 66 years old. Rest in peace *Kolobe ya Mamphela a Seepa bana sa Bakgwele. Motho wa ga bo Makgedi a bo MaMaropene a tswetši ya hloko tša selemo mangwe matswetši a emere matswele.*

The second of three women in my life to whom this work is dedicated is my grandmother, Mokgadi Tšitšila Seshibedi, née Masela (1896-2002). Ke *Letebele lekwankwane lahloka kgomo leja motho*. Born in the late 19^{th} century and left this world in the 21^{st} century, she is among the few members of humanity who have had the privilege to see three centuries. I spent my formative years living with her in the treacherous 1980s. She had great genes and fantastic health that kept her on earth for 106 years. From her I have learned a lot about humanity and love towards others. Like my mother, her last born, she had not been to school. But she was the family's repository of oral knowledge. She knew of the ways in which her people lived and insisted on certain ways of carrying oneself in order to betray respect without spelling it out in words because it was congruent with her culture as practiced long before people's ways of life diverged to new ways of living. Her language was laden with words that my mother's generation and my generation no longer used.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my wife, Ntokozo Seshibedi, née Mayeza. Her journey to obtain education mirrors mine in many ways. Unlike my mother and my grandmother, she is well educated. She endeavoured to get education against staggering odds. She and I have pushed one another through the different echelons of higher education and relished the victory each time one accomplished their goal. Her base degree and the honours degree are in Business Management from the University of South Africa. In 2021 she was admitted to the degree of Master of Business Administration (MBA) from Wits University.

MaMayeza is an efficient human being with a big loving heart. When she and I met nearly twelve years ago, we both did not have university degrees. Owing to lack of financial resources, we had both found ways to gain vocational education when we were younger and built our careers solidly by being completely dedicated to our work. She thrived in corporate and became a leader in that environment because her leadership qualities ought to have stood out. It is to her leadership that the children and I find it so natural to place our reliance upon her knowing that with her guidance, we would not lose our way.

She is a great company in our academic quest. When I immerse myself in the work of this research dissertation, she is the closest voice of reason. She pushes me when she senses that I am involving myself in too many things that threaten to deduct the time from this great academic endeavour.

While many people, including my siblings and friends, have also played an important part to my growth, these three women stand tall among many. This work is, therefore, dedicated to my wife, mother and grandmother.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Conducting research that culminates in the admission to a master's degree, particularly the dissertation writing process, was always going to be an insurmountable journey. One that both the tenacity of the author/researcher and the assistance and support system in place to be relied upon are cardinal components without which the journey may, probably, never be concluded.

Therefore, in this section, the researcher acknowledges the support and guidance that was available through the course of the study or in different times along the journey.

My wife Ntokozo Seshibedi always encourages me to work harder. Her words of encouragement and the fact that just a year earlier she too was writing her dissertation for her MBA go a long way in encouraging me to keep working on my dissertation.

My children, who never complain about so much time that I reserve for my studies and miss out on some of their important moments in life, I would like to acknowledge your silence and let you know that I take it to mean that you are in full support of my journey towards my master's degree. I would also like to acknowledge my supervisor, Dr Valery Ferim, for his guidance through the journey. COVID-19 pandemic protocols denied us many face-to-face meetings, however, through emails and phone calls, I was able to receive guidance and critique that helped to solidify this work. Thank you, Dr Ferim. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution to the development of this study made by the members of the Higher Degrees Committee who engaged with the proposal for this study to be undertaken and applied themselves and concluded that the study should proceed. Other Administrative staff in the Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty who engaged this study in one way or another in the process of its development are hereby duly acknowledged.

It would be remiss if I forget my manager Mr Paul Sales. Mr Sales made sure that when I needed time for my studies, which was every week, despite the demanding nature of our work, he would refrain from contacting me on my pre-elected academic days. The support from my family, supervisor and work manager was the catalyst in the process. I could not have completed this work in the time that I did without such support. Thank you all for your support.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACFTA - Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement

ANC – African National Congress

APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism

AU – African Union

BIT – Bilateral Investment Treaty

BLNS – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland

BNC – Bi-National Commission

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CAR – Central African Republic

COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

DFA – Department of Foreign Affairs

DIRCO – Department of International Relations and Cooperation

DOP - US department of defense

EU – European Union

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment

FTA – Free Trade Area

G20 – Group of 20 Richest Nations

G7 – Group of Seven Richest Nations

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

IMF – International Monetary Fund

LDC – Least Developed Country

MK – Umkhonto we Sizwe

MNC – Multinational Corporation

MPLA – People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

NDP – New Development Bank

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

NERSA – National Energy Regulator of South Africa

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

OAU – Organization of African Unity

OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PAP – Pan African Parliament

PetroSA – The Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (PTY)Ltd

SACU – Southern African Customs Union

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SPLM – Sudanese People's Liberation Movement

UAE – United Arab Emirates

UN – United Nations

UNITA – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

USA – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

WTO – World Trade Organization

ABSTRACT

This study sets out to explore the nexus between South Africa's petroleum energy security and its foreign policy. The specific objectives of the research include: to find out the state of South Africa's oil energy security, the extent to which oil is a consideration in the development of the country's foreign policy and the extent to which its foreign policy is framed to favour oil exporting states. Qualitative research methodology is applied in this study with the Realism as the theoretical framework. The study found out that the state of South Africa's oil energy security, which compels the country to rely on foreign oil, provides grounds for foreign policy intervention, with discernible espousal of relations with oil exporting states that is different to those that do not produce oil. The study also found that oil is a consideration in the development of South Africa's foreign policy, as the country's policy strategy towards oil exporting states is to build relations of bilateral nature, through diplomatic instruments, among others. South Africa's regional politics makes discernible the fact that South Africa prefers a policy of multilateralism to manage its relations with SADC and SACU members who are not oil exporting, while evidence showed that bilateral relations are preferred towards oil exporting states. The study recommends amongst others, that South Africa's over-reliance on foreign oil can be mitigated by taking the lead in transitioning to renewable energy.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The gasoline powered internal combustion engine of 1876 in Germany was a disruptive addition to human mobility technologies that included reliance on horse pulled cars and steam powered engines, inter alia (Sabhadiya, 2020). One decade after the emergence of the gasoline powered engine, Karl Benz was producing cars with this engine commercially. By the beginning of the 20th century, the cars with the gasoline powered internal combustion engines were competing for the larger US market where the vast land space of the country supported the value proposition of the automobile, which was affordable to buy and operate (Bjornstad, 2018). The Ford Motor Company pioneered the real mass production of the automobile as cars became common globally (Zimmerbaum, 2021).

In the buildup to World War I, Winston Churchill, as the First Lord of the Admiralty, made a strategic decision to convert the source of power for British warships from coal to oil, which made them significantly faster than their German counterparts (Sabhadiya, 2020) or foes (Yergin, 2006). This strategic move by the British army reduced Britain's energy security by forcing Britain to import more foreign oil to meet its oil energy security, since the coal that used to power the warships had been sourced domestically in Wales (Yergin, 2006). The internal combustion engine, now ubiquitous, improved human mobility at a global scale, and it also became so intrinsic to terrestrial human mobility that the oil from which petroleum products that power these engines are sourced became a geopolitical imperative. Newnham (2011) argues that while the demise of the USSR reduced Russia's geopolitical standing greatly, the Putin administration has presided of Russian resurgence in geopolitics through its strategy to use oil and gas as Foreign Policy tools. This Kremlin oil policy finds expression in the punishment of Baltic states such as Georgia, Ukraine and others whose own foreign policies include divergence from Russia, towards the West. The Kremlin instituted high prices against these states and also subjected them to oil and gas supply interruptions designed to rettle the geopolitics of the region (Newnham, 2011).

Global demand for oil increased sharply throughout the 20th century, with the oil crisis of the 1970s deemed to be among the biggest global crises. While the oil cisis of 1973 was a supply and demand issue at basic level, the crisis solidified oil as a political problem (Mitchell, 2010). The crisis constitute a salient political issue because of how the crisis unfolded. Six oil producing countries in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia leading them, summarily announced in October of 1973 that they would collectively cut five percent of global oil supply. They further threatened to cut another five percent each month henceforth, if the United States of America did not halt its blockage of a comprehensive settlement of the persistent Israel-Palestine conflict. This regional political decision by Middle Eastern oil exporting countries resulted in long queus in developed countries of North America and Europe for petroleum products for the first time in history and the reality of oil supply uncertainty, as the supply of oil had been taken to be infinite before this geopolitical move in the Middle East As the threat to cut supply by five percent each ensuing month from October 1973 was followed through by Soudi Arabia et al. crude oil prices soair sharply, to the detriment of heavy oil consuming importers of crude oil around the World (Mitchell, 2010).

Japan refused to side with the United States of America on this crisis for the first time in many years, opting for a new Middle East policy informed by Japanses domestic objectives. Befor the oil crisis, oil producing states had no control of their oil resources, which were controlled by the Majors, from whom Japan sourced its Middle East oil supply. Oil prices went up by three hundred percent amid the oil crisis, which influenced migration in Africa to oil exporting states such as Nigeria (Yergin, 2006).

South Africa is not considered an oil producing country, even with its small crude discoveries combined with synthetic oil capacity produced from coal, because the country's petroleum energy needs are many folds greater than these domestic sources can be able to supply (Henning Snyman, 2011). It is widely accepted in literature that oil or petroleum energy is an important foreign policy tool This study evaluates the extent to which South Africa's need to increase her petroleum energy security shapes its foreign policy and the wider geopolitical actions or behaviour in Africa and the global political system. In South Africa, the National Energy Regulator Act of 2004 establishes the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), which regulates gas, electricity, and petroleum in terms of each component's own legislation (NERSA, 2013). This study focused on oil petroleum energy specifically, which is regulated in South Africa through the Petroleum Pipelines Act, 2003 (NERSA, 2013).

1.2 The research problem

All countries have perpetual need for energy, even though not every country is endowed with natural energy resources. For its part, South Africa consumes approximately sixty five percent more barrels of crude oil per day than its measly oil production, synthetic oil projects included.

CEIC (2020) data shows that at five hundred and sixty-nine thousand four hundred and forty-two barrels of crude oil consumed per day, as of December 2019, South Africa's consumption is one of the highest in Africa. Energy consumption is pegged to economic growth, which means it increases perpetually in correlation with economic growth trajectory, unless there is a paradigm shift in global energy consumption towards renewable energy.

South Africa's domestic oil production and reserves at Oribi and Oryx oil fields off the Cape Coast are small and declining, according to an undated statement by PetroSA. Combined production from both oil fields and synthetic projects (coal to oil), as well as gas to liquid projects fall far below the country's domestic petroleum energy needs. The reality of energy security, therefore, plays out in the international relations or geopolitical context. It becomes an international political and economic problem. Political instability in oil exporting countries ought to create apprehension in oil importing countries such as South Africa. Angola went through a protracted civil war, while Nigeria contends with conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region. The interethnic conflict in South Sudan, including the full-blown civil war in 2013 are part of political instability that affect trade adversely (Seid, Kebret & Abdi, 2021) .

The memories of the devastating economic hardship from the 1973 oil crisis, along with instances of political instability in oil exporting states should still provide the basis for caution on the part of South Africa and all oil importing states, when it comes to oil energy security. McSherry (2006) argues that there is a negative correlation between oil and democracy, which finds expression in the Middle East and Africa. This view means that oil begets authoritarianism and perpetual protests by pro-democratic reform groups in oil exporting states. The US foreign policy aids some of these problems in countries such as Equatorial Guinea in which the US endorses the oil-led economic development (McSherry, 2006). In a white paper (2011) splendidly titled "The Diplomacy of Ubuntu," the South African government says that because of its struggle of the past, it leans in favour of a foreign policy that will make the country a good international citizen (Ubuntu Diplomacy, 2011).

Having established that oil is an international political and economic problem, the question arises for this study about South Africa's consideration of oil in foreign policy formulation and actions. South Africa prefers to frame its quest or endeavors to achieve its foreign policy objectives in a manner that imply altruistic intent. Realism holds that like individual human beings, states always act in their self-interest, even when their actions appear altruistic (Smith, 2015). This study analyzes Pretoria's political economy of oil and the extent of its policy pragmatism manifesting in its foreign policy towards oil exporting African states.

1.3 Research questions

- What is the state of South Africa's oil energy security?
- How does South African oil influence African relations?
- How is oil a determinant of South Africa's foreign policy?
- Besides oil, what are the other economic determinants of South Africa's foreign policy?

1.4 Research aim and objectives

The main aim of this study is to analyze the nexus between petroleum energy security and South Africa's foreign policy.

The study advances the following objectives:

- To ascertain the state of South Africa’s oil energy security.
- To assess the link between South African oil and African relations
- To investigate the ways in which oil is one of the determinants of South Africa’s foreign policy.
- To analyze other economic determinants of South Africa’s foreign policy.

1.5 Scope of the study

The study is limited in scope to investigate the relationship between oil and the South African foreign policy, focusing on the post Thabo Mbeki era. While President Mbeki’s foreign policy sought to integrate South Africa into the African continent and the world, it was after his presidency that it became apparent that South Africa had moved beyond the aura that lingered on since 1994. It was time for South African foreign policy to reflect the reality and the need for objective driven foreign policy.

1.6 Research Methodology

This research adopted the qualitative research approach. The qualitative paradigm brings to their study a different viewpoint on validity, compared to the traditional quantitative studies. Unlike quantitative approach in which the inquirers depend on test scores on standardized instruments and the use of experiments to arrive at their conclusions, qualitative researchers, in contrast, pursue a different viewpoint based on the views of people who conduct the research, participate in or read and review a study (Creswell, 2013). Literature holds that qualitative researchers are more concerned with gaining understanding of the nature of the problem (Baškarada, 2013). Qualitative researchers argue that social reality is created by people, therefore in their analysis of the nature of the problem, qualitative researchers are guided by human beliefs and practices, rather than numerical data (Baškarada, 2013).

Noor (2008) says that the research method to be applied in a research project is dependent on the phenomena in society that the researcher chooses to study, which gives case study research approch equal footing with other methods. The researcher studied the foreign policy objectives communicated through governing political party (ANC) speeches, academic literature in books and journal articles, newspaper articles, website articles, strategy documents and state positions in international relations manifesting petroleum energy security considerations.

1.6.1 Methods of data collection

This study relies on secondary sources of data. Literature on South Africa's oil energy security and South Africa's foreign policy was reviewed. Data was obtained from textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, political speeches and internet sources.

1.6.2 Method of data analysis

Content analysis method is applied in analysing the collected data. This has to do with drawing inferences based on a comparative study of information from text, newspaper articles, journal articles and internet sources. It deals with binding the pieces of words in communication to answer the research questions. It is also advantageous because it can be used to compare divergent perspectives on the same topic (Pierce, 2008).

1.7 Significance of the study

The study contributed to literature in Environmental Politics, Energy Relations and Political Science. It should also, in a small way, bring the spotlight on the implications of being a non-oil exporting African state in a geopolitical context. After all, oil importing states have a perpetual thirst and growing appetite for oil, in some cases, from politically and socially unstable oil exporting states, in Africa and elsewhere. The study might also provide a source for policy makers looking to find strategic ways around the use of foreign policy as an instrument to improve domestic oil energy security.

1.8 Ethical issues

The researcher did not encounter any ethical hurdles during the period of research and thereafter, because the study did not involve interviews. Most of the literature was sourced online and subjected to analysis guided by the theoretical framework. The study is describable as desktop research. All sources of information were acknowledged by way of academic citation, and an ethical clearance certificate was obtained from the University of Fort Hare.

1.9 The Structure of the dissertation

The structure of this dissertation is as follows:

Chapter One: Introduction

The first chapter is the introduction of the study in its entirety. It will include a good share of the conceptual sections of the study, such as: background, research problem, research questions, research aims and objectives and methodology.

Chapter Two: Literature review and theoretical framework

The second chapter contains literature review and theoretical framework

Chapter Three: The state of South Africa’s oil energy security

Chapter Four: Oil as a consideration in the development of South African foreign policy.

Chapter Five: The extent to which oil energy security tilts South African foreign policy in favour of oil exporting nations

Chapter Five: Research findings and conclusion

The summary of findings, recommendations and conclusion will be the features of chapter six.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The literature being reviewed in this section relates to the political economy with reference to oil energy security and its influences on foreign policies of states. The literature under review broadly relates to the political economy of oil and how states act strategically in the international relations context, through foreign policies and other diplomatic instruments to maintain their domestic oil energy security objectives. Realism is also discussed in this section, as the theoretical framework and academic instrument on which the study is applied.

2.2 Literature Review

Perusal of relevant literature in the same or similar area of study as this research project and critical analysis.

2.2.1 Global dependence on oil

The period from the end of President Thabo Mbeki's truncated second term henceforth is viewed as the end of South Africa's special treatment in the international political system and the beginning of more assertive and objective driven foreign policy (Sidiropoulos, 2008). Literature on South Africa's post-Mbeki administration foreign policies and those of other states are the core subject of review in this study. The foreign policy of the United States towards oil exporting states or those that may threaten oil supply to the US is commonly featured in the world news. In response to political instability in most oil exporting countries, the United States of America endorses a policy of increasing its domestic oil output, however, because of the projected growth in demand for more oil, the US also favours a policy adopted under President George W Bush that would increase that country's dependance on African oil. Michael and Daniel (2006) note that traditionally, the US Department of Defense (DOP) paid no attention to Africa in comparison with other regions, however, in line with the US policy to increase dependance on African oil, there has been discernible increase in US military activities in Africa, partly designed to encourge political stability and to ensure safer movement of oil shipments across the atlantic.

USA and China are cardinal examples of states adopting strategic behavior in the geopolitical context to improve their oil energy security. Andrew and Goldstein (2009) say that American government reports indicate that as China's economy develops, its need for secure access to markets, particularly access to metals and fossil fuels increases rapidly. Hurdles to pacy development appears frustrating to many within China who are bouyed by China's economic and political resurgence. Chinese scholars termed the situation in which eighty percent of China's oil imports passed through the Malacca sealane the "Malacca Dialemma" , because it created vulnerability that threatened China's oil energy security (Andrew & Goldstein, 2009). Which has strong correlation to economic growth. Oil energy security influence on the US and China's economies is apparent, perhaps because of their powerful standing in the international political system.

All coubntries that do not produce or export oil have the same need, as those of USA and China, to use foreign oil to meet or improve their domestic oil energy security. Each of South Africa's democratic era presidents made discernable foreign policy changes with different implications. President Thabo Mbeki's foreign policy placed Africa on the global agenda in a way that was congruent with Western liberal democratic philosophy. President Jacob Zuma looked east to China, in an effort to meet his government's foreign policy objectice. Salient among president Zuma's achievements in the foreign policy space would be South Africa's membership of BRICS, which notably came into effect while the country remained a participant in the G20 meetings (Cilliers, 2017).

Most might concede that President Mbeki's foreign policy achievements were more. His government was itself a strong advocate for Africa's development and renewal (African Renaisance) for which liberalization of the South Africa's economy paved the way, allowing private sector companies in South Africa to invest agressively across the African continent (Sidiropoulos, 2008). These investments include upstream investments in the oil sector in oil exporting Africa countries. Sidiropoulos (2008)'s article articulates a study of South Africa's foreign policy in the post-Mbeki era, arguing chiefly that this is the period in which South Africa will or should begin to interact with other states in the international political system in a normal foreign policy objective driven manner, rather than as a post-aparheid miracle.

South Africa's foreign policy priority of focusing on Africa, multilataralism and cooperation, as well as peace and security as articulated by (Pando, Annual Performance Plan 2020-2021, 2021) can draw lessons from Brazil. In her budget speech, Dr Naledi Pando places at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy priorities, cooperation with the continent's large economies of Nigeria and Egypt, encouraging South Africa to take full advantage of the recent Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) which she says it is an expanded market access with a collective GDP of $3.2 trillion (Pando, www.gov.za, 2019). According to Malamud

(2011), there is divergence between Brazil's regional power status and that of its global standing in the international political system.The author points out in the article that while Brazil is recognized globally as an emerging power, it has battled to assert its power at regional level among its neighbours, partly because its reagional leadership is challenged by Agentina, Venezuela, Mexico and others (Malamud, 2011). Brazil's foreign policy objectives of getting a permanent seat in the UNCS and Director-Generalship of the the World Trade Organization (WTO) has failed partly for lack of concensus for its regional leadership (Malamud, 2011). Closest to this study in existing literature is one qualitative research paper in which (Monday & Salihu, 2017) found that oil indeed has a major influence on Nigeria's foreign policy.

Oil influence on Nigeria's foreign policy objectives can be demonstrated, among many ways, by indicating its importance to the West African state in this way: in 1962 the export of crude oil in Nigeria accounted for ten percent of the country's total exports, eight years later, in 1970, it had shot up to fifty eight percent of Nigeria's total exports, and from 1978 onwards it remained above ninety percent consistently (Monday & Salihu, 2017). Perhaps more directly would be the assertion that Nigeria used its enormous earnings from oil exports in the past for its foreign policy objectives in the geopolitical space by supporting the efforts for freedom in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and others, according to the authors of the research paper (Monday & Salihu, 2017). The country's peace keeping contribution, support for the Frontline States, support for formation and maintenance of multilateral organizations such as the AU are all possible for Nigeria through the oil revenue, which arguably influences Nigeria's foreign policy (Monday & Salihu, 2017). It is note worthy that oil is the main driver of South Africa's foreign policy and diplomatic relationship towards Nigeria (Seokolo, 2015). Oil is the largest item imported by South Africa from Nigeria, by far.

Fikreyesus (2012) asks an oil energy security related question: "Does the presence of oil influence US Foreign Policy towards Sub-Saharan African States?" Fikreyesus (2012)'s study sought to answer whether oil influenced the US foreign policy in the 1960. Prompted to pursue the study by evidence showing that while the US professed to be driven in geopolitics by the need to promote democracy, in Sab-Saharan Africa evidence existed that contradicted the said commitment to democracy and human rights in which the US appeared reluctant to promote these principles in Africa (Fikreyesus, 2012). The reluctance can be linked to the need by the US not to interrupt the flow of crude oil exports from politically unstable African countries to the United States, for its oil energy security. If the US acts differently to promote democracy and human rights in states where oil is absent, this can be understood to be that oil influences the foreign policy of the United States. Indications are that the US oil consumption is likely to see an increase from sixteen to twenty five percent between 2008 and 2015 of the oil it imports from the Middle East alone, which leads scholars to infer that the US's need to meet its oil energy security is likely to compell the super power to turn a blind eye on the need to promote democracy and human rights in instances where its oil energy security are of foreign policy consideration (Fikreyesus, 2012).

Western governments, conventionally, force countries that depend on them for aid and other forms of developmental asistance to be more transparent and democratize. China on the other hand, does not compell any country to adopt liberal values of democracy, however, it specifies that the condition for its asistance is that it is in exchange for mineral resources, particularly oil (Malaquias, 2011). Angola's relationship with China is mutualy beneficial in this way that Angola is allowed to play its domestic cards close to her shest, while guaranteeing China access to oil (Malaquias, 2011). This arrangement demonstrates the influence of oil to both China and Angola's foreign policies.

Chris Landsburg applied the "Concentric Circle" model to both the Mbeki and Zuma government's foreign policies to ascertain their coherance, by looking into their priorities. Each circle represents foreign policy priority context as the circles have different radiuses while they have the same centre or core, which can be seen as the national interests for which the state embarks on a particular foreign policy (Landsberg, 2014). For the Zuma government the bottom up concentric circles model starts with National interests represented by the smallest central circle, followed by SADC, Africa Advancement, Strengthening South-South relations, Strategic relations with North, Participation in global governance, and the last circle with the widest radius represents Strengthening Political and Economic Relations (Landsberg, 2014). This circles indicate South Africa's foreign policy priorities, which indicates that the SADC region and the rest of Africa are higher on South Africa's foreign policy priority list. By coherence, Landsberg (2014) makes an argument that all the circles are meant to reinforce the core or smaller circle that stands for national interests. The question then arises as to whether that reinforcement does happen in the reality of South Africa's foreign policy under President Zuma? If oil energy security is one of the national interests, as South Africa is a net crude oil importer, does oil become the nexus between South African foreign policy and its domestic petroleum energy security?

Landsberg (2014) argues that when the Zuma administration came to power, flowing from the ANC resolution of the 52nd conference in Polokwane, it changed the departmental name of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) as an indication of its intention to depart from the domination and power seeking realist approach to one in which cooperation and partnership with other states in international relations and national interests are upper most in importance. In Minister Nkoana-Mashabane's view, soft power was to become DIRCO's most potent foreign policy instrument by which to persue South Africa's national interests. To this end, the minister promised to intensify public diplomacy effort and to keep South Africans in the loop about what the department was doing in the foreign policy space (Landsberg, 2014).

But the Zuma Administration's foreign policy is much more of a continuation of the Mbeki administration's foreign policy in other views also expressed in literature. South Africa's political economy in Africa is characterized by the presence of its firms doing business robustly on the continent, challenging the dominance of Multinational Corporations (MNC) from USA, France, Britain Germany and others who traditionally dominate private investment on the African continet (Alden & Soko, 2005). Perhaps South Africa's political economy, expressed in this way on the African continent along with its diplomatic reslations and peacekeeping effort define the country's hegemonic status (Alden & Soko, , 2005).

Seokolo (2015)'s research study titled "South Africa's Post 1994 Diplomacy in Securing the Supply of Oil" found that post apartheid South Africa used strategic diplomatic relationships with oil exporting states to secure access to oil and consequently improve its domestic oil energy security. To this end, the author says that South Africa relied on structured bilateral relations as diplomatic vehicles by which Pretoria won oil import agreements. This pursute of oil using foreign policy instruments such as structured bilateral relations is referred, in his study, as "energy diplomacy" which South Africa applied over many years of its democratic dispensation (Seokolo, 2015). Seokolo (2015: 3) argues that South Africa's international relations strategy is informed by its need for energy security sourced in the volitile international oil energy sector. Seokolo (2015)'s study sought to establish the extent to which South Africa uses its diplomacy to secure energy supply, particularly oil, between 1994 and 2014. The study used niche diplomacy as the theoretical framework for its analysis as it too is a qualitative approach study. Unlike this research study, however, Seokolo, (2015)'s study is not confined to oil exporting states in Africa, but rather looks at South Africa's use of diplomacy as a tool to access oil anywhere around the world. The study positions energy diplomacy as a strand of niche diplomacy for more studies in future to delve in and develop more knowledge.

2.2.2 Oil as a determinant of foreign policy

The Security theory places security as the biggest pronlem that human beings have to contend with at personal security, national security and international security levels, and security is also at the heart of international relations (Hu & Ge, 2014). Achah (2015)'s PhD thesis was prompted by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon's assertion in 2011 that his vision was that humanity should enjoy universal access to modern energy by the year 2030. At the time of the Secretary General's statement, less than fifty percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's population had access to modern energy sources, which encouraged the author to formulate a research study looking into the energy consumption by oil producing African States. In the process of the study, the research confirmed the common hypothesis about the "oil curse" in Africa. Poverty is named as the common factor among the oil producing states in Africa, which betrays the fact that these states are unable to convert or channel the oil revenue into their economies to stimulate economic growth and also diversification to include modern renewable energy use (Achah, 2015).

However, the prevalent and perpetual vicious cycle of poverty in Africa and inability to halt it can be atributed weak institutions. According to Atchrimi (2019) there is no scholarly and or scientiffic grounds for a plausible objection that Africa is the richest continent on earth, yet it grapples with the odd paradox, because Africa is also the poorest continent in the world when it comes to economic and social development. While analysing African institutions and their weakness that partly account for Africa's lack of development, Atchrimi (2019) also observes that even in research, African is analyzed as one entity, as it it is one country. African Scholars too are seen in colonial debates as one. The author augues that these aggregated view of Africa is caused by the fact that African institutions are not playing a signifficant role to make people outside Africa in the international community know about Africa. The literature paints a chaotic picture of the state of energy security in and among African states. This study seeks to analyze South Africa's position on this uninspiring picture in its quest to meet its domestic oil energy consupmtion needs. South Africa's state of oil energy security appears to be worrysome. South Africa is Africa's largest consumer of the continent's oil, among African oil importers, accounting for or consuming a quarter of the continent's total production output (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010).

The Draft Strategic Stock Policy and Implimentation Plan published by the Department of energy in 2013 sought to reduce the oil stock that South Africa needs in case of emergency or unforeseen disrupption in the supply of oil to South Africa to meet its oil energy security (Trollip, Butler, Burton, Caetano, & Godinho, 2014). The paper contained no analysis about the likelihood that there would be no interruption to South Africa's oil supply from oil exporting states, or to argue in favour of the earlier policy document published in 2007 that placed importance in holding signifficant stocks in case of emergency (Trollip et al., 2014). The Department of Energy (2020) says that South Africa is compelled by the AU, through Agenda 2063, to develop Africa's energy infrastructure. It is much like compelling a child to eat candy. The department of energy's statement is congruent with the realist position on state centric economic agenda in the system (Smith, 2015). While the statement is framed in a manner that imply passiveness on the part of Pretoria, it betrays policy intentions to invest in infrastructure, and this includes oil extracting infrastructure in African countries such as South Sudan. Perhaps the latter policy objective put forward by the Department of energy, that it is compelled by AU to invest in infrastructure is an indication of an intention by Pretoria to use upstream investment strategy to ensure better oil security in South Africa, rather than rely on contingency storage of excess oil.

It can be argued that as environmental regulatory restrictions in developed states may reduce demand for oil in those countries, developing economies such as South Africa and those in BRICS, among others, are seeing growing demand for oil in line with their economic development or growth (SADC, 2018). However, as cleaner technologies become cheaper demand for oil energy may also decline in developing countries in the future as renewables become more dominant. SADC (2018) states in its report that the World Energy Council predicts that the global oil consumption will peak in 2030, Germany and India also plan to have switched 100% to electricity powered motor vehicles in that same year. South African newspaper, Business Day, warned in an article it carried that prolonged stay in office by many leaders in Africa, examples being Chad, Republic of Congo, DRC, Cameroon, Uganda, Rwanda as well as Egyps and Zimbabwe, plus ANC's quarter century dominance in South Africa were robbing the continent of its potential to reduce poverty and grow continental economy (Hiebert, 2021). But the reality today is that the demand for oil to meet energy security is an impoirtant foreign policy agenda items that this study will discuss critically. Particularly, the extent to which such demand influences South Africa's foreign policy.

Oil constitutes South Africa's largest single item on its import account, with oil imports also accounting for eighty percent or more of all energy related imports into South Africa (Vanderschuren, 2008). Taking from the section above, the dependence on imported oil does not translate simplistically into geopolitical vulnerability for South Africa. In a comparative study on the influence of the rising powers, China, India and Brazil, to Mozambique and South Africa, the authors hold a view that unlike Mozambique with a higher donor dependence, South Africa is in a position to determine favourable terms for its transections with both donors and investors due to its low dependence on donor funding (Power, et al., 2016). Mozambique's investment in hydro energy is made on condition that South Africa's Eskom will buy the bulk of its generated energy, a geopolitical affirmation of South Africa's "rising Power"status (Power et al., 2016).

This study hopes to contribute to or seeks to attempt to close the gap in literature in oil-influenced foreign policy of a non-oil exporting state towards oil exporting states. The literature in both sections of this review shows that as an energy source, oil is important to both oil exporting states and oil importing states. It is also discernible in literature that for African states that export oil, political stability, economic growth, and diversification have been elusive for many years. While Angola has seen healthy GDP growth in its post war economic endeavors, Angola's reluctance to implement the Free Trade Area agreement it has with its SADC neighbours can be viewed as frustrating to South Africa's need to predictably rely on Angola's oil. By 2006, South Africa imported only four percent of its total oil imports from Angola, thirteen percent from Nigeria, and even smaller percentages from other African states such as Libya, Gabon, and others, while receiving thirty five percent and twenty nine percent from Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively, since the watershed moment of 1994 (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). This numbers were different before, according to another study, which may be revealing the presence of diversification strategy by South Africa to improve oil energy security. Earlier, South Africa imported more than forty five percent crude oil from Saudi Arabia, a little more than thirty three percent from Iran and just over sixteen percent from Nigeria, to maintain ninety six percent crude oil import to improve oil security in South Africa (Nkomo, 2006). In 2011, following US sanctions and that of the EU on Iran, South Africa could no longer access oil from Iran, which increased oil import to South Africa from Nigeria, making Nigeria, henceforth, the second largest supplier of South Africa's oil imports after Saudi Arabia, and the largest among African oil exporters to South Africa (Seokolo, 2015).

Wabiri and Amusa's (2010) study analysis the nature of South Africa's oil dependence due to its economic growth requiring more oil energy consumption while the country's low oil reserves fall far short of its energy security needs. Their study is quantitative in approach with elements of qualitative analysis (triangulation) and notes the apprehension emanating from the fact that South Africa depends mostly on two regions (Middle East and Africa) for its oil imports, which are both prone to political instability (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). For their paper, they develop an empirical framework to analyse the relationship between diversification of sources from which South Africa imports its crude oil and South Africa's oil energy security (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). Their paper's objectives are most like this study, however, it still leaves a gap that this study endeavors, in a small way, to fill up. Unlike their paper, this study is a qualitative approach dissertation, which takes a different methodological approach to the paper by (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). In the view of the researcher, this study contributes to literature and knowledge where other studies and papers left a gap that is more discernible or apparent upon reviewing the literature in this area of study. It terms of contribution Wabiri and Amusa (2010) boldly argue that their study:

> The paper makes two main contributions. First we address the death of research on the concept of oil energy security for oil-importing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. To the best of our knowledge, no published study has developed an empirical framework for quantifying risk associated with oil imports of an open middle income and oil importing African economu such as South Africa's. Secondly, we incoporate qualitative judgements, summarized into risk weights, into risk weighted index model.

The statement above mitigates the rational to pursue this study as it indicates the research neglect of this area of study. Diversification of oil imports for a country such as South Africa helps to reduce exposure to interruption that may be political or any other in the jurisdiction from which the oil is sourced (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). There is systematic risk and specific risk, according to (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). The former refers to risk that oil importing nations such as South Africa may not be able to use diversification as a strategy to mitigate the impact of such a risk, because it emanates from factors such as sudden international surge in demand, which cannot be planned for, while speciffic risk refers to problems that can be mitigated by way of diversification as a mitigating stratedy for speciffic risk (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). Specific risk could be political instability in a particular jurisdiction from which oil is sourced, and this is unlikely to happen at the same time across different sources of imorted oil, therefore, this risk can be successfully eschewed by diversifying import sources, which improves oil energy security at home for South Africa (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010). South Africa's synthetic fuel, from large coal deposits and conversion of gas to liquid, are important for South Africa's oil energy security as they mitigate, even in a small way, the dependance on inported oil (Nkomo, 2006). Hu and Ge (2014) define energy security as the following:

> …energy security is defined as a country or region able to obtain a stable, adequate, economic and clear energy supply to meet demand, ensure economic and social operation, and guarantee the ability and status of sustainable and coordinated development.

This definition of energy security places oil, for the purpose of this study, as a clear national objective that any state not endowed with oil deposits would see as a foreign policy objective to persue through its power, soft or hard. In this way, oil becomes a political problem. Dr Pando's assetion that the New Development Bank (NDB) loan of $180 million to Eskom, to develop the renewable energy sector, which the minister says is a sign that South Africa does use diplopmacy to improve energy security, should be understood to be part of the shift from carbon energy, including oil, to renewable energy (Pando, 2019).

2.2.3 The Role of oil in global peace and conflict

China's building up of its naval cxapacity can be seen as a way to protect its interests in international relations (Andrew & Goldstein, 2009). Perhaps South Africa's strategy to improve its oil energy security may look less ready to apply military force on the African continent, but the battle of Bangui sends a confusing policy signal on the part of Pretoria. South African soldiers, inexplicably fought in the battle of Banqui in Central African Republic, ill equiped and outnumbered, against the Seleka rebels in which 13 South African soldiers lost their lives (Thompson, Hofstatter, & Oatway, 2021). The literature reviewed make apparent that studies related to South African energy security, foreign policy and pragmatic behaviour are aggregated when it comes to the energy subject and not focusing on petroleum energy or oil as a strand of energy. Analysis of South Africa's foreign policy incapsulated in literature are also not specific to South Africa's policy towards oil exporting states as an effort to increase petroleum energy security. It is argued that the demise of Libya's Muammar Gaddafi offered South Africa an opportunity to form part of that country's rebuilding process and consequently gain access to oil resources (Henning Snyman & de Kock, 2011).

Snyman and de Kock (2011) also see Gaddafi's absence from the African Union (AU) as crucial for South Africa's geopolitical influence on the African continent. With regards to geopolitical power relations in Africa, South Afruca is not without a challenge on the continent. At political level South Africa does have a pre-1994 relationship with Angola, owing to the latter's hosting of South Africa's Liberation Movements during apartheid, notably the African National Congress (ANC) and its military wing Umkhonto we sizwe (MK). Angola's reluctance to trade with its SADC neighbours in this regard ought to be frastrating for South Africa and other members of SADC. Angola's post war economy has grown impressively, mainly due to oil, making the country the second largest economy among the SADC member states (Louise, 2013). In 2015 Angola was extracting 1.8 million barrels of crude oil per day that it exported almost entirly to the world, of which only four percent was exported to African States (SADC, 2018). South Africa's share of Angolan oil import would have been part of the four percent exported to African countries. In 2018 South Africa imported crude oil to the value of $1.16 billion from Angola, while the next highest iterm on the same import list was under $11 million as indicated by trade data between the two states (Tradingeconomics.com, 2018).

The picture of import items from oil exporting states to South Africa is the same. Oil is, by far, the single most dominant item that South Africa buys from these oil exporting African Sates. Similar to Angola, in 2019, South Africa imported crude oil from Nigeria to the value of $3.13 billion, while the second highest item imported from Nigeria in the same year was fertalizer to the value of only $5.3 million, indicating the overwhelming focus on crude oil (Tradingeconomics.com, 2018). This affirms the assertion that the relationship between South Africa and Nigeria in terms of trade is mainly about South Africa's access to oil. The 'oil curse' literature focuses on the mismanagement of oil resources and corruption oil's presence begets in oil exporting states. Which makes it no surprise that Nigeria imports more than ninety percent of refined petroleum products such as gasolin and diesel to meet its domestic oil energy security needs (Bala-Gbogbo, 2019).

Post-Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo presidencies in South Africa and Nigeria respectively, relations between South Africa and Nigeria are deemed to have cooled, owing to issues of xenophobia in South Africa and Nigeria's treatment of South African companies such as MTN, which operate in Nigeria (Fabricius, 2019). Fabricius (2019) argues that relations between South Africa and Nigeria during the Mbeki-Obasanjo era relied on the personal relationship between their two heads of state who cooperated on matters of building up multilateral organizations and institutions on the continent, such as converting the OAU to the current AU, as well as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), African Peer Review Mechanism and the Pan African Parliament (PAP). Nigeria and Angola are the largest and second largest oil exporting states in Africa respectively. They both export large quantities of crude oil to South Africa. They both have a dynamic political relationship with South Africa. While South Africa imports crude oil and refine for its population's daily petroleum energy security needs, Nigeria and Angola export nearly all crude oil that they extract, only to import refined petroleum to meet their own domestic petroleum security needs. Nigeria and Angola, for reasons stated above, become salient states of focus for this study, as stated in the section titled "scope of the study" in chapter one.

There is geopolitical hegemonic rivalry between South Africa, Angola and Nigeria as players of eminent stature in African politics. President Mbeki's government had a cooler relationship with Angola, but when the Zuma administration took over, President Zuma went to Angola on a state visit with the largest delegation of political and business representatives that his predicessor was unable to secure, yet the embrace of Angola by the Zuma administration cooled relations between South Africa and Nigeria on the other hand, which had enjoyed better relations with the Mbeki administration (Landsberg, 2014).To confine the study within the scope and size of its academic level and purpose, Nigeria and Angola will be the two oil exporting states whose relationship with South Africa and their political economy of oil will be the subject of analysis in the next chapter.

Oil exporting countries, referred to fondly in literature as 'Petrostate' are shown in research to have a higher frequency of civil wars in comparison with countries that do not possess this natural resource, and it is also on record that oil producing states mostly have perpetual ruthless autocratic regimes (Colgan, 2015). A closer observation in literature is that conflict sometimes opens opportunities for democratization, however, in petro-states, prolonged and more frequent domestic conflict has not been observed to beget opportunity for democratization (Colgan, 2015). Colgan (2015) argues that rebel groups in petrostates seldom succeed in their effort to overthrow these ruthless autocratic regimes because, oil makes it possible for both sides to finance their effort against one another perpetually. Incumbent autocratic regimes are well armed in their effort to root out rebel groups who are also armed enough to resist the push by the represive regimes. In Ecuadorian region of the Amazon, the local communities adjacent to oil extractive activities employed ways such as engaging oil companies extracting in their communities in dialogue, blocking access roads to keep these companies out, engaging in conflict as well as taking legal action against oil companies, arguing that they ought to account for damage to the sensitive local ecosystems in their quest to extract oil (Pellegrini & Arsel, 2018).

In the 1950s it was widely believed that oil rich states could effortlessly translated that to development, however, in about 1990 research brought about evidence showing correlation between the presence of oil and the increase of civil conflict and more socio-economic problems. Oyefusi (2007) notes that while oil abundance is associated with conflict and socio-economic problems, it is still possible for states with oil deposits to use oil for tangible development, one example being Norway's ability to use oil revenue for the good health of its economy and social upliftment. Research evidence indicates that the opposite is true in countries like Nigeria where the presence of oil has always been associated with the country's struggle against mismanagement and corruption. Nigeria holds thirty two percent of Africa's oil in reserves, as the continent's largest oil producer, and it is the fifth largest oil exporter of oil to the United States, the world's largest consumer of oil energy, but Nigeria has not succeeded in using the oil revenue for its people's economic development or avoid conflict associated with the management of its oil resources (Oyefusi, 2007).

South Africa's courting of Central African Republic (CAR) from the Mbeki leadership of the South African government culminating in the desasterous battle of Bangui of 2013 in which 13 South African soldiers died is, perhaps, a clearer way in which mineral riches such as oil, dimonds, other minerals and commercial interests can strongly influence foreign policy (Thompson, Hofstatter, & Oatway, 2021). South Africa's involvement in CAR, a country with no other discernible strategic importance to Pretoria, may seem like one driven by altruism, but former US Ambassada to South Africa Eric Bost's views repudiates altruism as a reason for Pretoria's involvement. According to Thompson et al., (2021:70):

> In a confidential memo to Washington released by WikiLeaks several years later, Eric Bost, the US Amassada to South Africa, noted that Pienaar had also pointed out that the rebels had seized towns in diamond rich areas, speculating that South Africa's military aid could be motivated by both 'a desire to stabilize CAR' and to advance commercial interests.

The commercial interest referred to in this regard relate directly to diamonds. However, it is a good demonstration that minerals such as diamonds and oil do induce state policy towards certain countries, and in this regard, South Africa's policy towards CAR may at one point been influenced to a certain degree by minerals. Bost's views were also contained in his cable to the US State Deprtment by (Thompson et al., 2021:70):

> Stability in this region is important to South Africa's interests. Pretoria devouted enormous resources to conflict resolutionin in the DRC and Sudan, the last thing Pretoria wants is another conflict or coup in the region.

The authours point out that Bost went on to state that South Africa deemed mining to be its foreign policy interest in CAR and the decision to enter or get involved in the CAR was a decision influenced to a large extent by mining interests. Oil was discovered as early as 1973 in CAR, however, it remains unexplored partly due to protracted political instability. Media coverage of the Mbeki presidency indicate clear policy intention by South Africa to help improve political stability in the CAR, but also pave the way for commerce, especially in mining and apparently oil (Thompson et al., 2021).

South Africa’s warm bilateral relations with CAR under president Bozize is intepreted by regional leaders in Chad, Republic of Congo and Cameroon as a departure by CAR leader from France’s area of influence, which leads to their isolation of the Bozize government, exposing it to an inevitable coup in which South Africa was the only source of aid to the CAR (Thompson et al., 2021). The presernce of one South African oil exploration non state player would not adequately justify an argument that South Africa’s presence in the CAR during the battle of Bangui was oil related, however, oil was one among many other menirals present in the CAR.

At a scale wider than the CAR, however, it is demonstrable that involvement in oil explorations or upstream investment is South Africa’s policy, in its effort to improve oil energy security at home. Former minister of Energy Jeff Radebe stated in an interview at the election centre in Pretoria following a recent upstream oil deal between South Africa and South Sudan that the deal was mutually beneficial in that it would mitigate the high petrol price in South Africa while South Africa’s investment in the development of oil Block 2 would also benefit the people of South Sudan (Seshibedi, 2019).

The minister indicated that at political level, the ANC and SPLM had a relationship that dated back to when the two organizations were in the liberation struggle before 1994 fighting to liberate their people. According to Seshibedi (2019) minister Radebe said:

> We are not an island as South Africa, we are part of the African continent. So, when we talk about agenda 2063 the Africa we want, we also want South African companies to invest in the rest of the African continent as well as those countries to invest in South Africa. Which is why as South Africa we are so keen to developin in partnership with South Sudan that oil block B2 in South Sudan in order to in order to give economic

> independence to the people of South Sudan as well as to secure our oil supply because we are an net importer of crude oil in South Africa. When that project is in full operation, it will reduce the cost and price of oil in our country. It is huge. We are talking here of 3.2 billion barrels in oil reserves which means it will be pumping oil for the next 40 years plus at peak.

The ANC and SPLM are governing parties in their respective jurisdictions and should both be naturally grappling with policies that will improve and sustain energy security for their domestic oil energy security needs.

2.2.4 The politics and economic dynamics of oil exporting countries and regions

Studies show that despite the prevailing wisdom in the Middle East and North Africa in the past two decades to diversify their economies by investing oil money in other sector of the economy to stimulate growth and diversity of state income sources, this region continues to be dependent on oil (Al-Rawashdeh, Al-Nawafleh, & Al-Shboul, 2013).

The inability by the Middle East and North African states, among others, to wean themselves from heavy dependence on oil and its revenue is attributed to corruption, lack of democracy, military spending and foreign funds outflow, which is commonplace in oil rich countries (Al-Rawashdeh et al., 2013). The study indicated that diversification that is not accompanied by good governance turn not to bring growth that is anticipated, even when there is abundance of minerals such as oil. It is not coincident that oil rich countries such as Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania and others are considered low-income countries, despite their oil, while most Middle East countries are considered middle-income countries, and only a few such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Bharain, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait are high-income countries (Al-Rawashdeh et al., 2013).

Testing a hypothesis about whether oil increased the chances of state repression, and whether rent from oil further increased repression by oil rich regimes, the results of the study by (DeMeritt & Young, 2013) were consistent with the two hypotheses. This study of the political economy of oil sought to measure the impact of oil on human rights and found that it had adverse impact. Oil can be applied as a geopolitical instrument of coersion, in the political economy context through imposition of oil embargos, and other ways of forcing other nations to act is a manner favourable (Monday & Salihu, 2017). The examples here through histrory are the oil embargo by the US against Japan ahead of World War II, Soviet Union, South Africa, Burma, Haiti and others in different times in history (Monday & Salihu, 2017).

2.2.5 Global political governance

South Africa is among the voices calling for the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to be more democratic and inclusive, prioritizes Africa and the global South while lamenting the recent retreat, by some countries, from multilateralism (Pando, Annual Performance Plan 2020-2021, 2021). In the department's annual performance plan, South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Dr Naledi Pando articulates South Africa's objectives during its chairmanship of the African Union (AU), as peace and security, and to promote effective implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (Pando, Annual Performance Plan 2020-2021, 2021). These priorities indicate that Pretoria sees cooperation among African states and multilateralism as effective ways in which peace and security can be effectively promoted on the African continent. Peaceful environment, therefore, ought to be seen by South Africa as an ideal environment in which protracted and uninterrupted movement of oil shipments or consignments from oil exporting states to South Africa should take place. Achievement of peace and security on the African continent improves South Africa's oil energy security.

South Africa's multilateral efforts saw it being invited to the G7, gaining membership of the G20 and many other signifficabnt occurances in geopolitical context. He looked to the West for global leadership and for Africa's development. Mbeki was able to engage Western powers and fascilitate cancellation of upto $40 billion in debt that impovarished African countries owed to the IMF and World Bank (Cilliers, 2017). It was under President Mbeki that South Africa started to challenge the global governance system architecture, calling for more democratic practices in the global multilateral governance systems (Sidiropoulos, 2008). Power et al. (2016) argues that literature should be interrogated to build understanding of the political economy of energy in Southern Africa. Their paper espouses liberalism and sees state led development preferred in realism as part of an outdated path to development. The only oil-exporting member of SADC, Angola, has acted with great reluctance on issues of trade. This reluctance by Angola found expression in its refusal to remove trade tariffs for SADC member states more than ten years after the country signed the SADC Free Trade Area agreement, in 2002. Louise (2013) observed that while Angola displayed reluctance to trade with its neighbours in SADC, by way of not removing tariffs to aid the flow of intra SADC trade, Angola had better trade relations with the

Portugese speaking countries (Portugal and Brazil), indicating that it had better diplomatic and economic trade relations along traditional and colonial lines than it did with its neighbours.

2.3 Theoretical framework

Nicolo Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Max Webber, Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes are among the well-known proponents of the theory of realism. Cardinal among the assumptions of realism is that the theory takes the state to be the main player in international relations. This study utilizes realism as the academic tool of analysis and the theory for the study. It could have elected to pursue its objectives through other theories such as liberalism. But this would have compelled the study to also look deeper into pertinent international relations issues such as human rights, which fall outside the scope of this study. By electing to work with the theory of realism as the lens by which to guide the study's analytical undertaking, this study was able to meet its objectives by narrowly focusing on states and how they relate to one another in the geopolitical context with regards to the political economy of oil and oil energy security of states. Yes, oil energy security affects individuals at the point of sale, however this is a high-level study looking at holistic oil energy security for states, and how states can or do use their foreign policies as instruments to mitigate or improve their oil energy security. The study does not reach the individual human level, which is why the theory of realism will help the study eschew questions that may relate to human level oil energy problems. Such problems may be better dealt with in a study that may elect to look at petroleum matters and their impact on the actual living conditions of people in a particular demographic. South African statecraft is the subject of this study, as it seeks to answer the research questions seen in chapter one.

According to Smith (2015) realism is the leading theoretical framework for the analysis of global politics. The theory of realism is state centric and acknowledges the anarchic nature of the global political system in which states are the individuals doing their best in the community of other states to survive and thrive (Smith, 2015). The theory of realism is more suitable for this study than the theory of liberalism and other theories because the focus of the study is also centered on South Africa as a state, her political economy of oil as well as its behavior towards oil exporting African states. These, oil exporting African states, often battle to achieve domestic social and political stability, causing South Africa to act at policy level to protect its petroleum energy security. Other studies found that South Africa applies diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument to mitigate its domestic oil energy security (Seokolo, 2015). Philip (2012) is critical of realism's repudiation of idealism and moralism and goes further to declare that realism should be purged of the illusions it holds. Realism remains better suited as an academic tool or lens for analysis in this study. Counter to views held by some Political Science scholars that realism is obsolete, it is sound to argue that realism remains relevant as it is not affected by changes that happen within the international political system because they are at unit level (Waltz, 2000). While non state actors such as MNCs feature in International Relations, as actors with considerable power, even in the oil or petroleum sector, this study is centered mainly on state actions at foreign policy level.

Sleat (2014) argues that disagreement in social setting, which includes politics, is permanent and that the earlier realist scholars located the source of conflict in the features deemed to be human nature. Features common to individual human beings such as desire for power to dominate others, egoism, passion, and pride are realist features of individual states in the political system.

(Sleat, 2014) says that because politics playout within unavoidable conflict, politics should be seen as a perpetual struggle for power and dominance. Realism developed over many years into the paradigm theory of International Relations (IR), although it being a paradigm of IR does not mean it is the only theory in the study of IR (Guzzini, 1998). Security theory is another IR theory that holds that security is the biggest problem to human beings at personal, national, and international levels (Hu & Ge, 2014). However, Hu and Ge (2014) proceed to argue that while security is the biggest human problem, the study of security is incoherent due to its controversial nature, among other reasons. The oil crisis of the 1970s begotten the energy security theory, following the formation of the International Energy Agency in 1974, centered around stabilization of the global supply of oil and pricing security (Hu & Ge, 2014). The development of the theory of realism in IR after the two world wars followed the same pattern of dominance by certain states in the international political system. I the post WW2 era, realism provided legitimacy to foreign policies of powerful actors in the international political system (Guzzini, 1998).

Idealism became less potent as realism became the tool of analysis showing that peaceful change was not the ideal way to foist change in the political system, rather power politics or force was the better way in which change in war times could be obtained (Guzzini, 1998). As a Superpower, the US sees itself as being responsible to drive change in the world, and Britain felt the same way when it was a Superpower before the US and framed its foreign policy in a manner that imposes itself on other states in the international political system (Guzzini, 1998). It is argued in analysis of a review article that scholars are united on the conception of realism as a normative theory that should guides the negotiation between the demands of ethics and politics, which scholars believe ought to happen (Hall, 2011).

2.4 Chapter conclusion

Literature review and the theoretical framework were the main components of this chapter. Under literature review, the literature was fragmented into themes with the following sub-headings: Global Dependence on oil, Oil as a determinant of foreign policy, The role of oil in global peace and conflict, The political and economic dynamics of oil exporting countries and regions and Global political governance.

CHAPTER THREE: THE STATE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S OIL ENERGY SECURITY

3.1 Introduction

This section consists, in part, of analysis of the literature in an attempt to answer the first research question, which deals with the state of South Africa's oil energy security. In this attempt to answer the first research question, the political economy of oil in South Africa is discussed.

3.2 Inadequate oil production to meet domestic demand

With four hundred thousand barrels consumed per day, South Africa is among the highest consumers of crude oil on the African continent (Mpemnyama & Stoddard, 2016). Oil energy consumption is pegged to economic growth; therefore, it is no surprise that South Africa as one of the largest economies on the African continent, would be among the continent's highest consumers of crude oil, which will continue to grow until the global oil energy consumption shifts significantly to renewable energy, most likely before the mid twenty first century. In the prevailing form, oil energy security is central to economic growth as it is the source that enables human mobility in South Africa and worldwide. The South African state continues to embark on exploration activities along its long coastal line, hoping to discover more oil and gas.

PetroSA stated that its oil production at Oribi and Oryx oil fields is small and in perpetual decline (PetroSA, 2017). South Africa cannot rely on its domestic oil production from these oil fields, as well as its synthetic production, in which the country converts coal and gas to liquid petroleum products, because production from these sources combined is too small to service the country's oil energy needs. The coal and gas to liquid petroleum production constitutes about eighty six percent of total domestic oil production, while the total domestic oil production only constitute ten percent of the country's total oil consumption, hence dependence on foreign oil (eia, 2017). To improve its oil energy security, South Africa's answer is to import crude oil from several countries on the African continent and in the Middle East. The need for South Africa and many other oil importing states around the world, therefore, become s strategic objective, which can be pursued partly through strategically framed foreign policy. United States and China, among others, do have oil as a strategic objective pursued through foreign policy to meet high domestic oil energy security. Dr Naledi Pando's assertion that South Africa's foreign policy priorities are Africa, multilateralism, peace and security, among others, can be understood to be strategic policy areas that can enable the kind of geopolitical relations that would allow diplomatic engagements that may mitigate access to oil imports to South Africa (Pando, Annual Performance Plan 2020-2021, 2021).

The commencement of the Zuma Presidency also marked the end of South Africa's special treatment by the world, which followed immediately after the 1994 elections under President Nelson Mandela. While different South African presidents in the democratic era had different foreign policy direction, Mbeki looked west and Zuma east, priorities and objectives have been the same or similar, which includes Africa, South-South cooperation, multilateralism as well as peace and security. During the Mbeki presidency, the South African economy was liberalized to allow South African business to invest in various sectors and markets on the African continent, and elsewhere in the world. This includes the oil sector in Africa, especially in the upstream area that no domestic opportunities exist for South African companies to invest in. The Department of energy's assertion that South Africa is compelled by the AU's Agenda 2063 to invest in upstream oil production on the African continent to help develop the continent betrays the desperate state of South Africa's need to maintain its oil energy security. This reveals that the state in which South Africa's oil energy security is in requires new and better relations with oil exporting African states.

Former minister of energy, Jeff Radebe stated, as quoted in the data collected for this study, that South Africa was in talks with South Sudan about upstream investment in the oil sector in South Sudan that Radebe argued would be beneficial to both the people of South Africa and South Sudan affirms the view that South Africa's state of oil energy security compels Pretoria to build new and better relations with oil exporting states on the African continent (Seshibedi, 2019). In the case of South Sudan, it can be argued further that South Africa is even prepared to enter terrains with apparent political instability in order to improve the state it is in regarding its oil energy security. As oil energy security become a discernible strategic objective for South Africa to help pursue by means of statecraft, for the sake of its economy, through foreign policy and its instruments such as diplomacy, it can be inferred that the state of South Africa's oil energy security requires rational application of statecraft in geopolitical context to maintain its oil energy security. The theory of realism espouses state led approach for states to act in the international political system for their own self-interest (Smith, 2015).

3.3 Renewable energy solutions

Renewable energy may become South Africa's most compelling solution to reduce dependence on foreign oil in the future. Movement of people, goods and services consume sixty percent of all oil used globally and human mobility has been designed to consume more oil for better travel efficiency over many years (Vanderschuren, 2008). The global just energy transition advocated by environmental activists and scientists shine spotlight on the need by all countries of the world to reduce reliance on carbon energy, in order to reduce emissions and save the planet. But the uptake of renewable energy has potential to help countries such as South Africa reduce their perpetual reliance on foreign crude oil imports. In 2016, primary energy use in South Africa was dominated by coal, followed by oil, at sixty nine percent and fourteen percent respectively, while renewables accounted for eleven percent (Ratshomo & Nembahe, 2019). South Africa's potential to grow in the renewable energy consumption had already attracted significant investment to the tune of more than R200 billion, twenty percent of which is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2016 as the country is ranked 12th as the most attractive renewable energy investment destination in the world (Ratshomo & Nembahe, 2019).

3.4 Over reliance on foreign crude oil

Angola's capital Luanda is situated about eight degrees latitude South and 13 degrees longitude East. The country shares its northern border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), its eastern border with Zambia and Namibia in the South. The western end of the territory is its only shoreline on the Atlantic Ocean. Its capital Luanda is a coastal city in the country's Northern region. Pre-colonial Africa's polities enjoying the freedom of no political border demarcations of the Westphalian sovereignty kind that are in force today. Some polities were large, while others were small and more like family clans (Ball, 2017). The origins of the modern-day Angolan state dates back to 1576 from which it expanded to the current political borders from Luanda Bay where the Portuguese colonizers had set it up strategically as a trans-Atlantic slave trade centre (Ball, 2017). Its expansion to the interior from Luanda involved many of wars of conquest by the colonial government against African settlements, lasting over centuries, until about the WWI

(Ball, 2017). With a population of more than thirty million, one third of Angola's GDP comes from oil, which also accounts for more than ninety percent of the country's exports (www.worldbank.org, 2020).

Angola has maintained relative political stability since the end of the war in 2002, which had begun shortly after independence in 1975. In 2010, the country's constitution established a Presidential Parliamentary system, which discontinued the direct election of the president in favour of the president being elected as head of the winning political party (www.worldbank.org, 2020). Angola advocates for peace and security both domestically and in regional or geopolitical context. Its effort to advocate peace and security found expression in Angola's facilitation of peace when tension was reaching boiling point in the Great Lakes region between Rwanda and Uganda. While Angola made great strides since the end of the war on the political and economic fronts, it still surfers development challenges that include deducing its dependence on oil and developing more inclusive policies to improve material conditions of majority of its population who live in poverty (www.worldbank.org, 2020).

The map of Angola:

Source: Google.com

3.4.1 Angola's political structure, relationship with the ANC and democratic South Africa

The republic of Angola is a multiparty democracy with a governance structure called Executive presidency, consisting of the President (head of state), parliament, government, and courts. The governing political party is People's movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the main opposition is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which were also the parties in the protracted civil war (https//www.un.int, 2020). The capital city and seat of government is Luanda. Angola's tiers of government are National, provincial, and local government. The latter is divided into 163 municipalities, while the country has 18 provinces, namely: Bengo, Benguela, Bie, Cabinda, Cuando Cubango, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, Cunene, Huambo, Huila, Luanda, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje, Moxico, Uige and Zaire (https//www.un.int, 2020).

The ANC notes that when MK, its armed wing, grappled with ways to return to South Africa to fight in the 1960s, its first decade in exile, Angola along with Namibia Rhodesia and Mozambique were all sympathetic to the apartheid regime in South Africa at the time (ANC, 2021). Angola was to play a pivotal role in South Africa's liberation as host to MK and the ANC. In exile, the ANC set up initially set up its political headquarters in Tanzania, which later moved to Zambia. But its MK military camps were set up in the Republic of Angola (Zantsi, 2019). This is the most salient relationship between a South African political organization and Angola. The ANC in exile did not exist without challenges. One of the most significant challenges faced by the ANC in exile was the mutiny in the MK in 1983/4 after its soldiers were called upon to assist the Angolan government to fight off the apartheid regime and the USA (Zantsi, 2019). The MK soldiers viewed their engagement with the energy outside South Africa as a deviation from MK's mission to return to South Africa and take on the apartheid regime in an open conventional military engagement. The mutiny itself threatened to decimate the ANC in Angola as it killed trust and morale among the soldiers and the political principals (Zantsi, 2019). The brutality of the ANC security on its members was also challenged in the context of the mutiny in Angola in which mutineers were arrested and kept in Angolan government prisons and others that were controlled by MK's brutal security branch known to use starvation as one among other instruments of torture (Zantsi, 2019). MK in Angola did engage UNITA at the request of FAPLA, the military wing of MPLA, and this gave the MK an opportunity to avenge the ambushes on its soldiers that had been carried out by UNITA on behalf of the apartheid regime. This FAPLA/MK cooperation is salient in the building of the pre 1994 political relations between the ANC and Angola, in the form of MPLA.

The history of diplomatic relations between South Africa dates to January of 1992 when the two countries signed an agreement to have representation in each other's capitals. Soon after President Nelson Mandela's inauguration on May 10, 1994, the relations between South Africa and Angola were upgraded to Embassy level on May 27, 1994 (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018). In 2000 a Joint Commission of Cooperation (JCC) was established to manage the formalize relations between the two countries. In 2017, the JCC between South Africa and Angola was then elevated to Bi-National Commission (BNC) during a state visit to Pretoria (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018). South Africa's Ambassador to Angola holds the coveted diplomatic title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary according to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, which is duly reciprocated as the Angolan Ambassador to South Africa also holds the prestigious diplomatic title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018). The Department of Trade Industry and Competition funds trips of businesspeople from South Africa to Angola frequently, with the hope to provide these South African businesses with exposure and investment opportunities (Dtic, 2019).

3.5. South Africa and Nigeria as strategic partners in Africa

The importance of establishing formal diplomatic relations between South Africa and Nigeria is betrayed by the timing of the two countries' establishment of formal diplomatic relations. According to DIRCO (2018), formal diplomatic relations between South Africa and Nigeria were established on February 12, 1994. This would have been through signing a treaty that establishes the relations formally, and spelling out the rules of engagement and legalities of the agreement. When the formal diplomatic relations were established between South Africa and Nigeria, black South Africans were waiting to go to the first general election of April 27, of the same year.

South Africa and Nigeria have High Commissioners as diplomatic representatives in each other's capital, whose positions both have the added prestigious diplomatic title of High Commissioner Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018). Diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa are managed through the Bi-National Commission (BNC), established in 1999 and chaired jointly by the deputy president of South Africa and the vice president of Nigeria. Through the BNC, a number of agreements between Nigeria and South Africa became possible, especially in the economic sphere. Bilateral trade agreements, encouragement to investment in each other's markets and agreements on avoidance of double taxation are the achievement of the BNC. DIRCO (2015) states on its website that South Africa considers Nigeria to be its strategic partner in the multiple contexts of bilateral relations, West African region and the African continent. The departtment proceeds to say that South Africa and Nigeria also share the vision to reform multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, IMF and the World Bank. Efforts are made to encourage trade and investment between South Africa and Nigeria, facilitated through agreements and business delegations visiting each other to learn more about each other's markets (Dtic, 2019).

3.5.1 Balance of trade and investment between South Africa and Angola

Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr Naledi Pando, told members of Parliament, in a parliamentary questions and answer session that South Africa did not signed any trade deals with Angola, however, she clarified, that Pretoria signed a number of trade facilitation agreements with Angola, which include Air Service Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Cooperation and Memorandum of Understanding on Industry Cooperation (DIRCO, 2015). The questions were asked by Economic Freedom Fighters leader Julius Malema. To the second question that sought to know the value of trade between South Africa and Angola trade, Minister Pando told Parliament that for the type of agreements that Angola and South Africa signed there was no value attached, as they were mere legal instruments designed to enable real trade that they precede (DIRCO, 2015).

Trade between South Africa and Angola is overwhelmingly dominated by crude oil as the single largest item of import from Angola to South Africa. However, the two countries endeavour to widen the scope through bilateral diplomatic means in which mutual business activities or access to each other's domestic markets is encouraged. Trade balance between South Africa and Angola is best illustrated in the graph below:

Source: (DIRCO, 2015)

In 2013 the value of total imports from Angola to South Africa was just under R23 billion, of which nearly R19 billion was the import of crude oil, while exports from South Africa to Angola were valued at just under R10 billion, mainly comprising of prepared food, machinery, chemicals, vehicles, vessels and vegetables (DIRCO, 2015). Despite being the second largest economy within SADC and among the highest growing economies in Sab-Saharan Africa since the end of the war in 2002, Angola was only expected to lose the "Least Developed Country" (LDC) status at the beginning of 2021 as projected (UNCTAD, 2019). Angola only has fourteen Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT), which is deemed to be too low for a country with the LDC status, however, South Africa and Angola signed a BIT in 2005 already (UNCTAD, 2019). Between 2004 and 2018, Angola hardly attracted any Foreign Direct Investment, despite high and sustained economic growth in the same period (UNCTAD, 2019). In terms of regional trade, although Angola signed the SADC Trade Protocol in 2003, Angola shows reluctance to join the

Free Trade Agreement (FTA), in a region in which its economy is the second largest, after South Africa (Louise, 2013).

3.6 Security of foreign crude oil imports

Security of oil supply is a complex matter, with economic and political sides to it. Nigeria, for example, is one of only a few oil exporters who moved away from non-discretionary tendering system for oil contracts. In 2014, Nigeria awarded 28 contracts to only local oil traders, who go on to make sell or partner with global oil houses who could not get direct contract (Farge & Cooks, 2014). This method of issuing contracts should be cause for apprehension to oil importers such as South Africa, whose PetroSA and private firms may have to compete for these secondary contracts held by local oil traders at a premium against global players. This may affect the security of oil supply adversely. Angola on the other hand the process is state led, which allows political powerplay between South Africa and Angola. The security of oil supply is context specific and these supplies from Nigeria and Angola have a degree of uncertainty for different reasons. Whether it is Nigeria's awarding of oil contracts to local private oil traders to force global oil houses to partner with these contract holders or state led Angolan contract awarding through state owned oil companies, political stability is an important context in which guaranteed and sustained oil supply contract politics playout.

3.6.1 Trade and investment between South Africa and Nigeria and oil dominance

The Guardian reported that the Nigerian Consulate in Johannesburg issued ten thousand three hundred and forty-one passports in a space of fifteen months, despite issues such as xenophobia in South Africa against Nigerian nationals and other foreign nationals living in South Africa

(Adekoya, 2021). In 2020, trade between South Africa reached $2.9 billion, not surprising since Nigeria accounts for sixty four percent of South Africa’s trade with the West African region, and Nigeria is in the top three of crude oil suppliers to South Africa (Adekoya, 2021). According to The Guardian, the Nigerian Consulate in Johannesburg reported that in 2020, South Africa imported goods from Nigeria, overwhelmingly dominated by crude oil, to the value of R35 billion or over $2.4 billion, while Nigeria imported goods valued at R6 billion or $425 million from South Africa (Adekoya, 2021).

But it is not only smooth sailing in terms of trade relations between South Africa and Nigeria. While the formal diplomatic relations between the two African giant economies commenced in 1994, coinciding with South Africa’s watershed moment and entry into democracy, a BNC was only established in 1999 and this BNC’s first meeting only took place in 2012, which is attributed to lack of political will on both side (Fundira, South Africa's trade with NIgeria: bilateral trade analysis, 2017). As articulated in the literature review in the previous chapter, the BNC was established to encourage trade and investment between Nigeria and South Africa. By 2016, the BNA had met eight times and thirty-four agreements as well as memorandums of understanding were signed between South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa has maintained a trade deficit with Nigeria and many years. In 2016 South Africa imported $2 billion worth of goods from Nigeria, ninety nine percent of which was crude oil, while South Africa exported diversified good basket of goods to Nigeria to the value of $438 million in the same period (Fundira, South Africa's trade with NIgeria: bilateral trade analysis, 2017). Because of oil, Nigeria is South Africa’s most important source of import on the African continent.

Nigerian cultural history predates the modern state by many centuries. The country's Islamic, Christian and colonial history are defining features of its history; however, the consolidated modern polity came together in 1914 when different British protectorates within the territory known as Nigeria today amalgamated (Falola & Heaton, 2008). From 1950, it was becoming clearer that Nigeria was getting closer to its independence. In 1954, the Lyttleton Constitution established the Federal System of governance in Nigeria, creating the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Two years later, in 1956, oil was discovered in the Niger Delta region of the new Federal Nigeria, which constituted both a curse and a source of income for Nigeria. Self-governing regional governments were established in the East and West in 1957 in the buildup to independence three years later (Falola & Heaton, 2008). In the immediate post-independence, Nigeria entered a discernibly tumultuous political period when the first president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was removed via military coup in January of 1966, after just three years in in office. And another military coup in July of the same year, and the Biafra region in the East declaring independence from Nigeria in 1967, effectively seceding from Nigeria and becoming a sovereign state (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Nigerian literature richly captures the Biafran struggle well.

Nigeria has the largest economy and population in Africa. The densely populated West African state is located on the Gulf of Guinea, bordering Benin on its West, Niger in the North, Chad and Cameroon on the North-East and East respect, with a coastline in the South along the Atlantic Ocean (Commonwealth, 2018). The most common fact about Nigeria is that it has the largest population in Africa, which was one hundred and ninety-six million people in 2018 and growing fast (Commonwealth, 2018). In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from colonial master, Britain and made its numerous attempts to wards development as an independent sovereign state since then, mostly unsuccessful, on the economic development front, but relatively successful on the political front, despite the coups articulated above. Every country works towards achieving its goals through political engagements within the polity itself and in the international relations context.

Nigeria's geopolitical credentials, therefore, include helping with the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa and liberate the oppressed majority of the country's black citizens. This Nigerian geopolitical position found expression ensuring that it had no formal pre-1994 diplomatic relationship with South Africa. The absence of formal diplomatic relation with the apartheid regime, while the post-apartheid South African state enjoys formal diplomatic relationship with Nigeria, albeit, not without problems, affirms Nigeria's degree of political power on the African Continent and the wider geopolitical context (Ebegbulem, 2013).

The map of Nigeria:

Source: EnchantedLearning.com

3.7 How the state of South Africa's energy security manifests in its leadership and foreign policy in the SADC region

As the second largest and the most advanced economy on the African Continent, it is not hard to expect that South Africa with the largest economy in the SADC region, in which most members depend on the South African economy, the country would be considered a natural leader. But the apartheid legacy, which hinder South Africa's assertiveness in the region's body that was originally formed to build regional geopolitical cooperation to mitigate the threat posed by belligerent apartheid South Africa. Democratic South Africa still finds itself over reliant on soft power, when managing regional affairs through its foreign policy. The World Bank categorizes South Africa as an upper middle-income country, along with only three other African countries, Botswana, Gabon and Mauritius, because South Africa accounts for twenty four percent of the African continent's GDP (Enaifoghe, 2019).

South Africa's foreign policy interests are both regional and global, which means that at times, the country has to make policy decisions that may not favour or be congruent with those of SADC as a region or its individual members (Enaifoghe, 2019). It is, however, accepted in the SADC region that South Africa is the gateway to FDI for developing countries, including SADC member states (Enaifoghe, 2019). While South Africa leads in the SADC region on the economic front, largely due to its natural position as the most diversified and largest economy in the region, the politics of the region are full of challenges and as such, literature shows that South African foreign policy focuses more on regional integration and cooperation than it does bilaterally. Quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe and rebuffing of human rights violations in Swaziland in recent times attest to this analysis. Outside the SADC region, South Africa does find its voice and stands for human rights issues. South Africa's policy position to Morocco and Israel is a good example of what Pretoria's policy towards individual states in the geopolitical context can be, in the context of standing against human rights violations. This also constitutes foreign policy inconsistencies for which scholars have shown their repudiation, through literature, of South Africa differing policy positions over the same human rights issues happening in different countries and regions.

The SADC tribunal perhaps represents the complexity of the political dimension of the region. SADC's tribunal made findings against Zimbabwe in the past, but instead of South Africa and other member states ensuring that the findings of the tribunal were implemented or enforced, the issues caused the demise of the tribunal in its original form (Phooko, 2018). The SADC tribunal was established in terms of the SADC treaty in 2005, but it was disbanded after five years while most of its decisions were never implemented, over human rights issues in Zimbabwe, a matter over which South Africa maintains a policy of quiet diplomacy (Phooko, 2018). When the SADC tribunal was reconstituted in 2014, its mandate was now limited to matters of dispute between member states, and no longer carried mandate to deal with matters it had previously ruled on which had domestic implications for member states. Zimbabwean courts also rejected matters that had been adjudicated upon by the SADC tribunal and later referred to local courts in Zimbabwe for enforcement, yet South African courts accepted and upheld the decisions of the SADC tribunal in its domestic context (Phooko, 2018). The SADC treaty and the SADC Protocol that establish the SADC tribunal are silent of whether member states are compelled to domesticate the provisions of international law in their domestic contexts. South Africa's record as a human rights champion seems to be discredited by its relationship with the SADC community. Pretoria has no appetite to act sternly against persistent negative human rights records by some SADC member states. The inconsistent application of the provisions of the SADC community laws between Zimbabwe and South Africa is an expression of political problems playing out within SADC, and that South Africa, hindered by its apartheid legacy of tormenting the region, is unable to act assertively in the region or even freely act like the champion of human rights it once was, under the leadership of president Nelson Mandela, who once censured Nigerian dictator, Sani Abacha over the execution of writer and human rights activist Ken Saro-wiwa.

Phooko (2018) argues that Zimbabwe's refusal to act on the SADC law on the basis of domestic provision of its public policy, and the constitution was misplaced, because it renders international law useless to a point that if countries were allowed to only enforce international law when they felt like it, multilateralism would be poinless and countries would stop signing treaties with one another. South Africa on the other hand took on SADC cases because it as a dualistic state, even though it is required by the constitution that international laws should be enacted into domestic laws, South Africa's jurisprudance boasted precedence dealing with such cases and domestic courts accepted registration of such international cases and adjudicated on them (Phooko, 2018).

Another thorny regional issue that defines South Africa's relationship with SADC is migration. SADC does not have a migration policy that is agreed to and practiced in the region. South Africa's policy on migration, however, has to play a regional role, while the country has domestic pressure to manage its borders much more sternly that it is ciurrently the case, according to many domestic commentators. In the absence of regional policy on migration, it is beliebved that South Africa's policy on migration is largely a response to labour migration in the region, of which South Africa has the overwhelmingly large share (Fioramonti & Lorenzo, 2014). South Africa is part of the reason why migration is a complex issue in the SADC region. The fact that the region has no applicable migration protocol means that SADC member states are not implementing the AU policy on migration. With regards to migration, it seems that South

Africa does not espouse region wide policy, whjich can be viewed as part of political complexity in the SADC region, affecting South Africa's relationship with the region. SACU members, for example, have secured bilateral migration treaties with South Africa, which allows them free movement, while non SACU SADC members are not party to such bilateral migration agreements, yet the large South African economy still attract many of SADC member states citizems who are not SACU members (Fioramonti & Lorenzo, 2014).

Labour migration system predates SADC itself as an organization. It can be traced back to the discovery of gold in Johannesburg in the 1880s until today that the system attracted workers from specific countries in the region to work in the mines in South Africa (Fioramonti & Lorenzo, 2014). Perhaps South Africa continues to use the same labour migration system to inform its migration policies to manage its affairs in the democratic era. The SADC treaty is not completely silent on migration. While it seems to largely leave it to its member states to manage movement of the region's citizens, it encourages progressive elimination of obstacles hindering free movement for the citizens of the region between its member states (Fioramonti & Lorenzo, 2014). Trade in the SADC region continues to be stifled by hindrances to movement of goods between SADC member states, despite the SADC Free Trade area agreement that should be in force region wide (Moyo & Khobai, 2018). Stunted trade openness in the SADC region could be the result of political relationships between member states, and South Africa's better movement of goods within SADC is with members of SACU.

The map of SADC:



Source: http://www.sadcreview.com/country_profiles/frprofiles.htm

3.7.1 Political and economic relations between South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique

South Africa's liberation movements, including the governing ANC, operated in these countries, even though Zimbabwe and Mozambique were under pressure from apartheid South Africa to relinquish their roles as safe havens for the ANC *et al*. However, relationship between former liberation movements, who became governing political parties in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia exists. Labour migration flowing from Mozamique to South African mines dates back to the 1920s, and South Africa proudly states on its DIRCO website that repatriation of deferred salaries to Mozambican mine workers, which was important to the Mozambican economy, was done due to good relations and cooperation between Mozambique and South Africa (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018).

Important to this study, are the bilateral diplomatic relations maintained by these countries in the democratic era of South Africa's government. Diplomatic representation between South Africa and Mozambique is through the South African High Commission in Mozambique and the Mozambican High Commission in South Africa, for which the offices are occupied by representative diplomats titled: High Commissioner Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Full diplomatic relations between Mozambique and South Africa started in 1993, which South Africa says are underpinned by strong historical and political relations (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018). Much of the latter is about the liberation movement era when South African liberation fighters were able to operate in Mozambique. In 1994 South Africa and Mozambique established the Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation (JPCC), which was upgraded only in 2011 to Bi-National Commission (BNC). DIRCO (2018) says that trade between South Africa and Mozambique is on the upward trend, with R21 billion in 2011 and R43 billion reached by 2014. South Africa imports minerals, including energy in the form of gas, from Mozambique.

South African liberation politics owe much to Zambia, where the ANC's Head Quarters were based when the party was a banned political formation. Diplomatic relations between Zambia and South Africa are discernibly of lightweight nature, in comparison with Nigeria's relationship with South Africa. Full diplomatic relations between South Africa were finalized on May 10, 1994. The same day that Nelson Mandela took oath of office as the first democratically elected

President of South Africa. South Africa-Zambia BNC is only envisaged to hold its innaugural meeting sometime in 2022, according to the Presidency media release during the visit to South Africa by president Hichilema of Zambia (Seale, 2022). The substance of the media release issued by the Presidency during president Hichilema's visit was cooperation in multilateral organizations, especially in the SADC activities. This shows that Zambia may not be of similar strategic economic importance to Pretoria, however, it would be South Africa's better ally on the political front, to advance Pretoria's geopolitical agenda in the region. Zimbabwe's proximity to South Africa is not different to that of Mozambique, however, South Africa and Zimbabwe share deeper cultural history, and are both English speaking nations. The common colonial and cultural history includes Mzilikazi's exoders breaking away from the Zulu Kingdom under King Shaka ka Senzangakhona, traversing a vast expanse in South Africa's modern KZN, Gauteng, Limpopo and North West provinces, and settling in the town of Bulawayo, in Zimbabwe, where Ndebele People still reside today. When Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, after defeting Ian Smith, the new Zimbabwean government cut formal diplomatic relations with South Africa (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018).

It is noteworthy to state that informal relations prevailed between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the years between 1980 and 1994, at which point, Zimbabwe and democratic South Africa re-established formal bilateral diplomatic relationas with each other (DIRCO, History of Relations, 2018). Diplomatic representation between South Africa is managed through the South African Embassy in Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean Embassy in South Africa with the occupants of the respective diplomatic offices holding the formal diplomatic titles of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (Daniel, 2021). South Africa had a bilateral trade agreement with Zimbabwe that dates back to the 1960s, which caused confusion because both countries are members of SADC and the SADC FTA protocol (Fundira, 2017). It became unclear as to which trade regime would be applicable when goods were processed at entry points as to whether the bilateral trade agreement or the SADC FTA should be applicable. But in 2018, the South African government, through the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition issued a notice that the bilateral trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe, which had been in force since 1964, was terminated with effect from November 2018. This was done in order to wllow the SADC FTA regime to be the only regime governing trade between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Trade between South Africa and Zimbabwe favours South Africa, however in comparison to oil exporters, the list of imports and exports between the two countries is more comprehensive. The value of goods exported from South Africa to Zimbabwe through the Beitbridge border post in 2020 was R53.6 billion (Crossborder, 2021). In the researcher's view, this is another indicator that South Africa espouses a foreign policy that embraces multilateralism when it comes to non oil exporting states. Evidence shows that on the other hand, Pretoria makes efforts to build and maintain bilateral diplomatic relations with strategic oil exporters such as Nigeria on the African continent.

3.7.2 Political and economic relations between South Africa and SACU member states

SACU is the oldest customs union in the world. The treaty dates back to its 19th century forerunner of customs agreements between the territories of South Africa in 1889, and formalized in 1910, making SACU the well-established customs union that it is today and holding its own in global matters of trade (Langton, 2008). Members of SACU are the countries around South Africa with very small populations, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and

South Africa. SACU is an attractive trade block in the region. Although SACU members are also SADC members, South Africa has a different relationship with members of SACU in which South Africa is clearly a recognized leader of this organization. USA has shown huge interest, in the early 2000s, in forming a Free Trade Area (FTA) with SACU for discernibly obvious reasons. SACU may account for about one percent (1%) of the Sab-Saharan population, however, it accounts for half of the Sab-Saharan African GDP, while SACU is also the second largest trader with the US, after Nigeria, which exports almost only crude oil to the United States (Langton, 2008). In total, SACU is the 33rd largest trade partner of the United States, which is significant in global trade with the world's largest economy (Langton, 2008). South African dominance of SACU finds expression in the fact that South Africa's population constitutes nearly ninety percent of SACU's combined population, as well as more than ninety percent of SACU's GDP is accounted for by South Africa (Langton, 2008).

South Africa and all SACU members share deep political and cultural history and the movement of goods and people in SACU is better than it is with the SADC members, as migration issues between South Africa and SADC member states have been articulated in the previous section. SACU is characterized by free movement of goods between its members, common external tariff and pooled tariff revenue collection which is shared by members and discernibly forms part of important budget revenue for the BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) component of the Customs Union (Langton, 2008). It is estimated that payments from SACU tariffs to members states accounted for around sixty nine percent (69%) of Swaziland's government revenue, fourty nine percent (49%) of Lesotho's government revenue, twenty five Percent (25%) of Namibia's government revenue, Twelve Percent (12%) of Botswana's government revenue and three percent (3%) of South Africa's government revenue in the past decade (Langton, 2008).

The political signifficance of SACU should be traced back to the beginning in 1910 when the Union of South Africa was founded in the wake of the Anglo-Boar war and SACU formalized as one of South Africa's three circles of regional political power and control (Alden & LePere, 2009). Alden and LePere (2009) argue that SACU is the platform in which South Africa has acted its malevolent hegemonic geopolitics during apartheid and it is in SACU that democratic South Africa seeks to act out its newly adopted role as a benign hegemon in the international political system, especially in Africa as a region. It is also argues that while the latest SACU agreement includes tariff sharing, this is linked to the South African currency, the Rand, and it is a strategic control mechanism for South Africa, because it prevents the BLNS states from persuing or developing a different fiscal policy or embark on major changes to the prevaling macroeconomic policy environmnet without South Africa's approval (Alden & LePere, 2009). Another notable aspect of SACU inserted in 2002 along with tarrif sharing or pooling, is the requirement for SACU members to harmonise their industrial development policies (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2010). When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the discussion about the incorporation of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland into the Union of South Africa was indulged, however, the political incorporation did not happen, then SACU was formalized to to enable the newly formed Union of South Africa to extend or rather retain economic power over Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2010). While South Africa is dominant in both SADC and SACU, it is not difficult to see that Pretoria, as the largest economy and the largest invester in the region, the source of its Pretoria's hegemonic role among its neighbours is economic.

South Africa's diplomatic relationship with SACU members reinforces the deep cultural, colonial and political ties extending deep into the history of the region. Articulation of SACU's history in this section betrays the fact that South Africa has dominated the region and SACU from the very beginning, and maintains the dominance in the democratic era as a much more benign regional leader. Political histry between South Africa and SACU and SADC member states show that while the Southern African people have maintained cultural links over many years, the years during apartheid are marked by lack of formal diplomatic relations between South Africa and her neighbours, as the country was a problem in the region during those years. The apartheid years still complicate democratice South Africa's desire to lead SADC, SACU and the AU assertively, without causing others to think that the old South Africa they rejected was now reemerging.

The map showing SACU member states:

Source: **Vector map and flags of the Southern African Customs Union SACU.**

3.7.3 South Africa’s social and cultural integration with SACU or BLNS states

South Africa’s cultural history with the BLNS members of SACU is arguably deeper than that of non-SACU SADC member states. With the exception of Namibia; Batswana, Basotho and Maswati are able to integrate into South African society in a manner that citizens of other countries cannot do. This is because Setswana, the language spoken in Botswana, is also an official language in South Africa, isiSwati, the language spoken in Swaziland is also an official language in South Africa, SeSotho, the language spoken in Lesotho is also an official language in South Africa. Like other countries in the SADC region and beyond, Botswana did not have formal diplomatic relations with South Africa during apartheid years, despite the intricately woven cultural and political histry between the two countries going back centuries. It was only in 1992 that diplomatic representation in Botswana and South Africa was established, and elevated to High Commisssion when South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth (DIRCO, 2021). South Africa does not have bilateral trade agreement with Botswana, since Botswana is a member of SACU, in which both countries enjoy the provisions of the SACU FTA (DIRCO, 2021). All SACU members enjoy free movement of goods between each other. South Africans and Botswana citizens do not require visa to visit each other’s countries upto sixty days.

Lesotho and South Africa established doplomatic relations as far back as 1987, but only upgraded relations to Ambassador level in 1992, and to High Commission when South Africa was readmitted to the Commonwealth in 1994, also South Africa’s starting point of democratic rule. South Africans and Basotho do not require a visa to cross the border into each other and stay for thirty days (DIRCO, 2021). Lesotho has grappled with political instability in recent years, and South Africa took the lead, within the SADC framework to mediate and help the

Mountain Kingdom stabilize politically. Representative offices were established between South Africa and Namibia as the latter became independent in 1990. When South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth in 1994, bilateral diplomatic relations between South Africa and Namibia were also elevated to High Commission level (DIRCO, 2021). South African citizens and Namibian citizens traveling on business or as tourists do not require visas in South Africa and in Namibia (DIRCO, 2021).

Swaziland is the only absolute Monarchy in Africa and also the only non-democratic state among SACU members and SADC member states. The country currently battles against protesters who are trying to force the country to become democratic. Swaziland has bad human rights record, yet South Africa's policy towards Swaziland has not been stern on the human rights score. It resembles the quiet diplomacy policy Pretoria has adopted towards Zimbabwe; a country also gripped with human rights violations. Videos released on YouTube show and report on the brutality meted on pro-democracy protesters by the Swazi police (DemocracyToday, 2021). South Africa's diplomatic relations date back to 1984, at which point relations were conducted or managed at trade representative level between South Africa and Swaziland (DIRCO, 2021). South Africans and the Maswati do not require visas to enter each other's countries for a period of thirty days.

3.7 Chapter conclusion

The inadequate oil production in South Africa, renewable energy solutions, over reliance on foreign crude oil, security of foreign crude oil and how the state of South Africa's oil energy security manifests in its political leadership in the SADC region were discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: OIL AS A DETERMINANT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY

4.1 Introduction

In a complex international political environment, states endeavour to fulfill their national interests, which proceed from domestic need for economic growth and security, inter alia (Botes, 2021). In this chapter the discussion of South Africa's political economy of oil will anchor on Pretoria's foreign policy activities on the African continent. The diplomatic relations, bilateral relations and evidence of cooperation or lack thereof, will be the subject of discussion in this chapter. This is to place apparent any evidence showing oil to be or not to be among determinants for South Africa's foreign policy. The battle of Bangui will also be discussed as an event relevant to the study to contextualize South Africa's willingness to act in self-interest on matters relating to oil energy security in geopolitics. Inexplicable as the battle of Bangui may be, in so far as Pretoria's rationality or irrationality is concerned, the realist approach by President Zuma's government is not lost on the author of this research report. For student applying liberalism as their academic tool of analysis, the battle of Bangui might focus much more on the human rights of those whose lives were lost, and their families who have not received plausible reasons for the battle in which their loved ones perished.

4.2 How oil influences the relationship between South Africa and oil exporters: Nigeria and Angola

It has to be conceded that what necessitate or heighten the need for qualitative content analysis to ascertain South Africa's consideration of oil or not considering oil in its foreign policy development is the fact that there is not a piece of literature or data of any form, found for this study, that explicitly confirm that oil is, or it is not a consideration or determinant when South Africa develops its foreign policy. In the case of the United States, a study by (Fikreyesus, 2012) endeavoured to answer whether oil influenced the US foreign policy in the 1960. The researcher had observed that while it was well documented that the United States was driven to act in the manner in which it did out of its commonly professed need to promote democracy around the world, evidence existed that contradicted the argument about promoting democracy (Fikreyesus, 2012).

The observation was that when it came to Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington seemed happy to allow dictatorships to prevail, especially those whose countries exported oil. It appeared that the US did not want to disturb the sensitive flow of oil exports, even in contexts where dictatorships maintained poor human rights conditions. Realist scholars will deem the US to have been acting in its self-interest, while others may have rebuked the superpower for acting hypocritically. In the context of that study, qualitative analysis pointed to a conclusion that yes, as a strategic energy security component, oil did influence the US foreign policy. But this outcome does not make a study such is this one irrelevant. Countries have different roles in the international political system, and the US makes it its point to ensure that other countries turn to democracy, South Africa may espouse democracy and indeed nurtures its young democracy and supports it elsewhere. But Pretoria's role is different to that of the USA. If oil was to influence South Africa's foreign policy, even though it would naturally emanate from the need to improve its oil energy security for domestic consumption and economic growth, it may be that South Africa has no parallel need to maintain a superpower status, which the US may well have such a need.

The absence of explicit affirmation or denial in this regard, in the case of South Africa, elevates the importance of thorough analysis, as a process by which to arrive at a reasonably likely answer to the second research question. This, therefore, means that the answer to the second research question is to be arrived at through qualitative content analysis. The study could have been convoluted to painstakingly look at South Africa's policy towards each of Africa's individual countries. However, that may not necessarily increase the validity of this study. The researcher argued that perhaps South Africa's relationship with just Angola and Nigeria may provide both the volume and content enough to qualitatively paint a realistic picture of South Africa's oil economy and its oil energy security. Confining this study to two significant and relevant case studies, the researcher's view, allows the study to live up to its academic level as it is undertaken to obtain a master's degree.

A number of factors exist in literature already embodied in this study that are congruent with the argument that affirms consideration of oil in the development of South Africa's foreign policy. It is revealed in (Seokolo, 2015) 's analysis that Pretoria does use foreign policy instruments such as diplomacy to form relationships with strategic partners in order to aid and meet South Africa's economic objectives. The same study which was reviewed under literature review demonstrates that these diplomatic relationships have been applied in instances where South Africa needed new strategic partnerships in the geopolitical sphere. The study revealed that in 2011, following US economic sanctions against Iran, which was South Africa's second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia, South Africa ramped up its reliance on Nigeria's oil, using diplomacy to make that increase possible (Seokolo, 2015).

Political relations between South Africa and Angola are reported to have been complex in South Africa's democratic era and extending through post war Angola. Cool in different times and improved in other times. This is also captured in the study by (Wabiri & Amusa, 2010), in which it is revealed that South Africa only gets a small percentage of its oil import volumes from Angola. This can be attributed to the often-cool relations between South Africa and Angola. Angola is geographically closest to South Africa than all the oil exporters whom South Africa imports oil from, and the two countries also have good historical liberation political relations at party level, through the governing political parties in both countries as Angola hosted the ANC military wing, MK before 1994. President Mbeki's time in office placed Africa on the geopolitical agenda and also took the lead in matters of African unity. It was in Mbeki's time that the OAU metamorphosed to AU, as Pretoria joined forces with Nigeria, among other African countries, to build continental institutions. It is noted that it was in context of African unity that in when the South African economy was liberalized, many South African MNCs poured their investments into different markets and industries across the African continent, according to (Sidiropoulos, 2008).

The sectors that South African companies invested in includes upstream involvement in the oil sectors of African oil exporting states. South African foreign policy desires Africa that is peaceful and growing economically. To aid the continent to this end, South Africa has taken part in most peacekeeping efforts on the African continent. The theory of realism holds that peace can only be achieved by states when they have military capacity to keep the enemy at bay. In security is, thus, associated with state weakness. Smith (2015) says that states act in self interest in the geopolitical context. It means that South Africa's espousal of unity, peace, and functional multilateralism on the African continent, should be understood to that Pretoria is using its foreign policy to advance her own interest, rather than pushing for peace out of altruism. Oil is not the only strategic factor for countries to ensure that they have adequate domestic security of supply, however oil is the sole focus for this study. Other studies should find other strategic factors, with similar importance to oil as gaps for more studies to expand the knowledge in matters of foreign policy influences.

African countries have, at least on paper, agreed to bring the ACFTA to fruition, which Dr Pando sees as a good vehicle by which South Africa can extend its reach into an expanded continental market with a coillective GDP of $3.2 trillion, according to (Pando, www.gov.za, 2019). It is discirnible in literature that Pretoria sees greater access to markets across the African continent as a matter that fulfills its need to meet its foreign policy objective, some of which are political and some are clearly economic. In the context of the state of South Africa's oil energy security, it is not hard to reach a conclution, or infer that for Pretoria, oil is a strategic resource with geopolitical signifficance. Partnership with larger economic players on the continent is seein by Pretoria as one, among the ways, in which warm relations can be levaraged for economic integration on the African continent. Landsberg (2014)'s concentric circles bring a theoretical model that demonstrates South Africa's foreign policy priority contexts in a more academic or abstract way. The circles affirm South Africa's strategy of prioritizing first SADC and the rest of the African continent. If oil is the nexus between South Africa's foreign policy and her energy security, prioritazing Africa ought to also mean that South Africa would want to ensure that her bilateral relation, as a diplomatic instrument of its foreign policy, would be applied in the quest to improve the domestic oil energy security. The nature of South Africa's dipolmatic relationship, as articulated in chapter three, with Nigeria and Angola somewhat betrays Pretoria's need to constantly improve relations with these nations, which are both eminent players of continental geopolitics. Both Angola and Nigeria's economies are oil led with an overwhelming need to diversify. Angola and Nigeria export most of their crude oil, only to re-import refined petroleum products. South Afriica on the other hand, imports crude oil from both Africa and the Middle East and refine the oil domestically for all its petroleum needs, including human mobility. Political instability over the years in both Angola and Nigeria may have made these polities unattractive and also complex for Pretoria to maintain good relations with the two chosen oil exporters, however, the reasons for South Africa to conetantly seek to build better relations with Angola and Nigeria, along with other African states are overwhelming and compelling enough for South Africa to keep trying.

Along with persistent attempt to build and maintain better relations with African oil exporters, South Africa continues with domestic oil and gas explorations, with the hope to discover larger deposits of oil within her jurisdictional land mass and offshore. Petroleum giant, Shell had to defend its plans to carryout seismic survey along South Africa's environmewntally sensitive Wild Coast at the behest of the South African government who are determined to continue with oil and gas ecplorations. It was reported in Fin24 that Shell was determined to continue with its plans to carryout the seisming survey along the Wild Coast, which it argued that would have minimal environmental impact on the marine life of the Wild Coast, contrary to the protest by groups that argue that the seismic survey that Shell plans to carryout will have adverse environmental impact on the Wild Coast marine life (Magubane, 2021).

In her time as minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane saw soft power as the most potent diplomatic instrument by which to persue South Africa’s foreign policy interests, according to (Landsberg, 2014). This would have included public diplomacy, among other means, to build the kind of geopolitical image that would allow South Africa to levarage on in order to reach speciffic targets such as ensuring economic benefits for Pretoria. South Africa’s continental political economy finds expression in the numbers of South African private investment in many sectors across the African continent, in many ways, challenging the traditional dominance of western investment on the continent (Alden & Soko, South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents, 2005). In answering the second research question, with all the collected evidence considered qualitatively, the researcher concludes that oil is a cardinal component of South African energy security. Pretoria’s efforts in the political economy of oil, including continuous search for oil deposits at home along the wile coast, provide sufficient grounds for this study to infer that oil is a rational consideration to include in the foreign policy as an economic objective, and oil probably do get due consideration.

4.3 South Africa’s Angola policy and oil trade

Post war Angolan economy has grown consistently faster than most countries on the African continent, mostly due to oil. It is the second largest economy after South Africa, among the SADC member states (Louise, 2013). As already articulated earlier, while South Africa and Angola have complex political relations, which have cooled and warmed in different times, the diplomatic relationship exists between the two countries, which is deemed important and strategic. In 2015, it was reported that Angola had reached the production output of 1.8 million barrels of crude oil each day, and only exported four percent of it to African States, the larger part of its oil went outside the African continent (Louise, 2013). While it may sound insignificant that African states shared only four percent of Angola's total oil export, Angola's bilateral diplomatic relations with South Africa are in place and maintained. Trade relations between South Africa and just about every African country is leaning in favour of South Africa. For oil exporting states, it is clear that Pretoria works hard to maintain cordial relations using foreign policy instruments such as bilateral diplomatic relations. However, these countries export very little else to South Africa, other than crude oil. In 2016, the value of oil imported from Angola by South Africa was $1.6 billion, while the next item imported from Angola at the same time was under $11 million. This demonstrates strategic importance of oil to South Africa from these exporters, for which, Pretoria is arguably prepared to maintain good relations to maintain oil energy security.

4.4 South Africa's Nigeria policy, oil and economic cooperation

Political relationship between South Africa and Nigeria too has been complex over the years. But the two countries also enjoy better formal diplomatic relations compared to many other countries. Nigeria's crude oil is the largest quantity of oil that South Africa imports from an African state. South Africa's largest of all oil imports is Saudi Arabia. South Africa and Nigeria are the two largest economies on the African continent, and the two countries have, over the years, worked together on firming up the multilateral efforts on the African continent. It is captured in this study that President Mbeki and President Obasanjo's times in office represented the best political and diplomatic relations between the two economies. Cooperation between

South Africa and Nigeria on African geopolitical issues is well recorded. The two countries have contributed to peace keeping missions in different African countries. On the diplomatic front, the two countries have signed many formal bilateral diplomatic agreements, the details of which are articulated in later sections.Trade between Nigeria and South Africa also favours South Africa, in that oil is the single conspicuous item exported from Nigeria to South Africa. In 2019 Nigeria exported $3.13 billion worth of crude oil to South Africa, while the next highest item on the same export list was a mere $5.3 million in comparison to oil (Tradingeconomics.com, 2018).

4.5 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the discussions focused on how oil influences relationships between South Africa and oil exporters, Nigeria and Angola. Focus was also placed on South Africa's Angola policy and oil trade as well as South Africa's Nigeria policy and economic cooperation between the two countries. Oil trade between South Africa and Nigeria being a resource of strategic importance to South Africa in the context of its geopolitical relationships.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This last chapter reinforces the findings made in the preceding chapters through a consolidated summary, answering the three research questions which have necessitated the pursuit of this study, in the first place. The findings are a product of data analysis that took place in the earlier chapters to provide qualitative answers to research questions. The researcher recognized the great energy paradigm shift currently in motion from carbon energy sources to renewable energy, and took the liberty to make a statement under recommendations to, hopefully, lead other researchers in the policy and energy space to pay vivid attention to this remarkable shift and begin with analysis to guide geopolitical actions in the context of future just energy consumption.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The state of South Africa's oil energy security

Having no adequate domestic oil supply to keep up with, and to help grow the South African economy, places the country in a state of perpetual need to gain access to foreign petroleum resources to meet ever growing domestic oil energy security needs. Literature shows that powerful countries in a similar need for oil energy security act aggressively in the international political system to coerce reluctant countries to allow them access to oil resources. South Africa's espousal of foreign policies that include cooperation, peace and security, has to resort to soft power and relationship building to gain access to foreign oil, through its foreign policy instruments. Diplomacy is one such instrument used by South Africa to build bilateral relations with oil exporting states, while indicating that for non-oil exporting states, multilateral cooperation is preferred by Pretoria. South Africa's import account from oil exporting African states consists almost exclusively of oil. Trade imbalance between Pretoria and these oil exporting states, particularly Angola and Nigeria, is glaringly obvious and ought to be the source of apprehension for South Africa, as it may indicate to those states that it is not reciprocally easy for them to enter the South African market, as much as South Africa is able to source oil from them.

Oil as a determinant for South Africa's foreign policy

It is hard not to concede that the importance of oil energy security as a catalyst for economic growth does not become a foreign policy objective for a country like South Africa with the second largest economy on the continent and no oil to satisfy domestic consumption. Although, in the case of this study, no explicit government policy position mentions oil by name as a foreign policy objective, literature exists that can help fortify a qualitative argument that yes, oil is a consideration in the development of the South African foreign policy. Seokolo (2015) stated in his study that oil was the main driver behind South Africa's relationship with Nigeria. Evidence analysed for this study shows that while many South African companies operate in the Nigerian market, trade between South Africa consists mainly of oil imported to South Africa, from Nigeria. Trade imbalance between the two largest economies in favour of South Africa is discirnible. This study finds that with all the evidence it perused, it is trational to conclude that oil is a consideration at different levels of foreign policy development by South Africa.

Diplomacy is the tool of choice for South Africa when it comes to building relationships that result in mitigation of oil energy security in South Africa.

Other economic determinants, besides oil, of South Africa's foreign policy

South Africa espouses multilateralism in regional geopolitics. It participates in all known regional vehicles that enable cooperation, to position itself for strategic economic benefits from oil and other strategic economic objectives. South Africa and Zimbabwe cancelled their bilateral trade relationship in favour of promoting the SADC FTA, of which the two countries are members and argue that the same benefits that could be derived from the bilateral relationship can still be realized through the provisions of the regional body's FTA.South Africa's trade relationship with smaller neighbours such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia is managed through SACU, rather than bilateral relations.

However, for oil exporting nations, such as Nigeria and Angola, among others on the African continent, literature shows Pretoria's persistent effort to build bilateral relations, along with partnership and cooperation at African Union level. This indicates the importance of bilateral diplomatic relationships with oil exporting states, which South Africa has no similar need to build with African states that do not export oil. It is, therefore, arguable that oil does tilt South Africa's foreign policy in favour of oil exporting states on the African continent. President Ramaphosa's Visit to Nigeria, which was analyzed earlier in this dissertation, and his words to the media about the need to strengthen bilateral relations with Nigeria provide some evidence to this conclusion. More studies in this area will be necessary. This can only be arrived at through qualitative data analysis; however, further studies can strengthen this study's argument that South Africa's foreign policy is tilted in favour of oil exporting states or challenge it.

5.3 Conclusion

This study aimed to analyze the nexus between petroleum energy security and South Africa's foreign policy. The objectives that the study set out to achieve were to ascertain the state of South Africa's oil energy security, investigate the ways in which oil may be determinant for South African foreign policy and to analyze the extent to which oil energy security shapes South Africa's foreign policy among other policy determinants.

These aims and objectives were achieved in this study. The Study found that the state of South Africa's petroleum energy security compels the country to find oil from foreign exporters, which makes it a foreign policy consideration, as this is pursued at inter-state level. It is demonstrable that while South Africa's foreign policy espouses group cooperation or multilateralism, bilateral relations with oil exporting states remain preferable for South Africa.

Relationship between South Africa and selected oil exporting states (Angola and Nigeria) as well as South Africa's relationship with its non-oil exporting neighbours within both SADC and SACU was a subject of analysis to in order to answer the last research question that sought to know if oil caused South Africa's foreign policy to tilt in favour of oil exporting states as a determinant for foreign policy among other economic determinants shaping foreign policy on the African continent.

It was clear in literature that South African foreign policy, as stated above, espouses multilateralism in the international political system. This point finds expression particularly in the SADC and SACU region where it becomes clearer that it is through SACU and SADC that South Africa prefers to lead its neighbour, without getting too involved at bilateral level. Quiet diplomacy policy towards Zimbabwe over the past two decades and rebuffing pro-democracy Swazi protests and only opting to act within the SADC framework, are indicators of South Africa's foreign policy inconsistency, or Pretoria's foreign policy towards non-oil exporting states is not applied the same as one towards oil exporting states.

While the relationship between South Africa and Angola and that of South Africa and Nigeria has had ups and downs, evidence show that South Africa makes discernible bilateral efforts to maintain diplomatic relations with oil exporting states (Angola and Nigeria) directly, and not only through multilateral formations, such as the EU, SADC or ECOWAS in West Africa.

The study took it upon itself to bring the renewable energy dimension under data analysis, because it is clear that the energy paradigm shift to renewable energy is well in motion and countries like South Africa still spending resources on the search for oil deposit at home may find that by the time they are ready to drill their own oil out of the ground, oil would have lost its dominance as a preferred energy source for human mobility globally. Renewable energy solutions are currently taken up slowly, in South Africa with less than one hundred cars sold in the South African market in 2021, while other automotive companies have started investing in the production of more electric cars for both South African and export markets. Oil is and has been the nexus between petroleum energy security and South Africa's foreign policy. Pretoria's pursuit of oil has not been as aggressive as that of the US and more recently China. This study's narrow scope left room for more studies to unravel the issue of oil as the nexus between South Africa's domestic petroleum energy security and its foreign policy.

It became apparent in the process of this study that while oil is, and has been a strategic resource for longer than one century, global energy consumption shift to renewable energy sources is happening fast and will soon plausibly replace carbon energy resources, oil included. The full embrace of renewable energy in the future may free South African foreign policy to other geopolitical and political economy matters in the international political environment. This study recommends that more studies be undertaken on the changing energy paradigm. The South African government should perhaps look to such research for it to develop appropriate policy frameworks to allow smooth transition to renewable energy resources, without falling behind and hurting the economy.

5.4 Recommendations

The study recommends that in a changing energy environment, South Africa can mitigate the state of its oil energy security by taking the lead in transitioning to renewable energy and encourage South Africans to consider electric cars. That would reduce the prevailing dependence on foreign oil which currently determines the state of South Africa's oil energy security. While oil is the leading source of energy, the study recommends that the South African government continues to build better relations with countries that export oil to South Africa, to maintain and grow the South African economy.

The use of foreign policy instruments such as diplomacy to create dependable bilateral relations with oil exporting states is also recommended to the South African policy makers.

The researcher would also like to unravel the growing importance of renewable energy, which has been framed as just energy source, as the future of global energy. The paradigm energy shift, away from carbon energy sources such as oil and coal, to solar, wind and other green energy sources is in motion and this study briefly discusses green energy and current South African approach towards it, briefly as a statement of recommendation to South African policy makers.

Environmental activists have pushed for governments around the world to consider policy shift in favour of just energy consumption, in order to mitigate the effects of global warming, over the past 20 years. Many conferences have been convened in the same period and partial concessions have also been made by many states. For environmentalists, the idea is to move global energy consumption from carbon energy sources to renewable energy. Earlier in this dissertation, it was noted that Germany and India committed to phase out cars that uses internal combustion engines by 2030. The EU commission proposed a total ban for the sale of fossil-fuel cars from 2035 across the single market (Reuters, 2021). The implications of this EU proposal means that the single market, consisting of 27 sovereign countries will no longer import cars that are not powered by electricity. Large global car manufactures such as Mercedes Benz manufacture cars in South Africa for global markets, including some EU member states, according to a radio conversation on SAfm, broadcast in February 2022.

The EU's proposal to do away with petrol- and diesel-powered cars by 2035 aims to achieve one hundred percent cut in CO_2 emissions from cars in that year henceforth (Reuters, 2021).

The EU policy on transport energy consumption is likely to force car manufacturers to transform their assembly lines to accommodate production of electric cars in the next decade. It is also likely to persuade other governments around the world along with regional multilateral bodies such as the AU, SACD and others to align their policies with the EU on the carbon free transportation energy consumption. In South Africa too, there has also been discernible movement both at motor industry level and regulatory level. Jagua South Africa has seen a R30 million infrastructure investment to accommodate the production of electric cars for the South African market, while Nissan and BMW also teamed up to build public electric car charging infrastructure across the country (Lilleike, 2021). At regulatory level, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC) set in motion the Auto Green Paper on the advancement of New Energy Vehicles to prepare the policy framework that will guide the future ubiquitous electric cars (Lilleike, 2021).

Many countries around the world are transitioning from coal powered electric power stations to a mix of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind energy sources. The transition at energy production level is happening simultaneously with the move from internal combustion engines, which are carbon fuel powered to electric cars. In 2011 South African media reported that Eskom along with the Department of Energy were piloting mini solar power stations, aimed for Eskom's internal use at its coal power stations (Fin24, 2011). The power utility Eskom hoped to learn the use of solar energy production and use from these pilot project, before attempting to embark on what it stated as its strategy, which was to replace its coal power station fleet with solar farms over time (Fin24, 2011). Eskom projects that Just Energy Transition (JET) will create in excess of 300 000 jobs when implemented in South Africa, which Eskom supports as it will be shutting down units of its coal powered power station fleet over the same period of transitioning to solar energy (Slater, 2021). As a monopoly power producer and distributor in South Africa, Eskom's embracing of the transition to renewable energy is an important aspect of the energy shift.

Renewable energy mix consists of both solar and energy as the leading sources of energy, replacing oil, and other old energy sources.

It is conceivable to think that before the first liquid fuel powered engine was patented, by Jean Joseph Etienne Lenoir in 1860 and unveiled for commercial use, other scientists too were working on perfecting this technology of the internal combustion engine that replaced earlier external combustion engines that had given the world steam engines (Forrest, 2019). But oil itself predates the invention of the internal combustion engine, which caused oil to become the dominant energy for more than a century. Louis Evans was able to locate oil deposits in California using the 1775 map (History, 2010). Oil went on to become an undisputed energy source that fueled human mobility globally. As early as 1933, American oil company, Standard Oil, was contracted to drill for oil in Saudi Arabia (History, 2010). It is not hard to see how oil, as a leading energy source, because a strategic resource important enough to drive geopolitical behaviour of many countries across the international political system. As a leading carbon energy, oil will be replaced by renewable energy sources in future because of the high level of emission polluting the atmosphere. Oil has dominated the entire 20th century and remains the dominant energy source for human mobility globally. South Africa continues to search for oil deposits on her shores, hoping to one day enjoy reasonably good supply of domestically sourced oil for her petroleum energy security. Calls by environmental activists and their organizations to decarbonize energy are louder and many governments are beginning to take early steps at policy level to prepare for a carbon free energy future. The EU is leading in this regard, with its proposal to cut emissions from the transport sector by one hundred percent, by 2035.

The few electric cars present on South African roads today recharge with electricity supplied through the national grid and generated largely from coal power stations among Eskom's fleet of such energy sources. The shift in energy consumption is, however, discernibly in motion. South African energy policy is evolving away from sole reliance of monopoly power supplier Eskom to a liberalized energy space in which Independent Power Producers (IPP) are to play a role. Government recently amended the policy or law that prohibited independent power production of more than one megawatt. The energy policy allows private entities to produce up to one hundred megawatts for own consumption, and companies classified as IPPs to produce power and sell to end users or consumers of electricity in South Africa (BusinessTech, 2021). This could mean that more energy consumed for human mobility through electric cars will also shift to renewable energy, as all IPPs offer renewable energy solution to the current energy problems in South Africa. Only 92 electric cars were sold in South Africa in 2020, representing 0.02% of total car sales in that yea. However, the South African government is planning to offer tax rebates on the production of electric cars, to mitigate the current prohibitive costs of owning electric cars (Daniel, 2021).

Some markets around the world, to which most of the vehicles assembled in South Africa are exported, are already developing policy frameworks towards banning cars with petrol and diesel engines, envisaged to be in force in the next decade (Daniel, 2021). These export markets will directly compel car manufacturing assembling cars in South Africa to invest in new assembly lines that will produce more and more electric cars for both domestic and the export market. The same factors will drive reduction in the dependency on oil. At political level, the change of status quo in oil energy security may reduce the strategic nature of oil as a resource for which South Africa currently frames its foreign policy to achieve. The uptake of renewable energy in South Africa will ultimately reduce the extent to which the need for oil energy security tilts South Africa's geopolitical relations in favour of oil exporting states. Even if South Africa eventually finds oil deposits, through its persistent explorations along the wild coast, the paradigm shift in energy towards renewables will not be reversed.

The persistence by the South African government to conduct seismic survey along the wild coast of South Africa, in an effort, to find oil and gas deposits has been met with stern objections from many environmental non-governmental organizations (NGO). Environmental activists are preventing global petroleum companies, Shell and Australian counterpart, Searcher Geodata, from carrying out seismic survey along the west coast of South Africa, through a myriad of protests actions and through courts, for which the companies are contracted by the South African government to look for oil and gas (Ngcuka, 2022). Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, defended government's position on the search for oil in the wild coast by labeling the protests by environmental NGOs as "apartheid and colonialism of a special type, masqueraded as a great interest for environmental protection," and further referring to these objections by environmental activists as "relentless attacks on oil and gas development in South Africa," according to (Bega, 2021).

These developments around South Africa's continued search for oil and the stern manner in which the government is prepared to deal with objections betray the sensitivity around government's need to deliver reliable energy security to the people of South Africa. It also affirms analysis of the view that to mitigate the status quo in which South Africa has no oil of its own to meet its oil energy security, Pretoria is likely to go out of her way to create better bilateral diplomatic relationships with oil exporting states to ensure it meets the domestic oil energy security. It is also plausible to believe of hold a view that oil is the kind of strategic resource for South Africa that would induce the country's foreign policy to tilt in favour of the countries that can provide South Africa with oil. Shell South Africa supported Government position by stating in an open letter published in the Sunday Times newspaper that oil resources, if found through the seismic survey, would make a significant contribution to South Africa's energy independence (Bega, 2021). Shell's statement also affirms the argument that if oil energy independence is not found, through South Africa's own oil, the country will continue in the undesirable trajectory in which it is compelled by the need for better oil energy security to form relations with other countries that are driven by the need for oil supply.

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